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External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

Ada Huibregtseab
a
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee b University of New York, Tirana
Online publication date: 25 August 2010
To cite this Article Huibregtse, Ada(2010) 'External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict', International Interactions, 36: 3, 265 —
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International Interactions, 36:265–293, 2010
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502447
External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict
ADA HUIBREGTSE
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and
University of New York, Tirana
Recently, ethnicity has received greater attention from interna-

tional conflict scholars. This study explores a new aspect of how
ethnic composition of states and the power of ethnic kin affect
external state interventions in ethnic conflicts. Here it is hypoth-
esized that states with dominant ethnic groups but still-significant
Downloaded By: [Hyso, Ada] At: 16:46 26 August 2010
ethnic minorities are expected to be more prone to intervention

in ethnic conflict than states without one of these two charac-
teristics. A new measure is proposed to capture such variation
in ethnic composition more precisely. Looking at large-N panel
data, it is found that ethnically fractionalized states with dominant
ethnic groups are indeed the most likely to intervene in ethnic con-
flicts. Additionally, the power of the embattled ethnic kin minority,
as determined by its settlement patterns in the host state, also
increases the likelihood of intervention. Traditional variables like
proximity and capability retain statistical significance. However,
ethnic variables have the strongest effects on interventions in ethnic
conflict.
KEYWORDS ethnic conflict, ethnic diversity, ethnic domination,

international intervention, settlement patterns
Ethnic civil war and conflict are a continuing threat to peace and security
in the international system. Sometimes they cause instability as a result of
conflict diffusion and spillover across international borders. The focus of this
study is on ethnic civil conflicts as a target of external state interventions.
Serbia and Croatia intervened militarily in the Bosnian conflict in support of
their co-ethnics. Pakistan has intervened in India over the Kashmir region
The author would like to thank Shale Horowitz for his valuable suggestions and support, Tobin
Huibregtse for proof-editing this article several times, and the reviewers for their constructive and helpful
comments.
Address correspondence to Ada Huibregtse, University of New York, Tirana, Rr: Komuna
e Parisit, Tirana, Albania. E-mail: adahuibregtse@unyt.edu.al
265
266 A. Huibregtse
several times over the last 60 years. Somalia also intervened on several occa-
sions in Ethiopia, supporting the Somalis in the Ogaden region. Other states
with the opportunity to intervene in these ethnic conflicts have not inter-
vened. Does ethnicity—ethnic composition in the state and ethnic kinship
with groups in other states—make some states more prone than others to
intervene in ethnic conflicts? There are several reasons for examining this
question: there exist lacunae in studying the role of ethnicity in intervention
in ethnic conflict; several dimensions of ethnicity either in the interven-
ing or the target state are likely to influence the decision to intervene;
and enhanced understanding of such interventions can help policymakers
formulate appropriate and effective preventive and state-building policies.
While international conflict scholars have examined the conditions
that affect state intervention in all civil or internal conflicts (Collier and
Hoffler 2004; De Soysa 2002; Heraclides 1990; Krain 2005; Mitchell 1970;
Pickering 2002; Regan 2002). Only a few scholars have studied inter-
ventions in ethnic conflicts in particular (Carment and James 1997, 2004;
Krain 2005; Saideman 2002; Saideman and Ayres, 2008). This study builds
on earlier ones by examining additional effects of ethnicity on inter-
vention, and by expanding the range of data analysis over time and
space.
The main argument here is that ethnically-diverse states dominated by
a large ethnic group are most prone to intervene in civil ethnic conflicts.
This state type has the ability to make a decision to intervene in ethnic con-
flicts, as well as a stronger motivation to do so. Ethnically diverse states with
no large dominant ethnic group have more difficulty reaching a decision to
intervene. Ethnically homogenous states are able to make decisions, but are
less likely to be motivated to intervene. The ethnically diverse state with a
large dominant ethnic group is captured quantitatively by a new measure,
which modifies the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman Concentration Index.
This is the first study to use such an improved method of measuring ethnic
composition to hypothesize and confirm that ethnically-diverse states domi-
nated by one ethnic group are indeed more prone to intervention than other
state types.
A second element of ethnicity investigated here is cross-border ethnic-
ity. Carment and James (1997), Moore and Davis (1998), Saideman (2002),
Toft (2002), and Carment, James, and Taydas (2006) have explored this link.
All these studies hypothesize and find that ethnic groups across borders
increase the likelihood of interstate conflict, external intervention or inter-
vention hostility. The present study simultaneously takes into account the
link between the large dominant ethnic group in the intervening state and
its ethnic kin in the target state, and the power of the ethnic kin captured by
its settlement patterns. The presence of geographically concentrated ethnic
kin is expected to increase the probability of intervention to a greater extent
than the presence of geographically dispersed ethnic kin. Domestic politics
External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict 267
conditioned by the nature of the regime, along with geographic contiguity

and dyadic power relations, are also included in the analysis.
To test the hypothesized relationships, I use a large-N, cross-national,
longitudinal dataset (1946–2000). The statistical results obtained using rare
events logit support the hypotheses of this study. The variable represent-
ing the state type has the most powerful explanatory power in the model,
confirming the expectation that ethnically fractionalized states with large
dominant ethnic groups are more prone to intervene in ethnic conflicts than
other state types. Cross-border ethnic kinship is distinctly important when it
is concentrated rather than dispersed.
I begin by reviewing the existing literature on intervention in civil
conflicts and civil ethnic conflicts, identifying strengths and weakness in
the subfield. Then I present the theoretical argument and the hypotheses
derived from it. This is followed by a description of data and research design.
Findings and conclusions are set out in the last sections.
ETHNICITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL

CONFLICT LITERATURE
Existing approaches to intervention in ethnic conflicts take two main forms.

One approach studies interventions into civil conflicts, thus putting ethnic
conflicts and revolutionary wars into one category (Bull 1984; Cooper and
Berdal 1993; Heraclides 1990; Regan 1998, 2002). This approach suggests
that the nature of the conflict has no substantial effect on a state’s decision
to intervene. Intervention is assumed to depend on a cost-benefit calcula-
tion with regard to either national interest (Bull 1984; Cooper and Berdal
1993; Feste 2003; Heraclides 1990) or decision-makers’ interest in keeping
power (Bueno De Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Carment et al. 2006; Findley
and Teo 2006; Regan 1998, 2002). A growing number of scholars believe
that domestic factors affect the decision-making calculations about whether
to intervene in a civil conflict of ethnic or nonethnic nature (Blechman 1995;
Carment et al. 2006; Pickering 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2009; Regan
1998, 2002). Regan models state cost-and-benefit decision-making process,
but the empirical test of domestic factors is somewhat indirect and statisti-
cally insignificant, while ethnic variables are not included in the intervention
models, so no conclusions can be drawn about the effects of ethnicity on
intervention.
The other approach studies interventions in internal ethnic conflicts sep-
arately from other forms of civil wars. This approach argues that ethnicity
is an enduring identity that has the ability to sustain sociopolitical move-
ments, which are likely to be more resilient and persistent than movements
based solely on class identity and material or political interests (Geertz 1973;
Gellner 1993; Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; Shils 1957; Smith 2000; Van Evera
268 A. Huibregtse
1997); and that ethnicity enters foreign policy decision-making calculations

(Carment et al. 2006; Moore and Davis 1998; Saideman 1997). Because the
nature and properties of ethnic conflicts are different from those of revolu-
tionary wars, it is important to distinguish between interventions in the two
types of conflict.
A number of studies focus on ethnicity as a crucial characteristic of
the state, affecting its behavior and decision-making toward other states in
the international system (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Carment and James
1997; Davis and Moore 1997; Marshall 1997; Mullenbach 2005; Saideman
1997; Saideman 2002; Stack 1997; Trumbore 2003; Woodwell 2004). Variables
not previously considered in theories of interstate war were deemed impor-
tant. Such variables include ethnic demographics, cross-border ethnicity,
ethnic objectives, and ethnic discrimination and grievances.
Ethnic alliance and cross-border ethnicity are the most commonly
included theoretical concepts in studies of interstate ethnic conflict. The
argument is that, for either affective or instrumental reasons, an ethnic group
in one state is likely to help its embattled ethnic kin in another state. Mitchell
(1970) argues that affective linkages between the potential intervenor and
the embattled group are significant for understanding intervention in internal
conflict. Several studies support the claim that shared ethnicity increases the
likelihood of interstate conflict, particularly when it includes an at-risk ethnic
minority. Moore and Davis (1998) and Henderson (1997) have found that
dyads with shared ethnic and cultural groups experience less cooperative
relationships and more conflictual interactions. Saideman (2002) concludes
that ethnic ties affect the state’s foreign policy, while the existence of ethnic
kin in a neighboring state increases the likelihood of ethnic secessionism and
irredentism. Trumbore (2003) shows that a divided ethnic group increases
the probability of hostility intensity, but not that of the first use of force.
Within the internal ethnic conflict literature, ethnic state composi-
tion variables have yielded contradictory results. Ethnic fractionalization
as an element of ethnic composition is often considered to have conflict-
stimulating effects at the domestic level and conflict-dampening effects at
the international level. Almond (1956) posits a relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and increased levels of internal conflict. Ethnic conflict man-
agement becomes more difficult as the number of ethnic groups increases,
because intergroup cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of
participants increases. Sambanis (2001) and Ellingsen (2000) also suggest
that greater ethnic fractionalization is associated with a higher probability of
internal conflict. De Soysa (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) find that economic variables have a considerably stronger
effect on the likelihood of civil wars than ethnic fractionalization, and sug-
gest that ethnic fractionalization is not a good predictor of internal conflict.
At an international level, highly ethnically fragmented states are expected
to venture fewer interventions in ethnic conflicts due to decision-making

difficulties (Carment et al. 2006; Marshall 1997; Woodwell 2004).
While several theoretical and qualitative works indicate that ethnicity is
an important element in explaining intra- or interstate violence, the quan-
titative measures capturing dimensions of ethnicity have not always lent
support to them. The concept of ethnic fractionalization has been criticized
by Reynal-Querol (2002), Posner (2004), Cederman and Girardin (2007), and
Ellingsen (2000). Attempts to capture dimensions of ethnicity quantitatively
have mostly focused on internal civil and ethnic conflicts. The interstate
conflict literature, however, has seen fewer attempts to quantify dimen-
sions of ethnicity or to apply those already in use in the internal conflict
literature.
The relation between interstate ethnic conflict and democratic dyads is
another element of the ethnic conflict literature that is unsettled. Henderson
(1997) and Moore and Davis (1998) find that ethnically similar or dissimilar
democratic states have less conflictual relations. Similar results have been
found by Saideman (2002). Carment and James (2004), however, conclude

that countries with high political constraints (including democracies), domi-
nated by one ethnic group, are the second most likely to intervene in ethnic
conflicts. In these states, “the electoral support of primary ethnic groups
is crucial to gaining and retaining power. Awareness at this point means
that elites respond to surges of nationalism at the grassroots level out of
fear that they otherwise will be replaced” (p. 22). Mansfield and Snyder
(2005) suggest that incomplete democratization is a reason for increased
interstate war.
The interstate ethnic conflict literature also needs to include a concept
of settlement patterns of ethnic groups, as this affects the legitimacy and
the power of the embattled ethnic group. In the internal ethnic conflict
literature, Toft (2002) finds that concentrated regional majorities are more
likely to engage in ethnic violence than minority populations concentrated
in urban areas, or regionally concentrated minorities, or minorities dispersed
among the larger population.
To summarize, the literature on intervention in ethnic conflicts has not
produced robust results. There is a need to examine further the elements
of ethnicity that affect intervention. An in-depth analysis of the ethnic com-
position of the intervening state and the ethnic settlement patterns of the
minority ethnic group in the host state will enhance our understanding of
how ethnic demography affects the probability of interventions. By studying
these concepts, I expect to shed light on dimensions of ethnicity that either
have not been previously studied, or have not been studied from this per-
spective. By adding ethnicity variables to the traditional conflict variables,
such as power relations, regime type, and geographic location, it should be
possible to explain a higher proportion of variation in interventions in civil
ethnic conflicts.
270 A. Huibregtse
ETHNICITY AND INTERVENTIONS
Interventions in an internal ethnic conflict can be of a military, economic or

diplomatic nature. Military intervention is the focus of this study. A decision
to commit militarily has higher stakes for the intervenor and is characterized
by different domestic and international dynamics than imposing economic
sanctions or intervening diplomatically. In this study, intervention in ethnic
conflict is defined as military action undertaken against a foreign government
that is in conflict with an ethnic group.
Following Bueno De Mesquita and Lalman (1992), it is assumed that
the basic interaction of international affairs occurs within a state dyad or
between two states. This assumption, rather than ignoring domestic struc-
tures and actors in each member of the state dyad, highlights the importance
of taking into consideration relevant structures and actors in both states. In
the present study, states are assumed to be rational actors that make goal-
oriented decisions (Bueno De Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Regan 1998, 2002).
Whether the goal is maximization of national interest as defined by the lead-

ers, state welfare and security, or the maximization of personal or group
power, or a combination of both, decisionmakers will take actions that they
believe will yield the highest expected utility. Although state’s chief execu-
tive, regardless of institutional structure, has the ultimate power to make the
decision to initiate or stop involvement in an ethnic conflict in another state,
this study recognizes that this decision is an outcome of complex interac-
tions of relevant domestic political actors and reflects to a great degree those
actors’ power within the political system.
Ethnicity is a powerful attribute of a state that has the potential to cre-
ate cleavages within the political and social structure of that state and affect
political preferences of decisionmakers. Fishman (1976:5) views ethnicity
as “the maximal case of socially organized intimacy and kinship experi-
ence.” Ethnic ascription provides its membership benefits and services at
both individual and group level. Horowitz (1985:42) argues that ethnic-
ity meets “the need for familiarity and community, for family-like ties, for
emotional support and reciprocal help, and for mediation and conflict res-
olution.” It would be irrational for rational decisionmakers, even if they are
purely instrumentalist, not to include ethnicity in their decision calculus.
ETHNIC DOMINATION AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY—A STIMULUS

FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
States often consider whether they should intervene in an ethnic conflict

occurring in another state. Mitchell (1970:170) argues that intervention in
civil conflicts depends on four main factors: “factors within the ‘disrupted
state’; factors within the intervening state; factors associated with the links
between the domestic group seeking external assistance, and the external
parties that are either appealed to, or become involved . . .; and factors
in the international system.” This study focuses mainly on the second and
third factors, while accounting for the other two. Thus, intervention will
be dependent on five main determinants: the intervener’s ability to make
a decision; the intervener’s motivation for intervening; presence or absence
of an ethnic alliance with capable kin; regime type in the intervening and
target states; and power relations between the potential intervener and the
target state.
The state ability to make a decision will be dependent on the number of
veto players1 with divergent preferences (Tsebelis 2002). As the number of
veto players with divergent preferences increases, the probability of finding
a policy that satisfies the preferences of all veto players decreases. The
ethnic makeup and interethnic relations within the potential intervening state
become particularly important when the decision to intervene concerns an
ethnic conflict, because they can create conditions for the emergence of
ethnic veto players (e.g., Horowitz 1985, Saideman 1997) and affect the
decision and motivation to intervene.
Ethnically homogenous states are less likely to have multiple ethnic veto
players. So a decision to intervene in an ethnic conflict will not be impeded
by the emergence of ethnic veto players. At the same time, homogenous
states are not immune from ethnic politics. The existence of an ethnically
similar group in another country may provide a motive for intervention.
In ethnically fractionalized polities, veto players are likely to consolidate
along ethnic lines. “Where ethnic loyalties are strong, parties tend to organize
along ethnic lines for much the same reasons that other organizations, such
as trade unions, social clubs, chambers of commerce, and neighborhood
associations, tend to be ethnically exclusive” (Horowitz 1985:293). When
issues of an ethnic nature are brought into the political or public arena, dif-
ferent political players tend to merge into and consolidate alliances within
their ethnicity, thus creating ethnic veto players with divergent preferences.
The number of veto players will be dependent on ethnic fractionalization
and the ability of each ethnic group to become a veto player in the polit-
ical arena. Different ethnic veto players, having competing interests, make
decision gridlock more likely, and an agreement to intervene less likely.
However, even in highly ethnically fractionalize states, there are some-
times large ethnic groups that dominate state institutions.2 In 67% of the
1
A veto player is an individual or a collective actor that participates in the decision-making institutions,
has divergent preferences from other veto players, is a cohesive actor, and has the ability to stop the
decision.
2
The size of the ethnic group is a proxy measure of group power within the state. There are examples
of ethnic minorities dominating political, economic and cultural life, such as Sunni in Iraq before 2003
or ‘Alawis in Syria. However, such examples are rare.
272 A. Huibregtse
countries included in the analysis of this study, the largest ethnic group con-
sists of 60% or more of the total population. In such conditions, other ethnic
groups are not in a position to act as veto players because they are unlikely
to have a strong influence in decision-making institutions. The large domi-
nant ethnic group does not necessarily need the consent of smaller ethnic
groups to intervene in an ethnic conflict in another state, because it most
likely dominates the decision-making institutions, and therefore the proba-
bility of political gridlock is low. As with an ethnically homogeneous state,
this state type has the ability to make a decision.
In order to understand better how ethnic demographics affect the
decision-making process, the presence of a large dominant ethnic group
in a state should be considered simultaneously with the degree of ethnic
fractionalization. This approach yields three different types of states (see
Figure 1). The Type A state has high ethnic fractionalization and a large
dominant ethnic group.3 The Type B state has low ethnic fractionalization
and a large dominant ethnic group.4 The Type C state has high ethnic
SIZE OF LARGEST ETHNIC GROUP

Large Ethnic Group Small Ethnic Group
Type A Type C
The more likely to intervene It is less likely to intervene in a
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX
in an ethnic conflict. civil ethnic conflict than Type A.

High
It has high motivation. It has high motivation.

It can reach a decision. It cannot reach a decision.
Type B Type D
It is less likely to intervene in Logically nonexistent.
a civil ethnic conflict than
Type A.
Low
It can reach a decision.

It has less motivation than
Type A.
FIGURE 1 The size of largest ethnic group and ethnic fractionalization.
3
Serbia and Montenegro was a Type A state. The ethnic fractionalization index is 0.56. The ethnic
minorities are as follows: Albanians 17%; Montenegrin 5%;, Hungarian 3%; and other ethnic minorities
(such as Roma, Turks, etc.) 11%. Serbs, however, make up 64% of the population.
4
Slovenia is a Type B state. The ethnic fractionalization index is 0.15. The ethnic minorities are Croats
1%; Serbs 0.5%; Hungarians 0.4%; Bosnians 0.3%; and others 5.8%. Slovenians make up 92% of the
population.
fractionalization and no dominant ethnic group.5 Containing a large dom-

inant ethnic group, Type A and B states are expected to be more able to
engage in interstate ethnic conflict than Type C states, because they can
make the decision unchallenged by ethnic veto players.
Examining the motivation for intervention, it can be argued that
between the three state types, Type A states have a greater motivation for
intervention than Type B and C states. The Type B state, the highly homoge-
nous state, may be motivated to intervene in an ethnic conflict in another
state if that conflict affects the security and national interests of the state,
or if that decision sustains the power of the decisionmakers. For example,
it is in the interest of the state not to allow a conflict to spill over into its
own territory, so it may therefore launch a preventive intervention. Several
reasoning paths suggest that intervention can result when kin are involved
in an ethnic conflict in the other state. The well-being of the kin outside
the mother state is often defined or perceived as an important component
of the national or state interest. The security of the kin in conflict becomes
part of domestic politics when parties in democratic polities or factions in

nondemocratic polities challenge the decisionmakers to intervene in sup-
port of their kin. Such conditions call for decisionmakers to be attentive
toward their constituency, and possibly to intervene militarily if deemed
necessary. As Carment et al. (2006) point out, “When the majority of the
electorate belongs to a single ethnic group, leaders are vulnerable to chal-
lengers who claim that the interests of this crucial constituency have been
betrayed” (p. 29). Thus, intervention can avoid ethnic outbidding (Devotta
2005; Gagnon 2004; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty 2008), while temporar-
ily creating in-group cohesion and closing up political schisms within that
polity. Another path to intervention may involve decisionmakers seeking to
divert audiences’ and/or political actors’ attention from unrelated domestic
problems (DeRouen 2000; Gagnon 2004; Gelpi 1997). Thus, to sustain the
internal status quo, the decisionmakers may have a strong motivation for
intervention. These sources of motivations also serve as such for ethnically
dominated fractionalized states or Type A states. As explained below, how-
ever, the dynamics and the intensity of motivation will be different from
those of Type B states.
The Type C state, which is highly ethnically fractionalized with no
ethnic group dominating the decision-making institutions, has motives to
intervene for security reasons, such as preventing a spillover or a demon-
stration effect in its own territory. If no ethnic kin is involved in the conflict
in the other state, the Type C states may also intervene to create cohesion
among different ethnic veto players. State motivation for intervention into
5
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a Type C state. The ethnic fractionalization index is 0.67. The ethnic minorities
are Bosnian Serbs 31.5%; Bosnian Croats 17.5%; and others (such as Turks, Roma, etc) 3%. Muslim
Bosnians, the largest ethnic groups, make up only 48% of the population.
274 A. Huibregtse
an ethnic conflict will be lower, however, than that of Type A state, when
the ethnic kin of one of the ethnic veto players is involved in the conflict. It
is more difficult to distinguish between the Type B and C states’ motivation.
The Type C state has stronger motivation to intervene in the absence of an
ethnic kinship between an ethnic veto player and the group in conflict. Yet,
such a kinship highly motivates singular ethnic veto players related to the
group in conflict to intervene in order to help its kin, to avoid in-group eth-
nic outbidding or to create in-group cohesion, while dissuading other ethnic
veto players and the state as an institution composed of all veto players.
The other ethnic veto players will tend to be more reluctant to depart from
the status quo (nonintervention), because such intervention can affect the
intrastate balance of power among the constituent ethnic groups. Thus, if an
ethnic conflict involving ethnic group a in state B is going on, state C has
a low probability of making a decision to get involved in this conflict if it
is highly ethnically fractionalized, and especially if it contains ethnic group
a. An involvement on the side of group a will be viewed as increasing the
power of group a in state C (which is assumed to be undesirable to other

ethnic groups). An involvement on the side of state B will be opposed by
ethnic group a and its allies, for it reduces the power of group a in state C.
This line of reasoning suggests that a state with a high level of ethnic frac-
tionalization is less motivated to intervene in another state’s internal ethnic
conflict.
Although one ethnic group dominates the state institutions in the Type
A state, the existence of several other ethnic groups can create a consistent
strain and lack of cohesion in the polity. For example, in Serbia, “two factors
which contributed to the great mobilizing potential of nationalism were ‘the
ethnic heterogeneity of the population of Serbia (a third of which is made
up of members of ethnic minorities) and long-standing tensions between
ethnic groups”’ (Goati 1995). The Type A state can be motivated to intervene
for the same reasons as the Type B state: security, responsibility to ethnic
kin, ethnic outbidding within the dominant ethnic group and/or in-group
cohesion. Motivation of the Type A state, however, is stronger than that of
the Type B and C states. When the ethnic conflict in the other state affects its
security either by spillover or demonstration effect, the ability to launch an
intervention and succeed can reinstate, sustain or strengthen the dominant
ethnic group’s standing among other groups. In the Type A state, there
are a number of ethnic groups that can potentially become veto players
in case of a schism within the dominant ethnic group. Signs of weakness
or indecision can be read by dominated ethnic groups as an opportunity
to launch their own projects ranging from gaining more power within the
polity to seceding from the state. This scenario may become more likely
if the dominant ethnic group does not attend to its embattled brethren.
Unwillingness to assist or inability to make a decision may create a window
of opportunity for potential ethnic veto players to press their claims. In such
a context, ethnic outbidding also is a much greater threat to the dominant

ethnic decision-making elites in the Type A state than in any other state type,
due to this constant possibility of weakened domination and pressing need
for in-group cohesion. Domestic considerations in the context of a Type A
state may make decisionmakers more risk averse, as they want to preserve
their power position. Risk aversion in domestic policy may translate into
risk acceptant behavior in foreign policy. In order to avoid lose of power,
decisionmakers may intervene in an ethnic conflict even when a successful
outcome is not ensured.
Additionally, the dominant ethnic group can use intervention to forge
alliances with ethnic groups whose interests are not entirely divergent to
close up some schism within the state polity. Times of military engagement
provide a conducive context for such alliances, for they improve the position
of the dominant ethnic groups and its allies while entrenching their power
over other ethnic groups with conflicting interests and goals.
Hypothesis 1: A Type A state, with high ethnic fractionalization and a large

dominant ethnic group, is more likely to intervene in a civil
ethnic conflict than any other state type.
HELPING YOUR OWN KIN: INTERVENTION

AND ETHNIC ALLIANCE
Ethnic kinship has been acknowledged as a driving force for intervention in

ethnic conflict (Carment and James 2004; Moore and Davis 1998; Saideman
and Ayres 2008; Woodwell 2004). Ties between an ethnic group in one state
and their ethnic kin in another create a potential cross-border alliance. This
alliance can function like other alliances. An ethnic group in one state will
help its ethnic kin in another state for reasons pertaining to the balance of
power and domestic politics. Additionally, kinship ties pertaining to national
interest also drive an ethnic group to help their embattled kin in another
state. An ethnic group controlling state power feels responsible toward its
brethren in another state, especially toward its beleaguered brethren, due to
a sense of belonging to the same ethnic group.
Substantial power control of decision-making institutions or, in other
words, dominance and a strong or singular veto player position is a neces-
sary condition for an ethnic group to have the ability to come to the help of
kin in conflict. A powerless ethnic kin group in the mother or another coun-
try is not expected to intervene. On the other hand, “Politicians may have
little choice if the kin are in trouble. Politicians will face greater pressure
from their competitors to take more aggressive foreign policies if they can
be accused of leaving their kinsman in harm’s way” (Saideman and Ayres
276 A. Huibregtse
2008:43–44). Furthermore, the ethnic kin in conflict with the state center
may be “very receptive to external support and intervention, and indeed
actively seek it” (Carment and Harvey 2001:19). Thus, a state may intervene
to detach territory populated by its kin from another state, to help them gain
independence, or to end their suffering and improve their status within the
other state.
There is one caveat: if a kin state considers only ethnic ties, it will
intervene to help their brethren at any cost and regardless of the other
factors. Power calculations are important. Kin states must consider if they are
powerful enough to ensure victory. The power of the potential intervener
vis-à-vis the target state is so important that Otte (1995) includes it in the
definition of intervention: “Military intervention is the planned limited use of
force for a transitory period by a state (or a group of states) against a weaker
state in order to change or maintain the target state’s domestic structure or to
change its external policies” (p. 18). In addition to its power versus the target
state,6 the potential intervening state will accrue the power of the embattled
ethnic kin as well.

The power capability of the group affects the likelihood of an exter-
nal intervention by affecting the political dynamics in the kin state and the
power capability ratio of the intervenor and target state. A somewhat pow-
erful group can make its concerns and goals public in a more efficient way,
thus affecting the domestic politics in the mother state or the state where
their kin hold power. A well-organized ethnic group has more to offer in
terms of manpower, available financial resources, population support on
the ground, and control over the contested territory.
The settlement patterns of an ethnic group can have a great effect on
that group’s power capability, on its influence on a potential intervenor’s
audience and political elites, and, as a result, an effect on the decision-
making outcome. The basic settlement pattern classification with particular
relevance to ethnicity is demographically-concentrated ethnic groups versus
demographically-dispersed ethnic groups. Ethnically concentrated settlement
patterns condition an ethnically exclusive social and political organization of
that group. In ethnically-concentrated territories, groups are more cohesive
and held together by dense networks of communication and interaction
(Gurr 1993:27). The activities of everyday life, business and social trans-
actions, cultural and religious activities, occur among people of the same
ethnicity. Mirroring that social organization, political parties, unions, inter-
est groups or other political players will emerge and operate along ethnic
lines. In ethnically dispersed territories, organization of political life along
ethnic lines is less likely or weaker, because it lacks the conditions and
6
The importance of power capability will be briefly discussed in the section discussing the control
variables.
infrastructure that breed and strengthen the strong political, social and
cultural organizations present in ethnically concentrated territories.
Territorially concentrated settlement patterns mean that an ethnic group
can build a stronger and more extensive organization to achieve its goals.
Resources are free of competing claims from other ethnic actors, so that
the ethnic group has greater control over assets.7 Existing dense social and
political networks serve as sources for recruiting members or fighters, raising
funds, and creating an effective communication system. Concentrated settle-
ment patterns suggest, if not complete control of territory, at least some
control of it. It also suggests deep knowledge of that territory, such as its
topography, social structure, and population distribution. A territorially con-
centrated population makes a stronger support base for fighters than those
in non-concentrated areas, for the population and the fighting organization
are more closely tied, and the cost of detecting rebels is higher. Toft (2002)
also finds that concentrated majorities’ claims on a contested territory have
the highest legitimacy, thus making it more difficult for the kin state and
population to overlook their aspirations and avoid involvement. In the field

of international relations, this relationship between the settlement patterns of
an ethnic group and the probability of intervention has not been examined
in large datasets.
Hypothesis 2: In decreasing order, an outside power is most likely to inter-

vene in an internal ethnic conflict if it involves a kin ethnic
group to its dominant ethnic group that is regionally concen-
trated; second most likely to intervene if it involves a kin ethnic
group to its dominant ethnic group that is not regionally con-
centrated; and least likely to intervene if there are no ethnic
kin involved in the internal ethnic conflict.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
Two main relationships are hypothesized in this study. First, an ethnically

fractionalized state with a large dominant ethnic group is more likely than
other states to intervene in a civil ethnic conflict. Second, the probability of
intervention in civil ethnic conflict increases if the embattled ethnic group
is geographically concentrated and ethnically related to the dominant ethnic
group in the potential intervening state.
The unit of analysis is the directed dyad. The analysis includes all
possible directed dyads from 1946 to 2001, in which an ethnic conflict
was ongoing in the target state. I consulted the Armed Conflict Dataset
7
For more on this issue see Tilly (1978).
278 A. Huibregtse
(Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002), the

Minorities at Risk project and a number of documents for data on ethnic
conflict occurrence. The EUGene v 3.1 software (Bennett and Stam 2000)
was used to generate data on Militarized Interstate Disputes (Ghosn, Palmer,
and Bremer 2004),8 contiguity (Stinett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman
2002), and capability (Singer, Bremer, and Stackey 1972). Data on ethnic
fractionalization, size of the largest ethnic group in the state, and settlement
patterns are drawn from the CIA Factbook, the Handbook of the Nations
(various years), the Britannica Book of the Year, and several case studies
and documents. Data on regime type are taken from the POLITY IV Project.9
Dependent Variable
To conduct the test of the hypothesized relationships, we need to construct
a variable representing state military intervention in ethnic conflict, opera-
tionalized as initiation of a new militarized interstate dispute (MID) against
another state that is experiencing ethnic conflict. Using EUGene v.3.1., ver-
sion three of the Interstate Militarized Disputes data (Ghosn, Palmer, and
Bremer, 2004), I generate a dichotomous variable measuring all new directed
MIDs taking the value 1 if a MID was initiated and 0 if no MID was initiated.
A subset of this variable was created to capture the presence of an ethnic
conflict in the target state. Only MIDs initiated against states experiencing
an ethnic conflict take a value of one; all other observations take the value
zero. A MID take several forms short of war, ranging from “display of threat,
to display of military force to the use of military force short of war by one
member state explicitly directed toward the government, official representa-
tives, official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones, Bremer,
and Singer, 1996:168). Therefore, I create two dichotomous variables. One
includes military interventions that include all forms of a MID or that have
reached a hostility level10 equal or greater than two. The other variable, mil-
itary interventions in which force has been used, eliminates the two events
that fall short of using military force: threat and display of military force or
that consists of all MIDs that have reached a hostility level of four or five.
Explanatory Variables
The primary independent variable for this study is the ethnic domination-
fractionalization index for the intervening state. This measure distinguishes
8
Sullivan and Koch (2009) have created a new dataset, which focuses on military intervention by powerful
states only, therefore doe not fit well the purpose of this study.
9
Polity VI data can be accessed at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data.
10
The hostility level variable takes on a value of “0” if there is no conflict; “1” if there was not militarized
action during the dispute; “2” if there is a threat of force by a party to the dispute; “3” if there is a display
of force; “4” if there is some use of force, and “5” when a war occurs.
between the Type A state on the one hand, and the Type B and C states
on the other. This is a continuous variable accounting for the state type.
The standard ethnic fractionalization measure (discussed below) somewhat
masks the presence of a large ethnic group able to make decisions despite
the presence of contending ethnic groups. For example, from 1991 until
2001, Yugoslavia has an ethnic fractionalization score of .56, which indicates
a high degree of ethnic fractionalization. However, the largest ethnic group,
the Serbs, comprised 64% of the total population. State decision-making
organized along ethnic lines ensures that the Serb majority can pursue its
goals without having the consent of other ethnic groups. To capture the pres-
ence of this type of state (Type A versus B and C), the following modified
Herfindahl-Hirschman formula is used:
Formula I. Ethnic Domination Fractionalization Index11

n
EDF = 1 − sij2 lj
i=1
where sij is the population share of ethnic group i (i = 1, . . ., n) in state

j, and l is the population share of the largest dominant ethnic group in
state j. The properties of this formula capture the argument stated in this
article. Type A states will have the highest numerical value, expected to be
associated with the highest probability of intervention.
Ethnic fractionalization12 for the intervening state is a continuous vari-
able that indicates the degree of ethnic diversity in a state. There exist a
number of ethnic fractionalization indices (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Krain
2005; Taylor and Hudson 1972). Here the Herfindahl-Hirschman Formula,13
also known as the concentration formula, is used as a foundation to
11
I also used data from Fearon and Laitin (2003) to compose the same index. The results using Fearon
and Laitin data are similar to those reported in this article using my data set, both in terms of direction
and statistical significance, so they are not reported here. I also used Reynal-Querol’s (2002) measure of
ethnic polarization designed to capture the potential for internal ethnic conflict. Unlike Fearon and Laitin’s
(2002) and my datasets, Reynal-Querol’s (2002) http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm dataset
excludes entire regions from the dataset, such as East Europe, the Former Yugoslavia, and the Former
Soviet Union, and states such as Eritrea and Albania. Therefore, it excludes a large number of states which
have either intervened in ethnic conflicts or have had the potential to intervene. When I included ethnic
polarization in my model, the ethnic domination-fractionalization index and ethnic settlement patterns
reflecting the two hypothesis of this study retain statistical significance and relative importance vis-à-vis
other variables. Ethnic polarization returns a negative sign, just like ethnic fractionalization.
12
Hereafter referred to as fractionalization.
13
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Concentration Index of ethnic diversity measures as follows. An ethnic
concentration index is calculated as the sum of squares of the population shares of the ethnic groups.
The concentration index is then subtracted from 1. The resulting fractionalization measure is continuous
and varies from “0” to “1.”
280 A. Huibregtse
construct a fractionalization index that accounts for ethnic cleavages14 and

gives more weight to larger groups, covering the years from 1946 to 2001:
Formula II. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

n
EF = 1 − sij2
i=1
where sij is the population share of ethnic group i (i = 1 . . . n) in state j.

The score ranges from zero (the lowest level of fractionalization) to one
(the highest level). The correlation between Krain’s and this study’s index
for the 1946–1992 timeframe is 0.9, indicating high reliability of the data.15
A similar correlation with MAR data cannot be calculated, due to limited
MAR coverage of ethnic cleavages. The size of the largest ethnic group in the
intervening state16 is a continuous variable measured in percentage terms. It
varies from zero to one.
Ethnic kinship concentrated settlement is a dichotomous variable that
equals one if the dominant ethnic group in the potential intervening state
has ethnic kin in the host state that is geographically concentrated, and zero
otherwise. Ethnic kinship non-concentrated settlement is constructed as a
dichotomous variable that equals one if the ethnic kin is not geographically
concentrated, and zero otherwise. Absence of ethnic kinship is the residual
category.
Control Variables
A substantial body of quantitative cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis
has accumulated on the effects of regime characteristics on war and conflict.
Recent empirical research on interstate conflict and war posits that regime
similarity is conducive to peace (Bennett 2006; Gowa 1999; Peceny, Beer,
and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Peceny and Butler 2004; Werner 2000), suggest-
ing that there may be both a democratic peace17 and an autocratic peace.
Bennet (2006) finds that “dyads where both states share an extreme regime
type are much less conflict prone than either dyads with two mixed/middle
regimes, or where the two states differ in regime type.” These findings
are contradicted by Lektzian and Souva (2009), who find little support for
14
There are a number of ways of measuring ethnic cleavages in the literature. This article uses the concept
of “revealed ethnicity,” which uses empirical evidence rather than a priori assumptions to determine
which potential markets of ethnic identity are the most salient sources of ethnic cleavages in a given
country.
15
Krain (1997) uses the same formula.
16
Hereafter referred to as domination.
17
For more on democratic peace see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992); Bueno de Mesquita et. al.,
(1999); Maoz and Russett (1993); Dixon (1994); Senese (1997); Reed (2000). For more on democratic
peace and international ethnic conflict see Moore and Davis (1998); Henderson (1997).
a separate peace between different types of nondemocratic dyads18 ; and

Tangerås (2009), who finds the likelihood of interstate war to be lowest in
democratic dyads, and highest in the autocratic dyads, with the mixed dyads
in between.
Another direction of research exploring the relationship between regime
and interstate conflict and war focuses on the domestic institutions of the
intervenor or conflict initiator (Carment et. al. 2006; Mansfield and Snyder
2005; Ray 1995). Results from this line of research are mixed. While Ray
(1995) suggests that democracies are less likely to engage in international
conflict, others argue that democracies can initiate international conflicts.
For example, Carment et al. (2006) and Saideman and Ayres (2008) find that
democratic leaders are pressured by their constituencies to support their
embattled kin in another country. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) find democ-
ratizing regimes are more likely to fight wars than mature democracies and
stable autocracies, and more likely to be embroiled in ethno-nationalist wars.
It also appears that anocracies are more likely to be targets of interventions.
Two variables reflecting these dyadic regime relations will be included

in the model: the democratic and autocratic dyad. The anocratic and mixed
dyads are the residual category. To reflect the importance of political infras-
tructure in which the decision-making takes place, intervenor’s regime type
is also included. The POLITY IV dataset was used to generate the regime
type variable. The democratic dyad takes the value one if both countries in
the dyad have a democracy—autocracy score greater than or equal to six,
and takes the value zero otherwise. The anocratic dyad takes the value one
if both countries in the dyad have a democracy—autocracy score smaller
than negative five. It is coded zero otherwise.
The power of the potential intervenor relative to its target has been a
recurring theme of international conflict studies, resulting in several com-
peting theories. The balance-of-power theory maintains that imbalance of
power supports military intervention by increasing the likelihood of a suc-
cessful use of force from a strong state against a weaker one (Waltz 1979).
Alternative explanations maintain that power parity increases the proba-
bility of an interstate conflict (Bremer 1992; Geller 1993; Reed 2000). A
variable measuring the relative power in the dyad is constructed using the
Composite Indicator of National Capabilities19 scores to measure each state’s
power (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Then, the stronger state’s power
is divided by the sum of each state’s power. Lower values of this mea-
sure indicate power parity and higher values indicate a greater imbalance of
power in the dyad.
18
Lektazian and Suova (2009) find monarchies to share a separate peace at the conflict onset stage, but
no other nondemocratic dyad consistently does so.
19
Data for this variable are generated in EUGene v.3.1.
282 A. Huibregtse
Research on effects of geographic proximity and contiguity on interstate

conflict and war has produced consistent results. An internal ethnic conflict
provides an opportunity for all other states to intervene into it. However,
for geographically contiguous or proximate states, if interest and motivation
exist, a military intervention is less costly, therefore more likely to occur.
Noncontiguous states will need a higher power capability to consider inter-
vention. Thus, I created a dichotomous variable accounting for geographic
contiguity taking the value one if states are contiguous by land and zero
otherwise (Stinett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002).20
To control for effects that ethnic composition in the target state may
have on the dependent variable, the following two variables are included in
the model. Ethnic fractionalization for the target state is constructed in the
same way as ethnic fractionalization for the intervening state. The size of the
largest ethnic group in the target state is a continuous variable measured in
percentage terms. It varies from zero to one.
The nature of the dependent variable is the determining factor for the
statistical method used in this study. The intervention variable is a dichoto-

mous variable capturing a rare event: intervention. The number of zeros
in the dependent variable representing the absence of intervention is large,
and the number of ones representing interventions is very small. Here, rare
events logit is employed to correct for underestimation of the probability of
war and biased logit coefficients (King and Zeng 2001).
FINDINGS
The results from the rare event logit analyses are presented in Table 1. The
first column of the table lists the independent variables included in the mod-
els. The second and the third columns present the estimated coefficients of
independent variables for each dependent variable. The associated standard
errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. The presentation of results
also contains the following information: (1) the statistical significance of
coefficients; and (2) the direction of the independent variables’ impact on
the dependent variable.
The first hypothesis anticipates that domination of the polity by one
ethnic group in a highly ethnically fractionalized state (Type A state) will
20
Using EUGene v.3.1., I also generated a geographic contiguity as an ordinal variable where land
contiguity equals “1,” contiguous across up to 12 miles of water equals “2,” contiguous across 13–24
miles of water equals “3,” contiguous across 25–150 miles of water equals “4,” contiguous across 151–400
miles of water equals “5,” and not contiguous equals “6” (Stinett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman,
2002). In this case, we expect a negative relationship, where states that are closer to the target are most
likely to intervene. The results with contiguity as an ordinal variable are nearly identical to those with
the contiguity as a dichotomous variable, so they are not reported here. The results are available upon
request.
TABLE 1 Results of Rare Events Logit for Intervention in Ethnic Conflict
Military Military intervention:

Equation variables intervention use of force
Ethnic domination fractionalization 6.30∗∗∗ (1.37) 8.86∗∗∗ (1.46)

index in intervening state
Ethnic fractionalization in intervening −2.48∗∗ (.80) −2.84∗∗ (.83)
state
Ethnic fractionalization in target state 4.64∗∗∗ (1.00) 2.28∗ (1.03)
Ethnic domination in target state 7.71∗∗∗ (1.21) 5.51∗∗∗ (1.27)
Ethnic kinship concentrated 3.86∗∗∗ (.35) 3.75∗∗∗ (.38)
settlement patterns
Ethnic kinship non-concentrated 2.10∗∗ (.77) 1.66(.95)
settlement patterns
Regime in intervening state .09∗∗∗ (.01) .07∗∗∗ (.01)
Democratic dyad −.14(.28) −.90∗∗ (.38)
Autocratic dyad .13(.33) .37(.38)
Relative power in the dyad −1.58∗∗ (.62) −1.43∗ (.70)
Border 3.00∗∗∗ (.36) 3.56∗∗∗ (.45)
Constant −14.54∗∗ (1.28) −13.66∗∗∗ (1.37)
N 1152800 113891
∗∗∗ ∗∗
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Probability: p < .001; p < .01; ∗ p ≤ .05.
increase the likelihood of intervention in an ethnic conflict in another

state, as compared to domination of the polity by one ethnic group in a
highly homogenous state (Type B state) or absence of domination of a
polity by an ethnic group in a highly ethnically fractionalized state (Type
C state). The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the ethnic
domination-fractionalization21 index in both models—intervention including
actions from military threat to war and intervention in which force has been
used–indicates that ethnically dominated fractionalized states (Type A state)
indeed have a higher likelihood of intervening in internal ethnic conflicts
than other state types (B and C).
Construction of a baseline model that has low probability of inter-
vention will help us understand the effects of a specific variable or a
combination of variables on intervention, when these variables are assigned
values other than baseline ones. In the baseline model, domination frac-
tionalization and index regime in intervening state are set their minimal
values, all other continuous variables are held constant to the mean, and
all dichotomous variables are given the value zero. The expected probabil-
ity of intervention for the baseline model increases with 0.00001. When the
domination-fractionalization index is set to the maximum value represent-
ing a highly ethnically fractionalized state with a large dominant ethnic group
and the rest of variables are fixed to their baseline values, the probability
of intervention increases to 0.0037, representing 43 additional interventions.
21
Reynal-Querol has constructed a variable capturing http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/
284 A. Huibregtse
Using the concept of first difference,22 an ethnically dominated fractionalized

state will initiate 42 additional interventions when compared to the baseline.
These results confirm the hypothesis that ethnically diverse states with large
dominant ethnic groups have the highest probability of intervening in ethnic
conflicts compared to other state types.
Previous studies have found that high levels of ethnic fractionalization
correlate to lower levels of interstate conflict (Marshall 1997; Carment et al.
2006; Woodwell 2004). The results of this study do not disprove the pre-
vious findings. Coefficients for ethnic fractionalization are negative and
statistically significant in both models, indicating that intervener’s ethnic
fractionalization has a dampening effect on intervention in ethnic conflicts.
When ethnic fractionalization is set to its maximum value and the rest of the
variables are held to their baseline values, the probability of an intervention
is equal to that of the baseline model.
Turning to the effects of ethnic ties and ethnic settlement patterns, the
expectation is that ethnic ties affect the leaders’ decision to intervene in an
ethnic conflict (Moore and Davis 1998; Carment et al. 2006; Saideman and
Ayres 2008). However, the power of the ethnic kin in conflict as defined by
the settlement patterns, concentrated versus non-concentrated, is the most
important determinant. Statistically significant positive coefficients across all
models for the variable representing ethnic kin with concentrated settlement
patterns establishes a high probability relationship between concentrated
ethnic kin and external intervention. In the absence of ethnic ties between
the intervener and ethnic group in conflict, the probability of an intervention
is equal to that of the baseline model. When the concentrated settlement
pattern is set to one, the differential with the baseline model indicating an
absence of ethnic kin is 39 additional interventions.
Results tell another story about the influence of a non-concentrated
ethnic kin on the probability of interventions. The analysis return statistically
significant coefficient for non-concentrated kin only in the first model, which
includes display of threat, display of military force, use of force and war,
but not in the model that includes use of force. It seems that a powerless
ethnic group, with little legitimacy (Toft 2002) in the eyes of the intervener,
can expect support from their kin state to be limited to low hostility levels
rather than actual use of force or full-blown war. These variables account
to some degree for geographic contiguity since similar ethnic groups tend
to be contiguous. But the fact that geographically concentrated ethnic group
is significant even when controlling for geographic contiguity, indicates that
trans-state ethnicity has an independent effect on interventions in internal
ethnic conflict. Cross-border concentrated ethnic group kinship results are
as important as ethnic composition of the potential intervenor.
22
First difference is change in probability as a function of a change in a covariate (King and Zeng, 2001).
Consideration of the domination-fractionalization index simultaneously

with ethnic ties and settlement patterns paints a more dramatic and telling
picture. When the domination-fractionalization index is set to its maxi-
mum value and the concentrated ethnic settlement patterns is set to one,
the probability of intervention increases by 0.01523 or 1,750 more interven-
tions than when the ethnic kin is dispersed, and 1,754 more interventions
than when there are no ethnic ties involved. These results confirm not only
the importance of the intervenor’s ethnic composition and ethnic kin set-
tlement power, but also the importance of considering political and ethnic
dynamics in both intervening and target states. While the ties with an ethnic
concentrated kin affect the political dynamics in the potential intervenor, eth-
nically dominated fractionalized polities are particularly susceptible to such
influence.
The performance of the control variables reported in Table 1 provides
further insight about interventions in ethnic conflict. The coefficients cor-
responding to the relative power in the dyad are negative and statistically
significant across all models, seemingly supporting the power parity hypoth-
esis. Power parity in the dyad seems to add about 5 additional interventions
compared to the power preponderance which returns values equal to the
baseline model. We should exercise some caution here. The intervener
accrues the power of the ethnic group in conflict, which is not part of the
relative power variable, thus softening or emphasizing power differences
to some degree. Geographic contiguity, presenting an opportunity and/or
imposing less cost on the intervenor, increases the likelihood of conflict
and intervention. Indeed, the intervention differential between a contiguous
and a noncontiguous state is 32 additional interventions. Ethnic composi-
tion of the target state also has an effect on the likelihood of intervention.
High degrees of fractionalization and ethnic domination in the target state
are associated with a higher probability of intervention. Higher ethnic diver-
sity can breed internal ethnic conflict, thus presenting an opportunity for
outside states to intervene, and increasing the likelihood of such an inter-
vention. Ethnically dominant groups in ethnically fractionalized states may
be more inclined to aggressively suppress ethnic movements, thus making
ethnic conflict more visible and the state itself more vulnerable to outside
interventions.
The coefficients corresponding to the autocratic dyad are negative
as expected, but statistically insignificant across both models. Coefficients’
direction for the democratic dyad are consistently negative indicating that
democratic states are less likely to use force against each other. However,
this variable returns statistical significance only in the model accounting for
use of force, indicating that a democracy will not initiate a high hostility
intervention against another democracy. The variable capturing intervenor’s
regime type shows that democratic states are more likely than other states
to initiate interventions into ethnic conflicts. Such results should not be very
286 A. Huibregtse
surprising. The democratic peace effect is captured by the democratic dyad

variable, so this variable captures most likely democratic initiators versus
nondemocratic targets. Furthermore, democratic states, being more sensitive
regarding human and minorities rights than other state types, may have a
greater motivation and may show a greater willingness to intervene in such
cases.
The 1992 Bosnian conflict illustrates the theoretical argument and the
empirical results. After the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation, Bosnia and
Herzegovina became embroiled in an ethnic conflict involving the Bosnian
Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. According to Burg and Shoup
(2000:5), the Bosnian conflict revolved around “the right to claim the titular,
or state-constituting status (usually reserved for the majority group), and . . .
the rights that accrued to others (minority ethnic groups).” Bosnian Muslims
claimed the right to govern that country based on their pluralistic majority
(43% of the population). Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs could not claim
the right to govern based on numbers. However, neither Serbs nor Croats
were prepared to allow their status as constituent nations to be diminished to

that of ethnic minorities. Here, the possible intervention from other former
Yugoslav republics (the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia,
and Macedonia) is considered. The FRY dominated by the Serb majority is
a Type A state that has strong ethnic ties with the ethnically concentrated
Bosnian Serbs and is geographically contiguous to Bosnia. Bordering Bosnia,
Croatia is a Type B state dominated by Croats that has strong ethnic ties
with ethnically concentrated Bosnian Croats. The noncontiguous Slovenia is
a Type B state that has no ethnic ties to any ethnic group in Bosnia. Finally,
Macedonia is a noncontiguous Type A state that has no ethnic ties to any
ethnic group in Bosnia.
According to the theoretical arguments of this paper, Serbia will be
the most likely to intervene in the Bosnian conflict, followed by Croatia.
In fact, Serbia and Croatia, both more powerful militarily than Bosnia
and Herzegovina, were respectively ruled by diversionary and nationalist
governments avowing their support to their co-nationals in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Both countries faced highly nationalistic audiences. Serbia’s
decisionmakers, resisting loss of power, used nationalist policies to rally the
audience around the flag and maintain power. The new nationalist deci-
sionmaking elite in Croatia defined state interest in ethnic terms. Thus, two
different political paths, diversionary and nationalist policies, end in a similar
outcome: intervention to the Bosnian conflict. Macedonia, although a Type
B state, is expected to be less likely than Serbia and Croatia to intervene
in the Bosnian conflict, because it has no ethnic kinship with any group in
conflict, is not contiguous, and has little military power. Slovenia will be the
least likely to intervene, because in addition to no ethnic ties and noncon-
tiguity, it is a highly homogenous state with low motivation to get involved
in the conflict.
Based on our model, which also incorporates the effect of other,

less important factors, the probability differential of the Serbian military
intervention into the Bosnian conflict in 1992 is 0.1052 greater or 12,128
more interventions compared to Croatia; 0.19119 greater or 22,040 addi-
tional interventions compared to Slovenia; and 0.19102 greater or 22,021
additional interventions compared to Macedonia. Slovenia and Macedonia
have only 0.00012 and 0.00045 probability of intervening in Bosnia, com-
pared to Serbia with 0.19138 and Croatia 0.08760. The model predictions
are consistent with the history of the Bosnian conflict, in which there were
interventions from the FRY/Serbia and Croatia, but not from Macedonia and
Slovenia.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has presented a theoretical framework examining how ethnic

composition of a potential intervening state, as well as ethnic kinship and

settlement patterns of the ethnic kin in conflict, affect the state’s deci-
sion to intervene. Statistical analysis of dyadic behavior of all potential
dyads from 1946 to 2001 revealed that ethnically fractionalized states dom-
inated by a large ethnic group have the highest probability of intervening
in an internal ethnic conflict, as compared to highly ethnically homoge-
nous and highly ethnically fractionalized states with no dominant ethnic
group. The effect of ethnic fractionalization and ethnic domination by
themselves, while important, seem to be rather limited compared to the
domination-fractionalization index. Much more important is whether politi-
cal decisionmaking is dominated by a particular ethnic group, and whether
such a dominant group operates in a fractionalized ethnic environment.
Highly ethnically fractionalized states with no large ethnic group to domi-
nate political decisionmaking, or highly ethnically concentrated states with
a large, dominant ethnic group, are less likely to intervene in an internal
ethnic conflict.
Distinguishing between the geographically concentrated and non-
concentrated ethnic groups, the analysis show that ethnic groups that are
geographically concentrated are more likely to receive help from their
ethnically dominant kin in another state. By affecting the power and the
legitimacy of claims of ethnic groups, the settlement patterns also affect the
audience in the intervening state and that state’s power calculations. The
analysis also indicates that a combination of ethnically dominated fraction-
alized states with ties to a concentrated ethnic kin has a significantly larger
effect than each variable on its own.
The theory and analysis in this article suggest several implications
for policymakers interested in designing responses to interventions in
288 A. Huibregtse
ethnic conflict. First, intervention in ethnic conflict by highly ethnically

fractionalized states with a large ethnic group to dominate political decision-
making should not come as a surprise. Similarly, ethnically concentrated
groups should be expected to receive substantial support from their kin
states. Risk assessments including indicators capturing the two main con-
cepts discussed in this paper should be able to better predict potential
interveners and target states, thus giving individual states or international
organizations an opportunity either to design preventive policies targeting
the potential intervenor and/or the target state, to join the potential inter-
venor, or to support the target state, depending upon the chosen objectives.
Second, international actors involved in settlements of ethnic conflicts should
be cautious about how the arrangements they propose affect ethnic compo-
sition and ethnic settlement patterns. Creating new states or rearranging
existing states in such a way that these states resemble a Type A state (eth-
nically fractionalized but dominated by one ethnic group) is a recipe for
future interventions. Arrangements that establish or reinforce concentrated
ethnic minorities, especially such that have an ethnic kin state across the bor-
ders, create both a potential target state and a potential intervener. Having
these factors in mind, settlement negotiators should look for ways to avoid
the establishment of one veto player in an ethnically fractionalized soci-
ety. Also, concentrated ethnic groups whose concerns remain unaddressed
by peace settlements have the potential to mobilize and attract external
interventions.
Further exploration of the nature, causes, and context of external mili-
tary interventions in ethnic conflicts is necessary. Ethnic conflict and ethnic
ties have not gone away, and remain a concern for regional and interna-
tional peace and security. While parts of the world such as most Western
European states and some Eastern European states seem to have settled eth-
nic grievances and concerns to a large degree, other parts of the world are
still experiencing strong nationalist and ethnic upheavals. Rather than con-
demning ethnicity and its sometimes negative effects on peace and security,
we should try to understand it better and manipulate institutions and political
actions in such a way as to obtain positive outcomes.
Finally, there is still much room for the refinement of the concepts
and quantitative measures introduced in this article. In particular, a deeper
theoretical distinction between the Types B and C states and a measure
that captures this distinction is a useful direction for future research. A
lot of criticism about ethnicity variables comes from studies that lump
together all types of civil wars. The effects of ethnicity variables should
be expected to matter mostly in ethnic civil wars and little or none in non-
ethnic civil wars. We can juxtapose two models of external intervention in
civil wars—distinguishing between ethnic civil conflict and nonethnic civil
conflict subsample—in order to understand such an effect.
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External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

Recently, ethnicity has received greater attention from interna-

ethnic minorities are expected to be more prone to intervention

KEYWORDS ethnic conflict, ethnic diversity, ethnic domination,

conditioned by the nature of the regime, along with geographic contiguity

ETHNICITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL

Existing approaches to intervention in ethnic conflicts take two main forms.

1997); and that ethnicity enters foreign policy decision-making calculations

to venture fewer interventions in ethnic conflicts due to decision-making

found by Saideman (2002). Carment and James (2004), however, conclude

ETHNICITY AND INTERVENTIONS

Interventions in an internal ethnic conflict can be of a military, economic or

Whether the goal is maximization of national interest as defined by the lead-

ETHNIC DOMINATION AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY—A STIMULUS

States often consider whether they should intervene in an ethnic conflict

SIZE OF LARGEST ETHNIC GROUP

in an ethnic conflict. civil ethnic conflict than Type A.

It has high motivation. It has high motivation.

It can reach a decision.

FIGURE 1 The size of largest ethnic group and ethnic fractionalization.

fractionalization and no dominant ethnic group.5 Containing a large dom-

part of domestic politics when parties in democratic polities or factions in

power of group a in state C (which is assumed to be undesirable to other

a context, ethnic outbidding also is a much greater threat to the dominant

Hypothesis 1: A Type A state, with high ethnic fractionalization and a large

HELPING YOUR OWN KIN: INTERVENTION

Ethnic kinship has been acknowledged as a driving force for intervention in

ethnic kin as well.

population to overlook their aspirations and avoid involvement. In the field

Hypothesis 2: In decreasing order, an outside power is most likely to inter-

RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY

Two main relationships are hypothesized in this study. First, an ethnically

(Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002), the

where sij is the population share of ethnic group i (i = 1, . . ., n) in state

construct a fractionalization index that accounts for ethnic cleavages14 and

where sij is the population share of ethnic group i (i = 1 . . . n) in state j.

a separate peace between different types of nondemocratic dyads18 ; and

Two variables reflecting these dyadic regime relations will be included

Research on effects of geographic proximity and contiguity on interstate

statistical method used in this study. The intervention variable is a dichoto-

TABLE 1 Results of Rare Events Logit for Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

Military Military intervention:

Ethnic domination fractionalization 6.30∗∗∗ (1.37) 8.86∗∗∗ (1.46)

increase the likelihood of intervention in an ethnic conflict in another

Using the concept of first difference,22 an ethnically dominated fractionalized

Consideration of the domination-fractionalization index simultaneously

surprising. The democratic peace effect is captured by the democratic dyad

were prepared to allow their status as constituent nations to be diminished to

Based on our model, which also incorporates the effect of other,

This article has presented a theoretical framework examining how ethnic

composition of a potential intervening state, as well as ethnic kinship and

ethnic conflict. First, intervention in ethnic conflict by highly ethnically

Almond, G. (1956) Comparative Political Systems. Journal of Politics 18(3):391–409.

Smith. (1999) An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American

Fishman, Joshua A. (1976). Language and Ethnicity. Paper presented at a conference

States 1945–2003. Journal of Peace Research 46(5):707–718.

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