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Documente Cultură
Schutzian Research
It is an annual journal that seeks to continue the tradition of Alfred Schutz.
It seeks contributions that are philosophical, cultural-scientific,
or multidisciplinary in character.
Vol. 1 / 2009
¤
IN MEMORY OF MARY ROGERS
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Monique Coutinho da Silva & Florence Romijn Tocantins
Necessidades do familiar no cuidado ao cliente
com insufuciência renal crônica: uma perspectiva para a enfermagem . . . . . 11
George Berguno & Nour Loutfy
A Phenomenological Study of Sudanese Children’s Experience
of Seeking Refuge in North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Bernhard Waldenfels
Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Wei-Lun Lee
心理治療的倫理現場:反面置身的抵達 (Psychotherapy as a Locale
for Ethical Care:The Reaching into Situated Negativity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Mary F. Rogers
Constituted to Care: Alfred Schutz and the Feminist Ethic of Care. . . . . . . . 85
Thomas Luckmann
Reality as Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Sungtae Lee
In Search of Cosmopolitan Space: A Case for Human Plurality . . . . . . . . . 113
Nam-In Lee
Husserl의 현상학과 Schutz의 현상학적 사회학
(Husserl’s Phenomenology and Schutz’s Phenomenological Sociology) . . . . . 129
Kenneth Liberman
The Itinerary of Intersubjectivity in Social Phenomenological Research. . . . .149
Lester Embree
Economics in the Context of Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Science . . . . . . . . . . 165
Chung-Chi Yu
舒茲的社會理論思想:從胡塞爾的現象學心理學來看
(The Social Theory of Schutz and Phenomenological Psychology). . . . . . . . 177
Denisa Butnaru
Typification and Phantasia:
New Possibilities for an Ontology of the Lebenswelt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Pablo Hermida Lazcano
Relevancias y planes de vida en el mundo sociocultural. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Alfred Schutz
Journal
(translated by Evelyn S. Lang)
Private Family Journal of First Trip to the
United States of America in 1937 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Alfred Schutz
Understanding, Self-reflection and Equality: Alfred Schutz’s Participation
in the 1955 Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion
Edited with an Introduction by Michael Barber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
introduction
This first issue of Schutzian Research exemplifies the kind of interests that
one finds in its statement of purpose:
Schutzian Research seeks contributions that are philosophical, cultural-
scientific, or multidisciplinary in character. We welcome a broad
spectrum of qualitative and interpretive work, comparable with Alfred
Schutz’s orientation but not necessarily derived from it. The journal is
multilingual in character, with abstracts in English.
Several of the contributions to this first edition are multidisciplinary in
character. For instance, Monique Silva and Florence Tocantins’s “Necessidades
do familiar no cuidado ao client com insufuciência renal crônica: uma per-
spectiva para a enfermagem” investigates the subjective point of view of the
family members of clients with Chronic Renal Insufficiency (CRI) in he-
modialytic treatment and supports nurse action of behalf of both the client
and the client’s family members. In a similarly fine synthesis of Schutzian
philosophy with qualitative research, George Berguno and Nour Loutfy, in
their essay “A Phenomenological Study of Sudanese Children’s Experience of
Seeking Refuge in North Africa,” study narratives of refugee children in Egypt
and draw on contemporary psychological studies of refugees as well as on
George Herbert Mead’s notion of the “generalized other.” The authors re-
cord children’s reactions to such factors as: architecture, the moral behaviours
of the host country, technology, family, discrimination, street violence, and
language; in sum, the authors “give voice to children’s experience of being a
stranger.” In “Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry,” Bernhard Waldenfels
begins with the extraordinary experience of the Other before considering psy-
chiatry, which confronts us with a peculiar pathological otherness, doubled
when it comes to ethnopsychiatry. The latter discipline raises questions about
how psychiatry can take account of the intercultural Other without sacrific-
ing its otherness to universal points of view, about how intercultural otherness
affect our intracultural otherness, or about whether there might be an alterna-
tives to the anti-other extremes of fundamentalism and globalism. Wei-Lun
Lee’s “Psychotherapy as a locale for ethical care: The reaching into situated
negativity” conceives therapeutic interactions between therapist and client as
8 Michael D. Barber
a matter of ethical care, a “talking” into bodily experience, that seeks not to
cancel negativity but to appreciate it as a source for new ways of existing.
Though several of the other papers in this volume represent the kind of
indisciplinarity typical of the Schutzian outlook, several papers take a par-
ticularly cultural scientific orientation. Mary F. Rogers’s “Constituted to Care:
Alfred Schutz and the Feminist Ethic of Care” illustrates how Schutz’s work
can enrich feminist theory. Rogers shows how Schutz’s views on the need
for revisable typifications and the We-relationship converge with the thought
of 19th century North American feminists and how Schutz’s theory of en-
claves, Carol Gilligan’s idea of “voice,” and the writings of nurses and health
care professionals can be used to clarify the experience of carer and cared-for
when they are catapulted into the enclave of the “medical world.” Thomas
Luckmann in “Reality as Work” relies upon phenomenological analyses to
distinguish key concepts such as action (Handeln), working (Werken), and
work (Arbeit), and he then shows how work is a form of working that has
for its principal goal the changing of reality. Luckmann shows how work as
we know it has evolved from structural developments in society such as the
social division of labor, the growth of professions, the social distribution of
knowledge, the growth of markets, and industrialization. The end results
have been that work roles have been separated from kinship structures, that
one produces for society at large rather than one’s own needs, and that one
is no longer self-sufficient in the maintenance of one’s lifestyle. In “In Search
of Cosmopolitan Space: A Case for Human Plurality,” SungTae Lee explores
the possibility that social science might think of the social world in a way that
might transform society by promoting social sensitivity. Aware of the ambi-
guities of globalization, cosmopolitanism, and even Mead’s generalized other,
Lee criticizes an us-versus-them attitude that can be detected in both “the war
on terror” and “jihad” and he recommends instead an ethical commitment to
plurality that is ethical in nature and depends on the other’s presence.
Quite a few contributions explore philosophical themes. In “Husserl’s
Phenomenology and Schutz’s Phenomenological Sociology,” Nam-In Lee
shows how both Husserl’s phenomenological psychology and his transcenden-
tal phenomenology influenced the development of Schutz’s phenomenologi-
cal sociology, and he suggests motives in Husserl’s later phenomenology that
could be of use for a phenomenological sociology.Kenneth Liberman’s “The
Itinerary of Intersubjectivity in Social Phenomenological Research” traces that
itinerary through Schutz’s and Gurwitsch’s criticisms of Husserl’s transcen-
dental approach to intersubjectivity and Schutz’s critique of Parsons. The itin-
erary climaxes in the ways in which Garfinkel and ethnomethodology, mak-
ing use of the technology of audio and video tape recordings and exhibiting
phenomenological self-reflectivity, discover the meaning or practical everyday
introduction 9
Michael D. Barber
NECESSIDADES DO FAMILIAR NO CUIDADO AO
CLIENTE COM INSUFICIÊNCIA RENAL CRÔNICA:
uma perspectiva para a enfermagem
Abstract: This study focuses on family members of clients with Chronic Re-
nal Insufficiency (CRI) in hemodialytic treatment, signaling the importance of
their participation in care aiming toward an adaptation of a new reality in one’s
life. The objective of this study is as follows: to understand the meaning attrib-
uted by significant family members to their participation in caring for the client
with CRI in hemodialytic treatment. This investigation was developed using a
qualitative research modeled after Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological approach,
namely to increase understanding in interaction with the other as a process of
facilitating an understanding of one’s experience that constitutes the newly con-
structed reality. The subjects of the research were ten family members noted sig-
nificantly for their care by the clients of a hemodialytic center from the state of
Espírito Santo (Br). The results allowed to identify the care activities developed
by the family members. The phenomenological interview consisted of a central
question: what do you have in mind when caring for a family member with
CRI? The analysis of the responses pointed principally toward two categories:
the well-being of the client and the well-being of the family member, or care-
taker. Generally, this demonstrates that the care given to the client by the family
member is intended to enhance the health care needs of both the client and
the family member, or caretaker. These perspectives support the quality of care
through the nurse’s action in planning health and nursing care for the client as
well as for the client’s family member, allowing recognition of each as a subject
of his or her professional action.
CONSIDERAÇÕES INICIAIS
Na década de 90, houve um importante avanço tecnológico com a in-
trodução de máquinas computadorizadas nas clínicas de hemodiálise, permi-
tindo um adequado controle da retirada do excesso de líquidos que o cliente
com insuficiência renal crônica (IRC) adquire no período interdialítico. Desta
forma, as intercorrências durante a hemodiálise, tais como: hipotensão arte-
rial, câimbras, vômitos, cefaléia, etc., reduziram significativamente, melhoran-
do a qualidade do tratamento. No entanto, este tratamento ainda representa
grande alteração na rotina de vida dos clientes e seus familiares.
Portanto, a presença de uma doença crônica na família pode ocasionar al-
gum tipo de instabilidade, requerendo uma parceria do Enfermeiro, principal-
mente pelo fato de ocorrer contatos mais intensos com este grupo de clientes
e eventualmente familiares.
Baseada nesta perspectiva, Alves, Pagliuca e Barroso (1999, p.133), consi-
deram que:
Desta forma, nestes momentos difíceis, que envolve um sujeito com uma
doença crônica, tendo que ser submetido a um tratamento ininterrupto e
contínuo, dentre outras dificuldades, a presença da família se faz importante,
como considera Kaloustian (2002, p.12): “É a família que propicia os aportes
afetivos e, sobretudo materiais necessários ao desenvolvimento e bem estar dos seus
componentes.”
Deste modo, a reação da família frente ao diagnóstico da IRC e seu res-
pectivo tratamento é, na maioria das vezes, conflituoso, manifestado pela di-
ficuldade de aceitá-los e compreendê-los. Sentimentos de revolta, hostilidade,
14 Monique Coutinho da SILVA & Florence Romijn TOCANTINS
Situação estudada
A experiência como enfermeira na Unidade de Hemodiálise, permite iden-
tificar que um dos momentos mais difíceis é a chegada do cliente ao Centro
para o início do tratamento. A maioria deles é proveniente dos serviços de
hemodiálise dos hospitais gerais. Estes clientes chegam ainda com catéter
de duplo lúmen (acesso provisório por onde a hemodiálise é realizada até a
confecção da fístula artério-venosa, que é o acesso definitivo). Geralmente es-
tão acompanhados por um familiar (pai, mãe, filho (a), maridos, esposa,...).
É visível que tanto a família quanto o cliente expressam, não só em suas
faces, mas também em suas falas a angústia, o medo e até mesmo em alguns
a revolta da não aceitação do tratamento originado pela IRC. Nestes casos,
procuro esclarecer para a família, sobre a importância do seu apoio. Muitos
compreendem esta importância, porém outros não se fazem tão participativos
ao longo do tratamento. Isto me preocupa, pois esta atitude reflete negativa-
mente na aderência ao tratamento por parte do cliente.
Sendo assim, este indivíduo necessita de apoio contínuo que lhe permita
manter um nível de estabilidade emocional suficiente para continuar vivendo
com integridade e sentimento de utilidade como ser social.
Kaloustian (2002, p.13), diz que “a família é percebida não como o simples
somatório de comportamentos, anseios e demandas individuais, mas sim como
um processo interagente da vida e das trajetórias individuais de cada um de seus
integrantes.”
Não se pode negar que as periódicas sessões de hemodiálise, e as conse-
qüências da IRC acarretam, tanto para o cliente quanto para o familiar que
participa do cuidado, uma vida social provida de limitações que antes da
doença não existia, levando muitas vezes ao isolamento, o que muitos até
relatam como “perda da liberdade.”
Todas as peculiaridades da hemodiálise favorecem para a queda na produ-
ção, na escola e trabalho, redução da renda familiar, em função das despesas
com a doença, diminuição das atividades sociais, redução das oportunidades de
emprego, dificuldade de comunicação entre os membros da família, limitação
da perspectiva de vida e perda da auto-estima. É o que evidencia Gualda, apud
Barroso, Vieira e Varela (2002, p.184):
Objetivo
Nesta ótica, reporto-se ainda a Ciosak & Sena, apud Santos (1998,
p.26), quando afirmam que:
ABORDAGEM TEÓRICO-METODOLÓGICA
O estudo foi constituído por uma pesquisa qualitativa por se adequar ao
objetivo que é compreender o significado atribuído pelo familiar significativo
a sua participação no cuidado ao cliente com insuficiência renal crônica em
tratamento hemodialítico, e com abordagem da fenomenologia sociológica de
Alfred Schutz.
A escolha por esta abordagem está pautada na possibilidade de compreen-
der a ação do familiar que participa do cuidado de seu integrante com IRC
em tratamento hemodialítico, cujas ações não podem ser vistas como simples
reações, mas num contexto de significados.
A participação da família no cuidado ao cliente com IRC tem significado e
como tal é intencional, deste modo, optei pela abordagem fenomenológica da
sociologia de Alfred Schutz considerando que para este autor toda ação social é
intencional dotada de significados subjetivos, sendo esta vivenciada pelo sujeito de
maneira autoconsciente (Schutz, 1962).
Sendo assim, apreender a ação possibilita a compreensão de seu signifi-
cado, pois de acordo com Tocantins (1993, p.14): toda e qualquer ação só
pode ser compreendida mediante o significado que esta pessoa confere à sua ação,
a interpretação do significado de uma ação pode ocorrer pela subjetividade da
própria pessoa.
Este estudo focaliza a participação do familiar no cuidado ao cliente
renal crônico, sendo esta participação uma ação intencional vivenciada
pelo sujeito.
Deste modo, a abordagem fenomenológica de Schutz adequa-se a este estudo,
visto que a partir dos atores sociais, constituídos pelos familiares significativos,
18 Monique Coutinho da SILVA & Florence Romijn TOCANTINS
TRAJETÓRIA DO ESTUDO
Os sujeitos deste estudo foram os familiares dos clientes submetidos ao
tratamento hemodialítico e por eles apontados como familiar significativo,
com os quais foi realizada uma entrevista fenomenológica buscando captar o
motivo-para de seu agir.
Como cenário da pesquisa foi considerado o espaço social do cuidar, por
entender que neste espaço, seja na clínica ou domicílio, estabelece-se uma rede
complexa de interações, negociações e tomada de decisões na busca de diferentes
suportes no percurso do tratamento, validando a ocorrência do fenômeno.
Optou-se, para ter acesso a estes clientes por uma clínica onde existe aten-
dimento diário de clientes portadores de IRC em tratamento regular de he-
modiálise. Para isto, foi encaminhada uma carta de solicitação de autorização
a autoridade máxima da instituição.
NECESSIDADES DO FAMILIAR NO CUIDADO AO CLIENTE 19
sendo quatro familiares consangüíneos (filha, irmã, mãe e pai) e seis não
consangüíneos (esposa, esposo e filha adotiva).
Quanto ao tempo de diagnóstico da IRC, este variou de seis meses a vinte
anos, com início do tratamento hemodialítico de seis meses a onze anos.
Dos dez familiares entrevistados, nove cuidam do cliente desde o início do
diagnóstico da IRC sinalizando o seu envolvimento antes mesmo de iniciar
o tratamento hemodialítico, e apenas um iniciou o cuidado após um ano da
descoberta do diagnóstico e do tratamento hemodialítico.
Os cuidados que dizem respeito à alimentação, descrito como controlar
dieta, e o de conversar com o cliente fornecendo amor e carinho, foram relata-
dos por todos os familiares entrevistados. Com relação ao controle de ingesta
hídrica, cinco familiares relatam evitar o aumento na ingesta e conseqüente
acúmulo de líquidos no cliente.
Três dos dez familiares acompanham o cliente à clínica para o tratamento
hemodialítico. Quanto a este acompanhamento, é válido ressaltar, que a maioria
dos clientes reside em outros Municípios e depende da condução fornecida pela
prefeitura, o que pode dificultar o acompanhamento ao familiar com IRC.
Oito familiares envolvem-se com a medicação, seja controlando os horários
da ingestão, seja com a responsabilidade em busca-la nas Unidades Básicas de
Saúde do Município de residência.
Seis familiares relatam que ajudam o cliente no banho, sendo que destes
apenas dois familiares informaram auxiliar na troca de roupa.
Cinco familiares acompanham os clientes em passeios. Apenas um familiar
relata o sono como cuidado, preocupação em zelar pelo repouso do cliente
com IRC, respeitando o momento do descanso. Três familiares relatam ajudar
o cliente nos seus afazeres domésticos.
Chama atenção que as atividades desenvolvidas pelos familiares signifi-
cativos envolvem tanto aquelas relacionadas diretamente com o tratamento,
qual seja o controle da dieta, o controle da ingesta hídrica e o da medicação
(DAUGIRDAS, 2003), como aquelas que envolvem relacionamento afetivo e
de auxílio entre os familiares em geral (MELLO FILHO e cols, 2000).
Quanto ao controlar a dieta, pode-se identificar como dito, que todos os
familiares o citaram como cuidado, sinalizando a possibilidade da dieta ser
preparada por eles (familiares), ao passo que, o cuidado controlar a ingesta
hídrica não foi citado pela maioria, o que não implica em dizer que o próprio
cliente é responsável por este cuidado, ou seja, de certa forma não há uma
dependência do cliente pelo familiar, nesta questão.
Ainda na perspectiva dos cuidados, é válido ressaltar que o tratamento
hemodialítico é desgastante, pois há uma espoliação ao cliente, pela retirada
não só de elementos nocivos como também de elementos indispensáveis ao
organismo. Esta situação nos remete a traduzi-los como os cuidados relatados
como ajudar no banho, auxiliar na troca de roupa, zelar pelo repouso e auxiliar
nos afazeres domésticos.
22 Monique Coutinho da SILVA & Florence Romijn TOCANTINS
Típico da Ação
O motivo-para dos familiares entrevistados foi captado mediante a res-
posta a esta questão, o que você tem em vista ao cuidar do seu familiar com
IRC?, o que irá nortear a compreensão da ação do familiar como ser humano
com toda sua subjetividade.
A leitura distinta procurando captar e trazer para uma visão objetiva aquilo
que se mostra subjetivo possibilitou o agrupamento dos diferentes motivos-
para em duas categorias concretas do vivido: Bem-estar do familiar-cliente
com IRC em tratamento hemodialítico e Bem-estar do familiar que cuida do
cliente com IRC em tratamento hemodialítico.
A seguir apresenta-se o recorte das falas dos diferentes entrevistados que
deram origem a essas categorias.
ANÁLISE COMPREENSIVA
A trajetória metodológica do estudo oportunizou reconhecer que o fa-
miliar significativo participa ativamente no cuidado a clientes com IRC em
tratamento hemodialítico em domicílio. Dentre os cuidados relatados desta-
cam-se atividades de conversar, fornecendo amor e carinho, como também de
controlara a dieta e de oferecer medicação prescrita. Identifica-se assim, que
este familiar desenvolve ações de cuidado voltadas tanto para a dimensão não
física como a dimensão física do cliente com IRC. (Silva, 1998).
O significado da ação de cuidar dos familiares de clientes com IRC em
tratamento hemodialítico, permitiu captar o típico da ação que foi construído
mediante duas categorias concretas do vivido quais sejam: Bem-estar do fami-
liar com IRC e Bem-estar do familiar que cuida de clientes com IRC. Sendo
assim, o significado atribuído pelo familiar à sua participação no cuidado en-
globa não somente o bem-estar do cliente como também de si próprio.
Contudo, na literatura pesquisada, entre outros Daugirdas (2003), Rem-
bold (2000), Silva (1996), o que predomina é o cuidado centrado apenas
no cliente com IRC em tratamento hemodialítico, perdendo-se de vista o
cuidado a esse familiar.
O trabalho do enfermeiro na Unidade de Hemodiálise é caracterizado pe-
las suas ações técnicas quanto aos procedimentos ligados aos clientes, a educa-
ção continuada para a equipe de enfermagem, e as orientações fornecidas aos
familiares e clientes quanto aos cuidados dispensados a quem utiliza deste tra-
tamento. No que se refere especificamente às orientações incluem-se: a dieta,
a restrição hídrica, uso das medicações, não faltar as sessões de hemodiálise,
cuidados com o acesso vascular, dentre outros, e no que se refere especifica-
mente ao familiar, é enfatizado a questão do apoio emocional ao cliente de
acordo com Ciconelli (1981) e Mello Filho e cols (2000).
Esses cuidados constituídos em literatura, e que são rotineiramente de-
senvolvidos em qualquer unidade de hemodiálise, não são suficientes para
promover bem-estar ao familiar que cuida de clientes com IRC. As necessi-
dades de cuidado relatados pelo familiar, para que este bem-estar se faça pre-
sente, emerge da sua “bagagem de conhecimentos disponíveis,” uma estrutura
24 Monique Coutinho da SILVA & Florence Romijn TOCANTINS
CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS
Este estudo viabilizou compreender a partir da vivência e experiência do
familiar que cuida de clientes com IRC em tratamento hemodialítico, que
apesar da convivência com uma doença crônica, que requer uma adaptação
ao novo estilo de vida, é possível obter satisfação e bem-estar quando está
cuidando deste outro.
Reconhece-se assim que o familiar que cuida de cliente com IRC, funda-
mentado principalmente em sua experiência vivida, mesmo com o sofrimento
e angústia em ver um ente querido passando por situações peculiares a doença
e ao tratamento, há esperanças. Esperança de poder ver o bem-estar do cliente,
esperança de ter dias melhores, e com isso alcançar seu próprio bem-estar.
Evidenciou também a importância do enfermeiro em considerar o familiar
como cliente de sua assistência, desenvolvendo ações de apoio profissional
contribuindo para o bem-estar físico e emocional de seus clientes.
Esta situação requer mudanças na prática profissional, requer ações mais
amplas de cuidado no contexto do tratamento hemodialítico, requer o recon-
hecimento que a vivência humana implica em relacionamento, compartilha-
mento de idéias, de emoções e de sentimentos.
Desta forma, é necessário para o enfermeiro aprimorar seus conhecimentos
e habilidades em relacionamento interpessoal, além de desenvolver habilida-
des específicas para com segurança e eficiência, cuidar não só de clientes com
IRC em tratamento hemodialítico como também de sua família.
O senso comum, quanto à função atribuída ao enfermeiro de supervisor -
de gerente e de educador, não são suficientes para que ele se desenvolva como
profissional na área da nefrologia. É preciso que ele desenvolva o relaciona-
mento interpessoal tanto com os clientes quanto com seus respectivos fami-
liares, modificando com suas atitudes, a imagem de enfermeiro supervisor ou
responsável por escala de plantão.
26 Monique Coutinho da SILVA & Florence Romijn TOCANTINS
REFERÊNCIAS
Abstract: Forty-five children between the ages of nine and twelve years, who
were forced to flee their native Sudan and seek refuge in Egypt, were inter-
viewed about their everyday life in Cairo. Phenomenological analyses of the
transcripts revealed the physical, social and technological dimensions to their
encounter with a new cultural world. The interviews also revealed the extent
to which the children had to face racism, discrimination and social exclusion.
Specific analyses of children’s difficulties in learning a new form of Arabic and
their involvement in play and games indicated that a refugee child develops
his or her self-identity as a stranger by reflecting on particular confrontations
with the new environment. Finally, comparative analyses across age groups led
to the construction of a phenomenological-developmental model of the child
refugee. Both the model and the findings are discussed in the context of Alfred
Schutz’s (1964a) essay The Stranger, George Herbert Mead’s (1967) commu-
nicative model of the self and Binnie Kristal-Andersson’s (2000) psychological
framework for understanding migration.
Introduction
The present study sets out to investigate children’s experience of being a
stranger in an unfamiliar country. Specifically, it focuses on a group of Suda-
nese children who were forced to cross an international boundary and seek
refuge in North Africa. Although the vulnerability of child refugee popula-
tions has been studied in its biological, social and psychological dimensions,
the approach that is adopted in the present study is phenomenological. To be
precise, we carried out a series of life-world analyses that focused on the taken-
for-granted aspects of refugee children’s everyday experiences. Moreover, we
examined refugee children’s intersubjective worlds by encouraging them to
construct narratives that revealed their understanding of their new cultural
environment. Finally, we conducted thematic analyses of children’s narratives
30 George Berguno & Nour Loutfy
METHOD
Participants
A total of 45 refugee children (25 males, 20 females) were interviewed
at the Saint Charles Lwanga Center for Basic Education, situated in Cairo,
Egypt. The center is also known as the Sakakini School and has been serving
refugees from Sudan since 1984.2 There were nine 9-year-olds (four males,
five females; mean age for the group = 9 years 4 months), twelve 10-year-olds
(six males, six females; mean age = 10 years 1 month), fifteen 11-year-olds
(seven males, eight females; mean age = 11 years 3 months) and nine 12-year-
olds (eight males, one female; mean age = 12 years 1 month). All the children
were originally from Sudan; they and their families met the criteria for refugee
status, as defined by the 1969 Convention of the Organization of African
Unity.3
Procedure
Children were interviewed individually in a secluded part of the school.
Apart from the interviewer and interviewee, a teacher from the school was also
present throughout all interviews. To begin with, background information
regarding each of the children was obtained from the school files concern-
ing: the child’s age, family details, their origins, languages spoken (how many
and which ones) and how long they had been in Egypt. All interviews were
recorded and transcribed verbatim in colloquial Arabic and later translated
into English. All children participated willingly: they gave their consent to be
2 We take this opportunity to thank Sister Anna Maria Sgaramella and all the
workers and teachers at the Sakakini School in Cairo for their support. It was their
dedication to our project and their generosity of spirit that made this research possible.
3 Article 1 of the 1969 Convention of the Organization of African Unity
defines a refugee as a ‘person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not
having a nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’
Article 1 of the 1969 Convention goes on to state that ‘the term “refugee” shall also
apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domi-
nation or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his
country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence
in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.’
Children’s Experience of Seeking Refuge in North Africa 35
interviewed. Moreover, prior to the interview they were informed that they
could discontinue the interview at any point and for whatever reason.
We used a semi-structured interview format consisting of the following six
questions:44
1. When you first came to Egypt, what were your first impressions?
2. Thinking about the way of life here: which everyday situations do you
find particularly surprising or even difficult to understand?
3. On the occasions when you are faced with difficulties, do you seek help
from someone who knows more about Egypt? (For example: an older person
who has been in Egypt for a while or a friend?)
4. Have you ever been in a situation where you misunderstood Egyptian
children or were misunderstood by them?
5. What about the way Egyptian children speak (Arabic)? In what way is
it different?
6. How do Egyptian children see you? Do you think that their impressions
of you are influenced by the fact you are a refugee?
When the interviews had been completed and translated into English, we
carried out two sets of analyses. First, we carried out phenomenological analy-
ses of children’s responses to the interview questions. Second, we made spe-
cific analyses of children’s views on language, play and games. The criteria for
the specific analyses will be presented in the discussion part of this paper. We
also made a comparative study across age groups for each of the set questions
and the most important themes.
(االسئلة )عامية
اول ما جيت مصر ايه الحاجات الي لفتت نظرك أو شدت انتباھك ؟.1
اية المواقف )الحاجات الصغيرة( بتاعة كل يوم الي بتالقيھا غريبية او حتي صعب انك، لما بتفكر في العيشة ھنا.2
تفھمھا؟
ھل بتسأل حد معين يعرف مصر كويس علشان يساعدك؟ )زي مثال، لما بتالقي نفسك في موقف )حاجة( صعب.3
(واحد صاحبك أو حد كبيربقاله شوية في مصر؟
ھل مرة حصل انك فھمت االطفال المصريين غلط أو ھما فھموك غلط؟.4
ھل بتفھم االطفال المصريين لما بيتكلموا عربي؟ ايه الفرق بين السوداني والمصري؟.5
ازاي االطفال المصريين بيبصولك؟ ھل تفتكرانھم بيبصولك بالطريقة دي علشان انت الجئ ؟.6
36 George Berguno & Nour Loutfy
6 The term refers to the girl’s dark skin, but it is a word with no equivalent in
the English language.
Children’s Experience of Seeking Refuge in North Africa 39
Finally, children also reported that they sought help when involved in inter-
personal conflicts stemming from a limited understanding of Egyptian culture.
An example that illustrates most of the points made above was given by ABI
(female, aged 9 years, 2 months): ‘Once an Egyptian girl hurt me with a knife in
my arm. When this happened I told my mother. She told me not to go out on
my own. I did not do anything wrong to the girl. She lives nearby and picks on
me every day. My friend has spoken to her but she hit me. I went after her and
told her, why hit me if I did not even speak to you? She did not answer me back.’
A more humorous example was provided by AJB (female, 11 years, 6 months):
‘I ask my father. He told me once if anyone beats you up, you have to fight back.
Once, an Egyptian boy started to beat me up and threw stones at me. I said God
forgives you. But he threw a bigger stone at me. Then I broke his glasses. I told
my father and he said, “Very good. Jesus said that if someone beats you up on
one side, you have to beat them back on the other side.” ’7
Children’s responses to question four, which concerned typical misunder-
standings, were the least informative. Sixteen of the forty-five children (36%)
claimed that they had not experienced misunderstandings with Egyptian chil-
dren. However, in some of these cases, the children clarified that although
they may have little difficulty in understanding Egyptian Arabic, the Egyptian
children had considerable more problems in understanding Sudanese Arabic.
Moreover, children’s responses to this question were possibly constrained by the
way the question was phrased, leading them to interpret the concept of misun-
derstanding as linguistic misunderstanding. In almost every example given, the
obstacle to understanding lay in the different forms of Arabic speech. The Suda-
nese children did state that they found Egyptian Arabic difficult to understand,
but they also noted the necessity of learning its forms (to integrate into Egyptian
society). Therefore, their accounts of misunderstandings emphasized the lack
of comprehension on the part of Egyptians. Some cases of misunderstandings
between children led to insulting behaviours. But there were also examples from
daily life about everyday transactions, such as buying goods or asking for direc-
tions. AKW (female, aged 10 years, 1 month) described one such incident: ‘I
was in the queue to get bread from the bakery. I told the girl in front of me that
I am going and coming back. I went to the grocery shop and when I came back
my spot was taken. She did not understand me.’
Question five concerned language, and the following categories emerged as
important indicators of the difficulties involved in attempting to understand
a different form of spoken Arabic: differences in vocabulary, un-translatability,
differences in colloquial expressions and semiotic practices (Kristeva, 1984).
One in three children said that they did not always understand Egyptian
Arabic, and although two-thirds of the children claimed to understand it for
most everyday purposes, they still made a point of emphasizing that this was
not always the case. Although the question did not specifically ask the chil-
dren to describe the interpersonal difficulties that the different forms of Arabic
might lead to, some of the children spontaneously offered examples of the lan-
guage difficulties that they had experienced. In some cases, a simple everyday
transaction became complicated by the differences in Sudanese and Egyptian
forms of Arabic. In others, the children had been picked on or laughed at.
A small proportion of the children answered that although they knew that
the two forms of Arabic were different, they were not sure how to express that
difference. Most children, however, were able to give concrete examples of the
differences. Children mentioned, for example, that the two forms of speech evi-
dently had different lexicons (in the children’s words: were made up of different
words). An interesting example of a typical linguistic misunderstanding was de-
scribed by MDA (male, aged 12 years) as follows: ‘I was coming to the Abbasiya
Church once. I was lost. I asked a shop owner for directions. He told me to go
right and then left. Then he said something that I thought was an insult. I asked
Marwal and he told me that it meant that I had to go straight ahead. It was not
an insult, although in Sudanese it means go to hell or go away.’
More importantly, the children realised that a word in one form of speech did
not necessarily translate into the other. Colloquial expressions were also highlighted
as an importance difference, including: slang, swear words, modes of introduc-
ing oneself, requests and demands. And a small number of children were able
to point out that the two forms of Arabic could differ in spellings, word order,
pronunciation, accents and rhythms of speech; characteristics known in psy-
cholinguistic theory as semiotic practices (Kristeva, 1984).8 Thus, the overall im-
pression gathered from the interviews was that the differences in spoken Arabic
represented a barrier to the refugee child’s integration into Egyptian cultural life.
Children’s responses to question six revealed that, on the whole, they did
not understand the social and legal concept of the refugee; but a careful ex-
amination of the transcripts indicated that the ten- to twelve-year-olds un-
derstood their status as an intruder or stranger in a foreign land. That is, the
older children demonstrated their capacity to take the point of view of the
host country by referring to themselves as strangers. Furthermore, they gave
reasons as to why they might be perceived as such by Egyptians. Their sense
8 We are referring to Kristeva’s term ‘le sémiotique’, which has often been
translated into English as ‘the semiotic.’ In other words: the rhythmic, musical and
emotional aspects of language.
42 George Berguno & Nour Loutfy
of identity as strangers was centred on the concepts of race and selective dis-
crimination. To be precise: a significant proportion of the children showed an
obvious awareness of the differences in physical appearance and skin colour
between Sudanese and Egyptian children. AYP (female, 11 years, 2 months)
explained it in the following manner: ‘They call me black. They don’t like the
people who are of black colour and they don’t respect them. For example, if a
[Sudanese] teacher is walking down the street and a boy who is with his father
insults him, the father will not tell him that this is rude. He will encourage
him. This is because we left our country and came here to eat their food. We
came here because we had problems in Sudan. We do not want to stay here.
We want to go to Australia.’
The children were also aware that in certain circumstances they could ex-
pect to be treated differently because of their physical appearance. This could
be anything from mild forms of discrimination in everyday interactions, to
more serious forms of discrimination such as mockery and insults (and in
some cases, physical aggression). However, the children were just as much
aware of the fact that they were also likely to encounter Egyptians who would
treat them in a welcoming fashion or with kindness. Although friendships
with Egyptians appeared to be limited, some refugees did report having regu-
lar contact with Egyptian children, leading to joint play activities or even
friendship.
pronunciation, word order and typical forms of making requests. Only one
child made a reference to games.
Focusing on the eleven-year-olds, we found that there were no references
to play. In contrast, there were more references to games: team sports were
mentioned, as well as video and computer games. We also noticed that this
age group demonstrated a greater understanding of Egyptian Arabic, although
the differences between the two forms of Arabic continued to be expressed by
means of concrete comparisons. Along with their greater understanding of
Egyptian Arabic there was a remarkable increase in their ability to commu-
nicate with Egyptian children, as well as a greater understanding of interper-
sonal conflict. Finally, we noted a decrease in the typing of people into good
and bad. The greatest number of references to games was found among the
twelve-year-olds. Their comments on games were primarily focused on team
sports, with some mention of computer games. There were also some refer-
ences to play but these were primarily linked to street activities (and therefore
may in fact be references to games). The twelve-year-olds’ understanding of
the differences between the two forms of Arabic continued to be limited to
concrete instances. However, it was clear that the twelve-year-olds understood
language as a cultural medium that could be used for the consolidation of
friendships, as well as for the promotion and negotiation of conflicts (for ex-
ample, there was a remarkable increase in the references to lies and deception).
To summarize our results to the specific analyses, we found that the older
children were more interested in games, whereas the younger children made
more references to play. As concerns language, the developmental picture is
as follows. The younger children demonstrated a vague understanding of the
differences between the two forms of Arabic. As the children grew older they
acquired knowledge of concrete differences between the two languages, which
in turn made possible a realisation of language as a medium for conflict and
cooperation.
DISCUSSION
The present research set out to investigate Sudanese children’s experience of
taking refuge in an unfamiliar country. In particular, we wanted to study and
understand children’s experience of being a stranger, as expressed through their
own narratives of being a refugee. We also set out to analyse our findings in
the context of Schutz’s (1964a) essay The Stranger. In particular, we wanted to
determine whether Schutz’s phenomenological analysis of the stranger provided
insights into the life-world of the child refugee. But before we can discuss our
findings in the context of Schutz’s work and in the context of psychological
approaches to the study of the child refugee, it is important to clarify the meth-
odological rationale for the specific analyses on language, play and games, as
well as their relevance to the general findings.
44 George Berguno & Nour Loutfy
language for our research is as follows. We found that the youngest group of
children (the 9-year-olds) were aware of the differences between the two forms
of Arabic but were unable to express that difference. The 10- and 11-year-olds
gave concrete examples of the differences between the two languages (such
as differences in vocabulary and colloquial expressions). The oldest children,
however, demonstrated the most sophisticated meta-linguistic awareness, re-
ferring to the more subtle aspects of language, such as the semiotic dimensions
and the un-translatability of certain terms. The Sudanese children’s capacity to
reflect on the Arabic language allowed them to engage in better communica-
tion with their Egyptian peers, and was instrumental in the development of
their self-identity as strangers.
If we now situate our phenomenological model in relation to the psycho-
logical framework presented by Kristal-Andersson (2000), it is clear that our
findings support the first dimension of the Kristal-Andersson framework: ‘states
of being.’ The phrase refers to typical forms of self-experience, such as feeling
a stranger, loneliness, guilt, shame, sorrow, suspicion, prejudice and the experi-
ence of being a scapegoat. Kristal-Andersson argues that one or more of these
states of being may come to dominate the refugee’s everyday life. Our research
also has parallels with the second dimension of the Kristal-Anderrson frame-
work, the adaptation cycle, which refers to the length of time that a refugee or
immigrant spends in the new country and its effects on the individual.
There are, however, some noticeable differences between our model and
the Kristal-Andersson framework. As concerns the first dimension (states of
being), we note that Kristal-Andersson takes for granted the refugee’s status
as a stranger. In other words, Kristal-Andersson proposes that the refugee is
necessarily a stranger given that the host country is new and different and that
there are new demands for adaptation placed upon the refugee. Our find-
ings indicate that the stranger status of the child refugee is not experienced
as a given: it develops over time by means of specific confrontations with the
new environment. Thus, young refugee children do not perceive themselves
as strangers to begin with, but gradually come to understand their position
within the host country after a period of reflection. Turning our attention
to the second dimension of the Kristal-Andersson framework, we are aware
that the framework does posit the refugee’s adaptation to the host country
in terms of stages (arrival, confrontation and flashback). However, Kristal-
Andersson concludes that adaptation is a very personal process and that few
generalizations can be made. In contrast, our findings show that if one focuses
on refugee children’s narrative accounts of their attempts to understand their
host country, it becomes possible to study the adaptive strategies that they use.
Moreover, our understanding of the dynamics of adaptation is significantly
enhanced when placed in the context of Schutz’s theory of typifications and
Mead’s communicative model of the self.
Children’s Experience of Seeking Refuge in North Africa 47
Our research has focused on identifying the typical everyday situations that
a refugee child must face in his attempts to become accepted by an unfamiliar
cultural group; but the ideas discussed thus far have wide-ranging applications.
The phenomenological-developmental model that we have presented provides a
framework for understanding the psychological experiences of the child refugee.
In particular, it allows us to examine how a refugee (or immigrant) may experi-
ence their existence as dominated by loneliness, a sense of loss, a lack of rooted-
ness and feelings of worthlessness. But the model also provides a framework for
understanding the social processes by which the refugee or immigrant comes to
know himself as a stranger. This in turn allows for the development of practi-
cal, interventionist strategies that would facilitate the refugee’s experience of a
variety of transition related conditions: the upheaval of leaving one’s homeland,
the encounter with an unfamiliar cultural group, the difficulties of waiting for
a decision regarding one’s plea for asylum or refuge, and the provision of ap-
propriate cultural help.
Among the transition related conditions that could be incorporated into
our model is the phenomenon that Kristal-Andersson (2000) has referred to
as the refugee’s ‘dream of the return.’ While Kristal-Andersson has discussed
the dream of the return to the homeland as it affects the refugee’s life in the
new country, Schutz (1964b) examined the social processes at work in the
actual return to one’s native land in his essay The Homecomer. To be sure,
the attitude of the homecomer is different to that of the stranger. While the
stranger seeks to join a group which has never been his own, the homecom-
er expects to return to an environment of which (he believes) he still holds
intimate knowledge. According to Schutz, the feeling of being ‘at home’ is
associated with experiences of familiarity and intimacy. To be precise, it is
linked to a life embedded in primary relationships: the sharing of interests
based on a common system of relevances, the experience of self and other as
unique beings present to each other, a sharing of plans about the future, and
the mutual interpenetration of personal histories. But to the person who has
chosen or been forced to leave home, the immediacy of primary relationships
is no longer open to him. This disruption in we-relations is experienced as a
disturbance in the shared system of relevances and it becomes more evident
upon the homecomer’s return to his native land: the home he returns to is not
the home he left behind. Moreover, the homecomer returns a changed person.
The phenomenon of homecoming has not been part of the present study;
neither did we focus on the dream of the return. Our aim has been to examine
the refugee child’s experience of not-at-homeness and to understand the de-
velopment of his self-identity as a stranger. Nevertheless, we have raised these
aspects of both Kristal-Andersson’s psychological model and Schutz’s phe-
nomenological approach to indicate possibilities for further research. To what
extent does the refugee (or immigrant’s) memory of home affect his attempts
to be accepted into an unfamiliar cultural group? Similarly, one could raise the
48 George Berguno & Nour Loutfy
question: how does the homecomer’s memory of home influence his attempts
to re-interpret and be accepted by a group to which he once belonged? We
hope, therefore, that our phenomenological study of not-at-homeness, rooted
in the work of Alfred Schutz, has contributed to our understanding of the
life-world of the refugee child and perhaps paved the way for further research
in this area.
CONCLUSION
The present study set out to investigate the life-world of the child refugee.
We also aimed to describe the process by which a child refugee comes to
perceive himself as a stranger in an unfamiliar country. Adopting a phenom-
enological approach to the study of a group of forty-five Sudanese children
who were forced to flee into Egypt, we identified the typical situations that
these refugees faced on a daily basis, including: new physical, social and tech-
nological environments; as well as racism, discrimination and new forms of
interpersonal conflict. Moreover, the children had to overcome the difficulties
of learning to speak a new form of Arabic. And by interviewing children of
different ages we were able to make comparative analyses that favoured the
construction of a phenomenological-developmental model of the process of
understanding oneself as a stranger.
According to our findings, a refugee child develops his self-identity as a
stranger by reflecting on particular everyday experiences. To begin with, the
child may react to the new environment with wonder and awe; but this initial
response soon gives way to bewilderment and frustration, leading the child to
compare his country of origin with his new environment. This comparative
stance furthers the child’s tendency to type people and situations into good and
bad. As the child grows older and more familiar with the new environment, the
limitations of typing become increasingly obvious and the child seeks new ways
to understand the cultural patterns of the host country. One way of achieving
this is to seek an adult or more knowledgeable peer who can interpret the new
way of life; a process that we have referred to as cultural help. Another very im-
portant strategy concerns language: the child refugee may have to learn a new
language, as well as acquire meta-linguistic abilities that will allow him to reflect
on the new medium of expression.
We have discussed our findings in the context of Schutz’s essay The Stranger
and Mead’s theory of the generalized other; and we have indicated possibilities
for further research. Our findings support both Mead’s account of the social
emergence of the self, as well as Schutz’s description of a stranger’s attempts
to interpret the cultural patterns of an unfamiliar group. However, Schutz’s
analysis of the stranger excluded children because their inclusion would have
required theoretical qualifications. We suggest, therefore, that our research be
seen as a contribution to Schutz’s analysis of the stranger. To be precise, our
Children’s Experience of Seeking Refuge in North Africa 49
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“Psychological disorder amongst refugee and migrant schoolchildren
50 George Berguno & Nour Loutfy
Bernhard Waldenfels
Otherness
1 The following text goes back to a paper given at the annual meeting, held by the
Transcultural Psychiatry Section of the World Psychiatric Association, Vienna 2006. Firstly
published online in World Culture Psychiatry Research Review, Vol. 2, Nr. 2/3 (2007), p. 69-79.
2 The problematic aspects of this conception are discussed in B. Waldenfels, In den
Netzen der Lebenswelt (1985).
52 Bernhard Waldenfels
sphere from which all significant differences arise, assumes that the interplay of
culture and nature is deeply rooted in the acts and the habits of our body. As
Merleau-Ponty already puts it in his Phenomenology of perception (1945, p. 221),
in our existence as human beings there is nothing to be found which is not at
once artificially fabricated and given by nature, be it smiling, fatherhood or our
sitting and walking, together with various techniques of the body, which Marcel
Mauss has carefully described (1975, p. 199 ff.).
With regard to the status of ethnopsychiatry that we have in mind, it is
most important to take into account the motif of otherness (Fremdheit), which
functions as a corrective against any attempt to place what is one’s own in the
centre or to globalise all peculiarities.3 Since in English we are accustomed to
speak simply of otherness or in German of Andersheit, we have to be careful
not to fall into a conceptual confusion which would accompany our reflections
like a shadow. We must clearly distinguish between logico-ontological otherness
(Andersheit), a sort of difference which comes about through a process of delimi-
tation, and topological otherness or alienness (Fremdheit),4 a sort of divorce or
separation which emerges from a process of in- and ex-clusion. Something that
is alien does not only appear to be other, rather it arises from elsewhere. Words
such as strange(r) or étrange(r), which are derived from the Latin word extraneus,
evoke the aspect of place. Thus, there is a topography of the alien, which cannot
be reduced to an ontology of the alien. Our experience of the Other or of the
alien (Fremderfahrung) consists neither in the fact that we do not yet or no lon-
ger know something, nor is it restricted to the fact that something is positively
indeterminate,5 rather it emerges in the fact that something affects and appeals
to us before we take it as something, and in the further fact that something is
there that escapes us. We could speak of an incarnate absence (leibhaftige Abwe-
senheit) which is experienced as an absence like our own past. Otherness touches
the uncanny (Unheimliche) which haunts us in our own house. Such a radical
sort of otherness, which cannot be reduced to something other, shapes our own
body, which simultaneously appears to be an alien body, and it permeates our
3 The new conception of otherness or alienness which is at stake here can only be
roughly outlined. More about it can be learned from B. Waldenfels, Topographie des Fremden
(1997) and, written in a more pointed form, Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden
(2006). See further The Question of the Other (2007).
4 In order to render the German word Fremdheit, I shall use both terms: ‘otherness’
and ‘alienness’; the second term is more precise, but not so common. The same holds true for
the translation of Fremde(r) with the ‘Other’, the ‘alien’ or the ‘stranger’. In any case, we should
keep the fact in mind that since Plato the Andere (greek: heteron) pertains to the basic assump-
tions of our Western thinking, whereas to this day the Fremde (greek: xenon or allotrion) is often
taken as merely deficient or derivative.
5 As to the manifold phenomenon of the indeterminate, which does not coincide
with the phenomenon of the alien, but does touch it, cf. Gerhard Gamm, Flucht aus der Kate-
gorie (1994). The author interlinks rather different approaches from Husserl, Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty up to Wittgenstein, Foucault and Quine.
Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry 53
common life-world which from the beginning is divided into the home world
and the alien world. In both cases we do not have to do with a strict separation
between the own and the alien, rather we meet with manifold transitions, gene-
rating something like an ‘inter-corporeality’, an ‘inter-monde’, an ‘inter-man’.
This sort of between (Zwischen, inter), which also comes up in what we call
the “inter-cultural” and which itself becomes a cross-cultural figure in what the
Japanese call ki (cf. Kimura, 1995), turns out to be much more than a mere
saying, it is constitutive for any experience of the Other.
Ultimately the question arises as to how ethnopsychiatry is related to what is
alien. The name transcultural ethnopsychiatry, which, due to authors like G. De-
vereux, W. M. Pfeiffer, and E. Wittkower, has been prevalent since the seventies,
seems to be just as ambiguous as the term “otherness.” The prefix trans can be
understood in a double sense, namely as going beyond, transcending a borderline
and reaching a common third, or as a passage from one to the other (see in La-
tin transcendere vs. transcurrere). In the first case, transcultural psychiatry would
gain a foothold beyond the different cultures, in the second case it would move
between the different cultures.6 This alternative comes close to the difference
between the transubjective validity of arguments or laws and intersubjective in-
terchange, which is also much too readily blurred. Hence, I shall use the unmis-
takable term “intercultural” whenever the phenomenon of the alien is at stake,
or I shall use the term “ethnopsychiatry,” which, by borrowing its title from
ethnology and ethnography, explicitly refers to ethnic groups, primarily to those
from other cultures and continents. The fact that the so-called ethno-sciences
do not allow reflection to stop at what is our own has an additional effect which
should not be neglected when one is occupied with the alien. Now, if we follow
the ethnologist Karl-Heinz Kohl in defining ethnology as the “science of what is
culturally alien or other” (Kohl, 1993), ethnopsychiatry gives rise to a doubling
of otherness or alienness. The sick person as somebody alien becomes the sick per-
son as somebody culturally alien.7 This marks the path of the following reflections.
8 The same holds true for other phenomena of life such as pleasure, anxiety, torture or
molestation by noise.
Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry 55
10 Whereas German only has the one verb heilen and French the one verb guérir in
the transitive and in the intransitive mode, English is equipped with two verbs, one transitive,
the other intransitive. But this does not mean that the activity of curing can be completely
separated from the process of healing. In addition to the possibility of a so-called spontaneous
recovery, curing itself depends on spontaneous forces of healing. In other words, no curing
without healing.
11 The clear dualism is mitigated if we consider that the word psyche was used to signify
the living being as self-moving and that the word spirit (spiritus, pneuma, ruach, Geist) sug-
gests the breath of life and not so much the interior of what is called mind or mental. As to the
Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry 57
attempts to renew a non-dualistic view and language, I refer to the analyses in my book Das
leibliche Selbst (2000) where many new efforts are presented, including those made by medical
anthropology.
12 Following Devereux we can distinguish between an ethnic and an idiosyncratic kind
of unconsciousness (1992, p. 23-28).
13 Concerning the different dimensions of alienness see my extensive explanations in
Bruchlinien der Erfahrung (2002), ch. V-VI, and concerning unconsciousness as a specific zone
of alienness see ibid., ch. VII.
58 Bernhard Waldenfels
14 In this context I refer to the wealth of research materials presented during the above
mentioned Vienna Conference.
Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry 59
constitution of the Other’s gaze as an alien gaze, and as if I were an ego before
I am touched by the Other’s gaze or word. What Husserl does nevertheless no-
tice is the iteration of otherness which returns to myself from my experience
of the Other.15 My experience of the Other culminates in a sort of othering
that affects my own experience as Alfred Schutz has shown on the figures of
the stranger and of the homecomer.16 Through affects like being afraid of the
Other or being curious for the Other, otherness invades us. Freud’s remark in
his essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle: “Fright [...] evokes the state in which
we fall, when we are faced with a danger without being prepared for it” (GW
XIII, 10), also holds true for the fright which originates from the Other. There
are parts of the otherness of the Other that we bear in ourselves. The Other is
implanted into us, as Jean Laplanche puts it, trying to complete the uncom-
pleted “Copernican revolution of psychoanalysis” (1992). Once purified from
affective influences and violations, our experience of the Other would no lon-
ger be an experience of the alien, but rather nothing more than a product
of sheer exotism, transforming the alien into a counterfeit of our own. Our
experience of the Other includes an intertwining of the own and the alien,
and this contrasts with a sharp dividing line, drawn on a drawing-board or
with the help of a ruler. Our own otherness and the otherness of the Other
are closely interlaced; this explains why there is an inner and an outer foreign
country, and why the extra-ordinary is never totally outside the ordinary, the
anomalous never totally outside the normal and the insane never totally out-
side the sane. This goes to the extent that over-normality and over-adjustment
are in themselves somewhat anomalous, and that norms by themselves pro-
duce pathogenic effects, affecting persons who might be called ‘normopaths’.
From this point of view the nightmare of relativism vanishes. We free our-
selves from a spectre we often attack with the weapons of infra- and supra-cul-
tural universalism, as if the simple difference between the particular and the
universal were at stake and not first of all the difference between the own and
the alien. It is pretended that all sorts of illnesses and also all sorts of customs,
being culturally tinted, were locked in their culture as if in a shell, until they
are freed from their cage by means of universalism. But this battle starts from
false presuppositions.
There is nothing like a pure culture, rather we encounter a manifold in-
terlacing of cultures which allows for a more or less of otherness. In the view
of an enlightened European, an assassin, who attempts to purchase a place
15 The concatenation and entanglement permeating our experience of the Other should
not be confused with a transitive relation as defined by the logic of relations, where one and the
same element is related to another element and through it to a further element. Our self cannot be
identified with the same, precisely as the alien, which is separate from me, cannot be identified
with the other, which is different from me.
16 See the related essays in CP II and, in addition to it, my critical considerations „Der
Fremde und der Heimkehrer“ in Srubar/Vaitkus 2003.
60 Bernhard Waldenfels
17 See „Ethnopsychiatrie im Inland“ (1984a). This essay has been published in a special
volume, dedicated to Georges Devereux on the occasion of his 75th birthday.
Doubled Otherness in Ethnopsychiatry 61
cruel way some time later, covering him with oil and igniting him, that a new
psychiatric assessment was ordered. This time the psychiatrist, namely Blan-
kenburg himself, referring to a preceding long-lasting jealousy delusion, came
to the conclusion that the perpetrator was suffering from a paranoid psycho-
sis. So he was moved to a closed psychiatric clinic. Up to this point everything
seems to be formally all right. Legal and medical people make their decision
in their usual manner from the standpoint of a legitimated third party. They
do so by classifying the act as a typical crime of a certain kind or of mental
illness, and by taking or recommending the right measures. In sum, we are left
with certain facts of a case, comparable with other facts, and we are left with a
certain profile of a perpetrator, comparable with other profiles, and both make
it possible to classify duly what happened. This also applies to a domestic alien
such as Moosbrugger: “In the eyes of the judges his actions proceeded from
himself, in his own eyes they had come upon him like birds which fly upon
us. In the judge’s view Moosbrugger was a particular case; in his own view
he was a world, and it is difficult to say anything convincing about a world.”
(Musil, 1978, p. 75)
The ethnic feature of our paradigm case would have completely vanished,
precisely as in legal proceedings the question of gender is often neglected, if
Blankenburg had not explicitly brought the socio-cultural surplus of the sa-
crificial act to bear. Indeed he mentions the human sacrifices in Greek myths
– e. g. the sacrifice of Iphigenie – but he refers in particular to the sacrifice of
Isaac, which was interrupted at the last minute – which Jewish and Christian
traditions have in common with Islamic traditions. Now, if we were to stop
here we would be caught in intracultural, intercultural as well as interreligious
conflicts of interpretation.18 Judgements about delusions or schizophrenia
would be based on the normative presuppositions of contingent life-forms.
The initial relativity of symptoms would end with the relativism of medical
judgements. Therefore, referring to Devereux, Blankenburg proposes trans-
cultural comparisons, taking the motive of sacrifice as something common to
all human beings into consideration.
But the debate which arises at this point would again take a dubious course,
if the discipline of ethno-psychiatry were to be regarded as a mere preliminary
to a definitive sort of anthropo-psychiatry. Otherness within one’s own culture
would then descend to a mere variant within a universal structure-system, preci-
sely as cultural-anthoprological structuralism assumes.19 But we have good rea-
sons to contest such a belief in an irresistible process of universalization. Cultu-
ral universals are comparable to linguistic universals. One may well concede that
18 As one example among others see Stéphane Mosès’s Jewish inspired interpretation:
“Why Isaac was not sacrificed” (2004, ch. 2).
19 However, Claude Lévi-Strauss, the protagonist of this movement, balances the trend
towards an all-encompassing science of the universal with a counter-trend towards a differential
science of the alien, inspired by Rousseau.
62 Bernhard Waldenfels
all human languages, like all human diseases, have certain features and rules in
common, to some extent formed by pre-cultural, natural processes, to some
extent based on trans-cultural, rational categories; but this does not prevent us
from assuming that all that exists on this side or on the other side of a certain
culture provides us with mere forms of conditio sine qua non. These are at best
necessary conditions, but by no means sufficient conditions in order to explain
what is created by culture. By no means does the undeniable fact that German
and Chinese are not toto coelo different abolish the difference between native
and foreign language. All the unavoidable efforts to learn and to translate, which
take place within a linguistic Zwischenreich, i. e. within a sort of between-region,
can never be completely covered by mental or natural laws, capable of organi-
zing our experience from above or from below. Mutatis mutandis, this should
also hold true for the multiplicity of medical phenomena and for the relation
between the doctor and the patient in his quality as a cultural other. Precisely as
there are several orders, without one single order, there are several pathologies,
without one single pathology. Deviations are as plural as the orders from which
the abnormal behaviour deviates.
In order to characterize those peculiarities of thinking which resist our
attempts of universalization, we assume certain idioms of thinking;20 in a si-
milar way we may take into account certain idioms of illness. Let us mention
a linguistic example, taken from Freud’s work The Unconscious (GW X, 296
f.): “The eyes are not right, sie sind verdreht (they are rolled or twisted) [...], he
is a hypocrite, an Augenverdreher (distorter of eyes), he has distorted her eyes,
now she has distorted eyes, they are no longer her eyes, she sees the world with
other eyes.” Or another passage: “ She stands in the church, suddenly es gibt
ihr einen Ruck (literally: it gives her a jerk), sie muß sich anders stellen, als stellte
sie jemand, als würde sie gestellt (she must place herself differently, as if some-
body were placing her, as if she were being placed).” These are plays on words
produced by a schizophrenic girl who has been taken to the clinic because of
a quarrel with her lover.21 Austrian and German readers cannot help thinking
of certain cascades of words in Thomas Bernhard’s texts, such as the following
sentences, taken from a text called Gehen (1971, p. 85): “We cannot say we
think as we go, as we cannot say we go as we think, because we cannot go as
we think, nor think as we go.” To some extent the idiomatic sound of such
sentences can be transferred into another language, but by no means can it be
universalized. The “cultural materials” from which psychopaths derive their
forces of defense, as Devereux assumes, are not raw, but pre-formed materials,
so that a certain sense shines through the non-sense.
22 Accordingly, chapter 4 of the Topographie des Fremden explicitly deals with the “para-
dox of a science of the alien”; such a paradox is inherent to all ethno-disciplines, including
ethnopsychiatry.
64 Bernhard Waldenfels
Literature
前言
本文以「治療者置身於心理治療現場」為輻輳點,探討心理治
療中的言語互動如何成為「倫理照顧」的技術。「倫理照顧」(ethical
care)的提出是筆者與台灣相關學者近年來對於華人本土心理療癒的研
究成果(余德慧、李維倫、林耀盛、余安邦、陳淑惠、許敏桃、謝碧
玲、石世明,2004),其意涵是:當社會文化之形式規範無法施行,
或甚至成為個人受苦結構的一部分,如新寡之婦女或些許輕忽意外
喪子的母親,受苦者處於「倫理的難處」而需要一種心理救助來為
其解除這些規範桎梧並將之送往一個重構人與人之間關係秩序的再
倫理化道路。「倫理照顧」不同於西方心理治療理論中的內部化症
狀理論,如防衛機制,也不再專注於各種解決症狀的手段,如認知
或行為的改變,而是指向人之活於世間的倫理安置。本文的論題則
是源於筆者對於心理治療的形式如何成就倫理照顧的系列研究(李維
倫,2004b;Lee,2007),目的在於討論心理治療現場中說話做為行
動 (speech as action),在促發及抑制倫理關係轉置上的操作。
68 Wei-Lun LEE
筆者過去曾探討華人文化傳統中知識分子的自我陶冶、新寡婦女
的處境、以及庶民生活中宗教療癒運作,提出了倫理行動(ethical act)
做為心理治療的療癒動向,指的是:「受苦與療癒即是個人心思空
間與其所在的人情形式之間的「阻絕」與「通透」。…透過被接引
到一個廣袤的「奧秘」空間,個人心思得以抒發與安置,進而促發
人情倫理局面的重解或行事的重新磨合。」(李維倫,2004b,頁359)
筆者也進一步分殊了心理治療作為倫理照顧,要去接引的是「倫理
性自我」(self-for-being-ethical),有別於以培養「功能性自我」(self-for-
functioning)為目標的心理治療(Lee,2007)。在這些研究成果中,倫理
照顧呈現為一個目前心理治療形式可以採用的療癒架構。
為了進一步探究心理治療現場中的倫理照顧互動,本文有了如此
的提問:相對於一般人的「勸說」以及助人專業的「症狀處理」,
倫理照顧心理治療現場中的說話行動如何給出抑制或促發的人際運
動?如果是促發,那麼說話的兩造之間,將呈現出什麼樣的互動歷
程?如果是抑制,心理治療中語言行動的接應狀況又當如何?「說
話」在此,又如何有別於認知的操作(如認知治療),或是意識理性的
亮光(如心理分析)?在這樣的追問下,「反面置身」浮現為一個核心
的現象與概念:心理治療的現場並非只有單一平面;離脫於一般正
面智性邏輯與人情應然領域之外的經驗地帶可稱之為「反面置身」
(situated negativity),而這正是受苦者的置身所在。說話做為倫理照顧
的技術即在於此一反面置身的抵達。
因此,本文將以底下四個主題來論述:二重性經驗與反面置身的
倫理照顧(the experience of duality and the ethical care for situated negativity)
、反面置身中的身體經驗(bodily experience in situated negativity)、現場
(the locale)、以及說話做為行動(speech as action)。最後,本文將結論,
在倫理照顧的心理治療現場,治療者透過說話要抵達的並非社會性
的規範倫理,而是無名且充滿力量的反面置身。因此,社會性規範
倫理的反面置身不是倫理照顧所要取消的對象,反而是治療者與被
治療者要一起進入且領受的地帶,也就是使其成為可以棲居(dwelling)
的地帶,也就是新的生存形式的生成。本文的考察,不但將發現心
理治療中倫理照顧的互動模式,也將深入心理治療的核心,建立一
個一般性的心理治療理論。
二重性經驗與反面置身的倫理照顧
過去數年來,在筆者所屬的一個關於台灣本土心理療癒研究團隊
�
的研究成果中,逐漸浮現的一個瞭解是,心理療癒經驗並非僅是一
個「問題-解決」歷程,而是涉及到在兩個不同性質之經驗平面間的
移動(李維倫,2004b;余安邦,2003;余德慧,2001;余德慧、石世
明,2001a,2001b;余德慧、李維倫、林耀盛、余安邦、陳淑惠、許
敏桃、謝碧玲、石世明,2004;余德慧、彭榮邦,2003;許敏桃、
psychotherapy as a Locale for EthicalCare 69
而第二個經驗平面則可描述為第一個經驗平面的「反面」,即
恰恰是智性邏輯與人情應然所不及處。如果說第一個經驗平面是講
道理的、依據因果的、可預測的,則第二個經驗平面就是被視為斷
裂的、難以說出或無可說出的、不可預測的、糢糊的、身體的。這
正、反兩個經驗平面構成了一個「二重性經驗」(the experience of dua-
lity)的基本結構。舉例來說,受創於重大災難的生還者經常會顯現出
一種對所遭遇之衝擊無法理解、無法說出、同時也是無法確定的經
驗現象;在這樣的經驗之後,他/她們進入了一般生活的反面。同樣
的,臨終病患除了對自己「為何患病?」無法理解外,通常也呈現
出一種接觸到日常行事應然之外、無法明白說出或是難以為人所知
的經驗領域(余德慧、石世明、李維倫、王英偉,2002)。我們可以
說,處於維持與推動生活平常之智性邏輯平面的是「正面世界」經
驗,而離脫於此一經驗領域之外的即是「反面置身」(situated negati-
vity)的經驗。
不過,前述的兩個例子似乎也暗示了,反面置身是一種反常,甚
至是破壞,是必須被加以排除或修補的。然而,在我們的研究瞭解
中,反面置身經驗不僅呈現為反常或破壞,同時也是療癒轉化中具
有超越性的部分(余安邦,2003;余德慧、劉美妤,2003)。這其實不
難理解,療癒本身即包括對「平常」的超越,這也就可能呈現為對
「平常」的背反。以另外的例子來說,一位音樂奇才的不世出作品
可能會被認為是對同時代之音樂規制的破壞。反面置身因此有著毀
壞性與超越性的矛盾性質。
在筆者過去有關心理治療的研究中(李維倫,2004b;Lee,2007)也
指出,心理治療的療癒活動總是起始於日常人情之應然的「掉落」
,即反面置身經驗。由圖1來說明心理治療的療癒行動,我們可以看
到A—B軸上的移動表示個人在現實生活中的受苦處境,其中主要的
是從A到B的「掉落感」(sense of being expelled),以及由B到A之回返的
努力的受阻。由此看來,反面置身即是一種「掉落」於人情形式之
理所當然領域之外的經驗。
70 Wei-Lun LEE
C. 奧 秘
有所抒發的交往 D. 助人者
重
擬似倫理
締結
解
/
行
事
本
心 磨
心
思 合
之
我 個空
間 阻絕 A.
化
之 現實生活之
本心觸動
人情形式
B. 受苦者
我
掉落感 間隙 / 裂縫
進一步來說,反面置身者將經驗到湧動的「心思空間」,其中包
括了兩個作為者位置(positions of agency)的產生:一是「個化之我」,
它仍是在人事之應然底下看待經驗者自己的反面置身,仍是以離棄
的方式來對待反面置身;而「本心之我」的作為者位置顯化的是讓
反面置身成為助人者與受助者共同的領受對象。也就是說,「本心
之我」的意涵是,A—B間的掉落與阻絕可以經由受苦者向上走抒發
的交往或擬似倫理的路子,進入B—D間的締結關係而產生通透於反
面置身的本心觸動經驗。而走水平方向之BA路子的「個化之我」
以抗立的方式求取自我保全,以防衛爭鬥的方式應付人情形式中的
要求,形成了一個「阻絕」的人情局面。「個化之我」與「本心之
我」是依著經驗到的人情形式不同,在心思空間中相應而生之不同
的自我思慮。筆者(李維倫,2004b)也以實際的例子說明,A—B軸上
的互動表面上看起來是似乎是要解決受苦者的顯著困境,但卻會離
開了受苦的本心經驗,陷入了與個化之我的糾纏。
正面世界 現實生活之人情形式
阻絕
反面置身 本心觸動
圖 2 :置身於倫理難處的二重
性
psychotherapy as a Locale for EthicalCare 71
連結到本文所提出的反面置身概念,圖1中的「現實生活之人情形
式」即為正面經驗領域,因為它跟隨的是智性邏輯之行事應然的道
理,而受苦者的B位置即是反面置身。圖2即是示意此一置身於倫理
難處的二重性。因此,我們可以說,所有的心理受苦都是反面置身
之苦。在反面置身底下,流動著種種感受與心思。「本心觸動」是
一個反面置身的經驗,它雖是有所察覺,但卻不可言喻。「個化之
我」的作為者位置,即是個人要離脫反面置身而向正面處境回返的
努力。底下試以一例進一步說明。
SU為一20歲的女大學生,在一次嚴重的車禍中全身多處骨折,需要
接受多次的手術治療與物理復健。在復原期間SU經常情緒激動,與
家人照顧者之間有多次衝突。在車禍發生後的第5個月,SU開始接受
心理晤談。她表示,在與別人的互動上,她有著兩個困難。第一個是
她感到自己不再能夠與朋友一起對某些事物感到興趣。在同學的聚
會中別人會興高采烈,但她卻不再覺得有何可興奮之處,只會注視著
正在說笑的友人,別人也就會說她變得冷漠。SU也說,她知道以前
的自己一定也會像別人一樣享受聚會的快樂,但如今的她卻已完全漠
然。SU第二個人際上的困難是,沒有人能夠瞭解她所經歷的,也沒
有人懂她為何有些堅持,即使是照顧她最多的母親也無法理解。因此
她與心力交瘁的母親經常衝突。
SU表示車禍後她覺得自己完全變了一個人,除了時常憤怒、焦
躁、孤單、害怕外,她感到對自己的陌生。有一次,SU幾乎是哀求
著說:「我要回到像以前一樣。」但我告訴她:「妳是不可能再像
以前一樣了。」SU頓時沈默,眼淚潸然而下。
相映著直接指出她所謂的「回到過去」的不可能性,我在策略
上採取與SU的「陌生之處」經驗進行連繫,也就是去靠近SU的置
身所在(situatedness),並指出此一新的經驗平面對她雖是陌生,但卻
絕非孤單之地;這些也是人類經驗的一部分。隨著晤談的進展,SU
逐漸呈現出有力量處理生活中的事務,她說:「我現在不再在意過
去覺得重要的事。過去我可能會擔心好朋友會離開我,現在我覺得
即使如此我自己一個人也會過得不錯。此外,我覺得不管面對什麼
樣的任務,我都可以做到。」SU開始出現對某些課程與事務的熱
切,以及對另一些課程與事務的不耐。在晤談開始後的兩個半月
時,SU甚至藉由一項課堂作業,主動決定訪問母親的受苦經驗。母
女兩人在電話交談中痛哭失聲,瞭解了彼此的受苦與心意。SU說:
「我從未感受到與母親如此地靠近。」
SU仍然擔心著接下來必須再度接受的手術治療,她甚至宣稱,
她寧願醫生直接割開她的皮肉也不要接受全身痲醉,因為全身痲醉
讓她感到就像車禍後昏迷時的無能為力、如同死去一般,SU說:「
那是一種完全沒有了的感覺。」而她無法確定她是否會再醒過來。(
節錄整理自:李維倫,心理晤談記錄SU20041004- SU20041213)
上面的例子在DSM-IV-TR的系統中很明顯的會被歸類於創傷經
驗,而這樣的創傷經驗會是處置介入的對象。也就是說,當定義為
創傷經驗,SU的種種情緒與體驗都會被認定為需要排除的對象。但
如以圖1的療癒動向來思考,我們可以這樣說,車禍讓SU的生活之理
所當然出現裂縫,而SU隨之經驗到一個反面的置身處境,不但難以
72 Wei-Lun LEE
被他人所瞭解,連她自己都感到陌生。這個經驗顯現為無以名狀的
情緒與感觸,而當她努力地想再返回原本的生活時,阻絕經驗顯著
起來,同時伴隨著另一層的挫折與怨怒感。筆者在上述晤談記錄中
呈現出以接引「本心感觸」的方向來與SU交往,這同時也是對想否
定反面置身之「個化之我」的挫折(「妳是不可能再像以前一樣了。
」)。在這個過程中,SU呈現出在正面世界與反面置身間的反覆移
動。當一方面SU能夠與母親和解,發展出一個新的關係樣態時(「我
從未感受到與母親如此地靠近。」),另一方面還是會有無法確定的
反面經驗發生(「那是一種完全沒有了的感覺。」)。
雖然筆者先前的發現可以部分說明SU的例子,但由於對反面置身
的經驗特性考察不夠深入,無法細緻地描述上例中SU的療癒運動歷
程。而在本研究中提出反面置身經驗為焦點,讓筆者能夠再仔細思
考一遍細部的療癒歷程。
前面的說明中,我們瞭解到療癒的過程中,有著一個熟悉的正面
世界,以及一個陌生的、反面置身經驗。我們一般處於正面世界,
會認為這是唯一且理所當然的。而當反面置身顯化,則同時出現一
種「正面/反面」的二重性經驗:經驗者不管是在那一個經驗平面,
都同時會經驗另一平面的對立,甚至是衝突。此時經驗者會有幾點
特徵:(1)、他/她會感到與他人的距離,咫尺天涯。看著別人的行
為與生活,但自己卻好像無法融入。這是一種個化(individualization)
的掉落經驗,這時的個化不見得是馬上形成個化之我,而是一種掉
落,從熟悉之周遭中掉落出來的經驗。因此,回到二重性的問題
上,掉落後的個化位置即是移置到反面置身的位置。(2)、想要「回
到從前」,即融回周遭人情形式的努力,回到正面的人情行事之應
然。這時相映於這些行為努力,個人經驗到自己成為一個作為者,
此即是個化之我的經驗。(3)、反面置身經驗者同時會有一種哀傷而
舔舐傷口的經驗。但這有時是個化之我的自我哀憐而非掉落時的本
心觸動。這些經驗都有一種私己性,即與他人阻隔的。(4)、由於掉
落於不同的經驗平面,經驗者將時常感受到與他人的不相合,經驗
者會被要求回到他/她回不去的地方。如上例的SU的親友要她不要這
麼「冷漠」,要她像以前一樣。(5)、經驗者本身對反面置身是陌生
的,也就自然傾向於尋求離脫反面置身的方法或做法。最後,(6)、
上例也似乎顯示,如果能夠讓經驗者安身於二重性的經驗中,不是
只想否定反面置身,也不是走向另一極端,否定第一個正面世界,
也就是讓經驗者具備在雙重空間穿梭的能力,經驗者的受苦結構則
會因而改變。也就是說,療癒的發生並非指在第一重空間中的事實(
原本熟悉的世界中的裂縫)獲得改變,而是原本以為是唯一的平面變
成二重中的一重。底下筆者將以輔仁大學助理教授蔡怡佳所提供的
一個例子來具體化第(6)點的主張。
一位母親因兒子車禍變成如同植物人一般而憂心焦急不已。這位母親
是虔誠的天主教徒,因此時常祈禱請求上帝顯示神蹟,讓兒子甦醒過
來。有一時,母親所熟識的一位修女來病床前探望這對母子,並陪同
psychotherapy as a Locale for EthicalCare 73
母親一起禱告。突然間母親看到一幕景象,耶穌基督手握權杖來到病
床前,以權杖點了兒子一下,兒子就坐了起來。就在這個時候修女也
宣稱她看到了一幕景象,兩人協議由修女先說出她的經驗,修女說她
看見耶穌基督手握權杖來到病床前,祂放下權杖,彎屈身體伸出雙手
將病人抱到懷裏。此時母親流下眼淚,卻沒有把自己所到看的景象說
出。事後母親道出這段經驗,並說當時她體會到一種更廣大的愛,也
同時感受到自己的苦楚獲得釋放。(蔡怡佳,私人溝通)
此例中母親所經驗到的療癒不能說是負擔的解除,而是接觸到、
或說顯化了另一經驗平面,即反面置身,的存在。這裏所顯示的受
苦療癒雖然與SU之例有很大部分的不同,但兩者都有二重性經驗的
發生:除了原本熟悉但已受破壞的世界之外,還接受了另一個經驗
平面的存在。療癒可以不是醫療技術或神蹟將傷害復原,也不是第
二重經驗的抹除,更不是「回去」原來的生活,而是安身於二重性
經驗之中。也就是說,反面置身也成為可存在的經驗,甚至是領受
而非拒絕的對象。彭榮邦(2000)曾指出,在台灣民間宗教中,許多的
乩身都是現實生活中的受苦者。筆者(李維倫,2004b)考察彭榮邦的
研究發現,在這些乩身的成乩過程中,其俗世之困難並未因為與神
祇的交往關係而被抹除,有時甚至變本加厲,但與神祇的交往提供
了另一重的經驗平面,使得原本的現實受苦生活已非唯一的經驗空
間。這相映著本文所提出的二重性經驗的療癒結構。
反面置身中的身體經驗
當我們考慮反面置身經驗時,無法忽略置身者的身體經驗(bodily
experience)。前述SU的例子也提示出,異樣的身體感,包括無法消除
的疼痛、麻醉劑的感受、以及後來的某種熱切,是反面置身的重要
面向。為了進一步考慮這個議題,我們再此先轉換一下跑道,借助
心理分析的古典案例來提供更多的線索。
回顧佛洛依德的古典案例朵拉(Freud,2004),我們可以發現,在
朵拉的生活中,最顯著也因為顯著而不被看見的,其實是一種曖昧
的氛圍:其家人與鄰人朋友之言語及意圖的多重意義。這種曖昧的
氛圍在經驗上,即如同本文在討論SU案例時所指出的「咫尺天涯」
:看得到卻得不到確定。如此,個化的經驗(the experience of indivi-
dualization)也就出現了。我們可以想像,朵拉身處於曖昧氛圍中,無
法明確知道到底發生了什麼事,即使她努力注視眼前發生的事情,
她還是難以對周遭人事有明確的認定。這種處於曖昧的複多經驗(the
experience of multiplicity)但卻凝視著、尋求著事物確定意涵的姿態正
是一個二重性經驗:她置身於反面,望著正面;她所注視的部分無
法說明她所置身的部分。而當在此處境中的個人開始「認定」事情
的意涵時,卻也從來無法「肯定」或「確認」。因此,此一曖昧並
未消散,而是繼續保持下來,個人處境也就成為一個特別的姿態:
身處反面但背向反面,無法置身於正面世界卻努力去尋求正面的置
74 Wei-Lun LEE
正面世界
反面置身
1 2
圖 3 :二重性經驗之穿梭樣態
身。圖3中第2號箭頭為朵拉之反面置身位移;而第1號箭頭運動,即
是顯示此一樣態:箭頭的部分好像已置身正面世界,但其實仍在反
面,也就是經驗到一種咫尺天涯的阻絕狀態。由此可知,雖然在瞭
解與行動的方向上大不相同,但本計畫所主張的正面/反面二重性經
驗結構也可見於傳統的心理分析理論中。
進一步來看朵拉案例中佛洛依德(Freud,2004)對身體經驗的認識
方式。佛洛依德對朵拉的分析主要在於對其生理症狀(咳嗽、呼吸
困難等)與如吸吮乳房、吸吮手指,吸吮陰莖等種種性慾經驗之間
的連結。佛洛依德認為,身體性的激發感受是潛意識構成的重要基
礎。佛洛依德在此提出了一個關於反面置身之身體經驗的論述與邏
輯。而回到本研究二重性經驗的理論思考上,我們可以進一步問:
在二重性經驗結構中要如何來理解佛洛依德對性慾及其種種作用的
觀察?在尚未有實徵資料而單純以思辨方式來回答這問題的話,筆
者認為,由於反面置身並非意義的擅場之地,因此經驗上極其容易
充滿了身體性與感受性等的激動或流動。當個體無法安身於單一意
義的運作平面時,他人的話語就容易散射出種種可能,甚至撩撥身
體感受。因此,反面置身也包括著許多身體性激動或流動的複多經
驗。
不過,反面置身經驗中的身體性激動或流動是否必然指向生物性
慾,或是佛洛依德的論述方式是否為我們討論身體經驗所必然要採
取的路徑,則有待商榷。龔卓軍(2006)對身體經驗的討論可做為另
一個思考的指引。龔卓軍的提問雖是從現象學出發,但與Merleau-
Ponty(1962)所處理的身體現象學不同:身體現象學談知覺與身體圖式
(corporeal schema)等,指向身體做為把生存經驗形構起來的架子。但
龔卓軍問的是,在這之前呢?是如何的條件使得某種身體部署(body
disposition)出現?龔卓軍指出,在還無法與世界搭出一個協商後的
結構之前,身體與世界還未組織起來,是無器官的身體(body without
organs;Deleuze and Guattari,1983)。這個身體無以名狀(unpresentable)
;在這個時刻,我們的思維無以為繼,無法思。我們可以說,這
正是一種反面置身的體驗,是主體隱遁的狀態。這種狀態或時刻,
psychotherapy as a Locale for EthicalCare 75
有著強度經驗,但無法以一個模式來接應。這是一個自我失落的時
刻,非理性時刻。
對龔卓軍來說,已形成的模式,如身體圖式,是外掛於無器官身
體的慾望機器(desiring-mechines,Deleuze and Guattari,1983)。而不
論慾望機器如何盛行,無器官身體都還是不透明的,當下的,力量
流動的。同時,若無器官的身體能夠被抵達,便有著機會開出種種
不同的身體部署空間(龔卓軍,2006),也即是一種生存形式的重新生
產。以此觀之,所謂的倫理,並不是進入既有模式的要求或重覆,
而是進入反面經驗,去遭逢無器官的身體,進入生產的時刻,搭建
起一個與世界聯繫起來的新的生存形式。
從本文的角度來看,龔卓軍以身體部署的生產時刻來談倫理,提
示出了倫理不是參與到正面世界的應然,而是參與到反面置身:在
倫理的難處,治療者如何進入受苦者的反面置身而得以與其遭逢,
其中包括了身體感的種種可能,這是一倫理性的考慮與作為。
何謂「現場」?
正面世界與反面置身構成的二重性經驗要如何拉出對心理治療現
場的聚焦呢?我們應再仔細看看,到底在心理治療現場中發生了什
麼事?到底在心理治療現場所進行的,是不是就是我們一般心理治
療理論所教導我們的問題解決或是進行解釋的活動?當我們思及「
何謂現場?」時,我們也就看到,「現場」(the locale)其實是一個被
認為太過明白以致於遭致忽略的地帶。從事心理治療的人都知道,
心理治療「現場」其實不是理所當然地自明;它是浮動的,也是最
無法被第三人來參與及評判的。
「現場」到底是什麼?底下一個幼兒學語的簡單例子或許可以做
為討論的參考。
我1歲9個月大的兒子寬寬指著月曆上的葡萄照片對我說:「一樣,一
樣。」同時也拉著他的褲子,讓我看到他的褲子上有著一個一串葡萄
的繡花圖案。寬寬重覆著說:「這個一樣,一樣。」(李維倫,寬寬
成長觀察記錄,20041115)
上面這個例子是小孩在獲得語言的過程中常見的情形,然而當
我們仔細考察,這其中有著相當複雜的經驗結構。當吾兒寬寬指著
身上衣服繡的葡萄圖案與月曆上的葡萄照片說「一樣」時,他一方
面進入語言指稱的領域,但另一方面,現場所覺知到的不同,如質
感、尺寸、與顏色,反而被推擠開來了;也就是說,這兩件東西是
不一樣、有差異的!但這「差異」在語言的指稱中被抹除了。再進
76 Wei-Lun LEE
一步言,相對於在場的某些覺知的排拒,寬寬的「一樣」所指涉的
那個東西,卻以不在場的形式被帶入在場。
我們可以這樣說,寬寬的作為是一生成性的過程,在此過程中,
他經歷了現場覺知。然而現場覺知是多樣的、雜多的,誰也不知道
這些多樣的經驗之間接下去要怎麼連在一起。當他說出「一樣」
時,發生了一個生成事件,這個生成包括了某些部分的突現,某些
部分的排斥。突現的部分立即生產了一個不在場的在場,在這個例
子中可能是與葡萄相關的事物,甚或他對吃葡萄的記憶。這一部分
使他進入了語言的領域,勾連上了語言的強大力量,讓他在照片與
繡花圖案的覺知之間獲得了一個突顯的連結方向,不再只是糢糊複
多的經驗。另一方面,他離開了那個複多經驗,其中包括許多不同
方向的覺知。
更進一步來說,倘若有人對上述寬寬的「一樣」接話:「你說
的是葡萄嗎?」、「你喜歡吃葡萄嗎?」或是「葡萄是紫色的,那
奇異果呢?」等,這樣的談話就會將對話的焦點帶離現場更遠;現
場複多的知覺經驗將不被參與、遭到遺留、也就有可能就此掩蓋下
來。這被遺留下來的經驗領域卻是話語生成的根源。
從上述的例子與討論,我們可以對「現場」提出這樣的認識。第
一,現場有著以語言所規劃出來的一個突現的意義秩序與理路。第
二,語言,指涉了一個不在場的世界;將此一不在場帶入了現場。
或者更常見的是,將我們的眼光帶出現場,帶向不在場的指涉世
界。以及第三,現場還包括了一個糢糊的複多知覺經驗地帶。上一
節討論的正面世界之邏輯行事理路,正是依賴正面語言的規劃;糢
糊複多的流動經驗地帶,摻雜著知覺與體感,則構成了正面語言的
反面,一種反面性的現場置身。也就是說,「現場」也正有著相映
受苦經驗中的正面世界與反面置身二重性。
具體來說,想像一個心理治療的現場:(1)、治療的約定、轉介
原因、治療方法、治療目標等構成了某種「應然」的正面世界,此
外,被說出的話語所鋪排的、充滿故事的意義平面,也是正面世界
結構的一部分;(2)、治療者與受助者的「在現場」也有一個流動
的、糢糊的、閃爍的、複多的知覺經驗領域,其中可能包含了兩者
的相互知覺與相互引動,以及其他種種心思的湧動;以及,(3)、除
了上述兩者構成的二重性結構外,本節關於「現場」的討論更進一
步提示出,在現場出現的語言事件的可能性質有二:一是「在場的
話語」指涉到「不在場的事實」;二是「做為在場生成事件之結果
的話語」連繫到「在場的反面置身」。也就是說,語言與「不顯現
者」的連繫方式,左右了語言是帶離現場的事實指認,或是指向回
到現場的就地發生。我們可以簡示如下:
E.在場的正面顯現話語 → F.不在場的事實或經驗
psychotherapy as a Locale for EthicalCare 77
↓
G.在場的反面置身
橫向的E-F指的是「在場—不在場」的連繫,兩者都處於正面;而
縱向的E-G指的是「正面—反面」的連繫,兩者都在現場。現場正面
語言的連繫指向決定了對話是否滑向不在場的事實、經驗,還是讓
在場之反面置身與語言生成之關係得以揭露。這個認識不但牽涉到
倫理照顧之療癒意涵,也構成了以話語為對象的研究方法論:即對
話語連繫方向的分辨。
就本文的反面置身的倫理照顧觀點而言,反面置身構成了臨床現
場,而正面世界的經驗及其語言對反面置身是無法通達的;然而正
是反面置身的靠近與抵達構成了療癒的可能(李維倫,2004b),這樣
的抵達在這邊的討論下也呈現為一種「生成事件」:就像寬寬的「
一樣」,雖然同時排擠了其他的現場經驗,但由複多經驗出發生成
了一種掌握。複多經驗的回歸也即是一生成歷程的開始。
以此來看一個現場事件,並非只是單純的事實性存在者,而是有
著生產與排斥的動態運動。我們可以說,生產是想像的生產,即生
產了想像。想像讓我們得以建造關係性的經驗平面,讓我們得以居
留其中。不過這樣的生產也讓我們遠離複多經驗,遠離我們的現場
覺知。從某一角度來看,這樣的生產也就是一種異化(alienation)。回
到克莉斯蒂娃(Kristeva,2003)的賤斥理論,這種有所生成有所拒斥的
作用,即是主體形成的過程。相對於陽面主體的生產,即有那被賤
斥的陰面。
心理治療因此可有兩個方向,一是貢獻於陽面或正面主體性的維
持,而療癒就會被定義為主體危機(陰面經驗,即複多經驗,如潛意
識,或創傷)的解除,或是主體的確定或再確定(陽面經驗,即想像平
面的穩固)。另一個療癒的方向則是,回到生成歷程,即不只是單方
向的線性運動,而是來回穿梭,來回穿梭即是生成。此時,那個被
賤斥者,被延異者,必需被靠近,而且不必然要被認為是恐怖,因
為恐怖的認定還是以主體視野為出發,這就造成焦慮。
以現場之二重性的生發歷程來思考心理治療,正提供了一個研
究分析心理治療活動的道路。所有的談話,包括心理治療的談話,
都有著被說出的話語(the said),以及言說行動(the saying)。被說出的
話語,就如同寬寬的「一樣」,構成了顯題的意義故事平面。而在
另一方面,在談話活動中,說話行動通常隱匿於我們的主要覺知之
外,它並且不是事先決定的,而是就地發生。此一生發性即是反面
置身的特徵之一。固然有許多言說並非生發性的,而是同一化的,
但這並非否定了生發性言說的可能。反面置身的話語並非只有沈
默。
78 Wei-Lun LEE
說話的現場行動與文本的現場性
前一節的討論發現了現場話語的雙重連繫結構,這對以談話為主
要形式的心理治療有著重要的意涵。一般對於語言的指涉功能較為
熟悉,而現場的「正面—反面」連繫有何思考的線索?筆者認為,
聚焦於談話現場作用的語用學(pragmatics)、說話行動理論(speech act
theory)、以及談話分析(conversational analysis)可以做為本研究進一步思
考現場語言的橋樑。
語用學(pragmatics,如Levinson,1983)以行動與互動的觀點來瞭解
語言,研究語句(utterance)在脈絡(context)中的使用;晚近的語用學
研究擴展到論述(discourse)的使用與社會文化脈絡的關係(Blum-Kul-
ka,2000)。語用學的理論早先是將語言的使用看做是有意圖的表達
(intentional communication),而被表達的意圖若要被正確地理解,有
賴於人際脈絡中某種默會的作用,後者超過一般語義的範圍。說話
行動理論(speech act theory,Austin,1962;Searle,1969)則進一步主張
語句本身即有能力行使行動,如「我警告你」、「我愛你」等,語
句的說出本身就是一個行動,也會產生作用與實際的後果。值得注
意的是,語言行動理論雖然將語言表達視為意圖性的行動,但此意
圖不再只是來自於說話者,而是在某些語句特徵上即具備了這樣的
行動能力,也同時構成了說話者與聽話者的位置。進一步來說,說
話行動理論將「行動意圖」從說話者那兒分開來,放到語句的結構
特徵上去。這樣一來,語句也就展現了其形構的(constituting)作用:
語句的說出也給出了說話者與聽話者之間在談話現場的關係。
進一步以語用學中談話分析(conversation analysis)的瞭解來看,將說
出的語句(utterance)視為談話動作(conversational move),使得一個語句
的意涵「深深地依賴於它在一連串接續行動之中的座落點」(Nofsin-
ger,1991,p. 50)。對照來看,語句的意涵就不必以不在場的指涉來
決定,而是植基於具現場性的前後語句間的互動之中。前面提過,
說話行動本身就承載了意圖,也就形構了說話者在現場的存在位
置。而且,決定這些位置的意涵本身具備了時間性的結構:語句做
為談話中的動作,其意涵也就牽涉到在它之前由其他語句動作所打
開的意義場(過去),而它也提供出可能性範圍以貢獻於即將出現的語
句動作(未來)。在一個語句之前與之後的語句的功能即在於幫助這個
語句獲得特定的意涵(現在)。這樣的位置也就顯現為談話現場就地發
生的置身所在(situatedness,李維倫,2004a;Lee,1999)。
也就是說,若研究者得以把握住說話語句的行動面向而非其指涉
面向,話語的意涵可以由語句之間的關係來獲得,也就是以現場的
談話行動來獲得。
不過,如同一般的社會科學研究,語用學的研究仍然依賴將談話
錄音謄寫成逐字稿的形式以做為分析材料。這樣由談話事件到談話
psychotherapy as a Locale for EthicalCare 79
文本的轉變,雖然讓「談話」獲得固定,但本文所提出的關於現場
的結構是否會因之遭到破壞?這對於本文堅持對「治療現場」的聚
焦是否是一個重大缺憾?「現場」不總是隨著事件的消散而逝去?
謄寫為文字的談話文本總不是談話現場本身,前者與後者的關係到
底如何?這些問題進一步牽涉到,本文所提出的現場架構,有可能
被具體且重覆地檢視?
詮釋現象學者呂格爾(Ricoeur,1976)在考察語言行動理論後進一步
指出,將語句或談話寫下來的文本(text),足以由詮釋分析的方式揭
露一個「生活世界」,一個「切合於此一獨特文本的世界」:
我在此的論點是,第一級參照(first-order reference)的消失,如在小說與
詩的情況中所出現的,是第二級參照得以自由可能的條件。第二級參
照所達到的,不僅是在可操弄的事物的層次,更是能通達胡塞爾以「
生活世界」(Lebenswelt)以及海德格以「寓居於世」(being-in-the-world)
所指稱的層次。(Ricoeur,1991b,p. 85-86,筆者譯,以下皆同)
如果我們不再把詮釋學(hermeneutics)定義為對隱藏在文本背後的另一
個人的心理意圖的追尋,如果我們不想將詮釋化約成結構的發現,則
剩下的又有什麼是詮釋所要通達的?我會說:詮釋即是對由文本所流
露展示出的那種寓居於世的解明。
在此我們接合到海德格所提到的有關理解(Verstehen)的概念。在存
有與時間一書中,理解的理論不再指向對他人的理解,而是寓居
於世的一項結構。更精確地說,它是在討論完現身情態(或譯境遇
感;Befindlichkeit [state of mind])之後所探討的結構。「理解」的時機
辯證地符合於在一情境中的落身:正是由我們本己可能性的籌劃投出
情境中,我們發現到自己。我要保留此一分析中「我們本己可能性的
籌劃」(the projection of our ownmost possibilities)的概念,應用到文本理
論中。因為在文本中所要詮釋的是一個於其中我得以棲居並籌劃一個
我最本己的可能性的可能世界(a proposed world)。那就是我所稱的文
本的世界,切合於此一獨特文本的世界。(Ricoeur,1991a,p. 86)
所謂的第一級參照指的是話語被說出的當時所指涉的情境意涵;
第一級參照並不會在話語被謄成文本之後一起被保留下來,而是就
此消失。然而呂格爾認為這樣的消失並不是一個缺憾。同時,在解
讀文本時也不盡然要追溯話語所指涉的、已過去的事實條件,因為
第一級的消失反而使第二級參照成為可能,那就是:即使事實性的
當時處境已不復得,但將對談文本中的話語視為說話行動後,反而
談話的互動與給出的機制可以獲得通達。
以本文所發現的話語之雙重連繫結構來看,「在場—不在場」
的連繫即等於呂格爾所說的第一級參照。一般我們傾向聚焦這樣的
連繫來解讀話語。然而在斷絕了此一連繫後,並且以行動來考慮說
話,反而讓第二級參照,即話語就地發生的過程,也正是「正面—
反面」的連繫得以被揭露。
80 Wei-Lun LEE
如此一來,記錄談話語句的文本本身也仍然負載著談話的「現場
性」,即:話語的雙重連繫結構。雖然文本已非談話事件本身,但
談話的就地發生過程還是被保留在逐字稿文本中。這將讓心理治療
的研究者得以透過具體的文本檢視心理治療療現場的說話行動其及
連繫方式。
綜而言之,將對話視為說話行動,每一個動作的意涵是決定於
與其他語句動作的應對進退之中,也就是貼回現場的活動。而即使
是這些對話被寫下來,成為文本後,說話行動的應對進退也沒有消
失。也就是說,只要談話錄音的逐字稿文本保留了談話語句之間的
關係,以適當的分析方法,是可以認識到這些「應對進退」及其發
生的來源。藉由說話行動及其「應對進退」的視野,我們可以將眼
光留在現場,以便進一步考察如何抵達反面置身。
結論:心理治療的倫理現場
從筆者過去所提出的「倫理照顧」心理治療架構中可以進一步以
「反面置身」的概念來解析出一個關於療癒的「正面/反面」二重性
經驗結構;其中提示出治療者要去抵達的不是人情義理之應然,而
是在此之外的反面置身。在對於談話「現場」的考察中,本文發現
了兩個語言連繫或語言參照的二重性結構。一是如同前述的「正面/
反面」二重性結構:在話語生成的過程中,被說出的話語所固定下
來的意義,突顯為被抓取到的正面;而做為說出之基礎的流動的、
體感的、複多的經驗卻同時成為難以企及的反面領域。另一個則是
在場話語指涉不在場事實或概念系統的二重性結構。借助「說話行
動」所著眼的談話間之應對進退,不論是在談話現場或是對於謄寫
談話錄音所成的文本,我們就有可能專注於談話間現場就地發生的
機制。而反面置身中的身體經驗及其「部署」過程,正是說話做為
一種倫理照顧之技術所要抵達的經驗地帶。
綜合上述,心理治療的臨床現場呈現出兩類的二重結構:即在場
與不在場;正面與反面。其中話語不同的參照連繫運動也可明晰起
來。筆者嚐試以圖3表示之。
其中,E—F指的即是一般話語正面表述的意含以及其指涉的事
實或概念系統間的連繫,以現場性結構來看,它是指「在場—不在
場」的連結。在心理治療中將焦點放到對受苦者之生活事實的追究
可說是一種滑出治療現場的運動。E G1是如圖1中A B的阻
絕結構,它指的是正面語言與反面置身之間的背反性質。如「你應
當…」的正面勸說或責備,或是「你好棒!」的正面稱許,對於
患病或受創而置身於人情應然之反面者,卻常是一重咫尺天涯的阻
絕。
psychotherapy as a Locale for EthicalCare 81
E—G2的連繫方向則是本文論述所設想的主題,它指的是治療現
場中正面話語與反面置身之間的連繫。鑑於EG1的阻絕結構,若
E—G2是可能的,顯然必需是有某種特別的機制牽涉在內。根據筆者
的考察(李維倫,2004b),倫理照顧的療癒動向著眼於治療者能夠與
受苦者之反面置身進行連繫,也即是在此的E—G2連繫。在台灣的民
俗療癒現象中確實可以看到這樣的操作,但在心理治療的形式中,
此一連繫操作又將是如何?這就有待實徵資料分析的解答。
本文以心理治療做為倫理現場的看法切入,不但瞭解到:在倫
理照顧的心理治療現場,治療者透過說話要抵達並非社會性的規範
倫理,而是無名且充滿力量的反面置身;而且更進一步地獲致具體
觀察的焦點:在心理治療的現場,以說話作為倫理照顧的技術,將
如何處理「正面世界的語言表述」對現場「流動的、身體的、複多
的反面置身經驗領域」的連繫操作。本文認為,若此一提問能夠獲
得回答,我們也就能夠完備地展示一個以植基於本土療癒思考的倫
理照顧心理治療論述與操作模式。
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Constituted to Care: Alfred Schutz
and the Feminist Ethic of Care
Mary F. Rogers
University of West Florida Pensacola
Abstract: This paper explores how Schutz’s ideas enrich and extend the ethic
of care promulgated by feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan, Nel Nod-
dings, Sara Ruddick, and Eva Feder Kittay. Using Schutz’s ideas about the I-
Thou relationship, systems of relevances, and growing old together, the author
lays a foundation for continuing dialogue between feminist theorists of care
and Schutzian phenomenologists.
gender-bound than the need for care. In fact, the feminists who helped lay the
foundations of social theory commonly invoked some sort of care as a method-
ological principle. With their insistence on sympathy, these women implied the
need minimally to care about the people we study, if not care for them.
This emphasis on care amounts to an ethic of care in the theorizing of such
luminaries as Harriet Martineau. As Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley
(1998: 33) emphasize, Martineau had a keen commitment to sympathy along-
side impartiality and critique as prerequisites of valid knowledge about social
structure, culture, and group life. She likened the observer without sympathy
to someone “who, without hearing the music, sees a roomful of people begin
to dance” (Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley 1998: 34). Anna Julia Coo-
per (in Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley: 1998 [orig.1892]: 191) also
stressed the necessity of sympathy: “The art of ‘thinking oneself imaginatively
into the experiences of others’ is not given to all, and it is impossible to acquire
without a background and substratum of sympathetic knowledge. . . . “
Herself a virtual social scientist and culture critic, George Eliot also pro-
moted an ethic of care resting on the foundations of community and sympathy.
Perhaps her finest novel, Middlemarch (1871-1872) is subtitled A Study of Pro-
vincial Life. There Eliot sketches the ins and outs of community life through
characterizations of a philosopher/curmudgeon, a physician/newcomer, and an
intellectual/romantic, among others. What most differentiates the characters is
their degree of engagement with the community and their contributions to its
well-being.
In Adam Bede (1859), though, Eliot offers what strikes me as her most
powerful, poignant appeal for sympathy and sympathetic observation. I have
often shared this passage from its Chapter XIV with sociology students:
These fellow-mortals, every one, must be accepted as they are: you can nei-
ther straighten their noses, nor brighten their wit,nor rectify their dispositions;
and it is these people – amongst whom your life is lived – that it is needful you
should tolerate, pity, and love: it is these more or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent
people whose movements of goodness you should be able to admire – for whom
you should cherish all possible hopes, all possible patience. . . .
We are children of a large family. and must learn, as such children do,
not to expect that our hurts will be made much of – to be content with little
nurture and caressing, and help each other the more.
For Schutz, as we will soon see, Eliot’s narrator is talking about the
sphere of the We where all care occurs.
Jane Addams’s stance is not unlike Eliot’s. Her extreme emphasis on sym-
pathy and sympathetic understandings addresses the demands of citizenship.
For her, democratic society requires that citizens share some sense of mutu-
ality and common fate. Put differently, “individuals who look out only for
themselves and their families lose the habits of democracy” (Burke 2002: 45).
Constituted to Care 87
We are all equal in that we are “all some mother’s child” – we are each a
person who has benefited from the care of another, who has been seen as wor-
thy of an investment of care and attention merely to survive, much less thrive,
as we grow into adults. If each of us is worthy of care, then the caregiver, too,
deserves care when she is needy (Kittay 2001: 536)
But Kittay (2001: 526) generalizes even further: “Our neediness, as well as
our ability to cooperate to fulfill needs and desires, is at the heart of commu-
nity and all social organization.” Hers is thus a fundamentally communitarian
ethic of care. To her great credit it is also aimed at shaping public policy.
for is able “to regain gradually the status of agent” (Fredriksson and Eriksson
2003: 146).
Voice lays claim, then, to the right of the cared-for to be listened to atten-
tively and openly. Here Sybylla (2001: 72-73) is again helpful:
In other words, rather than assuming we know what the other is, it is more
rational and respectful to hear the other’s speech without attempting to rein-
terpret it in the light of one’s own form of rationality, morality, or experience.
Empathy, then, is perhaps best understood to mean a sensitive, intelligent, and
responsive openness to what the other says.
Listening is, then, far from a “passive enterprise” (Horowitz and Lanes
1992: 136).
I draw a humbling example from my own lived experiences. My partner
Don, having moved from our home to an assisted living facility, found the
changes to his everyday life too much to accommodate. Barely settled there,
he began talking about finding a small apartment where he could live indepen-
dently. Since he had had a full-time, professional caregiver for more than three
years at that time, I vehemently resisted his repeated attempts to talk at length
and in detail about the prospect of an apartment. Time and again, I invoked the
matter of his physical safety outside of any living situation involving 24-hour
help and companionship. He remained relentless; stress continued building.
Then one day, I did what I have long taught qualitative research students
and others to do. I tried really hard to look at the situation from his point of
view. For Don, the quality of his life depended much more heavily on living
as independently as possible than on being as safe as possible. Immediately, I
understood and empathized. The overriding issue was not my peace of mind
but his quality of life. I had made the mistake of focusing on the problem
instead of the person (cf. Clow 2001: 113-114). Soon I joined Peggy, his
caregiver, in helping him find a small apartment only about five minutes from
our home. (Don had little desire to return home, since he had been the pri-
mary homemaker and found inordinately frustrating the woeful standards I
brought to bear in that arena!)
Much more is involved here than attuned respect for a person’s voice.
Such listening presupposes the kinds of intentionality associated with mak-
ing music together or any other ambitious exercise in co-constituting a world
governed by mutuality rather than hierarchy. But the world that carer and
cared-for can constitute together is often opaque when seen from the outside.
It’s both “normal” and far from any semblance of “normality”; both tightly or-
ganized and vastly dishevelled; both densely sociable and utterly lonely; both
somberly predictable and greatly surprising. Often, too, it is a “medicalized
world” (Kittay 1999: 164). Typically, people land there independently of
their own intentions or preferences. The world where caregiving holds sway
in one form or another is a hybrid one, often radically so. As physician Rita
Constituted to Care 91
Charon (1996: 293) observes, “sick people” often feel that “they inhabit a dif-
ferent world from that of the healthy.”
In large measure, the hybridity of their world derives from intersections
of worlds that are experientially distinct from one another most of the time,
as we have seen. The world of carer and cared-for typically hinges heavily on
other finite provinces of meaning, such as the world of medicine or the world
of (“special”) education. Thus, the finite province that we might call the world
of special needs is in many respects a colonized world. Its postcolonialist “hy-
bridity” serves as a meaningful, even powerful, descriptor of the experiences
typically eventuating there for carer and cared-for.
Before looking further at how Schutz’s ideas can illuminate this hybrid world
and the intense caring it invites, let’s look briefly at what health care profes-
sionals say about this world and its inhabitants. Nurses’ voices are particularly
powerful here, as I have enjoyed learning at the annual meetings of the Society
for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS). In fact, the connections
between feminist theorists’ work with the ethic of care and health care profes-
sionals’ (feminist or not) work in that vein are close as well as complementary.
As Billie Severtsen (2004: 184) reminds us, Madeleine Leininger, “a nurse
anthropologist . . . provided crucial leadership and collaboration in early dis-
cussions about integrating caring concepts into nursing education.” Like
Noddings’ work, Leininger’s (1981) centers on caring as a fundamental hu-
man predisposition. Leininger’s Toward a Caring Curriculum: A New Pedagogy
for Nursing (published by the National League for Nursing) made its appear-
ance in 1989, but Severtsen (2004) emphasizes that Joyce Travelbee had writ-
ten in detail about care among nurses more than twenty years earlier (1966).
What nurses and other health care professionals write about the carer and
the cared-for resonates with what feminist theorists emphasize. A recent anthol-
ogy is illustrative. There Craig Klugman (2007) analyzes the “grief narratives”
of those who have witnessed the dying of a loved one. Klugman (p. 162) turns
up “themes of isolation and loneliness,” with “separation from others tak[ing]
several forms, from self-imposed hibernation to being afraid of loneliness to be-
ing socially alienated from others.” In the same volume Shelley Raffin Bouchal
(2007) talks about relational ethics and “whole-person care.” Kathryn Kavana-
ugh (2007: 53) characterizes the story as “a tool toward wholeness,” and Ingrid
Harris (2007: 83) treats healing as “an intersubjective activity.”
In that same volume Nancy Johnston offers a myriad of insights into the
world of special needs. She sketches how people “turn away from the every-
day and the taken for granted” while sometimes “turning toward the alien, ap-
palling, and ominous” (Johnston 2007: 109, 111). She also says what it means
to feel abandoned: “In the turning brought on by adversity life takes on the
features of treacherous territory, sustained wandering, and homeless exile. The
self comes to be experienced as bereft, betrayed, bewildered, ill equipped, in-
92 Mary F. Rogers
while health professionals may have been important catalysts in the quest
for meaning, participants did not usually place them in the role of main pro-
tagonist. Family members, friends, colleagues, neighbors, and fellow parish-
ioners were given a central and constituting role.
The stranger thus interacts as “a cultural hybrid on the verge of two differ-
ent patterns of group life, not knowing to which of them he belongs” (p. 104).
And this experiential “stranger” is the cared-for who needs carers attuned to
hybridity. Initially, typifications fail the inhabitant of a strange world, or they
at least falter in ways that leave one at a loss for words. Linguistic as well as
social loneliness can easily overwhelm those trying to come to terms with
a strange world, such as the world of special needs. Without a meaning-
ful vocabulary, without a treasure chest of tried-and-true typifications, only
the “fringes” (Schutz 1973: 350) of types may be meaningful. These are, as
Schutz (1964: 100-101) emphasizes, “capable of being set to music but they
are not translatable” into the practicalities of everyday life.
There is a reason, I think, that Schutz (1982: 192) called music “the most
lonely art.” He went on, “It does not call for a Thou because it does not call
for interpretation.” With no call for interpretation, there is no immediate call
for language. So “lyrics are always subjugation of the word to music” (p. 194),
just as language is always subjugated by extreme pain, suffering, or even joy.
Like suffering or joy, “music is vividly evident” (p. 193). It calls for listeners
willing to let go of language for the sheer wonder of listening.
Perhaps caring-for sometimes involves that same willingness. Perhaps at
times the cared-for and the carer make music together, actual or virtual, that
reaffirms the sphere of the We in a vividly evident way to them and none but
them. Perhaps in other of Schutz’s (1964: 107) terms, together they consti-
tute a world where they oscillate between experiences of being strangers in
and homecomers to it. Like other strangers, their anticipations sometimes
have to be “more or less empty”; like other homecomers, their anticipations
at other times return them to “memories of [the] past.” Like all of us who
have the privilege to “grow older,” carer and cared-for find that “the recurrent
is not the same any more.” Things change. Schutz (1964: 116) offers power-
ful, poignant reassurance about this circumstance: “To a certain extent, each
homecomer has tasted the magic fruit of strangeness, be it sweet or bitter.”
To care, then, is perhaps to come home in all the complex and often messy
ways that people do as we grow older together from our coming of age onward.
It is also to experience the utterly strange and to familiarize the unfamiliar to-
gether. We should choose no less. As Eliot’s narrator in Adam Bede reminds us,
there are few extraordinary people in the world. The narrator goes on,
I can’t afford to give all my love and reverence to such rarities: I want a
great deal of those feelings for my everyday fellow-men, especially for the few
Constituted to Care 95
in the foreground of the great multitude, whose faces I know, whose hands I
touch, for whom I have to make my way with kindly courtesy.
So we are born of mothers, make our way, and grow old together. Through-
out the cycle of our finitude we will at times find ourselves catapulted into
the world of special needs. As we enter that world, “shift[s] in the system of
relevances dislocate” (Schutz 1964: 287) sedimentations from our prior expe-
riences and disrupt the flow of expectations we want – indeed, need – to take
for granted. These shifts undo what was once familiar and comfortable. They
invite us to know anew what we thought we already knew forever. They invite
us to care for and with one another.
Schutz’s corpus offers lessons this obvious and this profound. His work,
particularly his attention to enclaves, holds out lessons capable of further an-
choring as well as substantially extending feminists’ work on the ethic of care.
In some senses I have come to believe that Schutz’s work is as much about care
as anything else. In upcoming work I hope to translate that belief into a well
supported claim.
References
Thomas Luckmann
From our childhood, we all certainly remember Mark Twain’s book The
Adventures of Tom Sawyer. Many of you, like me, probably particularly recall
one or two of the impressive passages in which Tom Sawyer discovers, very
much to his advantage, that what he considers to be work is not necessarily
considered by others to be work as well. He notices that it depends on the
attitude of the person what he will consider to be work and what play.
Allow me briefly to recall the scene to memory: Aunt Polly, thoroughly
convinced of the practical usefulness and virtue of work, gives Tom the assign-
ment of whitewashing the fence in front of her house. Now she deviously does
this on a gorgeous summer day, one on which the other young lads easily and
freely run about on the street and at their gathering place at the well. In the face
of the seemingly giant task of painting the picket fence, Tom’s spirits sink—and
I might add, with complete freedom from Puritanism (a freedom that was cor-
respondingly attributed to Mark Twain by among others his New England rea-
dership and that was exemplified in his fine ear for ordinary everyday language).
But finally Tom has a brilliant idea: he begins, with great concentration and,
when he sees his buddy Ben Rogers nearby, with deeper dedication, to brush
the fence. Ben, who just at this time is dancing down the street, chugging
and jingling, since he is playing “Big Missouri,” the ship, the ship’s bell, and
the captain as well, stands still, and he commiserates with Tom for his visible
efforts, but with a certain amount of gloating. He is going swimming, but Tom
would rather continue to work. Then Tom allows the carefully-constructed trap
to spring: “What do you call work?” Ben, in full possession of his everyday
understanding: “Why, ain’t that work?” And Tom’s classic reply: “Well, maybe
it is, and maybe it ain’t.” The story goes on in the well-known and logical way.
Ben Rogers, and then one boy after another, beg and purchase the permission,
even the privilege, of painting the fence from the seemingly hesitant Tom. The
canny Tom, here as in other ways the physical and metaphysical counterpart to
his friend the freewheeling drifter Huckleberry Finn, collects from all of them.
At the end of the story Twain observes that Tom, were he only a comparatively
bigger and wiser philosopher like himself, Twain, would probably arrive at the
following insight: “Work consists of whatever a body is obliged to do and play
consists of whatever a body is not obliged to do.”
It might not, however, be quite as simple as our great philosopher Twain
suggests. I myself prefer to hold to the reply that Tom Sawyer makes to Ben’s
question, whether fence painting, which to Ben’s healthy common sense is so
clearly and suspiciously a work-like activity, might then not be work. With
this sentence I formulate my own response to the question of whether work
is the decisive condition in the construction of human reality: “Well, maybe
it is, and maybe it ain’t.”
It has already been known for a long time what Hegel memorably expressed
at the end of the philosophy for later times (after which no further philoso-
phy is needed): work is as equally concretely individual as it is generally abs-
tract. Hegel began what was furthered by Marx: work is constitutive for human
beings as individual and species-beings, but must under the circumstances of
capitalistic industrial production lead to the self-alienation of human beings.
As is shown by conceptual history and cultural anthropology, work is a reality
which arises as such only in the self-understanding of certain cultures which are
located in certain historical life-worlds. Work is not an experiential fact of just
any life-world. The phenomenological and materialistic convincing insight into
the anthropological universality of work stand over against the historical and
ethnological weel document fact of the its historical particularity. If this is not
to lead to a meaningless contradiction, work will have at least two meanings—if
not more—which are probably connected with each other, but which are ne-
vertheless different.
Reality as Work 103
I will in what follows attempt to show that work [Arbeit], once simply
conceived of as action [Handeln], could nevertheless also be conceived as thin-
king [Denken] and as world-engagement, or working [Wirken]. As such, work
is in its general action a fact of human life. Somewhat less comprehensively,
work can be understood as working, as an act that is involved in the world [Um-
welt]. Thus understood, work is presupposed and is concretely involved in the
construction of each social reality. At the same time, work is the necessary condi-
tion of the mediation between social and subjective reality. Finally, work can
be conceived of as those forms of working which cause more or less permanent
changes in the social and natural world—above all, such changes as serve the
satisfaction of needs. So understood, work is not only the empirical condition
for the organization of human life for all times, but rather, in its social-historical
uniqueness, it is also a consequence of this organization. Beyond this, work is the
precondition both for the factual survival of the concrete, living human essence
and also for his socialization in a predetermined but changeable meaning-reality,
a historical nature- and symbol-world. Work in this last sense becomes empha-
sized in the historical consciousness only in certain kinds of social relationships,
namely those of a comparatively high division of labor, or perhaps I should rather
say: a functional specialization of socially relevant activities. This preconception
itself, the development of work as an experiential fact of many historical cultures,
presupposes work in all three of the identified meanings, but above all in the
conceptually-organized work of scientific experts—of administrative experts of
the Babylonian irrigation system, Old Testament prophets, Greek philosophers,
reformation theologians, and modern sociologists. These are a collected preview
of what are probably not going to be particularly surprising reflections on the
themes of ‘work’ and ‘reality.’ But now let us turn to the reflections themselves.
Let us first ask ourselves what work means according to the perception of
reality that is characteristic of contemporary everyday understanding. Would
one say that a man works who piles up stones in order to lose a few pounds?
Does he work if he simply gets enjoyment from piling up of stones? Does he
work if he piles up stones in order to build a house? Does he work when he does
something for himself, or does he work only when he will be paid for it by others?
And what if he is forced to do it by others, perhaps by the Aunt Polly’s of history?
Am I working now here, assembling a series of words on the subject of work? Do
you work if you are encountering these words: whether from enjoyment, habit,
compulsion, or as part of the exercise or even the learning of a profession?
Each of these questions, which have concerned us, exemplifies an aspect
of human activity which for someone, somewhere, at some time, has consti-
tuted a pre-reflective conception or theoretical definition of work, and which,
as a characteristic feature or, at the least as a partial aspect, is foundational to
widespread contemporary conceptions of work. Work can be, as is the case with
Mark Twain, something that one must do, in contrast to something that one
must not do. Work can be conceived of as something that is arduous in contrast
104 Thomas Luckmann
do it oneself. This shows that, despite all the vagaries of the transitions, the
difference between kinds of action is useful and meaningful for distinguishing
those kinds of action that are characterized by the fact that the actor changes
the world according to a preconceived plan. Leaving traces in the snow is in
itself not work (although something has been changed in the world). Blazing
a trail, however, is work.
As is the case with action in general, so also work is not simply able to in-
terpreted in terms of behavioral criteria—although it is a form of action that
is necessarily embodied in behavior. For this reason work must be understood
according to the meaning it has for the actor, for the one doing the work.
Because the concept of work, so central for social organization of everyday
reality and for its ideological establishment, underlies historical contractions
and expansions, the phenomenologically precise action-theoretical determi-
nation of work, as a kind of life-world working, is of evident benefit. As we
have seen, work consists of more than is entailed by the prevailing everyday
meaning. It includes, of course, those activities that are considered to be
productive in accordance with the economic standards of a given age (such
as ours), but it likewise also includes all of those forms of social action which
cause an intentional change of the social world: declarations of love are work,
court negotiations are work, baptisms are work, the sale of stamps is work,
revolutions are work, counter-revolutions are work.
As mentioned, work proceeds from a preconceived plan: the actor works
when he wants to produce something definite in the world. This can be so-
mething in nature or in the social world (as usual, in a particular society and
in a particular age there will be differences between what is understood as
“natural” and “social”). Everyone knows that he can chop down a tree by per-
suading another or with his own hands and an axe that has been conveniently
appropriated. And everyone knows that he can wound a companion with evil
words or a slap in the face. Thus at least at the level at which the meaning of
everyday action is constituted, the distinction between work and communica-
tion, so dear to many sociologists and philosophers, is meaningless. There are
of course important differences between the simpler, tangible forms of wor-
king and communicative symbol-actions, but the dividing line proceeds di-
rectly through the category of work. No one can hold me responsible for what
I think. If I think aloud, however, I must be careful. I am responsible in any
case for trees that are chopped down—whether I myself have chopped them
down, or have done so by means of another, so to speak, “communicatively.”
Now the conception of work as we have here determined it is properly
comprehensive, but we are easily capable of imagining how inadequate this
conception is to the human experience, and thus how much simply just “oc-
curs.” In any event, the conception of work that has been determined here
outlines the fundamental category of the social attribution of responsibility
and thus of the social construction and destruction of reality. The broader
Reality as Work 109
category of working is, on the contrary, the basis of social attribution not of
responsibility but of causal origin. If we proceed on the basis of this unders-
tanding of work and bring to mind what is entailed by contemporary concep-
tions of work, namely that work primarily designates a professional activity
that is related to a market economy, we will become able to consider along
general lines—very general lines—how the social organization of work and
the work-mediated experience of reality have developed.
In ancient societies work is either not distinguishable or hardly distin-
guishable as a social fact that is distinct from other activities. There is no diffe-
rentiation of types of action into work and non-work; it does not correspond
to any real experience. The various activities that aim at basic subsistence
only arise fully in the institutions of kinship. Simple forms of the division of
labor within the family, which are predicated on the basis of the natural dif-
ferences among people (sex, age, strength, skill, intelligence, etc.), are indeed
widespread, but they are not the basis for specialized work-roles. Only when
a certain degree of nutritional surplus is capable of being produced is there
an initial division of socially-determined work roles. At first this allows that
those who are not workers in our contemporary understanding, but are rather
sorcerers, magicians, shamans, priests, and occasionally leaders of the hunt
or war, can be freed from the task of securing subsistence. (These are also, if
you will, the first workers.) But these functions are often only perceived as a
temporary and terminable assignment of the community. They remain largely
based on a personal charismatic characteristic or a coercive appropriation of
authority.
Work slowly becomes a social fact when the separation of work and non-
work becomes structurally enforced, as it were. In the development of ad-
vanced cultures there emerges a function-specific organization of action and
thus one that involves a social division of labor: definite institutions diffe-
rentiate themselves from each other. Authority structures in the narrower
sense develop through power concentrations. The domestication of some
animal species supposedly by the time of the early stone-age and later the
systematic cultivation of different plant species make possible the production
of economic surpluses and consequently population concentration in large
settlements. These two factors, coupled with further progress in the use of
metal, changes in warfare, and particularly the development of writing and
the construction of irrigation systems, lead to the formation of centralized
political institutions and to the social bureaucratization of essential social ac-
tivities. But it is only in developed advanced cultures that a state of social
differentiation is achieved, in the sense in which we can talk of early forms of
profession and of a professionalized organization of work. Work then becomes
an action with a determinate economic function, one that is comprehended in
social definitions: it becomes organized as a more or less long-term specialized
course of activity, and it is separated from the kinship group. On the other
110 Thomas Luckmann
hand, for a small part of the population the escape from subsistence-level
work is a systematic, authority-enforced privilege. The professional structure,
which now increasingly becomes the social core of the advancing social diffe-
rentiation, takes its place along side the institutions of the family, of authority,
and of religion.
In this way the socialized everyday reality for individual people is finally
no longer identical with the network of primary social connections in the
small community. Work becomes organized socially in differentiated roles
and so, although it remains for the individual a part of his everyday reality,
everydayness—of immediate everydayness, of the primary experience—it be-
comes alienated. The structural differentiation is closely linked to the social
distribution of knowledge. Generally the division of the body of social stock
of knowledge depends on which part of knowledge is generally considered
to be relevant for all members of society and which part is only considered
to be relevant for those members of society who fulfill certain roles. Because
of the division of labor, knowledge that is specific to work roles is clearly
separated from generally relevant and available knowledge, and in the face
of general knowledge it gains increasing comprehensiveness. The increase of
specific tasks and problems, which is a result of the division of labor, requires
standardized solutions which are capable of being taught and learned. These
solutions presuppose specialized knowledge of certain courses of action. They
likewise presuppose knowledge of ends-means-relationships, which in this
course are ordered in more or less socially binding determinations. For the
social organization of work there arise problems of the socialization of the suc-
ceeding generation, because sufficient working knowledge can no longer be
mediated in all cases through the family, but at most only in those professions
in which the recruitment is regulated by family inheritance.
The development of markets—something which has been particularly syste-
matically and sociologically analyzed by Max Weber—is one of the earliest his-
torical conditions of the professional organization of work. The fact that goods
were exchanged among families, clans, or tribes is an important basis for the
specialization of activities, skills, and for the development of special knowledge.
Indeed, initially exchange takes place among tribes and clans—not between
single producers and merchants; nevertheless the work becomes oriented in its
own community no longer just toward meeting needs, but also toward exchange
opportunities of an economic market that is not necessarily monetary.
The individualization of barter opportunities in the market is one of the
important conditions of the money economy. It enables the rational organi-
zation of the exchange act itself and the temporal and localized separation of
different exchange-acts: for one’s own needs through the sale of one’s own pro-
ducts for money. Its significant strengthening is accompanied by the “loss of
function” of clan ties in the development of cities, especially in the northern
European city of the Middle Ages. Membership in the social interest groups
Reality as Work 111
The immediate “meaning” of his own work can therefore, in contrast to other
forms of action, no longer be found in the satisfaction of his own needs. That
meaning can only be found mediately, namely through calculations, which as-
sign to work the role of an empty central factor because of its self-dependence
on the wage-discharging site of the social system.
The self-confirming success of the rationalization of work by experts of pro-
duction has favored the transfer of the methods to other areas of life. It is simple
to observe that today more and more socially important functions are organized
in the form of professions. Far beyond work in the narrow sense, the important
problems of contemporary action and life find rationalized, expert solutions—
or they seem to find such solutions. Max Weber has analyzed this process in the
example of the frame of domination, in the “routinization of charisma” through
the displacement of political dignitaries with trained party functionaries, as
well as in the development of professional jurisprudence. The commercializa-
tion and “professionalization” of performance sports and of “leisure” are recent
examples, and these days the path to the education- and marriage-counselors or
psychiatrists is becoming for many people increasingly almost as commonplace
as the demands for doctoral expertise in the case of sickness. But such professio-
nal organization usually raises many new problems: their common denominator
is a lack of self-sufficiency of the individual lifestyle—the radical heteronomy of
everyday reality.
The breakdown of general knowledge and the differentiation of special
knowledge have as a consequence the fact that the daily reality, with the ex-
ception of small and specialized realms of action, appears as indecipherable
to the individual. While in other forms of society the unclear and potentially
threatening elements of reality are located in another level of reality, such
as the symbolic-religious level, indecipherability and the experience of being
threatened are structural attributes of the fundamental conception of reality
in “modern” conditions of the organization of work. Work, as we have seen,
is the foundation of the capacity for being held responsible and for the social
construction of reality. But the historical development of work has changed
the projected character of all working in modern work, and has to some extent
alienated the work of everyday reality: not the everyday routines of work-rela-
ted behavior, but probably the ensuing associated meaning.
SungTae Lee
Department of Sociology, Nanjing University
Introduction
Current events and developments in the flux of globalization provide unique
opportunities to reflect upon the taken-for-granted self-evidence of the social.
In unprecedented ways of awakening, the destruction of the Berlin Wall or the
September 11 attack reveal that the boundary of the social is not “natural,”
and thereby fixed, but constructed and thereby not only challengeable but also
changeable. If the boundary of social is not “given” but is instead “constructed”
and can be reconstructed physically or discursively, then what might be the
theoretical/practical implications of its constructive origin?
This question might be approached, I would suggest, by examining the
present status or the future outlook of the “difference” factor in the mak-
ing of the social. From this point of view, one might argue that the factor of
difference and its social/political implications is, in fact, one of the distinc-
tive themes of current discourses on globalization. Furthermore, in reality,
it becomes an acute problem when the inclusion (or exclusion) of the other
emerges as an unavoidable choice that faces any given form of the social.
What is the shape of the social in the making? What is its stance in re-
lationship to the problem of differences in its present or future engagement
114 SungTae Lee
with others? With all the risk of oversimplification, will it ground itself on the
premise of the inevitability of antagonism rooted in the irresoluble differences
as argued by “The Clash of Civilizations”? Or will it be headed toward the
convergence of differences suggested by “The End of History”? Is there any
alternative, however slim, to this dichotomy? In other words, is there a way
that is free from either the inevitable perpetuation of irresoluble differences or
the ultimate dissolution of them?
In an effort to respond to these questions, this essay will first offer an account
on the current state of the social focused on the dichotomy of “us” vs. “them”
as exemplified by the confrontation between “the war on terror” and “Jihad.”
Secondly, it will search for an alternative possibility of the social by exploring
the concept of dialogue, with particular attention to its moral conditions as an
opening to a cosmopolitan space.
5 Ibid., 185.
6 Beck, ibid., 197.
7 Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, 195.
116 SungTae Lee
of life with him.”8 However, he notices “The task...is enormous enough, for it
involves not simply breaking down passive barriers such as those of distance in
space and time and vernacular, but those fixed attitudes of custom and status
in which our selves are imbedded.”9 Long before TV was available, let alone
the Internet, Mead realized the possibilities and obstacles of cosmopolitanism.
At this point, the gravity of the Meadian dictum becomes clear: “We must be
others if we are to be ourselves.”10 Mead sees there is an inherent difficulty in
taking up this challenge in that “any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the
group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds
itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there.”11
But then who is this self that abandons its old self and maintains itself in
the larger society? For Mead, “The human social ideal—the ideal or ultimate
goal of human social progress—is attainment of a universal human society
in which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence,
such that all social meanings would each be similarly reflected in their respec-
tive individual consciousness—such that the meanings of any one individual’s
act or gestures would be the same for any other individual whatever who
responded to them.” 12
With all due respect to the social ideal of Mead, one might ask whether
there is a theoretical/ practical trap in the essence of this Meadian solution to
the problem. Does not “a perfected social intelligence” presuppose a complete
access to other minds? If so, when members of a society have “a perfected
social intelligence,” do they need “to be others” in the first place? If the mean-
ings of any given acts or gestures of any given individual are the same for
everyone involved in social exchange, what would be left for exchange? To
be specific, what would be left to be exchanged socially ? If the affirmation
of the same is the predetermined destination of “to be others” or “tuning-in”
on with the others, would that not preempt anything uniquely different from
being accessed? If so, is not the Meadian conception of “a universal human
society” in a danger of becoming a form of totality where the existence of the
other or the otherness of different cultures loses social significance, if it is not
denied altogether?
Whatever the Meadian possibilities of the “ultimate goal of human social
progress” are, current humanity appears unable to reach that goal any time in the
near future. Until, if possible at all, one reaches to the point of “a perfected social
8 Ibid., 193.
9 Ibid., 194.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Mead, Mind, Self, & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, 310. One
might find a parallelism between Mead’s concept of a perfected social intelligence and Kant’s
concept of “enlarged mentality” which envisions oneself as a member of community of all
mankind, as a citizen of the world (cf. Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 140.).
In Search of Cosmopolitan Space 117
intelligence,” there is no other way but to come to terms with cultural barriers
or differences. In other words, unless the idea of “a universal human society in
which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence” has a
Hegelian conception of the end of history in view, human intercourse with oth-
ers cannot be accomplished other than “to be others” with limited access to the
other minds, which is the very ground of human understanding of the other.
Unless human understanding is completely free not only from “passive
barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular” but also
from “those fixed attitudes of custom and status in which our selves are im-
bedded,” and furthermore, if those limitations are fundamentally not to be
perceived as “barriers” to be “broken” rather than as the unavoidable condi-
tion of human communications13, the question is not how it is possible to be
above and beyond “to be others,” but rather how it is possible “to be others”
in human finitude.14
13 To quote Merleau Ponty, “We will arrive at the universal not by abandoning our particu-
larity but by turning it into a way of reaching others.” (Merleau Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, 92).
14 At this point it is noteworthy that Japanese philosopher Watsuji criticizes Karl Marx’s
concept of world history. Watsuji writes, “’Inter-national’ betweenness in the true sense …
becomes possible only when each historical nation strives to form the totality of humanity in
its own distinct way. Attempts to be ‘inter-national’ by transcending the exigency of being
national is nothing but an abstract fantasy of Marxism today.” (Watsuji, “The Significance of
Ethics as the Study of Man,” 248.) . In fact, Marx argues that “the more the original isolation
of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the developed mode of production and intercourse
and the division of labor between various nations naturally brought forth by these, the more
history becomes world history” (Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, 60.) . In other words,
the “real connection” among individuals is realized when the “existence of individuals is directly
linked up with world history,” when the individual becomes a part of “the mass of propertyless
workers” that is produced by “the world market through competition” (Ibid., 47.). It should be
noted that both Watsuji and Marx develop ways to communality respectively. But they headed
in opposite directions. Watsuji sees the way is possible on the basis of nationality, while Marx
sees the possibility beyond and after nationality.
118 SungTae Lee
the fact that “the organized perpetrators of the ‘September 11’ attack” them-
selves are “among those who benefit from this so-called globalization (capitalist
power, telecommunication, advanced technology, the openness of borders, and
so on),” they “nonetheless claimed to be acting in the name of those doomed by
globalization, [i.e.,]all those who feel excluded or rejected, disenfranchised, left
by the wayside, [those]whose means are limited to that of the poor in this age of
globalization (which is, today, television, an instrument that is never neutral), to
witness the spectacle of the offensive prosperity of others.”17
In terms of Derrida’s argument, the perpetrators should answer to the ques-
tion of whether or not the disparity of the classes in their homeland should
not be attacked in the first place, if their alleged representation is to be legiti-
mate. Otherwise, their representation is another concealment of the reality of
others that are excluded within the Islam society.
Habermas suggestively reminds us that the unbalance is a reflection of “the
unbalance that is brought about by modernization of the homeland of the
perpetrators.” Even though one might agree that the process of modernization
was so “rapid and radical” that “there seemed to be no redemption from the
erosion of the traditional life,”18 the perpetrators should answer to the ques-
tion of whether or not the use of civilian aircraft as a weapon of mass destruc-
tion was religiously grounded, even if their act of terror was, to them, the only
option available to protect their traditional way of life.
Even if it is the case that the World Trade Center was, to the “suicidal
bombers,” “a symbol of globalizing modernity” and nothing else but “a repre-
sentation of Satan”; even if their act of terror was a reaction to the “rapid and
radical” modernization and even if their attack was, as Fukuyama defines, a
“desperate backlash against the modern world,” their act would still seem to
involve a self-contradiction19 because the means of the reaction itself—the
highly calculated maneuver of the aircraft-bomb—is the product of the very
modernity against which it was used.
Nevertheless, while waiting on the answers to these questions from the
concerned parties, there is something that demands “our” attention in the des-
perateness of these reactions. Derrida argues that as globalization continues
to produce its victims, “dialogue” that is “at once verbal and peaceful” is “not
taking place.” Victims of globalization are those who are “not only deprived
of access to what we call democracy but are dispossessed of the so-called natu-
ral riches of the land.” Excluded and rejected from the global game played by
the sellers (the owners) and the client (the exploiters) that conceals the inter-
nal differences and imbalances on both sides, “the worst violence [committed
17 Ibid., 122.
18 Habermas, Ibid.
19 The perpetrators might be able to disregard self-contradiction, if in fact there is one
in their act, based on some religious principle. But to locate such a principle is beyond the scope
of this paper.
120 SungTae Lee
20 Borradori, Ibid., 122-123. Derrida quotes Mandela’s case in which “his party, after
years of nonviolent struggle and faced with a complete refusal of dialogue, resigned itself to take
up arms.”
21 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 59.
22 Beck, “The cosmopolitan society and its enemies,” 195.
In Search of Cosmopolitan Space 121
However, in the case of current events, I would argue that the absence of
“common ground” between “hostile communities” is not exactly due to the
absence of “a perfect social intelligence.” Instead, I would rather ask if the very
conception of “a perfect social intelligence” is not itself at the root of current
problem. At this point, the peculiar nature of the social that combines, and
reinforced by the antagonizing parties should be underscored once again. Is
not the hostility among communities grounded and fueled by the conviction
that only “we” and not “them” have “a perfected social intelligence,” in other
words, only “we” and not “them” have the ideal of “universal human society”
and carry the duty to realize it? 23 Is not this mythical conviction of a mo-
nopolistic possession of human ideal that leads to the denial of, if not, in fact,
annihilation of the other as exemplified by the relation between “the war on
terror” and “Jihad”?
If that is the case, the cosmopolitan challenge today depends not on the
possibility of a common ground that is above and beyond the differences but
on the possibility (or impossibility) of a communality achieved and unfolded
by empowering the others and their otherness rather than one that excludes,
oppresses or denies them in the name of monolithic universality. Then, would
there be any way to avoid the imperialist/fundamentalist tendencies and their
consequences?
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the implications of “world government” pro-
vides a resourceful clue to the issue. It is especially noteworthy that Arendt
has a fundamental reservation regarding the idea of “world government” in
that she is critical of any totalitarian tendencies, which consciously or uncon-
sciously oppress the plurality of political differences.
Arendt writes, “The very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole
earth, holding the monopoly of all means of violence, unchecked and un-
controlled by other sovereign powers, is not only a forbidding nightmare of
tyranny, it would be the end of all political life as we know it.”24 According
to Arendt, any given political territory is “not merely a geographical term.” It
would remain just a piece of land unless it becomes an “in-between space,” in
other words, unless it becomes a “space wherein the different members of a
group relate to and have intercourse with each other.”25
In that sense, the concept of “one sovereign force ruling the whole earth,
holding the monopoly of all means of violence,” jeopardizes the constitu-
tional ground of any given political territory exactly because it jeopardizes the
existence of the other that is the very condition of the political, which is the
“in-between space” within or without. That is to say, the very notion of the
23 One may ask whether the Meadian ideal of “universal human society” based on “a
perfected social intelligence” would ever be free from this type of exclusionary imperialist con-
viction or ambition.
24 Arendt, Men In Dark Times, 81.
25 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 263.
122 SungTae Lee
for it through a philosophy of mankind whose central concept would be Jaspers’s concept of
communication” (Arendt, Men In Dark Times, 84, 90. Emphasis is mine.).
30 Arendt, Men In Dark Times, 84, 90.
31 Ibid., 85
32 Arendt, The Human Condition, 52.
33 Ibid.
124 SungTae Lee
Dialogue as a commitment
In his paper, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” William James sees “a curious
mental mixture” in the modern “civilized opinion” on war. In contrast to the
ancient conception of war that glorifies “pure loot and mastery,” modern war-
fare justifies itself by “morally avowable motives” by attributing evil pretexts
“solely to the enemy.” James observed “England and we, our army and navy
authorities repeat without ceasing, arm solely for ‘peace,’ Germany and Japan
it is who are bent on loot and glory.”34
However, the act of blaming the enemy as the solely responsible party for
the war and justifying one’s own act of war as an inevitable self-defense does
not necessarily imply an innocent commitment to peace. On the contrary,
James writes “’Peace’ in military mouths today is a synonym for ‘war expect-
ed.’” And “Every up-to-date dictionary should say that ‘peace’ and ‘war’ mean
the same thing.” In fact, “modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and
all the love of glory of his ancestors.”35 Exactly to that extent, in the mentality
of modern man “peace” is nothing but a disguised preparation of the next war.
All that it needs is an excuse for its own hidden ambition.
Then, what is the peace that is worthy of its name? In other words, what is
peace that is not a disguised desire for the next war? Hannah Arendt provides
a clear clue to the problem. “Violence,” according to Arendt, is “by nature in-
strumental.” As a form of violence, war is also instrumental and needs “guid-
ance and justification through the end it pursues.” Hence, “[t]he end of war”
is “peace or victory.” But what is the end of peace? Arendt replies, “There is
no answer. Peace is an absolute.” That is to say, peace is “an end itself.”36
Concluding remarks
“Reverse Thatcherism” (there is nothing but society) and Thatcherism
(there is no society) are but two faces of the unique challenge that emerges
37 Said points out that “no culture or society is purely one thing” (Said, Reflections on
Exile, 587.) and adds “what it is about culture and civilization that makes them interesting-not
their essence or purity, but their combinations and diversity, their countercurrents, the way
they have had of conducting a compelling dialogue with other civilizations” (Said, Human-
ism and Democratic Criticism, 28.). To the imperialistic or fundamentalist tendencies which
ground “civilization identity” on the purity of any given culture, the different voices that de-
mands attention would be nothing more than either something inferior to be subsumed under
the given imperium or something to be silenced as noises.
38 Not to mention, the cosmopolitan challenge is not an exclusive task of the sociolo-
gist and, moreover, the sociologist does not necessarily mean a professional academic that lives
on practicing sociology. Rather it means anyone who thinks and acts on his or her sociological
imagination.
126 SungTae Lee
from the fabric of the globalization. Any attempt to meet the challenge in
terms of the cosmopolitan citizenship can and will be judged by its distance
(or proximity) to these dichotomic extremes. Namely, the navigation through
the hazards rooted either in the anachronic conception of the social or in its
reactionary counterpart is not to be taken-for-granted or self-evident as a pos-
sibility that is readily facilitated by the flux of globalization. However, the
critical point to initiate the navigation might be sought in the state of human
plurality. Any given social/political boundary can be questioned in terms of
its inclusion (or exclusion) of the others and the political potentials implicated
in its social/political/historical limitations might be sought out to be liberated.
When perceived not as given and fixed but as challengeable and changeable,
those limitations, already and always, signify the site where the commitment
to the cosmopolitan space, in the present living thinking, is summoned to
respond in defense of human plurality.
References
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1970
_____. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York:
Penguin, 1992.. Originally published in 1963 by Viking, New York.
_____. Responsibility and Judgment, edited by Kohn, J. New York: Random
House, 2003.
Beck, U. World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. _____ . “The
Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies.” In New Horizons in
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Borradori, G.. Philosophy In A Time of Terror: Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas
And Jacques Derrida. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press,
1992.
_____. History and September 11 in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future
of Global Order, edited by K.
Booth and T. Dunne. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Habermas, J. Belief and Knowledge: A Beginning, Address on accepting the
German Book Trade’s Peace Prize. Sueddeutsche.de October 15, 2001.
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Huntington, S.P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
New York: Simon& Schuster, 1996.
James, W. The Moral Equivalent of War. In The Writings of William James,
edited by John J. McDermot. New York: Random House, 1967: 660—
671.
Marx, K. & Engels, F. The German Ideology. Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1964.
Mead, G. H. The Philosophy of the Present. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1980. Originally published in 1932 by Open Court Publishing
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______. Mind, Self, & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934.
Said, E.S. Reflections on Exile. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
_____ . Humanism and Democratic Criticism. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2004.
Watsuji, T. “The Significance of Ethics as the Study of Man.” In Comparative
Political Culture in the Age of Globalizatio, edited by Hwa Yol Jung
and translated by Valdo Viglielmo and Agustin Jacinto Zavala. Oxford:
Lexington Books, 2002. Originally published in 1937.
Young I.M. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990.
Husserl의 현상학과
Schutz의 현상학적 사회학
Husserl’s Phenomenology and Schutz’s
Phenomenological Sociology
Nam-In Lee
요약문
이 글의 목표는 Husserl의 현상학이 Schutz의 현상학적 사회학
에 대해 미친 영향을 해명하는데 있다. 일군의 연구자들은 Schutz
가 Husserl의 현상학을 비판하고 거부하면서 자신의 현상학적 사회
학을 전개해 나갔으며 따라서 Husserl의 현상학이 Schutz의 현상
학에 대해 아무런 영향을 미치지 않은 것으로 간주하고 있다. 이 논
문은 바로 이러한 견해가 부당함을 밝히는데 있다. 이 논문의 1장은
Weber의 이해사회학의 의의와 한계를 간단히 다룰 것이다. Schutz
는 자신의 현상학적 사회학을 전개함에 있어 Weber로부터 결정적
인 영향을 받았으나 그럼에도 불구하고 그는 Weber의 이해사회
학이 심각한 문제점을 지니고 있는 것으로 간주하고 있는데, 바로
Schutz에게 이러한 문제점을 극복할 수 있는 토대를 마련해 준 것
이 Husserl의 현상학이다. 따라서 이 논문의 1장에서는 이 논문 전
체의 논의의 출발점을 마련하기 위하여 Weber의 이해사회학의 의
의와 한계를 간단히 살펴볼 것이다. 거기에 이어 2장과 3장에서는
Husserl의 현상학이 Schutz의 현상학적 사회학에 대해 미친 영향
을 살펴볼 것이다. 2장에서는 Husserl의 현상학적 심리학이 Schutz
의 현상학적 사회학에 대해 미친 영향을 살펴볼 것이다. 2장의 핵심
적인 논지는 Schutz의 현상학적 사회학은 Husserl이 구상한 현상
학적 심리학의 한 유형에 해당한다는 사실이다. 그러나 Husserl은
현상학적 심리학을 통해서뿐 아니라 초월론적 현상학을 통해서도
130 Nam-In Lee
주제어
Husserl, Schutz, Weber, 현상학적 사회학, 이해사회학, 현상학
적 심리학, 초월론적 현상학, 사회적 존재론, 사회적 인식론, 현상학
적 환원, 초월론적 주관, 지향성, 상호주관성
9 A. Schutz(1962), The Problem of Social Reality, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 132, 137;
Schutz(1981), 56 참조. L. Embree 는 Husserl의 현상학적 심리학과 Schutz의 문화과
학이론 사이에 밀접한 연관이 있음을 지적하는데, 이 점에 대해서는 다음의 논문
을 참조할 것: Embree, L.(2007), “The Nature and Role of Phenomenological Psychology in
The Theory of the Cultural Sciences of Alfred Schutz”, in: The Future of Applied Phenomenology
(proceeding for The 2nd Conference of Phenomenology as Bridge between East and West, Fe-
bruary 11-13, 2007, Seoul)
138 Nam-In Lee
4. 맺음말
참고문헌
이남인(2004), 『현상학과 해석학』, 서울: 서울대학교출판부.
Best, R. E.(1975), “New Directions in Sociological Theory? A Critical
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Husserl’s Phenomenology 147
Kenneth Liberman
University of Oregon
Abstract: The struggles that Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, Harold Garfin-
kel, and other social phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists have had
with Edmund Husserl’s progenitive but inconsistent notion of intersubjectiv-
ity are summarized and assessed. In particular, an account of Schutz’s objec-
tions to intersubjective constitution is presented. The commonly pervading
elements and major differences within this lineage of inquiry – a four gener-
ation-long lineage of teacher and student that commences with Husserl, runs
through Schutz and Gurwitsch, then Garfinkel, and then the present author
and his colleagues – are discussed, under the advisory (as suggested by Maurice
Natanson) that what Husserl sought was more important than what he found.
1 By the time of the Crisis, (Husserl 1970 (composed in 1937), 164) this was referred
to as “overarching community consciousness.”
150 Kenneth Liberman
received their fullest treatment. And it was there that Husserl (1970, 360)
addressed most extensively the genesis of meaning among a community of
thinkers, “In the unity of the community of communication among several
persons the repeatedly produced structure becomes an object of consciousness
as the one structure common to all,” which rendered his transcendental phe-
nomenology more useable by social inquirers.
Even so, Husserl’s analytic kept itself grounded in individual subjectivity;
accordingly, as many sociological researchers pursued inquiries essentially mo-
tivated by Husserl’s investigations into meaning-development, they became
dissatisfied with the notion of intersubjectivity as Husserl developed it. Hus-
serl’s follower Alfred Schutz has commented on the intersubjective charac-
ter of common-sense knowledge (Schutz 1970a, 10): “In analyzing the first
constructs of common-sense thinking in everyday life we proceeded as if the
world were my private world and as if we were entitled to disregard the fact
that it is from the outset an intersubjective world of culture.” This ‘from the
outset’ was a departure from classical constitutive phenomenology. As Schutz
explained (1970a, 11), “This world is not my private world but an intersubjec-
tive one, and my knowledge of it is not my private affair but from the outset
intersubjective or socialized.” In this way, Schutz envisioned intersubjectivity
as a primordial phenomenon.
That is to say, even though Husserl had begun to depart from Cartesian
individualism in offering his “critical reinterpretation of the Cartesian con-
ception” (Husserl 1970, 184) and had come to abandon the strictest version
of a transcendental reduction that always commences with what is disclosed
to the “I,” preferring instead to rely upon the horizon of experience present
in the Lebenswelt (Dodd 2004. 192-93), Husserl’s social phenomenological
followers still objected to his retaining too much of the narrative of Cartesian
individualist subjectivity in his more formal analytic summaries of the posi-
tions of phenomenology, including transcendental intersubjectivity, a notion
that seemed to be fraught with contradictory perspectives. Schutz accused
transcendental phenomenology of hubris by holding on to the primacy of the
individual ego (Schutz, in Grathoff 1989, 7). Another of Husserl’s disciples,
Aron Gurwitsch, commented (Grathoff 1989, 244), “How deeply illegitimate
[is] the ‘pure phenomenological I’ in Husserl,” and he concluded that “Hus-
serl’s idea of the social is indeed incredibly primitive” (245).
Schutz (1970a, 82) summarized his objections in a lengthy essay on “Tran-
scendental Intersubjectivity”:
This is not to suggest that Schutz did not take Husserl’s notion of inter-
subjectivity seriously; in fact, the problem is that he took it more seriously
than even Husserl did! Only, Schutz insisted that as a “datum” it preceded
transcendental constitution and that it itself is constituting rather than some-
thing constituted. He wrote (Grathoff 1989, 288), “Intersubjectivity, the we-
relation, and sociality are founded not in structures of consciousness but in
the life-world.” He also objected (Grathoff 1989, 282) to “the ‘exuberant use’
which Husserl makes of the transcendental constitutive method” and spent
a couple of decades reflecting upon the ironies surrounding the problems of
intersubjectivity and the Lebenswelt. After reading Husserl’s Crisis he wrote
to Gurwitsch (Grathoff 1989, 255), “If all transcendental phenomenology is
founded in the life-world (although, oh wonder of wonders, the latter is con-
stituted by the former), then I prefer to dedicate myself to the investigation of
the life-world.” Schutz’s method was to radicalize intersubjectivity, but he was
skeptical about being able to retain the formal analytic structure of Husserl’s
narrative: “The life-world as common world, as historical civilization, as spe-
cial group of contemporary privy councilors, as intersubjective community, as
common ground, as the product of collective action, as spiritual acquisition
(as it turns out on reflection!): all this is such a jumble that it is beneath the
dignity of the phenomenological method.” (246)
Schutz (1970b, 113; “Type and Eidos”) discovered that his diligent following
up of Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity led him to an aporia:
The nature of the typicality of the life-world and the meaning of its
preaquaintedness becomes especially complicated if we accept Husserl’s state-
ment that this typicality is by no means my private affair, but that of the
‘socialized’ subjectivity. It is the concrete typicality of the world valid for all of
us. This is without any doubt the case. But where is the origin or the founda-
tion of this intersubjective or transsubjective validity? Is there such a thing as
a transsubjective passive synthesis of congruence by wakening a reconstituted
and latent (as an habitual possession) element of the pair? We submit that all
the operative notions of phenomenology lead to insoluble difficulties when
applied to problems of transsubjectivity.
Gurwitsch’s account still leaves some scope for meanings to first become
constituted by the subjectivity of the solus ipse, individual consciousness by
individual consciousness, and then get “interconcatenated.” But could it be
that the interconcatenations come first? And if this is so, can the term inter-
subjectivity remain apt? Gurwitsch’s investigation of the thematic field and
its Gestalt provides important clues and serves to reduce the rationalism, so
it is somewhat hard to understand Gurwitsch’s relative reluctance to abandon
the language of constitutive phenomenology. Schutz (Grathoff 1989, 230)
despaired of resolving such difficulties when he wrote to Gurwitsch, “It is
more than ever my conviction that Husserl’s phenomenology cannot solve the
problem of intersubjectivity, especially that of transcendental intersubjectiv-
ity, and this is its undoing”; Schutz concluded, “The problem of intersubjec-
tivity has not been solved in transcendental phenomenology and most likely
cannot be” (Grathoff 1989, 293). For him the life-world was “the foundation
of the qualities of preacquaintedness and familiarity” (Schutz, 1970c, 93),
and the genesis of meaning must be investigated just as it happens there. One
of Husserl’s principal American proponents, Maurice Natanson (1970, 115-
116; “Alfred Schutz on Social Reality and Social Science”), had sympathy for
this perspective but was more ecumenical in his phrasing (possibly because his
The Itinerary of Intersubjectivity 153
The social itself, the current of mundanity, is not only equally deserving of
transcendental investigation but in need of such inquiry if a variety of ques-
tions related to social action are to be analyzed out to their roots. The We-
relationship, for example, is in many respects a primordial given for Schutz
…. Within the natural attitude, the We-relationship is a fact of life, but in the
phenomenological attitude it is deeply problematic …. Like Husserl himself,
Schutz was not completely satisfied with the attempt to account for intersub-
jectivity in terms of the doctrine of the transcendental ego.2
2 This can recall Durkheim’s development of the notion of the social as a social fact,
and more particularly Durkheim’s insistence in his Elementary Forms of Religious Life that the
collective experience of ritual practice, including the “collective effervescence” experienced
there, was the primitive origin of religious experience. It was primitive not because it is ancient
but because such sociality is foundational for religious sentiment and spirituality.
154 Kenneth Liberman
Objections to Parsons
Schutz developed parallel objections to the constructive-theoretical
projects of Talcott Parsons, the most influential American sociologist dur-
ing the post-War years. Attracted to Parsons because of the latter’s interest in
Weber and the role of subjectivity in social action, Schutz (Grathoff 1978, 36;
“Parsons’ Theory of Social Action,” pp. 8-60) came to conclude that Parsons’
own theoretical project stood squarely in the way of studies of actual everyday
social events:
Professor Parsons has the right insight that a theory of action would be
meaningless without the application of the subjective point of view. But he
does not follow this principle to its roots. He replaces subjective events in the
mind of the actor by a scheme of interpretation for such events, accessible only
to the observer, thus confusing objective schemes for interpreting subjective
phenomena with these subjective phenomena themselves. . . . The only ques-
tion Professor Parsons never asks is, what really does happen in the mind of
the actor from his subjective point of view.
your analyses are not radical enough as far as the subjective point of view is
concerned” (Grathoff 1978, 104).
Parsons responded only after Schutz’s death, in a postscript to their pub-
lished correspondence (Grathoff 1978, 116): “Schutz suggests that something
like ‘experience’ of phenomena is attainable without the mediation of what
Henderson called a conceptual scheme, Kant the categories of the under-
standing. The problems at issue in this discussion are then applied to what
has sometimes been called ‘the state of mind’ of an actor” (116); and Parsons
invoked Freud favorably in coming to defend the centrality and practicality
of formal theorizing: “[Freud] felt that the understanding of motives required
cognitive ordering on the part of not merely the external observer, vide the
psychoanalyst, but also on the part of the analysand himself in that through
interpretation the analysand could come to understand his own motives.”
Here the actual preconceptualized experience of the world for the actor is
undervalued and even essentially missed, except insofar as it can be related to
a preferred body of theorizing.
Another problem Schutz had with Parsons’s account echoes his criticism of
Husserl – that intersubjectivity taken most radically is not an individualized
event but is social ‘from the outset.’ This is apparent to any investigator who
studies the details of naturally occurring intersubjective activities; however,
Parsons was trapped within his theoretical projects, and at the time of his
active research the use of tape-recording technologies that were capable of
capturing the turn-by-turn, intricate details that compose the “interconcate-
nation” of meaning – and thereby make them available for careful analysis
by social phenomenologists – had not yet become widespread enough for
Parsons to appreciate the wealth of interactional detail that they provide access
to. Consequently, Parsons broadened his complaint about Schutz to include
Garfinkel (Grathoff 1978, 123-24) when he addressed “a puzzling contention
of the phenomenological school which is prominent in Schutz’s work and
has been carried on by such followers of him as Harold Garfinkel. This is the
special emphasis on phenomenological access to what is called ‘everyday life’
and the insistence that everyday life in this sense is radically distinct from any
perspective of the scientific observer.”
The thing about respecting “prepredicative lived experience” is that one
cannot simply work from concept to action, detailing one’s concepts with
empirical “findings” that illustrate it; rather, one must cultivate ways of work-
ing from action to concept. This would not constitute a blind empiricism, as
some have accused Garfinkel, since its perspective is theoretically informed
and a radical self-understanding is always at work.4 In Gurwitsch’s words, “We
deal with thing-phenomena, with ‘things’ just as they appear, and within the
limits in which they appear, but also only within these limits and in the man-
ners of their appearing. In other words, the world yields its place to the ‘world-
phenomenon,’ the latter to be taken precisely in the way, but also only in the
way, in which it is a world-phenomenon” (Gurwitsch 1966, 109).
In declaring, “It is high time that action be made the theme of philosophy”
(Grathoff 1989, 6), Schutz wished to capture the genesis of meaning as it
actually occurs in situ in this prepredicative sphere, but the question remains
whether Schutz came to allow theoretical structures of his own to preempt his
sight; that is, if what is “prepredicative” is not the tail of the dog but what is
doing the wagging, what are the benefits of hanging on scrupulously to the
more formal idealist components of constitutional terminology? This ques-
tion has plagued ethnomethodological researchers. Although Schutz did not
want to resolve his differences with Husserl by means of establishing his own
theoretical projects, for the most part that is just what he did, and some of his
reflections retain a Cartesian flavor.
Ethnomethodological Respecification of
Intersubjectivity
One of Husserl’s basic principles has been that “All prepredicative self-evi-
dence must be ultimately grounded on the self-evidence of experience” (Hus-
serl 1973, 41), and for him this experience was primarily the experience of
individuals. The primordial status of “experience” became the guiding direc-
tive for his students, both those who remained within the transcendental phe-
nomenological paradigm and those who took intersubjectivity further than
did Husserl. Gurwitsch was consistent in constraining his inquiries under the
guideline that “the thematic field must be taken exactly as actually experienced
and only as it presents itself in the given case” (Gurwitsch 1964, 330).
Even when diverging from Husserl’s constitutional project, Schutz re-
mained faithful to Husserl’s more important insights. Schutz (Grathoff 1989,
6) declared, “For me the question concerning the ‘correct,’ namely orthodox,
Husserl interpretation is always secondary to the question concerning the true
states of affairs.” Schutz was especially motivated by Husserl’s investigations
into internal time-consciousness and the temporal nature of thinking, and
Schutz came to learn that the temporal ways of thought as revealed in em-
pirical studies rendered it less predictable and less rational than constitutive
phenomenology proposed. When located in actual case studies found in the
real world, the prospective sense of occurrence revealed the utility of an inde-
terminacy of meaning that was incredibly robust; and studies of retrospective
reflection in-the-course of ongoing ordinary affairs revealed an abundance of
“practical rationality” that was vital for the collaborative production of mean-
ing and order in local occasions.
These insights into the prospective and retrospective sense of occurrence,
which were gained from applications of Husserl’s extensive investigations of
The Itinerary of Intersubjectivity 157
role; hence, it is inadequate since it does not cover meaning in the way it actu-
ally emerges. This inadequacy is derived from Husserl (1970, 360):
the parts for social actors; instead, it became a basic canon of ethnomethodol-
ogy that the activities of meaning-determination could only be discovered, and
in light of the real-world affairs they were examining, they learned that the
very rationality of meaning had to be re-envisioned. There is no question that
Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity and Schutz’s insistence upon a sociologi-
cal interpretation of it paved the way for them, but once they came upon the
social in its actuality and took the “things” just as they appeared to the parties
active there, the social phenomenological project became more radical than
even the ethnomethodologists had expected.
The critical breakthrough for ethnomethodological inquiries was the use
of audio and video tape-recordings of the details of actual affairs, which be-
came widespread only in the late fifties and so was a research tool that was
mostly unavailable to Schutz, Gurwitsch, or Parsons. Many committed phe-
nomenologists wince at the invocation of such a technological solution to
the intractable problems of intersubjectivity’s complexities, but they need to
overcome such a myopic bias and recognize how the taping of ordinary events
made possible the institution of a new sort of transcendental-phenomenolog-
ical reduction, so that one could, for the first time, see the mundane prepre-
dicative phenomena in which we are fully immersed, or as Garfinkel put it,
observe the water that the fish have been swimming in all along but which had
remained invisible to them. Ethnomethodologists were able to gain access to
the primitive Sinnbildung at the intersubjective level and review it hundreds
of times until almost every detail could be witnessed and studied carefully. By
the time they completed “studies” like this, the very idea of intersubjectivity
came to be regarded as a notion too remote from the embodied affairs of the
world they had been witnessing and too conceptually derived to cover the
wealth of details they were describing.
Very generally speaking one might say that ethnomethodology is inter-
ested in researching subjectivity, but it has no interest in substantivizing sub-
jectivity, which is an instantiation of European individualist metaphysics, a
cultural mythology from which phenomenological researchers are not entirely
immune. More importantly, intersubjectivity was discovered to be more than
just an additional phase that follows subjective constitution; rather, it is the
most active realm in which the genesis of meaning occurs. And this was not
primarily a theoretical discovery but something that was witnessed, again and
again, in their audio and videotapes of the social collaborations of ordinary
people. In fact, what they had located was not strictly speaking a subjective
point of view since the socially concerted notions that they saw being objec-
tivated often had an objectivity which preceded their meaning. This led eth-
nomethodology further away from Schutz, although Schutz (Grathoff 1989,
263) once commented astutely, “There isn’t a transcendental ego, but only a
thematic field which isn’t egological.” Even when one could establish clearly
the indexical meaning of an objective content, whatever meaning became
160 Kenneth Liberman
objectivated was always subject to further revision – but not revision by de-
liberate rational decision, or by any “negotiation” of meanings, but by the
serendipitous local work of the reflexive use of emerging semantic fields and
semiotic devices (Liberman 1999).
Much of the intricacy with which we organize the orderliness of ordi-
nary affairs escapes concise description for the reason that the parties who
are organizing those local meanings and orderlinesses do not themselves have
complete control over what they are doing. One might dismiss such a notion
as too postmodern, if it were not for the fact that ethnomethodologists have
been able to document these ‘post-rational’ orderlinesses in their lived details.
Let me be bold enough to suggest that ethnomethodology is on its way to
shedding some light on “the essential opacity of our lifeworld,” a vision that
Schutz (1970c, 148) mentioned at the end of his career: “We cannot penetrate
with the light of our knowledge into all dimensions of it; we may succeed in
making some of them semitransparent, and only fractions of the latter trans-
lucent. Paradoxically expressed, we are familiar (in the sense of acquaintance)
with the fact that large dimensions of our lifeworld are unknown to us.”
Schutz no longer sought for intersubjectivity in the structures of con-
sciousness but in the life-world (Grathoff 1989, 248); and in a recent work
Garfinkel (2007) has attempted to respecify this notion of the life-world, in
order to relieve it of any remnant Cartesianism and to emphasize that what-
ever might be collected under the label of intersubjectivity must be recog-
nized to be an originary realm. In doing so, Garfinkel remains consistent with
Gurwitsch’s suggestion (Grathoff 1989, 301) that we are not engaging in a
formal analytic but rather “a logic of the life-world and not of formalized
idealities.” However, social phenomenologists have been criticized by phe-
nomenologists for not employing the concept of the life-world with sufficient
specificity. While there is insufficient space to explore this issue further here,
ethnomethodologists take the Lebenswelt not so much as a concept but as a
datum revealed to them in their studies of naturally occurring social events.
If asked to explain the relation between the “We-community” and the first
personal givenness of experiential life, most ethnomethodologists will demur,
in preference for keeping their gaze attuned to the events they are studying.
And the ethnomethodologists will not commence their analyses until they
have at least a minion’s worth (the minimum five persons necessary for Jewish
spiritual observance) of collaborating actors to study.
Radicalizing Objectivation
Schutz also took up the task of investigating the development of objec-
tive norms and typifications in social settings. Husserl had provided a frame-
work for the study of the objectivation of meanings, and he asked, how
does the linguistic embodiment of ideas make out of merely intersubjective
The Itinerary of Intersubjectivity 161
Saliency of a group of data so that this group emerges and segregates itself
from the stream is a feature not introduced into the stream but yielded by the
stream itself. Here we are in the presence of a rough, transient, and primitive,
perhaps the most primitive organization: a group of data emerging from an
otherwise inarticulate field. Still, it is a form of organization, not bestowed
upon, but exhibited by, experience.
162 Kenneth Liberman
These authochthonous affairs are not produced planfully but are picked-
up and exhibited by parties serendipitously, and nothing theoretical needs to
be introduced from the outside. Introducing a theoretically derived order-
ing would inflict injury upon the local organizational work of parties on the
scene, since they are already finding a way to organize the scene themselves,
without the theorists.
Conclusion
In his “Foreword” to the correspondence between Schutz and Gurwitsch,
Natanson (Grathoff 1989, viii) writes, “The proper understanding of Husserl
and his texts was of major importance to the friends. Of much greater sig-
nificance was what Husserl sought: an immensely thorough – philosophically
stubborn – description, analysis, and comprehension of ‘the true states of af-
fairs,’ the ‘things themselves.’” In the same vein, Gurwitsch (Grathoff 1989,
241) wrote that the understanding he was seeking “requires very complicated
investigations of the kind Husserl began—but only began.” Garfinkel, too
(2007; see also 2002, 83), describes how ethnomethodology’s studies of con-
gregational activities6 were inspired by Husserl’s texts: “Hands-on experience
with ethnomethodological studies furnished from Husserl’s program of the
Lebenswelt Origins of the Sciences new initiatives in sociology’s unavoidable
problem of social order.” Garfinkel (2007, 10) specifically praises Husserl’s
contributions to these new initiatives, “Husserl’s program offers endless vener-
ated sources for the probative respecification and redescription of professional
sociology’s distinctive studies of lived work and sciences which are identified
as a central problem of social order in ordinary society.” And yet Garfinkel
(2007, 27) is careful to delineate what he considers the limits to Husserl’s
program of reducing local details to “formal analytic generalities”: “With this
policy [Husserl] obscured and lost the origins of the sciences in their lived
details of the shop floor.” It may be said that Garfinkel’s reliance upon Husserl
and his criticism parallel that of Schutz, Gurwitsch, Natanson, et. al., but the
demands of the worldly details he discovered carried his critique of intersub-
jectivity into more radical domains. Intersubjectivity has had a journey of
nearly a century now, but there can be no doubt that inquiries into the genesis
of meaning in social situations – founded upon the rigorous investigations of
Husserl, Schutz, Gurwitsch and Garfinkel – have only just commenced.7
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_______. Ethnomethodology’s Program. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
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_______. “Lebenswelt Origins of the Sciences.” Human Studies 30 (2007):
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Grathoff, Richard, ed. The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred
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_______, ed. Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and
Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959. Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University
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Gurwitsch, Aron. Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
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_______. Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
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Husserl, Edmund. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1931.
_______. The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970 [1954 (composed
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_______. Formal and Transcendental Logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
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_______. Experience and Judgment. Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe. Evanston,
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Liberman, Kenneth. “The Social Praxis of Communicating Meanings.” Text
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_______. Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An
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fruit of the most stimulating and personally rewarding life I could have ever imagined. For this
reason, it is gratifying to be able to make this small contribution to Schutzian scholarship.
164 Kenneth Liberman
Lester embree
INTRODUCTION
About the life of Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), nothing needs to be said
here because we have Michael Barber’s excellent biography.1 Some introduc-
tory points about Schutz’s thought in general can nevertheless help situate
the concerns of this essay.2 Previously, Schutz’s theory of law has been used in
CSS=”Choice and the Social Sciences,” ed. Lester Embree, in Life-World and Consciousness:
Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Lester Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1972), 565-70;
TSA=The Theory of Social Action, ed. Richard Grathoff (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1978); and
PP=“Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretative Social Science: An
Ineditum of Alfred Schutz from Spring 1953,” ed. Lester Embree, Husserl Studies 14:123-149
(1997), 119-145.
3 Lester Embree, “The Appeal of Alfred Schutz in Disciplines beyond Philosophy, e.g.,
Jurisprudence, The Legacy of Alfred Schutz, ed. Martin Endress, NASU Hisashi, and George
Psathas (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
4 Lester Embree,“A Problem in Schutz’s Theory of the Historical Sciences with an Il-
lustration from the Women’s Liberation Movement,” Husserl Studies, 27 (2004), 281-287.
5 Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944).
Economics in the Context of Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Science 167
he has to learn from social scientists and to interpret for them what they are
doing” (IV 146). In other passages, he conceives of the methodologist as a
student in relation to the scientists as teachers. “In this role, the methodolo-
gist has to ask intelligent questions about the technique of his teacher. And if
those questions help others to think over what they really do, and perhaps to
eliminate certain intrinsic difficulties hidden in the foundation of the scien-
tific edifice where the scientists never set foot, methodology has performed its
task” (II 88; cf. IV 24). To use another metaphor that Schutz did not use, this
task would be like somebody who composes a cookbook by observing what
chefs do in the kitchen, recording as recipes what is evident in their skillful
practice and of use to them in subsequent cooking—except that recipes are
typically stated as imperatives, while again Schutz’s postulates are typically not
expressed this way.
What kinds of science are there for Schutz? The generic difference is between
the cultural and the natural sciences. The title “cultural sciences” may seem
odd, even though Schutz uses it significantly in work written in Europe (IV
Ch. 11 and I 118ff.). He himself does not use “cultural science” in English (al-
though it occurs in one translation he approved—see I 120ff.), probably to get
along in American science. In Der sinnhafte Aufbau, however, he not only uses
“Geisteswissenschaft” and “Kulturwissenschaft,” but even “Sozialwissenschaft” for
the historical taken together with the strictly social sciences (e.g., sociology and
ethnology), actually calling biography, jurisprudence, pure economics, history
of law, history of art, political science (PSW 242), history of politics (PSW
136), economic history (PSW 137), and the histories of music and philosophy
(PSW 211) “social” sciences. Thus although Schutz is indeed concerned in
general with “concrete sciences of cultural phenomena (law, the economic and
social world, art, history, etc.)” (I 122), one always needs to ask if a broad or a
strict signification is expressed when he uses the term “social science.”
The cultural sciences thematize aspects of the socio-cultural world. This
lifeworld is concrete and original, whereas the nature of the naturalistic sci-
ences differs in being abstract and derivative: “The concept of Nature … with
which the natural sciences have to deal is … an idealizing abstraction from
the Lebenswelt, an abstraction which, on principle and of course legitimately,
excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of culture which origi-
nate as such in practical human activity. Exactly this layer of the Lebenswelt,
however, from which the natural sciences have to abstract, is the social reality
which the social sciences have to investigate.” (I 58)
What of species within the genus of cultural science? Psychological science
might be a species of cultural science, but Schutz does not say so. The list
assembled above can be divided. Economics, ethnology, jurisprudence, lin-
guistics, political science, and sociology are social sciences in the strict signi-
fication, while the history of art, economic history, history of law, history of
music, history of philosophy, and history of politics are historical sciences.
These two species of cultural science differ with respect to the regions of the
socio-cultural world referred to. Among humans alive at the same time as the
investigator, those with whom direct interaction and understanding are possi-
ble are deemed “consociates,” while those living others who are only indirectly
within cognitive and practical reach are called “contemporaries.” The social
sciences in the strict signification address the region of contemporaries. If the
others being investigated are deceased, the sciences in question belong to the
region of the historical sciences.
Two remarks serve to indicate how the socio-cultural lifeworld is thema-
tized in the cultural sciences in general. In the first place, naturalistic scientists
are not the only ones who construct models; the cultural scientist too observes
typical patterns and constructs models on that basis (I 36, 40ff.).
Economics in the Context of Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Science 169
Thus the social scientist arrives at a model of the social world or, better, at a
reconstruction of it. It contains all relevant elements of the social event chosen
as a typical one by the scientist for further examination. … From the outset
the puppet type is imagined as having the same specific knowledge of the
situation—including means and conditions—, which a real actor would have
in the real social world. From the outset the subjective motives of a real actor
performing a typical act are implanted as constant elements of the specious
consciousness of the personal ideal type. It is the purpose of the personal ideal
type to play the role an actor in the social world would have to adopt in order
to perform the typical act (TSA 59).
In other words, the cultural scientist develops a model of the social world
in terms of a system of mutually coordinated ideal types of actions as well as
relationships, situations, and products.
And in the second place, the ideal types--also called “constructs” and even
“thought objects”—that are employed in the cultural sciences are actually
concepts of a higher level, i.e., constructs about constructs:
Although Schutz does not address the issue, one might wonder whether
there is not a need to recognize constructs of a third degree, i.e., science-
theoretical or methodological constructs of cultural-scientific constructs of
common-sense constructs. And if a distinction is made between scientific sci-
ence theory (i.e., efforts at theory of science made within the framework of,
and limited to, a particular science) and philosophical science theory (which
deals with genera and species of science), then constructs of the fourth degree
would need to be recognized. Postulates would be constructs of the third and/
or fourth degree.
What are the key postulates for the cultural sciences? Schutz discusses a
number of postulates that arguably hold for all cultural sciences (see, e.g., II
18f.), those of adequacy and subjective meaning are especially important. Re-
garding the former, “each term in a scientific model of human action must be
constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world
170 Lester embree
Is it not the “behavior of prices” rather than the behavior of men in the market
situation which is studied by the economist, the “shape of demand curves” rather
than the anticipations of economic subjects symbolized by such curves? Does not
the economist investigate successfully subject matters such as “savings,” “capital,”
“business cycle,” “wages” and “unemployment,” “multipliers” and “monopoly”
as if these phenomena were entirely detached from any activity of the economic
subjects, even less without entering into the subjective meaning structures such
activities may have for them? The achievements of modern economic theories
would make it preposterous to deny that an abstract conceptual scheme can be
used very successfully for the solution of many problems. And similar examples
could be given from the field of almost all the other social sciences.
Economics in the Context of Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Science 171
The same contrast can be seen in the following discussion by Schutz of the
sociology of Talcott Parsons:
Modern sociologists dealing with the social system as such describe a concrete
social group, for example, as a structural-functional context of interlocked
social roles and status relations, of patterns of performance and significance.
Such patterns, in the form of expectations adhering to these roles and status
relations, become motivational for the actual and future actions of the incum-
bents to fulfill the functions prescribed by the positions occupied by them
within this system … But it will be useful to remember that what the sociolo-
gists calls “system,” “role,” “status,” “role expectation,” “situation,” and “insti-
tutionalization,” [are] experienced by the individual actor on the social scene
in entirely different terms. To him all the factors denoted by these concepts are
elements of a network of typifications—typifications of human individuals, of
their course-of-action patterns, of their motives and goals, or of the sociocul-
tural products which originated in their actions. These types were formed in
the main by others, his predecessors or contemporaries, as appropriate tools
for coming to terms with things and men, accepted as such by the group into
which he was born. (II 231-33)
Thus both the postulate of adequacy and the postulate of subjective inter-
pretation serve to anchor the second-order constructs of the cultural scientists
in the first-order constructs through which the actors themselves understand
the social world.
Now that postulates for science in general and the for the cultural sciences
have been sketched, it is possible to consider more specific postulates.
come to include law, linguistics, and cultural anthropology (I 58). And early
on he seems to agree that theoretical economics and sociology do not have to
be developed because they already exist (IV 88). The question can be confined
to how economics and sociology are theoretical.
“The answer is that in every branch of the social sciences which has arrived
at the theoretical stage of its development there is a fundamental hypothesis
which both defines the fields of research and gives the regulative principle for
building up the system of ideal types” (II 87). The system of ideal types for
a theoretical science would seem to be the same as the model of the social
world built up in the cultural sciences mentioned above, i.e., a model that
“contains all relevant elements of the social event chosen as a typical one by
the scientist” and that “complies perfectly with the postulate of the subjective
point of view” (TSA 59). However, Schutz hesitates to define the research
field of economics in terms of the social world as a whole: “No economist
considers the totality of human actions as falling under the province of his
science. Whatever his definition of the economic field may be … this defini-
tion will designate certain actions, goals, means, and motives as economically
relevant, whereas all the others remain as ‘economic matters’ outside the scope
of economic science” (CSS 583; cf. RPR 99, IV 104). Hence a fundamental
hypothesis for the whole of the cultural sciences—or even of the whole of the
specifically social sciences—does not yield the postulate that will define the
research field and method of theoretical economics in particular.
There similarly seems to be no statement of a fundamental hypothesis for
the whole of sociology. But in discussing the research field and method of the
school of interpretative or verstehende sociology, Schutz does say that “the pri-
mary task of this science is to describe the processes of meaning-establishment
and meaning-interpretation as these are carried out by individuals living in
the social world” (PSW 248). Later, he appears to approve of a characteriza-
tion of theoretical social sciences (including sociology), stating that “the out-
standing feature of these theoretical sciences is the interpretation of the social
world in terms of a system of determinate logical structure” (Parsons, op. cit.,
p. 7).6 And he also says that “sociology [is] a special analytical science on the
same level with economic theory as ‘the science which attempts to develop an
analytical theory of social action systems (the term social involving a plurality
of actors mutually oriented to each other’s action) in so far as these systems
can be understood in terms of the property of common-value integration’”…
(TSA 21; cf. II 231f.) As a theoretical social science, sociology thus deals with
the logical structure of social action systems, but as an interpretative science,
it approaches these systems in terms of what is meaningful for individuals,
raising the question of different theoretical articulations of the research field
in different schools of thought within a single discipline.
6 II 86, cf. II 80, PP 142. The source is Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action,
1937.
Economics in the Context of Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Science 173
observed social actions as if they occurred within a unified field of true alter-
natives, that is, of problematic and not of open possibilities” (I 83 f., emphasis
added). In other words, utilitarianism (in contrast to behaviorism) does seem
to include the perspective of the actor, but assumes an “objective” ranking
of what is to be liked and disliked, without acknowledging that this ranking
stems from the (subjective) orientation of the researcher. In contrast, modern
sociology can accommodate a more nuanced field of possibilities relevant to
the (typified) individual actor’s situation.
Analogously, the school of modern economics is characterized by the prin-
ciple of marginal utility, and what this does is to eliminate the question of the
intrinsic (economic) value of goods:
And with this, the requisite postulate emerges, indicating what will count
as “economically relevant” (CSS 583) for the investigation.
The marginal-utility principle or postulate characterizes the school of
modern economics within the social-science species of the cultural sciences
for Alfred Schutz.
SUMMARY
As mentioned at the outset, the results of Schutz’s reflections on the practice
of economics could be expressed as a series of imperatives. However, he resists
prescribing to scientists; instead, he wants instead to report to them what he
discovered in the foundations of their science, leaving it to them whether to re-
flect on and possibly eliminate some previously hidden difficulties there. In the
same spirit, the results reported in the present study can now simply be restated,
beginning with principles proper to science per se and gradually specifying them
for cultural science; social science in the strict signification; interpretative social
science; and modern theoretical economics as Schutz sees things.
Economics in the Context of Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Science 175
Abstract: In this paper, I try to argue that what Schutz enterprises can be
integrated into what Husserl calls phenomenological psychology. My inter-
pretation is based on Schutz’s own remarks, which are though more or less dis-
missed by most of the interpreters of Schutz. Beginning with an articulation
of the social theory of Schutz, I explore the meaning of phenomenological
psychology in Husserl as next in order to point out that despite the disagree-
ment with Husserl’s transcendental approach to intersubjectivity Schutz has a
closer adherence to Husserl than commonly held.
1. 前言:舒茲的自我定位與現象學心理學
舒茲曾經在早期代表著作《社會世界之意義構成》(Der sinnhafte
Aufbau der sozialen Welt)表示,他所從事的研究工作乃是「自然態度
的構成現象學」(die konstitutive Phänomenologie der natürlichen Einstel-
lung) (Schutz, 1932: 56)。「自然態度」這項語詞來自胡塞爾,意指
尚未進行認知反思活動的人所持有的素樸意識狀態。自然態度擁有
自己的認知模態與確定事情的方式,它的實踐特質導致人們沈湎於
眼前的事物而未能進一步思索當下活動的意義以及所在環境的特
質,這是自然態度的限制。著眼於反思活動的胡塞爾倡導懸擱現有
信念的必要性。對他而言,基於自然態度本身不能夠形成一套哲學
論述,所以若想要闡述自然態度本身,就非得脫離自然態度不可,
也就是執行現象學還原,甚至進入超驗態度。相對而言,致力於闡
述平常人意識基本結構的舒茲,不像胡塞爾那樣主張現象學還原的
必要性,尤其不願承認超驗現象學的絕對價值。惟如此一來,便產
生一個問題:我們如何能夠闡述自然態度的意識模態?是內在於自
然態度中進行嗎?抑或別有他途?早在1930年,舒茲便已經接觸了
胡塞爾發表於《哲學與現象學研究年刊》(Jahrbuch für Philosophie
und phänomenologische Forschung, Bd.XI, 1930)而後來被收錄於《觀念
第三冊》(Ideen III)的〈我的《觀念》後言〉(Nachwort zu meiner
Ideen)這篇相當長的文章,使得他在《社會世界之意義構成》一書
導論第六節的附錄裡明白指出,他所從事的工作無非就是胡塞爾所
說的「自然態度的構成現象學」或是「現象學心理學」(phänomeno-
logische Psychologie)(Schutz, 1932: 56)。依舒茲的解釋,其工作是去
描述自然態度的本質結構,他說:
「處在世俗社會界之中我們與現象學還原領域中的構成現象無
關,反而只和自然態度的相應項(entsprechende Korrelate)有關。
178 Chung-ChI Yu
一旦我們在本質描述中正確地掌握到『內在時間領域中的內在時間
性之問題』,我們就可以毫無疑問地把我們的研究成果應用到自然
態度的現象上,此外讓我們作為『現象學的心理學者』停留在『內
在直觀,也就是,屬於心靈本質的直觀』中。如此一來,我們的目
標就不是建立有關內在直觀領域之事實的經驗科學,而是本質的科
學,它所要探求的乃是個別心靈的不變之本屬結構,或者,社會心
靈(精神)生活不變之本屬結構,換言之,追問它們的先天特質
(Apriori)。」(Schutz, 1932: 56)
乍看之下,這段文字就整部書的結構來看顯得有些突兀,因為在
這本書的其他章節裡都未再度出現「自然態度的構成現象學」或是
「現象學心理學」等用語。只不過,如果據此斷言上述這段文字只
是信手拈來,無關宏旨之作,則也不免失之偏頗。在一篇由舒茲晚
年錄音講稿所整理出來的短文〈胡塞爾及他對我的影響〉(Husserl
and His Influence on Me)裡面,舒茲又再次提到類似的說法:
「我與胡塞爾哲學的相遇,一方面是受到我在社會科學受過科學
訓練此一事實的高度影響,另一方面則與我非正統的現象學研究進
路脫不了關係:從一開始我就對胡塞爾後來在「《觀念》後跋」所
稱的「自然態度的現象學」比對「超驗現象學」的諸多問題更感興
趣。」(Schutz, 1977: 126)
只要我們瞭解舒茲1940年流亡美國之後仍不斷提到相似的看
法,就能夠明白為什麼出現在《社會世界之意義構成》導論第六
節的附錄中的那段文字必須加以重視。舒茲在1940年剛抵達美國
不久便發表了〈現象學與社會科學〉(Phenomenology and the Social
Sciences) 1一文,他在該篇論文指出胡塞爾透過現象學還原所得到
的研究成果,其效力仍舊保留在研究「自然態度的心理學統覺」
(psychologische Apperzeption der natürlichen Einstellung)這個所謂「
自然態度的構成現象學」或胡塞爾偶而使用的「意向性的心理學」
(Psychologie der Intentionalität, psychology of intentionality, GA I, 138;
CP I, 132)這門學問中。這樣一門「本質而世俗的科學」(GA I, 138,
CP, 132),也就是如前所說,針對「個別心靈的不變之本屬結構,或
者,社會心靈(精神)生活不變之本屬結構」(GA I, 138)進行研究之
1 介於1940年與1959年之間,我們也不難發現舒茲在不同的文章
裡提到類似的想法,例如〈用現象學解讀威廉詹姆斯的意識流概念〉
(William James’ Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpre-
ted. 1940)、〈從日常觀點到理論觀點看真實世界〉(Realities from Daily
Life to Theoretical Contemplation, 1943)、〈一些現象學的核心概念〉(Some
Leading Concepts of Phenomenology, 1945)、〈現象學與社會科學的基礎〉
(Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Social Sciences, 1953)。再者,
收集在《論文集》第四冊(CP IV)的遺稿也出現不少與上述論點相關的陳
述。(參考頁158,164,172,178等)
The Social Theory of Schutz 179
科學,在舒茲看來,正是各個社會科學方法論與理論的起始點,他
並且強調胡塞爾所獲得的研究成果對於社會文化科學的理論奠基具
有極重要的意義。
胡塞爾思想對於社會科學理論基礎十分重要,這項看法在舒茲於
1959年 ─ 過世不久前 ─ 為紀念胡塞爾百週年誕辰所寫的短文〈胡
塞爾對於社會科學的重要性〉裡仍舊未曾改變,而且也再次肯定胡
塞爾在現象學還原之後所獲得的研究成果,其效力仍適用於自然態
度的領域。換句話說,1932年的看法也好,1940年的觀點也好,到
了晚期基本上都沒有重大改變,� 唯一不同的是,受到30年代中期
胡塞爾晚年對生活世界概念的重視,以及50年代胡塞爾遺稿逐漸整
理出來正式出版的影響,舒茲也援引了生活世界的概念,進而指出
胡塞爾在生活世界概念上所做的相關闡述,那些朝「哲學人類學」
(philosophical anthropology)發展的許多見解跟「自然態度的構成現
象學」是息息相關的。(CP I, 149)
如果上述這些解釋得以成立,也就是舒茲確實將自己的社會理論
思想定位在「自然態度的構成現象學」,也就是「現象學心理學」
之上,那麼我們便有必要進一步探討:舒茲的社會理論思想內涵為
何,而胡塞爾的「現象學心理學」的實質涵義又是什麼?第二節與
第三節將分別作出說明,第四節則進一步討論兩者的關連性並作出
檢討。
2. 舒茲的社會理論
舒茲的思想旨在闡明社會世界的意義理論,而這與他對「如何為
社會科學奠定哲學基礎」的論述是離不開關係的。他指出,「所有
關於社會世界的科學」都可以用「有關主觀意義脈絡的客觀意義脈
絡」來加以概括(Schutz, 1932: 317) 。為了說明這項論點,讓我們依
次解釋「主觀意義脈絡」、「客觀意義脈絡」的涵義。
在《社會世界之意義構成》一書中,意義的問題是緊緊環繞著
行動的問題而展開的。舒茲之所以會關注這個問題,是因為他想要
釐清韋伯所謂的「賦予行動以意義」之涵義。舒茲體認到韋伯「只
有在被迫以及明顯可見的勉強情況下才致力於他所謂科學基礎的工
作……只有在具體的專業科學問題的活動中有必要時,他才會去處
理科學理論的問題」(Schutz, 1932: 15)而且「一旦他覺得夠用,便
無意繼續分析下去了。」(Schutz, 1932: 15)這樣的基本態度使得韋
伯在理論上的成就受到限制,所以在有關理解他人行動的問題上韋
伯留下了許多說明不夠清楚的概念、例如「意義脈絡」、「主觀意
義」、「客觀意義」、「動機」等等,這一切都促使舒茲動念想要
180 Chung-ChI Yu
對相關的問題作進一步的分析。為韋伯的這些概念作哲學上的釐清
便促成了《社會世界之意義構成》這本書的誕生。
舒茲指出,「有意義的行動」作為韋伯社會學思想的核心概
念,本身就是「一個高度分歧、有待進一步分析的標記」(Schutz,
1932: 15)。而韋伯在處理這個概念時不盡周延之處在於:首先,
韋伯不曾釐清行動本身的不同涵義,他既不曾指出「作為過程中
的行動」與「作為已經結束的行動」之間的不同,也未區分「作為
產生過程中的意義」,以及「作為結果的意義」。其次,韋伯雖然
區別行動的主觀意義與客觀意義,卻沒有能夠進一步區分以及探討
個別的詮釋者基於立場的不同所帶來的改變,也就是他沒有區別行
動對於自我的意義與對他人意義的不同,沒能區別「自我的經驗歷
程」和「他人的經驗歷程」之間的差異,更未能針對「自我理解」
與「理解他人」作區分。再者、韋伯未能區別對社會世界的鄰人
(Mitmensch)與同時代人(Nebenmensch)不同的理解角度,也就
是未能對於社會世界複雜多樣的、具有不同程度的匿名性及體驗親
近性的他人作明確之區分。最後,韋伯不曾探討行動者不同的形
成意義的方式,還有此一意義對於參與社會世界活動的他人或者外
在於社會世界活動的觀察者所具有的不同模態,也就是沒有充分說
明從日常生活的角度與從社會科學的角度所進行的理解如何不同。
(Schutz, 1932: 15-16)
針對韋伯上述的缺失,舒茲分別在《社會世界之意義構成》第二
章分析「意義的構成」,在第三章處理「在日常生活層次的理解他
人」,第四章探討「社會世界的不同結構」,第五章則解析「社會
科學的理解方式」。本文底下集中於「社會世界的結構」來闡釋舒
茲的社會世界意義理論。
2.1 社會的周遭世界與共同世界
舒茲在對社會世界進行結構分析當中,最重視「社會的周遭
世界」與「社會的共同世界」這項區分。前者就是所謂「面對面
的關係」(face-to-face relationship),後者則是藉由「類型化」
(Typisierung)所建立起來的社會關係。在「周遭世界」中,他人以
具有明證性的方式自我呈現,此人與我分享同一個空間和時間,他
的表情、語言和溝通意向等等都直接展現在我的眼前,反之亦然。
在「共同世界」之中,他人則是僅僅以類型化的方式呈現,我只是
根據我在周遭世界中對他人的經驗來推斷「共同世界」中的他人之
可能經驗。基本上我們可以說,我所能直接經驗到的人非常有限,
大部分的人都是以類型化的方式被我所經驗的。
「社會的周遭世界」與「社會的共同世界」之區分對舒茲的意義
主要在於說明社會科學思考的特質。社會科學家對社會世界的研究
The Social Theory of Schutz 181
原則上建立在所謂「共同世界之觀察」(mitweltliche Beobachtung)
的基礎上,它既不同於「周遭世界的觀察」(umweltliche Beobachtung)
,更不是周遭世界當中的社會互動經驗,因為社會科學家與被觀察
的人彼此之間完全沒有互動的關係,他們只是以置身事外的方式
去面對後者,並且是以概念建構的方式來進行 ─ 正如韋伯(Max
Weber, 1864-1920) ─ 藉由理念型(Idealtypus)來面對對象那般。社
會科學家的觀察當然可以回溯到「周遭世界之觀察」而被修正,因
為後者的對象是活生生的呈現在眼前,而非只是藉由理念型概念間
接被認識而已。舒茲在此所要強調的乃是社會科學的概念不是憑空
出現,而是以具有明證性的生活世界經驗為基礎的。換句話說,社
會科學的概念形成以及思考方式以社會的共同世界為基礎,而後者
則又根源於社會的周遭世界。
2.2.1社會的周遭世界
「社會的周遭世界」具有底下幾個特點:首先,周遭世界中的他
人都是以活生生的方式(leibhaftig)自我呈現的,亦即,他的表情
和肢體動作都表現為具體鮮明的樣態。周遭世界中的你和我有著眼
神的交換,而這對於掌握彼此的意識流程與意識內容是有幫助的。
舒茲說:
「只有在社會的周遭世界中……我們的眼光才會實際地交會;
也唯有在此,一個人才能實際地注意到別人如何注視著他自己。」
(Schutz, 1932: 233)
「如此這般對於對方意識之注視的相互纏繞,而這當中的看
(Blick)又彷彿是在兩面互相映照的鏡子中進行,自我成為影像被
拋回來,這正是周遭世界社會關係的特別之處」(Schutz, 1932: 236
)
因此,雙方都有機會參與另一人行動構想的實現過程。而且,
我總是可以檢驗我對他人的意識體驗之詮釋是否恰當。在周遭世界
關係中,人們有著實質的互動關係(Wirkensbeziehung),我可以
預知他的行動構想,並依據此一瞭解調整我自己的實質行動。在此
一互動當中,我的意識流和你的意識流處於同步狀態。
再者,我的周遭世界與你的周遭世界是相同的;我們有著相同
的周遭世界。舒茲說:
「當我和你處於周遭世界情境時,我可以在我們的一起擁有的環
境裡指著某些物體而說「這個桌子」,並藉由對環境中的對象之相
同經驗,我確信我的詮釋基模對你的表達基模來說是適當的。對社
會生活的實踐來說相當重要的一件事是,我能確信我對一個對象的
詮釋就是和你對它的詮釋沒有不同,至少就同一個對象而言是如此
的。」(Schutz, 1932: 237)
182 Chung-ChI Yu
在周遭世界裡我的詮釋基模與你的表達基模容易達成一致,尤其
是針對共同環境當中的特定對象(例如一張桌子)來說。舒茲正是
從這一點去說明互為主體世界或是「我們」世界的涵義的。他說:
「我的環境與你的環境是相同的,我們的環境是一體而共同的。
我們的世界(die Welt des Wir)並不是我的或是你的個人世界,而是
我們的世界(unsere Welt)、是一個共同的互為主體性的世界 (uns
gemeinsame intersubjektive Welt),它就在那裡。只有從這裡,從周遭
世界的社會關係,從我們對世界的共同體驗出發,互為主體的世界
才可被構成,互為主體的世界從這裡獲得其原初而真正的效力。」
(Schutz, 1932: 237-238)
舒茲認為,社會關係是從「你注意到我」開始的。每一位行動者
都會以他人的原因動機(Weil-Motiv)或是目的動機 (Um-zu-Motiv)
為導向。在這樣的關係中,我將自己的經驗看成是你的目的動機之
所在或是原因動機之結果。舒茲說:
「一旦我確定你和我正處在周遭世界的關係中,我就會具有特
定的注意模態,在此之中我的意識與你的意識都專注在當下的如此
狀態。這意味著我們自己的意識體驗,受到了我們關係的影響。這
點對我們兩個人來說都是如此。只有當社會世界中的你不論以何種
方式注意到我,社會關係才真的開始。」(Schutz, 1932: 238)
根據以上這些描述,舒茲強調,「只有從社會的周遭世界關係,
從我們對於世界的共同經驗開始,所謂的『互為主體性』才被建
構起來。」(Schutz, 1932: 237)然而舒茲說這是一個「充滿內容的
我們關係」(inhalterfüllte Wirbeziehung),它不同於「純粹的我們
關係」(reine Wirbeziehung)。所謂的「純粹」指的是不具有任何
內容,因此不出現在任何具體的經驗中,如同舒茲所說的「你的存
在」(Dasein von Du)是不存在於任何經驗當中的,因為在具體經
驗中總是已經有著某種如在(Sosein),也就是具有特定內容或是狀
態的存在。「純粹的我們關係」可以說是一種極端狀況,舒茲把它
稱為「極限概念」(Limesbegriff)。在現實經驗中最為接近這種極
端狀況的乃是他所舉的例子 ── 兩個人一起看著一隻鳥從眼前飛
過。他說:
「假定我和你一起注視著一隻小鳥在天空飛翔,則首先在我的意
識中所構成的對象「小鳥飛翔」對我來講具有一個在自我詮釋中所
掌握到的意義,而你也可以從自己的意識體驗去做同樣的活動。總
之,我們無法確認在那個情況之中我們的體驗內容是否完全相同。
實際上,這個問題是得不到任何確定答案的,因為一個人的體驗內
容是不可能拿來跟另一個人的體驗內容做比較的。
The Social Theory of Schutz 183
然而就在小鳥飛翔的時候,我和你已經一同老化,對我來說你
的綿延與我的綿延同時前進著,正如同對你來說我的綿延與你的綿
延同時前進著一般。也許在我注視著小鳥飛翔之際,我從眼角瞥見
你的頭轉向與我相同的方向,因而我可以說我們兩人一同看到了小
鳥的飛翔。這個例子顯示,我在時間層面上整合一系列我的經驗與
你的經驗。則我可以說,我和你,我們已經看到一隻小鳥飛過。因
為在小鳥的飛翔過程中,我將我的意識流程與你的意識流程加以並
列,但此時我只不過是假設,在你的意識中有著一般體驗(Erlebnisse
überhaupt)在進行著,它和我所知覺到的小鳥飛翔是「對應」的。至
於你的體驗內容,或它們的特殊建構方式等任何知識,我都不做任
何判斷。對我來說,我只要知道你是注視相同事物的另一個人就足
夠了。而如果你也以類似的方式來整合我和你的經驗,那麼我們兩
人就可以說我們看到一隻小鳥在飛翔。」(Schutz, 1932: 229)
這個時候的「我們關係」幾乎沒有任何內容,但還是有著「小鳥
飛行」的意識。因此它仍然不等於「純粹的我們關係」。「純粹的
我們關係」是由兩個純粹的「朝向你態度」(Dueinstellung)所構
成的。後者意味著「我對你做好準備,將注意力朝向你」,此時它
沒有任何的內容,只是純粹的形式,它也是「極限概念」。如果「
朝向你態度」是相對應的,亦即對方也是同樣對我有著「朝向你態
度」,那麼這時候「社會關係」便形成了,這也就是「純粹的我們
關係」。「純粹的我們關係」可說是「社會的周遭世界」的根本基
礎。這意味著,生活世界中活生生的社會關係預設了純形式的「我
們關係」及「朝向你態度」。
2.1.2 周遭世界的觀察
觀察活動與處在社會關係之中的活動是不同的,前者只具有單
向的「朝向你態度」,後者則是雙向的。例如當我觀察他人的行動
時,他人並不知道正被我觀察著或未對我的觀察加以注意,這便是
典型的觀察活動。現在所出現的問題是,我如何能夠知道他的意識
內容?關鍵在於身體,他的身體可說是他內在意識的表達領域。我
把他人的身體知覺為他的意識體驗之記號,把他的動作、談話等當
作他的意識體驗之證明。這時候,我將注意力指向所知覺到之指標
的主觀而非客觀意義脈絡。身為一位直接觀察者,我可以掌握到意
識體驗的構成過程。而這之所以可能,舒茲強調,「乃是因為他
人的經驗與我客觀地詮釋他的談話及姿態同時進行著。」(Schutz,
1932: 241)換句話說,周遭世界的觀察是一種直接的觀察,我們對
他人的身體、姿態、語言表達有直接的經驗,更根本的是,由於他
的身體表達行動與我的觀察是同步進行的,因此他的活動的前後階
段都可以被我直接經驗到。這一點正是「社會共同世界的觀察」所
欠缺的。
184 Chung-ChI Yu
2.2.2 社會的共同世界
相對於社會周遭世界人與人之間的直接經驗,共同世界的特質乃
在於間接性。在這個領域中所呈現的對象不限於具體存在的個人,
因為制度性的存在如政府、公司、乃至於記號規則、法律規章、行
為規範等等也都包含在內。舒茲將它們分為四種類型,分別是:
1.我認識的他人,但當下不在眼前。
2.我不認識的他人,但這些人為我的親戚朋友等所認識。
3.具有特定功能或社會角色的他人,他不會以具體的個人現身,
而是以特定 類型出現。就算他以個體化的型態出現,也是被我當作
該類型的具體化。總 之,抽象的類型是優先的,具體的個人則是次
要的。例如郵差、交通警察等。
4.社會集合體(soziale Kollektiva),不再是可以個別化的個人存
在,而是一些組織機構,甚至於是一些規範或是規章,例如政府、
工會組織、憲法、交通規則等等。
共同世界之構成的前兩種方式:一是我曾經有過親身經驗的人,
只是目前不在眼前;二是我沒有任何親身經驗的人,我只是透過別
人的描述知道他們。這兩種方式都仍是以周遭世界為基礎。舒茲在
描述第一種類型的人時,指出他具有「從周遭世界過渡到共同世
界」這個特性。例如當我和朋友結束聚會要分手告別時,「隨著身
體與空間上的直接性逐步遞減,我們也由周遭世界的社會經驗漸漸
轉移到共同世界的社會經驗去。」共同世界與周遭世界之間存在著
聯繫的中間階段,「其特色在於身體徵兆的減少」。假定我有機會
看著他漸次走遠,則在什麼時間點上他離開我的周遭世界而進入共
同世界,很難確定清楚,因為總是存在著中間的模糊地帶。在以後
的時間裡,由於我們無法面對面接觸,所以只能藉著電話或是透過
信件保持聯繫,傳遞彼此的訊息,有時候甚至於要經由第三者傳來
消息。經由類似的例子,舒茲對於由周遭世界轉移到共同世界的漸
進過程作了清楚的說明。於此情況下,共同世界只是周遭世界情境
的一個變異與轉折,兩者之間不是對立的關係。
由於每個人的意識體驗不斷地變化著,所以隨著經驗的增長,我
的朋友很有可能會採用新的角度去看事情。嚴格說來,隨著經驗與
看法的改變,他已經變成不一樣的人了。但是在日常生活中,我往
往忽略這個事實,而緊抱著過去的影像不放,以為他還是不變的老
樣子。但是從我的角度來看,在下一次跟他面對面接觸之前,他是
不折不扣的「同時代人」。這位朋友在此情況下,不可能「前述詞
判斷地」(vorprädikativ)被經驗為一個自我,而只能被「述詞判斷
地」(prädikativ)經驗到(Schutz, 1932: 253)。共同世界的他人從
來都只能夠「述詞判斷地」間接顯現,那個在周遭世界才有的「前
述詞判斷」經驗在共同世界裡是不存在的。
The Social Theory of Schutz 185
其次,就「我不認識的他人,而是我的友人所認識的人」這種類
型而言,是來自於「別人對自己過去的周遭世界之說明有關,也就
是與所有從朋友、老師,還有從書本以及從不知名人士的報導所得
知的共同世界有關」(Schutz, 1932: 254)。雖然他不是我曾經親身經
驗過的人,但他畢竟是某些人(例如我的朋友)的周遭世界中的其
他人,所以對此一類型的經驗基礎仍是在於周遭世界。
第三種類型乃是具有特定功能或社會角色的他人,這種類型的他
人從來不會以具體的個人出現,而只能是特定的類型。就算他以個
體化的型態出現,也是被我當作是該類型的具體化。換句話說,抽
象的類型是優先的,具體的個人則是次要的。舒茲解釋道:
「我的伙伴在社會關係中並非以個別的如此狀態出現,而是以
『郵差』、『接受使用金錢者』或是『警察』等身份出現。我賦予
他們特定的行為、特定的功能:只有當他們是功能的承載者時,
他們在我的共同世界朝向態度裡才算是相關的,也就是作為類型或
者理念型而相關。至於他們的行為對他們自己的意義為何,我不去
在意。我依照過去的經驗認定『某一種人』會表現出某些典型的行
為。這些郵差或是貨幣接受者的行為首先原初地出現在我的客觀意
義脈絡之中,在我的朝向社會共同世界之態度中他們並不是具有自
我的個體,而是『像他們這一類的人』、『如同你們這樣的人』,
簡單地說,以類型出現。」(Schutz, 1932: 258)
這一種類型的人不是沒有意識,只不過作為類型的存在,他不指
涉特定的個人,所以這種意識不像是周遭世界中的人那樣具有鮮活
的流動歷程,這個意識反而是被「總是再一次」(immer wieder)的
理想化所掌握,而成為特定理念型的存在。
最後是有關於「社會集合體」的問題。「社會集合體」不可以
被個別化為個人的存在,因為它們是一些組織機構,甚至於是一些
規範或是規章,例如政府、工會組織,憲法,交通規則等等。舒茲
說:
「在我們經常使用的詞語中,有一些理念型諸如『政府』、『
報業』、『經濟』、『國家』、『人民』,或『勞工階級』等都成
為文法上的主詞,這些名詞都是以理念型方式被構成的共同世界之
他我。這種表達方式其實只是擬人化的比喻罷了,其目的在標明特
定的事態,在極端的情況下,它根本就不能指涉共同世界中的任何
一個行動者,也就是相對於他的意識而言,外在的流程可被放到他
的主觀意義脈絡裡。」(Schutz, 1932: 279)
186 Chung-ChI Yu
雖然,政府的每個「行動」都可轉化成政府工作人員的行
動,我們可用個人理念型來理解他們,並以「朝向他們態度」
(Ihreinstellung)來面對他們,把他們當成是同時代人。也就是
說,從社會學的角度來看,「『政府』一詞只是若干共同世界之個
人理念型的高度複雜網絡的一個縮影」。(Schutz, 1932: 279)但這
時,我們忽略了類型化個人的意識體驗是可以認識,而集合體的意
識體驗則否。換言之,集合體「行動」的概念中缺乏可接觸的主觀
意義脈絡。
以上是對於社會的共同世界四種存在類型之說明,我們接著要進
一步闡釋共同世界的基本特質。分兩點,其一是「朝向他們態度」
(Ihreinstellung)(相對於周遭世界的「朝向你態度」);另一則
是,共同世界的「如在」(Sosein)(相對於周遭世界的「存在」
(Dasein))。舒茲說:
「「朝向他們態度」一詞指的是意向地朝向共同世界的意識流程
之活動所具有的重要特質。相對於「朝向你態度」,它所指向的他
我之意識本質上具有或多或少的匿名性。質言之,我對社會的共同
世界之體驗不蘊含我的經驗性活動關聯到他人的意識體驗,也就是
與任何真實的意識流程有關。因為共同世界態度的對象並非一個具
體個別存在的「你」,也就是真實被體驗到的他人意識流程,以及
在其中能夠從事體驗活動的意識內容,也不是他人意識體驗所在的
主觀意義脈絡,而是我對一般社會世界以及對他人一般意識體驗的
經驗,完全不去管這些意識體驗是否真的屬於某一個人。所以我只
是以判斷或推論的方式認識共同世界,而這種認識主要在客觀的意
識脈絡之中進行。它未指涉個人,也未涉及構成經驗的主觀脈絡。
由於它從主觀意義脈絡脫離出來,我們用「總是再一次」(immer
wieder)來指明其特質。它們被視為他人典型的意識體驗(typische
fremde Bewusstseinserlebnisse),基本上它是同質性的而且可重複
的。」(Schutz, 1932: 256)
基於共同世界中的人的理念型,我們所面對的對象並不是具體
直接的他人,而是他與其他人共同具備的特質。詮釋同時代人的典
型行為,就是說明這個行為是「他們其中之一」的行為,以及「這
種人」的行為。
純粹的「朝向你態度」僅僅是由覺察他人的存在所構成的,至
於他人特質的問題則比較不重要。相對而言,純粹的「朝向他們態
度」是以他人的「如在」為基礎。由於「如在」是類型化的,因而
可以一再地被設定。一旦我設定這樣的類型化特質,便假定了這些
特質是真實存在或曾經存在過,只不過這不等於說他們是存在於特
定時空的特殊個人,因為同時代的他人存在只是某個類型的個體化
而已。
The Social Theory of Schutz 187
共同世界中的人,由於彼此相互採取「朝向他們態度」,因此
互相認為對方不過只是「他們其中的一個」。如此一來,我也不被
共同世界的社會關係的另一方視為真實的人,並且我只能期待對方
對我的行動有類型化的理解。所以在共同世界的社會關係中,每一
方都是以理念型來理解另一方的,每一方都覺察到這種相互理解,
並且都期待他人的詮釋基模和自己的詮釋基模相一致。總之,共同
世界的社會關係與周遭世界情境完全不同,在周遭世界關係中,我
和對方都能覺察到彼此意識體驗的細節。但是在共同世界的社會關
係中,這些細節則被一個假定的共享詮釋基模所取代。舒茲說:
「當我能以越多的理由來期待另一方產生適當的反應時,我歸
屬給他的基模就越是標準化。這種情形就是來自法律、政府、傳
統,以及所有各種秩序體系的基模,並且特別是以手段-目的關係
為基礎的基模,簡單地說,就是韋伯所謂的『理性』詮釋基模。」
(Schutz, 1932: 284)
「每個理念型建構都受限於觀察者當時的知識範圍。我們的例
子已經明白顯示出意義脈絡、詮釋基模,與理念型都是彼此相關
的。它們是對一個共同問題的不同表達,這個問題就是關涉性。」
(Schutz, 1932: 272)
所謂「關涉性」就是興趣的相關性。社會的共同世界所經驗到
的他人會以何種面貌出現取決於我對他的興趣。興趣架構(Interes-
senlage)會決定問題的結構(Problemstellung),而且也決定我會採
取哪一些理念型來面對他人。「隨著每一次興趣架構以及問題的改
變,理念型也會隨著改變。」(Schutz, 1932: 285)最後,舒茲提
到了「共同世界的觀察」。在直接的周遭世界,參與者與觀察者大
不相同。然而在共同世界,這項差別便消失不見了。因為在共同世
界中我們根本不可能接觸到真實的人。在這樣的世界中,不管我們
是參與者或觀察者,我們所處理的只是理念型。我們的經驗全部都
是屬於「他們」形式,而不是「你」的形式。「共同世界的觀察」
對舒茲來說是很重要的,因為它跟社會科學的觀察活動已經相當接
近。這一點稍後再行解釋。
2.3.社會科學的知識建構:有關主觀意義脈絡的客觀意義脈絡
被建構出來的理念型所涉及的個人,所謂的「個人理念型」和在
真實生活中活動的個人是有明顯差別的。後者的行動具有開放性,
存在有被改變的可能性,也就是一般所說「自由的」。然而作為理
188 Chung-ChI Yu
念型的個人便非如此。舒茲說:「社會科學對日常生活中的人之理
解,絕不是具有獨特意識的活生生個體,而是欠缺綿延或自發性的
個人理念型。」(Schutz, 1932: 340)這樣的「個人」具有「明確不
變的動機」,依據這個動機我們又可以引導出固定模式的行動來。
例如假若我們建立了「官僚」理念型,則種種典型的官僚式行為便
附加在這個理念型之上。
科學所研究的「個人」因為不是真正的活生生的人,而是被建構
出來的,所以我們很難說這個「個人」具有怎麼樣的「主觀意義」
。因為再怎麼說它也只具有社會科學家所建構出來的客觀意義罷
了。正如舒茲所說的「在理念型的建構過程中,主觀意義脈絡已漸
由一系列客觀意義脈絡的系統所取代。」(Schutz, 1932: 341)不過,
就像我們之前所說的「從自己的意義脈絡去理解他人」和「從他人
的意義脈絡去理解他人」兩者仍然是可以被區分的。社會科學家的
目的在於揭示社會的真實面貌,能不能對社會世界做適當的闡述才
是重點所在。假如社會科學家所提出來的都是脫離社會真實現象的
揣測或一相情願的見解的話,是不可能滿足科學的客觀性要求的。
因此,現在的問題重點在於,究竟社會科學,特別是韋伯的理解社
會學所說的「主觀意義脈絡」該如何解釋?
關於這個問題,我們必須強調,這個被社會科學家所建構出來的
「主觀意義脈絡」,目地在於能夠適當的對社會現象做解釋,所以
絕不是被任意構造出來的,而是有其一定的脈絡可尋。這個被建構
出來的個人主觀意識所具有的內容是固定不變的。這個主觀意識被
理解為具有特定的目的動機,在特定機緣底下會有固定模式的行為
反應,彷彿機器人一般。所以它只是類型化的存在,不指涉任何特
定的真實個人。既然這是個類型化的「個人」,因此他的主觀意義
是可以被充分掌握的,如此一來,在理解社會學中所說的「從客觀
意義脈絡出發去掌握主觀意義脈絡」乃成為可能。而我們在一開始
所指出的「所有關於社會世界的科學都是有關主觀意義脈絡的客觀
意義脈絡」,其道理也才能夠得到理解。
3. 現象學心理學
3.1胡塞爾的思想發展與現象學心理學
胡塞爾思考哲學問題的起始點在於探索人的意識經驗與客觀知識
之間的關係。借用寇克曼斯(Kockelmans, J. Joseph)的話來說,胡塞
爾進行的是「人類知識的心理學」的工作(Kockelmans, 1967: 90)。
這項工作致力於如何在避免陷於主觀相對主義的情況下,於心理或
意識經驗的基礎上說明知識的客觀有效性。這項努力讓胡塞爾與心
理學結下不解之緣,他曾經意圖站在作為經驗科學的心理學之基礎
The Social Theory of Schutz 189
上找尋數學知識的基礎,接著對自己早期的這項努力提出強力的批
判,之後藉由「描述心理學」(deskriptive Psychologie)為邏輯知識
尋求基礎,並進而提出「現象學」來標示自己的學問。在他逐步發
展出「超驗現象學」以便為所有科學確立嚴格基礎後,到了接近晚
年的1920年代還是提出了「現象學心理學」這個結合「現象學」與
「心理學」兩門學問的「新類型」學問來。現象學與心理學之間的
關係似乎顯得糾纏不清。究竟這是怎麼一回事呢?
在面對知識基礎問題的時候,我們可不可以採用作為經驗科學的
心理學來解決問題?年輕的胡塞爾受到當時知識氛圍的影響對這個
問題抱持著肯定的看法。在自然科學擁有輝煌成就的時代,人們普
遍相信追問知識基礎的問題要不是沒有必要,就是這個問題可以藉
助於自然科學的研究來加以回答,人們對於自然科學的高度信心導
致人們以為人類的知識本身無非也是個自然事實,亦即所謂的心理
學事實,所以理當可以用心理學的方式加以研究。十九世紀中葉到
末期的德國學者諸如弗利士(Jakob Friedrich Fries, 1783-1844),利普士
(Theodor Lipps, 1851-1914)等人,或是英國學者穆勒 (John Stuart Mill,
1806-1873),斯賓塞(Herbert Spencer, 1820-1903)等人都是典型代
表。胡塞爾於1887年完成的博士論文《算術哲學》(Philosophie der
Arithmetik)正是延續著這種觀點。但眾所週知,這種想法很快就受
到他人的挑戰以及自己的質疑,徹底反省的結果就是分別於1900年
與1901年出版的兩冊《邏輯研究》(Logische Untersuchungen)。在《
邏輯研究》第一冊當中,胡塞爾嚴厲批評想要藉助於經驗心理學為
邏輯奠定基礎的心理主義(Psychologismus),在《邏輯研究》第二冊
則藉助於布倫達諾 (Franz Brentano, 1838-1917) 的純粹描述心理學來
完成為邏輯奠基的任務。胡塞爾終究沒有完全脫離採用心理學思路
去處理知識基礎的問題,只不過這次採用的是不同於經驗科學涵義
底下的心理學。為了讓這個以意識為探討對象的新類型心理學和一
般涵義底下的心理學區別開來,胡塞爾於是採用新的名稱來界定自
己的學問,也就是後來廣為人知的「現象學」。
《邏輯研究》完成以後,他意識到為知識奠基的工作進行的不夠
徹底,需要針對嚴格的基礎做更進一步的說明,導致他1903年起開
始逐步發展出超驗現象學(transzendentale Phänomenologie)2。發表
於1907年的《現象學的觀念》(Die Idee der Phänomenologie: Fünf Vor-
lesungen)這本書可以說正式開啟超驗現象學的大門,它不僅為哲學
找到絕對起點,也為包含邏輯數學在內的所有學科提供了穩固的基
礎。
2 這段翻譯參考倪梁康譯本,見「現象學(1927)」(《面對
實事本身》,倪梁康主編,北京:東方出版社,2000),頁95-96。
以下簡稱倪譯。
190 Chung-ChI Yu
3.2 現象學心理學作為本質心理學
胡塞爾指出,雖然心理學這門學問自柏拉圖以來就已經存在,隨
著時代的演進,到了近代也有新的發展,但是笛卡兒等近代學者卻
都未能使心理學成為一門基礎穩固的學科,原因在於他們把物理學
當作典範去從事心理學的研究。一味仿效物理學模式的後果是,心
理學不能真正的找到自己的研究起點,其成就當然也是遠遠落後於
自然科學(Hua IX, 3ff.)。十九世紀開始心理學有了新的進展,馮
德(Wilhelm Wundt, 1832-1920)等人發展了一種與生理學密切相關
的研究取向。這個學派頗受歡迎,也逐漸取得心理學的正統地位,
因為它們確實做出一些成果來,甚至發展出一些研究心理現象的技
巧,藉此取得與嚴格的物理學平起平坐的機會(Hua IX, 5)。但這
個學派並不是沒有值得檢討之處,狄爾泰(Wilhelm Dilthey, 1833-
1911)就曾提出批評。
狄爾泰在1894所出版的書《描述與分析心理學的觀念》(Ideen
über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie)指出,近代心理學追
隨自然科學思考模式只會得到一些不適切於心理現象的研究成果,
因為心理學對於狄爾泰來說就如同其他的人文科學,重點在於內在
經驗。這種經驗不是從最小而且獨立的心理現象出發,再經由因果
法則的連結所形成的,心理經驗的特質在於人有體驗(Erlebnis)以
及永不止息的生命流動經驗。總之,心靈生命(Seelenleben)絕非
外表顯示的那樣而已。我們正是可以從內在與外在的區別來看心理
現象與自然現象的差異,我們接近前者的方法是理解(Verstehen),
而接近後者的方法則是解釋(Erklären)。例如假若我們要理解一個
藝術作品,就非得從作者對生命的體驗入手不可,而不是單單對於
作者以及作品進行外在觀察就夠了。(Hua IX, 11)
胡塞爾十分贊同狄爾泰的批評,因為後者看到了當時人文科學
界崇尚自然科學方法的迷思,然而胡塞爾也指出狄爾泰在解釋心理
現象上面並未有所突破,也就是對於心理現象的本質,狄爾泰沒能
說出個所以然來。狄爾泰雖提出了「描述心理學」(beschreibende
Psychologie),試圖建立心理的「類型學」(Typologie),藉此為人
文社會科學提供基礎,它讓我們瞭解一個政治家為何會採取某一項
行動,而一個藝術家又為何會創造出某一項作品等等。但胡塞爾不
能贊同這種類型學的構想,因為如此一來頂多只能說明精神生命的
自然歷史,無法把精神生命或心靈活動奠定在理性的普遍律則上。
簡單地說,狄爾泰就是欠缺對於此一普遍律則的認識。在胡塞爾
眼中,心理學的首要任務乃是要能夠指出心理活動的本質(eidos)
所在,也就是意識活動與意識對象的相應性(Korrelation)。與某
個意識活動相應的對象不一定要客觀地真實存在著,但那個相互
關連性無論如何一定成立。換言之,胡塞爾所在乎的是先天心理學
The Social Theory of Schutz 191
在此胡塞爾談及《邏輯研究》(Logische Untersuchungen)的相關論
述。雖然《邏輯研究》所關心的是為邏輯與數學做哲學釐清的工
作,心理學並非重點所在,不過胡塞爾卻看到《邏輯研究》的研究
成果可以導引出本質心理學(eidetische Psychologie)。之所以會如
此,胡塞爾自己說,《邏輯研究》所重視的乃是「對於邏輯與數
學等觀念對象在某個意義底下無法分離的心理體驗之描述研究。」
(Hua IX, 24)他甚至說:
「《邏輯研究》的真正主題以及擴大來講整個現象學的主題可以
如是觀之。你們知道,這裡所重視的並非觀念對象,不是要在這個
領域進行專門的研究。算數,數字的先天科學以及其他的數學構成
乃是數學家的事。就傳統邏輯而言也不例外,只不過在那裡必須事
先進行淨化而且指明在形式邏輯方面有著一個同樣平行的,純粹邏
輯的與觀念的對象存在。」(Hua IX, 26-27)
《邏輯研究》轉向對心理領域進行研究而帶出描述心理學(des-
kriptive Psychologie)來不是沒有道理的,它揭示了「深藏於思想者
的思想體驗之內在直觀(Innenscahu),以及相關的本質描述。」
(Hua IX, 28)。總之,研究心理現象的方法在《邏輯研究》中已
經有所突破,這也是後來現象學發展的重要基石。胡塞爾感謝他的
老師布倫達諾(Franz Brentano)所提出的「意向性」(Intentionali-
tät)概念。胡塞爾指出:
「所有心理現象的基本特質,意識是意識著什麼,首度被當作
焦點給提出來,而且是作為最普遍的,從內在經驗的明證性之中
直接獲得以作為心理經驗的創造性根本特質描述性的被提出來。」
(Hua IX, 31)
意向性乃是心理現象的基本特質,也是心理學的中心論題
(Zentralthema),這是布倫達諾的創見,可惜的是,布倫達諾未能
看到這個重要概念的深刻含意,沒有進一步加以闡述(Hua IX, 32)
,反倒是狄爾泰,雖然他沒能如布倫達諾提出意向性作為心理現象
特質的說法,在接觸胡塞爾的《邏輯研究》之後卻頗能認同胡塞爾
的見解,以致於在胡塞爾看來,晚年的狄爾泰思想與現象學的精神
不謀而合。(Hua IX, 35)
胡塞爾根據意向性所展開的現象學心理學,其具體內容為何?
首先,胡塞爾指出一般心理學處理心理現象的方式是先將心理經驗
還原為意識單元,之後再藉由因果法則將它們聯繫起來。然而胡塞
爾認為意識的綜合並非外在的聯繫而已,它們不是物理現象,所以
192 Chung-ChI Yu
並非只藉著因果關係互相連結著,而是「一個包含著意向性的緊密
結合存在,一個動機性存在,一個相互意指的決定存在,它與物理
的形式及原則大不相同。」(Hua IX, 37)反思(Reflektion)使得心理
活動被意識到,而與這個被意識到的領域有關的學問就是現象學心
理學。如前所言,它的核心概念是意向性,也就是看到意識體驗都
是意向性的體驗。意向性具有綜合統一的作用,讓意識對象得以作
為同一的對象,而且是以它的本質類型(Wesenstypik)呈現出來,
雖然在每一個知覺活動的當下我們都只是看到該對象的某個側顯
(Abschattungen)而已。同樣地,意識的各種判斷、評價等活動各
有其本質類型。心理學的新任務就是去研究各種心理經驗與其相應
對象關係的基本類型。
質言之,胡塞爾的現象學心理學作為新的心理學有幾項根本
特質,分別是「先天性」、「本質性」、「直觀」或是「純粹描
述」,「意向性」以及停留在「自然的獨斷態度」(natürliche, dog-
matische Einstellung),而非「哲學的超驗態度」(philosophische,
transzendentale Einstellung)。
1. 先天性意味著這個心理學所著重的乃是本質上的普遍性與必
然性,少了這些特性,心理現象就無法被辨認。
2. 先天性的根源在於直觀,唯有基於內在直觀以及直觀內容
所做的分析才能得到普遍的必然性,本質是絕對不能出於臆測而得
到的。胡塞爾在此提到自由變異(Variation)的方法,藉由想像脫
離事實性的束縛,以便最終達到不變的本質,這是世界經驗(Wel-
terfahrung)與被經驗的世界(erfahrene Welt)之相關性的普遍的結
構,(Hua IX, 64)也就是意向性的結構 ─ 意識無非就是意識著什麼
(Bewußtsein als Bewußtsein von etwas)。
3. 心理學家不同於哲學家,至少他們沒有必要像哲學家那樣關
心科學的基礎問題,為完成科學奠基的工作而走上超驗之路。心理
學家佇留在世界之中,針對自然態度的心靈模態進行探討。換句話
說,作為先天科學(die apriorischen Wissenschaften)的現象學心理學
是對於世界以及與之緊密相關的主體性所做的本質性研究。
3.3世界與經驗
世界首先是知覺的世界,此一知覺世界是所有科學的共同預
設,但這個由知覺世界所構成的前理論世界不能與自然科學中的
世界混為一談,後者實際上預設了一些知覺世界中的原初材料。
前科學的世界是個「前理論的直覺的世界」(Welt vortheorethischer
Anschauung)(Hua IX, 56)。胡塞爾用了許多不同的說法來加以
指稱,例如「當下生活的世界」(Welt des aktuellen Lebens),又
如「在純粹經驗中的真實前理論世界」(eine wirklich vortheoretische
Welt in reiner Erfahrung, Hua IX, 56),「首要的經驗真實界」(er-
ste Erfahrungswirklichkeit, Hua IX, 57),「直接當下存在的真實界」
The Social Theory of Schutz 193
胡塞爾指出,前理論的世界有其系統結構性,而且此一結構是先
天必然的。假若這個世界與「對世界的經驗」(Welterfahrung)是
一體兩面,不可分離的,則胡塞爾要我們更把焦點擺在「對世界的
經驗」以及「被經驗的世界」兩者的對應關係(Korrelation)上,
而這個對應關係正是有其典型普遍性(typisch Allgemeinen)的。胡
塞爾強調,我們需要一門「普遍的科學」(universale Wissenschaft)
去研究這些普遍性,它是一門「對作為純粹經驗世界的世界之普遍
性進行描述的科學」(deskriptive Wissenschaft von der Welt als purer
Erfahrungswelt und nach ihrem Generellen)。這門探求世界普遍結構
的學問正是「現象學心理學」。其首要方法除了先前提到的「本質
還原」(eidetische Reduktion)之外,在1927年以後的許多著作裡,
例如〈《大英百科全書》的現象學條目〉(Der Encyclopaedia Britanica
Artikel, 1927)、〈阿姆斯特丹演講錄:現象學心理學〉(Amsterdamer
Vorträge: Phänomenologische Psychologie, 1929)(以上兩篇收錄於《現
象學心理學》(Phänomenologische Psychologie, Hua IX))、〈我的純粹
現象學與現象學哲學觀念後跋〉(Nachwort zu meinen Ideen zu einer
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 1930)(
收錄於《觀念》第三冊(Ideen III, Hua. V))、(從心理學邁向現象學
的超驗哲學之路)(Der Weg in die phänomenologische Transzenden-
talphilosophie von der Psychologie aus, 1936)(收錄於《危機》(Die
Krisis der europäischen Wissenschften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie,
Hua. VI))則是包括了「現象學─心理學還原」(phänomenolo-
gisch-psychologische Reduktion)。
胡塞爾主張,假若世界不是在經驗中或是當下的生活中預先被
給予,那麼我們將不可能進行有關於世界的理論化工作,因為理論
性的思想活動將無根基可言。經驗與世界緊密相連,只要經驗持
續著,世界的呈現也就永不停息。這也正是我們佇立在自然態度當
中的情況。就在這個自然的生命型態裡,世界被認定為持續地存在
著。這個世界就是我們的「周遭世界」(Umwelt)(Hua IX, 56)
。無論我們所從事的是實踐活動或是理論活動,我們所提出的問
題都是朝向這個周遭世界而去的。不容否認,這個世界不斷在改變
其面貌。尤其受到前人的影響,這個世界或多或少已經被塑造出各
種各樣的文化風貌,尤其是近代以來,因為科學思想的發達,這個
世界早已蒙上濃厚的科學色彩。當人們與這個世界接觸時,難免不
會受到既存觀念的影響。如此一來,我們還有可能找到那個「在純
粹經驗中的真實前理論世界」嗎?胡塞爾指出,藉由還原我們可以
達到這個目的,但這裡的還原不是「超驗現象學還原」(transzen-
dental-phänomenologische Reduktion),而是「現象學心理學還原」
194 Chung-ChI Yu
(phänomenologisch-psychologische Reduktion),這是胡塞爾直到
1927年才提出的概念 ,其作用在於:
�
「獲得動物實體的心理之物及其純粹特有本質和其純粹特有本
質性的聯繫。這些心理之物即使在本質研究中也仍保留著世界的現
存之物的存在意義,它僅與可能的實在世界相聯繫�。」(Hua IX,
290-291)
心理學家所專注的是人們的心理現象,為了要獲得這些經驗內
容,他們也要進行還原的工作,也就是將與被研究的人之意識活動無
關的一些想法或概念等等擱置一旁,例如他所經驗到的是否真的客觀
存在,又或者他的意識活動與他的生理結構是否有關等等,他們所關
心的問題在於這個被研究者的意識活動及其意識對象為何,唯有透過
如此這般的還原程序,他們才能建立起自己的研究領域,並進行「作
為心靈自身本質直觀」的「內在直觀」(Ideen III, 144)。此外,作為一
門本質科學(Wesenswissenschaft),如前所述,其目標是得出個體心
理存在或群體的心理存在之內在的不變結構,或其先天性。
在〈《大英百科全書》的現象學條目〉一文胡塞爾一方面提到現
象學心理學是經驗心理學的基礎,但是另一方面它與經驗心理學一
樣都仍然是科學,它們都還是在自然態度中,所探討的對象都是世
界中的個人或團體之心理現象,都是把研究對象看成是世界中的一
份子。胡塞爾說:
「心理學在其所有經驗科學和本質科學中都是『實證科學』,都
是在自然觀點中的科學,而在自然觀點中,始終現存的世界是研究
的基礎。無論心理學想研究什麼,它的對象都出現在這個世界中的
心靈和心靈共同體中。」(Hua IX, 290;倪譯95)
透過作為現象學心理學方法的現象學心理學還原,心理學家把「
對他來說自然有效的世界之內將出現的主體性還原為純粹心靈的主
體性 ─ 世界之中的主體性」(Hua IX, 293; 倪譯98),這個「『心
靈』(自我主體)」始終被當作是「一個可能空間世界中現存的人
和動物。」(Hua IX, 290-291)。換句話說,現象學心理學家所面
對的,從主體面向來說是「世界之中的主體性」,從世界的面向來
說,則是稍前一再提及的「在純粹經驗中的真實前理論世界」,「
世界」與「主體經驗」或「被經驗的世界」與「對世界的經驗」之
間所構成的原初共屬關係(Ursprungszusammenhang)正是現象學心
理學所探討的主題與描述對象。(Hua IX, 58)
3.4 現象學心理學與超驗現象學
超驗還原不同於心理學還原,它要對所有對象領域以及實證科
學進行懸擱,心理之物以及相關的心理學也不例外,正如胡塞爾
The Social Theory of Schutz 195
所言,「我們在這裡將引入『超驗還原』,它是比心理學還原高
一層次的還原,心理學還原是隨時都可以進行的,並且同樣借助於
懸擱來進行的純化,先驗還原則是在此純化之後進一步的純化。」
(Hua IX, 293; 倪譯98)也就是它不只要求對這個世界進行普遍的懸
擱,也要求把純粹心靈和與心靈有關的純粹現象學的心理學放入括
弧。通過這種方式純粹的心理現象變成了超驗現象。簡而言之,心
理學家把在世界之內出現的主體性還原為純粹心靈的主體性,而超
驗現象學家則通過他的絕對普遍懸擱把心理學純粹的主體性還原成
為超驗純粹的主體性。
現象學心理學與超驗現象學兩者之間雖然有所區別,卻是也有者
平行(Parallele)的關係。胡塞爾的觀點是,當我通過徹底的懸擱而
將世界,包括我的存在都設定為僅僅是現象,並且探討在其中構造
著整個對世界的統覺(Apperzeption),尤其是對我的心靈、我的心理
感知體驗的統覺等等的意向生活,則那種心理學的被給予性便會變
成我的超驗體驗。這時,我的感知體驗內容之特有本質完全保留下
來。他說:
「我們因此看到被執行的現象學心理學與超驗現象學之間的值得
注意的平行關係。一方面每一個本質的確定(Feststellung)或是經
驗的確定都必定互為平行關係。但另一方面這些完全屬於理論的內
容,當它在自然態度中作為心理學,作為一門實證的科學,一門與
先給予的世界息息相關的科學被獲取時,它完全是非哲學的,在超
驗態度中卻也有著『相同』的內容,也就是被理解為超驗現象學,
一門哲學的科學。」(Ideen III, 146-47)
平行關係不表示兩者的位階相同,而是如前所言,現象學心理學
是超驗現象學的前階段或預備階段,胡塞爾解釋理由:
「超驗的觀點意味著一種對整個生活形式的改變,它完全超出了
迄今為止的所有生活經驗,因此,超驗的觀點由於其絕對的陌生性
而必定難以被人瞭解。超驗科學面臨的也是同樣的情況。現象學心
理學儘管相對來說是新的科學,有著新的意向分析方法,卻仍具有
所有實證科學所具有的那種可接受性。一旦人們哪怕是從其精確嚴
格的觀念上理解了現象學心理學,人們便只需弄清超驗哲學問題以
及超驗還原的真正意義便可以明了,超驗現象學只是對現象學心理
學的學說內容的超驗改造而已。」(Hua IX, 295-296; 倪譯100)
一般人不易明白的超驗現象學,在胡塞爾看來可藉由現象學心理
學的導引而被瞭解,因為兩者有著相同的學說內容,差別僅僅在於
反思程度的徹底與否。在此,現象學心理學與超驗現象學之間呈現
出一種手段與目的之間的關係,誠如耿寧(Iso Kern)所言,現象學
心理學是邁向超驗還原的途徑之一�。
196 Chung-ChI Yu
胡塞爾堅持我們必須區分「直接經驗到的世界」以及「加在這世
界的各種思想」,他肯定世界隨時隨地都被經驗著,「被經驗的世
界」是任何的科學理論研究都不得不預設的。他致力從事的工作便
是去說明及描述「經驗」與「被經驗世界」之間的關係,藉以反對
實證科學中所謂「真正的世界」之優先性。稍前提過,由這個知覺
世界所構成的前理論世界與自然科學中的世界是不能混為一談的,
後者在理論建構中往往被認定為是「在己的真正的世界」(an sich
wahre Welt)(Hua. VI, 177; Hua. IX, 57),殊不知這只是經由對於「
經驗中的被給予者」(Erfahrungsgegebenheit)加工改造而成的知識
成果。人們往往不能夠認識到那個所謂的「真正的」、與人無關、
獨立存在的、「在己」的世界其實是理論思想,特別是近代科學的
產物。基於這種科學式的認知,客觀的自然被當作是世界的首要基
礎,人的心理或是精神活動則被看作次要或衍生的現象。胡塞爾大
力抨擊這種被自然科學所誤導的思維方式,沈痛指出在此情況下不
僅人文精神日漸萎縮,就算自然科學所談的自然也未必得到彰顯。
胡塞爾於是呼籲,人們必須重視世界與人的經驗之間的原初共屬關
係,體認素樸的經驗世界在先,科學研究的「真正的世界」在後的
道理。(Hua IX, 58)
4. 結論
本文在第二節陳述舒茲的社會世界理論,第三節則說明了胡塞爾
的現象學心理學,如同本文在第一節根據舒茲自己的說法指出,他
在《社會世界之意義構成》所從事的研究工作乃是胡塞爾所稱的「
自然態度的構成現象學」,也就是「現象學心理學」。儘管舒茲在
相關論述裡並未依照胡塞爾的思想架構去探討社會世界之結構,但
正如同他在〈胡塞爾及他對我的影響〉這篇短文所指出的,於胡塞
爾的《觀念》第二冊(Ideen II)正式出版以後,他體認到「我(舒
茲)的某些發現竟與胡塞爾的系統性論述極為相符,且比我的作品
早了好幾年,而我對它們則是毫無知曉的。」(Schutz, 1977: 127)
舒茲與胡塞爾兩人的人文社會思想可說若合符節。底下針對這一點
再作進一步解說。胡塞爾曾說:
「現象學心理學的理念涉及探索底下兩個完整範圍,自我經驗以
及奠基於自我經驗的他人經驗。」(Hua. IX: 281)
這裡所說的自我不是超驗自我,而是在世界中,與他人一起活
動,彼此相互理解的自我。簡單地說,就是社會世界中的自我。對
於這樣的自我,胡塞爾又說:
「每一個心靈不僅僅因為擁有多樣的意向體驗而有與他不可分離
的客觀意義整體。而且同樣不可分離的是作為同一的自我主體、讓
所有體驗集中的「自我極」(Ichpol),以及從這個生命成長出來
The Social Theory of Schutz 197
的各種習性。同樣還有被還原的互為主體性,它純粹而具體的被掌
握著,它是一個由純粹的人(reine Personen)所構成的社群,而此
社群在互為主體的純粹意識生活中活躍著。」(Hua. IX: 283-284)
基於胡塞爾的相關論述,我們不難理解為何舒茲會在〈胡塞爾及
他對我的影響〉提到:「任何試圖探索社會實相的現象學嘗試,恰
也存在於胡塞爾所提出的論點中」(Schutz, 1977: 126)。且讓我們
再從兩方面去說明舒茲的社會理論與胡塞爾的現象學心理學之間的
關連性。
首先,胡塞爾強調,現象學心理學所研究的對象是生活在自然態
度中的人,包含自己與他人,也包括個人的心靈與群體的心靈。自
然態度所蘊含的「一般設定」(Generalthese),對世界的存在從來不
加以質疑,所以這也使得現象學心理學是一門有關於世界現象的科
學,雖然它跟一般的經驗科學有很大的差別。舒茲肯定描述自然態
度的思維方式就是現象學心理學的主要內容,而針對「一般設定」
的內容,他除了肯定「世界存在」從來不被質疑之外,更進一步補
充「他人的存在也不被質疑」和「他人也會賦予其行動以意義」等
等對於他的社會理論十分重要的兩項設定。
其次,現象學心理學作為先天科學,即經驗科學的本質所在,也
是同時被胡塞爾與舒茲所肯定的。胡塞爾認為,現象學心理學所談
的先天性是所有的意識經驗或是心理現象的根本條件。他將現象學
心理學比喻為數學或是幾何學,後者是自然現象的先天科學,前者
則是意識活動或心理現象的先天科學。但胡塞爾同時也強調,先天
科學依舊是對世界現象的研究,而不是超越了這個世界。舒茲在社
會科學領域深入探討先天性的問題,描述社會世界的先天結構,探
索所有社會科學不可或缺的基本架構,以便完成為所有社會科學奠
定哲學基礎的任務。舒茲肯定,活生生的社會周遭世界經驗是所有
社會經驗的起點,只有從社會的周遭世界出發,互為主體性才可能
建立起來。在周遭世界經驗中一方面以共同的時間流或是一同老化
的同步現象作為基礎,另一方面則是由「朝向你態度」以及「純粹
我們關係」所構成的。相對而言,社會的共同世界則是以「朝向他
們態度」為基礎,重視對象的普遍「如在」特質,而不是像周遭世
界所重視的個體「存在」。
除了指出舒茲的社會世界理論與現象學心理學如何密切相關,我
們還要進一步檢討兩者間的關係,特別是舒茲理論本身的侷限性。
胡塞爾的「現象學心理學」跟自然態度固然有關,但終究不等同
於自然態度,它不受限於自然態度的各種根深蒂固的信念或偏見,
它是一門以「本質還原」和「現象學心理學還原」為方法針對自然
態度進行討論,特別是針對世界與人的心理或精神關係的基本結構
進行描述的學問。因為未曾遠離自然態度,所以它和立基於超驗態
198 Chung-ChI Yu
度的超驗現象學大不相同。現象學心理學可以說是介於自然態度與
超驗態度,或經驗科學與超驗現象學之間的一門學問,(Kockelmans,
1967: 96)這門學問一方面跟自然態度或經驗科學比較起來更能夠為
自身奠定基礎;另一方面,跟超驗現象學相比較,則又能夠貼近世
界,保持與世界之間的緊密關係。它針對屬世者的主體心靈及精神
風貌所進行的描述,正是所有科學理論立說之依據。
舒茲在闡述社會世界的意義問題時,致力於描述社會的周遭世界
的人際互動現象,說明它如何是社會科學論述的根源所在。這一點可
以說完全契合於胡塞爾現象學心理學的中心論旨。所以對於舒茲將本
身的工作定位為從事胡塞爾意義底下的「自然態度的構成現象學」或
是「現象學心理學」,我們可以贊同。問題在於,雖然他一再提到,
也認同胡塞爾在超驗現象學還原之後所獲得的研究成果,其效力仍適
用於自然態度的領域之主張,但是對於這項說法為何得以成立,卻始
終不做解釋。由於舒茲並不如同胡塞爾那般將超驗現象學當作「自然
態度的構成現象學」或是「現象學心理學」的最後根據,我們便不免
產生疑問,「自然態度的構成現象學」或是「現象學心理學」本身可
以自我證成嗎?如果不透過胡塞爾式的超驗之路,可以回過頭來讓它
立基於自然態度嗎?舒茲本身的態度並不明確,但一些舒茲的詮釋者
卻是採用這個方式去詮釋舒茲的。�本文以為,這不是唯一的選擇。
就算我們不讓舒茲過度往胡塞爾靠攏,要他接受或認可超驗現象學
是唯一的出路,但是進一步澄清現象學心理學的涵義,尤其是釐清「
超驗現象學還原」以及「現象學心理學還原」之間的區別卻是頗有必
要的。假若他清楚瞭解胡塞爾對於「超驗現象學還原」以及「現象學
心理學還原」所做的區分,則他將不至於排斥還原的必要性。本文以
為,舒茲固然可以不必認同超驗現象學還原,但他不可能迴避任何形
式的還原。只有認真看待並接受「現象學心理學還原」涵義底下的現
象學還原,他才能夠一方面擔保他所做的本質描述之有效性,另一方
面,也避免引起他是否從自然態度出發去談自然態度的意識模式之疑
慮。如何能夠避免這項疑慮,且避免一舉走向遠離自然態度的超驗態
度,則我們不得不指出,「現象學心理學還原」對舒茲的現象學而言
是不可或缺的重要基石。
最後,讓我們思考一下是不是有更好的名稱來取代「自然態度的
構成現象學」或是「現象學心理學」。「自然態度的構成現象學」
既然包含「自然態度」一詞,便不免引起誤解,或以為這是以自然
態度為基礎進行論述的一門學問,殊不知自然態度僅是被論述的對
象,和論述的基礎毫無瓜葛。現象學心理學比「自然態度的構成現
象學」好一些,畢竟它點出了我們是從什麼出發點去思考問題的。
但是假若心理學在一般的認知裡是指經驗心理學,那麼無論做了什
麼樣的區分與辨別(例如加上「現象學」或「意向性的」),心理
學的經驗意含還是揮之不去。或許有人認為「心靈論」是比較好的
替代用詞。然而,心靈不免顯得空泛,其「與世隔絕」的色彩跟這
The Social Theory of Schutz 199
門學問濃厚的「屬世」性格難以相容。舒茲從人文社會科學的基礎
立論,認為其出發點正好就在這門胡塞爾所倡導的現象學心理學上
面。舒茲晚年曾指出「自然態度的構成現象學」是一門朝向「哲學
人類學」發展的學問,(CP I, 149)言下之意,「現象學心理學」
跟人離不開關係。對胡塞爾來說,釐清人與世界的關係是其首要課
題,舒茲則更重視它對於人文社會科學基礎的重要性。如果我們要
避免「現象學心理學」或是「自然態度的構成現象學」名稱本身所
帶來的負面效應,則我們是否可以賦予這門學問以新的名稱,例如
「人文現象學」?
參考文獻:
Barber, Michael. The Participating Citizen. New York: State University of New
York Press, 2004.
Embree, Lester. Schutz’s phenomenology of the practical world, in List/
Srubar(Hrsg.), Alfred Schütz: Neue Beiträge zur Rezeption seines Wer-
kes, Amsterdam, 1988.
Gurwitsch, Aron. Phenomenology and the Theory of Science (ed. Lester Em-
bree), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
Gratfoff, Richard. 1989. Milieu und Lebenswelt, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Hamauzu, Shinji. Schütz und Husserl: zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjek-
tivität, in Focus Pragenesis IV (2004): 115-137.
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen (Husserliana I), The Hague,
1950.
———. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philo-
sophie, drittes Buch, (Husserliana V), The Hague, 1971. (Abbr. Ideen
III)
———. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschften und die transzendentale Phä-
nomenologie, (Husserliana VI ), The Hague, 1954.
———. Phänomenologische Psychologie, (Husserliana IX), The Hague, 1962.
Kern, Iso. The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Re-
duction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, in F. Elliston &
P. Mccormick(eds.), Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, p. 135.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology: A Histo-
rical-Critical Study, Atlantic Highland, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1967.
Natanson, Maurice. Anonymity: A Study of the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz,
Bloomington, 1986.
Schütz/Gurwitsch. Briefwechsel: 1939-1959 (Hrsg. von R. Grathoff), Mün-
chen, 1985.
200 Chung-ChI Yu
Denisa Butnaru
Introduction
Through the discussion of the concept of Phantasia and its correlation to
that of the typification, we are trying in the present text to launch a complex
of hypotheses concerning the way subjectivity relates and continuously ap-
proaches the reality with which it is continuously confronted. By emphasizing
the concept of Phantasia, we would like to show its function and its impor-
tance in the process of instituting objectivity and of the continuous reconfigu-
ration of this objectivity at a mundane level. Our acceptance of this term tries
to take advantage simultaneously of two major phenomenological discussions
related to it- one sketched by Edmund Husserl, and one proposed by Alfred
Schutz. At a first glance, one would believe that the two directions have no ob-
vious relation to each other and that they have nothing in common in respect
202 Denisa Butnaru
1 Schutz has constantly discussed the notion of typification throughout all his writings,
but we have selected only certain texts for the purpose of our presentation. We would refer to
“Type and Eidos,” published in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1975, pp.92- 115, and partially to Reflections on the Problem of Relveance, New Haven and Lon-
don: Yale University Press, 1970, (further quoted as RPR) chapter 3.B, and Alfred Schutz and
Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Lifeworld, vol.I, translated by Richard M. Zaner and H.
Tristram Engelhardts Jr., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, chapter 3.C
204 Denisa Butnaru
2 These two terms are developed by Edmund Husserl in Erfahrung und Urteil, Ham-
burg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985, esp. §82 and §84; see as well Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, Husserliana III, hrsg.
von Walter Biemel, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950, §81, and Alfred Schutz, RPR, op. cit.,
pp.59-60
3 See for a brief discussion on the role of the atypical, The Structures of the Life-World,
op. cit., p.235-238
Typification and Phantasia 205
The meaning of the object which is in immediacy given to our actual intui-
tion refers also to its—mostly hidden—relations to objects which were given
to us once in the past, and might now be represented in terms of recollections
of various kinds, and even objectivities of our free phantasying, provided that
a relationship of similarity between them and the actually given object prevails
at all. The unity between the related elements might be experienced merely
passively as pregiven in the unity of our consciousness. (Schutz, 1975: 99)
Here we have a first presence of the way Phantasia contributes to the es-
tablishment of a type, and, consequently, to the recognition of the structural
mobility that it induces. But the Husserlian approach, reconfirmed by Schutz,
would rather conceive phantasying in terms of a process of “free variation”
that would lead to the constitution of the eide and not only to that of types.
The latter are more related to the so-called empirical level of experience or
to a specific form of experience which does not concern in such an evident
way the transcendental sphere. While the eidos is supposed to be always only
an unchangeable configuration, the type is continuously confronted with the
infinite realm of experience in the sense that it is displayed as an objectifying
horizonality, as an on-going formation and re-formation of possibilities for
thematizing certain objectivities.
Types make proof of “empirical certainty,” and this characteristic is funda-
mental in the discussion concerning the configuration of objectivity outside
the transcendental sphere. While eide are meant to be “purified” of accidental
characteristics through “eidetic variation,” types prove their richness of con-
tent namely through this process of assuming, comparing and confronting
5 Cf. A Schutz, Type and Eidos, op. cit., pp. 96-97, as well as Husserl, Erfahrung und
Urteil, op. cit., §81-83.
Typification and Phantasia 207
6 See the discussion that Schutz makes in Type and Eidos concerning the difference
between individual judgment (S’ is p’) and generic judgment (S’ is p), the latter resulting since
“the difference of the kernels leads to a modified form of the synthesis of identity … ,” p.103
7 The main Husserlian texts that devlop on this topic are Cartesianische Meditationen,
Formale und transzendentale Logik, and especially Ideen I and Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaf-
ten und die transzendentale Phänomenologie
208 Denisa Butnaru
the problem of rationality in respect of our projecting actions, and the other
following the discussion of the possibility of the “multiple realities” within
which we simultaneously or only in certain circumstances live. The first direc-
tion is basically oriented by the analyses of how we plan our action, how we
decide the complex of motivations which supports them, and how we can
possibly anticipate the pursued goal. In this direction, we are confronted with
a pragmatic perspective,8 rather than a proper phenomenological one, and
Schutz arrived at the discussion of this theme starting from the prospects in
the theory of action of Max Weber. Phantasia means here the possibility of
realizing a rehearsal in advance in respect of a certain action which we want
to perform. The temporal dimension in which this activity is realized is modo
futuri exacti (future perfect tense), i.e., the subject imagines a situation which
has not yet taken place and tries to foresee the fulfillment of this project,
which can be either his/hers or that of another person. This activity in the case
where one is trying to develop a project can be oriented towards the specific
organization of one’s motives. In the case where one deals with the prediction
of another subject’s behavior, it is oriented towards the “understanding” and
the “comprehension” of another motivational complex.9 So in this latter case,
Phantasia as an activity that is performed at the level of potentiality plays a
very important role in the relation to another consciousness and in the realiza-
tion of a typifying milieu which might be a common surrounding.
The second perspective of Phantasia, which is perhaps correlated with a more
common definition, is that which links it to the idea of another level of reality.
The act of phantasieren is not so much connected with the paramount reality
anymore (even though these two orders can never be completely separated for
very clear reasons that lead to a detailed phenomenological analysis). It is seen
as a product of the “modifications which the world-conceived-in-full-awakeness
undergoes when our minds turn away from full attention towards life and its
tasks—in other words, when the tensions of our consciousness gradually dimin-
ish,” (Schutz, 1996:39) and thus, when we are able to ignore the pragmatic
motive that is present most of the time in our lives. This involves as well that
the events that are lived at the level of Phantasia show a specific ontological
organization. But even if placed under specific conditions of signification and
of accomplishment of the different forms of objectivity, they cannot escape the
8 The first writing which treats about this subject is “Das Problem der Personalität in
der Sozialwelt.” See this text in Alfred Schütz, Theorie der Lebenswelt 1, Konstanz: UVK, 2003,
pp.33-176. For the topic of Phantasia see especially p. 62 and pp. 147-150.
9 See for a more elaborate presentation of these two directions, “The Problem of Ra-
tionality in the Social World” in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers II, The Hague : Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964, pp.64-88, Part VI and another version of this text in Alfred Schutz, Collected
Papers IV, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, pp.6-24, Part VII
Typification and Phantasia 209
irreversibility of the temporal flux that is the characteristic of the durée.10 Even
if I can place myself as a subject at the level of Phantasia in epochs that are prac-
tically inaccessible to me—I can even phantasize future societies, or my own
life trajectory—I can never escape the dimension of the present. So Phantasia
would always be constituted as a “parasite” in respect of the concrete conditions
into which the subject lives. Most of the time, acts of phantasying strongly dis-
tinguished from the reality of everyday life can be considered as not affecting
the system of relevances—and consequently the stock of typifications—with
which we usually qualify the world. There are nevertheless cases when Phantasia
can overcome this level. And this happens at the moment when the accent set
upon the concrete reality is completely nullified, the ties are cut, and the world
of Phantasia would replace the world of everyday life.
There is a concrete example in this respect where Phantasia conquers some-
how the realm of concrete reality in the Schutzian theory. It is the case of Don
Quixote,11 a character who crosses the borders of the pragmatic motive and
creates his own order, which he opposes to that of the so-called real life. This
experience and the role that Phantasia plays in it is included in the Schutzian
perspective in a specific classification that is concerned with the presence of
“multiple realities,” or orders of being, to use the expression of Aron Gurwitsch
for this connection. Within these realities, Phantasia holds a specific place. The
basic problem with respect to these realities is that they are conceived as “sepa-
rated” from the paramount reality. The Don Quixote example actually proves
that they are not, even if Schutz actually tries to demonstrate the contrary hy-
pothesis. We can simultaneously assume the two levels of being, and we can
enrich both of them by taking advantage of the qualitative changes in the struc-
ture of the significations with which we qualify the world.12 Phantasia means
10 See Alfred Schutz, “Realities from Daily Life to Theoretical Contemplation,” in Col-
lected Papers IV, op. cit., pp. 25-50, especially p. 40.
11 Cf. Alfred Schutz, “Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality,” in Collected Papers II,
op. cit., pp.135- 157
12 In respect of these “realities” Schutz mentions only three: the world of dreams, of sci-
entific contemplation and that of phantasms. See for this exposure, “On Multiple Realities,” in
Collected Papres I, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, pp. 208- 259.
This classification generated strong polemics, one of which was that of Aron Gurwitsch. See Hel-
mut Wagner, Alfred Schutz’s Biography (unpublished manuscript at Waseda University, Tokyo, Ja-
pan), Chapter 25, pp. 86-89 and the critics of “Betty” in the Correspondence between Alfred Schutz
and Maurice Natanson, manuscript housed at Alfred Schutz Archive at Waseda University, Tokyo,
p. 1469, the latter being of an outstanding importance for the questioning of the relation and the
status between reality as such and other worlds which are supposed to be separated from it: “The
worlds of dreams, phantasms, and science are not necessarily compatible with concrete reality.
But they may be; or they may become.” As he [A. Schutz, n.n. D.B.] says (pp. 558) “factual, but
not logical incompatibilities can be overcome.” The point is that the day dreams of Walter Mitty
are just as much an attempt to master reality (to change the world) as a flood control project or a
political campaign. There isn’t enough distinction here between the world and the world as taken
by the individual. Why is the world taken as it is taken? Deeper than the psychological problem,
what are the needs seeking to be fulfilled?”
210 Denisa Butnaru
not only a radicalization and a split (a “leap” as Schutz names it) with respect to
the concrete world. It is continuously in relation to it and it can influence it and
act upon it in different ways. There is a continuous circularity between the ways
the world that we are coping with is dealt with, in the sense that Phantasia does
not have to be conceived as a product depending on the receipts we acquire in
everyday life. As a form of consciousness, it can partially be influenced, but in its
turn, it can give a reply, and influence the way things are understood at the level
of the natural attitude. So to question the role of Phantasia is rather to question
“how we experience reality,” and to understand that if we take into account the
existence of other “orders of being,” reality would not lose its primordial status;
on the contrary, it acquires new possibilities for the thematisation of the objects
with which the subjects are confronted.
Compared to the acts that usually characterize the life of consciousness, the
acts of Phantasia are said to lack “the specific positionality of the thetic con-
sciousness” (Schutz, 1990: 235)13 namely they are neutral. By invoking this
property, one has equally to take into account the difference between “imageries
imagined” and “imagining as a manifestation of our spontaneous life,” and the
Schutzian approach would go on in supporting the idea that these “imagined
imageries” do not affect and do not transform the outer world. But they may.
This does not mean that the pure act of phantasying a project for a certain activ-
ity cannot fulfill the project. And despite the neutral character that is attributed
to the acts of Phantasia, since they are considered to be results of types, they can
influence types, and so they can nevertheless manifest a so-called “positionality”
that characterizes the consciousness in its normal state.
Husserl himself recognizes the importance of the acts of phantasieren, as
variants that help us to get to at the eidetic structure of objectivity. But while
the two perspectives—that of Schutz and that of Husserl—tend to be ori-
ented towards the quid of the object in the process of its constitution, the
important part which enriches this quid is the “how,” and this “how” is a
hypostasis which is very much revealed through the act of phantasieren. In
any case, Schutz takes into account a very important Husserlian distinction
that concerns the recognizance of the so called degree of consistency in the
structure of objectivity that is supposed to be under the attentional ray. That
is even if at the factual level there are incompatibilities, at the logical level they
do not exist. The world of Phantasia thus is challenging the borders of logic
and consequently infringing upon the ensemble of typifications a continuous
movement. Phantasieren does not mean the delineation of a “finite province
of meaning”; on the contrary. It is a fundamental activity of our conscious-
ness through which the borders between the real and the “imagined” can be
overcome. Even if the real provides an important basis in the constitution of
13 Schutz makes a clear reference to the work of Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, Husserliana III, op. cit.,
§111. See as well concerning the discussion upon the acts of Phantasia in this text §4, §70,
§111-113
Typification and Phantasia 211
any type of objectivity, the same process of constitution happens at the level
of Phantasia. This means that the acts of Phantasia are not only “reproductive”
acts or acts which are displayed within a neutral background. They do thema-
tize objectivities. They do institute objectivities, even if their “object” may not
exist in the “concrete” sense. Probably the role of Phantasia in completing the
objective configurations proposed by types at the mundane level is to be rec-
ognized when taking into account the intentional characteristic of conscious-
ness. Being one of the forms of consciousness, Phantasia, is intentional. So as
long as it is discussed in these terms, its characterization as “neutral” can be
strongly questioned.
Following these ideas, one could understand then that Phantasia contrib-
utes to the general capability of consciousness of instituting objectivities and
thus it can affect the so called “basic” structure given by types. The relation
between typification and Phantasia should not be considered anymore in
terms of dependence or of difference in consistency, but in terms of parallel
functions of the same instance that is the consciousness. As a consequence,
Phantasia and the results obtained at the level of Phantasia can influence the
paramount reality into which we are leading our lives, or better said, it influ-
ences the way through which the paramount reality is given, signified, insti-
tuted, and acknowledged under the form of a system of relevances. The only
difference that remains fundamental in the discussion concerning Phantasia
and types, is that Phantasia remains on an extremely subjective level, and,
only when the changes it induces upon a certain type are radical enough, can
it be considered that it has equally an effect upon the way the Lebenswelt is
conceived and functions for a certain subject at a certain determined moment
in his/her personal history.
The Husserlian distinction between predications of existence and predica-
tions of reality14 could be of great support in respect not only of the mark of
the differentiation between the world of Phantasia and that of the everyday
life, but also as far as a possible ontological status of the “region Phantasia” is
concerned. Phantasia is projected thus with the status of “as if.” The realities
that are referred to, are variants of the concrete reality, and thus possibilities of
being—possibilities of being which may co-exist with the paramount reality
without endangering its status and which cannot do otherwise than bring a
surplus of signification.
In this order of ideas the role of the “enchanters” in Don Quixote would
consequently be confirmed to assure the change of “the scheme of interpreta-
tion prevailing in one sub-universe into the scheme of interpretation valid
in another” (Schutz, 1964:139), and thus confirming the transformation of
the concrete reality into another reality that would constitute the realm of
imageries. But this transgression has to work in both directions, and through
this exchange, the existence of both could be assumed, in the sense that they
have an obvious influence upon one another. So the example of Don Quix-
ote would show us not the predominance of the paramount reality. But ex-
actly that paramount reality, being also a subjective construction, could be
strongly influenced by the level of Phantasia and thus the relation between
the paramount reality and Phantasia has not to be conceived anymore as one
of dependence, but as one of interdependence, or reciprocal determination.
Actually for Don Quixote, the realm of Phantasia is the paramount reality.
field, being nevertheless based upon it, and being capable in its turn of play-
ing an important role upon the structure of experience in general. The advan-
tage of the apprehensions of Phantasia is that compared to their counterpart
in respect of perception, they are always “in the making.” They constantly
manifest themselves within a “constituting temporality” and not within a
“constituted” one,20 which means that they belong to a consciousness that
does not “present,” but “presentifies” (vergegenwärtigt). It reproduces objective
structures and it produces them at the same time. As consciousness of present
(Gegenwartsbewusstsein), Phantasia is a reproduction of former experiences;
it is projected as “resembling” (gleichsam) to former perceptual acts,21 but by
reactualizing certain properties given first and foremost at the perceptual level,
Phantasia does not limit itself only to a mere repetition. It equally involves,
as we have already seen, a “production,” because the new acquired objectivity,
since understood as a “quasi-perception” does not limit itself only to a former
scheme; it crosses its boundaries and responds actually to the former model
basically involved in the objectifying act.
Thus the acts of Phantasia do reveal another aspect of the consciousness,
and another way of giving account of the constitution of different objectivi-
ties. The so-called neutrality that Husserl invoked as characterizing the acts
of imagination,22 and correlatively, those of Phantasia, actually confirms this
property of instituting objectivities in the sense of a presence with a “weaker”
degree of consistency. For the thus constituted objects, the basic element that
is primordial in the discussion of their content is sensation. Their realization
should not be understood then only as a reproduction, as a repetition of a
former experienced type. They actually represent a reproduction of a former
model; they instantiate the novelty of the structure, and thus through Phan-
tasmata the objectivity escapes a stronger determination. However, for Hus-
serl—and following him, for Schutz—the process of perception is understood
in terms of apperception, a feature that would argue in the favor of the flex-
ibility of types themselves. And thus, the consideration of the Phantasmata,
and of the internal/external horizon of the objects would not contradict each
other so much. The differences would hold for the temporality within which
the objectivity is inscribed, as well as for the ways of positionalities (Setzungen)
which are responsible for the donation of the objects.
It is a consciousness that sends back, that calls for a certain designated objec-
tivity (ein Bezeichnetes), but that does not impose a rigorous frame for this
objectivity. It is one of the ways through which consciousness affirms the un-
foreseen side which sometimes characterizes it.
26 cf. Edmund Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, op. cit., Text 13, p. 299:
“Aber leben wir eben ganz in der Bildwelt und gar nicht in der Wirklichkeitswelt, so wird das
modifizierte Wahrnehmungsbewusstsein allein vollzogen: Es ist ‘Phantasie,’ dass heisst jetzt, es
ist Inaktualitäts-bewusstsein. Es ist quasi- Wahrnehmungsbewusstsein, aber nicht wirkliches.
Wir sehen gleichsam. Aber es ist kein vergegenwärtigendes Bewusstsein, sondern ein gegenwär-
tigendes. Ein gegenwärtigendes, aber Gleichsam- Bewusstsein.”
218 Denisa Butnaru
30 Schutz himself takes into account this question in his article Type and Eidos,
in Collected Papers III, op. cit., pp. 104-106 and p. 116
31 cf. Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, op. cit., §48, p. 138
220 Denisa Butnaru
that since they are always so fluid in their presence, they are not accepted under
the term of a concept and they have in this sense not so much in common with
the formation of judgments. But since they are also responsible for ways in
which objectivity can present itself, the “details” they bring into the structure of
the object may be of a certain importance. This is namely their specificity as acts
of consciousness: they can thematize—certainly with a lesser degree of position-
ing—but their thematization, even if treated as a mere “detail” in comparison
to the “stronger” acts realized at the judicative level can cast changes upon the
configuration of a certain objectivity.
The role of Phantasia is only not so “explicit” as in the case of other acts of
consciousness, but it plays a fundamental part in the constitution because it
does not suffer so many restrictions with respect to laws of realization of the
objectivity it creates and because it can “subversively” influence configurations
of “higher order.” It is Phantasia that demonstrates the richness of phenomenal-
ity and not the configurations of judicative acts that seem to be much more
formalized. We say they seem to be, because Husserl speaks of the inexactitude
(Unrichtigkeit) of a judgment, without taking away its ontological privilege.32
Judgments are even associated with characteristics of doxa (belief ), and doxa
suffers an ontological modification when considered in respect of the acts of
Phantasia. In the mode of Phantasia everything is considered within the frames
of “as if” (Als-ob). If the doxic character is then related to Phantasia, it equally
follows this rule of modalization, from the character of certitude—which is the
general law with which consciousness manifests itself—to that of the “as if.” It is
particularly this property that marks the character of possibility of the conscious-
ness as Phantasia. The doxic mode takes always the reality for what it is, namely
the mode with which the experienced Sachverhalten is that of certitude, while in
the acts of Phantasia, the experienced Sachverhalten are reduced to the modaliza-
tion of “as if,” which then equally affects in a fundamental way their way of be-
ing. Namely their being becomes of the nature of “as-if.”33 Nevertheless, even if
projected as a pure possibility, the being postulated by acts of Phantasia remains
in any case a product of reason, because this modification, just as any other, is a
consciousness-of (Bewusstsein-von) and it has its constitutive reason (konstitutive
Vernunft). Its correlate is the pure possibility. That means, that
36 cf. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzenden-
tale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana VI, hrsg.
von W. Biemel, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, §47, p. 167
37 ibid., §48, [p.169], translation of Krisis online by David Carr, www.husserlpage.
com, Online Texts
Typification and Phantasia 223
the constitutive role which belongs to any objectifying act, the creative func-
tions of subjectivity and its continuous mobility while performing its constant
encounter with the world.
In the frame of the analysis of Phantasia, objectivity is understood only as a
configuration determined by different processes of passive and active manifes-
tations of consciousness; it means rather a continuous overcrossing of its own
boundaries, within a temporal projection, which includes more than percep-
tion and representation and which confirms actually the always present “leere
Schemen” that are responsible for its transformation. Phantasia affects thus the
basic structures of consciousness as such, and those of the medium where this
consciousness is the most of the time anchored, namely the Lifeworld. By in-
voking Lifeworld, we cannot avoid bringing into discussion the presence of the
types on which the Lifeworld is said to be instituted. Certainly, the Husserlian
perspective in respect of the structures of Lifeworld—and correlated to it, the
Schutzian—help us understand certain processes of the constitution of types,
namely that they can be at the same time “markers” for certain regional ontolo-
gies. They have in this perspective a static aspect and by their dependence of
the inner processes of consciousness they are submitted to a process of chang-
ing that is permanent. They could be then defined as a pure approximation (ein
bloß ungefähres),38 their constitution fluctuating according to the interest of the
subject at a certain moment and according to the way other subjects grasp them.
Phantasia seems to be equally ignored in this respect, but in our opinion, it rep-
resents one of the most important forms of consciousness that is responsible for
the process of surpassing objectivity as such, and for fundamentally changing
the configuration of the type. Thus, the idea of an ontology of Lifeworld that
“can be revealed in pure evidence” (Schutz, 1975: 106),39 makes us understand
not only the relation of Phantasia to types and to their institution as products of
subjectivity through which the world as sum of regions presents itself. It rather
draws our attention to the fact that Phantasia plays a very important role in this
process of “phenomenological construction” of objectivity, and more than being
a simple delineation and recognition of the objective schemes in the world, it
plays an important part in the objectivitv’s “granting of being”.
Possible Conclusion
In the above exposition we have tried to circumscribe the possibility of
a new theory of constitution. This was realized by discussing the process of
constitution above the restricted level of subjectivity and by trying to privi-
lege the role of the Lebenswelt. The notion of Phantasia helped us in pursu-
ing this inquiry, and, more than being merely a conceptual tool, it brought
new possibilities for understanding the projections of objectification. Hence
38 Ibid., §9 a)
39 See as well for this idea Husserl, Krisis, op. cit., §51
224 Denisa Butnaru
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Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
______. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Husserliana I, Den
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.
______. Erfahrung und Urteil. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985.
______. Formale und transzendentale Logik. Husserliana XVII, Den Haag:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
______. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie. Erstes Buch, Husserliana III, hrsg. von Walter Biemel, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
______. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie.
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1962.
______. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An
Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL:
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______. Logische Untersuchungen. Husserliana XIX 1, zweiter Band:
Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.
Erster Teil, hrsg. von Ursula Panzer, 1, The Hague/Boston/Lancaster:
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______. Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Husserliana XXIII, hrsg. von
Eduard Marbach, The Hague/ Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff,
1980.
Sartre Jean-Paul. L’immaginaire. Paris: Gallimard, 1986.
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Grenoble: Jerôme Millon, 2007.
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Schutz Archive at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
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Schutz Alfred, “Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality.” In Alfred Schutz
Collected Papers II, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, pp.135-157.
______. “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World.” In Alfred Schutz
Collected Papers II, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, pp.64-88.
______. Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. New Haven & London: Yale
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______. “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy.” In Alfred Schutz,
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Wagner Helmut R., Biography of Alfred Schutz (unpublished manuscript) at
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RELEVANCIAS Y PLANES DE VIDA
EN EL MUNDO SOCIOCULTURAL
Pablo Hermida-Lazcano
I. LA CENTRALIDAD DE LA RELEVANCIA EN EL
PROYECTO FUNDAMENTADOR DE SCHÜTZ
A mi juicio, el principal proyecto filosófico de Schütz es el examen de la cons-
trucción significativa y las estructuras del Lebenswelt, concebido como mundo
intersubjetivo de cultura o, simplemente, mundo sociocultural. No obstante,
este proyecto nace subordinado a la empresa de fundamentación filosófica de las
ciencias sociales y, en su desarrollo desde Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt
hasta Strukturen der Lebenswelt, describe una compacta trayectoria investigado-
ra, en la que la fenomenología del mundo de la vida va ganando terreno paso a
paso al interés fundamentador y a las cuestiones metodológicas.
Pues bien, la tesis de este artículo es que la teoría schütziana de la relevan-
cia es, en un primer nivel, la clave de arco de la fundamentación filosófica de
la sociología comprensiva y, en un segundo nivel, el fruto más maduro de la
fenomenología constitutiva de la actitud natural en cuanto investigación de la
construcción significativa y las estructuras del mundo sociocultural, concebido
precisamente como macroconjunto de sistemas de relevancias subjetivas e in-
228 Pablo Hermida-Lazcano
sistemas de relevancias7) y, por otro lado, del perpetuo juego de luces y sombras
que define la dialéctica entre núcleo temático y horizonte de conciencia.
2) La pluralidad de roles
Un lugar común de la psicología social y la microsociología es la consta-
tación de que el individuo desempeña numerosos roles o papeles sociales a
lo largo de su vida. Si el desempeño de roles es un factor inherente a la vida
social, su importancia crece de forma espectacular en las sociedades modernas
frente a las tradicionales. Schütz hace suya la manera como Simmel (1955)
expresa esta múltiple afiliación de la persona a distintos grupos, afirmando
que «cada individuo está situado en la intersección de varios círculos sociales,
que serán tanto más numerosos cuanto más diferenciada sea la personalidad
del individuo» (Schütz, 1964: 253). En efecto, la división del trabajo y la dis-
tribución social del conocimiento, exacerbadas en la modernidad, acentúan el
polifacetismo que define lo que Goffman (1959) diera en llamar la presenta-
ción de la persona en la vida cotidiana. La personalidad es el resultado de la
conjugación más o menos armónica del repertorio de roles desempeñados por
un individuo; el Self como conjugación del I con sus distintos Me, por usar los
términos de Mead (1934). Dicha integración dista a menudo de la perfección.
Los roles pueden entrar en conflicto y competencia, hasta alcanzar cotas de
incompatibilidad destructoras de la personalidad, allí donde está ausente una
mínima concomitancia entre los sistemas de relevancias interna y externamen-
te asociados a los diversos papeles sociales. Y es que, en efecto, «es posible que
precisamente los rasgos de la personalidad a los que el individuo atribuye el
más alto orden de relevancia no la tengan desde el punto de vista de cualquier
sistema de relevancias presupuesto por el grupo del cual es miembro» (Schütz,
1964: 254). No es difícil que surjan, en tal caso, «conflictos dentro de la per-
sonalidad, originados principalmente en el intento de responder a las diversas
y, con frecuencia, incompatibles, expectativas de rol inherentes a la pertenen-
cia del individuo a varios grupos sociales» (ibíd). Sin llegar a ese extremo, la
plausibilidad de un plan de vida coherente depende del equilibrio de fuerzas
y de las relaciones jerárquicas entre los distintos roles y, en definitiva, de qué
papel o papeles (el feligrés, el amante, el cirujano, el apasionado coleccionista
de antigüedades, el hincha del Real Madrid) logren imponerse a los demás y
llevarse el gato al agua en la empresa de suministrar sentido a la biografía del
individuo. (Deseo consagrar mi vida a la cirugía cardiovascular; mi amante y
mi iglesia me hacen sentirme arropado y me ayudan a superar los fracasos, los
malos momentos y las crisis vocacionales; mi pequeño museo de antigüedades
y las proezas de mi equipo me brindan la distracción y la evasión que necesito
8 Resulta sumamente significativo el hecho de que Schütz se apresure a ilustrar esta re-
ciprocidad funcional, y esta potencial intercambiabilidad entre núcleo temático y horizonte de
conciencia, con la teoría freudiana de la relación entre la conciencia y el subconsciente. Aunque
Schütz nunca abordó el estudio sistemático del psicoanálisis freudiano, sus varias referencias a la re-
lación que Freud establece entre la conciencia y el subconsciente suponen otras tantas invitaciones
a excavar en la génesis de nuestras estructuras de relevancias y, en particular, en las motivaciones
ocultas que subyacen a nuestras deliberaciones y elecciones (Schütz, 1970: 14). En suma, Schütz
está proponiendo la relación entre conciencia y subconsciente como un caso paradigmático de vi-
vencia simultánea en múltiples realidades, con la subsiguiente activación de diferentes niveles de la
compleja estructura personal en forma de contrapunto musical. Ni que decir tiene que los guiños a
Freud se intensifican cuando se trata de poner en correlación con la realidad eminente del ejecutar
cotidiano esa peculiar provincia finita de sentido que es el mundo de los sueños, a cuya interpreta-
ción viene dedicando ingentes esfuerzos el psicoanálisis, ya desde su fundador.
RELEVANCIAS Y PLANES DE VIDA EN EL MUNDO SOCIOCULTURAL 241
V. APUNTES FINALES
En este artículo he propuesto una reconstrucción de la filosofía schütziana
del mundo de la vida centrada en las nociones de relevancia y plan de vida.
Quisiera concluir sugiriendo la fertilidad de la aplicación de este enfoque a
REFERENCIAS
JOURNAL
1 Business Associates
2 Rockefeller Center which contains Radio City Music Hall
3 Rockefeller Center
4 Concourse
5 Floors
JOURNAL 247
elevators race through, all going to different locations and the only difference
is the vertical direction of the trip. Our elevator went directly to the 76th floor
and proceeded to the 82nd floor after stopping at any desired floor in between.
(The remaining 4 floors up to the roof(7)6 is a distance covered by transferring
to another local car.) The trip takes 3 minutes and one has to keep one’s mouth
open in order to equalize the change in pressure within the eardrum.The view
from the roof (312 meters high) shows New York in its magnificence from the
Statue of Liberty in the harbor all the way to the uptown borders, with the Hud-
son River and East River and their wonderful bridges and it reaches all the way
across to the other side to New Jersey. It is the most unique and most intelligent
perspective over a city which I’ve ever been able to appreciate.
In the evening - the afternoon was spent on business matters and brought
me the biggest pleasure, news from home - we again went to the main build-
ing of Radio City, this time, in order to see the huge movie theater which seats
6,000 people. The giant auditorium rises up four stories which doesn’t even
include the ancillary rooms which are below ground and also worth seeing.
We were offered 1) An organ concert on a terrible Christie organ, 2) The
overture to Dichter and Bauer played masterfully by about 100 musicians, 3)
a stage show consisting of 3 portrayals with about 80 performers, outstanding
choreography and arrangements of lighting and costume color effects far more
beautiful than anything of this kind that I have ever seen in Paris, 4) a newsreel,
5) an excellent documentary film about child labor in America (currently a very
big issue) and the British crown conflict (which people here are very excited
about) put together according to very novel principles which themselves dem-
onstrate the possibilities of film, 6) an interminable film about a clumsy Boxer
which the audience heckled but which bored us so that we left in the middle.
This entire splendor cost 80 cents per person.
We then drove to Broadway, namely to its center which is called the theater
district where one can find one entertainment establishment next to another. The
mid-point of this section is what’s known as Times Square. The impression of the
quiet elegant New York was immediately corrected. It explodes, screams, clamors
with its brightly lit advertisements, its shabby drugstores and food automats, its
huge masses of poor people all mixed together like a gigantic amusement park on
a summer Sunday evening but lacking the charm of the amusement park(8)7. It’s
a bit more like the Berlin Lunapark, the hustle and bustle of fairgrounds or bad
Parisian Boulevard - with everything exaggerated. I know of few more tiresome
or tasteless streets. Here I saw for the first time the New York madness which on
another day I should get to know from an entirely different side.
We went “downtown” by taxi, to the lower city, which constitutes the
business center of New York around Wall Street. The trip went on the
“Highway”, a roadway for cars, which runs approximately two floors above
the normal street level on iron girders in order to avoid stops at the cross-
streets. This auto route consists of three columns of cars next to each other
traveling in every direction and provides a view of the entire harbor. We visit-
ed two of our business friends, both of them stock market brokers. The office
of one of them is situated almost at the very southern tip of Manhattan, the
so-called Battery, on the 22nd floor. From their office windows one can see
the Hudson as well as Long Island and beyond the Statue of Liberty, prob-
ably one of the most spectacular views in the world. The offices of the other
one are located in the famous Equitable building. We were taken on a tour
of their offices. It was in the middle of the trading day (The Stock Exchange
opens at 10 o’clock and closes at 3 o’clock). It’s difficult to draw a picture of
the working mode of operation here. In the midst of screaming and frantic
telephoning and telegraphing multitudes, people in sweaty shirtsleeves and
the continuously flashing and sound-piercing signals, the clattering of totally
strange machines, one believes one is anywhere but in a Bank office. Basi-
cally work is done in a huge open room rather than in individual offices. The
traders and arbitragers sit at a long table, the Ticker Tape runs past them
on a glass conveyor by which the teletype machines connected to a central
room at the Exchange presents the price of all stock trades of 100 shares at
incredible speed. The same information enlarged by a projector appears on
the wall of the client room and on special boards with counters on the walls
sorted by categories of registered stocks. There are several telephones in front
of each clerk one of which goes directly to a special section in the Stock
Exchange Building which by turning a numerical disk immediately makes
available the rate of exchange and selling price of the corresponding paper.
Telegraph operators sit on the other side of the table because this Office is
directly tied by private wire to the 10 branch offices in the United States
(Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, etc.). Special long distance connections
have been established at some of these Branches. In addition there are private
telephone connections to some larger clients. There are long distance telex
machines which continuously broadcast news from the big News Agencies
and with very important news, an alert signal goes off. A loudspeaker, which
is connected by telephone to the large center for financial news continuously
repeats additional information. In addition to all that, there are the general
teletype machines which are connected to the telephone network and which
enable written communications with each subscriber in the U.S.A., namely,
whatever is typed in New York on a kind of typewriter simultaneously ap-
pears typed out on a corresponding machine in San Francisco.
JOURNAL 249
very uncertain, they live separated from their families and Gerhart fears that his
stipend of $150 per month (which here is equivalent to a stenotypist’s salary)
won’t be renewed. The optimism of his parents is greatly unfounded. He told
very interesting things about the actual state of the planned reform of the top
court(10)9 and of his work at the American Law Institute at which occasion I
was most astonished to discover that a number of Southern States of the Union
forbid marriage between Blacks and Whites.
I then visited the Metropolitan Museum, partly with them and partly alone.
The collections are very uneven, all in all I had expected more. The very exten-
sive Egyptian collection is wonderful, which greatly surpasses that of the Louvre
and is at least equivalent to that of the British Museum. The collection of old
musical instruments is particularly interesting(11)10 with everything displayed in a
very practical and educational manner. In my opinion the collections of ancient
and medieval sculptures don’t represent much. As to the paintings, half of them
are dedicated to American production and are a nightmare. In the other galler-
ies there were a few very important pieces, primarily Goya, then Vermeer, Peter
Breughel, Rembrandt (especially the “Admiral’s Wife”). The Italian Masters are
represented by far less substantial works than can be found in European Galleries.
In the evening we ate with Ziegler(12)11 and then went to an interminable
and tiresome movie adapted from Pearl Buck’s “The Good Earth” with the Vi-
ennese Luise Rainer and Tilly Losch, who both are even more lamentable and
ill-mannered than at home.
Took the subway for the first time. There are four tracks, the middle ones for
express trains which only stop at every fourth or fifth station. We took a wrong
train and landed in a part of the city which otherwise we would never have
known about, namely, in the middle of Brooklyn, on the opposite bank of the
East River. This part of the city has a population of 2½ million and has ugly low
buildings which gives a typical impression of the outskirts. Robert(13)12 assured
us that this is the characteristic image one gets in all American cities with the
exception of well-known metropolitan cities.
We had meetings with Bankers during the day about Roosevelt’s New Deal.
Even the most intelligent people support this politic. They are all believers in
purchasing power and claim that the American experience of stimulating pro-
duction is to be expected from this side. Government interventions protected
the country from a major catastrophe. Of particular interest is the support
of the labor union movement which would resolve the Wagner-Labor-Act’s
main conflict in the current strike. Most people think the Wagner-Labor-Act
is unconstitutional, the matter is dependent on the Supreme Court which in
9 Supreme Court
10 Interestingly Alfred’s closest friend, Emanuel Winternitz, became the curator of this
department at the Metropolitan Museum of Art many years later.
11 Another business Associate.
12 Robert Lambert. Alfred’s immediate boss.
252 ALFRED SCHUTZ
nice hats for 98¢ in the warehouse). As to the taste, I hear that the styles
here are exactly the opposite of those in Vienna. Whereas Vienna moderates
every Parisien originality, New York takes up every flamboyance. Our hostess
told me that at the beginning every hat which she considered very successful
remained unsold. Naturally at any time that it suits her she could open up a
shop of her own, But the costs for rent and furnishings are so high that one
can take on such an experiment only after one has secured a solid customer
following. So she tries not to stand out from her colleagues and to make sure
they don’t notice that in Vienna she was the boss.
friends with whom he often gets together outside their homes has never been
invited to his home gave him the following spontaneous explanation, namely,
that he didn’t want to invite him alone nor did he want to bring him together
with other people because the disparaging remarks about Jews in those circles
are as much a part of normal discussions as the weather or the Stock Market.
The biggest corporations as well as the banks (with the exception of Chase
Bank) have always been purely gentile. General Electric, for example, em-
ployed no Jews as a principle. It is also certain that individual Universities, as
for example Harvard, name no Jews to Professorships.
than 60 days. When that time is up, it will be disposed of for sale at a marked
down price (often 50% down). It is exactly here that the enterprising Buyer
can use her skills because at that point in time, the manufacturer wants to
sell his remainders at dirt cheap prices to Stores which can then achieve large
profits if there are reorders placed by the shop-keeper. The Congressman from
New Hartford was also at our table, a lively supporter of the New Deal. His
name is Koppelmann and is, of course, Jewish.
In the afternoon we visited the Capitol about which there is nothing to
report, the new Supreme Court Building - “had cost a lot of Dollars - that is
American marble” - and the very beautiful Library of Congress, which con-
tains many interesting manuscripts, among them the original handwritten
charter of the Constitution, several handwritten manuscripts, and the last
highlight, the Gutenberg Bible from St. Paul in Kärnten.
In the evening I separated myself from my company in order to take the
night train to Buffalo.
men greeted her with a friendly “hello Mitzi!”. Salary: $40 per week. They
kept a girl by the name of Phyllis, a farmer’s daughter, high school graduate
(Matura); but who does not expect to come back in the Fall because she wants
to become a piano teacher and take on an office job. Salary of the girl: $45 per
month but she seldom sleeps at home. The house is very comfortable and the
Viennese furniture adds a lot to the atmosphere.
I visited the University in the morning, seven buildings in the middle
of an open field obviously intended for expansion. It seems generally that
most American cities were built in a cleared space by Morgenstern architects
who fled there. Everything was covered in deep snow because it is still com-
pletely winter here. The entire University enterprise resembles that of a middle
school. There are exams, school work, homework, notes, catalogues during
the semester and curious questionnaires which the student must answer in
order to verify that he had actually read certain books. Fritz gets approxi-
mately $6000 income and is one of the highest paid teachers. He also has the
most students and is highly respected. But he has only one solitary colleague
with whom he can discuss anything and a single student who wants to do his
Doctorate with him.
There was lots that was delightful; A wonderful broadcast of Lohengrin from
the Metropolitan Opera with Flagstad Branzell and Hoffmann, we played pi-
ano, discussed intelligent matters and took great pleasure in each other. In the
evening, Professor Marvin Farber came over, a Husserl student and a long phe-
nomenological discussion ensued. Farber also complained about the fact that he
had no one to talk to.
During dinner unexpected visitors came. That is the custom here - “to drop
in anytime”. In order to make a virtue out of necessity, I learned a number
of very interesting details about the actual economic situation here and about
some refinements regarding the politics of the Federal Reserve which I had
not known until now. In any event. I noticed much to my amazement, that
our friend Fritz, the anti-interventionist, also shares Roosevelt’s fight regard-
ing foreign influx of capital. After the visitors left, we still discussed all kinds
of interesting things, especially about pedagogical questions for another two
hours in front of the fireplace.
was hard for us to separate and we did so unhappily even though I seldom felt
comfortable in the house of Machlup and have again discovered my better self.
Nothing notable today, the evening was taken up by writing these pages.
but unfortunately I understood very little. The women told each other dread-
ful things and Lisa {Reitler} was royally entertained. The plot is scanty, the
characterization of the environment is good, the actresses only fair. Typical
dialog: A woman is expecting another child. She is asked: “are you Catholic
or just careless?” The audience was very mixed, as far as it was elegant, very
elegant. Lots of Ermine, Sabel, and Broadtail, many light-colored dresses with
low cut backs. It is strange that when one enters from the street one lands
almost immediately in the auditorium, there isn’t a wardrobe to check one’s
coat but instead one puts coats and hats under one’s seat.
to disposing of a thought with “dis versteh i net” (15)14. The parting was also quite
cool. I’m really quite sure that I won’t accept his invitation to come to Harvard
for the weekend. But I’ll think some more about that whether it makes sense to
write the Economics article. For whom? why? to what purpose?
From his report about Harvard, the only interesting fact worth retaining is
that the young people, as long as it does not concern sons of millionaires, are
almost all oriented toward communism.
to prove the Constitutionality of the Wagner Labor Act and that the Canadian
Prime Minister found some very serious words to announce measures against
the prevailing threat of the strike movement in Canada.
the eyes of the Pastor where I previously stood on the side of the young revolu-
tionary. This time, by the way, I was able to follow the performance quite well.
It is noteworthy that all 60 theaters in New York are sold out weeks ahead.
One can only get tickets to the major shows at a ticket bureau with great dif-
ficulty. A ticket which costs $3 at the box office is sold there for $5.
order number and get packed as soon as everything is together. Each worker
must complete 10 packages within 15 minutes regardless whether it is large or
small. Another conveyor takes the packages to a scale where they are weighed,
franked, the accompanying papers verified again and the time is checked to
be sure the process was completed in the required time. If that isn’t the case,
the responsible person is docked 15¢ from her paycheck. From this space the
outgoing packages move to the government post office which is in the same
building and is reserved exclusively for the company and where the 400 clerks
are paid by the firm.
As far as the business is concerned, the problem lies in the commercial
difficulty that the company is committed to the catalogue price and that they
never know which 8 or 10 ladies’ hats shown in the catalogue will be asked for
or will be remaindered. In order to find some balance, the firm has a number
of affiliated warehouses where the dead stock can be sold at reduced prices.
In a purely economic sense, the operation is brilliantly rationalized. But
when one looks at those poor girls working at that killing tempo for $16 - $20
per week one can understand that neither the division of labor nor the eco-
nomic efficiency is worth the desired goal.
In the afternoon we visited the Museum. It mostly contains only second-
ary pieces with the exception of a few Dutch ones, the well-known Rem-
brandt and a really good collection of modern French pieces among which
Renoir is superbly represented.
Spent the evening with our business friends, a Partner in a large Bank and
his wife at a genuine mid-western show, much of it tasteless but trying very
hard to be like Parisians. Our friends live outside the city and his wife declared
that as of three weeks ago she has had to do all the housework herself because
in spite of all her efforts she has been unable to find any help.
15 Not to be shown to Dad’s father Peter because he would be too sensitive for this.
270 ALFRED SCHUTZ
former years, the slaughterhouses were severely criticized but much has been
reformed since then. The path which visitors can take is precisely decreed and
visibly well chosen. First we visited the hog division.
The animals are driven in herds directly from the stalls to the slaughter-
house. About twenty swine are moved into a small room, maybe 3 x 5 meters.
A stage-worthy black man (virtually only black men work here) grabs the
animal’s hind legs and hangs it with a hook on a chain which passes in front
of him. The chain (with living animals hanging from it) screaming pitifully
passes a vertical turntable whereby the animal hanging from one of its hind
legs gets lifted head down so that its neck is at the arm height of the slaugh-
terer in front of whom it passes on the moving chain. The man cuts its throat
with a single stroke of the knife, a huge stream of blood gushes into the catch
basin as the chain drags the twitching animal through boiling water, after
three minutes it emerges from the chain as a white cadaver without bristles.
Now the chain passes along a row of workers who each only make one hand
movement: one of them cuts the ears off, the second one opens the belly with
one cut, a third one takes the innards out and throws them onto a moving
conveyor belt so that they pass by the Official Inspector, a fourth one saws the
animal in half lengthwise with a mechanical saw blade - each man does his
“sorry job”, as our driver said, with the result that 29 minutes after it enters,
the dismembered animal is in the refrigeration unit. It remains there for 48
hours. The additional processes also proceed by conveyor belt in a very clean
manor and one is then taken at once from the slaughterhouse through an ap-
petizing fragrant smokehouse where one can observe the packaging of clean
bacon so that the unpleasant impression is wiped out. But I must admit that
the conveyor belt which transforms a mother sow in record time from a living
organism to a cadaver and then to a delicacy, seemed disgusting to me in spite
of my renowned hardening in all such matters.
It was very similar in the section for sheep only it was silent which made
the matter even much worse. The lambs had no idea what awaits them and
quietly follow the bellwether (i.e., the lead sheep wearing a bell) of the plant
into the room. (This bellwether, which is especially trained for its devilish
business raises all kinds of political considerations.) No slaughtering took
place (I almost said: fortunately) as we came by. So we only saw how the pre-
viously slaughtered animals were skinned and carved up. The preparations are
almost the same with the only difference that the cattle in the cattle division
about to be slaughtered are given a mighty blow on the forehead with a heavy
hammer so that it is completely stunned before it is put on the chain.
The plant management (we were wonderfully received everywhere by either
the President or Vice President) offered us lunch and I had occasion to wonder
at the nerves of the epicures who reveled in a marvelous piece of roast beef.
After lunch we were taken by a representative of the International Har-
vester Corp. to see their plant and we got to know a much more pleasant use
JOURNAL 271
16 Although the Journal appears to end here, the trip continued to Detroit and Canada. On
4/25/37 Ilse wrote to Alfred at the Plaza Hotel in New York and on 5/10/37 she wrote to him
at the Hotel Scribe in Paris. They were expected to disembark on 5/11/37 and to leave Paris for
Vienna on 5/12/37.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND
EQUALITY: ALFRED SCHUTZ’S PARTICIPATION
IN THE 1955 CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE,
PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGION
edited by
Michael Barber
Abstract: This text includes the interventions of Alfred Schutz at the 1955
Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, entitled “Aspects of Human
Equality,” to which his paper, later published as “Equality and the Meaning
Structure of the Social World,” had been submitted. In Schutz’s reactions to
the comments of other conference participants, one can see his views on: the
“secularization” of more theoretical philosophical and theological ideas, the
need to distinguish levels of abstraction, the importance of self-reflection on
one’s own viewpoint, and the significance of common sense. In the end, he
recommends that theoreticians return to kindergartens and playgrounds to
examine the equality practiced there.
1.Introduction
It is little known that Alfred Schutz, philosopher and sociologist, was in-
volved in a series of high level intellectual discussions that focused on hu-
man equality and that followed on the famous 1954 Supreme Court decision
Brown vs. Board of Education, which ended racially segregated schooling. As
will be seen in the document that follows, Schutz was not only concerned
about racial prejudice, but he also shows an awareness years before its time of
the fact that age and sex groups can easily be targeted for unequal treatment.1
The Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion had sponsored intel-
lectual discussions since 1940, and, Louis Finkelstein of the Jewish Theological
1 See below p. 24 and see Lester Embree, “Alfred Schutz on Reducing Social Tensions,”
in Phenomenology of the Political, ed. Kevin Thompson and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2000) p. 102.
274 Michael Barber
Seminary, one of the fellows of the conference, invited Schutz to its 1954
meeting on symbols and values where he presented his “Symbol, Reality, and
Society.”2 After attending an interim, planning meeting in May 1955 at Lake
Mohonk, New York, Schutz partook in the Conference’s 1955 meeting in
August, focused on aspects of equality, no doubt in response to Brown vs.
Board of Education, to which there are repeated references in the proceedings
(Alfred Schutz Papers, GEN MS 129, Box 21, Folders 465 & 466, Beinecke
Library, Yale University). Papers submitted by those in attendance were pub-
lished in Aspects of Human Equality,3 including Schutz’s paper, “Equality and
the Meaning Structure of the Social World” (pp. 33-78). Near the end of
the conference, Richard McKeon, whom Schutz respected, invited the par-
ticipants after their return home to write down three or four pages about the
direction of future discussions, and this invitation resulted in Schutz’s “In
Search of the Middle Ground.”4 Finally, in June 1956, Schutz attended the
Institute on Ethics at Lake Mohonk, and, in connection with that meeting, he
produced three texts on equality of opportunity—one with Harold Laswell,
and all recently published by Lester Embree.5
The August 1955 meeting, from whose proceedings Schutz’s interventions
below are excerpted, included approximately thirty-four persons: professors of
various ideological stances in the areas of political science, education, theol-
ogy, economics, law, physiology, anthropology, sociology and Jewish rabbis,
Jesuit priests, and Protestant ministers, one African-American president of a
college, and one woman professor. Among Schutz’s acquaintances during his
three years of involvement with the conference group were such renowned
persons as McGeorge Bundy, Alfred Hofstadter, Harold Lasswell, R.M.
MacIver, Thurgood Marshall, Eugene McCarthy, Richard McKeon, Margaret
Mead, John Courtney Murray, S.J., and John Plamenatz.
In spite of the great diversity of participants, the cooperative spirit of the
discussions provoked reflections by group members about the democratic
character of their own discussions, about what Lyman Bryson called their
2 Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice
Natanson (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 287-356.
3 Aspects of Human Equality Fifteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Phi-
losophy, and Religion, ed. Lyman Bryson, Clarence H. Faust, Louis Finkelstein, and R.M.
MacIver (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956).
4 In Collected Papers, Vol. IV, edd. Helmut Wagner and George Psathas in collabora-
tion with Fred Kersten (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) pp.
147-151; on Schutz’s respect for McKeon see his letter to Aron Gurwitsch of November 10,
1952 in Philosophers in Exile, The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch 1939-
1959, ed. Richard Grathoff, trans. Claude Evans (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1989), p. 186.
5 “The Ethical-Political Side of Schutz: His Contributions at the 1956 Institute on
Ethics concerned with Barriers to Equality of Opportunity,” Chapter 12 of Schutzian Social
Science, ed. Lester Embree (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 227-307.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 275
7 Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Freder-
ick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 43-44
8 “Equality and the Social Meaning Structure,” 67; cf. also the essay in Collected Papers,
II: Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid Brodersen, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 261-
262; see Lester Embree, “Alfred Schutz on Reducing Social Tensions,” p. 101.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 277
and theoreticians themselves. In this light, it does not come as a surprise that
one of his final recommendations to this gathering of distinguished professors
is that they return to the kindergarten and playground to examine the equal-
ity practiced there (infra, 31-32). This metaphor of sportsmanship, referred
to throughout the papers and conference discussions on equality, does not
reveal a kind of subterranean anti-intellectualism, but rather reflects a more
profound critical approach toward the idea of equality itself, the theme of
the conference. In Aspects of Human Equality, Clarence Faust explains how
sportsmanship involves a recognition that there are natural inequalities and a
willingness to acknowledge the other’s excellence even if it is not one’s own,
thereby escaping the leveling ressentiment that can underpin the pursuit of
equality, as Nietzsche knew so well (Clarence Faust, “Equality in American
Education: Notes on Development with Respect to Racial Equality in Edu-
cation,” 318-319). While clearly all the participants favored rectification of
American racial inequalities--such that Perry Miller could joke that everyone
thought equality was a good thing, except for Dr. Lee (Monday Afternoon
Session, Aug. 29, 1955, p. 13)—still several participants were uncomfort-
able with the idea of equality itself if it were detached from some underlying
ethical concept such as the community of humanity, freedom, solidarity, hu-
man dignity, or natural law (Aspects of Human Equality: F. Ernest Johnson,
“The Concept of Human Equality,” 30; John P. Plamenatz, “Equality of Op-
portunity,” 94; Comments by Simon Greenberg on Plamenatz’s “Equality of
Opportunity,” 109-110; Albert Hofstadter, “The Career Open to Personality:
The Meaning of Equality of Opportunity for an Ethics of Our Time,” 113,
132; Hoftstader, Tuesday Afternoon Session, Aug. 30, 1955, 142-152, and
Thursday Morning, September 1, 1955, 23-24; McKeon, Monday Evening
Session, August 29, 1955, 50). Dorothy Lee, perhaps the most outspoken
proponent of founding equality on an underlying ethical value, repeatedly ar-
gues that equality is actually a means for promoting human dignity to which
it is subordinate; that other cultures may have great respect for human dignity
even without Western egalitarian practices; and that equality understood as
interchangeability, equivalence, or conformity, can suppress uniqueness and
result in totalitarianism—a viewpoint with which Albert Hoftstadter also
concurs (Lee, “Equality of Opportunity as a Cultural Value,”, 255, 256-258,
262, 265, 269-270; cf. Dorothy Lee, Wednesday Morning Session, August
31, 1955, 185-187; Hofstadter, Tuesday Morning Session, August 30, 1955,
p. 89; Tuesday Afternoon Session, August 30, 1955, p. 132, 169).
Schutz’s strategy is different but related. While Schutz does not emphasize
the ethical founding of the idea of equality, nevertheless, like his colleagues,
he seeks to delve beneath the abstract notion of equality. Schutz, however,
seeks to understand how the different groups belonging to the discussion will
grasp equality. Hence, in the interventions below, he stresses the difference
between insider and outsider interpretations, the variations in understanding
278 Michael Barber
of equality from group to group and culture to culture, the ways in which
discrimination disregards the viewpoint of those discriminated against, and he
reiterates the main features of his equality essay on how insiders and outsiders
understand differently the meaning of group membership, equality, and equal
opportunity.9 Rather than hunting for the ethical foundations of the abstract
concept of equality, Schutz explores the cognitive dissonances between indi-
viduals and social groups in their understanding of such abstract concepts.
As he had done through his call for self-reflectivity, Schutz strives to makes
interlocutors self-aware of the distinctiveness of their own viewpoint and its
difference from other viewpoints and to encourage more careful attention to
understanding others. Such self-reflectivity and understanding are as neces-
sary for any discussion of the issue of equality as locating the issue with refer-
ence to an ethical foundation.
Of course, one feels a bit of alarm when one of participants speaks of
the need for the United States to prepare other nations so they can be self-
governing, a comment which evokes Lee’s response that “when we speak of
preparing the rest of the world to accept the concept of equality,” we ought
to examine what makes our concept of equality good or better. Similarly, it is
troubling that one participant should speak of America’s “Messianic role and
function” on the present world stage (Tuesday Morning Session, August 30,
1955, 101-104). Likewise, it is bothersome that Schutz should speak of non-
Western peoples as our “primitive” people, an expression also deployed a few
pages later by Dr. Lee, who is otherwise quite opposed to cultural chauvinism
(Wednesday Morning Session, August 31, 1955, pp. 191-193). There is some
hope, however, in the fact that the typification “primitive,” runs counter to
the self-reflectivity and understanding that Schutz champions throughout his
writings and conference interventions on the topic of equality.
Alfred Schutz’s essay, “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the So-
cial World,” was originally published as the third paper in Aspects of Human
Equality and reprinted in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, II. It was originally
accompanied by Alfred Schutz, “In Search of the Middle Ground” which has
been reprinted in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers IV.
The Meeting of the Fellows of the mentioned conference took place from Au-
gust 29 to September 1, 1955, at the Men’s Faculty Club of Columbia Universi-
ty. The participants, whose essays had already been distributed in mimeographed
forms, joined in presentations and discussions that were themselves recorded in
a stenographic transcription (Alfred Schutz Papers, Folders 465 & 466). Schutz,
like the other participants was asked not to summarize his essay, but “to tell how
9 Infra, 14-21; “Equality and the Social Meaning Structure,” Aspects, 56-78;CP II:250-
273; Michael Barber has drawn out the importance of understanding the differences between
groups by constrasting Schutz’s approach in his equality essay with Hannah Arendt’s “Reflections
on Little Rock,” in “Pluralism and the Subjective Interpretation of Meaning: Arendt and Schutz
on Race in the United States,” in Culture and Society (Waseda University), 1 (1999): 86-103.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 279
the issues in the paper are related to issues which have already been raised in the
Conference” (comment by Lyman Bryson, p. 87, Aug. 30, 1955). The present
text has been assembled from what Schutz said there. The reader is here afforded
the pleasure of reading how Schutz spoke spontaneously and provided with a
concise statement that shows different emphases than his larger essay.
If somebody reviewed the transcription, it was probably not Schutz. All
remarks found in the transcription are included here and in the order made.
Some alternative or supplementary expression, a note at a point difficult to un-
derstand for the editor, interstitial remarks in italics chiefly about what Schutz
was responding to, and the title have been added. The division into paragraphs
has been left as in the transcription. Some punctuation has been altered. I thank
The Beinecke Library, Yale University, for copies of materials from the Schutz
Nachlass held there, Ms. Evelyn Schutz Lang for permission to publish this text,
and Professor Michael Barber for adding the introduction. Lester Embree is
thanked for finding this text and preparing it for publication.
Schutz’s Remarks
Richard McKeon provides the first presentation based on his advance-circulated
text, published in Aspects as Paper I, “The Practical Uses of Philosophy.” McKeon
fills in two parts that are not developed in his paper and that contain a wealth of
historical material. In the transcription, which is 8 1/2 x 11” and single spaced,
McKeon’s presentation occupies pp. 40-53. The discussion on topics such as the lived
versus theoretical approaches to equality and the possibility of arriving at a common
formulation of equality extends to p. 86. Schutz speaks once, on pp. 61-62.
I should like to revert to a statement by Dr. McKeon where I think all
of our difficulties or several of our difficulties converge, and I hope that this
might also give a solution to the problems of our Conference.
Dr. McKeon has pointed out the critical point where the theoretical phi-
losophy goes via institutions into the practical life, for instance, politics. Dr.
McKeon has characterized institutions, if I understood him correctly, by three
elements. First of all we have the individual in its relationship to the institu-
tion. And then we have the association. And then we have the ideas behind
it. Here is exactly the point where the philosophical approach becomes [takes
on] an entirely new meaning.10
Let us begin with ideas. The philosophical idea, of course, is experienced
by those within the group which is governed by the institutions not in terms
of clearly stated philosophical propositions, but in terms of values taken just
for granted and [transferred] from generation to generation.
10 Schutz here concurs with McKeon’s idea of institutionalization, and he notes this
again in “In Search of the Middle Ground,” 149, by making reference to his own essay, “Equal-
ity and the Meaning Structure of the Social World,” where he had already spoken of “institu-
tionalization” of myths (Aspects, 51; Collected Papers, II:245).
280 Michael Barber
11 Here Schutz makes quite explicit a tension, latent in his other works, between the
individual and his or her group. This tension is clearer in “Equality and the Social Meaning
Structure,” where Schutz discusses how in-group members speaking on behalf of the out-group
might be designated as “traitors” by the spokespersons “of radical ethnocentrism”(Aspects, 54/
CP II:247), how one’s personal relevance scheme may not be compatible with that scheme
socially approved by one’s in-group (Aspects, 45,60/CP II:238, 254), and how there may be
a conflict between individuals and the group about even the definition of group membership
(Aspects, 71/CPII:266). One can envision the internal conflicts with which an Italian-America
Frank Sinatra or a Mexican-American Selena may have struggled as members of groups with
different relevance-schemes. Indeed working mothers or fathers, belonging to different groups,
face such conflicts daily.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 281
12 At the very outset of “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World,” as
McKeon mentioned, Schutz distinguishes diverse Greek notions of equality: isotimia (equal
respect for all), isonomia (equality before the law), isogoria (equal freedom of speech and po-
litical action), isokratia (equality in political power), isopsephia (equal right to vote), isopoliteia
(or equality of civil rights), isodaimonia (equality in fortune and happiness), and isomoiria
(participation in a partnership with equal shares)(Aspects, 34; CP II:227). In a fragment from
the Schutz archives [Alfred Schutz Papers, 2806-2807] that begins with “The main theses of
present paper are the following one[s]:” Schutz lists under point (2)(8) several of the these
notions, leaving out isopoliteia and including isoklyros (equality of property). It is conceivable
that this fragment, which does not follow the exact organization of Schutz’s equality paper,
may represent notes Schutz took in preparation for presenting his paper in the August meeting
since participants were not supposed merely to summarize their papers but show the relevance
of what they were saying to the ongoing discussions.
13 In his unpublished manuscript “T.S. Eliot’s Theory of Culture,” Schutz tries to re-
place Eliot’s idea that cultural heritages are “unconscious” with the idea that they are “taken for
granted” and yet capable of being questioned at some future date. In contrast to Eliot’s definition
of culture as “that which makes life worth living,” Schutz defines it as “everything which is taken
for granted by a given social group at a certain point of its historical existence.” This includes not
only the things classed by certain anthropologists under the unfortunate terms artifacts (tools
and implements), “sociofacts” (institutions), and “mentifacts” (ideas and ideals), not only the
permanently reproduced and managed “second environment” which, according to Malinowski,
is superimposed upon the primary or natural environment by human activity and the sum total
of habitual and traditional life. It also includes the whole realm of things taken for granted as well
as the system of relevances and their organization, upon which the belief is founded that this way
of life is unquestionably the good one and the right one, perhaps the only good and right one.”
“T.S.Eliot’s Theory of Culture,” Alfred Schutz Papers, Box 13, folder 243, 7478-7515.
14 Lester Embree points out how the naturalistic sciences themselves abstract a stratum
of nature from out of the whole of the social-cultural world with reference to which the physical
world is always already given. See in this edition, “Economics in the Context of Alfred Schutz’s
Theory of Science,” p.5.
282 Michael Barber
If we investigate this typical structure more closely, we find that there are
certain elements of relevance in the organization of these various typical sys-
tems which themselves belong to the world we take for granted. It is my
principal thesis that equality as such is also an element of [our] world taken
for granted and of the relevance of the structure prevailing within this world
taken for granted, therefore varying from group to group and varying from
culture to culture.
On the other hand, there arises a difficulty which has, however, resolved
[produced?] very concrete problems. This difficulty is that this whole social
attitude, or I prefer to call this relativ natürliche Weltanschauung the relative
natural aspect of the world prevailing within the particular group, is inter-
preted in a different way (a) by the group itself, (b) by the other group, (c) by
the theorist, the social scientist or the philosopher.15
Now this leads to the differentiation between two kinds of typifications
and two kinds of groups. There is a social group which considers itself to be a
group from the subjective point of view, from the point of view of those who
are living within this group, and this [there(?)] is a kind of a positive typifi-
cation, a typification which comes from the out-group. There is the kind of
typification, let’s say of the Hitler, or kind of typification by which an outsider
considers the in-group as belonging together although the in-group is not
existent, there is no in-group, the members of this group don’t feel that they
are belonging to any.16
There is a difference, a basic difference in whether we say “We Americans,”
or whether we say, “The Russians.” Both aspects of difference are there in the
general problem, which is a problem of subjective [and] objective interpreta-
tion in the social [scientific] sense. But is has a considerable impact on our
study of equality because equality [inequality] is discrimination and refers
to an imposed typification by one single trait which is not even relevant to
the members of the group brought together by the typification. The whole
personality is identified with this particular trait, the color of the skin, the
religious creed, the language, or whatever it is. All of this comes into the defi-
nition of the situation.17
and Schutz considers such equal opportunity “worthwhile fighting for.” However, he also
recognizes that this openness of positions should not be taken to mean that there is an “equal
start for everyone,” since there are factors on the subjective side (financial necessities, housing,
sanitation) that make it impossible for some even to try to occupy an objectively open position.
See “Equality and the Social Meaning Structure,” Aspects, 78/CP II: 273.
22 Considering the obstacles that one might subjectively encounter in the pursuit of
objectively open posts, Schutz, in the equality essay, entertains Crane Brinton’s suggestion that
such large-scale social alterations might have to be introduced that only a form of collectivism
could realize. But, alternately, he suggests that equality of opportunity may mean for an indi-
vidual “the maximum of self-realization which his situation in social reality permits.” (“Equality
and the Social Meaning Structure,” Aspects, 78/CP II: 273). Schutz’s friend and colleague at the
New School, Adolf Lowe, interpreted Schutz’s conclusion here as recommending that people
“Enjoy what God has allotted to them,” and Lowe opposes this view since social orders are not
that static and since the extremes of laissez faire or collectivism do not exhaust the possibili-
ties, contrary to “Hayekian slogans.” Letter of Adolph Lowe to Alfred Schutz, Sept. 14, 1955.
Schutz’s policy recommendations here, however, seem rather ambiguously formulated, in the
subjunctive mood.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 285
23 There is a shift in meaning in this last paragraph. An individual from the subjective
side can inject his unique personality into an objectively defined role, as the different presidents
molded the presidency. The discussion of equality of opportunity also makes use of objective/
subjective distinction, but in a different sense: a position can be objectively defined and open to
whoever is qualified, but various subjective factors must be in place if one will be able to strive
to win that position.
24 See “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” CP I:20-21.
25 Thus in driving to school and noticing a dog, the typification of “dog” is adequate,
but if one notices that the dog is foaming at the mouth and swaying and one is compelled
to call the humane society, a much more refined set of typifications is required: “German
286 Michael Barber
Shepherd,” “four feet tall,” “with a white spot on its neck.” The problem at hand dictates the
typifications required.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 287
26 If Schutz only took exception to postulate five, it may indicate that he accepted the
other postulates. His interest, here, though, lay in the fact that Hofstadter confused an abstract
level of principle with a more concrete level of application, as becomes clear in his next inter-
vention. This difference between the abstract and concrete levels emerges clearly in Schutz’s
correspondence with Eric Voegelin whose concern for concrete value commitments contrasts
with Schutz’s more abstract treatment of “relevance,” see Michael Barber, “Values as Critique
and the Critique of Values: Voegelin and Schutz on Theory in the Social Sciences” in Alfred
Schutz’s Theory of Social Science ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht,Boston, and London: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1999), 229.
288 Michael Barber
only [by] reducing its conception from these premises. What does it mean, the
community needs to be served by its members? What does it mean, parents
have the duty to make their children responsible members of the community?
Here we are exactly in the middle ground, an understanding of the concrete
social group which alone can teach us what all these nice phrases mean, and
here is the limit of the speculation of the philosopher and here is, therefore,
my objection to Dr. Hofstadter’s postulates, at least the fourth and fifth of his
formulations. I mention economic equality just as an example.27
Schutz’s next statement if the following:
Our Chairman [MacIver] has developed in his book on The Web of Gov-
ernment (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947) the theory which is re-
stricted to each particular culture, each historical situation from which all these
varieties between the social system can be developed. I think this is exactly the
limit to which the philosopher can carry us. And then there are areas where the
social scientists, where Dr. Miller and Dr. MacIver, have to take over.
That ended the second day of the conference. On the third day, Wednesday, Au-
gust 31, Louis Finkelstein presented “Human Equality in the Jewish Tradition,”
emphasizing that the Jewish people considered themselves equal in service of God
but not in rights to be claimed against God. The participants took up such topics as
religion’s role in affirming self-worth, the danger of construing religion only as serv-
ing pragmatic social purposes, and the possibility that equality might be only an
ideological defense developed by the West against the Russians. The second morning
presentation, by Dorothy D. Lee, focuses on how equality is practiced in “everyday
life”(p. 185); how “equality” is derivative from respect for human dignity, revered
in many societies with marked social inequalities (p.185); and how the concept
of equality may promote an idea that people are measurable and accentuate the
comparisons already being made in competitive society. To a result, an emphasis
on equality can produce more conformism and reduce unique persons to merely
interchangeable parts of a whole (p. 186). When it is said that it “is a very great
moral indictment of the society if any man is content to be a garbage collector,”
Schutz enters the conversation, returning to Dr. Lee’s point about the diversity of
cultures and concurring with it:
Mr. Chairman, perhaps this came about because of [the] fact that our con-
cept of equality and even the concept of dignity of man is a product of a highly
theoretical attitude, this philosophical concept [has been secularized into] the
cultures of literate people. Our primitive people have not such a philosophical
27 Schutz’s concern for levels here dovetails with the “middle ground” theme. There
may be disagreement at a highly theoretical level but at the level of practical application of
principles, a middle ground of mutual understanding and consensus may develop. Likewise,
there can be agreement at a theoretical level, but the meaning of the principles to which one
assents theoretically must be spelled out at the practical level. At that practical level, the cultural
sciences, such as sociology (MacIver) and even literature (Miller), can play a role in conjunction
with applied, but not theoretical philosophy, and other disciplines.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 289
and theoretical attitude. I have run into this. Again you must distinguish be-
tween [subjective] and objective interpretation. We outsiders are interpreting
these primitive cultures in terms of our concept of equality which is [the prod-
uct of ] our very own slow process. For instance, Miss Lee has shown how the
concepts of equality slowly developed in Greek philosophy. The primitive peo-
ple have not the idea of an individual which we have, not the idea of man which
we have. They are participating just in the general stream of life which goes
through the cosmos as well as through society. They have also not our concept of
religion in these primitive cultures because sorcery and medical practice cannot
be compared with religion in our terms, for instance.28
Now it seems our difficulty consists just in the fact that we are apply-
ing our theoretical concept to the non-theoretical societies. It means that our
theoretical concept of philosophy is based on Greek knowledge which implies
[that] it is impossible to look at life without participating in life. Now, this
is not the case in the societies which the anthropologist studies because there
is no necessity, there is no motive, to take [up] this attitude, so we have to
distinguish between [the] societies in which they do not need the concept of
equality or which do not have the idea of dignity of man. Whether this means
that in the self-interpretation of these societies in the practice of life and the
attitude, let me say, toward strangers, toward age groups, toward sex groups,
and so on and so forth, we find equality as we understand equality now, goes
to the root of our dilemma, and the purpose of this conference. I feel we have
not to bother with this too much because we are after all a conference within
the 20th century and want to apply concepts in spite of the historical origin to
our actual problems and to the questions which meet us in our day.29
The Wednesday Afternoon Session of August 31 included Faust’s inviting par-
ticipants to return to the middle ground theme, Charles Johnson arguing that
the state must protect rights through law before a public consensus develops, Eli
Ginzberg treating the role of education in combating racism, and Quincy Wright
pointing to tensions between state sovereignty and the rights of citizens. On the
Thursday Morning Session, September. 1, F. Ernest Johnson stressed education and
the importance of the is/ought distinction in the discussion of equality. After brief
discussion, Schutz intervened:
28 The reference to a stream of life flowing through the cosmos and society is undoubt-
edly a reference to Henri Bergson’s work Creative Evolution.
29 As mentioned in the introduction, the reference to “primitives” by Schutz and Lee
is somewhat problematic, especially when one considers that in the 1890’s the United States
was 95% functionally illiterate. Fortunately, the very emphases on understanding and learning
from other cultures that are the hallmark of both Schutz’s and Lee’s presentations and com-
ments would work against this ethnocentrism to which even the most culturally enlightened
can succumb. The above intervention, however, also shows Schutz’s framework already leading
him beyond his time and social world insofar as he recognizes strangers, age groups, and sex
groups as the potential victims of unequal treatment.
290 Michael Barber
30 One hears echoes here of Schutz’s interest in the life-world, which already contained
the processes of thought and feeling that transcendental phenomenology makes focal. One also
hears echoes of George Herbert Mead, with whose work Schutz was thoroughly familiar. Mead
proposed that children arrive at the idea of Generalized Other through stages of playing and
games [cf. George Herbert Mead, “The Genesis of the Self and Social Control,” in Selected Writ-
ings, ed. Andrew J. Reck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1964), p. 284-285].
31 The idea that we are only fragments of our possibilities, that we materialize only a
part of our possibilities refers to the work of Georg Simmel, as Schutz acknowledges elsewhere,
see “A Scholar of Multiple Involvements: Felix Kaufmann,” CP IV:125. In these last few com-
ments, Schutz shows himself aware of issues regarding child-development, the principal locus
for in-group transmission of their cultural heritage.
UNDERSTANDING, SELF-REFLECTION, AND EQUALITY 291
The meetings ended with R. McKeon’s proposal that each member write
a summary of his reflections about the future directions the group should
take and with consideration of how to make the group’s discussion availa-
ble for the common person. At a final luncheon, the group considered the
commonality of reason evidenced in their conversations.