SBMA VS COMELEC

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven
(7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and
also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as
she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner
of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications
for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim
Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO VS COMELEC
Aldaba vs. COMELEC

Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of
Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a
population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then
Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as
projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan”
is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or
projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis
and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of
E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l
Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been
declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer,
in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification
issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos
population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:

The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.v

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections

December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital
Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing
of the official.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there
will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC, GR No. 136781, 2000-10-06
Facts:
On
1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated.
the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13)... party-list representatives from twelve (12)
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system.
. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC
PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to
Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged... that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory.
. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit... under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should
actually sit in the House.
Comelec Second Division... granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation
of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-
list representatives.
In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote... requirement prescribed
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First,
"the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system
should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage
[the] multi-party system."
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on
the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,
objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.
They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or
coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled
to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for
each,... should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in
proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section
11.
Issues:
7941
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the... time?
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Ruling:
Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees
that they should all be granted additional seats.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets... down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election
of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and...
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order
to be... entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives.
Thus the... relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to... additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican
or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised
by... representatives chosen by them.
But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system,
the result might be the proliferation of... small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and... progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful
local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-
limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various...
interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the... number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties... shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties... cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to
the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by... the first
party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose
number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less
than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for
two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than
1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is... no
such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation
of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient
violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of... qualified
parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional
contravention.
Principles:
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional
seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we... need to review the parameters of the Filipino
party-list system.
they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent
of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the
House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party vs COMELEC GR No 147589 26
June 2001

Facts: Petitioners challenge Omnibus Resolution No 3785 issued by COMELEC that

approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners contend that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented. The inclusion of the political parties is objectionable. Solicitor General
argued that RA 7941 allow political parties to participate as this is open to all registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organization.
Issue: Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Pursuant to RA 7941, respondents may not be disqualified
from participating on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution also
provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”

Bantay Republic Act. Vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177271) Digest

FACTS:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor
for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition seeking to disqualify the nominees
of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters
to the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724
under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying
petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be
personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.

In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to
be qualified.

2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-
list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and

3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.
Ruling:

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special
civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues
and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari
is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of
the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. Also, the petitioner’s posture that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously
determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis, Nowhere in R .A. No. 7941 is there a
requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the
accreditation of an organization.

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the partylist groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-
list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be
posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is
to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No.
7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited
nondisclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007
elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on
the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited
to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are
GRANTED.
Banat Vs. COMELEC
QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

G.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:

This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow
Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing Women's Sector and to
restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three
others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII
Sec. 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the
CoA.

RULING:

Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of
Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
(Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President ”the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.” The records show that Deles’ appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while
Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of
Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

Macias vs COMELEC
principle of proportional representation

MACIAS VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-18684 32 SCRA 1 September 14, 1961

LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO MERCADO and MARIANO
PERDICES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as National
Treasurer,respondents.

Facts:
 Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental and
Bulacan and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the respondent
officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the
country. They alleged that their respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less
representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because:

1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the HOR at
least 3 calendar days prior to passage.
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population.
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

Issues:

Whether or not the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act 3040 is in accordance
with the constitution.

Discussions:

The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives “shall
be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their
respective inhabitants.” A law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative
districts than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional
representation prescribed by the Constitution. Inequality of apportionment law is “arbitrary and
capricious and against the vital principle of equality.” as held in Houghton County v. Blacker.

Tobias vs Abalos Gr No. L-114783. December 8, 1994

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”.

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675, President
Ramis signed it into law.

Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of Mandaluyong
were asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these
results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
 Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is
unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule. They also alleged
that the subject law embraced two principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and 2. the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two
separate districts.

Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements.

Issue:

1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may increase.

3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.

Ruling:

1. No.

The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than 250, 000
indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one representative” as provided in Article VI,
Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.

The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct
from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural ang logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject
of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequence of the proposed law and its operation.

2. Yes.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

3. No.
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party. It
should be noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the
former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could
hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Petition dismissed.

Case Digest: Montejo v. Commission on Elections

Posted: August 17, 2010 in Case Digests
Tags: case, comelec, constitution, digest, law, legislative, Philippines, political

0
G.R. No. 118702 16 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of

Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the

principle of equity of representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First

District to the Second District of the province.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the population distribution, census

1990 and 1994:

Census 1990 Census 1994

First District 303, 349 178, 688

Second District 272, 167 156, 462

Third District 214, 499 125, 763

Fourth District 269, 347 155, 995

Fifth District 309, 148 181, 242

ISSUES:

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

HELD/RULING:

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the

reapportionment herein made.

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the

transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive

one. Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it

promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition

praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the

province of Leyte is denied.

SEMA VS COMELEC

Lozada vs COMELEC (G.R. No. L-59068)

Posted: July 24, 2011 in Case Digests, Political Law

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an
election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on
Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang
Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a
special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve
the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack
standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.
HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders
or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:
“Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its
certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision
conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist,
would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the
courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP
has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses
thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even
when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a
petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was
intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP

CASED DIGEST : PIMENTEL VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 178413 March 13, 2008
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF

CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO
CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL F. ZUBIRI, respondents.

Facts : The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. At the time
of filing of the Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest
number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as Senators.
With other candidates conceding, the only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post
were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct
canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.

Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. The
SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao)
Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly
copy 2, or the copy intended to be posted on the wall. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-
Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions
to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution and
authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentel’s counsel manifested her continuing objection to the
canvassing of the said MCOCs.

On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the second PCOC for Maguindanao. In
the proceedings before the NBC, Pimentel’s counsel reiterated her request to propound questions to PES
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. The NBC,
however, refused to grant her request. Pimentel’s counsel thereafter moved for the exclusion of the second
Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass

Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao
in violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of
the laws, and in obvious partiality to Zubiri

In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from the Court, the canvass proceedings
before the NBC continued, and by 14 July 2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with
10,984,807 votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the
highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections.

After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and evidence presented by all the parties before this
Court, this Court rules to dismiss the present Petition

ISSUE

HELD : A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as follows:

SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appearance of the election returns.

Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections, pre-proclamation
controversies refer to matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of
election returns and certificates of canvass
Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators, did not violate Section
30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied Pimentel’s request to
question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, and
his subsequent motion to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC.

The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel
to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the
MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said
MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7166, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.

According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and
the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and
transmitted to them by the local boards of canvassers. For the province of Maguindanao, it is the PBOC
which transmits the PCOC to the NBC.

Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s request before the NBC to still question PES
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao regarding the
Maguindanao MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC from the
national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity and due execution had been determined by the
NBC in accordance with the criteria provided by the law.

This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process problematic since he has not
established what he is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate in the senatorial
elections. At the time he filed the instant Petition, he might have been leading in the canvassing of votes,
yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no winner for the twelfth and last senatorial post had
been proclaimed. May he already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass
proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a property right which he
cannot be deprived of without due process? These were clearly substantial and weighty issues which
Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court cannot argue and settle them for him.

Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, did introduce an additional exception to the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in
elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators, this Court has already established in the preceding
discussion that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in his Petition. The provisions in question did not materially
change the nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers, which still remain summary
and administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the elected official
with as little delay as possible and in time for the commencement of the new term of office
Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)

Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare
him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate,
Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President
Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters
employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left
in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as
the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing
so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in
the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if
the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree
that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may
participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious
to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of
the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter
held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved
the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of
a doubt.

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Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
on 6:56 AM in Case Digests, Political Law
0

G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

4. While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who
could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
5. Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker
6. Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
7. Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared
the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement
of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the
“majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
“minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus,
also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this
case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
2. Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative
procedure
RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply
mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the
“minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in
mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is
“a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.”
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would
obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than
two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties,
one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes
of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either
belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision
prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has
the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President
and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by
this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the
rules of its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing
the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe
the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the
rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial

legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

Pacete v Commission on Appointments G.R. No. L-25895. July 23, 1971

7/23/2010
0 Comments

Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the
Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.

He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was
made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next
session in 1965.

On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition, through the
Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being
that his appointment had been by-passed.

Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration
of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view
of derogatory information which he had received.

Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary of
Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere
presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question . .
." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner that he
should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer
of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent as he had, as a consequence, withheld
petitioner's salaries.

Issue: Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory upon the
adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965;

Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed; and

Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by petitioner.

The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in
accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it
aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is
provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single
member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man
rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is
infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the
constitutional prescription.
In view of confirmation
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his confirmation became
final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21,
1965.
In view of construction
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any
appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after
their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment
shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any
appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion."

1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for
reconsideration of Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the confirmation of
petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent. His opinion
continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the members present in favor of the motion
for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment — and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation —
and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation."

2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."

That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a
decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of
what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.

3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts
and executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct
about a rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a construction
sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public office. The task becomes
unavoidable when claims arising from the express language of the Constitution are pressed upon the
judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism that under the circumstances, what cannot be ignored is the
primacy of what the fundamental law ordains.

JOKER P. ARROYO v. JOSE DE VENECIA, GR No. 127255, 1997-08-14

Facts:
hallenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240... charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which
he was interpellated.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum,... although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November
22, 1996.
etitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody... the "constitutional mandate" in
Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They
contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was... properly passed is
false and spurious.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November
21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo
from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No.
7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry
sought by the petitioners is barred.
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone... objection of petitioner
Rep. Lagman.[8]
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval
except Rep. Lagman.
Issues:
Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's
motion approved.
Ruling:
"When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to asce... n this
case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for
the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and
later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They say that the method
used in... this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact
was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of
submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the
pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep.
Arroyo's... question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further...
consideration of the question.[31]
To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying
the... business of the House.[
Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so
doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.[3
34 Phil. 729, 735
Principles:
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and
third readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of the Members... present,[27] and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer... tedium to repeat the process.
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess... of jurisdiction"
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure.
Santiago vs Guingona GR No
134577 18 November 1998
11 WednesdayMar 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

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Facts: The Senate convening on 27 July 1998, Senator Marcelo Fernan and Francisco Tatad
were nominated for president. Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2 and declared President of
Senate. Senator Ople was president pro tempore and Senator Drilon as majority leader
were likewise elected. Senator Tatad manifested that he will assume minority leader. This
was contested by Senator Flavier stating that their party being the minority group will
determine the holder of the said post. Thereafter, they voted for Senator Guingona. Hence
the petition for quo warranto by Tatad.
Issue: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the constitution in the election of
Senate officers?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The term “majority” simple means “the number greater than
half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than
one half of all the Senators.