Case no.

1
Digested by: AGUILAR, Jesabel D.

ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased,

vs.
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., Claimant-Appellant.
G.R. No. L-8437.November 28, 1956

FACTS: The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on
twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed
by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary
guarantor.
[in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having
guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors.]
The Luzon Surety Co prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the
value of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the
counterbonds, and asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and
documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest

ISSUE: Whether or not Luzon Surety can file against the Estate of Hemady a
contingent claim for reimbursement?

RULING: YES. Transmissible to the heirs

Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of
1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that—
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
In our successional system, the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of
their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from
him. The principle is that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil
Code expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311: ART. 774.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law. ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. The
principle in the New Civil Code of Procedure also provides that: The heirs of a
deceased person cannot be held to be third persons in relation to any
contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their
hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all the
obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their
rights. The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties.

The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of

Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the: Nature of
the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, and nor
by provision of law. Hemadys eventual liability necessarily passed upon his
death to his heirs. Thus, the contracts give rise to contingent claims provable
against his estate [Section 5, Rule 87] The most common example of the
contigent claim: When a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a
principal who is insolvent or dead. Ordinary contract of suretyship: Surety
has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something
by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does
this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the
principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed
something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured
obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody no
claim that could be reduced to judgment. For Defendant administratrix, it
averred that the doctrine refers to a case where the surety files claims
against the estate of the principal debtor. What the Luzon Surety Co. may
claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from the
estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter does not
even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.
Hence, the solidary guarantors’ liability is not extinguished by his death.
Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim
for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estates
liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution
to this question, the Luzon Suretys claim did state a cause of action, and its
dismissal was erroneous.

Case no. 2
Digested by: ALMOITE, Jolly Joy A.

Pacio vs. Billon

G.R. No. L-15088. Jan. 31, 1961; 1 SCRA 384

FACTS: In 1901, Flaviano Pacio married Severa Jucutan. Herein defendants

were their children. Severa died in 1930; and thereafter Flavio married the
plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla, who bore him the other four plaintiffs. The dispute
between the parties concerned two parcels of land which defendants
allegedly retained without any right thereto. The litigants later agreed to a
partition of the first parcel, and the court sodecreed. As to the second parcel,
a hearing was held, and it was awarded to the defendants, on the ground
that it had been donated propter nuptias to Severa, in 1901, by Flaviano
Pacio, who was thenadmittedly the owner. However, the plaintiffs-appellants
contend that the donation was void because it was not made in a public
instrument.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation propter nuptias was void?

RULING: Yes. Art. 633 of the Spanish Civil Code states that "In order that a
donation of real property be valid it must be made by public instrument in
which the property donated must be specifically described and the amount
of the encumbrances to be assumed by the done expressed...” And this
Court has held that a donation propter nuptias of real property written on a
private instrument is not valid even between the parties. It follows that
Flaviano Pacio continued to be the owner of the land as the donation had no
effect and there was no prescription. Upon his death, the land became the
joint property of his children by the first and second marriage. Subject of
course to the rights of his surviving spouse, the plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla.
Reversing the decision in so far as this parcel is concerned, we hereby order
the return of the expediente to the court below for further proceedings on
partition in accordance with these views.

Case no. 3
Digested by: AQUINO, Jerickson I.

Maria Uson vs. Maria Del Rosario

G.R. No. L-4963. January 29, 1953; 92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his
death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left
no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that
when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession
and enjoyment. With this reason, Maria Uson filed an action for recovery of
the ownership and possession of five parcels of land in Labrador, Pangasinan,
against Maria del Rosario and her four children. During the trial, the
defendanrs in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21,
1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and,
in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property that may be left by her husband upon his death. However, the court
rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the
ownership and possession of the lands in dispute. Aggrieved, defendants
then interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Uson has the right to inherit

RULING: Yes, Maria Uson’s rights of inheritance became vested upon the
death of Faustino. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario was merely
a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four
illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code.
With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment
of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" . From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria
Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she
expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may
acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered
into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.

Case no. 4
Digested by: BANASAN, Brandon M.

Bonilla v Barcena
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio

Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil
action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels
of land located in Abra. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and,
therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on
August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the
death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children
and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing
immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be
a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue. On September 1,
1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that
the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute
their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of
merit. This is a petition for review of the Order of the Court of First Instance
of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et
al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death of
the plaintiff.

RULING: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, he
can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners
of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and
they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the
heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or
contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in
them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or
intestate proceedings.

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the

nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which
survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while
in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to
the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. The
claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the
parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and
property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. The
respondent Court is directed to allow the substitution of the minor children,
who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a
qualified person as guardian ad litem for them.

Case no. 5
Digested by: BANASAN, Guilfeliko B.

De Borja vs. De Borja

46 SCRA 577

FACTS: When Josefa Tangco died, her husband Francisco de Borja filed a
petition for probate of the her will with the CFI of Rizal. With that, he was
appointed as executor and administrator. Eventually, when he died, his son
Jose became the sole administrator. However, Francisco had taken a 2nd wife
Tasiana before he died in which Tasiana instituted testate proceedings with
the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special
administatrix. Fortunately, Jose and Tasiana entered into a compromise
agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement.
In such a way that, she argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot
enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being
probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of

Francisco has not yet been probated, or not.

RULING: Yes, the compromise agreement is valid. The agreement stipulated

that Tasiana will receive P800, 000 as full payment for her hereditary share in
the estate of Francisco and Josefa. There was here no attempt to settle or
distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the
probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
Also, as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor
in interest under Article 777 of the Civil Code, there is no legal bar to a
successor with requisite contracting capacity disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of
such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

Case no. 6
Digested by: BAYENG, Verchelle M.

Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons

G.R. No. L-15499, February 28, 1962

FACTS: Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and
lot located at Sta. Cruz, Manila. Other owners are Marie GarnierVda. de
Ramirez, 1/6; José V. Ramirez, 1/6; José E. Ramirez, 1/6; Belen T. Ramirez,
1/6; Rita De Ramirez, 1/6; and José Ma. Ramirez, 1/6. On October 20, 1951.
José V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was
instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided
share in the aforementioned property. His last will and testament has been
admitted to probate, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and
grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte,
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant. The Bank of the Philippine
Islands was appointed judicial administrator.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, one of
the co-owners of the late José V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her
undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy& Sons, Inc., defendant-appellee herein, for
the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution an affidavit to the effect that
formal notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the
deed of sale was duly registered and the old TCT was cancelled in lieu of
which a new one was issued in the name of the vendee and the other-co-
owners.
 On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uya l Son Inc. sent a
letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the
estate of the late José V. Ramirez informing it of the above-mentioned sale.
This letter, together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the latter to
Mrs. Butte. On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, sent a letter and a
Philippine National Bank cashier’s check in the amount of P500,000.00 to
Manuel Uy a l Sons, Inc. offering to redeem share sold by Mrs. Marie
GarnierVda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the
same day consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding action
for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of
the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged
to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and
for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
May 13, 1959, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff in the case at bar has a right to redeem the
property.

RULING: By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased person are

transmitted to his heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of
succession includes all property, rights and obligations that survive the
decedent so from the instant of Jose Ramirez’ death, his heirs became co-
owners of an undivided share and co-owner of the whole property thus they
became entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption as soon as another
co-owner has sold his undivided share to a stranger. The presence of the
judicial administrator is of no moment because the rights of the
administrator of possession and administration of the real and personal
estate of the deceased do not include the right of legal redemption of the
undivided share sold to Manuel Uy and Sons because the right to redeem
only came into existence when the sale was perfected 8 years from the
death of Jose Ramirez. The administrator cannot exercise the right of
redemption since the land was sold AFTER the death of Ramirez. The
administrator may exercise the right to redeem only if the right pertains to
the estate, and this can only happen if the sale of said portion to Uy was
done before the death of Ramirez.

Case no. 7
Digested by: BEN-AT, Joy C.

GO ONG v. COURT OF APPEALS 154 SCRA 270

G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987

FACTS: Two parcels of land (Lots 1 and 12) were in the name of “Alfredo Ong
Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong.” When Alfredo died, Julita was appointed
Administratrix. Julita sold Lot 12 to Lim Che Boon and mortgaged Lot 1 to
Allied Bank to secure a loan of P900,000. When the Bank tried to collect the
unpaid amount of P828,000 on the loan, Julita filed a complaint alleging that
the contract of mortgage she entered into with the Bank was a nullity
because the necessary judicial approval was never obtained. Julita based her
allegation on Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court whereby a judicial approval
is mandatory before an administrator can validly enter into a mortgage over
properties belonging to the estate.

ISSUE: Whether judicial approval is necessary to validate the mortgage

entered into by the Administratrix.

RULING: Julita’s assertion that the mortgage is void for want of judicial
approval required under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, may have
merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her husband is concerned but the
same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her hereditary rights in
the estate. Section 7 of Rule 89 is not applicable since the mortgage was
constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as Administratrix
of the estate of her husband. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in
custodial legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary
share in the property is concerned since she was the absolute owner thereof.

Case no. 8
Digested by: PINKIHAN, Leah

HEIRS OF REGANON v. RUFINO IMPERIAL

G.R. NO. L-24434 (22 SCRA 80), JANUARY 17, 1968

PRINCIPLE: Residuary Estate of Eulogio Imperial – money accumulated in

his guardianship proceedings from the monthly allowances given to him by
the US Veterans Administration during his lifetime.

FACTS: The heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of

ownership and possession of about 1 hectare portion of a parcel of land in
Zamboanga Del Norte against Rufino Imperial. Trial court rendered a decision
declaring the heirs of Reganon as lawful owners of the land and entitled to its
peaceful declaring the heirs of Reganon as lawful owners of the land and
entitled to its peaceful possession, ordering imperial to immediately vacate
the portion occupied by him. The court sentences him to pay plaintiffs the
amount of P 1, 929.20 and the costs. A writ of execution was granted by the
RTC and the deputy provincial sheriff submitted a sheriff’s return reporting
the garnishment of a carabao and goat of Imperial for P 153.00 and
attachment and sale of defendant’s land for P 500.00. However, on March
13,1964, PNB deposited with PNB-Dipolog Branch the residuary estate of its
former ward, EULOGIO IMPERIAL (predecessor of the defendant) in the
amount of P 10, 303.80. The heirs of Eulogio Imperial (including the
defendant) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the Residuary Estate
wherein defendant was apportioned with P 1, 471.97. When petitioners
learned about this development, they filed an ex parte motion for issuance of
an of an alias writ of execution and of an order directing the manager of PNB
Dipolog to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same to the provincial
sheriff to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of the money
judgment. RTC granted the motion and the provincial sheriff notified the
defendant of the garnishment of the rights, interests, shares and
participation that defendant may have ove the residuary estate of the late
Eulogio Imperial consisting of the money deposited in PNB Dipolog.

DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS: The property of an incompetent under

guardianship is in custodia legis and therefore cannot be attached.

ISSUE 1: Upon the death of the ward, is the money accumulated in his
guardianship proceedings (deposited in the bank) still considered in custodia
legis and therefore cannot be attached?

RULING: No. The money deposited in the bank is no longer considered in

custodia legis and can therefore be attached. The new Rules of Court
provides for the procedure to be followed in case what is attached is in
custodia legis. The clear import of this new provision is that property under
custodia legis is now attachable, subject to the mode set forth in said rule.
Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer
subsist since death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and
thereupon all powers and duties of the guardian ceases, except the duty,
which remains, to make proper accounting and settlement in the probate
court. Branch 1 of CFI Zamboanga Del Norte (where the guardianship
proceedings were heard) directed PNB (guardian) to deposit the residuary
estate of Eulogio Imperial (ward) with its bank agency in Dipolog, in the
name of the estate of the deceased ward Eulogio Imperial, preparatory to the
eventual distribution of the same to the heirs when the latter shall be known,
and “upon proof of deposit of said residuary estate, the guardian PNB shall
forthwith be relieved from any responsibility as such, and this proceeding
shall be closed and terminated. This condition has been fulfilled by PNB when
it deposited the money with PNB Dipolog.

ISSUE 2: Was there transmission of rights from the death of the ward,
Eulogio Imperial in favor of his heirs?

RULING: Yes. When Eulogio Imperial died on Sept. 13, 1962, the rights to his
succession – From the moment of his death- were transmitted to his heirs,
one of whom is his son – Rufino Imperial. This automatic transmission cannot
but proceed with greater ease and certainly than in this case where the
parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened with any debt. For,
the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
death, and where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is
not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of
law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the properties of his
predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter. That
the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached
for purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement
before courts, is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction. The heirs of
Eulogio Imperial, including defendant, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition which suffices to settle the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore,
the estate for all practical purposes have been settled. The heirs are at full
liberty to withdraw the residuary estate from the bank and divide it among
them.

ISSUE 3: Is the residuary estate of a US Veteran exempt from execution?

RULING: No. The residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial is not exempt from
execution. Any pension, annuity, or gratuity granted by a Government to its
officers or employees in recognition of past services rendered, is primordially
aimed at tiding them over during their old age and/or disability. This is
therefore a right personalissima, purely personal because founded on
necessity. It requires no argument to show that where the recipient dies, the
necessity motivating or underlying its grant necessarily ceases to be. Even
more so in this case where the law providing for the exemption is calculated
to benefit U.S. Veterans residing here, and is therefore merely a
manifestation of comity. Besides, as earlier started, the heirs of Eulogio
Imperial, one of whom is appellant, have already executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition – the end result of which is that the property is no
longer the property of the estate but of the individual heirs. When the heirs
by mutual agreement have divided the estate among themselves one of the
heirs cannot therefore secure the appointment of an administrator to take
charge of and administer the estate or a part therefore. The property is no
longer the property of the estate, but of the individual heirs, whether it
remains undivided or not.

Case no. 9
Digested by: FELICIANO, Ludy Jane

MARGARITA SALVADOR vs. JUDGE ANDRES STA. MARIA

G.R. No. L-25952, June 30, 1967

FACTS: Seven parcels of titled land and two parcels of untitled land, situated
in Bigaa, Bulacan, were owned by Celestino Salvador. He executed a deed of
sale over them in favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili.
Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed, against the
vendees, a suit for reconveyance of said parcels of land. Thereafter Celestino
Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, twenty-one persons were
substituted as plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance. Celestino Salvador's
will was then admitted to probate and Dominador Cardenas was appointed
executor of said will. In the suit for reconveyance, the Court (CFI of Bulacan,
Br. I) rendered judgment, ordering the defendants therein (the spouses
Alfonso and Anatolia), to reconvey the parcels of land to the estate of
Celestino Salvador. Appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals was interposed
by said defendants. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the reconveyance
judgment. About three years later, one of the parcels of land involved, Lot 6,
was sold, so that with its proceeds debtors who filed claims may be paid. The
claims against the estate is for a total of P38, 872.58. The Philippine National
Bank bought it at P41, 184.00. Said amount was then deposited in the same
bank by the administrator. The probate court, ordered the PNB to release the
P41, 184.00, or so much thereof is needed to pay the afore-stated debts of
the estate. After failure of the order, the twenty-one (21) substituted heirs,
filed a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to assail
the order to pay the debts of the estate with the P41, 184.00 proceeds of the
sale of Lot 6.

ISSUE: Whether the parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale of one of
them, properties of the estate or not?

RULING: YES. It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific,
distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally determinable until
all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims,
their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of
a residue after payment of the debts. The properties they claim are part of
Celestino's estate. The right thereto as allegedly his heirs would arise only if
said parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. They
cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs
without the debts of the estate being first satisfied. At any rate, the proceeds
of Lot 6 alone (P41, 184.00) appears more than sufficient to pay the debt
(P38, 872.58); and there will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to
the question of who will receive how much as heirs, the same is properly
determinable by the settlement court, after payment of the debts.

Case no. 10
Digested by: CAYATOC, Beverly S.

RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses

Baltazar, defendants in this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the
mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate
proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and
Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as
adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as
judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure
of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an
answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was
bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the
court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings,
alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their
interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue
and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs have the cause of action against the defendant.

HELD:
Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically
transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent.
While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional
rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special
circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or
attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled
that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the commencement
of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when
the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in
his place."

Case no. 11
Digested by: CERALDE, Kyle Alexander P

Marina Dizon Rivera v. Dizon, et al.,

G.R. No. L24561, 33 SCRA 554

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina J. Valdez died and was survived by seven

compulsory heirs. The testatrix left a will written in pampango dialect. In her
will, she divided and distributed all her properties which was appraised at
1.8million among her heirs. The will was admitted to probate and Marina was
appointed as executrix. The legitime of each heirs amount to P129, 362.11.
In her testamentary disposition she devised and bequeathed specific real
properties. Executrix filed her project partition in accordance with the will of
the testatrix, however, the heirs also submitted their own counter project of
partition where they reduced the value of one-half of the estate to
P900million and contend that their share should consists of the legitime and
the devises.
ISSUE: Whether the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix’ will are
in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate and is
subject to reduction.

RULING: No, “The payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to

meet with the requirements of the law in respect to the legitimes which have
been impaired is in our opinion a practical and valid solution in order to give
effect to the last wishes of the testatrix”. Testacy is always preferred over
intestacy, what is controlling is the wishes of the testatrix.

Case no. 12
Digested by: COTIW-AN, Kizel

Vda. De Villaflor vs Juico

4 SCRA 550

FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor, a will in Spanish in his own handwriting,

devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno,
one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his
brother. The will stated that all the legacies will be used and enjoyed by his
wife while she lives and does not remarry, otherwise, the legacies will
become the property of her grandniece, Leonor Villaflor. The 12th clause of
the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be
deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. Don Nicoloas died without begetting any child with his wife.
The latter instituted a Special Proceeding for the settlement of her husband’s
estate. She received the use and possession of all the real and personal
properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order
approving the project of partition, however, expressly provided that approval
thereof was without prejudice to the provisions of clause 8 of the will of
Nicolas Villaflor. Dona Fausta died in 1956 and defendant Juico was appointed
as the judicial administrator. The plaintiff Leonor was admitted to be the
same person mentioned in Don Nicolas’ will. Leonor instituted the action
against Juico contending that upon the widow’s death, she became vested
with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the
late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not Leonor is entitled to the properties.

RULING: Yes. The plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in
clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life
tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the
further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her
rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow
was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if
she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the
deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in
which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or
"propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did
not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only
the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. The
Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly
enjoins the following: “ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in
another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained."
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the
context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. The testament of Don Nicolas
Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the
possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It
necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will,
the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein,
upon the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime.
Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their
return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value
should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.

Case no. 13
Digested by: DAPILLOZA, Emmir Lhoyd B.

Maria Gervacio Blas, et al. vs. Rosalina Santos, et al.

G.R. No. L-14070, March 29, 1961; 1 SCRA 899

FACTS: Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom
he had three children. He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta
Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they
had no children) but the properties he and his former wife acquired during
the first marriage were not liquidated. In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will
disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment
of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this,
Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands
the will of her husband; that she promises that she’ll be giving, upon her
death, one-half of the properties she’ll be acquiring to the heirs and legatees
named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them
depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said
legatees/heirs/devisees. In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died
and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of her estate. In the same year,
Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with
three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that
Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only
disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon
Blas. The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’
property precisely because Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving
properties upon her death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the
promise of Maxima.

RULING: YES. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though
it is not a will (it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable
because said promise was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of
Simeon Blas’ estate) hence it is a compromise. It is not disputed that this
document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that
the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an
obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in
the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are
stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.

Case no. 14
Digested by: DAWEG, Shamira Y.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF

FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DECEASED, AND PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION: FIDELA DE GUZMAN and EMETERIO DE
GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DIONISIA VALENZUELA and MELQUIADES
VALENZUELA respondents.
G.R. No. 61167-68 January 20, 1989

FACTS: Francisco Benitez was the only surviving child. He died single at the
age of 61 years on November 6, 1970, without descendants, nor ascendants,
nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen (14) parcels
of coconut land in Laguna, with a total area of 34 hectares, a residential lot in
the Poblacion of Pagsanjan, Laguna, and a small savings account (P3,843.08)
in the Philippine National Bank. On December 10, 1970, Dionisia and
Melquiades are first-cousins of the deceased Francisco Benitez, filed a
petition for administration of his intestate and for the issuance of letters of
administration to Dionisia who, during the lifetime of the deceased, had been
administering the said estate as judicial guardian of his person and property
duly appointed on January 22, 1957. The petition for administration was
opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the deceased left a will
leaving his entire estate to him and that a petition for its probate. Emiterio
de Guzman died on April 20, 1973 and was substituted by his heirs, Fidel,
Cresencia and Rosalie. In support of the petition for probate, the petitioner
Fidel de Guzman and two attesting witnesses of the will who prepared the
will, gave evidence. The oppositors presented six (6) witnesses who
identified the transcript of the testimony given on January 22, 1957 by Dr.
Jose A. Fernandez in the proceedings for the guardianship of Francisco
Benitez for incompetence on account of insanity. On April 4, 1975, Judge
Maximo Maceren rendered judgment disallowing the will and appointing
Dionisia administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether the testator, Francisco Benitez was of sound mind on August
18, 1945 when he allegedly executed his last will and testament.

RULING: The lower court hold that the evidence shows that from January 18,
1929 up to March 12, 1941 Francisco Benitez was confined at the National
Mental Hospital for varying periods of time. The foregoing premises leads
this Court to the conclusion that at the time Francisco Benitez executed his
supposed will on August 18, 1945 he was not possessed of a sound and
disposing mind. Wherefore the same is not allowed probate. The CA affirmed
the decision of the lower court disallowing the will and appointing Dionisia
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.

Case no. 15
Digested by: DE GUZMAN, Rhenzyl

Nenita De Vera Suroza vs. Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado of CFI Rizal,

Pasig Br 25 and Evangelista Yuipco, Deputy Clerk of Court
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981

FACTS: In 1973, Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will

bequeathing her house and lot to a certain Marilyn Suroza. In 1974,
Marcelina died. Marina Paje was named as the executrix in the said will and
she petitioned before CFI Rizal that the will be admitted to probate. The
presiding judge, Honrado admitted the will to probate and assigned Paje as
the administratrix. Honrado also issued an ejectment order against the
occupants of the house and lotsubject of the will. Nenita Suroza, daughter in
law of Marcelina (her husband, son of Marcelina was confined in the
Veteran’s Hospital), learned of the probate proceeding when she received the
ejectment order (as she was residing in said house and lot). Nenita opposed
the probate proceeding. She alleged that the said notarial will is void
because (a) the instituted heir there in Marilyn Suroza is actually Marilyn Sy
and she is a stranger to Marcelina, (b) the only son of Marcelina, Agapito
Suroza, is still alive and is the compulsory heir, (c)the notarial will is written
in English a language not known to Marcelina because the latter was illiterate
so much so that she merely thumb marked the will, (d) the notary public who
notarized will admitted that Marcelina never appeared before him and that
he notarized the said will merely to accommodate the request of a lawyer
friend but with the understanding that Marcelina should later appear before
him but that never happened. Honrado still continued with the probate
despite the opposition until testamentary proceeding closed and the property
transferred to Marilyn Sy. Nenita then filed this administrative case against
Honrado on the ground of misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence on record to show that
the will on its face was void?

RULING: Upon perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and
was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, respondent Judge
could have readily perceived that the will is void .In the opening paragraph of
the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known”
to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will
was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language.” That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of
Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language
or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not
known to the Igorot testator, is void.

Case no. 16
Digested by: DICKSON, Jemyma C.

TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN

REYES, petitioner-administrator-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-2862 April 21, 1952

FACTS: On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will of Maria
Zuñiga Vda. de Pando was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On
December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased,
filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial,
at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court
rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of
the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that
the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that
even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was
not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner
appealed to this Court.

ISSUE/S: 1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the

will are genuine; 2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the
testatrix knew the language in which the will was written; and, 3) Whether or
not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.
RULING: To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance
with law, petitioner presented as witnesses the three persons who attested
to the execution of the will. These witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de
Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. The substance of what
they have testified and from an examination of their testimony to the court
entertains no doubt that they had told the truth. There is nothing in their
testimony which may in any way reflect against their credibility nor has the
oppositor proven fact or circumstance which may give rise to the suspicion
that they testified out of personal interest or pecuniary consideration. The
oppositor presented only one expert to contradict the testimony of these
instrumental witnesses. Jose G. Villanueva made a comparative analysis of
the signatures appearing in the will in relation to some genuine signatures of
the deceased. In his testimony as well as in his memorandum, this witness
has reached the conclusion that the hand that wrote the signatures of the
deceased appearing in the will is not the same hand that wrote the genuine
signatures he had examined and which he used as basis of his analytical
study, thereby concluding that said signatures are not genuine. The lower
court gave full faith and credit to the opinion of this expert witness, and
decreed as a result that the will cannot be admitted to probate. The opinion
of this expert witness has been rebutted by another expert witness Jose C.
Espinosa, whose opinion, to our mind, deserves more weight and credence.
And our reason for reaching this conclusion is the fact that the standards of
the comparison used by Espinosa are more reliable than those used by
Villanueva in the comparison are two signatures appearing in two
documents. The standards used by Espinosa in making his comparative
study bear dates much closer to that of the disputed signatures.

1. The closeness or proximity of the time in which the standards used had
been written to that of the suspected signature or document is very
important to bring about an accurate analysis and conclusion. The selection
of the proper standards of comparison is of paramount importance especially
if we consider the age and the state of the health of the author of the
questioned signatures. A signature affixed in 1941 may involved
characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1945. And
this is because the passing of time and the increase in age may have a
decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a person. It for this reasons
that the authorities of the opinion that in order to bring about an accurate
comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to the suspected signature. Such was not followed in
the study made by Villanueva. But such was observed in the study made by
Espinosa. He followed the standard practice in handwriting analysis. It is for
this reason that we hold that Espinosa's opinion deserves more weight and
consideration.
2. The law requires that the will should be written in the dialect or language
known to the testator and this fact having been proven, the probate of the
will must fail.
In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the deceased was a
mestiza española, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made
several trips to Spain. In the second place, we have the very letters
submitted as evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by the deceased
possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege
the contrary. These facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew
the language in which the testament has been written, which presumption
should stand unless the contrary is proven. . And finally, we have the very
attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and
possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is not required to
be stated in the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the
instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew
the language in which the will was written.

3. The testimony of the instrumental witnesses give an idea of mental

condition of the deceased in the will differ from each other in certain aspects,
this is only due to her age and state of health rather than to a defective
mental condition. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of
genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings
of old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the
age, sickness, or weak condition of the writer. A comparison of the three
disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression. Abbreviated,
distorted and illegible, forms, which are sufficiently free and rapid, often
actually indicate genuineness rather than forgery even though they are very
unusual and not exactly like those in the standard writing. Those who write of
difficulty or hesitation through some physical infirmity may sometimes
produced broken and unfinished signatures and these results, which in
themselves are distinctly divergent as compared with signatures produced
under conditions of strength and health, may forcefully indicate
genuineness . Under conditions of weakness due to diseased or age, parts of
a genuine signature may be clumsily written over a second time not at just
the same place and in a way when clearly shows that the writer either could
not see or was so week and inattentive as not to care what the result might
be. This careless, perfectly evident repetition (figure 184), unlike the
painstaking and delicate retouching of the forger, often indicates
genuineness.

Case no. 17
Digested by: DOGA-ONG, Charmaigne O.

In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the

deceased ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN vs.EUSEBIA
ABELLANA, et al
 G.R. No. L-15153 August 31, 1960

FACTS: Anacleta Abellana left a will. In said will, she let a certain Juan Bello
sign the will for her. The will consists of two pages. The first page is signed
by Juan Abello and under his name appears typewritten “Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana”. On the second page, appears the signature of Juan Bello
under whose name appears the phrase, “Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana”
– this time, the phrase is handwritten.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Bello appearing above the

typewritten phrase “Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana” comply with the
requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be
executed.

RULING: No. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that: “Every will, other
than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.” This Court said In the case of Ex Parte Pedro Arcenas, et al., Phil.,
700: Where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any reason, to
sign the will himself, it shall be signed in the following manner: John Doe by
the testator, Richard Doe; or in this form: "By the testator, John Doe, Richard
Doe." All this must be written by the witness signing at the request of the
testator.

In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does
not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Juan Abello.
There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the
law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed
thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction.

Case no. 18
Digested by: DOMINGO, Melanie Joy

Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, et al vs. Hon. Conrado M Vasquez, et al.

G.R. No. L-26615, April 30, 1970

FACTS: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried on 2 September 1965,

leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her
death, she was said to be 90 years old more or less, and possessed of an
estate consisting mostly of real properties. During her lifetime she executed
two will; June 9 1965 will and December 29 1965 will. On 17 September
1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased,
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last
will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario, executed on 29 December 1960,
and for her appointment as special administratrix of the latter’s estate, said
to be valued at about P100,000.00, pending the appointment of a regular
administrator thereof. The petition was approved by the court. Oppositor
now question the probate and the validity of the Dec. 29 1960 will allege that
the eye sight of Gliceria was so poor and defective that she could not have
read the provisions of the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1960 will is valid and the order allowing the
probate is correct.

RULING: The will is not valid for the reason that Gliceria was considered
blind at the execution of the will thus Article 808 must apply which is
READING OF THE WILL TWICE TO A BLIND TESTATOR; The rationale behind
the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so
that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
Failure to comply with this requirement shall render the will void. The order
of the court in admitting the will for probate is reverse.

Case no. 19
Digested by: BRIONES, Mark David

Nera v. Rimando
G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911

FACTS: At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a
smaller room by a doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the
witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were attaching
their signatures to the instrument. The trial court did not consider the
determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of vital
importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of
Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing
witnesses was in the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner
room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will. The CA
deemed the will valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator
and other witnesses in the act of affixing their signatures.

RULING: YES. The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses
been proven to be in the outer room when the testator and other witnesses
signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will since the
attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not done 'in the
presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness
to the testator and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating
the rooms. The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each
other at the moment of the attaching the signatures, they may see each
other sign if they chose to. In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is
not whether or not they actualy saw each other sign but whether they might
have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical,
mental condition and position in relation to each other at the moment of the
inscription of the signature.

Case no. 20
Digested by: GACUYA, Jan Hanna B.

Taboada vs. Rosal

G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982

FACTS: Petitioner Taboada filed a petition for the probate of the will of late
Dorotea Perez. He attached the will written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect
consisting of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary
disposition and was signed at the bottom of the page by the testatrix alone
and at the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second
page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgement is
signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three attesting witnesses
and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. Judge Pamatian of the trial court
denied the petition for a want of formality in the execution of the will and
also required the petitioner to submit the names of the intestate heirs so that
they can be properly notified and they could properly intervene in the
summary settlement of the estate. However, the petitioner instead of
complying, filed an MR and a motion for a 30 day period extension to
deliberate. The motions were still pending when judge Pamatian was
transferred to his new station and judge Rosal was appointed as the new
presiding judge of the respondent court. Subsequently, Judge Rosal denied
the motions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 805 of the Civil Code requires that the
testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the
end of the will.

RULING: NO. Under article 805 of the Civil Code, a will must be signed at its
end by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by another in
his presence, and by his express direction and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
In the case at bar, the objects of attestation and subscription were fully met
and satisfied when the witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page
which contains the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will
was properly identified by the subscribing witnesses to be the same will
executed by the testatrix. There is no question of fraud behind the
questioned order.
Case no. 21
Digested by: GONZALES, Victor Javy C.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA

VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

FACTS: A petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original
(Exhibit "A") as the alleged will of the deceased Josefa Villacorte and for the
appointment of Icasiano as executor was filed by the latter. Natividad
Icasiano, daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition and petitioned to
have herself appointed as a special administrator to which proponent
objected. The petitioner proponent filed a motion for the admission of an
amended and supplemental petition alleging that the decedent left a will
executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements and that he was
submitting on that day such signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"). Oppositors
Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition
but the court admitted said petition. The court issued the order admitting the
will and its duplicate to probate. Oppositors-appellants introduced expert
testimony that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not
genuine nor affixed on the same occasion as the original and granting that
the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with
undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into
adopting as her last will the wishes of those benefit from the provisions
whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by them
therein while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other
properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.

ISSUES:
1. Is the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate
given the allegations of forgery, fraud, undue influence and pressure?
2. Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its
validity?

RULING:
1. YES. SC holds that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all
respects. The decision appealed from is affirmed.
SC is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been
complied with; that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate
spontaneously in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary
public who acknowledged, and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the
documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in a language
known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to
and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were
actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to
and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. On the allegations of forgery,
the testimony of the oppositor’s expert is insufficient to overcome that of the
notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution. The
opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s
signature failed to convince the Court principally because of the paucity of
the standards used (only three other signatures), considering the advanced
age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of
writing fatigue. The alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink does not
appear reliable considering that the writings were affixed to different kinds of
paper with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the allegations fraud
and undue influence, SC doesn’t find adequate evidence. That some heirs
are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment
is the usual reason for making a testament. That the heirs should not inquire
into other properties and that they should respect the distribution made in
the will under the penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not
suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. Also, fraud and undue influence are
mutually repugnant and exclude each other. Their joining as grounds for
opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of
the will.

2. NO. Inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one

page of a testament due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages is not per
se sufficient to justify denial of probate. The law should not be so strictly and
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control
where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and
its component pages is sufficiently attained.

Case no. 22
Digested by: GUNDRAN, Angelica

Cagro vs. Cagro

G.R. No. L-5826 (1993)

FACTS: This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the

CFI of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente
Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949. The
main objection insisted upon by the appellants is that the will is fatally
defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting
witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the 3 witnesses to the
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective?

RULING: YES. The AC is "a memorandum of the facts attending the

execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses,
and it MUST necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause
cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their
signatures at the bottom thereof negates their participation. The petitioner
and appellee contends that signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left hand
margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said
signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed
on the left hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by
the 3 witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be
easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the
absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
 
Case no. 23
Digested by: JIMENEZ, Pacholo

Testacy of Sixto Lopez. Jose S. Lopez vs. Agustin Liboro

G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948

FACTS: On March 3, 1947, six months before his death, Don Sixto Lopez
executed a will wherein he named Jose Lopez as one of his heirs. Agustin
Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground,
among others: The first sheet, which is also the first page is not paged either
in letters or in Arabic numerals.
1. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.
2. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.
3. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is
known by Don Sixto Lopez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.

RULING: YES, the will is valid. The omission to put a page number on the
first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification
more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters. The
unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense
of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By
their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page
are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before
the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Further, the first pages is captioned “Testamento”. The contradictions in the
testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in Liboro’s appelant’s
brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be
supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they
occurred. Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of
signing his name. The reason for this was that he was suffering from “partial
paralysis.” There is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator
chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a
matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. There is no statutory
requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly placed in the will that
the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a matter that may
be established by proof aliunde.
 
Case no. 24
Digested by: LARIN, Christian John V.

Rosario Feliciano Vda. De Ramos vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978

FACTS: Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a
petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9,
1963 and codicil dated April 18, 1963 of the late Eugenia Danila who died on
May 21, 1966. The petitioner prayed that after due notice and proper
hearing, the alleged will and codicil be probates and allowed and that she or
any other person be appointed as administrator of the testatrix's estate.
Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an
opposition on July 18, 1966 and an amended opposition on August 19, 1967,
to the petition alleging among others that they are the legally adopted son
and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that
the purported will and codicil subject of the petition were procured through
fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required by law for the
execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were
not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and
deed of the purported testatrix. The two parties talked and they came up
with a compromise agreement which essentially stated that Nista is
admitting the invalidity of the will. The compromise agreement was approved
by the trial court BUT Rosario de Ramos et al – the other instituted heirs and
devisees – intervened. The trial court allowed the intervention and set aside
the compromise agreement. Rosario de Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras
repudiated their shares when they abandoned Danila and committed acts of
ingratitude against her. Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to
probate. The decision was appealed by the Guerras. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the probate court. The CA ruled that there was a
failure to prove that Danila was in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses when she signed the will – this was because two of the
instrumental witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz) testified in court that the will
was already signed by Danila when they affixed their signatures. However,
Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the will was executed
and who assisted in the execution, vehemently assailed the testimony of the
two witnesses. He affirmed Danila and the three instrumental witnesses were
in each other’s presence when the will was signed by them. Another lawyer,
who was also present during the execution of the will, corroborated the
testimony of Atty. Barcenas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were
executed in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering the
complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testified
against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to
the contrary.

RULING: There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us that the

will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by
law. It appears positively and convincingly that the documents were prepared
by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero The execution of the same was evidently
supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the
deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of
a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension
of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity. If there should be any stress on the participation of
lawyers in the execution of a wig, other than an interested party, it cannot be
less than the exercise of their primary duty as members of the Bar to uphold
the lofty purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-named
lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, respondent court
failed to consider the presumption of ty in the execution of the questioned
documents. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no
evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is no question that
each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of
Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the
attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the
attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in
signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix.
Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all
the time present during the execution. Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by
necessity of law must contain an attestation clause Which, significantly is a
separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding that the conduct of
execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it that compliance with
the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. This Court had
previously hold that the attestation clause basically contracts the pretense of
undue ex execution which later on may be made by the attesting witnesses.
In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature
of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their
signature following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact at not
only to the genuineness of the testatrix's signature but also to the due
execution of the will as embodied in the attention clause. 5By signing the wilt
the witnesses impliedly to the truth of the facts which admit to probate,
including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the
absence of undue influence, and the like. In weighing the testimony of the
attesting witnesses to a will, his statements of a competent attorney, who
has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of
the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person
casually called to anticipate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is
revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that
the mind of the attorney being conversant of the instrument, is more likely to
become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain
those incidents in his memory. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby reversed in so far its it disallowed the probate of the will and codicil.
 
Case no. 25
Digested by: LOPEZ, Raffy D.

In the matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Will of

Gregorio Gatchalian, deceased. Pedro Reyes Garcia vs. Felipe
Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog,
Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay
G.R. No. L-20357, November 25, 1967

FACTS: On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of

age, died in the municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced
heirs. On April 2 of the same year, appellant filed a petition with the above
named court for the probate of said alleged will (Exhibit "C") wherein he was
instituted as sole heir. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G.
Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay,
appellees herein, opposed the petition on the ground, among others, that the
will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not intend the instrument
signed by him to be as his will; and that the deceased was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of
said will. After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the
document Exhibit "C" to be the authentic last will of the deceased but
disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Article
806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the instrumental witnesses.

RULING: An examination of the document (Exhibit "C") shows that the same
was acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the
instrumental witnesses. Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in
the above legal provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is
indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No. L-
11948, April 29, 1959). As the document under consideration does not
comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be
probated. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Case no. 26
Digested by: MAGALGALIT, Regie C.

Cruz vs. Villasor

G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973; 54 SCRA 31

FACTS: The case is for the probate of the last will a testament of the late
Valente Z. Cruz. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them
is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to
have been acknowledged. Despite the opposition of the surviving spouse of
Valente Z. Cruz the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and
testament, hence an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was
executed in accordance with law, particularly Article 805 which requirs at
least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will?

RULING: The last will and testament in question was not executed in
accordance with law. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that the will shall
be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The notary public before whom
the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. To allow the notary public to act as a third witness would have the effect
of having only two attesting witnesses to the will, which would be in
contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at least three credible
witnesses to act as such. The probate of the last will and testament of
Valente Z. Cruz is declared not valid.

Case no. 27
Digested by: MAPPANG, Joy Francine B.

GABUCAN v. MANTA
FACTS: Manta dismissed a petition for the probate of a notarial will of the
late Rogaciano Gabucan on the ground that it does not bear a 30-centavo
documentary stamp. The requisite documentary stamp was not affixed to the
notarial acknowledgment in the will. Manta cited Sec. 250 of the 1977 Tax
Code, which provides that failure to stamp a taxable document shall not be
admitted in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp shall have been
affixed thereto and cancelled. According to him, because no documentary
stamp was affixed to the will, there was “no will and testament to probate.”

ISSUE: Is Manta correct?

RULING: No. The probate court should have required the petitioner to affix
the requisite documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will
which is the taxable portion of that document. That procedure may be
implied from the provision of Sec. 250 that the non-admissibility of the
document subsists only “until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been
affixed thereto and cancelled.” The documentary stamp may be affixed at
the time the taxable document is presented in evidence. The lack of the
documentary stamp on a document does not invalidate the document.

Case no. 28
Digested by: PERALTA, Jessica C.

GARCIA VS VASQUES
32 SCRA 490

FACTS: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried in the City of Manila on 2
September 1965, leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. At
the time of her death, she was said to be 90 years old more or less, and
possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real properties. During her
lifetime she executed two wills, the 1956 and 1960 will and testament. On 17
September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the
deceased, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of the
alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario, executed on 29
December 1960, and for her appointment as special administratrix of the
latter’s estate, said to be valued at about P100,000.00, pending the
appointment of a regular administrator thereof.

However, the oppositor argues that the instrument itself reveals

irregularities in its execution, and that the formalities required by law for
such execution have not been complied with in the second will. The eyesight
of the deceased was so poor and defective that she could not have read the
provisions contrary to the testimony of the witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether the will is valid?

RULING: No. The records show that the requisites of Art. 808 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines that "if the testator is blind, the will shall be read to
him twice," have not been complied with, the said 1960 will suffer from
infirmity that affects its due execution. The rationale behind the requirement
of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be
able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. The declarations
in court of the opthalmologist as to the condition of the testatrix’s eyesight
fully establish the fact that her vision remained mainly for viewing distant
objects and not for reading print; that she was, at the time of the execution
of the second will on December 29, 1960, incapable of reading and could not
have read the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her.

Case no. 29
Digested by: QUIMSON, Ellaine M.

IN A MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF THE DECEASED BRIGIDO ALVARADO, CESAR ALVARADO
VS
RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., ET.AL.

FACTS: Brigido Alvarado executed a will, “Huling Habilin”, disinheriting Cesar

Alvarado, an illegitimate son. This will revoked previously executed
holographic will awaiting probate. On December 29, 1977, a codicil entitled
“Kasalatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling
Habilin” was executed changing some dispositions to generate cash for the
testator’s glaucoma. Both the will and the codicil was not read by the
testator but instead read to him aloud by Bayani Ma. Rino, who drafted the
will.

Upon probate, it was contested by the herein petitioner on the ground

that it was not executed and attested as required by law for he is not blind at
the time it was executed.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Brigido was blind for the purpose of Art. 808.
2. If so, was the double-reading requirement was complied with.

RULING: Brigido was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were
executed. His vision on both eyes was only of counting finger at “3 feet”. He
could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of December
14, 1977 or had poor eyesight. The Supreme Court declared that the
rationale behind Article 808 is the provisions thereof known to him, so that
he may able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Clear
that Article 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who are
incapable of reading the will. This includes the illiterate. Moreover, since
Brigido was incapable of reading the final draft he comes to the scope of the
term “blind”.

On the second issue, Article 808 was not strictly complied. Instead by
the notary public and the instrumental witnesses, it was the respondent
lawyer who read once not twice followed by the notary public and witnesses,
albeit silently. Supreme Court ruled that with four persons following the
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that
the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the
terms actually appearing on the type written documents.

Case no. 30
Digested by: Sangalang, Angelo

GIL v. MURCIANO
G. R. NO. L-3362,.Prom. March 1, 1951

FACTS: A last will and testament was executed by Carlos Gil. Early in 1945,
before the application was heard on the merit, the record, along with the will,
was destroyed, necessitating its reconstitution after liberation. The parties
submitted a stipulation of facts agreeing “that the will as transcribed in the
record of appeal” in another case is “a true and correct copy.” The Court of
First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of
the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil V da. de Murciano appealed
to the Supreme Court alleging that the lower court erred in allowing the
·probate of said will on the ground . that it was not executed according to
the- requirements· of the law. The attestation clause of the Will in question
does not state that the testator signed the will. It declares only that it was
signed by the witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.

RULING: No. The attestation clause does not state that the alleged testator
signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the. witnesses. This is a
fatal defect, for the · precise purpose of the attestation is to certify that the
testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause.
Without it there is no attestation at all. It is contended that the deficiency in
the attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body· of the
alleged will. At first glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should have
made an attestation clause, which is the function of the witnesses. But the ·
important point is that he attests or certifies his. own signature, or, to be
more accurate, his signature certifies itself: It is evident that one cannot
certify his own signature for it does not increase the evidence of its
authenticity. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in
anyway the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the witnesses.
Case no. 31
Digested by: SERAPION, Johnny

Caneda vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993

FACTS: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any

children executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu
before three attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and
Elvaiano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer Atty.
Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the
preparation of the last will. It was declared in said will that the testator was
leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
several persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
The testator himself filed the probate of his will. He died on May 29, 1979.
Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Petitioners in case, who claimed to be the nephews and nieces of the
testator opposed the probate of the will and the appointment of special
administrator on the following ground: that the testator could not have
possibly executed such will since he was already in poor health during the
alleged date of execution of his will and that the testator’s signature is not
genuine.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and
testament of Caballero complies with the requirement of Art. 805 in relation
to A. 809 of the Civil Code

RULING: Art. 805 require that the witness should both attest and subscribe
to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. “Attestation”
and “subscription” differ in meaning. Jurisprudence provides that attestation
consists in witnessing the testator’s execution of the will in order to see and
take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for
the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact.
On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witness’s names upon
the same paper as the will which was executed by the testator. As it involves
a mental act, there would be no means, therefore of ascertaining by a
physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed in
the presence of the testator. While the attestation clause in the case recites
that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
the 3 attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were
used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The Court ruled that the absence of such
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is sought admitted to
probate. 

Case no. 32
Digested by: SUMALI, Grace G.

Roxas vs. De Jesus

G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985

FACTS: Following the death of spouses Andres de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus, Simeon Roxas, the brother of Bibiana, filed a Special Proceeding
entitled “In the Matter of Intestate Estate of Andres de Jesus and Bibiana de
Jesus”. Simeon Roxas was then appointed as the administrator. After Letters
of Administration had been granted to Simeon, he delivered to the lower
court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana de Jesus.
Hearing of the probate of the holographic will followed. Simeon testified that
after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to
Bibiana and on pages 21-24, a letter-will addressed to her children and
entirely writted and signed in the handwriting of Bibiana was found. The will
is dated “Feb./61”. The testimony of Simeon was corroborated by the
children of Bibiana, Pedro and Manuel. They recognized the handwriting of
their mother and identified her signature. They further testified that Bibiana
understood English in which the will is written.

Luz Henson, another compulsory heir, filed an opposition to probate

alleging the following:
1. That it was not executed in accordance with law;
2. That it was executed through force, intimidation, undue duress, undue
influence and improper pressure;
3. That the alleged testatrix acted by mistake or did not intend, nor could
have intended the will to be her last will and testament.

In 1973, Judge Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the

holographic will. Luz filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the
alleged holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil
Code. Judge Colayco reconsidered and disallowed the probate of the
holographic will stating that it should contain the day, the month, and year
as required by the Civil Code. In the case, no exact date was indicated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the date “Feb. /61” appearing on the Holographic Will
of Bibiana de Jesus is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code.
RULING: YES. The prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue
or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege. If a will has been
executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the
possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise is obviated, said will should
be admitted to probate. If the testator, in executing his will, attempts to
comply with all the requirements, it is sufficient if the objective sought to be
accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by
the testator. In this case, the court found no evidence of bad faith and fraud
in its execution nor was there any substitution of wills and testaments. There
is no question that the holographic will of Bibiana was entirely written, dated,
and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is
also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. As a general rule,
the date in a holographic will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case, there is no appearance of fraud,
bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date “Feb./61”
appearing on the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.

Case no. 33
Digested by: TORINO, Marx Earvin C.

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will Of Melecio

Labrador, Sagrado Labrador et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, Gaudencio
Labrador, and Jesus Labrador
G.R Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990

FACTS: The deceased, Melecio Labrador, left behind him a parcel of land
which was partitioned among his nine heirs through a holographic will.
Sagrado, therefore, one of his heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the
alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. However, Jesus and
Gaudencio, also heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition on
the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of
law alleging therein that before Melecio’s death, he executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of Jesus and
Gaudencio the parcel of land.
The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null
and void the Deed of Sale. Jesu and Gaudencio and appealed to the Court of
Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court. It denied the
allowance of the probate of the will for being undated. The aggrieved party,
therefore, filed a petition to the Supreme Court alleging among others that
the CA erred in not allowing the probate proceeding withstanding the fact
that in the first paragraph of the second page of the alleged holographic will,
which was written in Ilocano, the testator made mention a date – “month of
March, 17th, 1968.

ISSUE: Whether the holographic will is dated.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The will has been
dated in the hands of the testator himself in perfect compliance Art. 810.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date must be placed
in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
should be executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are
present in the subject will. Hence, the probate proceeding should be allowed.

Case no. 34
Digested by: BIADO, Jefferson G.

Gan vs. Yap

G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958

FACTS: Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died leaving a holographic will she
allegedly executed. Her heir, Faustino Gan initiated probate proceedings of
the will in the CFI of Manila. The subject will was not presented and its
contents and due execution was tried to be established through statements
of witnesses. The probate proceedings was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not holographic wills may be probated by bare testimony

of witnesses even if said will is not presented.

RULING: The truthfulness and veracity of a holographic will requires only

that it is entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator himself. It is the
will itself the proof authenticity. Hence, a witness will only explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are the handwriting of the testator. Witnesses
need not have seen the execution of the will. The non-presentation of a
holographic will may not be proved by bare testimonies of witnesses because
the loss of holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. The
handwriting is the only guaranty of authenticity of a holographic will.

 
Case no. 35
Digested by: CALSIYAO, Ghisleen

Rodelas vs. Aranza

G.R. No. L-58509. December 7, 1982

FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor. Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing
to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and
therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the
decedent;
3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed
holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary
wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed
and attested as required by law.

MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the
will stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme
Court held that ‘in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to
suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of
said wills.” And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25,
1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than
14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the
decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows
to that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his
death. Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA.
Aranza et al. moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of
law not of fact.

ISSUE: W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be
proved by means of a photostatic copy.

RULING: YES. A holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be
proved by means of a photostatic copy. If the holographic will has been lost
or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy
or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison
can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the
handwriting of the testator.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity.” But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or
by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of
the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court”.
Case no. 36
Digested by: BAGYON, Joyce Noreen W.

Azaola vs. Singson

109 Phil 509

FACTS: On September 9, 1957 Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon

City. Petitioner submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria
Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is the defendant.
Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the
handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more
or less, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife;
and that it was in the testatrix’s handwriting. He presented pieces of
evidence for comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will
was procured by undue influence and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously
intend the instrument to be her last will. The probate was denied on the
ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present
three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the
writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone
witness presented “did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix.” Petitioner appealed, urging: first,
that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the will’s
authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not
mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity
should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or

permissive and that the petitioner is bound to present three witnesses.

RULING: No. Since the authenticity of the will was not being contested. But
even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the
opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic
will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes
obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications
is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three
witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is
had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments. But it
cannot be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in
the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least
three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to
their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided. Again,
under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words
“if the Court deem it necessary”, which reveal that what the law deems
essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will’s authenticity.

The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely
directory and is not mandatory. This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of
Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees
the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to
the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the
authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply
the deficiency. What the law deems essential is that the court should be
convinced of the will’s authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the
will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On
the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those
produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to
handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available
lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the
true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Case no. 37
Digested by: AGUILAR, Jesabel D.

JOSE RIVERA petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA,

FACTS: in May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town
named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be
the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP
No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that
Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his
father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills. On
November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed
as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who
reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. On
November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated.
The respondent court did not err in holding that the Venancio Rivera who
married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria
Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family
which had no relation whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and
Maria Vital. The holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own
petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and
in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by
Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the
holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were
spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have
applied Article 811 of the Civil Code,

ISSUE: W/N the court should require at least three witnesses to declare the
holographic will valid.

RULING: No. The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already

determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera
whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the
legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and
Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and
signed by their father, was sufficient.

Case no. 38
Digested by: ALMOITE, Jolly Joy A.

Kalaw vs. Relova

G.R. No. L-40207. September 28, 1984

FACTS: Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir
of sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in
1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the
sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such
was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and
Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This alteration was initialed by the
testator. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect
so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to
the unauthenticated alterations and additions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is VALID.

RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will
which could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such was
altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the
first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind.
However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to
authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.

Case no. 39
Digested by: AQUINO, Jerickson I.

Ajero vs. Court of Appeals

236 SCRA 488

FACTS: The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate. Herein
Respondent opposed the petition on the ground that neither the testament’s
body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent: and the
will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the
disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could
not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
The trial could have held that since it must decide only the question of the
identity of the will its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to
comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision holding
that the decedent did not comply with the provisions on law on wills and
succession. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned
or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that provisions on law
on will and succession.

RULING: A separate will of each other; and joint will being prohibited by law,
the estate of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and
not to the testamentary heir, unless the testamentary heir is the only heir of
said wife. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass
upon her death to her heirs’ intestate, and not exclusively to the
testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist,
or unless she will be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia. It is
unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common
usage could not make them valid when our civil codes consistently
invalidated them because laws are repealed by other subsequent laws, and
no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance.

Case no. 40
Digested by: BAGYON, Joyce Noreen W.

Dela Cerna v. Potot

 G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964

FACTS: The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gervasia Rebacaa executed a
joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of land to Manuela Rebaca, a niece,
as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was
probated in 1939. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the failure of the
petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954. The CFI
held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to
law. While the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate
in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the
due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a
decree of probate becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it
is res judicata. The final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu
is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the
Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on
the court but the decree has now become final). The probate court
committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but
which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive
effect of its final decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole world.

Case no. 41
Digested by: BANASAN, Brandon M.

Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals

90 SCRA 187

FACTS: Isabel Andres Gonzales, widow of the late Eligio Naval, former
Governor of Rizal Province died without issue at the age of 85. A will was
thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was written in Tagalog and
appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two month prior to the
death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of the testatrix on page 4 and the left
margin of all the pages. Lutgarda Santiago was named as the universal heir
and executrix filed a petition for probate of Isabel’s will. The petition was
opposed by Rizalina Gonzales another niece of Isabel. The RTC denied the
probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in
accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the
witnesses. Lutgarda Santiago appealed to the CA and upon consideration of
the adduced evidence the CA reversed the decision of the Lower Court.
Petition filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court holding that there
is no proof that the three instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material
to the validity of a will Or Is it required that there must evidence on record
that the witness to a will has good standing in his community or that he is
honest and upright.

RULING: NO. The law requires only that witnesses possess the qualification
under Article 820 of the New Civil Code, and none of the disqualifications
under Article 821. The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness
is determined by the statute, whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the
court that said witness is telling the truth. For their testimony to be credible
it is not mandatory that evidence be first established that witnesses have a
good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or
reputed to be trustworthy for such attributes is presumed to be such of the
witness unless contrary is proved by the opposing party.

Case no. 42
Digested by: BANASAN, Guilfeliko B.

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. Francisco Gago vs. Cornelio

Mamuyac, Ambrisio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317. January 29, 1927

FACTS: Gago filed a petition to probate the will made my Miguel Mamuyac
executed on 1918. Cornelio mamuyac et al. protested contending that the
will was annulled and cancelled by the testator. It then appeared that
another will was executed by Miguel on 1919 the court dismissed the probate
on the ground of the existence of the second will. Eventually, Gago filed
another petition to probate the second will, which was again opposed by
Cornelio Mamuyac et al.. contending that the second will was merely a copy
of the first will which was allegedly annuled and revoked. The court denied
the probate of the second will on the ground that it was satisfactorily proved
that it was merely a carbon copy of the first will, whereas the original copy
was last seen in the possession of the testator and could no longer be found
after his death. And that, such will has already been cancelled and revoked
by the testator before his death, as evidenced by the testimonies of two
witnesses. Hence, Gago appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a revocation of the will.

RULING: The court ruled that the law does not require any evidence of the
revocation of a will. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove it,
however, where the original of a will is unable to be found but is shown to
have been in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption
is that, in absence of any competent evidence, such will is deemed
cancelled, revoked or destroyed by the testator himself. In probate
proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the proponent to clearly establish
not only its due execution but also its existence. Having proved these two,
the burden is now shifted to the oppositors to prove its revocation. Where
there is no witness as to the act of revocation, all other evidences pertaining
to the revocation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by courts with great caution. However, when it is proven by proper
testimony that a will was executed in DUPLICATE and each copy was
executed with all the formalities prescribed by law, then the duplicate may
be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been
LOST, and was NOT cancelled or destroyed by the testator. Therefore, since it
has been clearly proven that the will in issue has been cancelled and revoked
by the testator during his lifetime, and absent any evidence to the contrary
by the petitioner, the will cannot be probated.

Case no. 43
Digested by: BAYENG, Verchelle M.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIAN MALOTO v. COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. NO. 76464

FACTS:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and
nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and
the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the
deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs
commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then Court of
First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736.
However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1,
1964, the parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement
provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the
parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement
to the trial court for approval which the court did approved. Three years
later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of
Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document
entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January
3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty.
Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was
going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by
Atty. Hervas. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in
the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more
valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of
the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will
likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the
petitioners. Significantly during the investigation, the appellate court found
out that the will was allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana,
Guadalupe Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix and found that the will
had been revoked. The CA stated that the presence of animus revocandi in
the destruction of the will had nevertheless, been sufficiently proven.

ISSUE: Whether the will was revoked by Adriana

RULING: No, the will was not validly revoked. A valid revocation must be
done with animus revocandi or the intention to revoke coupled with an overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out
by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express
direction. The document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe,
was not satisfactorily established–that such was the will of Adriana Maloto.
And that the burning was not proven to have been done under the express
direction of Adriana. Also the burning was not in her presence. Both
witnesses stated that they were the only ones present at the place where
papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses could not have
constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s Will.

Case no. 44
Digested by: BEN-AT, Joy C.

Gallanosa v Arcangel

Facts:
Florentino Hitosis executed a will in Bicol dialect in 1938. He died on 1939.
He is survived only by his brother. Thereafter, a petition for probate of his will
was filed. He bequeathed his ½ share of the conjugal property to his second
wife, Tecla, and should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, it would be
assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia. He likewise
bequeathed his separate properties to his protégé. The probate was opposed
by his brother, nephews and nieces. Subsequently, the will was admitted for
probate. Thereafter the testamentary heirs submitted a project partition
wherein the properties therein were distributed in accordance with the
testator’s will. The same was approved by the judge. However, the heirs of
Florentino’s deceased brothers and sisters instituted an action for recovery of
the land alleging that they have been in continuous possession of the same.
As the basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses,
through fraud, caused the simulation of the document purporting it to be the
last will and testament of Florentino.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the
annulment of the will to recover the parcel of land subject of legacy therein.
Ruling: No, after the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the
voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore ((Santos vs. De
Buenaventura, L-22797, September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47). Our procedural
law does not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a will. In order that a
will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory. The 1939
decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of
the will. That means that the testator was of sound mind at the time when he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue
influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent
proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the
finality of the allowance of a will the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore. It was held in Austria vs. Ventenilla that
“under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given to parties who are
displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the
time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or
not an order admitting a will or probate will be opened for fraud, after the
time allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal has taken from an
order probating a will, the heirs cannot, in subsequent litigation in the same
proceedings, raise questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a
will is conclusive as to its due execution and as to the testamentary capacity
of the testator.”

Case no. 45
Digested by: QUIMSON, Ellaine M.

G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S.
ASENETA, respondents.

FACTS: On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will. In the will it states
that Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have lived continuously
for around the last 30 years now shall inherit all of her real properties and
personal properties upon her death. On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad
Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the
Court of First Instance, Quezon City. However, on July 25, 1977, respondent
Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of
decedent Clemencia Aseneta and instituted intestate proceedings with
CFI,Pasig, Rizal. The case was consolidated and was presided by the
respondent judge. Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void
because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited. In her Opposition to
said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that
in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that
respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.

ISSUE: Whether the issue of validity of testamentary provision can be

questioned in a probate proceeding?

RULING: No. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic
validity.
The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding
its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is
merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.

Case no. 46
Digested by: AGUILAR, Jesabel D.

PASTOR Jr. v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.

FACTS: Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their
two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia),
and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the
probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the
CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation by
ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special
administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or
affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against
Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of
estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the
names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in
their own rights, and not by inheritance.
 The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The
order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the
petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying
reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court,
all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the
probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon
objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required
the parties to submit their respective position papers.

While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the
probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the
question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect
that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order,
ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to
decedent’s estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for
himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees
was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada.
Being “immediately executory”, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of
Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof
but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all
royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of
oppositor’s motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment
issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as
their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions
of ownership and intrinsic validity.

RULING: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and
large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question
of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title.

The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is

the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the
disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is
there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is
manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to
the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of
appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been
duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law.” It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must
proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership
and possession of real and personal properties.

The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the
properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of
ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that
was still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing
Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question
of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on
this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed
special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

Case no. 47
Digested by: CALSIYAO, Ghisleen

Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

194 SCRA 367

FACTS: The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson

produced four (4) children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and
Angeles. During the existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5)
parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After the death of
Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot
the seven petitioners herein:

Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
5346, praying to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the
deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva. In October, 1979, herein private
respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion
for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and
Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino
Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva
Caolboy and because they have already received their inheritance consisting
of five (5) parcels of lands in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. On March 23,
1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy. On May 21, 1981,
she filed an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy wherein she included the five (5) parcels of land in
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the exclusion of the five
(5) parcels of land from the inventory on the basis of the evidence of private
respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among others of: (1) Tax
Declaration showing that the subject properties were acquired during the
conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson; and, (2) a
Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the
subject properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his children by a
previous marriage, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles. The
motion for reconsideration of said order was denied on January 26, 1982.
Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the
annulment of the order; On November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.

Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December
10, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII,
docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 16111, to recover possession/ownership
of the subject five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez
and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents to render an
accounting of the produce therefrom.

RTC- resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower

court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether the 5
parels of land should be excluded from the inventory of property.

RULING: NO. The probate court cannot settle questions of owmership. It can
only settle on what properties shall be included in the inventory of property.
The 5 parcels of land should be excluded from the iventory of property
because there no enough evidence to show that such properties were
acquired during thesecond marriage. Petitioners' present action for recovery
of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general rule,
a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the
probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate
proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of
land. The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the
principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to
the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Case no. 48
Digested by: CAYATOC, Beverly S.

ROMAN OZAETA VS MARIA CUARTERO

G.R.No.L-5597, May 31, 1956

FACTS: On September 2 1950, Carlos Palanca Tanguinlay died leaving a

large estate and 3 sets of heirs. In 1884 he married Cesarea Gano, with
whom he begot 3 children. Cesarea died in 1907, and 1 year thereafter, lived
unmarried with Rosa Gonzales and came to have 8 children. While living with
Rosa, Palanca also sustained relation with Maria Cuartero, and by her he
came to have 6 children. Realizing in his old age and failing health that life’s
end was fast approaching, he married Rosa Gonzales then later on made a
will. Designated in the will as substitute executor, Roman Ozoeta, on
September 20, 1950, filed a petition in the CFI of Manila asking for the
probate of the will, for issuance of letters of administration and for his
appointment as special administrator pending probate. Cuartero and her 6
children filed their opposition, alleging that the will was not executed in
accordance with law, that it was procured by fraud and undue pressure and
influence on the part of some of the beneficiaries or some other person for
their benefit, and that the decedent’s signature thereon were procured
through fraud and trickery, the same having been affixed by him without any
intention of making the document his will.

ISSUE: Whether the will was obtained by undue influence and improper
pressure on the part of the beneficiaries.

RULING: NO. The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by
undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will
cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that
there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may
have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually
exercised.

Case no. 11
Digested by: CERALDE, Kyle Alexander P.
Pascual Coso v. Fermina Fernandez Deza
G.R. No. L-16763, 42 Phil. 596

FACTS: In 1898 Zoboli, the testator, met Rosario Lopez in Barcelona and
had illicit relationship with her. When testator suffered from severe illness
from 1909-1916, Lopez took care of her. When he returned to the Philippines,
she followed him and they had one illegitimate son. He died in 1919, In his
will he left some properties to the son and 1900 duros to Lopez as
reimbursement for expenses incurred when suffered from an illness. When
the will was to be probated it opposed by the wife of Testator to which the
CFI set aside the will on the ground of undue influence. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the influence exercised by Lopez could invalidate the will.

RULING: No, Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not

sufficient to invalidate a will: to have that effect the influence must be
undue. While it was show that testator entertained strong affections for
Lopez, does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated
his mind as to “destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own”. Testator was a lawyer by profession, an
intelligent man, what he did was legitimate sense of duty in making the
provision for the welfare of his son and as a feeling of gratitude in repaying
Lopez. In the absence of fraud or imposition, mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. Moreover,
the only outside influence before the enactment of Civil Code of Procedure,
were duress, deceit and fraud.

Case no. 50
Digested by: COTIW-AN, Kizel

Pascual v. Pedro de la Cruz

28 SCRA 421

FACTS: On January 2, 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any

surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89. On January 14,
1960, Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as the executor and
sole heir of the descendant, filed a petition for probate in the CFI. Pedro de la
Cruz and 26 other nephews opposed and contested the validity of the will on
the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that
the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at
the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of
the testatrix was obtained through fraud. Inconsistencies and contradictions
pointed out by the oppositors were related to the weather condition at the
time the will was executed, the sequence of the signing of the witnesses, and
the length of time it took to complete the act. Oppositors claim that the
witnesses were better known to proponent Andres Pascual than to the
testatrix, rendering their testimonies suspect. The oppositors also presented
an alleged tape recording of a conversation between one of the instrumental
witnesses and oppositor Cruz at the latter’s house sometime in 1960 wherein
said witness signed the will with the other witnesses’ signatures already
affixed and were not the. present and that the witness signed the document
in 1958 or 1959. The alleged tape recording was made without the
knowledge of the witness. The contestants further assail that the execution
of the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence by Andres on the
testatrix, who is a stranger. They also invoke that the nephew of Andres, who
is a lawyer, prepared the will of Catalina, thus undue influence is presumed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was valid.

RULING: Yes. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses and

the Notary are not substantial in nature, sufficient to discredit their entire
testimony. It is to be noted that the will was signed in 1954 and that the
attesting witnesses testified in court in 1962 or after the lapse of 8 years. It
is therefore understandable and reasonable to expect said witnesses will not
retain a vivid picture of the details surrounding the execution and signing of
the will. What is important and essential is that there be unanimity and
certainty in their testimony regarding the identity of the signatures of the
testatrix, the attesting witnesses, and the Notarial Public and the fact that
they were all present at the time that those signatures were affixed on the
document. The fact that the witnesses were better known to Andres than to
the testatrix will not render their testimonies suspect. During the time the
will was executed, Catalina was already 83 years old and suffering from
rheumatism. It is not unlikely that she could have entrusted the task of
securing them as witnesses to Andres. The friendly relations of the witnesses
with the testator or the beneficiaries do not affect the credibility of the
former. The tape recording was not credited by the court because there was
no adequate proof that the declarations of the tape recorded were in fact
made by one of the witnesses. Further, SC stated that the mere fact that a
will was made in favor of a stranger is in itself proof that the same was
obtained through fraud and undue influence for there are numerous
instances where strangers are preferred over blood relatives in the institution
of heirs. In this case, Andres, although not related by blood to the testatrix,
was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own
son. The oppositors failed to prove undue influence. For undue influence to
avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make
him express the will of another rather than his own. Also, the lawyer who
prepared the will, who is the nephew of Andres, cannot be considered to
have undue influence to the testatrix. He is a member of the bar in good
standing and in the normal course of events, would follow the instructions of
the testatrix.
Case no. 51
Digested by: DAPILLOZA, Emmir Lhoyd B.

Sofia Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals and Rufina Gomez

G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985

FACTS: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last and
testament in the said will, the testator named petitioner Sofia Nepumuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate though it is clearly stated in the
will that the testator in the will that the testator was legally married to a
certain Rufina Gomez and he had two legitimate children Oscar and Carmela,
but he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and been living
since with petitioner. The testator devised to his forced heirs Rufina Gomez
and his children his entire estate and the free portion to the petitioner.
However, the Trial Court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the
testator admitted in his will to cohabitating with the petitioner, hence the
invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The Court of Appeals
respondent court set aside the decision of the Trial Court and declared the
will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and
void pursuant to Article 739 and 1028

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its

jurisdiction when after declaring the last will and testament of the testator
validity drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision.

RULING: NO, the respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after
declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and
void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court area of
inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of
the will. The rule, however is not absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The probate of the will might
become an idle ceremony on its face of appears to be instrinsically void.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a poor substitute
marriage when the testator executed the will. The very wordings of the will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person whom he had been living in concubinage.

Case no. 52
Digested by: DAWEG, Shamira Y.

Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754
FACTS: Grimm, an American resident of Manila. He was survived by his
second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two
children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will have disposed
of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his
second wife. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah
by Maxine. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition
filed in Manila by Ethel. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to
probate and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the
attorneys for Maxine and Ethel. Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate. As mentioned, an intestate proceeding was
instituted by Ethel. Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will. However,
pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and
the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.
The estate was partitioned. Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of
the two wills which was already probated in Utah, that the partition approved
by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged
that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the
compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void
because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s
wills.

ISSUE: Whether the testate proceeding is proper? Whether probate is valid

even it was executed in US?

RULING: A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died

with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a
person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases. The probate is valid as long as it is in accordance with
the law.

Case no. 53
Digested by: DE GUZMAN, Rhenzyl

Austria vs. Reyes

G.R. No. L-23079. February 27, 1970
FACTS: In July 7, 1956, Basilia Austria vda. De Cruz filed with the CFI a
petition for probate, ante mortem of her last will and testament. The probate
was opposed by Ruben, Consuelo, Laura Austria and some other nephews
and nieces of Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and the probate was
allowed. The bulk of the estate of Basilia will be passed to Perfecto, Benita,
Isagani, Alberto, and Luz, all surnamed Cruz, who were declared by Basilia as
her legally adopted children. In April 1959, Basilia died. Perfecto Cruz was
then appointed executor in accordance with the last will and testament. In
November of the same year, petitioners filed a petition for intervention for
partition alleging that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the 5
respondents were not adopted by Basilia in accordance with law. Hence, they
are strangers and cannot succeed Basilia. The court allowed petitioner’s
intervention. Both sides debated on the matter of authenticity of several
adoption papers presented by respondents. Petitioners contend that Basilia
was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath ½ of her
entire estate to the respondents, that if Basilia had known that the adoption
is spurious, that there would have been no institution of heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of heirs is valid.

RULING: YES. The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails
the legality of the tie which the respondent claim to have with the decedent.
The lower court had assumed that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is
not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if
the adoption were spurious, the respondents will nevertheless succeed not
as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia’s will.
Since petitioners are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest
which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition.
General rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary
institution does not affect the validity of the institution. Before the institution
of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: first, the cause must be stated in the will; second,
the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face
of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause. The requisites were not met. The decedent’s
will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute that it does not state in
a specific and unequivocal manner the cause for such institution. Also, her
disposition of the free portion of her estate largely favored the respondents.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
her whole estate.

Case no. 54
Digested by: DICKSON, Jemyma C.
 G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and
Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y Barretto,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.

FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime
they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila,
Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936,
in the City of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud
Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small
portion as legacies to his two sisters and his nephew and nieces. The
usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan,
however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo was also
appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of
partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the
minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court
of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the
estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a
consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and
secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance
of new titles in her own name.
Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution of the
said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her
death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of
which, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she
revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the
first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud
Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same. Having thus lost
this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of
Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria
Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof. This
action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir,
and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby
directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE: Whether the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void
ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.
RULING: Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old
Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. The
reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the
late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant
Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had
with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and
was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081)
does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction
between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud
happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being
one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was
at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano
Barretto. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a
share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir,
since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.

Case no. 55
Digested by: DOGA-ONG, Charmaigne O.

Remedios Nuguid vs. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid

G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without

descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto,
all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. On June 25, 1963,
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors —
who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line —
were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of parents of the deceased in the will
constitute preterition.

RULING: The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or

illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents,
now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de
heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will
here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that
we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
The word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion
that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in
totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of
universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will —
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

Case no. 56
Digested by: DOMINGO, Melanie Joy

REMEDIOS NUGUID, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

FACTS: Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed a holographic will allegedly

executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before
her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that
letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. On June 25,
1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father
and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were
illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void. RTC ruled
the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of
the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition on
the ground of preterition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is void on the ground of preterition

RULING: Yes. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited.” Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s
parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will
rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition. On top of this is the fact that the
effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat,
“shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in the
will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code,
such disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, put only
“insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”, which last phrase was
omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the
nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived. Thus, the will is null and void.

Case no. 57
Digested by: FELICIANO, Ludy Jane

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria
Julian.
FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B.
LANABAN, respondents.

FACTS: Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February
12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix
Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob,
Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the
lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his
mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In
that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
"southern half of nine conjugal lots; (b) that she was the absolute owner of
two parcels of land which she inherited from her father, and (c) that it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during
her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the
fruits of her properties. Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after
her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal
lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties")
should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her
will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned
by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the
conjugal assets. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the
probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue
influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the
conjugal estate. April 18, 1973 , Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument
captioned "Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights"
wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and
renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In
that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife
had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.

ISSUE: Whether the preterition of the husband produce intestacy?

RULING: NO. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving
spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. It results
that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will. Save
in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the
probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will, because
generally, the probate of the will is mandatory. As decided by the SC in
previous cases; to give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is
the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. Testacy is preferable
to intestacy. It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's
conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his
one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His
conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of
the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs. The distribution and partition therefore,
would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the
meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children
and the surviving spouse.

Case no. 58
Digested by: GACUYA, Jan Hanna B.

Cayetano vs. Leonidas

G.R. No. L-54919. May 30, 1984

FACTS: On January 31, 1997 Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father,
Hermogenes and her three sisters as surviving heirs. As Hermogenes was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an affidavit of Adjudication. He
adjudicated himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased.
Nenita Paguia filed a petition for reprobate the will which was allegedly
executed in the US and for the appointment as administratrix of the estate of
the testatrix. Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the
time of her death and was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania USA and
that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister.
Also she alleged that the will was made according to the laws of
Pennsylvania. The petitioner filed an opposition alleging that the will in
question is a forgery and that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and
void. Meanwhile, the petitioner died and left a will appointing Cayetano as
the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano filed a motion to
substitute herself as petitioner which was granted by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was preterited.

RULING: NO. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion
was, at the time of her death an American Citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania USA. Applying article 16(2) of the Civil Code, the law which
governs Adoracion’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, which is the national law
of the decedent. Although the partied admits that the Pennsylvania law does
not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may have been given away
by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law
should not apply because it would contrary to public policy and would run
counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as
regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided by
Article 16(2) and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, the national of the decedent
must apply.

Case no. 59
Digested by: GONZALES, Victor Javy C.

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON,
respondents.

FACTS: Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the
probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain on the premise that Nemesio
Acain died leaving a will which provides that in case Nemesio’s brother
Segundo Acain (Constantino’s father) pre-deceased him, all the money
properties, lands, houses shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-
deceased Nemesio thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be
heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner. Oppositors, Virginia A. Fernandez, a
legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa
Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; that he is
merely a universal heir; and the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge. Respondents filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. The latter granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for the probate hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.

RULING: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Both the adopted child and the widow were deprived
of at least their legitime. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of
the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the
testator. Although the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance because she is not in
the direct line. Insofar as the legally adopted Virginia A. Fernandez is
concerned, she was totally omitted and undeniably preterited in the will.
Adoption gives the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were
a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir
of the adopter. Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The universal
institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other
testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be the
opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must be
respected. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as
an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. Petitioner is
not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee. He appears to
have an interest in the will as an heir however intestacy having resulted from
the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of
heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
standing to petition for the probate of the will. The probate court's authority
is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will come only after
the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule,
however, is not absolute under exceptional circumstances. For private
respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as
petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs with
the fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. Petition is
DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Case no. 60
Digested by: GUNDRAN, Angelica

Ramirez v. Ramirez
111 SCRA 704

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December

11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965.
Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. On June 23,
1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to
the widow “en plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or
“free portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.”
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow‟s
usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a

Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal
beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free
portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the ½ (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio
Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix

-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because: a. vulgar substitution in favor

of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID because first heirs
(Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator: b. fideicommissary substitutions
are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC: c. grant of usufruct of real
property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5: and, d. proposed
partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow
and appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them.
LC: approved partition

ISSUE: WON the partition is valid insofar as substitutions.

RULING: b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator
is not the only case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according
to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance
therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it
validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does
not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that
there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to
the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts
the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe
usufructuaries and naked owners.

Case no. 61
Digested by: JIMENEZ, Pacholo M.

Paz Garcia Vda. De Mapa, Segundo Mapa, Priscilla M. Monzon,

Teresa Mapa, Ignacio Salazar and Jose Salazar vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.
G.R. No. L- 38972, September 28, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners Paz Garcia Vda. de Mapa, et al. claimed that the
deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, in her last will and testament
dated June 2, 1951 and admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No.
46015, instituted Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal heir to the residue of her
estate with the obligation as trustee to hold the same in trust for petitioners
herein who are nephews and nieces of the deceased Concepcion Mapa de
Hidrosollo and for respondents Luis, Teodoro, Victorina, Corazon, Violets, ***
Rosario and Magdalena, all surnamed Hidrosollo, who are nephews and
nieces of Ludovico Hidrosollo; that Ludovico, however, died without fulfilling
the obligation so that the estate of Concepcion formed part of the estate of
Ludovico. They prayed in the alternative that judgment be rendered either a)
declaring a trust to have been created in their favor and their co-
beneficiaries over the residue of the estate of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo
and ordering therein defendants Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo as
administrators of the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo, to deliver to them 6/13 of
the said properties; or b) declaring the institution of Ludovico Hidrosollo as
universal heir with a provision for fideicommissary substitution in their favor
and their co- beneficiaries as null and void, declaring the residue of the
estate of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo to have been subject to intestate
succession, declaring them to be the sole heirs to said residue and ordering
therein defendants Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo to turn over to them the said
properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not a fideicomissary substitution was created in the

subject will.

RULING: None, there is no fideicommissary substitution because the

testatrix did not impose upon her spouse the absolute obligation to deliver
the property to said petitioners. When the testatrix provided in her will that
her husband dispose of in favor of the petitioners his remaining properties it
only shows that he was not absolutely obligated to preserve and transmit to
the petitioners the properties by him acquired under the will of his deceased
wife. If the testatrix intended to entrust the property to her husband with the
obligation to preserve and to transmit the remaining properties to the
petitioners, she could have said so in an express manner. However, even
assuming that Clause 9 could be interpreted to be a fideicommissary
substitution, such substitution cannot be given effect in the face of an
opposition and in view of Art, 863 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
requiring that substitution must not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted. It will be noticed that the second heirs instituted are
merely "sobrinos" of the fiduciary or first heir (surviving spouse). 

Case no. 62
Digested by: LARIN, Christian John V.

Crisologo vs. Court of Appeals

4 SCRA 491 (1962)

FACTS: Leona Singson died with a will wherein she devised one-half of a big
parcel of land to her three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, and the
other one-half to a grandniece, Consolacion Florentino, but subject to the
condition that upon Consolacion’s death, whether before or after that of the
testatrix, said one-half of the property devised to her shall be delivered to
Evaristo, Manuel and Dinisio, or their heirs should anyone of them die before
Leona and Consolacion. After the will was admitted to probate, Consolacion
demanded for the partition of the property. Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio,
however, contended that since she is only a usufructuary she cannot
demand for the partition of the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention is tenable

RULING: This contention is untenable. Art. 785 (now Art. 865) of the Civil
Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect unless
it is made expressly either by giving it such name or by imposing upon the
first heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to the second heir.
The testamentary clause under consideration does not call the institution a
fedeicommissary substitution nor does it contain a clear statement that
Consolacion enjoys only a usufructuary right the naked ownership being
vested in the brothers of the testatrix. The will therefore establishes a simple
or common substitution, the necessary result of which is that, upon the
death of the testatrix, Consolacion became the owner of an undivided half of
the property. She can, therefore, demand for partition.

Case no. 63
Digested by: LOPEZ, Raffy D.

Emeterio A. Rodriguez and Jose Ayala vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and
Petra Rodriguez, Antonia Rodriguez and Rosa Rodriguez
G.R. No. L- 28734, March 28, 1969; 27 SCRA 546

FACTS: Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament leaving no
compulsory heirs or forced heirs and, consequently was free to dispose of
her properties even to strangers at will as provided in her will. The testatrix
made letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the
will. The said last will and testament was legalized by virtue of the resolution
or order of the Court of First Instance of Manila without the appellant’s
opposition in, hence the extrinsic validity of the will was substantially not in
question. The executor also presented a project of partition and the same
was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, again without the
opposition of the appellants. Hence, the intrinsic validity of the will could
never be again questioned. The trust created by the testatrix was then
objected to by private respondents, who claimed to be first cousins of the
deceased. Such an objection was overruled by the lower court which granted
letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will.
Such an order of the lower court was appealed by respondent to the Court of
Appeals, which, in the original decision affirmed the action taken by the
Court of First Instance. The motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondents resulted in a resolution which set aside its previous decision and
modified the judgment appealed from insofar as the validity of the provision
of clause 10 of the will creating the trusteeship was concerned. The disputed
clause reads thus: "Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi Clausulang ito (hindi
kasama ang ‘generator’ at automobile) hindi maisasanla o maipagbibili
kailan man, maliban sa pag-aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na
maaring isanla kung walang pondo sa gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi or
ipagpapagawa ng panibago at alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon"

The Court of Appeals held that the above "perpetual prohibition to

alienate" the property mentioned, constitutes a clear violation of Article 867
and Article 870 of the Civil Code. The trust in question is then a nullity for
being in violation of the aforestated rules. There being then no institution of
heirs as regards the properties covered by the trust, the Court of Appeals
held that "there should be intestate succession concerning the same, with
the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the properties in
accordance with the law on intestacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trust in question should be annulled as being in

violation of the rules against perpetuities and the limitation on the
prohibition for the alienation of the property left by the deceased.

RULING: NO. It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause the
testatrix did make clear her purpose not to mortgage or to sell forevermore
(kailan man) certain properties left by her. There would seem then some
justification for the Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution to deny
force and effect to such a wish considering that "a perpetual prohibition to
alienate" is by the Civil Code forbidden. The more controlling provision,
however, as already made mention of is supplied by Article 870. Its terms are
clear: "The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
The Codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically.
What was declared as void is the testamentary disposition prohibiting
alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim, such a provision does
not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be stricken down. The wishes
of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect. This is so
even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the
ascertainment thereof is concerned. In the language of the Civil Code
provision, “If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred.”

Respect for the will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary

disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the rules which the law
prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the
words and provisions therein written must be plainly construed in order to
avoid a violation of his intentions and real purpose. The will of the testator
clearly and explicitly stated must be respected and complied with as an
inviolable law among the parties in interest. Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than those petitioners could not challenge the provision in
question. It had no right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The
twenty-year period is still with us. What would transpire thereafter is still
locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power of mere mortals to
foretell. At any rate, we cannot anticipate. Nor should We. We do not possess
the power either of conferring a cause of action to a party when, under the
circumstances disclosed, it had none.

Case no. 65
Digested by: MAPPANG, Joy Francine B.

TAYAG v. CA
209 SCRA665

FACTS: Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian
of minor Chad, filed a “Claim for Inheritance” against Corito Ocampo Tayag,
the administrator of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo who died
intestate. Tayag contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed is
premature because recognition of the minor child by the putative father
must first be established before the child can invoke his right to succeed and
participate in the estate. Also, Tayag submits that the right of Chad has
already prescribed because recognition should have been filed during the
lifetime of the father.

ISSUES: (1) Must there be an action for recognition first before an action
claiming inheritance?
(2) Has the right prescribed?

RULING (1) No. From the allegations of the complaint, it may be considered
as one to compel recognition as well. Further the two causes of action – one
to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance – may be joined in
one complaint. A person can maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in
the character of heir. There is no absolute necessity requiring that the action
to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action seeking additional relief in the
character of heir. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment,
but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs and may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased
natural father.

(2) No. Tayag argues that Article 175 of the Family Code applies where
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father.
Cuyugan insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling: since the
parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be
filed within 4 years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Cuyugan is correct. The right of action has been vested by the filing of the
complaint under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. The fact of filing of the petition already vested in Cuyugan
her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time. Such right cannot be impaired
by the enactment of a new law.

Case no. 66
Digested by: PERALTA, Jessica C.

BARITUA VS COURT OF APPEALS

183 SCRA 565

FACT: In 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along
the national highway in Camarines Sur, figured in an accident driven by
petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua.
As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died.

Subsequently, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the

matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Bienvenido
Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In
consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed “Release of Claim"
in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them
from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident.

About one year and ten months from the date of the accident, the
private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners. The private respondents
alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through
their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-
judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for
the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the
tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only
loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, defaulted on their promise
and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged
wife of their late son.

The Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner but such decision was
reversed by the court of Appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alicia Nacario and the one who received the payment
are entitled to it?

RULING: Yes. Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with
the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons
authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect
to their legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in
Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another.
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the
deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion
of collateral relatives.

It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when
the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the
surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established
that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private
respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not
compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their
obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian
of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from
Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification
of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

Case no. 67
Digested by: PINKIHAN, Leah W.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983,
stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to
render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is
a Filipino citizen

RULING: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He

would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not
bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality
laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of
justice is to be served.
Case no. 68
Digested by: QUIMSON, Ellaine M.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.

ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL

PRINCIPLE: A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right

of representation. Article 971 explicitly declares that the representative is
called to succession by law because of blood relationship. The representative
does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. A widow of the person represented
cannot assert the same right of representation as there is no filiation by
blood.

FACTS: Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived by her husband, their
two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. In the course
of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased
and prescribing their respective share of the estate — Fortunata T. Rosales
(husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4;
and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of
the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales. Petitioner
contends that she is a compulsory heir as enumerated in Art. 887 being the
widow or widower of the son of the decedent and that at the time of the
death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right
to the properties of Petra Rosales as her compulsory heir.

ISSUE: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?

RULING: NO. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a
widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire
Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-
in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the
parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. Article 887 refers to the
estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or
widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-
law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law. By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of
the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful
examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein
is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter
of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra
V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V.
Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the
right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code. The essence
and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971
of the Civil Code, viz— Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of
law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. Art. 971. The
representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called
to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she
has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. Petitioner however contends
that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory
heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

Case no. 69
Digested by: SANGALANG, Angelo

Dionisia, et al. vs. Melania Baldovino, et al.

G.R. No. L-11960, December 27, 1958

FACTS: Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime.With his
first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child named manuel Padura, and his
second, Benita Garing, he had two children named Fortunato Padura and
Candelaria Padura. Agustin Padura died leaving a last will and testament duly
probated in special Proceedings of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children Manuel, Fortunato,
Candelaria and his surviving spouse Benita Garing. Fortunato Padura died
unmarried without having executed a will, and not having any issue, his
parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother Benita Garing.
Benita applied for and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her
name, but subject to condition that the properties were reservable in favor of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came, in accordance with the applicable provision of law. In 1934
Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children
the appellants herein, Melania, Cristeta, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed
Baldovino. Six years later, in 1940, Manuel Padura also died, surviving him
are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana,
and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein. Upon the death of
Benita Garing (reservista), appellants and appellees took possession of the
reservable properties. In a resolution of the CFI the legitimate children of the
deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were declared to be the
rightful reserves and as such entitled to the reservable properties. The
instant petition filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties
partitioned, such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the
other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reserves. The
appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all have an
equal share. The lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reserves
“co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of land” subject matter
of the suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in a case of reserve troncal, where the only reserves
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of
the descendant, but some are nephews of the half-blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned
among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood?

RULING: The reserve troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure

the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. The code
Provides: Art. 891 – The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
scendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. Art. 1006 –Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be
entitled to a share double that of the latter. Wherefore, the appealed order is
reserved and set aside and the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole
blood are decalred entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews
of the half-blood.

Case no. 70
Digested by: SERAPION, Johnny

Edroso v. Sablan
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913

FACTS: Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on
September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro who at
his father’s death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,
1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of
land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership. Two legitimate brothers of VictorianoSablan — that is, two uncles
german of Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose the registration,
claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, “or that if
granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the
registration of each parcel.” The Court of Land Registration denied the
registration. Registration was denied because the trial court held that the
parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law
to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented
jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Land Registration erred in denying the
registration of the reservable properties by reservista, Edroso.

RULING: YES. The Court held that applicant is entitled to register in her own
name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants,
recording in the registration the right required by the law to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they
survive her. The reservista has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can
use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is
in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a
condition. The ascendants who inherits from descendants, whether by the
latter’s wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a
title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right
of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and
recovery. During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of
the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the
relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain
to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do
not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.

Case no. 71
Digested by: SUMALI, Grace G.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE vs. CHATO

G.R. No. 115754 August 25, 1994

FACTS: The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a
nonprofit organization of newspaper. Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103
by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became subject to the VAT
with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, respondent
Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations exempting the "circulation
income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press,
among others." The exemption of "circulation income" has left income from
advertisements still subject to the VAT.

CONTENTION: Even with the exemption of the circulation revenue of print

media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because
of the imposition of the VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from
advertisements and on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for
publication.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law violates the constitutional grant of press
freedom.

RULING: Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively been

granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in
these cases. To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its
face operates in the area of press freedom. The PPI's claim is simply that, as
applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due
recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society,
however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State. It
has been held: The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the
application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights
and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for
contempt of court. Like others, he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory
taxes on his business.

Case no. 72
Digested by: TORINO, Marx Earvin C.

LACERNA vs Vda. DE CORCINO

1 SCRA 127

FACTS: Catalino, Marcelo, Agatona and Bonifacia Lacerna are brothers and
sisters. Bonifacia Lacerna was married to Valentin Marbebe, and had a son
named Juan. Upon her death, the lands she owns passed by succession to
Juan. Juan then according to records, died intestate in 1943.

Defendant Agatona, was the sister of Bonifacia Lacerna, and had in her
possession the lands inherited by Juan. The plaintiffs, who are cousins of
Juan, instituted an action against Agatona since according to them, they are
the sole heirs of Juan. Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in intervention
alleging that she is a half-sister of Juan Marbebe who died intestate, leaving
neither ascendants nor descendants, and that, as his half-sister, she is
entitled, by succession, to the properties in dispute. According to her, in the
order of intestate succession, brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral
relatives.

Plaintiffs however contend that, in reserva troncal, properties in dispute

should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong
to the line from which said properties came. Since the property came from
the Juan’s mother, then Jacoba is excluded, and the cousins are to inherit.

ISSUE: Who shall inherit?

RULING: Jacoba shall inherit. Contrary to the plaintiffs allegations, there is

NO RESERVA TRONCAL in this case. This article applies only to properties
inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from a
descendant, and this is not the case before us, for the lands in dispute were
inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother,
Bonifacia Lacerna. A sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other
sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes all other
collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line
from which the property of the deceased came - (intestate succession).

Case no. 73
Digested by: AGUILAR, Jesabel D.

Celedonia Solivio v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990

FACTS: On October 11, 1959, Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died
leaving all her property, including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, to
him. Esteban Jr,” died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his
maternal aunt, petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, the spinster half-sister of his
mother, SalustiaSolivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. Pursuant to
an agreement between Concordia and Celedonia, the latter would take care
of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation. Celedonia
in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed for a Special
Proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that letters of administration be issued to her;
that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all
claims and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her. Concordia filed a civil case in
the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. Celedonia averred that the estate of Esteban Jr. was subject to
reservatroncal and thus it should redound to her as a relative within the 3rd
degree on his mother side.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of the deceased was subject to

reservatroncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third
degree on his mother’s side

RULING: No. There is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the estate of
the deceased was subject to reservatroncal, and that it pertains to her as his
only relative within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reservatroncal
provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows: ART.
891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. The
persons involved in reservatroncal are: (1) the person obliged to reserve is
the reservor (reservista)—the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants;
(2) the persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted
from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which
the property came; and, (3) the propositus—the descendant who received by
gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.) Clearly, the
property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of
his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother’s side. The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by
an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or
a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by
a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Article 891.

Case no. 74
Digested by: ALMOITE, Jolly Joy A.
 Chua vs. CFI of Negros Occidental
G.R. No. L- 29901, August 31, 1977

FACTS: Jose Frias Chua sired three children: Ignacio, Manuel, and Lorenzo,
with his marriage with Patricia S. Militar. When Patricia died, Jose married
Consolacion de la Torre and they had one son, Juanito Frias Chua. Jose Chua
died intestate.
In intestate proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjucating the estate
of Jose, Lot No. 399 equally in favor of second wife Consolacion (1/2) and son
Juanito (1/2). After sometime, Juanito died intestate without any issue and his
mother Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399.
Consolacion later died intestate leaving no direct heirs either descending or
ascending except her brothers and sisters. The heirs of Jose Frias Chua in the
first marriage filed a complaint in the CFI of Negros Occidental praying that
the one-half (1/2) portion that formerly belonged to Juanito but which passed
to his mother upon his death be declared a reservable property by virtue of
reserva troncal doctrine under Article 981 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property falls under the doctrine of
reserva troncal.

RULING: YES. The requisites of reserva troncal under Article 981 of the Civil
Code were met. The property was gratuitously acquired by Juanito, a
descendant, from his father Jose, his ascendant. Juanito died without any
issue. His share was inherited by his mother Consolacion, his ascendant, by
operation of law. Juanito had remaining relatives within the third degree, his
half-brother, a nephew and niece, the same line where the property came.

DECISION: One-half (1/2) of the property shall remain in the name of

Consolacion while the other half, formerly belonging to Juanito, will be
reverted back to the heirs of Jose Frias Chua on his first marriage.
 
Case no. 75
Digested by: AQUINO, Jerickson I.

Encarnacion Florentino, et al. vs. Mercedes Florentino, et al.

G.R. No. L-14856, November 15, 1919

FACTS: That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as
his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio
III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his
children of both marriages. That, in the partition of the said testator's estate,
there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property
marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary,
pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal
property and other objects mentioned in the complaint. That Apolonio
Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that
his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in
the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18,
1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living
daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de
Leon; that among same is included the property, described in the complaint,
which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the
posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of
the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone
the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the
parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of
the reservable property described therein, either by direct participation or by
representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.

After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge
absolved the defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to
pay the costs. Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to
vacate it and to grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the
plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions
which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court. On
appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the
complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their
complaint within the period prescribed by the rules undoubtedly believing
that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause
of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the
complaint as well as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of
the law, already submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge,
disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by
absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the
plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.

ISSUE: Whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the
character of reservable property when it was received by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon.

RULING: The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their

complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor
Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the
same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the
provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not
fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the
order of person other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said
property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition
of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her
son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of
ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary
obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property
to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her
daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute

dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his
descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become
the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case
that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which
case said reservable property losses such character. With full right Severina
Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of
her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But
whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property
received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce
the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her
daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is
not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the
obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom
is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino. For this reason, in no manner can
it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming from the
inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and
impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in
no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch
as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being no
lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to
Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the
reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living,
claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and
lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not
be granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.

Case no. 76
Digested by: BAGYON, Joyce Noreen W.

Beatriz Gonzales vs. CFI of Manila

G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981

FACTS: Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y Tuazon
(Benito I), died and was survived by his widow, Filomena and their 7 children.
The real properties left by his deceased father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3
equal parts by Benito II’s sisters and his heirs pro-indiviso. One of his
daughters, Filomena, died without issue and her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena vda de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to
herself the properties she inherited from her daughter as a result of which
she succeeded her deceased owner as co-owner of the properties held pro-
indiviso by her other 6 children. Later, Mrs. Legarda executed two
handwritten documents disposing of the properties which she inherited from
her daughter in favor of her 16 grandchildren (the children of her sons).
Eventually, Mrs. Legarda and her 6 surviving children partitioned the co-
owned property. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of her
estate, Beatriz Gonzales, one of her daughters, filed a motion to exclude in
the inventory of the properties inherited from Filomena, the deceased
daughter, on the ground that said properties were reservable and should be
inherited by Filomena’s 3 sisters and 3 brothers, not by the 16 grandchildren
of Mrs. Legarda, or Filomena’s nephews and nieces. She also filed an action
securing a declaration that the properties are reservable which Mrs. Legarda
could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her 6 chidlren. It is contended here than the properties in
question are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third
paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the properties
to her grandchildren, who are third degree relatives of Filomena and who
belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been
satisfied: “to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some
special accident of life, property that should otherwise have remained
therein.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16
grandchildren (reservees within the third degree) to the exclusion of the 6
children (reservees within the second degree).
RULING: NO. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her 16
grandchildren the reservable properties she inherited from her daughter
because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The
reservoir cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties
as long as the reservees survived the reservoir. Art 891 clearly indicates that
the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest within the
third degree from prepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom to the reservable
properties should be given and deprive the other reservees of their shares
therein. To allow the reservoir to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a
glaring violation of Art 891, this cannot be allowed. Mrs. Legarda could not
dispose of the properties in question in her will even if the disposition is in
favor of relatives within the third degree from Filomena. The said properties,
by operation of Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda’s 6 children as reservees
within the second degree from Filomena. Reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis
causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor. The
reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the
time of Mrs. Legarda’s death. Since at the time of her death, there were
reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties
did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the properties
should be made in accordance with Art 891 and in accordance with the
reservor’s holographic will.
Case no. 77
Digested by: BANASAN, Brandon

Francisca Tioco De Papa, et al., vs. Dalisay Tongko Camacho

G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986

FACTS: Appellees and appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho have as a common

ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), fatherof appellees and great grandfather of defendant. During her
lifetime, Romana gratuitously donated four parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of appellees). When Toribia died, she was
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children
Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay). The 4 parcels of land were left as
inheritance of Toribia‟s two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. They too
inherited 3 parcels of land which was supposed to be the inheritance of the
late Toribia Tioco from her father Balbino. However, when Faustino died
intestate, single and without issue, the ½ pro-indiviso share in the 7 parcels
of land was left to his father Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserve troncal. Subsequently,
Trinidad died intestate and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
were inherited by her only legitimate childe, appellant Dalisay. Eustacio
thereafter died intestated, survived by his only legitimate defendant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho.
The lower Court declared that the appellees as well as appellant
Dalisay were entitled as reservatarios to ½ of the seven parcels of land in
dispute, in equal proportions.
ISSUE: Whether or not all relatives of the prepositus (Faustino) within the
third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the
reservable property upon the death of the reservista.
RULING: NO. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the
rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without
any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino
Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece,
the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. As held in the case of Abellana v. Ferraris, under the
Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)
being called to the succession. Hence, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may
not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed, similar to the case at hand.

Case no. 78
Digested by: BANASAN, Guilfeliko B.

Prima G. Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup vs. Francisca Salak De Paz and
Ernesto Bautista
G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992; 209 SCRA 446

FACTS: Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of
the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac. On August 16, 1943, Severino sold to Honoria
Salak his ½ portion of said lot. A year later, Severino died and in January
1945, Honoria Salak and other members of her family died. As a result, two
settlement proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Tarlac, Special
Proceeding No 3, to settle the estate of Severino and Special Proceeding No.
23, to settle the estate of the Salak family. A project partition was now
submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3 which adjudicated Lot No. 221 to
Francisca Salak de Paz. On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, the
court held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the of the Salak family
were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carillo and Francisca Bautista. Agustina
now filed an action against Francisca to recover the ½ of Lot No. 221 but on
April 24, 1950, Agustina died. Later on, the court held that the properties
inherited by Agustina were subject to reserve troncal. On, April 22, 1963,
Prima Carillo filed a suit for the recovery of 2/3 of ½ of Lot 221 against
Francisca but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to recover the property has already
prescribed.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition. The court stated
that, the reserve is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios who can
bring reivindicatory suit. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the
time for recovering real properties, can be lost by prescription. The law fixes
10 years as the period of prescription for actions to recover real property,
counted from the time the cause of action accrued. It is clear therefore, that
the right of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs on April 24, 1950, since
the action has been filed only on April 22, 1963 or more than 10 years from
the death of Agustina.

Case no. 79
Digested by: BAYENG, Verchelle M.
 Sumaya v. IAC
G.R. No. 68843-44

FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two
(2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) 1/3 interest of a parcel of land
from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) 1/7 interest
from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3,
1950. On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and
leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. De Balantakbo, as his sole
surviving heir to the subject real properties. Vda. de Balantakbo caused
the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul,
wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from
his father Jose, Sr. and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista Vda de
Balantakbo sold the property to Sumaya which was subsequently sold to Villa
Honorio Development Corporation. Villa then transferred and assigned its
rights over the property to Agro Industrial Coconut Cooperative. The parties
admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties
do not contain any annotation of its reservable character. On March 4,
1970,five brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and three surviving
children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first
named Balantakbos, filed civil cases to recover the subject properties which
they claimed were subject to a reserve troncal in their favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by

Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable
nature of the properties is sufficient annotation of the reservable nature of
the same.

RULING: NO. The Court disagreed with the disposition of the appellate court
that there is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if
only for the protection of the reservees (reservatarios), against innocent third
persons. In this case, the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo
Vda. de Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was
inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter
from another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The
failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the
property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo. As to the
sale of subject properties, the Court affirmed the order of lower
courts against plaintiff Agro Industrial Coconut Cooperative to convey the
subject properties back to reservatarios. The Court held that there is
sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable
character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by the parties. Moreover, the Court
a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time
acquaintances and that they knew all along that the properties litigated in
this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his
maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. De Balantakbo inherited
these properties from his son Raul.

Case no. 80
Digested by: BEN-AT, Joy C.

Bonifacia Mateo, et al. v. Gervasio Lagua, et al. G.R. No. L-26270,

October 30, 1969

FACTS: Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public

instrument, donated the two parcels of land to their son Alejandro Lagua, in
consideration of the latter’s marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The couple took
possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the
donor’s name. Cipriano Lagua later executed a deed of sale of the same two
parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. A TCT were issued to
Gervasio. Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, sought the annulment
of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession
of the properties which was granted by the court. The decision became final,
and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were installed in
possession of the land. Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, filed a complaint
for annulment of the
donation of the two lots, insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned
claiming that in donating the two lots, said plaintiff not only neglected
leaving something for his own support but also prejudiced the legitime of his
forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua. While the cases were pending, plaintiff
Cipriano Lagua died. The Court of Appeals held that the donation to
Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir,
Gervasio Lagua. The donation was thus declared inofficious, and defendants-
appellees were ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of
494.15 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness of the donation

proper?

RULING: No. ART. 908 of the civil code provides that to determine the
legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added
the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the
time he made them. In other words, before any conclusion about the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain
steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting a payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject
to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined,
the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being
inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as
legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be
said that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to
rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its
reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

Case no. 81
Digested by: SANGALANG, Angelo

Vda De. Tupas vs.RTC of Negros Occidental

G.R. No. L-65800, October 3, 1986

FACTS: Epifanio Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless,
leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir.
He also left a win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on
September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the CFI of Negros
Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and
839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. But at the time of
his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them
the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had
obtained title to said lots. Claiming that said donation had left her practically
destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas
Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to
have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime,
therefore reducible by ½ or such proportion as justified and the resulting
deduction restored and conveyed to her. The Trial Court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit, based on these grounds: (1) Article 900 relied
upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the properties which were
disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas
were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death; (2) the
donation properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas
Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation
inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 1061.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is inofficious insofar as it prejudiced

Partenza’s legitime and must be properly redused.

RULING: A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain

limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can
give by will. If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can
give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent
of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's
lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated. Such a
donation is collationable, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of
the donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of determining the
legitime of the compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the
estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory
heirs.

In order to find out whether the donation is inofficious or not the

following step-by-step procedure is to be followed:
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of
the testator's death;
(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be
paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the
liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they
were made, of donations subject to collation; and
(5) The determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the
total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each
respective compulsory heir.

Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate
leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question must
be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not
exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the
donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount
of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be reverted to the
Partenza as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Tupas.
 
Case no. 82
Digested by: BRIONES, Mark David

Angela Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, et al. vs. Hon. Juan De Borja, et

al.
G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966

FACTS: Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of

Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez,
meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the
purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a
another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the
special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the
purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with
the testate proceedings?
RULING: YES. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father
Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the
Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy
only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
 
Case no. 83
Digested by: CALSIYAO, Ghisleen

Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain vs. Hon. Eufrocinio S. De La

Merced and Loreta Sta. Maria
G.R. No. L-39975, June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain are the niece
and nephew respectively of the spouses Benito Catain and Andrea Madarcos.
Francisca is the daughter of the deceased brother (Joaquin) of Andrea
Madarcos while Telesforo is the son of a deceased brother (Gregorio) of
Benito Catain. The Catain spouses died without issue and ab intestato. They
left a tract of land with an area of 50,985 square meters, more or less,
situated in Salvacion, Roxas, Palawan, in the name of Benito Catain on
September 28, 1925 by the Register of Deeds of Palawan.The only heirs of
the deceased homesteaders were their nephews and nieces. In their duly
registered Affidavit of Adjudication, said heirs divided the above parcel of
land into several lots. On May 19, 1972, Francisca Madarcos sold her share of
the inheritance, Lot B, to respondent Loreto Sta. Maria. Subsequently,
petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain demanded the
reconveyance of the Lot. Respondent vendee Loreto Sta. Maria having
refused, they instituted an action for repurchase with damages in the Court
of First Instance of Palawan. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that petitioners had no legal capacity to sue
because they are not the legal heirs contemplated in Section 119 of the
Public Land Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are the legal heir of the deceased
spouses.

RULING: Petitioners are the legal heirs. Having been decreed under the
rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses
due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the
decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs
contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead. Since
the Catain spouses were childless and were survived only by their nephews
and nieces, the latter succeeded to the entire estate of the deceased. Article
975 states that “when children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they
survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit
in equal portions.” But even as both are decidedly legal heirs of the Catain
spouses, only petitioner Francisca Madarcos can invoke the right of
repurchase. The other petitioner, Telesforo Catain, cannot claim that
prerogative as an heir of his deceased uncle because the homestead had
already been partitioned and distributed among the nieces and nephews.
The contested Lot B had been given to Francisca and it was she who
executed the sale to respondent Loreto Sta. Maria in 1972. Only the vendor
has the right to repurchase. As Francisca is still living, she alone can demand
the reconveyance of her share, Lot B, from respondent vendee.

Case no. 84
Digested by: CAYATOC, Beverly S.

Delos Santos vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971

FACTS: Pelagia dela Cruz died intestate on October 16, 1962. Plaintiff-
appellee, the decedent's grandniece, the latter’s mother being the niece of
the decedent who predeceased her seeked implementation of conditions as
agreed in an extra-judicial partition against defendant-appellant, nephew of
the decedent. The defendant claimed that plaintiff has no right to enforce the
same since she is not considered as an intestate heir of Pelagia.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee is heir of the decedent.

RULING: NO. Being a grandniece of the decedent, she cannot inherit from
the decedent by right of representation. Art.972 provides that the right of
representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of
brother or sisters, whether they be full blood or half blood. Much less
plaintiff-appellee could inherit in her own right. Art. 962 state that in every
inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. In the present
case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia are her nephews and nieces,
one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a
grandniece is excluded by law from inheritance.

Case no. 85
Digested by: CERALDE, Kyle Alexander
 Isabel De La Puerta vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77867, February 6, 1990

FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will
leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo,
Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her
legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. A petition for the probate of
the will was filed by Isabel. However, it was opposed by her brothers, who
averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of
the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the
properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively.
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court.
Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. On August 1,
1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a
petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta which was granted. However, the
decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the
pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the
dismissal of the case. On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been
allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the
payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta. On November 12, 1982, the probate court granted the
motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that
Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the
amounts claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence
presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to discredit the same.
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the illegitimate children of a legitimate child can

inherit by right of representation from the children and relatives of such
legitimate parent.

RULING: NO. Articles 902, 989 and 990 clearly speak of successional rights
of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit
by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate.
Although Art 982 provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants
shall inherit by right of representation", the same is limited by Art 992 to the
end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother (who must be
legitimate children themselves). Also, while it is true that the NCC granted
successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles must however be
read in conjunction with Art 992, which prohibits the right of representation
from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate
child. The determining factor therefore is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
person to be "represented." It must be emphasized that illegitimate children
have only those rights expressly granted to them by law.

Case no. 86
Digested by: COTIW-AN, Kizel

In Re: Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris.

Filomena Abellana De Bacayo vs. Gaudencia Ferraris De Borromeo
G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris, herein decedent, left no surviving direct

descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral
relatives, namely Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita,
and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the
children of Melodia’s only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-
deceased Melodia. The two classes of heirs claimed to be the nearest
intestate heirs and sought to participate in the estate of said MelodiaFerraris.
The trial court ruled in favor of the appellees. The court held that collateral
relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters of children of brothers or sisters
of the decedent in accordance with Article 1009 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant may inherit.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in
ruling that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the decedent exclude
all other collaterals (aunts and uncles) from the succession. This rule is
apparent in Article 1009 of the Civil Code where the absence of brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals being called to the succession, hence, the preferred position of
the former vis-à-vis the other collaterals.
 
Case no. 87
Digested by: DAPILLOZA, Emmir Lhoyd B.

Sayson vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1995; 205 SCRA 321

FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio,
Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on Nov. 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
Mar. 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on Mar. 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On Apr. 25, 1983, Mauricio,
Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios and Juana, Isabel’s mother, filed a complaint
for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. Subsequently,
Delia and Edmundo, both legally adopted, and Doribel as the legitimate
daughter, filed their own complaint for the partition of the intestate estate of
Eleno and Rafaela claiming that they are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share in
his parents’ estate by right of representation. Both cases were decided by
the trial court in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in
the case of Mauricio, et. al.; and, modified the trial court’s decision in the
case of Delia, et. al. stating that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified
from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are capacitated under the law to
inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents.

RULING: YES as to Doribel but NO as to Delia and Edmundo. There is no

question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, to wit:
Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by
right of representation. Hence, Doribel is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the
shares of her grandparents' other children. In the case of Delia and
Edmundo, however, they are total strangers with respect to the
grandparents. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, those rights do not
include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption
is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party. All told, Delia and Edmundo as
the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
Sayson and Isabel Bautista are their exclusive heirs and are under no
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. Only
Doribel, however, has the right of representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the
adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
The petition is DENIED.

Case no. 88
Digested by: DAWEG, Shamira Y.

EUGENIO C. DEL PRADO vs. AUREA S. SANTOS, legal guardian of the

minor JESUS SANTOS DEL PRADO
G.R. No. L-20946 September 23, 1966
FACTS: The deceased Anastacio C. del Prado and Aurea S. Santos cohabited
with each other without the benefit of matrimony; as a result of cohabitation,
they had one son Jesus S. del Prado, and whom Anastacio admitted to be his
son in his birth certificate. Santos, adjudicating to the minor Jesus, her son
parcel of land left by Anastacio. Eugenio, brother of Anastacio alleged that he
was thus deprived of his rightful share in the estate of his brother. Annulment
of the transfer certificate of title issued to the minor by virtue of said deed of
adjudication was also prayed for. Appellant contends: Even if said minor is
the illegitimate son of the deceased, the latter never recognized him as such,
no showing having been made that it was at the instance or with the consent
of the deceased that said minor was entered as his son in the civil registry or
that the birth certificate where the recognition appears authentic.

ISSUE: Whether Eugenio, deceased’s brother has a better right to the parcel
of land left by Anastacio over Jesus, deceased’s illegitimate son.

RULING: The lower court ruled that since the deceased Anastacio C. del
Prado "left no legitimate descendants or ascendants the minor Jesus S. del
Prado shall succeed to the entire estate left by his supposed father to the
exclusion of the plaintiff who is only a collateral relative." Since Anastacio C.
del Prado died in 1958 the new Civil Code applies (Article 2263). Illegitimate
children other than natural are entitled to successional rights (Article 287).
Where, as in this case, the deceased died intestate, without legitimate
descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to his
entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is only a
collateral relative.

Case no. 89
Digested by: DE GUZMAN, Rhenzyl

Cacho vs. Udan

G.R. No. L-19996, April 30, 1965

FACTS: Silvina G. Udan, single, died leaving a purported will naming her
illegitimate son, Francisco G. Udan, and Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs,
share and share alike. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in
the CFI of Zambales. This was opposed by Rustico G. Udan, legitimate
brother of the testatrix, but upon the filing of an opposition by Francisco G.
Udan, Rustico G. Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his
opposition. Francisco G. Udan then died on June 1961. After the death of
Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brothers of
the testatrix, filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the will
was not attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix was
incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue
influence. The CFI issued an Order disallowing these two oppositions for lack
of interest in the estate. Their Motions for Reconsideration were also denied
hence the filing of a direct appeal with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the brothers John and Rustico Udan may claim to be heirs
intestate of their sister, Silvina.

RULING: No, because at the time of Silvina’s death, her illegitimate son,
Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This
is clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the
Philippines, in force at the time of the death of the testatrix: ART. 988. In the
absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. ART. 1003. If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. These legal provisions decree that
collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of
descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Although the brothers
and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they
do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or
illegitimate.

Case no. 90
Digested by: DICKSON, Jemyma C.

Cuartico vs. Cuartico

16 November 1955 52 O.G. 1489

FACTS: Petitioner Tranquillo Cuartico was named administrator of the

Intestate Estate of said Patricia Clavecilla. After all money claims against the
estate has been settled, the administrator and his co-petitioners moved that
they be declared the exclusive heirs of the deceased. The oppositors filed a
similar motion praying that they, along with the petitioners, be declared
heirs of the deceased. After trial, the court declared the petitioners and
oppositors legal heirs of Patricia Clavecilla whereupon the petitioners,
unsatisfied with the ruling, interposed the present appeal.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANTS: The appellants claiming to be natural

nephews of Patricia Clavecilla aver, moreover, that their mother Maria
Clavecilla is a natural sister of Patricia Clavecilla.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLEES: The appellees contend that Juan

Clavecilla was legally married to Bonifacia Cardente. The appellees further
maintain that Patricia Clavecilla and Maria Clavecilla, assuming that the
latter was child of Juan Clavecilla, were both adulterous children and could
not have been validly recognized by Juan Clavecilla. The appellees tried to
prove that Maria Clavecilla was neither a natural nor an adulterous daughter
of Juan Clavecilla but was merely a maid of the latter; that Maria’s real name
was Maria Romano; and that she was born of the wedlock between Sinforosa
Romano and Benigno Martinez. Appellees admit that Maria Clavecilla was
legally married to their brother Macario Cuartico; that from said marriage,
the herein appellants were born and that consequently, appellants are
entitled to inherit from Patricia Clavecilla merely in representation of
appellants’ father Macario.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance left by

Patricia Clavecilla?

RULING: It appears clear between the parties that Patricia Clavecilla died
single and ab intestate. No dispute exists that the appellees are the children
of Eleno Cuartico and Susana Germodo. Susana Germodo being the natural
mother of Patricia Clavecilla, it results therefore, that the appellees are
natural half-brothers, half-sisters and half-niece respectively of Patricia
Clavecilla. The oppositors who are legitimate children of Susana Germodo
and Lino Cuartico are seeking to inherit ab intestato from their natural half-
sister, Patricia Clavecilla. This pretension is certainly not countenanced under
Article 943 if the Old Civil Code which provision is substantially reproduced
as Article 992 in the New Civil Code. Article 943 reads: “Art. 943. A natural
child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledge it; nor shall such
children or relatives so inherit from the natural child.”
The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate succession is
obviously the intervening antagonism and incompatibility between members
of the natural family and those of the legitimate family.

Assuming that Maria Clavecilla was an acknowledged natural child of

Juan Clavecilla and therefore, a natural half-sister of Patricia Clavecilla, the
law applicable would be Article 945 of the Civil Code which recites:
“Art. 945 of the Old Civil Code provide that “In default of natural ascendants,
natural children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in
accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters.”
Remarkably, this legal provision stops with natural brothers and sisters
without making any mention of the latter’s children. Obviously, the
legitimate or natural child of the natural brothers and sister of a natural child
are disqualified from succeeding the latter ab intestato even by
representation, for if the law intended to accord this right to natural nephews
and nieces of the natural child, it would have expressly so provided. It has
been held that with the exception of the relatives mentioned in Art. 944 and
945 of the Old Civil Code, no other relative of the natural child has the right
to succeed it. In view of all the foregoing, and finding that neither the
appellants nor the appellees are entitled to succeed ab intestato to the
inheritance left by Patricia Clavecilla, it behooves us to call upon the State to
succeed.
 
Case no. 91
Digested by: DOGA-ONG, Charmaigne

Tomas Corpus vs. Rafael Corpus

85 SCRA 567

FACTS: RAMONA ARGUELLES and TOMAS CORPUS were married, blessed

with 5 children: PABLO CORPUS, JOSE CORPUS and 3 others. When TOMAS
CORPUS DIED, RAMONA wed LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and had 4 recognized
acknowledged natural children, one of them was the decedent TEORORO
YANGCO. TEODORO Yangco died on April 20, 1939. His will was dated August
29, 1934 and was probated 1941. At the time of his death, he had no forced
heirs. He only had his half brother (LUIS YANGCO), half sister (PAZ YANGCO),
wife of Miguel Ossorio (AMALIA CORPUS), the children of his half brother
Pablo Corpus (JOSE and RAMON) and the daughter of his half brother Jose
Corpus (JUANA/JUANITA CORPUS). Juanita died in 1944. Pursuant to the order
of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was
submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. The said
project was contested by the following, on the following grounds
(oppositors): Estate of LUIS YANGCO: intestacy should be declared because
the will does not contain an institution of heir; and, JUANITA Corpus, PEDRO
MARTINEZ and JULIANA DE CASTO, through ATTY. CRUZ: the proposed
partition was not in conformity with the will as the testator intended that the
estate should be CONSERVED and not physically parititoned. Nevertheless,
the project of partition was approved by the Probate court, in essence
holding that the testator did not really intend to a perpetual prohibition
against alienation when he stated that some of his estate be conserved.

Oppositors appealed to SC but appeal dismissed after the legatees and

the appellants entered into compromise agreements wherein the legatees
agreed to pay P35k to PEDRO MARTINEZ, the heirs of PIO CORPUS, the heirs
of ISABEL CORPUS, and the heir of JUANITA CORPUS – her son TOMAS
CORPUS. For the estate of Luis Yangco, a similar compromise agreement was
entered. The dismissal of the appeal became final and executory. Pursuant to
the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt acknowledging
that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as “settlement in full of my
share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman
Cruz, our attorney in this case”. The legatees executed an agreement for the
settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate which was approved
by the probate court in 1949. 1945 project of partition was pro tanto
modified. TOMAS CORPUS still filed action to recover JUANITA’s supposed
share in Yangco’s intestate estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangco’s
will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void under
A785, OCC and that 1949 partition is invalid. The decedent’s estate should
have been distributed according to the rules on intestacy. The Trial Court
DISMISSED the case on the grounds of Res Judicata and laches. Petitioner
directly appealed to SC. Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in
holding (1) Teodoro Yangco was a natural child; (2) Teodoro Yangco’s will had
been duly legalized; (3) Plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata and laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not the JUANITA CORPUS, TOMAS CORPUS’ mom, was a
legal heir of TEODORO YANGCO so that his mom would have a cause of
action to recover a supposed intestate share in the estate.

RULING: NO. JUANITA CORPUS, the petitioner’s mother, was NOT A LEGAL
HEIR of Yangco because there is NO RECIPROCAL SUCCESSION between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives. NCC: An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the legitimate child. A992 is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family
is, in turn, hated by the legitimate child. The Law does not recognize blood
tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment. TEODORO YANGCO,
and 3 other children, was ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD and NOT A
LEGITIMATE CHILD, of LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and RAMONA ARGUELLES. JOSE
CORPUS was the presumed legitimate child of TOMAS CORPUS and RAMONA
ARGUELLES. Therefore, TOMAS CORPUS (Petitioner) had no cause of action
for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, JUANITA
CORPUS, as legal heir in YANGCO’s estate. Legitimate relatives of the mother
cannot succeed her illegitimate child. The natural child cannot represent his
natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent.
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural mother. The SC affirmed the lower court’s
judgment.

Case no. 92
Digested by: DOMINGO, Melanie Joy

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES,

JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 and was survived by
two daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo,
the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero
Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the
son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties,
sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking
judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca
Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the
properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an
accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the time
defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been
made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest. Answering the
complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership
over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child
who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other
defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties
are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly
mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in
September 1963.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes,

has legal right to inherit by representation.

RULING: No. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo,
still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court
of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother
were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father’s first marriage
was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Philippines.

Case no. 93
Digested by: FELICIANO, Ludy Jane

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA,
guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents

FACTS: Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the
spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin
and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona
Santero in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his
mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Petitioners now claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old
Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code
(Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a
formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could

inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of
their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

RULING: NO. The court do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has
given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never
before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time
merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory
primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of
intestate succession). These are only some of the many rights granted by the
new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the
New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990,
claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to
represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents,
would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment." It is therefore clear from Article 992
of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person
spoken of. The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the
only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by
the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

Case no. 94
Digested by: GACUYA, Jan Hanna B.

Santillon vs. Miranda

G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

FACTS: On November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in

Tayug, leaving one son, Claro and his wife Perfecta Miranda. During his
marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
Four years after his death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration
which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario
Corrales on the following ground: (a) that the properties are conjugal except
3 parcels claimed by perfecta to be her exclusive properties (b) that Perfecta
conveyed ¾ of her undivided share (c) that the administration of estate was
not necessary, and (d) Perfecta was better qualified for the post when the
administration is necessary.

The court appointed commissioners draft a project of partition and

distribution of all properties of Pedro. Claro filed a motion to declare the
share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties invoking Article
892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting ½ from the conjugal
properties, the remaining ½ must be divided as follows: ¼ for the spouse and
¾ for him. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed besides her conjugal half, she
was entitled under Article 996 of the New Civil Code to another ½ of the
remaining half. After due notice and hearing, the court held that perfecta is
entitled ½ shares and the remaining ½ share for Claro after deducting the
share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate is divided when
the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?

RULING: Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Code chapter of legal or

intestate succession, the only Article applicable id article 996. Our conclusion
that it must be an equal share seems a logical inference from the
circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which
article 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children as a general rule and second, where the widow or widower survives
with only child as an exception. Article 996 omitted to provide for the second
situation, thereby indicating the legislator’s desire to promulgate just one
general rule applicable to both situations.
 Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to ½ of the
intestate estate. When intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with
only legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to ½ of the estate of the
deceased spouse under Article 996 of the new Civil Code.

Case no. 95
Digested by: GONZALES, Victor Javy C.

Suntay vs. Cojuabco-Suntay

621 scra 142

FACTS: Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional
bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not
apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary –
Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by
the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy,
educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by
decedent’s husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for
letters of administration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the illegitimate child may inherit from the
grandparent, who treated the former like his own son, notwithstanding
Article 992 of the Civil Code.

RULING: YES. The factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the
basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent,
Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate
grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised
the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate
child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by
counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the
Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Case no. 96
Digested by: GUNDRAN, Angelica

G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate and survived by her spouse,

Dr. Federico Suntay and three legitimate grandchildren, (Margarita, Emilio II,
and respondent Isabel), and two illegitimate grandchildren (Nenita and
petitioner Emilio III). All are the children of Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I),
Federico's and Cristina's only son. Emilio I predeceased his parents. The
illegitimate grandchildren were reared from infancy by the spouses Federico
and Cristina while their legitimate grandchildren lived with their mother
Isabel Cojuangco after the separation of Isabel's parents (Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco) due to domestic relations cases the family involved in. A case for
parricide was filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I who was acquitted.
Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife charging her
with infidelity and their marriage was declared as null and void. To maintain a
relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel petitioned and were
given visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II which ended
because of respondent Isabel's claim that their grandparents' visits caused
her and her siblings stress and anxiety. After Cristina's death, Federico
adopted his illegitimate grandchildren. Respondent Isabel, filed before the
RTC a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina's
estate. Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Isabel had no
right of representation to the estate of Cristina being an illegitimate
grandchild as a result of Isabel's parents' marriage being declared null and
void. However, SC in a previous case already declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother Cristina. Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent's estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues
to Federico. Almost a year after Federico died, the trial court appointed
Emilio III as administrator of Cristina's intestate estate.CA reversed and
revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III and appointed
respondent as administratrix. SC reversed and set aside the ruling of CA and
included Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina's estate, giving weight to
his interest in Federico's estate. Isabel contends that Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must
be followed. She asserts that EmilioIII demonstrated adverse interests and
disloyalty to the estate thus he does not deserve to become a co-
administrator.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Emilio III is proper?

RULING: No. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the

estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the
appointment of an administrator. The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator's interest in the estate. Those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate have
the highest interest and most influential motive to administer. The person to
be appointed administrator must demonstrate an interest greater than any
other candidate. It is to this requirement of observation of the order of
preference that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed as an
exception. Under certain circumstances, SC upheld the appointment of co-
administrators:
1) to have the benefits of their judgment and at all times to have different
interests represented;
2) where justice and equity demand;
3) where the estate is large or intricate and perplexing one to settle;
4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate; and
5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him.

Mere demonstration of interest in the estate does not ipso facto entitle
an interested person to co-administration. Neither does squabbling among
the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference. In the appointment of administrator, the principal consideration
is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
“Next of kin" are those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent's property. "Nearest of Kin” are those whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator. The strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
preferred. Given Isabel's unassailable interest in the estate as one of the
decedent's legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator cannot be a demandable right.
It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends
on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case. Evidence reveals
that Emilio III turned out to be an unsuitable administrator. The general
denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator
rooted in his failure to "make and return a true and complete inventory". He
omitted in the partial inventories he filed properties of the estate including
several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor
vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1 paragraph a,
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

Case no. 97
Digested by: JIMENEZ, Pacholo M.

Testate Estate of the Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor. The Parish
Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac vs. Belina
Rigor, Nestora Rigor, Francisca Escobar De Rigor and Jovita Escobar
de Fausto
G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979
FACTS: Father Rigor, parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan died on August 19,
1935. He left a will executed on October 29, 1933. Said will was probated by
the CFI of Tarlac. Contained on said will is a controversial bequest allowing a
nearest male relative who will pursue an ecclesiastical vocation and career to
administer Father Rigor's property. For there was no identified nearest male
relative who is taking up ecclesiastical vocation that time, the administratix
of the estate submitted a project allowing the priest of Victoria Tarlac Roman
Catholic Church to administer the property subject of the legacy.

ISSUE: How long after the testator's death would it be determined that he
had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation?

RULING: The Court ruled that the said bequest refers to the testator's
nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to an indefinite
time thereafter.
The law provides that in order to be capacitated to inherit, the heirs, devisee,
legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens except in cases
of representation, when it is proper. The said testamentary provisions should
be sensibly and reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to
testator's nearest male relative at any time after his death would render the
provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his
estate. That could not have been his intention. Art.888 of the Old Civil Code
provides that the bequest becoming inoperative will be merged into the
estate except with respect to substitution and accretion. Art. 960 of the New
Civil Code provides further that legal succession takes place when the will
does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator.
 
Case no. 98
Digested by: LARIN, Christian John V.

LASTIMOZA, Johanne Rose V.

Dionicia Cid, et al., vs. Nancy W. Burnaman, Elis J. Burnaman and the
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979

FACTS: The lot in question was decreed in undivided halves, one in favor of
Gregorio Bonoan and the other half in favor of the five petitioners
Julians,Dionicia, Amador, Escolastica, Domingo and Teodoro as owners in
equal shares of said moiety. Gregoria had in her possession Original
Certificate of Title whom she transferred to her children. Hernando ceded by
way of absolute sale all his rights, participation and interest over his entire
share of one fourth unto Nancy Warwick Burnaman for the price of P1,500.00
then conveyed the same to the same seller for P2,500.00. Petitioners Julians
filed a complaint against Nancy Burnaman, her husband, Elis J. Burnaman,
and Cenon Hernando, seeking the avoidance of the sale by the latter in so
far as concerned a one-fourth undivided interest in the lot, on the basis that
the original half owner, Gregoria Bonoan, died leaving two children. Cenon
and Engracia, the latter being the mother of plaintiffs Julians; that upon
Engracia's death, her children, the Julians, became entitled to half of
Gregoria's half interest in addition to their recorded half share; that the
Burnamans were duly informed of the Julians' claim and were purchasers in
bad faith. They prayed to be declared owners of an undivided three-fourths.
The defendants Burnamans denied the allegations of the complaint; pleaded
good faith in their purchase from Cenon Hernando and counterclaimed for
damages; while Cenon answered admitting that Engracia B. Hernando was
his sister, but denied that she had any right or participation in the land in
question; and pleaded that the lot was purchased with his earnings as a
soldier in the Philippine Scouts, and that his mother, Gregoria, and his sister,
Engracia, had recognized his rights to the undivided half.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of an undivided share of lot in the

inheritance valid?

RULING: YES. The Burnamans were purchasers in good faith. Even if they
were in bad faith, such fact would be irrelevant for the purposes of the
present case, since the plaintiffs are not entitled to the proprietary interest
that they claim to have inherited through their mother, Engracia. The
question of appellees Burnamans' good or bad faith can be put in issue only
by someone entitled to the ownership of that undivided interest; either
Cenon, if he was properly acknowledged; and if not, by some other heir of
Gregoria, whether ascendant or collateral, who may be found to be entitled
thereto.
 
Case no. 99
Digested by: LOPEZ, Raffy D.

LOPEZ, Phoebe Grace D.

Dimayuga, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Manuel Dimayuga
G.R. No. L-48433, April 30, 1984

FACTS: The spouses Genaro Dimayuga and Segunda Gayapanao, acquired a

Torrens title for homestead in 1928. Segunda died intestate in 1940, survived
by her son, Manuel, and her husband, Genaro. During their marriage, Genaro
had a mistress named Emerenciana by whom he begot five children, named
Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaide, Remedios and Socorro.A sixth child, Nelia
Dimayuga, was born in 1944 or after Segunda's death. On September 16,
1948, a "partition of real property" was executed. In the partition, Genaro
treated the homestead as his sole property and not conjugal which it actually
was. Manuel was given as share 5 ½ hectares of the homestead. The six
illegitimate children were given 7 and 7/10 hectares. It was amended in 1951
by means of an affidavit. An additional one hectare was given to Manuel,
making his total share 6 and 5/10 hectares because the 1948 partition was
prejudicial to him. Nineteen years later, Manuel having been advised that
the entire homestead was inherited by him from his parents obtained a
Torrens title for or the 13-hectare homestead. About two months later, the six
illegitimate children filed a complaint for the annulment of Manuel's title and
for the division of the homestead equally among Genaro's seven children
including Manuel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1948 partition is in conformity with law and such
partition shall stand.

RULING: NO. Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator
should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall stand insofar, as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean that a person who makes
an inter vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is void, the
partition is void. With more reason would the partition be void if there was no
will. The 1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that
Genaro was the owner of the entire homestead. One-half of the homestead,
subject to the husband's usufructuary legitime, was inherited in 1940 by
Manuel upon the death of his mother who was married to Genaro for twenty-
five years.
 
Case no. 100
Digested by: MAGALGALIT, Regie C.

GONZALES, Dolores Marietta D.

Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
160 SCRA 581

FACTS: On September 7, 1963, Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a

written agreement with the Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a
petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. It
was agreed that the contigent fee would be 35% of the property Rosa will
receive upon the probate of the will. On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a
letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his
services as her counsel due to “conflicting interest.” On September 20, 1965,
petitioner filed a motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for
Professional Services but was soon denied since he had not filed a claim for
attorney’s fees nor recorded his attorney’s lien. On November 23, 1965,
petitioner filed a formal statement of Claim for Attorney’s Fees and Recording
of Attorney’s Lien. Despite the denial of his motion to intervene, Atty. LEviste
kept on receiving copies of the court’s orders, as well the pleadings of the
other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. On November
23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed
a motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate. They alleging that Del Rosario
waived her rights to the devise and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and
sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties
left by the decedent.

The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being
contrary to public policy. The court disallowed the will, holding that the legal
requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses. Atty.
Leviste filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The
private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
petitioner was not a party in interest. Atty. Leviste opposed the motion
claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the decision sought to
be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner but
was denied. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, he suffered the same fate.
Leviste brought this case to the Supreme Court asserting Art. 1052 of the
Civil Code: ART. 1052: If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice
of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to
accept it in the name of the heir. The acceptance shall benefit the creditors
only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess,
should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be
adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established
in this Code, it may belong. Thus, Leviste asserts he has a right to accept for
his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor
(which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee

basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his
client’s refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not
apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating
heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees
is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic
will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the
contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee. Also,
Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a
legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. The contract for contingent
attorney’s fees neither gives, nor purports to give, to the lawyer any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in his client’s share of the properties. The
amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. SC claimed
that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an attorney’s lien did
not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It
only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case
his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.

Case no. 101

Digested by: MAPPANG, Joy Francine B.
 BUHAY DE ROMA v. CA
152 SCRA 205

FACTS: Candelaria de Roma had 2 legally adopted daughters, Buhay and

Rosalinda She died intestate. Buhay was appointed administrator and in due
time, filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda
because 7 parcels of coconut land earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay
had not been included. Rosalinda argues that the lands are subject to
collation. Buhay claims she has no obligation to collate because the
decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.

ISSUE: Whether these lands are subject to collation.

RULING: Yes. There is nothing in the deed of donation that expressly

prohibited collation of the donated properties. The phrase “sa pamamagitan
ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli” merely described the donation as
“irrevocable” and should not be construed as an express prohibition against
collation. Candelaria would have included therein an express prohibition to
collate if that had been her intention. There can be no implied prohibition
even if the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the
estate. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly
and unequivocally.

Note relevant articles of the Civil Code:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate
the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

Case no. 102

Digested by: PERALTA, Jessica C.

ANITA MANG-OY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

144 SCRA 33

FACTS: Old man Tumpao had a wife and begot three children, the
respondents in this case. After his wife died, he married again. His second
wife had two children she had adopted according to the practice of the
Igorots. On September 4, 1937, Old man Tumpao executed a “Last will and
testament.” According to such, Bandao Tumpao shall be the one to carry or
fulfil the testament, and shall have the power to see and dispose of the Old
man Tumpao’s property. The will was read to the beneficiaries who were
already occupying the lands allotted to them. On September 7, 1937, they
had an agreement recognizing the will and Bando’s appointment. Two days
later, Old man Tumpao died. The parties remained in possession of the lots
assigned to them, apparently in obedience to the wish of the old man
Tumpao, as expressed in his last will. However, in 1960, the respondents
executed an extrajudicial partition of the lands of Old man Tumpao. The
latter’s title was cancelled and the respondents were given a new one. It is
that title which is being questioned the petitioners. The trial court ruled for
the petitioners. The CA reversed as it said that the will was void since it was
not probated. The agreement of partition among the supposed beneficiaries
of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not
been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian tribes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was VALID.

RULING: NO. The will is NOT VALID since it was NOT PROBATED. However,
the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code
of 1899, which was in forced at the time the said document was executed by
old man Tumpao in 1937. Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition
of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in
so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. Article 1056 of
the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his
property, and distributed them among his heirs, and that this partition is not
necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during
his lifetime, and does not operate as conveyance of title until his death. It
derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of
legitime of the forced heirs. It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition
should be in writing. It does not have to be in a public document except to
affect third persons (Article 1280), being valid between the parties who
signed it in its present form. As the trial court puts it, the will alone, would be
inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated. However, when
the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of
probate, and further, carried out its terms after the death of the testator until
now, then it must be held to be binding between them. Said agreement was
not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the
testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by the
defendants, and, after the lapse of 25 years, their rights, if any, to assail it
has prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Any formal defect of the
deed was cured by the lapse of time. The agreement entered into by the
parties did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were
not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a
conveyance of the properties or property right. It remains to state that the
property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is that it
was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the
respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao.
Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive
inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.

Case no. 103

Digested by: AGUILAR, Jesabel D.

Chavez v. IAC
G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990

FACTS: The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner

Manuela Buenavista who had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario,
Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were the
plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in this
case. Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, with the conformity of their
mother, sold their 1/6 undivided share of the same land to their sister
who became the owner of 4/6 share of the subject land. In all the deeds of
sale, there was the stipulation wherein the owner , Manuela Buenavista, had
assigned or distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her
paraphernal property. Despite the transfers or assignments her children had
executed with her conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, sold the
entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband,
Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed
a civil case against their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon,
Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 with
right to repurchase.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deeds of sale were considered as a partition by

an act inter vivos.

RULING: YES. Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a
partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition
shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the
compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance,
the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case
expressly authorized by law. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a
person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter
vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative
that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the
law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by
an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not
be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the
legitime of compulsory heirs.
 In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may
be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in
severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. A parol
partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty,
exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing
the existence of the partition.
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds
of Sale executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed
Chavez in favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the
land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she
not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of
Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to feature inheritance but a
contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of
Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto.
Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.

Thus, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow

Manuela Buenavista Vda. De Chavez to revoke the sales she
herself authorized as well as the sale she herself
executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her
daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the
property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to
the doctrine that “no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at
the expense of another.”

CASE NO. 104

Digested by: SERAPION, Johnny

Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

and Tecla Padua
G.R. No. 72873, May 28, 1987

FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. In 1963, one
of them sold his undivided share to herein petitioners. In 1964, another sold
her share to the same vendees. By virtue of such agreements, the
petitioners occupied an area equivalent to two-fifths of the lot and proceeded
to enclose it with a fence. In 1975, the vendee’s son constructed a semi-
concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. In 1976, Mariano Padua, one
of the co-heirs, sought to redeem the lot sold to spouses Alonzo but it was
dismissed when it appeared that he was a US citizen. In 1977, Tecla Padua,
another co-heir, invoked her right of redemption.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 30-day period to redeem has begun and lapsed
when there was no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court has deviated from the strict letter of the
law in this case in view of its peculiar circumstances. Article 1088 of the Civil
Code provides: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided
they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified
in writing of the sale by the vendor.

The co-heirs were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in

writing was given to them. There is then no doubt that the 30-day period
began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the
filing of the complaint in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. Although it cannot be declared when the 30-day period
commenced, we can say that between the time when the sales happened
and the time when the first complaint was filed, the co-heirs were actually
informed, and thereafter the period started running and ultimately expired.
The court cannot accept the pretense that the respondents were unaware of
the sales made by their brother or sister. The other co-heirs were living on
the same lot which is only 604 square meters including the partitions bought
by the petitioners. A co-heir who sold his portion is even living in the same
house as Tecla. It stands that the purpose of the law, which is to make sure
the redemptioners are duly notified, is sufficiently satisfied.