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CASE 25
CASE 26
CASE 28
CASE 29
CASE 30
CASE 37
CASE 43
CASE 55
CASE 56
CASE 57
CASE 58
CASE 60
CASE 61
CASE 62
CASE 63
CASE 66
CASE 67
CASE 47
FACTS:
Plaintiff gave to defendant P1,770 to be used in the purchase of palay, with the obligation to
return said amount within 10 days, if not spent for said purpose. The latter never bought palay
nor returned said amount. As a result, the former accused him of estafa. When the case was about
to be heard, a common friend, acting upon defendant’s request, prevailed upon plaintiff to move
for the dismissal of the case and be contented with a promissory note to be executed by the
defendant. The note was executed and, accordingly, the criminal case was dismissed. Defendant,
however, was unable to comply with his promise despite repeated demands. Subsequently,
plaintiff brought this action against him for the recovery of the P1,770.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the promissory note is void because the consideration thereof is the dismissal of
the estafa case which is certainly contrary to public policy
HELD:
This contention is untenable. It is admitted that defendant had received the P1,770 from plaintiff
to be used for the purchase of palay. The cause or consideration, therefore, for the promise was
the pre-existing debt of said defendant, not the dismissal of the estafa case, which merely
furnished the occasion for the execution of the promissory note.
CASE 48
27 SCRA 1276
FACTS:
Marlene Dauden, a movie actress, fi led a complaint against the Hollywood Far East
Productions, Inc. and its President and General Manager, Ramon Valenzuela, to recover P14,700
representing the balance of her compensation as leading actress in two motion pictures produced
by the defendant company. Upon motion of defendants, the lower court dismissed the complaint
because “the claim of plaintiff was not evidenced by any written document, either public or
private’’ in violation of Art. 1358 of the New Civil Code. As a last recourse, plaintiff appealed to
the Supreme Court on the ground that the court below had abused its discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court had abused its discretion
HELD:
We hold that there was abuse, since the ruling herein contested betrays a basic and lamentable
misunderstanding of the role of the written form in contracts, as ordained in the present Civil
Code. In the matter of formalities, the contractual system of our Civil Code still follows that of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and of the “Ordenamiento de Alcala” of upholding the spirit and
intent of the parties over formalities; hence, in general, contracts are valid and binding from their
perfection regardless of form, whether they be oral or written. This is plain from Articles 1315
and 1356 of the present Civil Code. To this general rule, the Code admits two exceptions, to wit:
(1) Contracts for which the law itself requires that they be in some particular form in order to
make them valid and enforceable (the so called solemn contracts). Examples of these are the
contracts or agreements contemplated in Arts. 748, 749, 1744, 1773, 1874, 1956, and 2134 of the
present Civil Code. (2) Contracts that the law requires to be proved by some writing
(memorandum) of its terms, as in those covered by the Statute of Frauds, now Art. 1403(2) of the
Civil Code. Their existence not being probable by mere oral testimony (unless wholly or partly
executed), these contracts are exceptional in requiring a writing embodying the terms thereof for
their enforceability by action in court. The contract sued upon by petitioner herein does not
come under either exception. It is true that it appears included in the last clause of Art. 1358, but
it nowhere provides that the absence of written form in this case will make the agreement invalid
or unenforceable. On the contrary, Art. 1357 clearly indicates that contracts covered by Art. 1358
are binding and enforceable by action despite the absence of writing. Wherefore, the order
dismissing the complaint is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings not at variance with this decision.
CASE 49
36 Phil. 960
FACTS:
In a contract, it was agreed that a metalled roadway would be built on the street where the real
property was located to “its entire length.” Now the pronoun “its” may refer either to the street
or the real property. The government contended that the whole street should be metalled, alleging
that the antecedent of “its” was the street. Upon the other hand, the contractor said that “its”
referred throughout the length of the real property (and not the whole street) should be metalled.
It was the government that drafted the contract.
ISSUE:
The contractor is correct. It was the government that cause the ambiguity, so the interpretation of
“its” should not be in the government’s favor and, therefore, it may be concluded that it was not
intended by the contracting parties that the whole street would be metalled. When different
interpretations of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that construction is to be taken which
is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made, and did not cause the
ambiguity.
CASE 50
22 Phil. 623
FACTS:
In a contract of lease, it was provided that the lessee could make “obras” (improvements) on the
property of the lessor without the necessity of asking the lessor’s permission every time an
improvement is to be made. The lessee demolished an old wall and erected one of reinforced
concrete in its place. The lessor is now blaming the lessee for having demolished the old wall,
claiming that the lessee was allowed to make only improvements, not demolitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the demolition of the old one and its substitution by a new one constitute
“improvements” or “obras”
HELD:
The term “obras” or “improvements” is susceptible of different interpretations, and since the
ambiguity here was caused by the lessor, the term should not be interpreted in his favor. Hence,
it was all right for the lessee to do what he did.
CASE 51
Olino v. Medina
13 Phil. 379
FACTS: Olino was indebted to Isidora Rendon for P175. Because Olino had no money, Medina
offered to pay, and actually paid P175 to Rendon. Because he was grateful, Olino consented to
the transfer of his land to Medina.
ISSUE: Whether or not this is to be considered as a mere loan with the land as security
HELD: This should be considered as a mere loan with the land as security instead of a sale to C,
inasmuch as the former involves both the lesser transmission of rights as well as greater
reciprocity of interest. Said the Supreme Court: “Inasmuch as we are in doubt as to which of the
two contracts it was by reason of which Medina (C) furnished the P175, with which Olino (A)
redeemed his land from Isidora Rendon (B), and Olino in turn consented to the transfer of the
land to Medina, the party who furnished the money, we elect to consider that said contract was
that of loan, because such a contract involves a smaller transmission of rights and interest, and
the debtor does not surrender all rights to his property, but simply confers upon the creditors the
right to collect what is owing from the value of the thing given as security, there existing
between the parties a greater reciprocity of rights and obligations.”
CASE 52
31 Phil. 517
FACTS:
The records show that plaintiff purchased some lands from the defendant and, as a consequence,
took possession of the same and collected their products. Subsequently, they dissolved the
contract of sale, and, as a result thereof, plaintiff returned the lands, while defendant bound
himself to return the part of the purchase price which plaintiff has paid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is obliged to return to the defendant the products of the lands which
he had collected during his possession
HELD:
“The rescission mentioned in the contract is not the rescission referred to in Article 1295 (now
Art. 1385). Although the plaintiff and the defendant employed the word rescind, it has not, in the
contract executed by them, either the scope or the meaning of the word rescission to which
Article 1295 (now Art. 1385) refers and which takes place only in the cases mentioned in the
preceding Articles, 1291 and 1292 (now Arts. 1381 and 1382). Rescission, in the light of these
provisions, is a relief which the law grants, on the premise that the contract is valid, for the
protection of one of the contracting parties and third persons from all injury and damage that the
contract may cause, or to protect some incompatible and preferential right created by the
contract. Article 1295 (now Art. 1385) refers to contracts that are rescissible in accordance with
law in the cases expressly fi xed thereby, but it does not refer to contracts that are rescinded by
mutual consent and for the mutual convenience of the contracting parties. The rescission in
question was not originated by any of the causes specifi ed in Articles 1291 and 1292 (now Arts.
1381 and 1382), nor is it any relief for the purposes sought by these articles. It is simply another
contract for the dissolution of a previous one, and its effects, in relation to the contract so
dissolved, should be determined by the agreement made by the parties, or by the application of
other legal provisions, but not by Article 1295 (now Art. 1385), which is not applicable.’’
CASE 53
45 Phil. 371
FACTS:
The records show that a contract of a lease of certain lot situated in Manila was entered into
between the partnership Jacinto, Palma y Hnos, as lessor, and Potenciana Guevara, as lessee.
This contract contained an option by which the lessor is given the right to purchase within a
period of one year from the time of the execution thereof a house which the lessee had
constructed on the lot, but in case of failure to exercise such right, the lessee is given the right to
purchase the lot. The period for the option having expired without the lessor exercising its right,
Guevara offered to purchase the lot, but the said lessor refused. In view of such refusal, Guevara
brought an action to compel the lessor to sell the lot to her. There was, however, no notice of the
commencement of such action filed with the office of the Register of Deeds. During the
pendency of such case, the aforesaid lessor sold the lot under litigation to the Sikatuna
Corporation. This sale was recorded in the Registry in accordance with Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. Subsequently, judgment was rendered in the civil case in
favor of Guevara, but it was not executed because the lot had already been sold to the Sikatuna
Corporation. Later, the new owner ordered Guevara to vacate the premises. Having declined to
do so, the corporation commenced these proceedings against her for unlawful detainer. In her
answer, she contended that since the contract involves the sale of property under litigation
without the approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority, it should be rescinded.
This contention was upheld by the lower court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Romualdez, however, ruled: “As the appellant
rightfully contends the rescission of the sale does not lie in the present case because the property
is now in the legal possession of a third person who has not acted in bad faith. There is no doubt
but that in this case the plaintiff corporation has the character of a third person, and it has not
been shown that it had acted in bad faith. This case has a special circumstance in that it deals
with property registered under the Land Registration Act No. 496, Section 78, which provides
that acts concerning properties registered under the law shall affect only the parties litigant,
unless a notice of the commencement of the action is recorded, which does not appear to have
been done in the case before us. There was, therefore, no legal obstacle to the transfer of the title
of the said property, and for this special reason the said transfer cannot be rescinded.”
CASE 54
FACTS:
This is an action commenced by plaintiff against the defendants for the rescission of a contract of
sale on the ground that such contract was entered into in fraud of creditors. The records show
that Felipe Lotivio purchased a parcel of land from Luisa Marcayda for P1,000, although at the
time the contract was executed there was already a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
latter with regard to the property and a writ of attachment had already been issued. The plaintiff
contends that the sale is fraudulent in accordance with the rule stated in the second paragraph of
Art. 1297 (now Art. 1387) of the Civil Code; the defendant Felipe Lotivio, on the other hand,
contends that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Felipe Lotivio was a purchaser in good faith and for value, and
HELD:
“The sale was consummated on January 6, 1936, in consideration of P1,000. Original certificate
of title No. 14567 showed that the land was free from any lien or encumbrance. Felipe Lotivio
was not, under the law, supposed to go farther to find out whether the land has any other lien not
appearing on the face of the title as held in the cases of Reynes vs. Barrera, 68Phil. 656;
Hernandez vs. Vda. de Salas, 69 Phil. 744; Visayan Surety and Insurance Corp. vs. Verzosa, 72
Phil. 362. It is well settled that when the property sold on execution is registered under the
Torrens system, registration is the operative act and a purchaser on execution is not required to
go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, and he is only charged with
notice of the burdens of the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the
primary objects of the Torrens system. In the present case, the writ of attachment issued by the
justice of the peace court of Daraga, Albay was not annotated on the back of the original
certificate of title. True enough that it was filed with the office of the Register of Deeds of Albay,
but such fact is not a notice to the whole world. Consequently, such unregistered order of
attachment does not create any lien or burden upon the land in question. The valuable
consideration of P1,000 paid to Luisa Marcayda by Felipe Lotivio, who does not appear to be her
relative is, in our opinion, not small for the property since its improvements are assessed at no
less than P800. It is fitting to apply in this case the principle of ‘innocent purchaser for value’ as
declared and applied in the case of Bailon vs. Cacias, et al., 40 Off. Gaz., p. 1896, August, 1941.
“According to our Supreme Court in the case of Cui, et al. vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 600: ‘A
purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in
the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and of bad faith and its
nonexistence must be established by competent proofs.
Tested by these doctrines, we hold and declare that defendant Felipe Lotivio was, under the
foregoing circumstances, a purchaser in good faith and for value; and for this reason, we also
hold that the presumption of fraud as contemplated in Article 1297 of the old Civil Code (now
Art. 1387 of the new Civil Code) can be considered overcome and overthrown as held in the
cases of Peña vs. Mitchell, 9 Phil. 587; Guash vs. Espiritu, 11 Phil. 184; Kuenkle vs. Watson &
Co., 13 Phil. 26; Golinko vs. Monjardin, 31 Phil. 643; Asia Banking Corp. vs. Corcuera, 51
Phil. 781. Therefore, the contract of sale, for the reasons above stated, is not rescissible.’’
CASE 59
FACTS:
The records show that plaintiff purchased from defendant Poncio a parcel of land; that she paid
part of the agreed price with the understanding that she will pay the balance upon the execution
of the deed of conveyance; that defendant refused to execute the deed in spite of repeated
demands; and that defendant sold the land to his co-defendants who knew of the first sale.
Defendants, however, contend that plaintiff’s claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiff is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds
HELD:
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory
contracts (Facturan vs. Sabanal, 81 Phil. 512), not to contracts that are totally or partially
performed. (Almirol, et al. vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil. 67, 70; Robles vs. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50
Phil. 387; Diana vs. Macalibo, 74 Phil. 70) The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a
wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the
intention of the contracting parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1957 ed., p. 178) However, if a contract has
been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad
faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him from the
transaction in litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities
assumed or contracted by him thereby. So that when the party concerned has pleaded partial
performance, such party is entitled to a reasonable chance to establish by parol evidence the truth
of his allegation, as well as the contract itself.”
CASE 64
FACTS:
Macario died intestate in 1966, leaving a widow, Clavita and five minor children. He left a parcel
of land. In 1967, Clarita, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of the minor plaintiff
executed a deed of extra-judicial partition and sale of the property through which she sold the
property to Gregorio. Modesta, a sister of Macario, was able to obtain guardianship over the
property and persons of the minor children on 1968. In 1970, Modesta caused the minor children
to file a complaint to annul the sale of their participation in the property and asked that as co-
owner they be allowed to execute the right of legal redemption with respect to Clarita’s
participation therein. The trial court annulled the sale to Gregorio of the minor children’s
participation in the property and allowed them to redeem the participation of their mother
therein.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The contention is untenable. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an
annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract
voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting
party’s consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this
case, however, the appellee minors are not even parties to the contract involved. Their names
were merely dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed a right to represent them,
purportedly in accordance with Article 320 of the New Civil Code. A contract entered into in the
name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party. Clearly,
Clarita Ferrer Badillo has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to the
appellants that 5/12 undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case.
The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of
administration and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the
permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to
her minor children. The appellee minors never ratifi ed this Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Sale. In fact, they question its validity as to them. Hence, the contract remained unenforceable or
unauthorized. No restitution may be ordered from the appellee minors either as to that portion of
the purchase price which pertains to their share in the property or at least as to that portion which
benefited them because the law does not sanction any.
CASE 65
52 Phil. 831
FACTS:
This action was originally instituted by plaintiff bank against McCoy and six other solidary
debtors for the payment of an indebtedness of P16,000. When the case was ready for hearing,
McCoy entered into a compromise with plaintiff and paid P12,000 in satisfaction of the debt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not McCoy can be substituted as plaintiff against her former co-defendants for the
purpose of compelling them to reimburse to her their proportionate shares in the obligation
HELD:
By paying off the claim which was originally the subject of litigation, the executrix was
subrogated to the rights of the original plaintiff, and if the situation was one involving a joint and
several liability on the part of all of the original defendants, the executrix, upon paying off the
claim, necessarily acquired the right to prosecute the action for contribution against her co-
defendants. But it is said that the amendment by which the executrix was permitted to substitute
the original plaintiff had the effect of changing the cause of action entirely, since the original
action was founded upon a debt supposedly owing to the bank from the seven defendants,
whereas after the instant debt was paid, the only right of action vested in the executrix was the
right to obtain contribution. It must be remembered, however, that if the original action had
proceeded to its end against all of the defendants, the court, in giving judgment, would have
taken account of the obligation of each to contribute his proportionate share to the payment of
the judgment, and what has been finally done, as the case shaped itself here, is to give effect to
the same obligation. It was in our opinion a proper case of substitution of parties resulting from
the subrogation of one of the defendants to the right of the plaintiff.
CASE 68
27 SCRA 1179
FACTS:
The lot which is the subject matter of this litigation originally belonged to Jorge Bueno. When he
died, the property descended by intestate succession to his three children, Brigida, Eugenia and
Rufino. Subsequently, Brigida and Eugenia died. In 1936, by agreement among the heirs,
Francisco Reyes, Eugenia’s husband, was entrusted with the job of filing the answer in the
cadastral proceedings and in obtaining title to the property for and in behalf of the heirs of Jorge
Bueno. Reyes filed the answer, claiming the lot as property belonging to himself and to his two
brothers, Juan and Mateo. Subsequently, the lot was adjudicated in favor of the claimants, in
whose names an original certificate of title was issued in 1939. In 1962, the heirs of Jorge Bueno,
who had always been in possession of the property, discovered the fraud committed by Francisco
Reyes. As a consequence, they brought this action for reconveyance of the lot to them.
Defendants, however, interposed the defense or prescription of action which was reiterated in a
motion to dismiss. The trial court a quo held that the action is predicated on the existence of an
implied trust and that such action prescribes in ten years. Consequently, the case was dismissed.
Plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
While there are some decisions which hold that an action based upon a trust is imprescriptible,
with better rule, as laid down by this Court in other decisions, is that prescription does supervene
where the trust is merely an implied one. Upon the general proposition that an action for
reconveyance such as the present is subject to prescription in ten years to the appellees and the
court a quo are correct. The question here, however, is: from what time should the prescriptive
period be counted? It should be remembered that the constructive trust arose by reason of the bad
faith of Francisco Reyes, compounded by the connivance of his brothers. Consequently, the
cause of action upon such trust must be deemed to have accrued only upon the discovery of such
bad faith, or to put it more specifically, upon the discovery by the appellants that. Francisco
Reyes, in violation of their agreement with him, had obtained registration of the disputed
property in his own name and in the names of his brothers? It would not do to say that the
cadastral proceeding itself, by virtue of its nature as a proceeding in rem, was constructive notice
to the appellants, for as far as they were concerned the cadastral answer they had authorized
Francisco Reyes to file was not adverse to them; and neither he nor the appellees may invoke the
constructive notice rule on the basis of their own breach of the authority thus given. On top of all
these, it was the appellants and not the appellees who were in possession of the property as
owners, continuously up to 1962, when for the first time the latter appeared upon the scene and
tried to get such possession, thereby revealing to them the fact of the fraudulent registration. It
would be more in keeping with justice, therefore, to afford the plaintiffs as well as the defendants
the opportunity to lay their respective claims and defenses before the court in a full-blown
litigation. Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
CASE 69
39 SCRA 206
FACTS:
A, married to B, executed a fi ctitious deed of sale of a two-storey house and four subdivision
lots in favor of his mistress, M, who at that time was pregnant, with the understanding that the
latter shall hold the properties in trust for their unborn illegitimate child. After securing a new
transfer certificate of title in her name, M mortgaged the properties twice to a bank, and
subsequently, she tried to sell them. A then brought an action against her praying for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining her from further alienating or disposing of the
properties and for judgment ordering her to convey the properties to their illegitimate child, X,
who by that time was already five years old. A motion to dismiss was filed on the ground that the
illegitimate child, who is the beneficiary of the alleged trust, is not included as a party-plaintiff,
and that the action in question is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Subsequently, A
amended his complaint so as to include X as party-plaintiff. The lower court, however, dismissed
the case.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not there was a valid cause of action in the instant case
(b) Whether or not the action is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds
HELD:
(a) There is a valid cause of action in the instant case. Upon the facts alleged in the complaint,
the contract between appellant and appellee was a contract pour autrui, although couched in the
form of an absolute deed of sale, and that appellant’s action was, in effect, one for specific
performance. That one of the parties to a contract is entitled
to bring an action for its enforcement or to prevent its breach
autrui amplifi es this settled rule only in the sense that the third
person for whose benefi t the contract was entered into may
favor is revoked.
that the contract between the parties had already been partially
CASE 70
Coquia vs. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co.
26 SCRA 178
against all sums which the Insured will become legally liable
the driver, the Insured and the parents of Carlito, the Coquias,
whose benefi t it was made, although not a party to the contract, before the stipulation in his
favor has been revoked by the
“The policy provides, inter alia, that the Company ‘will indemnify
of the Insured and, in the event of death of said driver, the Company
character being made more manifest by the fact that the deceased
the Coquias — who, admittedly are the sole heirs of the deceased
could and did properly join the latter in fi ling the complaint
hereon.”
CASE 71
P84,000 despite the fact that Sy had been deducting the amount
the gates of the three theaters under lease and took possession
as a result of the fi ling of the case by Sy and his violation of the terms and conditions of the
agreement. It held that Ventanilla
with interest on each amount of P10,000 from the time the same
fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts above-mentioned. Finally, the court held Sy thru the
injunction bond liable to
pay P10,000 every month from Feb. to Nov. 1980. The amount
HELD: The Supreme Court affi rmed the CA’s decision and
cost which was duly proven before the trial court, was correctly
decide that the Plaintiff was not entitled thereto.” The CA correctly
sustained the trial court in holding that the bond shall and may answer only for damages which
OVEC may suffer as
not deducted from plaintiff’s cash deposit from Feb. to Nov. 1980
after the forfeiture of said cash deposit on Feb. 11, 1980) and
CASE 72
CASE 73
72 SCRA 514
that they are the only owners of the subject property and that
one-half thereof is the share of the widow and the other onehalf
prescribed?
which is barred after ten years, there being no question that the
appellees secured their title more than twenty years before the
such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes
11 SCRA 153.)
CASE 74
Fabian vs. Fabian
22 SCRA 231
title in their name. In 1945, they subdivided the lot into two
equal parts and as a result, two new transfer certifi cates of title
were issued in their names. On July 18, 1960, the other heirs of
disable the trustee from acquiring for his own benefi t the property
does not openly repudiate the trust, and make such repudiation
Upon the undisputed facts in the case at bar, not only had laches
CASE 75
69 Phil. 101
Philippines, while the plaintiff was one of those who had invested
the company, and, at the same time, stating that he felt “a moral
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Villareal, held: “The contract sought to be judicially
enforced by the
give a thing, namely the payment of the sum of P2,000, but the
latter had suffered because of the failure of the enterprise. The obligation which the said
defendant-appellant had contracted
with the plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, purely moral, and, as
CASE 76
59 Phil. 562
Bank against him for payment of the debt that such debt must
CASE 77
CASE 78
CASE 79
CASE 80
the consent and approval of the GSIS. The association of tenants of the building sued
assail the validity of the contract. The main thrust of the Association’s challenge on
contract which is merely voidable. Cited to support its assertion that the conditional
XIV, Sec. 3), agrarian reform (Art. XIV, Sec. 12) and the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, particularly
trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners.”
CASE 81
CASE 82
CASE 83
42 Phil. 182
New York to withhold payment of the amount to the plaintiff. Because of this development,
plaintiff fi led this action to recover
of Article 1257 (now Art. 1311) of the Civil Code; and unless
“In the case of Uy Tam vs. Leonard (30 Phil. 471), Justice
following words:
New York City. The recognition of this unqualifi ed rightin the plaintiff to receive the money
implies in our opinion
CASE 84
CASE 85
one of the lots. If the buyer does not continue paying, may the
vendor was ordered to convey to the buyer one of the two lots.
CASE 86
39 Phil. 60
and since the bonus has not yet been paid, its amount must
(now Arts. 1182 and 1308) of the Civil Code. Holding that the
bonus had already been paid since the contract itself specifi es
held invalid under Article 1256 (now Art. 1308) of the same Code, which declares that the
validity and performance of a contract
cannot be left to the will of one of the contracting parties. The
1349, Civil Code), since the contract itself specifi es the manner
CASE 87
CASE 88
CASE 89
CASE 90
CASE 91
CASE 92
CASE 93
CASE 94
CASE 95
CASE 96
Schedule applicable?
to wipe out their debt to the Bank was created during the
applied.
said Bank and the entire credit was transmitted to him with all
co-debtors, but on his having paid the entire loan. The present
created in 1938. The Bank could collect the whole amount of the
loan from any one of the solidary co-debtors, and in fact did from
one of them. This, the appellant may not do just because he paid
CASE 97