HW 2

Property Cases - Atty.
Salazar
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI, petitioner, vs . acted upon by the RTC. To satisfy the

FILOMENO GARCIA judgment, the sheriff levied on a building
located at No. 140
FACTS: Kalayaan
Avenue, Quezon City, covered by Tax
Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena T. Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the
Villasi lots
(Villasi) engaged the services of registered under Transfer Certificates of Title
respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (TCT) Nos. 379193 and 379194. While the
(FGCI) to construct a seven-storey building was declared for taxation purposes
condominium in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it
building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. was
Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. erected were registered in the names of the
Spouses
Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda
For failure of Villasi to fully pay the
Halili- Garcia (Spouses Garcia).
contract price despite several demands,
FGCI initiated a
suit for collection of sum of money before the
RTC of
Quezon City. In its action FGCI prayed
for the payment of the amount of
P2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid
accomplishment billings.
Villasi filed an answer specifically

denying the material allegations of the
complaint. Contending that FGCI has no
cause of action against her, Villasi averred
that
she delivered the total amount of
P7,490,325.10 to
FGCI but the latter accomplished only
28% of the project.
RTC ruled in favor of FGCI.
Case elevated to CA and reversed decision

averring that an overpayment was made by
Villasi and
thereby directed FGCI to return the amount
that was
paid in excess
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To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi

filed a
Motion for Execution which was favorably
Tinn de Leon, Nely Dumpit, Arvin Gagajena,Julrey Garcia, Jojo Guce, Anj Joson, Pritz Montalvo, Lynette Piñon, Alex Ramos,Juan
Reyes & William Terencio Page 1
Property Cases - Atty. Salazar
Sps Garcia claimed that they are the rightful opposition. Worthy to note is the fact
owner of the said property, but by pursuant to that the building in litigation was
the tax declaration declared for
FGCI owned it. After weighing the said taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not
arguements of both parties, RTC suspend the in the
conduct of sale on the excution of the said Spouses Garcias'. While it is true that
building. tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
ISSUE: they constitute credible proof of claim of
title over the property.
W/N THE SPS GARCIA ARE THE RIGHTFUL
OWNER OF THE SAID PROPOERTY?
RATIO:
RULING It is a basic principle of law that money

judgments are enforceable only against the
:
NOPES.
The Court said that the Spouses Garcia are

trying to protect FGCI from liability by
asserting that they, not FGCI, own the levied
property. The Spouses Garcia are asserting
their separation from
FGCI. FGCI, the judgment debtor, is the
proven owner of the building. Piercing FGCI's
corporate veil will not protect FGCI from its
judgment debt. Piercing will result in the
identification of the Spouses Garcia as FGCI
itself and will make them liable for FGCI's
judgment debt.
The Court found out that the record shows
that, as the party asserting their title, the
Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have
a bonafide title to the building in question.
Aside from their
postulation that as title holders of the land,
the law presumes them to be owners of the
improvements built thereon, the Spouses
Garcia were unable to adduce credible
evidence
to prove their ownership of the property. In
contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily
establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces
of
evidence she appended to her
property incontrovertibly belonging to the number of cases, we recognized the separate

judgment debtor, and if the property ownership of the land from the building
belonging and brushed aside the rule that accessory
to any third person is mistakenly levied follows the principal.
upon to answer for another man's
indebtedness, The rule on accession is not an iron-clad
such person has all the right to challenge dictum. On instances where this Court was
the levy through any of the remedies confronted with cases requiring judicial
provided for determination of the ownership of the building
under the Rules of Court. separate from the lot, it never hesitated to
disregard such rule. The case at bar is of
The right of a third-party claimant to file a similar
terceria is founded on his title or right of import. When there are factual and evidentiary
possession. Corollary thereto, before the court evidence to prove that the building and the
can exercise its supervisory power to direct the lot on which it stands are owned by different
release of the property mistakenly levied and persons, they shall be treated separately. As
the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the such, the building or the lot, as the case may
claimant must rst unmistakably establish his be, can be made liable to answer for the
ownership or right of possession thereon. In
Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya , we declared that
for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper,
the claimant must first sufficiently establish his
right on the property.
It likewise failed to escape our attention that

FGCI is in actual possession of the building
and as the payment of taxes coupled with
actual possession of the land covered by
tax
declaration strongly supports a claim of
ownership.
While it is a hornbook doctrine that the

accessory follows the principal, 31 that is,
the
ownership of the property gives the
right by accession to everything which
is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto,
either naturally or artificially, 32 such
rule is not without exception. In cases where
there is a clear and convincing evidence to
prove that the principal and the accessory
are not owned by one and the same person
or
entity, the presumption shall not be applied
and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In
a
obligation of its respective stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to

owner. her the corresponding certificate of stock,
claiming that said dividend, although paid out
in the form of stock, is fruit or income and
therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or
In the matter of the testate estate of Emil life tenant.
Maurice Bachrach, deceased.
MARY MCDONALD BACHRACH , petitioner- Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of
appellee, vs . SOPHIE SEIFERT and ELISA the deceased, opposed said petition on the
ELIANOFF , oppositors-appellants. ground that the stock dividend in question was
not income but formed part of the capital and
Facts therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but
: to the remainderman. And they have
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no appealed from the order granting the
forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald petition and overruling their objection.
Bachrach, in his last will and testament made Issue: Is a stock dividend fruit or income,
varius legacies in cash and willed the which
remainder of his estate:
“Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath

and devise to my beloved wife Mary McDonald
Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of
the remainder of all my estate after payment
of the legacies, bequests, and gifts provided
for above; and she may enjoy said usufruct
and use or spend such fruits as she may in
any manner wish."
The will further provided that upon the death

of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one half of all his
estate "shall be divided share and share alike
by and between my legal heirs, to the
exclusion of my brothers."
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of

108,000 shares of stock of the Atok Big Wedge
Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter
54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock
dividend on the said
108,000
shares.
On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald

Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the
estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize
the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as
administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach,
to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of
belongs to the usufructuary, or is it capital or no division or severance from the corporate

part of the corpus of the estate, which assets of the subject of the dividend; that it
pertains to the remainderman? does not distribute property but simply
dilutes the shares as they existed before;
Held and that it takes nothing from the
: property of the corporation, and adds
Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that nothing to the interests of the shareholders.
the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all
the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the
property in the usufruct. The stock dividend Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat 48 Phil
in question in this case is a civil fruit of the 536
original investment. The shares of stock issued Phil Sugar Estate v Poizat 48 Phil
in payment of said dividend may be sold 536
independently of the original shares just as Fa
cts
the offspring of a domestic animal may
:
be sold independently of its mother.
August 25, 1905, the appellant,
with his
“The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the
consent executed to and in favor of
property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of
stock dividend are civil fruits of the original her husband, Juan M. Poizat, a
investment. They represent profits, and the general power of
delivery of the certificate of stock covering
said dividend is equivalent to the payment of
said profits. Said shares may be sold
independently of the original shares, just as
the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold
independently of its mother.”
For reference, if asked why Pennsylvania rule

is more in accord with our statutory
laws than the Massachusetts rule with
regard to the issue…
Pennsylvia rule- declares that all earnings

of the corporation made prior to the death of
the testator stockholder belong to the corpus
of the estate, and that all earnings, when
declared as dividends in whatever form,
made during the lifetime of the
usufructuary or life tenant are income and
belong to the usufructuary or life tenant.
Massachusetts rule - It regards cash

dividends, however large, as income, and
stock dividends, however made, as capital.
It holds that a stock dividend is not in any
true sense any dividend at all since it involves
attorney, which among other things, this defendant to the payment of

authorized him to do in her name, place the debt
which, as to appellant, was not a
and stead, and making use of her rights
valid
and actions, the following things: Toloanor contract. That the judgment
borrowanyamountincashorfungible was rendered by confession
conditionshemaydeemconvenientco lecting when the plaintiff and J. M.
orpayingtheprincipalorinterest,forthetime, Poizat knew that Poizat was not
andundertheprincipaloftheinterest,when authorized to confess judgment,
theyrespectivelyshouldorprivatedocuments, and that the proceeding was a
andmakingtheretransactionswithorwithout constructive fraud.
mortgage,pledgeorpersonalsecurities oThat at the time the action was filed
November 2, 1912, Juan M. Poizat applied and the judgment rendered, this
defendant was absent from the
for and obtained from the plaintiff a credit Philippine Islands,
for the sum of 10,000 Pounds Sterling to
be drawn on the" Banco Espanol del Rio de
la Plata" in London not later than January,
1913. Later, to secure the payment of the
loan, he executed a mortgage upon the
real property of his wife.
For failure to pay the loan, on November
12,
1923, plaintiff, PhilSugar Estate, brought
an action against the defendants to
foreclose the mortgage.
August 22, 1924, execution was issued
directing the sale of the mortgaged
property to satisfy the judgment.
September 18, 1924, the property was
sold to
the PhilSugar Estate.
September 23, 1924, and for the first
time, the appellant (wife) personally
appeared by her present attorney, and
objected to the confirmation of the sale,
among other things, upon illegally
executed, and is null and void, because:
othe agent of this defendant was
not authorized to execute it
othat there was no
consideration
oThat the plaintiff, with full knowledge
that J. M. Poizat was acting beyond
the scope of his authority, filed this
action to subject the property of
and had no knowledge of Gabriela Andrea de Coster were

the execution of the husband and wife, and that the real
mortgage. property upon which the mortgage was
oThat after the judgment of her sole property before her marriage,
foreclosure became final and and that it was her paraphernal
order of the sale of the property property at the time the mortgage was
was made, that this executed, and that the new building
defendant for the first time constructed on the land was the
learned that he mortgage property of the conjugal partnership.
contract was tainted with fraud, Giving to it the very broadest
and that she first knew and construction, he would not have any
learned of such things on the authority to mortgage her property,
11th of September, 1924. unless the mortgage was executed for
oThat J. M. Poizat was not her "and in her name, place or stead,"
authorized to bind her property and as her act and deed. The mortgage
to secure the payment of his in question was not so executed. it was
personal debts.
signed by Don Juan M. Poizat in his own
oThat the plaintiff knew that the name, his own proper person, and by
agent of the defendant was not him only, and it
authorized to bind her or her
property.
oThat the mortgage was executed to
secure a loan of 10,000 Pounds
which was not made to this
defendant or for her benefit, but
was made to him personally and
for the personal use and benefit
of J. M. Poizat.
Issue: The legal force and effect of the real

mortgage in question , by whom and for
whom it was executed, and upon whom is it
binding, and whether or not it is null and void
as to the appellant.
Held
:
Real mortgage contract is null and

void.
*Question of authority of attorneys to

represent wife is not material to the case
It thus appears that at the time the

power of attorney and the mortgage
were executed, Don Juan M. Poizat and
was acknowledge by him in his personal to the contrary, it must be presumed

capacity, and there is nothing in either that the new building is conjugal
the signature or acknowledgment which property of the husband and wife. As
shows or tends to show that it was such, it is subject of the debts of the
executed for or on behalf of his wife or conjugal partnership for the payment or
"in her name, place or stead." It should security of which the husband has the
have been executed by both husband power to mortgage or otherwise
and wife, and should have been so encumber the property.
acknowledged.
Dept of Education v Casibang
It should be noted that this is a
mortgage upon real property, the title Facts:
to which cannot be divested except by
sale on execution or the formalities of a The property in question is a portion of Lot
will or deed. For such reasons, the law 115 covered by an OCT in the name of Juan
requires that a power of attorney to Cepeda. Upon the request of Mayor Caronan,
mortgage or sell real property should Cepeda allowed the construction and operation
be executed with all of the formalities of a school on the western portion of his
required in a deed. For the same reason property. The school is known as Solana
that the personal signature of Poizat,
standing alone, would not convey the
title of his wife in her own real
property, such a signature would not
bind her as a mortgagor in real
property, the title to which was in her
name.
Under his power of attorney, Juan M.
Poizat may have had authority to
borrow money and mortgage the real
property of his wife, but the law
specifies how and in what manner it
must be done, and the stubborn fact
remains that, as to the transaction in
question, that power was never
exercised. The mortgage in question
was executed by him and him only, and
for such reason, it is not binding upon
the wife, and as to her, it is null and
void.
It is an undisputed fact, which appears
in the mortgage itself, that the land in
question was the paraphernal property
of the wife, but after the marriage the
old buildings on the property were torn
down and a new building constructed
and, in the absence of evidence
North Central School, operating under the Yes. It is undisputed that the property is
control and supervision of DepEd. covered by an OCT in the name of Cepeda. As
Respondents and other descendants of registered owners of the lots in question, the
Cepeda continued to tolerate the use and respondents have a right to enject any person
possession of the property by the school. illegaly occupying their property. Such right is
Later on, the respondents entered and imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that
occupied a portion of the property, upon they were aware of the petitioner's occupation
discovery of this, the teachers of the school of the property, and regardless of the length of
brought the matter to the attention of the that possession, the lawful owners have a right
brgy captain. The school officials demanded to demand the return of their property at any
that the respondents vacate the property time as long as the possession was
which respondents refused to do. DepEd filed unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This
a complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages right is never barred by laches. the occupation
against the respindents. MCTC ruled in favor of the subject lot is by mere tolerance or
of DepEd and directed respondents to vacate permission of the respondents, the DepEd,
the premises. RTC affirmed the MCTCs ruling. without
Respondents then demanded the petitioner to
either pay rent, purchase the area or vacate
the premises. DepEd did not heed and refused
to recognize the ownership of the respondents
over the property. Respondents then filed am
action for Recovery of Possession against
DepEd. They averred that since their late
father did not have any immediate need of the
land in 1965, he consented to the building of
the temporary structure and allowed the
conduct of classes in the premises. That they
have been deprived of the use and enjoyment
of the portion of the property and are entitled
to just compensation and reasonable rent. In
their answer, DepEd allege that it owned the
subject property because it was purchased by
civic-minded residents of Solana from Cepede.
That the property has always been occupied
and used adversely, peacefully, continuously
and in the concept of owner for almost 40
years. That respondents lost whatever right
they had over the property through laches.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, finding that
they are the owners of the property. Ca
affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issue:
W/N the respondents is the owner of the
property
Ruling:
any contract between them, is bound by an On April 14, 1992, BDC executed a Contract to
implied promise that it will vacate the same Sell in favor of Diaz. On April 15, 1994,
upon demand. Hence, until such demand to however, BDC informed Diaz that
vacate was communicated by the respondents respondent Edgar Arreza was claiming that
to the DepEd, respondents are not required to the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the
do any act to recover the subject land, rights over the property. BDC then placed
precisely because they knew of the nature of Diaz’s account in “inactive status.” To resolve
the DepEd's possession which is by mere the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, BDC
tolerance filed a complaint for Interpleader against
them, before the RTC, Makati City, Branch
146. On March 27, 1996, the Makati City RTC
BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. MONTANO Branch 146 ruled that the signatures of
DIAZ Sps. Melgazo transferring their rights to Nacua
were mere forgeries. Thus, it ruled that Arreza
had a better right
Doctrine: Abuyeringoodfaith
Facts: Petitioner Bliss Development

Corporation is the registered owner of Lot No.
27, Block 30, New Capitol Estates I, Brgy.
Matandang Balara, Diliman, Quezon City, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 331582. On October 19, 1984, it
entered into and executed a Deed of Sale over
the said property in favor of Spouses Emiliano
and Leonila Melgazo, both of whom are now
deceased.
On May 7, 1991, a certain Rodolfo Nacua sent

a letter to BDC, saying that Sps. Melgazo
transferred to him their rights over the
property. He further expressed willingness to
pay the outstanding obligations of Sps.
Melgazo to BDC. Before the property was fully
paid, however, Nacua sold his rights to
Olivia Garcia, through a Deed of Transfer of
Rights. Later, Garcia transferred her rights to
Elizabeth Reyes. Reyes then transferred her
rights to Domingo Tapay, who then later sold
his rights to herein respondent Montano Diaz
for P600,000.00. Diaz then paid BDC the
amortizations due on the property,
amounting to P406,915.15, and BDC issued a
permit to occupy the property in favor of
Diaz. Diaz then introduced improvements
on the property, amounting to
P700,000.00
over the property. This decision became full and fair price for the same at the time of
final and executory. such purchase or before he or she has notice
of the claim or interest of some other person
On August 27, 1996, Diaz filed the present in the property. For one to be considered a
complaint for sum of money against BDC purchaser in good faith, the following
before the RTC, Makati City. Diaz argued requisites must concur: (1) that the purchaser
that BDC and Tapay’s representations buys the property of another without notice
led him to believe that he had a good title over that some other person has a right to or
the property, but due to the court’s ruling in interest in such property; and (2) that the
the interpleader case, he was constrained to purchaser pays a full and fair price for the
transfer the property to Arreza. property at the time of such purchase or
before he or she has notice of the claim of
another. We find that in the
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
because he failed to prove that he is an
assignee in good faith.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC finding Diaz

is both a buyer and builder in good faith.
Considering that the property involved is
registered land, Diaz need not go beyond the
title to be considered a buyer in good faith.
Issue: W/N BDC acted in bad faith; W/N

Diaz is a purchaser for value and good faith
Ruling:
Petitioner BDC acted in bad faith BDC acted in

bad faith, when it allowed Diaz to take
over the payment of the amortizations over
the subject property. As the CA correctly
noted, “It is undisputed that Bliss knew about
Arreza’s claim in 1991. It even received
amortization payments from Arreza. Yet,
Bliss acknowledged the transfer to Diaz and
received the monthly amortizations paid by
Diaz. Also, Bliss is aware that should Arreza
pursue his claim in court, Diaz may be evicted
from the property.
Respondent Diaz is not a purchaser

for value and in good faith This Court had
ruled that a purchaser in good faith and for
value is one who buys property of another
without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays
case at bar, the first element is lacking. A the RTC found "as valid and genuine," was not
careful review of the records of this case the source document for the transfer of the
reveals that Diaz, in fact, failed to diligently subject property and the issuance of TCT No.
inquire into the title of his predecessor before 262218 in the name of Sps. Sarili 25 but
entering into the contract of sale. As such, he rather the February 16,
cannot be considered a buyer in good faith. 1978 deed of sale, the fact of which may be
gleaned from the Affidavit of Late Registration
executed by Isabel (affidavit of Isabel).
Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. Lagrosa Petitioners essentially argue that regardless of
the fictitious February 16,
G.R. No. 193517 January 15, 2014 1978 deed of sale, there was still a valid
Facts conveyance of the subject property to Sps.
: Sarili who relied on the authority of Ramos (as
per the subject SPA) to sell the same.
Respondent Pedro F. Lagrosa filed a
complaint against Spouses Sarili and
against the Register of Deeds. Lagrosa
claims that he is a resident of California,
USA, and that during his vacation in the
Philippines, he discovered that his parcel
of land located in Caloocan is now under
the name of Victorino Sarili by virtue of a
falsified Deed of Sale dated February 16, 1978
purportedly executed by him and his wife,
Amelia U. Lagrosa (Amelia). Lagrosa prayed
for the annulment of TCT No. 262218, and
that Sps. Sarili deliver to him the possession
of the subject property, or, in the alternative,
that Sps. Sarili and the RD jointly and
severally pay him the amount of
P1,000,000.00, including moral damages as
well as attorney's fees. In their answer, Sps.
Sarili maintained that they are innocent
purchasers for value, having purchased the
subject property from Ramon B. Rodriguez,
who possessed and presented a Special Power
of Attorney to dispose of the same, and, in
such capacity, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 20, 1992
conveying the said property in their favor.
RTC rendered a Decision finding
respondent's signature on the subject SPA as
"the same and exact replica" of his signature
in the November 25, 1999 SPA in favor of
Lourdes. respondent appealed to the CA.
CA granted respondent's appeal and held
that the RTC erred in its ruling since the
November 20, 1992 deed of sale, which
Issue ART. 450. The owner of the land on which

: anything has been built, planted or sown
in bad faith may demand the demolition
Whether or not there was a valid conveyance of the work, or that the planting or sowing
of the subject property to Sps. Sarili be removed, in order to replace things in their
Held former condition at the expense of the person
: who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price
It is well-settled that even if the procurement of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
of a certificate of title was tainted with
fraud and misrepresentation, such defective ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding
title may be the source of a completely articles, the landowner is entitled to damages
legal and valid title in the hands of an from the builder, planter or sower.
innocent purchaser for value. The general
rule is that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in no way oblige him
to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. However, a higher
degree of prudence is required from one who
buys from a person who is not the registered
owner, although the land object of the
transaction is registered. The strength of the
buyer's inquiry on the seller's capacity or legal
authority to sell depends on the proof of
capacity of the seller. If no such power of
attorney is provided or there is one but there
appears to be flaws in its notarial
acknowledgment, mere inspection of the
document will not do; the buyer must
show that his investigation went beyond
the document and into the circumstances of its
execution. The Court, however, finds a need
to remand the case to the court a quo
in order to determine the rights and
obligations of the parties with respect to
the house Sps. Sarili had built on the subject
property in bad faith in accordance with
Article 449 in relation to Articles 450, 451,
452, and the first paragraph of Article 546 of
the Civil Code.
ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity.
ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad

faith is entitled to reimbursement for the Maria Villaflores (Maria) was the owner of Lot
necessary expenses of preservation of the 2-A, with an area of 277 square meters, in
land. Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-84.761
xxx xxx (M). In 1980, Maria sold a portion of Lot 2-A
xxx to her nephew, respondent Antonio Villaflores
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be (Antonio).
refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing Antonio then took possession of the portion
sold to him and constructed a house
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
thereon.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Twelve (12) years later, or on August
xxx xxx 15,1992, Maria executed in favor of Antonio a
xxx Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan 3 covering the entire
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is Lot 2-A. However, Antonio did not register
essential that a person asserts title to the land the sale
on which he builds, i.e., that he be a or pay the real property taxes for the
possessor in concept of owner, and that he subject land.
be unaware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates
it. As for Sps. Sarili, they knew — or at the
very least, should have known — from the very
beginning that they were dealing with a person
who possibly had no authority to sell the
subject property considering the palpable
irregularity in the subject SPA's
acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on
said document and without any further
investigation on Ramos's capacity to sell,
Sps. Sarili still chose to proceed with its
purchase and even built a house thereon.
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be
seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually
aware of a flaw or defect in their title or mode
of acquisition and have consequently built the
house on the subject property in bad faith
under legal contemplation. The case is
therefore remanded to the court a quo for the
proper application of the above-cited Civil
Code provisions.
FILOMENA R. BENEDICTO, petitioner, vs .

ANTONIO VILLAFLORES
Facts
:
Filomena was rescissible, fraudulent,
On August 31, 1994, Maria sold the same Lot fictitious, or simulated.
2-A to Filomena, evidenced by a Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Filomena registered the RTC - Filomena was the one who registered
sale with the Registry of Deeds of the sale in good faith; as such, she has
Meycauayan on September 6, better right than Antonio. It rejected
1994. Consequently, the title was then Antonio's allegation of bad faith on the part
named after Filomena and paid the real of Filomena because no sufficient evidence
property taxes for the subject parcel of land. was adduced to prove it, therefore Antonio is
declared to be a builder in good faith of his
*****************meat of improvement/building erected in TCT No. T-
the 208268 (M) and the provisions of Art. 448 of
case******************* the New Civil Code applies;
****
*AccionPubliciana-rightofpossesion CA - The CA affirmed the RTC for upholding
Filomena's ownership of Lot 2-A and for
On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case declaring Antonio a builder in good faith.
for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation of However, it remanded
Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages and
Attorney's Fees against Antonio. She alleged
that she acquired Lot 2-A in
1994 from her grandaunt Maria by virtue of the
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan . At the time of
the sale, she was not aware that Antonio had
any claim or
interest over the subject property. Antonio
assured
her that there was no impediment to her
acquisition of the land, and promised to
vacate the property five (5) years after the
sale. In August 1999, Antonio requested an
extension of one (1) year, and offered to pay
a monthly rental of P2,000.00, which she
granted. However, in 2000, Antonio refused to
vacate the property and, instead, claimed
absolute ownership of Lot 2-A.
Antonio traversed the complaint, asserting

absolute ownership over Lot 2-A. He alleged
that he purchased the subject property from
Maria in 1980; and that he took possession of
the same and constructed his house thereon.
He came to know of the sale in favor of
Filomena only in 2000 when the latter
demanded that he vacate the property. He
averred that Filomena was aware of the sale;
hence, the subsequent sale in favor of
the case to the RTC for further proceedings to formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the
determine the respective rights of the parties owner and possessor in good faith
under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, of a piece of land, to administer complete
and the amount due Antonio. justice to
both of them in such a way
as neither one nor the other may enrich
ISSUE:
himself of that which does not belong to
him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the
W/N Antonio is not entitled to any
current market value of the
reimbursement because he possessed the
property by mere tolerance.
RULING:
No. It is not disputed that the construction of

Antonio's house was undertaken long
before the sale in favor of Filomena; that when
Filomena bought the property from
Maria, Antonio's house which he used as
residence had already been erected on the
property.
Thus, the Court sustain the finding that

Antonio is a builder in good faith.
Under Article 448, a landowner is given the

option to either appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the
proper amount of indemnity, or sell the
land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly,
Article
546 provides that a builder in
good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for
all the necessary and useful expenses
incurred; it also gives him right of retention
until full reimbursement is made.
RATIO:
According to Pecson v. CA:
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code

is to administer justice between the
parties involved. In this regard, this Court had
long
ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717
(1920)]
that the said provision was
improvements which should be made the Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they
basis of reimbursement. A contrary constructed their house was the lot which was
ruling would unjustly enrich the private consistently pointed to them as theirs by
respondents who would otherwise be Vergon's agents over the seven (7)-year
allowed to acquire a highly valued income- period they were paying for the lot. They
yielding four-unit apartment building interposed the defense of being buyers in
for a measly amount. Consequently, the good faith and impleaded Vergon as third-
parties party defendant claiming that because of the
should therefore be allowed to warranty against eviction, they were entitled
adduce evidence on the present market value to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is
of the apartment building upon decided against them.
which the trial court should base its finding as
to the amount of reimbursement to RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses and
be paid by the landowner. found that petitioners' house was undoubtedly
built on Lot
LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES ,
petitioners, vs . JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D.
MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY
INVESTMENTS CORPORATION , respondents.
Facts:
Macabagdal, Respondent-spouses purchased
from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation
(Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a 325-square-meter
land located in
Vergonville Subdivision No. 10 at Las Piñas
City,
Metro Manila and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 62181 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City. On the other hand,
petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S,
which is adjacent to Lot No. 2-R.
Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the

necessary building permit and the approval of
Vergon, Briones (petitioners) constructed a
house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was
Lot No. 2-S. After being informed of the mix
up by Vergon's manager, respondent spouses
immediately demanded petitioners to
demolish the house and vacate the property.
Petitioners, however, refused to heed their
demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed an
action to recover ownership and possession of
the said parcel of land with the RTC of Makati
City.
No. 2-R. appropriating the building by paying the

proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding the price of the land. The choice belongs to
that the lot upon which petitioners built their the owner of the land, a rule that accords with
house was not the one (1) which Vergon sold the principle of accession, that the accessory
to them. Based on the documentary evidence, follows the principal and not the other way
such as the titles of the two (2) lots, the around.
contracts to sell, and the survey report made
by the geodetic engineer, petitioners' house However, even as the option lies with the
was built on the lot of the respondent- landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
spouses. Petitioners insist that they relied preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot,
with full faith and confidence in the reputation for instance, compel the owner of the building
of Vergon's agents when they pointed the to remove the building from the land without
wrong property to them. Even the President of first exercising either option. It is only if the
Vergon, Felix Gonzales, consented to the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder
construction of the house when he signed the or planter fails to purchase it where its value
building permit. And that they are builder’s in is not more
good faith.
Issue: WON Petitioners are builders in good

faith
Held:
We note that the CA and RTC did not overlook

or fail to appreciate any material circumstance
which, when properly considered, would have
altered the result of the case. Indeed, it is
beyond cavil that petitioners mistakenly
constructed their house on Lot No. 2-R which
they thought was Lot No. 2-S.
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good

faith, and since no proof exists to show that
the mistake was done by petitioners in bad
faith, the latter should be presumed to have
built the house in good faith.
When a person builds in good faith on the

land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code
governs. Wherein, it covers cases in which the
builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at
least, to have a claim of title thereto.
The builder in good faith can compel the

landowner to make a choice between
than the value of the improvements, that the by Installments, the subject matter of which
owner may remove the improvements from is a parcel of land in Sindangan. It provided
the land. The owner is entitled to such that upon the failure of the buyer to pay the
remotion only when, after having chosen to remaining balance within the time stipulated,
sell his land, the other party fails to pay for he shall return the land to the seller, and the
the same. seller shall return all the amounts paid by the
buyer. Tuatis took possession of the land
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be and constructed a residential building.
indemnified for the necessary and useful Tuatis asserted that she paid Visminda the
expenses they may have made on the subject remaining balance of P3000 in the
property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil presence of one Erik Selda and thereafter
Code provide, requested Visminda to sign the absolute deed
of sale. Visminda refused contending that the
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be purchase price has not been fully paid.
refunded to every possessor; but only the The RTC
possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the

possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere

pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in good faith; but he may remove
the ornaments with which he has embellished
the principal thing if it suffers no injury
thereby, and if his successor in the possession
does not prefer to refund the amount
expended.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have

the option to appropriate the house on the
subject land after payment to petitioners of
the appropriate indemnity or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless
its value is considerably more than the value
of the structures, in which case petitioners
shall pay reasonable rent.
Tuatis v. Spouses Escol

Facts: Visminda Escol, the seller and Ophelia
Tuatis, the buyer entered into a Deed of Sale
dismissed Tuatis’s complaint and also ruled proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
that Tuatis constructed the building in bad faith the terms of the lease and in case of
for she had knowledge of the fact that disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
Visminda is still the absolute owner of the land thereof.
and there was also bad faith on the part of According to the provision, the landowner can
Visminda since she allowed the construction of choose between appropriating the building
the building without opposition on her part. by paying the proper indemnity for the
The rights of the parties must, therefore, be same, as provided for in Articles 546 and
determined as if they both had acted in bad 548 of the Civil Code; or obliging the builder to
faith. Their rights in such cases are governed pay the price of the land, unless its value is
by Article 448 of the Civil Code. The Court of considerably more than that of the
Appeals dismissed the appeal by Tuatis which structures, in which case the builder in
resulted to the finality of the appealed good faith shall pay reasonable rent.
decision. Visminda filed a writ of execution.
Tuatis then moved that the RTC issue an Under the firstoption, Visminda may
order allowing her to buy the subject appropriate for herself the building on the
property and maintained that she has the subject property after
right to choose between being indemnified for
the value of her building or buying from
Visminda the parcel of land. During the
pendency of the motion, the writ of execution
was enforced. Tuatis filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus but the same was denied hence
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Tuatis is entitled to

exercise the options granted in Art. 448 of the
Civil Code. NO.
Held: No, Tuatis is not entitled to exercise
the options granted in Article 448 of the Civil
Code.
Article 448 provides that the owner of the land
on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after
indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary and subject property until Visminda pays proper
useful expenses the latter incurred for said indemnity; and (b) under the second option, a
building, as provided in Article 546 of the right not to be obliged to pay for the price of
Civil Code. Until Visminda appropriately the subject property, if it is considerably
indemnifies Tuatis for the building higher than the value of the building, in which
constructed by the latter, Tuatis may retain case, she can only be obliged to pay
possession of the building and the subject reasonable rent for the same.
property. The rule that the choice under Article 448 of
Under the secondoption, Visminda may choose the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land
not to appropriate the building and, instead, is in accord with the principle of accession,
oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair i.e., that the accessory follows the principal
value of the land.The P10,000.00 price of the and not the other way around. Even as the
subject property, as stated in the Deed of option lies with the landowner, the grant to
Sale on Installment executed in him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
November 1989, shall no longer apply, since landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the option and compel
price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s
rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and
not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will
then be statutory, and not contractual, arising
only when Visminda has chosen her option
under Article 448 of the Civil Code
Still under the second option, if the present or
current value of the land, the subject property
herein, turns out to be considerably more than
that of the building built thereon, Tuatis
cannot be obliged to pay for the subject
property, but she must pay Visminda
reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and
Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease;
otherwise, the court will fix the terms.
The Court highlights that the options under
Article
448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of
the subject property. There is no basis for
Tuatis’ demand that, since the value of the
building she constructed is considerably higher
than the subject property, she may choose
between buying the subject property from
Visminda and selling the building to Visminda
for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of
options is for Visminda, not Tuatis, to make.
And, depending on Visminda’s choice, Tuatis’
rights as a builder under Article 448 are
limited to the following: (a) under the first
option, a right to retain the building and
instead the owner of the building to remove it Eastern, Inc. Ogas sold the property
from the land. to his daughter Rose O. Alciso. TCT No
T-1068 was cancelled and TCT No.
The raison d’etre for this provision has
T-12422 5 was issued in the name of
been enunciated thus: Where the builder,
Alciso.
planter or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners, On 25 August 1979, Alciso entered
and it becomes necessary to protect the into a Deed of Sale with Right to
owner of the improvements without causing Repurchase, selling the property to
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of Jaime Sansano for P10,000. Alciso later
the impracticability of creating a state of repurchased the property from
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a
Sansano and, on 28 March 1980, she
just solution by giving the owner of the land
entered into another Deed of Absolute
the option to acquire the improvements after
Sale, this time selling the property to
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and Celso S. Bate for P50,000. The lease
the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to rights over the said property in
exercise either option. It is the owner of the favor of ESSO STANDARD
land who is authorized to exercise the option, EASTERN, INC., as a lessor is likewise
because his right is older, and because, by the hereby
principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.
Visminda’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution cannot be deemed as an expression
of her choice to recover possession of the
subject property under the first option, since
the options under Article 448 of the Civil Code
and their respective consequences were also
not clearly presented to her by the 19 April
1999
Decision of the RTC. She must then be
given the opportunity to make a choice
between the options available to her after
being duly informed herein of
her rights and obligations under
both.
Spouses Narvaez vs. Spouses Alciso 594 SCRA

60
Facts
:
Larry A. Ogas (Ogas) owned a 1,329-
square
meter parcel of land situated in
Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet a portion
of which was subject to a 30-year
lease agreement with Esso Standard
transfered in full to the buyer. TCT August 1979 Deed of Sale with Right to
No. T-12422 was cancelled and TCT No. Repurchase, the 28 March 1980 Deed of
T-16066 Absolute Sale, and the 14 August 1981
9 was issued in the name of Deed of Sale of Realty be annulled; (2) the
Bate. Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel
On 14 August 1981, Bate entered into a TCT Nos. T-16066 and T-16528; (3)
the Spouses Narvaez be ordered to
Deed of Sale of Realty, selling the
reconvey the property; and (4) Sansano,
property to the spouses Dominador R.
Bate, and the Spouses Narvaez be
Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez (Spouses
ordered to pay damages, attorney's
Narvaez) for P80,000. TCT No. T-16066
fees and expenses of litigation. Alciso
was cancelled and TCT No. T-16528
claimed that the intention of the parties was
11 was issued in the name of the
to enter into a contract of real estate
Spouses Narvaez.
mortgage and not a contract of sale with
In 1982, the Spouses Narvaez
right of repurchase. The RTC held among
built a
others that Deed of Sale of Realty
commercial building on the
contained a stipulation pour autrui in
property amounting to P300,000. Alciso
favor of Alciso — Alciso could repurchase
demanded that a stipulation be
the property and that
included in the 14 August
1981 Deed of Sale of Realty allowing
her to
repurchase the property from the
Spouses Narvaez. In compliance with
Alciso's demand, the Deed stated
that, "The SELLER (Bate) carries over
the manifested intent of the original
SELLER of the property (Alciso) to buy
back the same at a price under
such conditions as the present BUYERS
(Spouses Narvaez) may impose." The
Spouses Narvaez furnished Alciso with a
copy of the Deed.
Alciso alleged that she informed the
Spouses
Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase
the property. The Spouses Narvaez
demanded P300,000, but Alciso was
willing to pay only P150,000. Alciso
and the Spouses Narvaez failed to
reach an agreement on the
repurchase price.
In a Complaint dated 15 June 1984 and
filed with the RTC, Alciso prayed that
(1) the 25
Alciso could either appropriate the

commercial building after payment eld:
of the indemnity equivalent to The Court disagreed with the Court of
Appeals.
one-half of its market value when
The Court of Appeals stated
constructed or sell the land to
that:
the Spouses Narvaez.
“The contract between defendants-
he Spouses Narvaez appealed to the
appellants Bate and Narvaez spouses is
Court of Appeals. The Spouses
a contract of sale with a stipulation
Narvaez claimed that (1) the 14
granting plaintiffs-appellees the right
August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty
to repurchase the property at a
did not contain a stipulation pour
reasonable price. Being the absolute
autrui — not all requisites were
owners of the property in
present; (2) the RTC erred in setting
question, defendants-appellants
the repurchase price at P80,000; (3)
Narvaez spouses have the undisputed
they were purchasers for value and
right to use, enjoy and build thereon.
in good faith; and (4) they were
builders in good faith. Having built the improvement on the
The Court of Appeals held among land they own and registered in their
names, they are likened to builders in
others that the Spouses Narvaez
good faith and their rights over the
were builders in good faith; and
improvement shall be governed by
Alciso could either appropriate the
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
commercial building after
payment of the indemnity or Applying said Article, plaintiffs-
oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay appellees, after repurchasing the land,
the price of the land, unless the will have the following options:(1) to
price was considerably more than appropriate for themselves the building
that of the building. The Spouses upon payment of its value to
Narvaez elevated the case to the defendants-appellants Narvaez
Supreme Court. spouses; OR (2) to compel the
defendants-appellants Narvaez spouses
to buy the land, unless the
I
value of thereof [sic] be During his lifetime, Marcelo owned a parcel of

considerably more than that of the land (Lot G) covered by an OCT, when he
building, in which case, said spouses died, he was survived by his wife Higinia and
his children. 5 years before he died, Marcelo
may lease the land instead. The
allowed his son, Marcelino to build his house
parties shall agree upon the terms of
on a portion of the parcel of land, later,
the lease and in case of disagreement,
Marcelino’s son also build his house on the
the courts shall fix the terms thereof.” disputed property. Marcelos heirs extra-
Article 448 does not apply to a case judicially settled among themselves Lot G.
where the owner of the land is the Daniel sold a portion of his share to SPS
builder, sower, or planter who then later Merete. Later on, the heirs subdivided Lot G
loses ownership of the land by sale or into Lot G-1 in favor of Marcelino and Lot G-2
in favor of Higinia, Daniel, Natividad, Juan,
donation. Elsewise stated, where the
Cecilio, Margarita, Lorenzo, Lauro and
true owner himself is the builder of the
Anacleto. Lot G-2 was further subdivided and
works on his own land, the issue of the remaining portion, Lot 1, became subject
good faith or bad faith is entirely of TCT with Higinia, Margarita, Natividad,
irrelevant. Article Lorenzo, Daniel, Oscar, Merete, Cecilio,
448 is inapplicable in the present Carmelita and Anacleto. The co-owners
case executed a
because the Spouses Narvaez built
the commercial building on the land that
they own. Besides, to compel them to
buy the land, which they own, would
be absurd.
In a sale with right of repurchase,
the applicable provisions are Articles
1606 and
1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448.
Under Article 1616, Alciso may exercise
her right of redemption by paying the
Spouses Narvaez (1) the price of the
sale, (2) the expenses of the contract,
(3) legitimate payments made by
reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary
and useful expenses made on the thing
sold. In the present case, the cost of
the building constitutes a useful
expense. Useful expenses include
improvements which augment the
value of the land.
Heirs of Cabal v SPS Lorenzo and Cabal
FACTS
:
deed of agreement of partition and in the same Marcelino was aware that he intruded on
deed, Lorenzo bought the shares of Higinia, the respondents property when he continued
Margarita, Daniel and Natividad. The to occupy and possess the disputed lot after
subdivision plan revealed that Marcelino and partition was effected. The fact that Marcelino
his son occupied and built their houses in the mortgaged Lot G-1 is not an indication of bad
southernmost portion of Lot 1-E and not faith since there is no concrete evidence that
adjacent to Lot G-1, the respondents he was aware at that time that the property
confronted Marcelino on this matter which covered by the title and the one he was
resulted to a re-survey and swapping of occupying were not the same. There is no
lots for the purpose of reconstruction of evidence that he introduced improvements on
land titles. But this did not materialize Lot G-1.
and efforts to settle were futile.
Respondents filed a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages
against Marcelino. Marcelino answered with
counterclaim, contending that respondents
have no cause of action against him because
he has been in possession in good faith since
1949 with respondents knowledge and
acquiescence. MTC ruled in favor of
Marcelino saying that prescription has
barred respondents from filing a claim. RTC
reversed the decision of the MTC saying that
Marcelino’s possession was in the concept of a
co-owner and therefore prescription does not
run in his favor. CA affirmed the RTC ruling,
that Marcelino may have been in good faith
when he started to occupy the land but his
occupation in good faith diminished after Lot
G was surveyed.
ISSUE
:
W/N Marcelino occupied the land in good
faith
RULING
:
The Court remanded the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings to determine
the facts essential to the proper application of
Art. 448 in rel. to Art. 546 and 548 of the NCC.
Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot was
based on a mistaken belief that Lot-G-1 is the
same lot on which he has nuilt his house with
the consent of his father. There is no
evidence, other than bare allegation, that
LEONILA SARMINETO v. HON. ENRIQUE wife the sum of 40,000.00 as the value of
A. AGANA the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or the option to
allow them to purchase the LAND for
Doctrine: Abuilderingoodfaith;Art.448 P25,000.00. SARMIENTO did not exercise any
Facts: It appears that while Ernesto Valentino of the two options within the indicated period,
was still courting his wife, the latter's mother and ERNESTO was then allowed to deposit the
had told him sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the
the couple could build a residential house on a purchase price for the LAND. This is the
lot of hub of the controversy. SARMIENTO then
145 sq. ms., being Lot D of a subdivision instituted the instant certiorari proceedings.
in Paranaque (the LAND, for short). In 1967,
Ernesto did construct a residential house on Issue: W/N Spouses Ernesto are builders in
the land at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. good faith.
It was probably assumed that the wife's
mother was the owner of the land and that,
eventually, it would somehow be transferred
to the spouses.
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had

been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C.
Santo, Jr. who, on September 7 ,1974, sold the
same to petitioner Leonila Sarmiento. The
following January 6, 1975, Petitioner asked
Ernesto and wife to vacate and, on April 21,
1975, filed an Ejectment suit against them. In
the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal
Court, Petitioner submitted the deed of sale of
the land in her favor, which showed the price
to be P15,000.00. On the other hand, Ernesto
testified that the then cost of the
residential house would be from
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.
The Municipal Court found that private

respondents had built the RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE in good faith, and, disregarding the
testimony of ERNESTO, that it had a value of
P20,000.00. It then ordered ERNESTO and
wife to vacate the LAND after SARMIENTO has
paid them the mentioned sum of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court

of First Instance of Pasay where, after the
submission of memoranda, said Court
rendered a modifying Decision under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
SARMIENTO was required, within 60 days, to
exercise the option to reimburse ERNESTO and
Ruling: We agree that ERNESTO and wife from his encroachment, filed an action for
were builders in good faith in view of the Unlawful Detainer on February 6, 1973 against
peculiar circumstances under which they had DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of Dumangas,
constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far docketed as Civil Case No. I. Said complaint
as they knew, the LAND was owned by was later amended to include DEPRA as a
ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated party plaintiff.
they could build on the property, could
reasonably be expected to later on give MTC- Found that DUMLAO was a builder in
them the LAND. good faith, and applying Article 448 of the
Civil Code.
The owner of the building erected in good faith
on a land owned by another, is entitled to "Ordering that a forced lease is created
retain the possession of the land until he is between the parties with the plaintiffs, as
paid the value of his building, under article
453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the
land. upon, the other hand, has the option,
under article 361 (now Article 448), either to
pay for the building or to sell his land to the
owner of the building.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is

hereby ordered dismissed
FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

AGUSTIN DUMLAO
FACTS
:
Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel

of land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-3087, known as
Lot No. 685, situated in the
municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Agustin
Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an
adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with
an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, DUMLAO constructed his

house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had
encroached on an area of thirty four (34)
square meters of DEPRA's property. After the
encroachment was discovered in a
relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on
November 2,
1972, his mother, Beatriz Derla, after writing
a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back
lessors, and the defendants as lessees, encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to

over the disputed portion with an area of sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot
thirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay for the
paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month, encroaching part of the building, and to sell
payable by the lessee to the lessors within the encroached part of his land, as he had
the first five (5) days of the month the manifested before the Municipal Court. But
rent is due; and the lease shall commence on that manifestation is not binding because it
that day was made in a void proceeding.
that this decision
shall have become However, the good faith of DUMLAO. is part of
final." the
Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First
On July 15, 1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court
Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to
then Court of First Instance of Iloilo. (Court
ruled that the litigated property belongs to
plaintiff evidenced by
title)
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied

upon by
DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the
Decision of the Municipal Court was null and
void ab initio because its jurisdiction is
limited to the sole issue of possession,
whereas
decisions affecting lease, which is an
encumbrance on real property, may only be
rendered by Courts of First Instance.
RULING:
Since the Municipal Court, acted without

jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and
cannot
operate as res judicata to the subject
complaint for
Queting of Title. Besides, even if the
Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata
would not apply due to difference in cause of
action. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial
Court is hereby set aside, and this case is
hereby
ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo for further proceedings consistent
with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA

has the option either to pay for the
possession," without more, of the disputed just solution by giving the owner of the
portion implying thereby that he is entitled land the option to acquire the
to improvements after payment of the proper
have the kitchen removed. He is entitled indemnity, or to oblige the builder or
to such removal only when, after having planter to pay for the land and the sower to
chosen to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner
sell his encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay of the land who is authorized to exercise the
for the same. option,
because his right is older, and
In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his because, by the principle of accession, he is
willingness to pay for the land, but DEPRA entitled to the ownership of the
refused to sell. accessory thing.
The Court however reiterated that:
"The owner of the building erected in good

faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land
until he is paid the value of his
building, under article 453 (now Article
546). The owner of the land, upon the
other hand, has the option, under article 361
(now
Article 448), either to pay for
the building or to sell his land to the owner
of the building. But he cannot, as
respondents here did refuse both to pay
for the building and to sell the land and
compel the owner of the building to remove it
from
the land where it erected. He is
entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same.
Additional benefits were extended to the

builder but the landowner retained his
options.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also
been
explained as follows:
"Where the builder, planter or sower has

acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced
co-ownership, the law has provided a
---------------------------- CFI’s decision that Depra is entitled to possess

ver 2 the disputed portion of his land, implying
that he is entitled to have the kitchen
FRANCISCO DEPRA vs. AGUSTIN DUMLAO removed is invalid. He is entitled to such
removal only when, after having chosen to
[G.R. No. L-57348. May 16, sell his encroached land, Dumlao fails to pay
1985.] FACTS: for the same.
Francisco Depra and Agustin Dumlao Under Article 448, the owner of the land
were owners of adjoining parcels of land. has the option to either pay for the building or
In 1972, to sell his land to the owner of the
Dumlao constructed his house on his lot. building. But he cannot refuse both to pay
However, the kitchen thereof had encroached for the building and to sell the land and
on an area of compel the owner of the building to remove it
34-sq. m. of Depra's property. Such
from the land where it is erected. He is
encroachment was discovered upon a
entitled to such remotion only when, after
relocation survey of Depra’s
having chosen to sell his land, the other party
land. Depra’s mother, Beatriz Depra, wrote a
fails to pay for the same.
letter asking Dumlao to move back from his
encroachment.
An action for Unlawful Detainer was filed
against
Dumlao in the Municipal Court of
Dumangas.
Municipal Court found that Dumlao
was a builder in good faith and ordered a
forced lease agreement over the encroached
portion (5pesos per
month). The judgment lapsed into finality. But
even
then, Depra did not accept payment of rentals,
hence, Dumlao deposited such rentals with
the Municipal Court.
Depra filed a Complaint for Quieting of
Title against Dumlao before CFI of Iloilo
involving the same 34-sq.m. portion of his
land. CFI held that Depra owned the 34-
sq.m. subject of the litigation and entitled to
possess the same.
ISSUE
:
Whether or not Depra is entitled to
possess the disputed portion of his property
RULING
:
The CFI’s decision SET ASIDE.
Case REMANDED to RTC for further
proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code.
sales application on the ground that the
Ortiz vs. Kayanan relinquishment of the homestead rights
92 SCRA of Dolorico I in favor of Comintan and
146 Zamora is proper and that because
Antonio, Dolorico II failed to participate in the
J. public auction, he is forever barred to
claim the property.
TOPIC: Rights of possessor in good faith
Director of Land denied
FACTS: motion for reconsideration.
The ward of Martin Dolorico II owned Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
a lot
subject of Homestead Application. Resources affirmed Regional Land
Officer’s decision.
Upon the death of Dolorico II’s ward in
Bartolome Ortiz sought the review
1931, he continued the cultivation and
possession of the property, without and/or annulment of the decision of the
however filing any application to acquire Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
title thereon. Resources.
In the Homestead application,
Dolorico II
named his uncle, Martin Dolorico I as
his heir and successor in interest.
Dolorico I relinquished his rights to
Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora,
his grandson and son-in-law,
respectively, and requested the Director
of Lands to cancel the homestead
application.
The Homestead application was
cancelled and
respective sales application was
filed.
Dolorico II protested alleging that he
should be given preference to purchase
the lot inasmuch as he is the actual
occupant and has been in continuous
possession of the same since 1931.
Despite opposition, “Portion A” of the
property was sold at public auction
wherein defendant Comintan was the
only bidder.
Regional Land officer dismissed the
protest and gave due course to the
the true owner for the recovery of the
CFI of Quezon awarded ½ portion of the
property. Hence, all the fruits that the
property in litigation to Comintan, being possessor may receive from the time he
the highest bidder, and gave due course is summoned in court, or when he
to the sales application of Zamora over answers the complaint, must be
the other half without prejudice to Ortiz’ delivered and paid by him to the owner
right to participate in the public bidding or lawful possessor. However, even after
of the same. However, should Ortiz be his good faith ceases, the possessor in
not declared the successful bidder, fact can still retain the property,
Comintan and Zamora are ordered to pursuant to Article 546 of the New Civil
reimburse jointly Ortiz for the Code, until he has been fully reimbursed
improvements he has introduced to the for all the necessary and useful expenses
property. made by him on the property. This right
CA affirmed. The judgment became of retention has been considered as one
final and
of the conglomerate of measures devised
executory and a motion for
by the law for the protection of the
execution was filed.
possessor in good faith. Its
In the order of Judge Union Kayanan of
CFI of Quezon, it was found that Ortiz
collected tolls a portion of the property
wherein he has not introduced any
improvements. Such tolls and the
possession of ½ of the land were
awarded to Comintan. In addition, the
other half was awarded to Zamora.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ortiz is a possessor in
good
faith and thus entitled to possession
and tolls collected pending full payment
of the value of the improvements he
introduced
HELD:
Judgment MODIFIED.
A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted.
Possession in good faith ceases
or is legally interrupted from the
moment
defects in the title are made known to
the possessor, by extraneous evidence
or by the filing of an action in court by
object is to guarantee the Cavite. To secure possession of the land from

reimbursement of the expenses, such the vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20,
as those for the preservation of the 1929, instituted Civil Case No. 1935 in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite. The trial
property, or for the enhancement of its
court found for the plaintiff in a decision
utility or productivity. It permits the
which was armed by this Supreme Court on
actual possessor to remain in appeal (G. R. No. 33017).
possession while he has not been
reimbursed by the person who When plaintiff entered upon the premises,
defeated him in the possession for however, he found the defendant herein,
those necessary expenses and useful Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have
improvements made by him on the been authorized by former owners, as far
thing possessed. back as 1922, to clear the land and make
Applying this in the case, Ortiz cannot improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a
party in Case No. 1935, plaintiff, on June 11,
appropriate for his own exclusive 1931, instituted against him a Civil Case No.
benefit the tolls which he collected from 2428. In this
the property retained by him. It was his
duty under the law, after deducting the
necessary expenses for his
administration, to apply such amount
collected to the payment of the interest,
and
the balance to the payment of the
obligation. The disputed tolls, after
deducting petitioner’s expenses for
administration, belong to Comintan,
owner of the land through which the
toll road passed, further considering
that the same was on portions of the
property on which petitioner had not
introduced any improvement.
VICENTE STO. DOMINGO BERNARDO

, plaintiff-appellant, vs . CATALINO
BATACLAN , defendant-appellant and TORIBIO
TEODORO , purchaser-appellee.
Fact
s:
By a contract of sale executed on July 17,

1920, the plaintiff herein, Bernardo,
acquired from Pastor Samonte and others
ownership of the parcel of land of about 90
hectares situated in sitio Balayunan, Silang
case, plaintiff was declared owner but the Held:

defendant Bataclan was held to be
possessor in good faith, entitled to The Court ruled that the right to retain the
reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for property has already been lost. Due to the
work done and improvements made. failure and inability of the defendant to pay
the purchase price the subject property was
Plaintiff was given by this court 30 days from sold in apublic auction which Bernardo asked
the date when the decision became final for, without any protest from Bataclan.
within which to exercise his option, either Therefore, the court found no reason to
to sell the land to the defendant or to buy keep the property in the possession of the
the improvements from him. defendant.
On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff manifested to The Court explained that Article 448 provides a
the lower court his desire (to sell) "to just and equitable solution to the imprac-
require the defendant Bataclan to pay him the ticability of creating “forced co-ownership” by
value of the land at the rate of P200 per giving the owner of
hectare or a total price of P18,000 for the
whole tract of land." H/r the defendant
informed the lower court that he was
unable to pay for the land and, on January 24,
1934, an order was issued giving the plaintiff
30 days within which to pay the defendant the
sum of P2,212 stating that, in the event of
failure to make such payment, the land would
be ordered sold at public auction.
Plaintiff appealed for reconsideration but was

denied. Then on April 24, 1934, the court
below, at the instance of the plaintiff and
without objection on the part of the defendant,
ordered the sale of the land in question at
public auction. The land was sold to
Toribio Teodoro, the highest bidder, for
P8,000. Teodoro then moved that he be placed
in possession of the land purchased by
him. The motion was granted.
H/r the defendant states that he is a possessor

in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to
which he is entitled has not yet been paid to
him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to
retain the land in accordance with the
provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code.
Issue: WON the defendant Bataclan lost his

right to retain the property pending payment
for indemnity.
the land the option to acquire the only to the condition that the said stay would
improvements after payment of the proper last until anyone of appellants would need the
indemnity or to oblige the builder or subject property. Forthwith, appellees and their
planter to pay for the land and the sower to children occupied the same as agreed upon.
pay the proper rent. The owner of the land is In November 1997, appellants made known
allowed to exercise the said options because to appellees that they were already in need of
his right is older and because, by the the subject property. They explained that
principle of accession, he is entitled to the appellant Shirley Yu-Go needed the same
ownership of the accessory thing. and, besides, appellees already have their
own house in Villa Grande Homes, Naga
Mores v Yu- City. Yet, appellees begged that they be given
Go a 6-month extension to stay thereat or until
May 1998. However, even after May 1998,
CASE DOCTRINE: Indeed, full appellees failed to make good their promise
reimbursement of useful improvements and and even further asked that they be allowed to
retention of the premises until stay therein
reimbursement is made applies only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds
on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one’s only
interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract, otherwise, it would always be in
the power of the tenant to improve his
landlord out of his property
DETAILED
FACTS:
Facts: On January 21, 1998, plaintiffs-
appellants Shirley M. Yu-Go, Ma. Victoria M.
Yu-Lim and Ma. Estrella M. Yu
("appellants") filed a Complaint for
InjunctionandDamageswithPrayerforIssuanceo
fa Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional
Trial Court in Naga City against defendants-
appellees, spouses Antonio and Alida Mores
("appellees"). Appellants alleged that they co-
owned a parcel of land located in Sto. Tomas,
Magarao, Camarines Sur on which a building
of strong materials ("subject property")
was built. In March 1983, appellees pleaded
to appellants that they be allowed to stay in
the subject property in the meantime that
they did not own a house yet. Since appellee
Antonio Mores used to be an errand boy of
appellants’ family, they readily agreed
without asking for any rental but subject
until October 1998, which was again extended court’s conclusion that the spouses Mores
until the end of the same year. were builders in good faith and have the
right of accession under Articles 546 and
Appellants gave their final demand for 547 of the Civil Code. Instead, the appellate
appellees to vacate the subject property. court believed that the relationship between
However, instead of heeding such demand, the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores is
appellees hired some laborers and started one between a lessor and a lessee, making
demolishing the improvements on the Article 1678 of the Civil Code applicable to
subject property on January 20, 1999. the present case. . The options given by Article
Appellants’ protest fell on deaf ears 1678, the right of appropriating the useful
because appellees continued their demolition
and even took away and appropriated for
themselves the materials derived from
such unlawful demolition.
They denied that appellants made a demand
for them to vacate the subject property,
insisting that it was merely a sort of reminder
that sooner or later appellees should yield
possession thereof since, after all, they had
already bought a second-hand house which
was undergoing repair. Appellees argued
that what they removed was merely the
improvements made on the subject property,
which removal had not caused any substantial
damage thereto as, in fact, it remained intact
RTC ruling: Ruled in favour of Mores
defendants failed to prove the allegations in
their counterclaims that plaintiffs acted in bad
faith and/or through gross and reckless
negligence in filing this complaint, and the
damages defendants allegedly suffered.
Failing in this, plaintiffs must also be
presumed to have acted in good faith when
they filed this complaint with the honest
belief that their rights were violated
when defendants removed the useful
improvements from the principal building
and land of plaintiffs. Applying the same
principle, the equipoise rule, defendants’
counterclaims must necessarily fail.
Both parties having acted in good faith,
the court will not disturb the present status,
and will leave the parties where it found them.
CA ruling: Ruled in favour of Yu Go The
appellate court disagreed with the trial
improvements after reimbursing 50% of its to the use for which the lease is
value or the right of removal of the useful intended, without altering the form or
improvements, are given by law to the substance of the property leased, the
lessor - the Yu siblings. The spouses Mores, lessor upon the termination of the lease
however, failed to give the Yu siblings the shall pay the lessee one-half of the
opportunity to choose from these two options value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse
Issue: 1) Whether or not spouses mores are said amount, the lessee may remove
builders in good faith. NO. the improvements, even though the
2) Whether or not Article 1678 principal thing may suffer damage
should apply. YES. thereby. He shall not, however,
cause any
Held: 1) NO, [The Spouses Mores’] good
faith is underscored by the fact that no one
from appellants had objected or prevented
appellees from effecting said improvements
which, obviously, were undertaken in
quite a span of time. Even if we believe
appellant Victoria Yu-Lim’s testimony that they
would only learn of the introduction of such
improvements after each of such
improvements had already been built, [the
Yu siblings] never made known their
objections thereto nor did they pose a
warning against future introduction of any
improvement. After all, the said
improvements were not introduced
simultaneously.
The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was
about the building of the improvements on
the leased subject property. However,
tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be
said to be builders in good faith as they have
no pretension to be owners of the
property.10 Indeed, full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made
applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner thereof.
2) YES, The appellate court is correct in
ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil
Code should apply in the present
case. Article 1678 reads:
If the lessee makes, in good faith,
useful improvements which are suitable
more impairment upon the property As administrator, he leased the units

leased than is necessary. to third persons. One of whom is
With regard to the ornamental Leonida Dela Cruz who used it for her
expenses, the lessee shall not be business of selling rocks, pebbles and
entitled to any reimbursement, but similar construction materials.
he may remove the ornamental Upon expiration of Leonida’s lease, Rex
objects, provided no damage is Daclison and other persons acting
caused to the principal thing, and the under her took possession of the
lessor does not choose to retain leased property without prior
them by paying their value at the knowledge and consent of Baytion.
time the lease is extinguished. Since then, Daclison had been using
It is incorrect, however, for the the property without paying anything
appellate court to state that the spouses to Baytion.
Mores did not give the Yu siblings the
option to retain the improvements.
Since the Yu siblings failed to make
such offer, the spouses Mores had
the right to remove the
improvements.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION
the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 26 August 2005 as well
as the Resolution promulgated on 14
March 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76076.
Article 1678 of the Civil Code is
applicable to the present case. The
award of moral damages worth
₱100,000 to the Yu siblings is deleted.
SO
ORDERED
Rex Daclison vs. Eduardo Baytion GR No.

219811 April 6, 2016
FACTS:
Eduardo Baytion and his siblings were
co-owners a parcel of land which
they inherited from their parents.
A one-storey building divided into 7
units was erected on the land
Petition GRANTED.
Baytion demanded Daclison to
Baytion does not have a better right
vacate the property when he
learned Daclison’s unauthorized over the leveled portion.
entry. Daclison refused. Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, in
A complaint for forcible entry and order for an accretion to be considered
damages the following requisites must concur,
was filed against Daclison. namely: (1) that the deposit be gradual
In his answer, Daclison contended that and imperceptible; (2) that it be made
the portion that he occupied was through the effects of the current of the
outside Baytion’s property. It was water; and (3) that the land where the
outside the stone wall accretion takes place is adjacent to the
erected at the creek lying beside banks of rivers.
Baytion’s In the case, the leveled portion
property. This down-sloping area was
cannot be considered as an
filled up until it was leveled with
accretion.
Baytion’s property and Antonio dela
Cruz, one of Baytion’s lessee, paid for The land did not came about by reason
the right to possess the same. of a gradual and imperceptible deposit.
Ernanie dela Cruz who took over The deposits were artificial and man-
Antonio’s made and not
business and Daclison entered into a
business venture in the leveled portion.
Despite investigation made to affirm
that the leveled portion was outside
Baytion’s property, Baytion still
demanded him to vacate.
MeTC dismissed.
RTC held that Baytion had a better
right of possession over the leveled
portion as it was considered as an
improvement of the leased property.
CA dismissed appeal and affirmed that
Baytion had a better right to possess.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baytion has a better
right over
the leveled portion as it forms part of
his property because it is an accretion,
construction, or improvement on the
property
HELD:
the exclusive result of the current from application over the Motherland. That when
the creek adjacent to his property. the patent is approved, Ciriaco is deemed to
Baytion failed to prove the attendance be holding the Motherland in trust for the
Imbornal sisters. Francisco et al alleged that
of the indispensable requirement that
through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and
the deposit was due to the effect of the
misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano had
current of the river or creek. Alluvion illegally registered the accretions in their
must be the exclusive work of nature names notwithstanding the fact that they were
and not a result of human intervention. not the riparian owners, that they did not
assert their inheritance claims over the
Motherland and the accretions in respect to
Narvasa v Imbornal respondents rights. Respondents answered
that the amended complaint state mo cause of
Facts: action against them, having failed to describe
Basilia had four children. Francisco and the disputed properties, the action was
Perdro were the children of Alejandra, one of
the children of Basilia, while petitioner Petra
was the daughter of
Balbina. Petitioners are the herirs and
successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and
Petra. Respondents are the descendants of
Pablo, one of the children of Basilia. During
her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land
located in Pangasinan which she conveyed to
her 3 daughters, Imbornal sisters. Catalina's
husband, Ciriaco applied and was granted
homestead patent over a riparian land
adjacent to the Cayanga River. An OCT was
later issued in his name. This was eventually
cancelled and a TCT was issued in the heirs of
Ciriaco. Ciriaco and his heirs had since
occupied the northern portion of the
Motherland, while respondents occupied the
southern portion. In
1949, the first accretion adjoined the southern
portion of the Motherland. An OCT was issued
in the name of respondent Victoriano covering
the first accretion. The second accretion
abutted the first accretion on its southern
portion. An OCT was issued in the names of all
respondents covering the second accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland,
Francisco et al filed an Amended Complaint for
reconveyance against respondents. They
anchored their claim on the allegation that
Ciriaco urged Balbona and Alejandra to sell
the Sabangan property and that Ciriaco used
the proceeds to fund the homestead patent
barred by prescription, and the properties 1952in the name of respondent Victoriano, an
sought to be reconveyed are not the action of the same nature should have been
properties of their predecessors-in-interest. filed untilAugust
RTC ruled in favor of Francisco et al who 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the
found that an implied trust existed between Second
Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters. With respect Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on
to the accretions, RTC ruled that the owners November 10, 1978in the name of the
of the Motherland are likewise the owners of respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor
the accretions. Ca reversed the RTC ruling should have been filed until November 10,
having found that Ciriaco alone was awarded 1988. The burden of proving the existence ofa
a homestead patent which later became the trust is on the party asserting its existence,
basis for the issuance of a Torrens certificate and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily
of title in his name, as such, it cannot be show the existence of the trust and its
attacked collaterally. That the homestead elements. In this case, it cannot be said,
patent was awarded by the government to merely on the basis of the oral evidence
Ciriaco after complying with the requirements offered by Francisco, et al., that the
of CA 141. With respect to the accretions, CA Motherland had been either mistakenly or
ruled that respondents need not be the
owners of the Motherland in order to acquire
them by acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
W/N the descendants of Ciriaco are the
owners of the Motherland and respondents
owns the accretions Ruling:
The Court found that the cause of action

pertaining to the Motherland and First
Accretion are barred by prescription. When
property is registered in another's name, an
implied trust is created by law in favor of the
true owner, as such, an action for
reconveyance bases on implied trust
prescribes in 10 years from the date of
registration. Francisco, et al. had then a
period of ten (10) years from the registration
of the respective titles covering the disputed
properties within which to file their action for
reconveyance, taking into account the fact
that they were never in possessionof the said
properties. Hence, with respect tothe
Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued
on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco,
an action for reconveyance therefor should
have been filed until December 5, 1943; with
respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT
No. P-318 issued on August 15,
fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. of Rights 8 ceding his claim over the entire
Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio
was merely a trustee
of an implied trust holding the Motherland - In January 2003, however, respondents
for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or were surprised when several officials from the
their heirs. barangay and the city planning office
Consequently, as Francisco, et al.failed to proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees
prove their ownership rights over the planted on the said lot. Respondents filed
Motherland, their cause of letter-complaints before the Regional Director
action with respect to the First Accretion and, of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of
necessarily, the Second Accretion, must Interior and Local Government and the Office
likewise fail. of the Vice Mayor.
13 On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE Barangay of
CITY VS EBIO Vitalez
held a meeting to discuss the construction of
FACTS: the proposed road. In the said meeting,
respondents asserted their opposition to the
Respondents claim that they are the absolute proposed project and their claim of ownership
owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 over the affected property.
square meters, more or less, located at 9781
Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez,
Parañaque City and covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 01027 and
01472 in the name of respondent Mario D.
Ebio. ----> Said land was an accretion of Cut-
cut creeK.
-Respondents assert that the original occupant

and possessor of the said parcel of land was
their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez.
Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his
son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and
possessed the said lot. In 1966, after
executing an affi davit declaring possession
and occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a tax
declaration over the said property in
his name. Since then, respondents have
been religiously paying real property taxes
for the said property. In April 1964 and in
October 1971, Mario
Ebio secured building permits from the
Parañaque
municipal office for the construction of their
house within the said compound. 7 On April
21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer
- respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque Whether the character of respondents'

City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of possession and occupation of the subject
preliminary injunction against petitioners. 18 property entitles them to avail of the relief of
In the course of the proceedings, respondents prohibitory injunction.
admitted before the trial court that they have a
pending application for the issuance of a sales
patent before the Department of Environment RULING
and Natural Resources (DENR). becauase
theyare ordering to vacate the area within It is an uncontested fact that the subject land
30 days was formed from the alluvial deposits that
have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-
rtc - RL containing an area of 291 square cut creek. This being the case, the law that
meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. governs ownership over the accreted portion
covered by TCT No. S- is Article 84 of the Law of Waters of
62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been
donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City
Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966
and which was
accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO
BERNABE on
5 April 1966. There is no evidence however,
when RL
8 has been intended as a road lot.
- On the other hand, the evidentiary records

reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the
accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit
dated 21 March
1966 for the purpose of declaring the said
property for taxation purposes. The property
then became the subject of Tax Declaration
No. 20134 beginning the year 1967 and
the real property taxes therefor had been paid
for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970,
1972, 1973,
1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,
1999,
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime
in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were
issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for
the subject property. On
21 April
1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights
in the accreted property to MARIO
EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
Issue:
1866, which remains in effect, 26 in relation to the action.

Article A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable
457 of the Civil Code. right.
34 A party seeking to avail
Article 457 of the Civil Code states: of an injunctive relief must prove that he
or she possesses a right in esse or one
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the that is
banks of rivers belong the actual or existing. It should not be
contingent,
accretion which they gradually receive
abstract, or future rights, or one
from the effects of the current of the
which may never arise.
waters.
In the case at bar, respondents assert
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing
that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro
provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The
only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner
of the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription
by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion

cannot be acquired by prescription. No
matter how long the possession of the
properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain. 29 Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a

property of public dominion, 31 the land
which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its
banks does not form part of the public domain
by
clear provision of law.
We also find that the character of

possession and ownership by the
respondents
over the contested land entitles them to the
avails of
Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the decree of registration merely confirms, but
subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, does not confer, ownership.
respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit
from the local government of Parañaque
for --------------------------------->
the construction of their family dwelling on Version 2
the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an
affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing
him to OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE
declare the property in his CITY
name v. MARIO D.
for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also EBIO
in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the
registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) Doctrine: A
which adjoins the land occupied by the luvialDeposits;Registration
respondents, donated RL 8 to the local
government of
Facts: Respondents claim that they are the
Parañaqu
absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting
e.
of 406 square meters, more or less, located
at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay
RATIO
Vitalez, Paraaque City and covered by Tax
:
Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the
name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land
From these findings of fact by both the trial
was
court and the Court of Appeals, only
one conclusion can be made: that for more
than thirty
(30) years, neither
Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. nor the local government of
Parañaque in its corporate or private
capacity
sought to register the accreted portion.
Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to
have
acquired ownership over the subject
property through prescription.
Respondents can
assert such right despite the fact that they
have yet to register their title over the said
lot. It must be remembered that the purpose
of land
registration is not the
acquisition
of lands, but only the registration of title
which the applicant already possessed over
the land. Registration was never intended as
a means of acquiring ownership. 37 A
an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli
assert that the original occupant and Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering
possessor of the said parcel of land was them to vacate the area within the next
their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted
Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his from the said property. Threatened of being
son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro evicted, respondents went to the RTC of
continuously and exclusively occupied and Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied
possessed the said lot. In 1966, after for a writ of preliminary injunction against
executing an affidavit declaring possession petitioners which was denied. The CA
and occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a tax reversed the decision and ruled in favor of
declaration over the said property in his name. respondents.
Since then, respondents have been religiously
paying real property taxes for the said Issue: W/N the State is an indispensable party
property. to respondents action for prohibitory
injunction; and substantively, whether the
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio character of respondents possession and
married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. Upon occupation of the subject property
Pedros advice, the couple established their
home on the said lot. In April
1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio
secured
building permits from the Paraaque municipal
office for the construction of their house
within the said compound. On April 21,
1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer
of Rights ceding his claim over the entire
parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.
Subsequently, the tax declarations under
Pedros name were cancelled and new ones
were issued in Mario Ebios name.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the

Sangguniang Barangayof Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08, series of 1999 seeking
assistance from the City Government of
Paraaque for the construction of an access road
along Cut-cut Creek located in the said
barangay. The proposed road, projected to be
eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters
long, will run from Urma Drive to the
main road of Vitalez Compound
traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
When the city government advised all the
affected residents to vacate the said area,
respondents immediately registered their
opposition thereto. As a result, the road project
was temporarily suspended.
entitles them to avail of the relief of prescription. Respondents can assert such
prohibitory injunction. right despite the fact that they have yet to
register their title over the said lot. It
Ruling: The petition is without must be remembered that the purpose of land
merit. registration is not the acquisition of lands, but
only the registration of title which the
applicant already possessed over the land.
An action for injunction is brought
Registration was never intended as a means of
specifically to restrain or command the
acquiring ownership. A decree of
performance of an act. It is distinct from the
registration merely confirms, but does not
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction,
confer, ownership.
which cannot exist except only as part or as an
incident to an independent action or
NEW REGENT SOURCES,
proceeding. Moreover, in an action for
INC vs TANJUATCO, JR., and VICENTE
injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a
CUEVAS
preliminary prohibitory or mandatory
injunction may issue. [G.R. No. 168800. April 16,
2009.] FACTS:
Under Article 84 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of
1866 and Article 457 of the Civil Code, it is
clear that alluvial deposits along the banks of
a creek do not form part of the public domain
as the alluvial property automatically belongs
to the owner of the estate to
which it may have been added. The only
restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the
same under the Torrens system; otherwise,
the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a

property of public dominion, the land which
is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks
does not form part of the public domain by
clear provision of law.
That for more than 30 years, neither

Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Paraaque in its corporate or
private capacity sought to register the
accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to have acquired
ownership over the subject property through
Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. An action for reconveyance is one that
(NRSI) filed a Complaint for seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, registered by another, to its rightful and
Reconveyance and Damages against legal owner.22 In an action for
respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of reconveyance, the certificate of title is
Deeds of Calamba. NRSI alleged that in respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
1994, it authorized Cuevas, its Chairman and instead is the transfer of the property,
President, to apply on its behalf, for the specifically the title thereof, which has been
acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
its right of accretion. person’s name, to its rightful and legal
owner, or to one with a better right.
Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots
in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the
Bureau of Lands. On January 2, 1995, Cuevas following requisites must concur:
and his wife executed a Voting Trust
Agreement over their shares of stock in the
corporation. Then, pending approval of the
application with the Bureau of Lands,
Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for
the sum of P85,000. On March 12, 1996, the
Director of Lands released an Order, which
approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to
Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Titles were
then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.
NRSI anchors its claim over the lands
subjects of this case ontherightofaccretion. It
submitted in evidence, titles to four parcels
of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the
name of Tanjuatco.
ISSUE
S:
1) W/N the complaint for
rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,
reconveyance and damages against
Tanjuanco may prosper
2) W/n NRSI has claim over the subject
property base on the right of accretion
3) W/N Cuevas is an innocent purchaser in
good faith
RULING
S:
1) No.
(1) the action must be brought in the Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried
name of a person claiming ownership or San Juan River Bed, which under Article 502
dominical right over the land registered in the (1) of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the
name of the defendant; public dominion. The Certification issued by
the forester confirms that said lands were
(2) the registration of the land in the name of verified to be within the Alienable and
the defendant was procured through fraud or Disposable lands certified and declared as such
other illegal means; on September 28, 1981. Clearly, the Republic
(3) the property has not yet passed to an is the entity which had every right to
innocent purchaser for value; and transfer ownership thereof to respondent.
(4) the action is filed after the certificate of 3) Yes, Cuevas is an innocent purchaser in
title had already become final and good faith
incontrovertible but within four years from
the discovery of the fraud, or not later than
10 years in the case of an implied trust.
Petitioner failed to show the presence of
these requisites.
2) No, NRSI has no claim over the
subject property base on the right of
accretion
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property
under Article 45731 of the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
It is not enough to be a riparian owner in
order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One
who claims the right of accretion must
show by preponderant evidence that he has
met all the conditions provided by law.
Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as
it did not offer any evidence to prove
that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco
derived his title to the lands from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) registered in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Tanjuatco’s titles were derived from private respondents simply transferred their
Original Certificates of Title in the name of no dikes further down the river bed of the
less than the Republic of the Philippines. Meycauayan river, and thus, if there is any
Hence, we cannot validly and fairly rule that accretion to speak of, it is man-made and
in relying upon said title, Tanjuatco acted in artificial and not the result of the gradual and
bad faith. A person dealing with registered imperceptible sedimentation by the water.
land may safely rely upon the correctness of *read the full text on the testament of Mrs.
the certificate of title issued therefor and the Acuna to get private respondents’ response*
law will in no way oblige him to go behind the ISSU
certificate to determine the condition of the E:
property. This applies even more
particularly when the seller happens to be W/N there is
the Republic, against which, no improper accretion
motive can be ascribed. The law, no doubt,
RULIN
considers Tanjuatco an innocent purchaser for
G:
value. An innocent purchaser for value is one
who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right or
interest in such property and pays the full
price for the same, at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claims
or interest of some other person in the
property
Republic V CA
FACTS
:
Respondents are registered owners of a parcel
of land covered by a TCT located in Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. They filed an application for the
registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond
property. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vicente
filed a written opposition to the application.
Respondents filed a partial withdrawal of
the application with respect to Lot 3 in line
with the recommendation of the
Commissioner. Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn
and the lower court granted the application
finding that the lands in question are
accretions to the private respondents’
fishponds. On appeal by the Republic, CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Republic submits that there is no accretion
to speak of under Art. 457 of the NCC
because what actually happened is that the
No. Art. 457 requires the concurrence of fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the
the 3 requisites before an accretion is said to pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter
have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
be made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (3) that the land where SPOUSES FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES ,
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
of rivers. The requirement that the deposit AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ,
should be due to the effect of the current of
the river is indispensable. In the instant The controversy began in 1962, when
case, there is no evidence whatsoever to the government dug a canal on a private
prove that the addition to the said property parcel of land, identified as Lot 2958 and
was made gradually through the effects of the covering an area of 33,902 sq.m., to
current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
We agree with the observation of the
Solicitor General that it is preposterous to
believe that almost four (4) hectares of land
came into being because of the effects of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone
witness of the private respondents who
happens to be their overseer and whose
husband was first cousin of their father
noticed the four hectare accretion to the
twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The
respondents claim that at this point in
time, accretion had already taken place. If so,
their witness was incompetent to testify
to a gradual and imperceptible increase
to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that
year, she observed an increase in the area of
the original fishpond which is now the land in
question. If she was telling the truth, the
accretion was sudden. However, there is
evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive
result of the current of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits
came into being not because of the sole effect
of the current of the rivers but as a result of
the transfer of the dike towards the river and
encroaching upon it. The land sought to be
registered is not even dry land cast
imperceptibly and gradually by the river's
current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under
two meters of water. The private respondents'
own evidence shows that the water in the
This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
who registered it in his name under TCT No. Thus if the riparian owner is entitled to
10990 and then had it subdivided into three compensation for the damage to or loss of
lots, namely: (a) Lot his property due to natural causes, there
2958-A, with an area of 28,889 sq.m.; (b) Lot is all the more reason to compensate him
2958-B, with an area of 3,588 sq.m.; and (c) when the change in the course of the river is
Lot 2958-C, with an area of 452 sq.m., effected through artificial means. The loss to
covered by TCT Nos. 11041, the petitioners of the land covered by the
11042 and 11043, canal was the result of a deliberate act on the
respectively. part of the government when it sought to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek.
In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was It was therefore obligated to compensate the
totally occupied by the canal, the government Baeses for their loss.
gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area as
Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of
Real Property. The property, which was near We find, however, that the petitioners have
but not contiguous to Lot 2958-C, was already been so compensated. Felix Baes
denominated as Lot 3271-A and later was given Lot
registered in the name of Felix Baes. The soil 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot
displaced by the canal was used to fill up the 2958-B
old bed of the creek.
After resurvey, it was discovered that

there were errors. New TCT’s were issued
to represent the enlargement. Government
opposed as the lots were allegedly unlawfully
enlarged. Baes relying on Art.
461 of the CCV, averred that he should own
dried up land as the creek was discovered to
the canal in his property. The government
rejects this claim and avers that the
petitioners had already been fully
compensated for it when they agreed to
exchange their Lot 2958-B with Lot 3271-A
belonging to the government.
Issue
:
Held:
Art. 461 states that River beds which are
abandoned
through the natural change in the course
of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners
whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying
the value thereof, which value shall not exceed
through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property proceeded with the attachment, so Santos files
dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange a complaint. He says that Tiongson cannot
because the two lots were of the same area claim the 924 cavans of palay; he says that
and value and the agreement was freely by asking for the attachment of the
entered into by the parties. The petitioners properties, Tiongson is claiming that the
cannot now claim additional cavans of rice all belonged to Bernabe and not
compensation. to him.
The court ruled that both Tiongson and Santos
must divide the cavans and palay
Santos v Bernabe proportionately.
The cavans belonging to Santos, having been
mixed with those belonging to Tiongson, the
CASE DOCTRINE: In the following rule
following rule
prescribed in article 381 of the Civil Code for
prescribed is Article 381 of the Civil Code: “If,
cases of this nature, is applicable: by will
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two of one of their owners, two things of
things of
identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if
identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or
the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter
if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the
case, the things cannot be
latter case the things cannot be separated
without injury, each owner shall acquire
a right in the mixture proportionate to
the part belonging to him, according to the
value of the things mixed or commingled.
RECIT-READY FACTS: Santos deposited

778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the
warehouse of Bernabe. At the same time,
Tiongson also deposited
1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The
share of
Tiongson and Santos were mixed together
and cannot be separated.
Later on and for some unknown reason,

Tiongson files a case against Bernabe to
recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay
deposited in Bernabe’s warehouse. So
Tiongson files for a petition for a writ of
attachment and the Court granted it.
Bernabe’s properties were attached, including
only 924 cavans of rice and 31 ½ kilos of
palay. These were sold at a public auction
and the proceeds were delivered to
Tiongson.
Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of

the palay but then the sheriff had already
separated without injury, each owner shall to said defendant Pablo Tiongson, who
acquire a right in the mixture proportionate obtained judgment in said case.
to the part belonging to him, according to the The herein plaintiff, Urbano Santos,
value of the things mixed or comingled.” intervened in the attachment of the palay, but
The number of kilos in a cavan not upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper bond,
having been determined, the Court took the the sheriff proceeded with the attachment,
proportion only of the giving rise to the present complaint.
924 cavans of palay which were attached It does not appear that the sacks of palay of
andsold, Urbano Santos and those of Pablo
therby giving Santos, who deposited 778 Tiongson, deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's
cavans, warehouse, bore any marks or
398.49 and Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 signs, nor were they separated one from
cavans, the other.
525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of
3Php per cavan.
Issue: Whether or not Tiongson can claim
the 924 cavans of rice as his own. NO.
DETAILED FACTS:
Held: NO, the following rule prescribed in
Facts: This appeal was taken by the
article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this
defendants Pablo Tiongson and the Provincial
nature, is applicable:
Sheriff of Bulacan from the judgment of the
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two
Court of First of said province, wherein said things of identical or dissimilar nature are
defendant Pablo Tiongson was ordered to pay mixed, or if the
the plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of 778
cavans and 38 kilos of palay, at the rate of P3
per cavan, without special pronouncement as
to costs. The following facts were conclusively
proved at the trial:
On March 20, 1928, there were deposited in
Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse by the plaintiff
Urbano Santos
778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and by
Pablo
Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the same
grain. On said date, March 20, 1928, Pablo
Tiongson filed with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Jose
C. Bernabe, to recover from
the latter the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of
palay
deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At
the same time, the application of Pablo
Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted,
and the attachable property of Jose C.
Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31 1/2
kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his
warehouse, were attached, sold at public
auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered
mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case

the things cannot be separated without injury,
each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him,
according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having
been determined, we will take the proportion
only of the
924 cavans of palay which were attached and
sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who
deposited 778
cavans, 398.49 thereof, and Pablo Tiongson,
who
deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value
thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
hereby
modified, and Pablo Tiongson is hereby
ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos
the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at the
rate of P3 a cavan, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

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It subsequently turned out that the LAND had

The Municipal Court found that private

The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is

FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel