Conchada vs.

director of prison

FACTS:

On May 19, 1914, the provincial fiscal charged Eustaquio Conchada with the crime of murder in
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, then presided over by the
Honorable George R. Harvey, judge. He was tried on July 23, 1914, before the same Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, then presided over by the Honorable Isidro Paredes and on that date included in the
Fourteenth Judicial District by virtue of Act No. 2347 of the Philippine Legislature which went into effect
on the 1st day of the same month of July and which provided for the reorganization of the Courts of First
Instance and of the Court of Land Registration. Defendant was sentenced on September 23 of that year,
1914, by the same judge, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, to the penalty of life imprisonment and
consequently confined in Bilibid Prison of this city of Manila under an order issued by said Honorable
Isidro Paredes as judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas.

During the course of the trial, defendant filed a motion praying that said court refrain from
proceeding further in the case and from sentencing him, and that it disqualify itself in favor of the
competent court, on the ground that it was not legally constituted, because said Act No. 2347, which had
created it, was contrary to the Organic act of the Philippines and therefore void, and said court and the
judge presiding therein lacked jurisdiction to try and decide the case and sentence him, because such
jurisdiction belonged to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, in which the
complaint had been filed and which still existed in the province. This motion was denied by the court,
with exception on the part of the defendant, and the trial was carried forward in the same court presided
over by the Honorable Isidro Paredes, who, as has already been said, rendered the said judgment of
conviction.

Later, the attorneys representing the said Conchada, prayed this Supreme Court to issue a writ of
habeas corpus to the Director of Prisons to compel him to produce said defendant and, after due hearing,
to order his release or grant him a trial in a competent court. After mentioning the facts already set forth,
they virtually alleged that the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, fourteenth
Judicial District, on September 23, 1914, against the defendant was illegal, null and void, because: (1)
The Philippine Legislature had no authority to abolish or deprive of jurisdiction the Court of First of
Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, created by the constitution, nor to substitute therefore another court of
its own creation; (2) the Philippine Legislature had no authority to dismiss or remove the judge of said
Court of First Instance, which had exclusive jurisdiction, as established by the constitution, of the crime
specified in the complaint; and (3) the judge of first instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District,
established by the Organic Act, having first acquired jurisdiction over the cause of action and the person
of the defendant, no territorial law could validly compel the defendant-petitioner to submit to the
jurisdiction of another court created by the Legislature and presided over by a judge who held office
subject to the will of that Legislature.

After this court had directed that the respondent Director of Prisons show cause why the writ of
habeas corpus sought should not issue, and the Solicitor General, representing the said Director of
Prisons, had submitted such arguments as he deemed proper, the hearing was had, and counsel for the
petitioner set forth in their brief that on the appeal they relied upon the following legal propositions: 1) the
Philippine Legislature has no authority to limit the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts created by the
Organic Act and still less to abolish, suppress, or destroy said courts; 2) the Philippine Legislature has no
authority to remove the judges appointed under the Organic Act to preside over the court created thereby,
without abolishing the courts in which they sit; 3) the Philippine Legislature, by Act No. 2347, has
decreed the final extinction, abolition or destruction of the constitutional courts created by the Organic
Act, and has replaced or supplanted them with other courts of its own creation; 4) the removal of the
judges, along with all the officers and employees of the old courts, and the limitation of their jurisdiction
to certain causes pending, necessarily imply the destruction or abolition of said courts; 5) the courts
"organized" by Act No. 2347 are not legally constituted and the judges appointed by virtue of said Act
lack jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner. These five propositions rest upon the following
hypotheses: 1) that the courts created by the Organic Act, or the law organizing the courts of justice of the
Philippine islands to wit, Act No. 136, passed on June 11, 1901, by the United States Philippine
Commission, are constitutional courts and that said courts have been replaced or supplanted by the
Philippine Legislature through Act No. 2347 with other courts of its own creation; 2) that the same
Philippine Legislature, through Act No. 2347, without authority therefore, has limited the jurisdiction of
the courts, characterized by petitioner's counsel as constitutional, created by the Organic Act, and has
abolished, suppressed, or destroyed said courts; 3) That the Philippine Legislature has removed, likewise
without authority therefore, the judges appointed under the Organic Act to preside over the courts created
thereby. From these hypotheses said counsel for the petitioner, after arguing at length in support of the
propositions laid down by them, deduce that the courts "organized" by Act No. 2347 are not legally
constituted and that Judge Paredes, appointed under said Act, lacked jurisdiction to try and sentence
Eustaquio Conchada, the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, fourteenth Judicial District and the
Honorable Judge Isidro Paredes have jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes. The Philippine Legislature could, without violating the law organizing the judiciary in the
Philippine Islands or the Philippine Bill passed by Congress on July 1, 1902, the constitution of the
Philippines, by means of Act No. 2347, reorganize the judicial territory of the Islands by creating new
districts, changing the numbers of those that previously existed, including in each district one or more
provinces, whether or not they were those which formed part of the districts previously created by Act
No. 140 and the others already enumerated. Furthermore, by reason of this organization, it could provide
that the judges should cease to hold their respective offices in accordance with the previous organization
and that new judges should be appointed to hold them in the districts newly created by virtue of such
reorganization, for neither the law organizing the judiciary nor the Philippine Bill contains any provisions
fixing the number of districts of which the division of the judicial territory of the Philippines must
necessarily consist, nor the provinces or the number thereof which must be included in each district, nor
has it limited or restricted the power of the Legislature or of the Government of the Philippines in
connection with the organization of the judiciary with respect to the Courts of First Instance, nor has it
laid down any rules to which their actions must conform in the exercise of such power, the Governor-
General having been expressly empowered, as we have already seen, by section 9 of the Philippine Bill,
to appoint the judges of the Courts of First Instance with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission. All this clearly demonstrates that said Courts of First Instance are not constitutional courts,
and the hypothesis from which petitioner's counsel have started in their brief being incorrect, the whole
argument advanced by them to show that Act No. 2347, which provides for the organization of the Courts
of First Instance of these Islands, is illegal and null and void, falls through. Moreover, without going
beyond that same law organizing the courts of justice of these Islands and the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, the Philippine Bill, we have a plain demonstration of the difference between the constitutional
courts and those which are not such, a difference which exists between the Courts of First Instance of
these Islands and the Supreme Court thereof.

In conclusion, since Act No. 2347 of the Legislature, whereby the reorganization of the Courts of
First Instance of these Islands was provided for, is not illegal and null and void, and the said courts are
legally constituted by virtue of said reorganization, the Honorable Judge Isidro Paredes had jurisdiction to
try and sentence the petitioner. Eustaquio Conchada, for the crime of murder and to order, as he did, the
imprisonment of said defendant by virtue of the sentence imposed upon him.

It is therefore held that there is no ground for issuing to the Directors of Prisons the writ
of habeas corpus applied for the counsel for said petitioner.