Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

© 2018 American Psychological Association 2019, Vol. 148, No. 8, 1312–1334

0096-3445/19/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000526

False Memory at Short and Long Term

Marlène Abadie and Valérie Camos
University of Fribourg

False memories are well-established long-term memory (LTM) phenomena. Recent reports of false
recognition at short term suggest that working memory (WM) could also give rise to false memories,
supporting the unitary view of memory. Alternatively, we hypothesized that the emergence of false
memories at short term results from the impairment of WM maintenance, memory performance relying
then on LTM. More specifically, we assumed that false memories rely on the retrieval of gist traces of
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the memory items while their verbatim traces that could block false memories are no longer accessible.
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To test this proposal, we reported a series of 4 experiments in which the availability of 2 WM

maintenance mechanisms, articulatory rehearsal and attentional refreshing, was manipulated, and the
reliance of recognition performance on gist and verbatim traces was also assessed. In line with our
hypothesis, the occurrence of false memories in immediate recognition test was accompanied by the
reduction of verbatim memory retrieval resulting from the impairment of rehearsal. By contrast, false
memories in the delayed test depended on gist memory, which was strengthened by the use of refreshing.
These findings support an integrated account of false memories at short and long term, shed light on the
nature of mental representations generated by WM maintenance mechanisms and on the relationships
between WM and LTM.

Keywords: false memory, working memory, long-term memory

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000526.supp

The relationship between working memory (WM) and long-
term memory (LTM) is a central question for understanding hu-
man cognition and has been a matter of intense debate since the
19th century. On the one hand, some models assume that WM and
LTM are two distinct systems, with WM being a limited-capacity
This article was published Online First December 13, 2018.
Marlène Abadie and Valérie Camos, Department of Psychology, Fri-
bourg Center for Cognition, University of Fribourg.
This article is a collaboration between the two authors during the
postdoc of Marlène Abadie with Valérie Camos. Valérie Camos is an
expert on working memory and she developed the Time-Based Resource-
Sharing model with Pierre Barrouillet, and especially demonstrated the
existence of distinct maintenance mechanisms. Marlène Abadie is an
expert on long-term memory; she worked in particular on the distinction
between verbatim and gist representations of the fuzzy-trace theory. This
study initiated a new line of research on the relationships between WM and
LTM. Marlène Abadie is now at Laboratoire de Psychologie Cognitive,
Aix-Marseille Université, France. Data of Experiment 1 and 2 were pre-
sented at the 58th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society and at the
20th European Society for Cognitive Psychology Conference. Part of this
work was supported by a grant to Valérie Camos from the Pool de
Recherche of the Université de Fribourg. We thank Kim Hirsbrunner for
her assistance with data collection. We also thank Clément Belletier, and
Laurent Waroquier for their advices, and Pierre Barrouillet for his advice
and editing work.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marlène
Abadie, who is now at the Laboratoire de Psychologie Cognitive, Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique & Aix Marseille Université,
UMR7290, Bâtiment 9 Case D, 3, Place Victor Hugo, 13331 Marseille
Cedex 3, France. E-mail: marlene.abadie@univ-amu.fr
1312
system for maintaining relevant representations across a relatively
short interval, and LTM a virtually unlimited and permanent
memory for events and general knowledge (e.g., Atkinson &
Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley, 1986; Barrouillet & Camos, 2015). On
the other hand, models pertaining to the unitary-memory view
deny any distinction between WM and LTM (e.g., Brown, Neath,
& Chater, 2007; Nairne, 1988, 1990). Between these two extreme
theoretical positions, several intermediate models have been pro-
posed that treat WM as a subset of LTM representations in a
temporary state of heightened accessibility (e.g., Cowan, 1995;
Oberauer, 2002).
The present article will address the issue of the relationships
between WM and LTM by examining the impact of WM on the
occurrence of the false memory effect, a phenomenon that is
supposed to reflect the influence of LTM. Research on false
memories has mainly focused on LTM, exploring how recall and
recognition of previously studied items can be distorted over a
period ranging from minutes to days (Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, &
Brainerd, 2016). In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), participants are
presented with lists including the 15 strongest word associates
(e.g., “sing, concert, piano, etc.”) for a given theme word (in this
example, “music”) and are then given a recall or recognition test.
Investigations using this paradigm consistently show that the un-
presented theme word is falsely remembered at very high levels,
almost rivaling the acceptance rate of presented words (see Brain-
erd & Reyna, 2005; Gallo, 2006, for reviews). Although the false
memory phenomenon has been investigated largely in the LTM
domain, recent research also reported false recognition at short
term, suggesting that WM could also give rise to false memories
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
(e.g., Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Flegal, Atkins, & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2010; Flegal & Reuter-Lorenz, 2014). According to At-
kins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008), the occurrence of semantic distor-
tions over the short and long term might indicate overlap between
WM and LTM mechanisms, thereby challenging any dissociation
between WM and LTM.
However, one might wonder whether showing that memory
distortions can occur in a short-term test necessarily implies that
these distortions are specifically produced within WM. Indeed,
LTM can also influence short-term recognition, especially when
items cannot be maintained in WM. According to the primary-
secondary memory framework (Unsworth & Engle, 2007), when
the number of items to be maintained in WM exceeds its capacity
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or when maintenance in WM is impeded, items are no longer
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accessible in WM and must be retrieved from LTM for further
recall, even at short term. Supporting this view, it has been shown
that the level-of-processing (LOP) effect, a well-known LTM
effect (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975), appears
in a short-term recall test when WM maintenance is impaired and
that items are retrieved from LTM (e.g., Rose, Buchsbaum, &
Craik, 2014; Rose, Craik, & Buchsbaum, 2015). Hence, the mere
observation of false recognition in a short-term test is not sufficient
to deny the existence of separate memory systems and to integrate
short and long-term memory processes within a single system.
Providing compelling evidence that WM produces memory distor-
tion requires in a first place to ascertain that items are maintained
in, and retrieved from, WM. Otherwise, one cannot know whether
short-term false memories come from WM influence as suggested
by Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008; Flegal et al., 2010; Flegal &
Reuter-Lorenz, 2014). LTM influence, or mutual influence of both
memory systems.
Our aim in the present study was thus to examine whether WM
mechanisms underlie the emergence of false memories at short and
long delays. This question is of fundamental importance not only
to better understand the emergence of false memories, but also to
address the key issue of the structure and functioning of human
memory, which spans the entire field of cognitive psychology. For
this purpose, we manipulated the availability of mechanisms of
maintenance of information in WM and tested under which con-
ditions lists of associatively related words produce false memories
in immediate and delayed recognition tests. We reasoned that if
false recognition errors appear at short term when maintenance of
memory words in WM is disrupted, but disappear when mainte-
nance in WM is effective, then false memories are intrinsically
under LTM influence and prevented by WM maintenance. By
contrast, WM would be the source of false memories if recognition
errors occur when WM mechanisms of maintenance are available,
but disappear when these mechanisms are blocked. Finally, if false
memories occur whatever the availability of WM maintenance
mechanisms, then it might concluded that WM does not influence
false memories.
Two first experiments were conducted demonstrating the role of
WM in the occurrence of false memories: active maintenance of
information in WM prevented false memories in immediate test,
but elicit their occurrence in delayed test. Two follow-up experi-
ments were then conducted to disentangle the role of the different
WM maintenance mechanisms on the emergence of false memo-
ries at short and long term. These two sets of experiments provided
insight on the relationships between WM and LTM, stressing in
1313
particular the role of WM in preventing or enabling LTM influ-
ences. It also allowed to determine the nature of mental represen-
tations that underlie these false memories, and more generally it
indicated how WM mechanisms give rise to different kinds of
representations. In the following section, we present first the
theory that provided the most prominent account of long-term false
memories. Then, we review studies reporting false memories at
short term. Next, we briefly describe WM maintenance mecha-
nisms, their impact on short- and long-term tests, and the nature of
representations they maintain. Finally, we propose and test in the
present series of experiments a new account of the role of WM
maintenance mechanisms on the occurrence of false memories at
short and long delays.
False Memory at Long Term
Several studies have shown that memory errors obtained using
the DRM paradigm are difficult to restrain (e.g., Gallo, Roberts, &
Seamon, 1997; McDermott, 1996). The fuzzy-trace theory (FTT;
Brainerd & Reyna, 2002, 2005) provides one of the most promi-
nent account of the occurrence of long-term false memories (see
also Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Robinson & Roediger, 1997; Roe-
diger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998). According to the FTT, the
nature of representations retrieved during the test determines the
formation of false memories. This model proposes that the surface
form and meaning content of experiences are processed and stored
in parallel. Verbatim traces are instantiated representations of the
surface forms of experienced items, whereas gist traces are inter-
pretations of concepts (meaning, patterns, relations) that are re-
trieved as a result of encoding the surface form of the items. Both
gist and verbatim retrieval support true memory for experienced
items, either because the corresponding items are specifically
recollected (verbatim retrieval) or because their meaning is famil-
iar (gist retrieval). However, verbatim and gist retrieval have
opposite effects on false memories for items that preserve the
meaning of experience (e.g., related distractors). Retrieving ver-
batim memories produces rejection of related distractors (remem-
bering “sing” or “concert” produces rejection of the unpresented
theme word “music”), whereas retrieving gist memories produces
acceptance of related distractors (remembering that the gist of the
list was music produces acceptance of “music”).
According to FTT, variations in the contributions of gist and
verbatim memories determine responses to related distractors.
Related distractors are good cues for gist memories and also better
cues than unrelated distractors for verbatim memories (e.g., putting
“music” at test can remind people of “sing” from the study list, but
putting “apple” does not help reminding people of music-related
study items). Related distractors can cue the retrieval of verbatim
memories, and retrieving verbatim memories produces recollection
rejection of related distractors (Brainerd, Reyna, & Kneer, 1995).
According to FTT, access to verbatim and gist memories is as-
sumed to decline over time, but verbatim traces are faster to fade
away. Therefore, when the delay between study and test is short,
verbatim traces are accessible and can oppose gist traces, reducing
the incidence of false memories. By contrast, at longer delays, the
short-lasting verbatim traces should leave the more durable gist
traces unopposed, and the incidence of false memories should
increase. Research on FTT also demonstrated that verbatim traces
are more fragile and sensitive to cognitive load and interference
 1314 ABADIE AND CAMOS
than gist traces (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995, for a review).
Furthermore, studies showed that performing a highly demanding
concurrent task that generates an additional cognitive load during
the retention interval between study and test has a higher detri-
mental effect on the long-term retrieval of verbatim than gist
memory (Abadie, Waroquier, & Terrier, 2013, 2017). Therefore,
there should be more false memories in delayed test when the
retention interval is filled with a highly attention-demanding rather
than a less demanding secondary task, because the verbatim traces
of the memory words would be less accessible to oppose gist
traces. Finally, research on FTT showed that gist memory in-
creases when a concept has been repeatedly activated at study by
multiple items as in the DRM lists (Brainerd, Reyna, & Mojardin,
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1999; Stahl & Klauer, 2008). Thus, false memories are more likely
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to occur when lists of associatively related words, rather than lists
of unrelated words, are presented at study.
In sum, according to the FTT, the occurrence of false memories
in delayed test depends on the nature of representations retrieved
during the test, gist traces being the key ingredient in long-term
false memories. Moreover, the FTT predicts that false memories
are more likely to be observed when a concept has been repeatedly
activated at study by multiple items or when the retention interval
was filled with high rather than low demanding secondary task or
in delayed test rather than in immediate test.
False Memory at Short-Term
Although false memory effect has been largely investigated in
LTM, recent studies indicated that WM is also susceptible to
memory distortions by showing that false memories occur on the
timescale of a WM task (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Coane,
McBride, Raulerson, & Jordan, 2007; Flegal et al., 2010; Flegal &
Reuter-Lorenz, 2014; Macé & Caza, 2011). Using a simple span
task with DRM lists of three, five, or seven words, Coane,
McBride, Raulerson, and Jordan (2007) asked participants to in-
dicate whether a probe had been presented in the memory set or
not. Probes were targets that had appeared in the memory set,
related distractors that were associated with words in the memory
set (e.g., the theme word) or unrelated distractors that had not
appeared and were not associated with the memory set words.
Results showed that related distractors were more often falsely
recognized than unrelated distractors, although virtually no false
recognition of related distractors occurred at Set Size 3.
Similarly, Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008) reported false mem-
ories in a short-term Brown-Peterson recognition and a free-recall
task (Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959) in which DRM
lists containing four associates were followed by a 3 to 4 s
retention interval that was filled with a mathematical distractor
task. In the recognition task, the retention interval was followed by
one of the three types of probes (targets, related distractors, or
unrelated distractors). Results showed that related distractors were
more often falsely recognized as members of the memory set than
unrelated distractors. Moreover, in the recall task, semantic errors
(false recall of an unpresented theme word or an associated word)
exceeded other errors. Although false recognition and false recall
still occurred, they were strongly reduced in the absence of verbal
distraction during the retention interval. In a subsequent study,
Flegal, Atkins, and Reuter-Lorenz (2010) showed that false rec-
ognition of related distractors occurred at the same rate in an
immediate test and a surprise delayed recognition task that oc-
curred after the presentation of all the lists. Taken together, these
findings evidence that false memories can occur over the short
term. The existence of similar phenomena over the short and long
term has been taken as strong evidence in favor of the unitary view
of memory that does not distinguish between WM and LTM
(Flegal et al., 2010).
However, it might be noted that the short-term false recognition
effects reported in these studies appeared only when the number of
memory items exceeded WM capacities (as in Coane et al., 2007)
or when the retention interval between the study and test phases
was filled with a demanding distractor task that could have im-
paired the maintenance of information in WM (Atkins & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2008; Flegal et al., 2010; Flegal & Reuter-Lorenz, 2014).
Hence, false memories seem to appear at short delays, but only
when WM maintenance is not possible or particularly difficult.
Thus, it remains possible that WM maintenance mechanisms might
prevent short-term false memories instead of promoting them.
Maintenance of Verbal Information in WM
Several mechanisms for the maintenance of information in WM
have been described. In the time-based resource sharing (TBRS)
model of WM, two main mechanisms have been described as
responsible for the temporary maintenance of verbal information
in WM: articulatory rehearsal and attentional refreshing (see
Camos, 2015, 2017, for reviews). They are assumed to be quali-
tatively distinct because rehearsal is thought to operate by phono-
logical repetition of memoranda, while refreshing is considered as
a domain-general, attention-based mechanism that operates by
thinking back briefly to recently active memoranda (see Barrouil-
let & Camos, 2015; Camos, 2015, 2017; Camos & Barrouillet,
2014; Camos et al., 2018, for reviews).
Importantly, the two mechanisms are thought to be independent
from each other. Camos, Lagner, and Barrouillet (2009) demon-
strated that manipulating the opportunity for rehearsal and refresh-
ing had independent and additive effects on immediate recall. In a
complex span task, they manipulated refreshing by varying the
cognitive load (i.e., the attentional demand) of the secondary task,
and rehearsal by requiring or not a concurrent articulation (i.e.,
articulatory suppression). Manipulating the availability of one
mechanism while controlling for the other led to poorer immediate
recall performance. Moreover, the orthogonal manipulation of
refreshing and rehearsal yielded additive effects, suggesting that
both mechanisms contribute to recall performance in an immediate
test, but do so independently.
Further studies examined the role of each maintenance mecha-
nism on LTM, providing evidence that the two mechanisms also
differ on their impact on long-term retention (Camos & Portrat,
2015; Loaiza & McCabe, 2012; Rose et al., 2014). While manip-
ulations that affected refreshing reduced both immediate and de-
layed recall, the addition of a concurrent articulation reduced
immediate but not delayed recall. These findings indicate that both
short- and long-term memory traces depend on the availability of
refreshing, whereas the use of rehearsal affects only short-term
recall performance.
Given this distinction between rehearsal and refreshing in im-
mediate and delayed recall, other studies have investigated
whether the qualitative nature of representations differs as a func-
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
tion of using each maintenance mechanism. Camos, Mora, and
Oberauer (2011; see also Camos, Mora, & Barrouillet, 2013; Mora
& Camos, 2013) showed that using rehearsal emphasized the
phonological characteristics of the memory items. For example,
the phonological similarity effect (i.e., poorer recall for phonolog-
ically similar words) and the word length effect (i.e., poorer recall
for long words) appeared when rehearsal was used for maintaining
memory words in a complex span task, but not when it was
suppressed (Camos et al., 2011; Mora & Camos, 2013). Therefore,
rehearsal reinforces the phonological characteristics of the mem-
ory words. Conversely, it was argued that refreshing operates
independently of the phonological characteristics, but results are
mixed regarding the nature of representations that refreshing pro-
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motes. Some studies suggested that semantic processing could be
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moderated by attention-based factors (Shivde & Anderson, 2011).
Another study showed a benefit of deep semantic processing
during encoding only when maintenance mechanisms of WM were
prevented in an incidental encoding condition (Rose & Craik,
2012). On the contrary, other studies provided evidence of seman-
tic processing effects in immediate recall independently of the
availability of refreshing. Loaiza and Camos (2018) presented a
cue word that was semantically or phonologically related to a
target during the recall phase of a complex span task. Results
showed a benefit of semantic over phonological retrieval cues, but
this benefit did not vary with the cognitive load of the concurrent
task or the intention to learn (see also Craik & Tulving, 1975;
Hyde & Jenkins, 1973).
In sum, two mechanisms allow the maintenance of verbal in-
formation in WM. Rehearsal can be prevented by concurrent
articulation, which reduces immediate recall but not delayed recall
performance. Refreshing is impaired by increasing the cognitive
load of a concurrent task, resulting in reduced immediate and
delayed recall performance. Finally, both mechanisms differ in the
nature of the representations they promote. Rehearsal reinforces
the phonological characteristics of the memory items, whereas it is
less clear what are the representations that refreshing can manip-
ulate.
A Theoretical Account of the Role of WM
Mechanisms on False Memory
By integrating the FTT and the TBRS model, we propose a new
theoretical account of the relationships between WM and LTM
that explains the emergence of short- and long-term false memo-
ries. Our reexamination of previous research (Atkins & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2008; Flegal et al., 2010; Flegal & Reuter-Lorenz, 2014)
suggests that false memories occur in immediate test when the use
of WM maintenance mechanisms is impeded. In studies in which
participants maintained word lists while verifying a math equation,
the use of rehearsal is likely to have been disrupted, because
equation verification is known to rely on the phonological loop
(DeStephano & LeFevre, 2004; Fürst & Hitch, 2000). Moreover,
the equation verification task is attention-demanding and could
therefore reduce the ability to refresh the memory items (Ver-
gauwe, Camos, & Barrouillet, 2014). Because preventing any WM
maintenance mechanism impairs immediate recall performance, it
might also boost false recognition of related distractors. Indeed,
studies on FTT indicated that completing an attention-demanding
secondary task during the retention interval between study and test
1315
disrupts maintenance of verbatim traces of memory words but
leaves gist traces unaffected (Abadie et al., 2013, 2017). Moreover,
Brainerd, Reyna, and Mojardin (1999) also showed that verbatim
memory decreases when memory words could not be repeatedly
read and rehearsed. Thus, verbatim traces might be less accessible
when WM maintenance mechanisms are impeded, which should
increase false recognition of related distractors since the retrieval
of gist traces is unopposed. So far, no studies have been conducted
to examine the role of WM maintenance mechanisms on false
memories. Thus, based on the FTT and TBRS model, we draw
some specific predictions regarding the role of each WM mainte-
nance mechanism on the occurrence of short- and long-term false
memories.
First, because rehearsal reinforces the phonological characteris-
tics of the memory words (e.g., Mora & Camos, 2013), has only
transitory and no long-term effects (e.g., Camos & Portrat, 2015),
and that the mere repetition of studied words fosters encoding and
retrieval of their surface forms independently of their meaning
(Loaiza & Camos, 2018), rehearsal should strengthen verbatim
traces in WM. Indeed, verbatim memories are representations of
the surface forms (e.g., phonological characteristics) of memory
items, which cannot be maintained over the long term (e.g., Reyna
& Brainerd, 1995). Furthermore, rehearsal emphasizes the phono-
logical, but not the semantic, characteristics of the memory words
(Loaiza & Camos, 2018; Rose et al., 2014, 2015). Hence, rehearsal
should not allow maintenance of gist memories, which represent
the meaning of information. In addition, gist traces persist over
time whereas rehearsal cannot create long-lasting memories (e.g.,
Camos & Portrat, 2015). Thus, there should be no false recognition
of related distractors in an immediate test when participants use
rehearsal to maintain memory words. By contrast, false memories
should appear when rehearsal is prevented. Findings of a unique
experiment that investigated the effect of articulatory suppression
on short-term false memories are congruent with this hypothesis.
Macé and Caza (2011) used a short-term recognition task in which
participants had to judge whether two successive mixed lists
consisting of related and unrelated words were matched. They
found that, relative to silence, the addition of a concurrent articu-
lation during lists presentation increased false recognition of mis-
matching lists comprising a critical lure (e.g., a word that was
semantically associated with all the words of the first list). Finally,
regarding the role of rehearsal on long-term false memories, as
rehearsal does not impact the retention over the long term, it
should not impact delayed false recall and recognition. Whether
rehearsal was used or not, verbatim memories decline over time,
and remembering after a long delay could not be primarily based
on the retrieval of verbatim memory, but mostly on the retrieval of
gist memory or on guessing.
Second, contrary to rehearsal, refreshing allows the maintenance
of information not only at short, but also at long delays (Camos &
Portrat, 2015). Although it remains unclear whether refreshing
manipulates semantic representations (Loaiza & Camos, 2018;
Shivde & Anderson, 2011), it is clear that it does not only empha-
size verbatim representations since it impacts LTM remembering.
Thus, one could assume that refreshing would strengthen both gist
and verbatim memories. FTT (Reyna, 2012) predicts that when
both verbatim and gist representations are equally available, adults
tend to rely more on gist representations to generate responses (i.e.,
a fuzzy-processing preference). If refreshing allows maintenance
 1316 ABADIE AND CAMOS
of both the meaning and surface characteristics of memory words,
and that people should rely primarily on the meaning to make
recognition judgments, then false recognition of related distractors
is likely to occur in immediate test when refreshing is available. By
contrast, preventing refreshing should reduce the retrieval of both
verbatim and gist memory. However, because verbatim memory is
more sensitive to cognitive load than gist memory (Abadie et al.,
2013, 2017), preventing refreshing should affect verbatim memory
more than gist memory. Hence, there should be more false mem-
ories in the immediate test when refreshing is prevented than when
it is available. Obviously, this would be the case only if memory
words cannot be maintained using rehearsal, their verbatim traces
being otherwise preserved by this mechanism. Moreover, as re-
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freshing reinforces gist memories during maintenance, these mem-
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ory traces can be preserved over the long term. Thus, the use of
refreshing should foster the occurrence of false memories in de-
layed test as well. Conversely, like true memories, the occurrence
of false memories at long delays should be reduced when refresh-
ing is prevented.
In sum, using rehearsal to maintain memory words should
prevent the occurrence of false memories in immediate tests,
whereas using refreshing should foster their occurrence in delayed
tests. This makes the relationships between WM maintenance
mechanisms and the emergence of false memories more complex
than it could have been expected, as WM mechanisms could either
prevent or promote false memories depending on which mecha-
nism is considered, and for which delay of retention.
The Present Study
Our present purpose was to test this functional account of the
emergence of false memories at short and long delays. Our meth-
odology was similar to the one used in previous studies reporting
short-term false memories (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Flegal
et al., 2010; Flegal & Reuter-Lorenz, 2014), namely a Brown-
Peterson task with both an immediate and a delayed recognition
test. We manipulated the associative similarity of the word lists,
which served as memory sets. Memory sets consisted of four
associatively related words (high associative similarity condition)
or four unrelated words (low associative similarity condition). This
manipulation has been shown to affect gist memory (e.g., Brainerd
et al., 1999). It was implemented here to manipulate the probability
of emergence of false memories. The presentation of each word list
was followed by a 4-s retention interval. Half of the word lists
were probed in the immediate recognition test and the other half
were probed in the delayed test. This procedure allows to compare
performance across equivalent lists without confounding long-
term recognition with intervening short-term recognition of the
same list (adapted from Flegal et al., 2010). There were three probe
types: target, unrelated distractor, and related distractor. To obtain
comparable measures of memory performance across delays, we
computed an index for false recognition by subtracting unrelated
distractors from related distractors error rates (producing the dis-
criminability index) as done by Flegal et al. (2010). Then, we
compared high associatively similar word lists to low associatively
similar word lists on this index to assess false memories. Larger
values of this index in the high associative similarity condition
relative to the low associative similarity condition indicated the
presence of false memories.
Four experiments were conducted in which the attentional de-
mand of the concurrent task and the presence (or not) of a con-
current articulation during the retention interval were manipulated
to impede attentional refreshing and articulatory rehearsal, respec-
tively. In the first experiment, both maintenance mechanisms
could be used; in the second experiment, both mechanisms were
impeded; in the third one, refreshing was available and rehearsal
was blocked whereas in the fourth experiment, only rehearsal was
available, refreshing being impaired. The two first experiments
were designed to test the role of WM maintenance on false
memories and the two last to disentangle the effects of refreshing
and rehearsal.
The second aim of these experiments was to examine the con-
tribution of verbatim and gist memory to the false memory effect
at short and long delays. To gain insight into these memory
representations, we used the simplified version of the conjoint-
recognition (CR) model of the FTT (Brainerd et al., 1999; Stahl &
Klauer, 2008). The CR model is a mathematical model that uses
performance obtained in a recognition task to extract direct mea-
surements of verbatim and gist representations (see Brainerd et al.,
1999, for a complete description of the CR model, and Stahl &
Klauer, 2008, for a complete description of the simplified version).
The model provides parameter estimates for verbatim and gist
memory for the responses (i.e., acceptance or rejection) to the
different types of probes. CR estimates verbatim and gist memory
that underlie the true recognition of targets, the correct rejection of
related distractors and the false recognition of related distractors,
respectively, and also provides guessing parameters computed
from acceptance and rejection rate of unrelated distractors.
The first experiment tested our main hypothesis that false mem-
ory is not an inherent WM phenomenon and there should be no
false recognition of related distractors in the immediate test if both
refreshing and rehearsal could be used to maintain memory words
in WM. Indeed, both mechanisms should enhance the retrieval
of the verbatim traces of targets, resulting in correct rejection of
related distractors in the immediate test. False recognition of
related distractors, however, should appear in the delayed test
because refreshing should also enhance the retrieval of gist mem-
ory, which is more durable than verbatim memory. The second
experiment should support the key conclusions of the first one by
showing that when WM maintenance is prevented, false recogni-
tion appears in the immediate test. Indeed, preventing both WM
maintenance mechanisms should reduce the retrieval of both ver-
batim and gist traces, but verbatim traces should be more affected
than gist traces, leading to some false recognition. Moreover, there
should be few or no false recognition of related distractors in the
delayed test, because both verbatim and gist traces should be so
weak that they could not be preserved over the long term.
The two last experiments examined the role of each mainte-
nance mechanism separately. In Experiment 3, only rehearsal was
prevented to investigate the role of refreshing on false memories.
Because refreshing should enhance the retrieval of both gist and
verbatim memory, we expected false recognition of related dis-
tractors in both immediate and delayed tests when refreshing is
available. Finally, only refreshing was prevented in Experiment 4
to examine the role of rehearsal on false memories. We assumed
that rehearsal would enhance the retrieval of the verbatim traces
of targets in the immediate test, which would prevent false recog-
nition of related distractors. Rehearsal should not affect recogni-
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
tion in the delayed test. However, there should be no false recog-
nition in the delayed test because refreshing is not available to
create strong gist traces, and also because rehearsal should rein-
force verbatim memory at the expense of gist memory.
For all experiments, we also reported true recognition scores. As
previously observed, we expected that both refreshing and re-
hearsal increase true recognition in the immediate test, whereas
only refreshing would increase true recognition in the delayed test.
We also examined the nature of representations that underlie true
recognition. We expected that rehearsal would strengthen verbatim
memory for targets whereas refreshing would strengthen both gist
and verbatim traces for targets.
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Experiment 1
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In Experiment 1, participants maintained word lists in a Brown-
Peterson task, while they concurrently performed a low attention-
demanding secondary task that did not elicit any concurrent artic-
ulation, thus preserving the use both rehearsal and refreshing.
Regarding false recognition, we expected that both rehearsal and
refreshing would stimulate the retrieval of verbatim traces of the
targets, which would oppose gist memory and minimize false
recognition of related distractors in the immediate test. Hence,
false recognition rate should be small and should not differ as a
function of associative similarity of the word lists. Because ver-
batim memory that underlies correct rejection of related distractors
is assumed to decline over time, participants should rely more on
gist memory when a related distractor is presented in the delayed
test. Moreover, because the use of refreshing would enhance gist
memory, we expected to replicate the traditional false memory
effect in the delayed test with a larger rate of false recognition of
related distractors for lists of associatively related words (high
associative similarity condition) than for lists of unrelated words
(low associative similarity condition).
Regarding true recognition, we predicted that it would only be
affected by the time of test. True recognition should be high in the
immediate test because both rehearsal and refreshing could be used
to maintain memory words. It should be reduced in the delayed test
because of time-related decay of verbatim and gist memory for
targets. We expected however that the effect of time of test would
be smaller on gist memory, which is more durable than verbatim
memory and could be strengthened by the use of refreshing.
Finally, we expected that gist memory for targets would be larger
in the high than in the low associative similarity condition because
multiple activations of the same concept is assumed to increase
gist memory (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1999).
Method1
Sample size. We computed a meta-analytic effect size across
studies that demonstrated the occurrence of false memories within
several seconds of studying brief four-item lists (Atkins et al.,
2008; Flegal et al., 2010). The meta-analytic effect size was
Cohen’s d ⫽ 1.057, 95% CI [0.751, 1.362]. The procedure used in
these studies was similar to the present one. Power analysis indi-
cated that 50 participants would be needed to achieve a 95% power
(GⴱPower; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).
Participants and design. Fifty participants (12 males, Mage ⫽
20.7 years, SDage ⫽ 1.6) took part in Experiment 1 for either
1317
course credits or a cinema ticket. Participants were randomly
assigned to the high or the low associative similarity condition.
One participant was mistakenly assigned to the low associative
similarity condition resulting in an unbalanced number of partic-
ipants between conditions. All participants performed the imme-
diate and the delayed recognition tasks.
Materials.
Item recognition task. Two types of lists were constructed:
high associatively similar and low associatively similar lists. To
create the lists, 64 theme words were selected from the verbal
association norms for concrete French nouns (Bonin, Méot, Fer-
rand, & Bugaïska, 2013). Each theme word was (a) a high-
frequency and concrete noun, (b) had at least four associates, and
(c) shared no associates with any other theme words. Sixteen of
these theme words were chosen to be the unrelated distractors and
were never presented as memory items. For each of the remaining
48 theme words, a high associatively similar list was then con-
structed by taking the first four most highly associated words (e.g.,
rooster, chick, hen, wing) of these theme words (e.g., chicken).
The low associatively similar lists were created by replacing the
second, third, and fourth words of each of the high associatively
similar lists (e.g., chick, hen, wing for the list chicken) by three
new words, each of them being the most highly associated word to
144 other theme words (e.g., rooster, whip, drawer, cave). In this
way, the four words in each low associatively similar list were
unrelated and each low associatively similar list had one word in
common with the high associatively similar lists. Pilot testing
using the same procedure as Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008)
confirmed that our high associatively similar lists, but not our low
associatively similar lists, induced false recognition of unstudied
theme words in an immediate test. Table 1 provides a description
of both types of lists.
Concerning the probes, there were three types of probes: related
distractors, unrelated distractors, and targets. Each type of probes
was presented in one third of the trials. In related distractor trials,
the probe was the theme word of the list in the high associative
similarity condition (e.g., chicken for the list rooster, chick, hen,
wing), and a theme word related to one of the four presented words
in the low associative similarity condition (e.g., chicken for the list
rooster, whip, drawer, cave). In unrelated distractor trials, the
probe was one of the 16 theme words selected from French
association norms and for which no lists were created. Finally, in
target probe trials, we replicated Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz’s
(2008, 2010) method. In the high associative similarity condition,
the first associate of each list was replaced by the theme word for
that list, subsequently presented as probe (e.g., rooster was re-
placed by chicken). Similarly, in the low associative similarity
condition, one of the four words was replaced by its theme word
presented at test as probe. In this way, in related distractors and
target probes trials, the probes were the same words for each list.
Per participant, a given probe appeared only once during the
experiment.
In each associative similarity condition, lists were divided into
three groups of 16 lists each. Each group was associated to one
1
The four experiments reported in this article have been approved by the
internal ethics committee of the department of psychology of the Univer-
sity of Fribourg.
 1318 ABADIE AND CAMOS

Table 1
Description of Word Lists and Probes Presented as a Function of the Associative Similarity Condition and Type of Probes in the
Recognition Test

High similarity condition Low similarity condition

Probe type Word list Probe Word list Probe

Related First four most highly associated
distractor words to a theme word
selected from Bonin et al.’s
(2013) norms.
e.g., “rooster, chick, hen, wing”
Unrelated First four most highly associated
distractor words to a theme word
selected from Bonin et al.’s
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Theme word The most highly associated word
e.g., “chicken” of four different theme words
selected from Bonin et al.’s
norms.
e.g., “rooster, whip, drawer, cave”
Theme word selected The most highly associated word
from Bonin et al.’s of four different theme words
norms and that selected from Bonin et al.’s
Theme word related to one
word
e.g., “chicken”
Theme word selected from
Bonin et al.’s (2013)
norms and that was not

(2013) norms. was not used in (2013) norms. used in our material
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e.g., “rooster, chick, hen, wing”
Target A theme word with its first three
most highly associated words
selected from Bonin et al.’s
(2013) norms.
e.g., “chicken, chick, hen, wing”
our material e.g., “rooster, whip, drawer, cave” e.g., “rain”
e.g., “rain”
Theme word A theme word plus the first Theme word related to one
e.g., “chicken” associated word from three other word
theme words selected from e.g., “chicken”
Bonin et al.’s (2013) norms.
e.g., “chicken, whip, drawer, cave”

type of probes, the group-probe association being counterbalanced
across participants. Each group had the same mean backward
associative strength (M ⫽ 0.29) for the high associatively similar
lists. Memory lists and mean backward association strength for
each of them are available at https://osf.io/ets8j/.
Secondary task. Stimuli were adapted from Vergauwe, Bar-
rouillet, and Camos’ (2009) spatial fit task. They consisted of a set
of 24 white boxes, each of which contained a black horizontal line
and two square black dots. The horizontal line was displayed in the
center of each box and the dots were positioned on the same
horizontal plane as each other, either above or below the horizontal
line. The line varied in length, and the distance between the dots
was chosen so that for half of the boxes the line could fit into the
gap between the dots. The stimuli were presented one at a time.
Procedure. To avoid confounding delayed recognition perfor-
mance with an intervening immediate recognition of the same lists,
the procedure included two types of trials. For half of the trials, the
memory lists were probed within the same trial (i.e., immediate
test) and for the remaining trials, they were probed in a recognition
test following the completion of all trials (i.e., delayed test).
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed
that they would see several word lists and that they would com-
plete two recognition tests, one immediately after the presentation
of each list and one at the end of the experiment after the presen-
tation of the last list. Half of the participants were presented with
high associatively similar word lists whereas the other half were
presented with low associatively similar word lists. Each trial
began with the four words of a memory list, which were presented
simultaneously for 1,200 ms (see Figure 1). Participants were
asked to read the words aloud. Then, during a 4,000-ms retention
interval, participants completed a secondary task on each stimulus
that was displayed for 862 ms with interstimuli interval (ISI) of
431 ms. Participants were asked to press the space-bar as quickly
and as accurately as possible when a stimulus appeared. This task
was a simple reaction time (RT) task known for its low attention
demand (Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos,
2007) and performed without any concurrent articulation.
For the immediate test trials, a probe word appeared on screen
for 3,000 ms after the secondary task, and participants indicated
whether it was in the memory set by pressing the S (yes) or L (no)
keys on a standard keyboard (Figure 1A). When they responded
“no,” they had to indicate within the next 3,000 ms whether the
probe was related to a studied word by pressing the same keys (yes
or no). In trials that were not probed in the immediate test, a
geometrical shape (a square, a circle or a diamond) replaced the
probe word, and participants had 3,000 ms to indicate whether it
was a square (yes or no; Figure 1B). When they responded “no,”
a second geometrical shape appeared, and they had to indicate
within 3,000 ms whether it was a square (yes or no). This proce-
dure was used to prompt the same type of responses and to keep
retention duration constant in all trials. Each participant completed
48 trials presented in random order. In the 24 trials probed in the
immediate test, eight were of each probe type (related distractor,
unrelated distractor, target).
Following the completion of all trials, participants had to count
backward by twos from a given three-digit number for 2 min. This
distractor task was performed aloud to prevent any use of main-
tenance strategies. Then, participants received instructions for the
delayed recognition test. Each participant completed 24 trials,
which tested memory lists that had not been probed in the imme-
diate test (eight of each probe type). In each trial, a probe word
appeared for 3,000 ms, and participants indicated whether it was
presented during the presentation of the lists or not by pressing
keys. When they responded “no,” they had 3,000 ms to indicate
whether the probe was associated with a studied word or not by
pressing the same keys.
Results
We verified that all participants complied with instructions and
did press the space-bar at each occurrence of stimuli in the sec-
ondary task. We conducted Bayes factor analyses, first to assess
the effect of time of test and associative similarity on memory
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
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Figure 1. Diagram of the experimental procedure. (A) Immediate test trials. (B) Delayed test trials.
accuracy, and then on gist and verbatim memory. Data of the four
experiments are available at https://osf.io/ets8j/.
Memory accuracy. We computed discriminability indexes to
obtain comparable measures of memory performance across delay
(see Flegal et al., 2010). True and false recognition were condi-
tionalized by subtracting the baseline false recognition rate of
unrelated distractors (i.e., responses “target” or “related” to unre-
lated distractors) from the rate of correct recognition of targets
(true recognition) and from the rate of false recognition of related
distractors as targets (false recognition). Larger values of the
discriminability index of false recognition in the high relative to
the low associative similarity condition indicated the presence of
false memories. True and false recognition data are shown in
Figure 2. Response frequencies are given in the online supplemen-
tary material.
The true and false recognition data were submitted to default
Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA with time of test as
repeated-measures factor and associative similarity as between-
subjects factor (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012).
Bayesian analyses were conducted using JASP (Version 0.8.3.1,
JASP team, 2018). In Bayesian Hypothesis Testing, the strength of
True recognition False recognition
High similarity Low similarity
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 Then, we compared the best model with each of the other models
Immediate test Delayed test Immediate test Delayed test
Figure 2. True and false recognition accuracy as a function of time of test
and associative similarity in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard
deviations.
1319
evidence in favor or against an effect is quantified by comparing a
model including the effect (H1) to a model omitting it (H0). The
relative likelihood of the two models under comparison is the
Bayes factor (BF; Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995). BF
indicates the factor by which prior odds ratio for the two models
should be multiplied to obtain the posterior odds ratio. The odds
ratio represents our degree of belief that the data was generated
from one model (e.g., H1) relative to the other (H0). For instance,
if we think that both models are equally probable before seeing the
data (i.e., our prior odds ratio is 1) and BF in favor of H1 is 10, then
the posterior odd ratio is 10, which means that observed data are
10 times more likely to have occurred under H1 than under H0.
The BF can be used as a continuous index of the strength of
evidence for one model relative to another. The BF can express the
evidence in favor of H1 over H0 (BF10) or the evidence of H0 over
H1 (BF01). Here we reported BF10.
For our Bayesian 2 (Time of Test) ⫻ 2 (Associative Similarity)
ANOVA, five models are considered: (a) a null model in which
there was no effect of time of test nor of associative similarity, (b)
a model in which there was an effect of time of test but not of
associative similarity, (c) a model in which there was an effect of
associative similarity but not of time of test, (d) an additive model
in which there was an effect of both variables but no interaction
between them, and (e) a full model in which there was an effect of
both variables and an interaction. The Bayes factors for each
model relative to the null can be found in Table 2. A BF10 of 3 or
more is considered substantial evidence for the model of interest,
a BF10 below one third is considered substantial evidence for the
null model and values around 1 indicate no substantial evidence
either way (Dienes, 2014; Jeffreys, 1961). In the text, first, we
reported the best model, that is, the model with the largest BF10.
to check if it is substantially preferred to all of them. In case it was
not substantially preferred, we reported also the second-best
model. When the full model is preferred, we conducted further
analyses to interpret the interaction.
 1320 ABADIE AND CAMOS

Table 2
Summary of Bayesian Analyses (BF10) for the Four Experiments

Models
Experiments Measures Time of test Associative similarity Additive model Full model

Experiment 1 True recognition 9.83e ⴙ 17 .23 2.45e ⫹ 17 6.67e ⫹ 16

False recognition .25 53.3 13.7 4216
Vt 4.08e ⫹ 23 3.86 4.20e ⫹ 26 2.23e ⴙ 31
Gt 6.31e ⫹ 6 9.91e ⫹ 9 9.35e ⫹ 18 6.28e ⴙ 19
Vr 751 4.69 5608 3.44e ⴙ 7
Gr 1.94e ⫹ 19 6.29e ⫹ 7 1.87e ⫹ 40 1.91e ⴙ 48
Experiment 2 True recognition 7.52e ⴙ 9 .24 2.20e ⫹ 9 1.89e ⫹ 9
False recognition 3029 2.69 12092 91696
Vt 1.92e ⴙ 15 .25 5.14e ⫹ 14 3.41e ⫹ 14
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Gt 7926 291 9.03e ⫹ 6 9.60e ⴙ 13

2.33e ⫹ 14 1.43e ⫹ 15 5.83e ⴙ 16
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Vr 1.28
Gr 1.36e ⫹ 7 461 1.60e ⫹ 11 6.21e ⴙ 14
Experiment 3 True recognition 1.38e ⴙ 16 .27 4.58e ⫹ 15 1.29e ⫹ 15
False recognition 8.42 250 2737 1014
Vt 5.64e ⴙ 30 .31 4.33e ⫹ 30 2.11e ⫹ 30
Gt 719298 567 3.77e ⫹ 9 5.12e ⴙ 9
Vr 1.15 431 620 195
Gr 1.59e ⫹ 14 425793 1.06e ⴙ 25 3.92e ⫹ 24
Experiment 4 True recognition 3.09e ⫹ 19 .48 4.02e ⫹ 19 8.49e ⴙ 19
False recognition 2.17 .24 .51 .25
Vt 2.25e ⫹ 25 .43 2.61e ⴙ 25 7.86e ⫹ 24
Gt 2.66e ⫹ 21 6.51 1.74e ⫹ 25 1.51e ⴙ 43
Vr 1.02e ⫹ 18 .53 1.34e ⴙ 18 5.28e ⫹ 17
Gr 6.26e ⫹ 13 421 6.55e ⫹ 19 1.35e ⴙ 31
Note. Vt ⫽ verbatim memory for targets; Gt ⫽ gist memory for targets; Vr ⫽ verbatim memory for related distractors; Gr ⫽ gist memory for related
distractors. The BF10 for the null model was 1. BF10 for the best model is in bold.

True recognition. The model that only included time of test
was the best model, true recognition rate being higher in the
immediate than in the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.551, 95% CI
[2.006, 3.169]2).
False recognition. The full model was the best model. Be-
cause follow-up Bayesian t test showed a substantial preference for
a null effect of time of test, similar tests were performed to assess
the effect of associative similarity separately in the immediate and
the delayed tests. As predicted, there was a substantial preference
for a null effect of associative similarity in the immediate test
(BF10 ⫽ 0.3), and a substantial preference for an effect of asso-
ciative similarity in the delayed test, the rate of false recognition
being higher in the high than in the low associative similarity
condition (BF10 ⫽ 4060, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.486, 95% CI [0.873,
2.135]) in this test. These results replicated those of classic false
memory studies (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995) showing
high rate of false recognition of related distractors in a delayed test,
but contrasted sharply with more recent studies (e.g., Atkins &
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Flegal et al., 2010) showing the false mem-
ory effect in both immediate and delayed tests.
Verbatim and gist memory. We used the simplified CR
model of the FTT (e.g., Stahl & Klauer, 2008) to compute param-
eter estimates for verbatim memory for targets (Vt), gist memory
for targets (Gt), verbatim memory for related distractors (Vr), and
gist memory for related distractors (Gr) as well as parameters for
guessing processes (␣ and b) for each of the four experimental
conditions. The parameter Vt represents the probability of retriev-
ing a verbatim trace of a target given a target as retrieval cue,
whereas Gt represents the probability of retrieving a gist trace of
the target given the same cue. Vt and Gt underpin true recognition
of targets, reinforcing each other for true recognition. The param-
eter Vr represents the probability of retrieving the verbatim trace of
a target when a related distractor is given as retrieval cue, whereas
Gr represents the probability of retrieving the gist trace a target
given the same cue. Vr and Gr underpin false recognition of related
distractors, but they oppose each other in suppressing or fomenting
false memories. The guessing parameter b assesses the tendency to
identify targets, related distractors and unrelated distractors as
studied words. Parameter ␣ assesses the tendency to identify any
type of probe as a target rather than as a related distractor. The
model equations are provided in the appendix of Stahl and Klau-
er’s (2008) article.
Consider the processing-tree representation of the model given
in Figure 3. The first tree represents the processes occurring when
a target is presented at test. When verbatim memory is available,
it is correctly identified as a target. When there is no verbatim
memory but available gist memory, participants have identified the
probe meaning as old, but they cannot remember whether the
probe itself or a related word with the same gist had been presented
in the study phase. A decision has to be made between the
2
Following recommendations by Cumming (2014) and Lakens (2013),
we used the average standard deviation of both repeated measures and the
pooled standard deviation of both groups of measures as the standardizer
for calculating Cohen’s d for within-subject and between-subject measure-
ments, respectively. Then, we apply Hedges’ correction to get an unbiased
estimation Cohen’s dunb. The calculation of Cohen’s dunb and the CI on d
was carried out on ESCI (Cumming, 2014).
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM 1321
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Figure 3. Processing-tree for the simplified conjoint recognition paradigm based on Stahl and Klauer (2008).
Rectangles on the left represent probe types and rectangles on the right represent responses to questions “Was
the word in the memory set?” and “Was the word related with a word in the memory set?” They are connected
by branches of the processing tree that represent the combination of cognitive processes postulated by the model.
Vt ⫽ verbatim memory for targets; Gt ⫽ gist memory for targets; Vr ⫽ verbatim memory for related distractors;
Gr ⫽ gist memory for related distractors; b ⫽ guessing that an item is either a target or a related distractor; ␣ ⫽
guessing “target.”

responses “target” and “related.” The probe is identified as a target
with the probability a and as a related distractor with the proba-
bility 1 ⫺ a. When neither verbatim nor gist memory is available,
participants can still guess that the probe meaning is old with the
probability b. A decision between the responses “target” and
“related” is required, which is again modeled by the parameter a.
They also can guess that the probe is new with the probability 1 ⫺
b. The second tree represents the processes occurring when a
related distractor is presented at test. Given available verbatim
memory, it is correctly identified as a related distractor. Retrieving
gist memory leads participants to identify the probe meaning as old
but would not allow them to remember whether the probe itself or
a related word with the same gist had been studied. With the
probability a, the related distractor is identified erroneously as a
target and, with the probability 1 ⫺ a, it is identified as a related
distractor. When no memory traces are available, participants can
guess that the probe meaning is old with the probability b or new
with the probability 1 ⫺ b. Finally, as shown in the third tree,
identification of unrelated distractors is based on a combination of
guessing processes a and b.
Verbatim, gist, and guessing parameter estimates are given in
Table 3. Individual parameter estimations were computed using
hierarchical modeling (Klauer, 2006), and latent-class estimates
using Stahl and Klauer’s (2008) HMM tree. When individual
parameters differ (because some individuals having better verba-
tim memory than others), several latent classes can be estimated,
and each individual is sorted into one of these classes (e.g., Person
i belongs to Class C1 with the probability p, and to Class C2 with
the probability 1 ⫺ p). Before these analyses, we computed indi-
vidual parameter estimates as an average of the parameter of each
class weighted by the individual probabilities of belonging to each
class. We checked they were similar to the parameter estimates in
each condition computed from the single-class model. For each
experiment, the omnibus test of goodness of fit showed that the
single class model fit was very good, and we reported the value of
G2 in footnote for each experiment.3 Bayesian analyses were used
to test the effect of time of test and associative similarity on the
model parameters. The results of Bayesian analyses are provided
on Table 2. The analyses on verbatim and gist memory are re-
ported in the next subsection and those on guessing parameters are
provided in the online supplementary material.
Verbatim and gist memory for targets. Regarding Vt, the full
model was the best model. Follow-up tests showed a substantial
preference for an effect of associative similarity in the delayed test
(BF10 ⫽ 70,998, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.687, 95% CI [1.056, 2.359]), Vt
being larger in the low associative similarity condition, and a
marginal preference for a null effect in the immediate test (BF10 ⫽
0.35). Regarding Gt, the full model was also the best model.
Follow-up analyses provided substantial evidence that Gt was
larger in the high than in the low associative similarity condition in
both the immediate (BF10 ⫽ 340836, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.896, 95%
CI [1.244, 2.594]) and the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 1.004e ⫹ 12,
Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 3.089, 95% CI [2.294, 3.967]).
Verbatim and gist memory for related distractors. Regarding
Vr, the full model was the best model. Substantial evidence was
gathered that Vr was larger in the high than in the low associative
similarity condition in the immediate test (BF10 ⫽ 615, Cohen’s
3 2
G(df ⫽12) ⫽ 1.49, p ⫽ 1.
 1322 ABADIE AND CAMOS
Table 3
Parameter Estimates for Verbatim and Gist Memory and Guessing Processes as a Function of Time of Test and Associative Similarity
in Experiment 1
Immediate test
Parameters High similarity Evidence for Low similarity
Vt .87 (.07) ⫽ .89 (.12)
Gt .87 (.12) ⬎ .50 (.24)
Vr .46 (.34) ⬎ .11 (.16)
Gr .88 (.06) ⬎ .62 (.12)
b .09 (.06) ⬎ .02 (.01)
␣ .36 (.11) Ø .34 (.43)
Note. Vt ⫽ verbatim memory for targets; Gt ⫽ gist memory for targets; Vr ⫽ verbatim memory for related distractors; Gr ⫽ gist memory for related
distractors; b ⫽ guessing that an item is either a target or a related distractor; ␣ ⫽ guessing “target.” ⬎ and ⬍ symbolize substantial evidence for an effect
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of the similarity condition in one or other direction, ⫽ symbolizes evidence for a null effect, and Ø symbolizes the absence of evidence either way. Values
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in parentheses are standard deviations. Statistical evidence for difference between the similarity conditions was summarized using symbols.
dunb ⫽ 1.285, 95% CI [0.687, 1.913]), with no evidence either way
in the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 0.41). Regarding Gr, the full model
was also the best model. There was substantial evidence that Gr
was larger in the high than in the low associative similarity
condition in both immediate (BF10 ⫽ 1.02e ⫹ 10) and delayed
tests (BF10 ⫽ 2.1e ⫹ 24), with a larger effect in delayed (Cohen’s
dunb ⫽ 3.504, 95% CI [2.651, 4.453]) than immediate test (Co-
hen’s dunb ⫽ 2.664, 95% CI [1.925, 3.474]). In sum, in the
immediate test, Vr was high, especially in the high associative
similarity condition, and could oppose Gr. In the delayed test, Vr
was reduced, leaving Gr unopposed, especially in the high asso-
ciative similarity condition in which Gr remained high.
Discussion
Experiment 1 assessed true and false memories of low and high
associatively similar word lists in immediate and delayed recog-
nition tests when both WM maintenance mechanisms were avail-
able. The classic false memory effect (e.g., Roediger & McDer-
mott, 1995) was replicated in the delayed test. Indeed, presenting
lists of high associatively similar words increased false recognition
of related distractors in the recognition test performed after a
2-min countdown sequence following the presentation of the last
list. However, our results did not replicate those of recent studies
showing the false memory effect in immediate test (e.g., Atkins &
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008). The false recognition rate was low and
similar in both associative similarity conditions in the recognition
test performed immediately after the presentation of each list. How
can we understand this last discrepancy in findings? As we ex-
pected, when participants can actively maintain memory items in
WM, no false memories occur. It is therefore likely that the
occurrence of short-term false memories in previous experiments
was at least partly due to the obstruction of WM maintenance.
Moreover, our findings support the FTT’s prediction that gist
retrieval underlies false memories. In the immediate test, verbatim
memory for related distractors was high in the high associative
similarity condition. Indeed, participants retrieved a target’s ver-
batim trace given a related probe in almost 50% of cases. This
would lead them to correctly identify a related probe as a related
distractor. Verbatim retrieval opposed gist retrieval, which reduced
false recognition of related distractors in the high associative
similarity condition. By contrast, in the delayed test, the retrieval
Delayed test
High similarity Evidence for Low similarity
.18 (.23) ⬍ .51 (.15)
.69 (.17) ⬎ .14 (.18)
.06 (.20) Ø .10 (.10)
.59 (.07) ⬎ .08 (.08)
.19 (.06) ⬍ .40 (.19)
.53 (.04) Ø .40 (.10)
of target’s verbatim trace when a related distractor was presented
was reduced. Hence, gist memory was unopposed, which increased
false recognition of related distractors. This was especially true in
the high associative similarity condition in which gist memory for
related distractors was high in the delayed test. Note that verbatim
memory for related distractors was lower (or equal in the delayed
test) in the low relative to the high associative similarity condition.
However, participants also retrieved less frequently the gist trace
of a target given a related probe in the low relative to the high
similarity condition, which explains why false recognition rate was
low even with few verbatim retrievals. Altogether, these results
support the idea that gist memory underlies false memories in the
long term.
Finally, as predicted, true recognition declined over time, per-
formance being lower in the delayed than in the immediate rec-
ognition test. Verbatim memory for targets was also reduced in the
delayed test. It contributes to the same extent to true recognition of
targets in both associative similarity conditions in the immediate
test but, unexpectedly, it was lower in the high relative to the low
associative similarity condition in the delayed test. This might be
because a high associative similarity between memory words
fosters gist formation. Indeed, gist memory was larger in the high
than in the low similarity condition in both tests. Gist memory for
targets was also reduced in the delayed test. However, as expected,
the effect was smaller than for verbatim memory.
In sum, our first experiment demonstrated that the false mem-
ories do not occur at short term when items are maintained in WM.
By contrast, the classic false memory effect was replicated in the
LTM test, showing that our material and procedure can allow the
emergence of false memories. These findings and those obtained
on gist and verbatim memory suggest that, on the one hand, WM
maintenance might prevent short-term false memories by strength-
ening verbatim memory. On the other hand, WM maintenance
mechanisms might also promote long-term false memories by
fostering long-term retention of gist memory. We conducted a
second experiment in which both WM maintenance mechanisms
were blocked.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, both refreshing and rehearsal were prevented
by asking participants to read aloud and verify math equations,
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
which is a high attention-demanding task inducing a concurrent
articulation. The impairment of WM maintenance mechanisms
should weaken both verbatim and gist memory traces for related
distractors, but the effect should be larger on verbatim traces at
short term. Hence, we expected a high rate of false recognition of
related distractors in the high similarity condition in the immediate
test, replicating Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008). However, in the
delayed test, verbatim traces had suffered from temporal decay and
gist memory would not be strong enough due to the impairment of
refreshing. Therefore, we expected that false recognition rate
would be small and would not differ as a function of associative
similarity of the word lists. Indeed, given no available gist nor
verbatim memory, recognition performance should be mostly
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based on guessing. There is no reason that participants in the
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high associative similarity condition incorrectly identify more
often a related probe as a target on the basis of guessing than
those in the low associative similarity condition. We also ex-
pected to replicate the decrease of true recognition over time.
Because both rehearsal and refreshing were prevented, true
recognition, verbatim and gist memory for targets are likely to
be reduced relative to Experiment 1.
Method
Participants. Fifty-two new participants (14 males, Mage ⫽
19.6 years, SDage ⫽ 1.9) participated for either course credits or a
cinema ticket. Half of them were randomly assigned to one con-
dition of associative similarity.
Materials and procedure. The same procedure from Exper-
iment 1 was used. The only difference concerned the secondary
task, which was a math equation verification task adapted from
Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008). After the presentation of the
memory list and a 500-ms delay, a two-operation math equation
was displayed during 3,000 ms followed by a 500-ms delay (see
Figure 1). Participants read aloud the equation and decided
whether it was correct or not by pressing keys. The first operation
was always multiplication or division and the second was always
addition or subtraction. This secondary task was more attentional
demanding than the simple RT task used in Experiment 1 to
prevent participants from refreshing memory traces, and reading
the equations aloud prevented rehearsal.
Results
Math task accuracy was high, with an average 0.82 (SD ⫽ 0.13),
assuring that participants did not favor the memory task at the cost
of poor performance in the secondary task.
Memory accuracy.
True recognition. The model that only included time of test
was the best model (see Table 2). As predicted, true recognition
rate was higher in the immediate than in the delayed test (Cohen’s
dunb ⫽ 1.413, 95% CI [1.042, 1.819]; Figure 4).
False recognition. The full model was the best model (see
Table 2). Follow-up tests showed substantial preference for an
effect of associative similarity in the immediate test (BF10 ⫽ 1168,
Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.319, 95% CI [0.730, 1.937]) with a higher rate
of false recognition in the high (vs. low) associative similarity
condition, and for a null effect in the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 0.29;
see Figure 4). Thus, contrary to Experiment 1, presenting lists of
1323
True recognition False recognition
High similarity Low similarity
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Immediate test Delayed test Immediate test Delayed test
Figure 4. True and false recognition accuracy as a function of time of test
and associative similarity in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard
deviations.
high associatively similar words increased false recognition rate in
the immediate test, but not in the delayed test.
Verbatim and gist memory. Similar analyses as in Experi-
ment 1 were performed (Tables 2 and 4), and individual parameter
estimations were computed.4
Verbatim and gist memory for targets. Regarding Vt, the
model that included only the effect of time of test was the best
model. As expected, Vt was larger in the immediate than in the
delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.942, 95% CI [1.499, 2.436]).
Regarding Gt, the full model was the best model. Substantial
preference for an effect of associative similarity was gathered in
the immediate test (BF10 ⫽ 8e ⫹ 10, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.816, 95%
CI [2.072, 3.631]) in which Gt was larger in the high associative
similarity condition, and for a null effect in the delayed test
(BF10 ⫽ 0.28; Table 4).
Verbatim and gist memory for related distractors. Regarding
Vr, the full model was the best model. Although Vr was low in all
the conditions, there was a substantial evidence that Vr was larger
in the high relative to the low associative similarity condition in
both immediate (BF10 ⫽ 5.5, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 0.734, 95% CI
[0.179, 1.304]) and delayed tests (BF10 ⫽ 17.15, Cohen’s dunb ⫽
0.873, 95% CI [0.312, 1.453]). Regarding Gr, the full model was
the best model. Follow-up analyses provided substantial evidence
that Gr was larger in the high relative to the low associative
similarity condition in the immediate test (BF10 ⫽ 1.89e ⫹ 6,
Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.936, 95% CI [1.293, 2.625]) and no preference
either way in the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 0.64). In sum, in the
immediate test, Vr was low in both associative similarity condi-
tions leaving Gr, which was high especially in the high similarity
condition, unopposed.
Discussion
Experiment 2 assessed true and false recognition of low and
high associatively similar word lists in immediate and delayed
recognition tests when both WM maintenance mechanisms were
blocked. By preventing the maintenance of information in WM,
we were able to replicate in this experiment the results of Atkins
and Reuter-Lorenz (2008) showing a false memory effect when a
few seconds separated study from test. Indeed, results showed that
false recognition of related distractors was higher in the high
4 2
G(df ⫽12) ⫽ 7.21, p ⫽ 0.84.
 1324 ABADIE AND CAMOS
Table 4
Parameter Estimates for Verbatim and Gist Memory and Guessing Processes as a Function of Time of Test and Associative Similarity
in Experiment 2
Immediate test
Parameters High similarity Evidence for Low similarity
Vt .59 (.19) Ø .57 (.11)
Gt .74 (.20) ⬎ .26 (.12)
Vr 2e-6 (3.71e-6) ⬎ 0 (0)
Gr .70 (.23) ⬎ .27 (.20)
b .18 (.04) Ø .25 (.12)
␣ .48 (.08) ⬎ .33 (.20)
Note. Vt ⫽ verbatim memory for targets; Gt ⫽ gist memory for targets; Vr ⫽ verbatim memory for related distractors; Gr ⫽ gist memory for related
distractors; b ⫽ guessing that an item is either a target or a related distractor; ␣ ⫽ guessing “target”. ⬎ and ⬍ symbolize substantial evidence for an effect
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of the similarity condition in one or other direction, ⫽ symbolizes evidence for a null effect, and Ø symbolizes the absence of evidence either way. Values
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
in parentheses are standard deviations. Statistical evidence for difference between the similarity conditions was summarized using symbols.
relative to the low associative similarity condition in the immedi-
ate test. Moreover, this experiment also showed that, in the im-
mediate test, participants were more likely to retrieve the gist than
the verbatim trace of a target given a related distractor probe as
retrieval cue. Hence, it seems that preventing WM maintenance
increases the frequency of short-term false recognition of related
distractors by impeding the retrieval of verbatim memory and
facilitating the retrieval of gist memory.
In this experiment, no false memory effect occurred in the
delayed test. Not only verbatim memory but also gist memory for
related distractors was low in the delayed test when a related
distractor probe was presented. The decrease of gist memory
observed here might be due, as we predicted, to the obstruction of
refreshing, something that we tested in Experiment 4. In the
present experiment, given that neither gist nor verbatim memory
were available, participants were likely to guess when they were
confronted with a related probe. The increase of guessing param-
eters a and b in the delayed test relative to the immediate test (see
online supplementary material) was in line with this suggestion.
Finally, as expected, true recognition was lower in delayed than
immediate test. Verbatim memory for targets was also reduced in
the delayed test. Gist memory was larger in the high relative to the
low associative similarity condition in the immediate test, but it
was reduced and no longer affected by associative similarity in the
delayed test. True recognition, verbatim, and gist memory for
targets were lower in this experiment in which both rehearsal and
refreshing were prevented relative to Experiment 1.
To conclude, the two first experiments provided clear evidence
that short-term false memories depend on WM maintenance. The
following experiments aimed at disentangling the role of each WM
maintenance mechanism on the emergence of false memories in
immediate and delayed recognition tests. Because each mainte-
nance mechanism has a specific role in promoting verbatim or gist
memory traces, their respective implication in WM maintenance
should lead to a specific pattern in the emergence of false mem-
ories. In Experiment 3, only rehearsal was prevented to assess the
specific role of refreshing on false memories formation. Con-
versely, refreshing was prevented in Experiment 4 to examine the
role of rehearsal. After presenting the results of these two exper-
iments, we compared their results with those of Experiment 2 in
the cross-experiment comparison section.
Delayed test
High similarity Evidence for Low similarity
.29 (.07) Ø .34 (.14)
.27 (.28) ⫽ .27 (.16)
.19 (.12) ⬎ .10 (.06)
.22 (.09) Ø .15 (.23)
.48 (.12) Ø .53 (.17)
.71 (.07) ⬎ .60 (.10)
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, participants performed a low attention-
demanding secondary task under concurrent articulation. They
were presented with the same math equations as those used in
Experiment 2, but were asked to only read them aloud without
verifying them. This procedure prevented rehearsal, but not the
use of refreshing for maintaining memory words. We expected
to observe more false recognition of related distractors in the
high than the low associative similarity condition for both
immediate and delayed tests. The use of refreshing should
stimulate the retrieval of both gist and verbatim traces when
confronted with related distractors. The fuzzy-processing pref-
erence principle of FTT states that adults rely by default on gist
memory. Therefore, false memories should occur in the imme-
diate test. There should be false memories also in the delayed
test because verbatim memory declines more rapidly over time
than gist memory.
We also predicted that true recognition would be lower in the
delayed than in the immediate test. Verbatim and gist memory for
targets should also decline over time. The effect should neverthe-
less be smaller for gist memory that is reinforced by refreshing. As
in previous experiments, we also expected that gist memory would
be better in the high relative to the low associative similarity
condition.
Method
Participants. Fifty-two participants (16 males, Mage ⫽ 22.2
years, SDage ⫽ 3.1) who did not participate in the previous
experiments participated for either course credits or a cinema
ticket. Half of them were randomly assigned to one condition of
associative similarity.
Materials and procedure. The same materials and general
procedure were used as in Experiment 2. The only difference was
that participants had only to read aloud, but not to solve, math
equations. This low attention-demanding task allowed participants
to refresh memory traces but not to rehearse them. As in Experi-
ment 2, each math equation was displayed during 3,000 ms with a
500-ms ISI.
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
Results
We verified during testing that all participants did read aloud
each math equation.
Memory accuracy.
True recognition. The best model was the model which in-
cluded only the effect of time of test (see Table 2). As in the two
first experiments, true recognition rate was higher in the immediate
than in the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.005, 95% CI [1.528,
2.475]; Figure 5).
False recognition. Although the additive model was the best
model, it was preferred to the full model only by a BF10 of 2.70,
providing no substantial evidence against the time of test x
associative similarity interaction (see Table 2). The rate of false
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recognition was higher in the immediate than delayed test
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(Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 0.489, 95% CI [0.206, 0.783]), and in the high
than in the low associative similarity condition (Cohen’s dunb ⫽
1.315, 95% CI [0.727, 1.933]). As predicted, there was a
substantial preference for the effect of associative similarity in
both the immediate (BF10 ⫽ 4.74) and the delayed tests
(BF10 ⫽ 189), the effect being larger in the delayed (Cohen’s
dunb ⫽ 1.145, 95% CI [0.569, 1.747]) than in the immediate test
(Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 0.729, 95% CI [0.174, 1.299]; Figure 5), due
to a greater reduction of false recognition in the low than high
associative similarity condition between the immediate and the
delayed test.
Verbatim and gist memory. Similar analyses were per-
formed (Tables 2 and 5), and individual parameter estimations
were computed.5
Verbatim and gist memory for targets. Regarding Vt, the
model that included only the effect of time of test was the best
model, but was preferred to the additive model only by a BF10
of 1.60, which provided no substantial evidence against an
additive effect of time of test and associative similarity. Sub-
stantial evidence supported that Vt was larger in the immediate
than in the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 3.952, 95% CI [3.186,
4.830]). A null effect of associative similarity on Vt was also
supported by substantial evidence (see Table 2). Regarding Gt,
the full model was the best model, but preferred to the additive
model only by a BF10 of 1.36 (which provided no substantial
evidence against the additive effect of time of test and associa-
tive similarity). Follow-up tests provided substantial evidence
for the effect of associative similarity in both the immediate
True recognition False recognition
High similarity Low similarity
1 In Experiment 4, participants could use rehearsal to maintain the
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Immediate test Delayed test Immediate test Delayed test
Figure 5. True and false recognition accuracy as a function of time of test
and associative similarity in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard
deviations.
1325
(BF10 ⫽ 3365) and the delayed tests (BF10 ⫽ 8.17), the effect
being larger in the immediate (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.406, 95% CI
[0.811, 2.033]) than in the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 0.802,
95% CI [0.244, 1.377]).
Verbatim and gist memory for related distractors. Vr was
very low in all conditions. The additive model was the best
model, but preferred to the model including only the associative
similarity effect by a BF10 of 1.44. Vr was larger in the low than
in the high associative similarity condition (Cohen’s dunb ⫽
1.502, 95% CI [0.899, 2.139]). But there was no substantial
evidence either way for the effect of time of test (see Table 2).
Regarding Gr, the additive model was the best model, but
preferred to the full model only by a BF10 of 2.69. Substantial
evidence supported the effect of the associative similarity in
both the immediate (BF10 ⫽ 7.20e ⫹ 8) and the delayed tests
(BF10 ⫽ 178531), the effect being, however, larger in the
immediate (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.420, 95% CI [1.725, 3.176]) than
in the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.749, 95% CI [1.124,
2.414]). To summarize, Vr was very low in all the conditions
leaving Gr unopposed.
Discussion
Experiment 3 assessed true and false recognition of low and
high associatively related word lists in immediate and delayed
recognition tests when only refreshing was available for maintain-
ing words in WM. As predicted, a high rate of false memories was
observed in both immediate and delayed recognition tests. False
recognition of related distractors was higher in the high relative to
the low associative similarity condition and it was the case in both
tests. Moreover, when high associative similar word lists were
presented, participants relied more on gist than on verbatim mem-
ory when they responded to a related distractor. This effect was
present in both recognition tests. These results suggest that refresh-
ing reinforces gist memory, leading participants to falsely identify
related distractors as targets. Finally, true recognition was reduced
in the delayed relative to the immediate test. Verbatim and gist
memory for targets were also reduced in the delayed test. The
effect was, however, smaller for gist memory. Gist memory was
larger in the high relative to low associative similarity condition in
both tests. The next experiment was designed to investigate spe-
cifically the role of rehearsal on false memories formation at short
and long delays.
Experiment 4
words, but refreshing was prevented by asking participants to
perform a silent high attention-demanding secondary task. This
task was a spatial fit task with keyed responses, which is known for
impeding refreshing (e.g., Vergauwe et al., 2014).
Because rehearsal strengthens verbatim memory, we predicted
that participants would be more likely to retrieve verbatim than
gist traces of the targets when confronted with related distractors in
the immediate test. This should lead them to correctly reject these
distractors. Therefore, false recognition rate should be small and
5 2
G(df ⫽12) ⫽ 5.72, p ⫽ 0.93.
 1326 ABADIE AND CAMOS

Table 5
Parameter Estimates for Verbatim and Gist Memory and Guessing Processes as a Function of Time of Test and Associative Similarity
in Experiment 3

Immediate test Delayed test

Parameters High similarity Evidence for Low similarity High similarity Evidence for Low similarity

Vt .74 (.004) ⫽ .76 (.04) .35 (.19) ⫽ .42 (.10)

Gt .59 (.04) ⬎ .25 (.33) .22 (.29) ⬎ .05 (.09)
Vr 1.18e-6 (1.60e-6) ⬍ .06 (.11) .02 (.05) ⬍ .10 (.07)
Gr .77 (.04) ⬎ .42 (.20) .38 (.14) ⬎ .08 (.19)
b .15 (.09) Ø .16 (.19) .42 (.12) Ø .46 (.18)
␣ .40 (.11) Ø .36 (.05) .69 (.13) ⬎ .54 (.09)
Note. Vt ⫽ verbatim memory for targets; Gt ⫽ gist memory for targets; Vr ⫽ verbatim memory for related distractors; Gr ⫽ gist memory for related
distractors; b ⫽ guessing that an item is either a target or a related distractor; ␣ ⫽ guessing “target”. ⬎ and ⬍ symbolize substantial evidence for an effect
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of the similarity condition in one or other direction, ⫽ symbolizes evidence for a null effect, and Ø symbolizes the absence of evidence either way. Values
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

in parentheses are standard deviations. Statistical evidence for difference between the similarity conditions was summarized using symbols.

should not differ as a function of associative similarity in the
immediate test. We expected the same pattern of findings in the
delayed test (i.e., small false recognition rate and no difference as
a function of associative similarity). Indeed, verbatim memory
should decline over time, and because refreshing was impaired
during maintenance intervals, participants would not benefit of
strong gist traces at long term.
True recognition rate should decline over time, performance in
true recognition decreasing in delayed compared with immediate
test. The effect should be large because rehearsal does not create
memory traces that persist over time. Verbatim memory and gist
memory for targets should also decline over time, and gist memory
should be larger in the high relative to the low associative simi-
larity condition.
Method
Participants. Fifty new participants (11 males, 39 females,
Mage ⫽ 21.2 years, SDage ⫽ 2.9) received either course credits or
a cinema ticket for participating. Half of them were randomly
assigned to one condition of associative similarity.
Materials and procedure. Material and procedure were the
same as in Experiment 1, except for the secondary task. Although
the stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, participants had to
perform a spatial fit task, which is a choice RT task, in which they
decided whether the horizontal line could fit into the gap between
the two dots by pressing keys as quickly and as accurately as
possible. This induced a high attentional demand, that prevented
participants from refreshing memory traces, although rehearsal
was immune as the task involved nonverbal material and was
silently performed.
Results
Participants nicely complied with instructions with a high mean
accuracy in the spatial fit task of 0.75 (SD ⫽ 0.13).
Memory accuracy.
True recognition. The best model was the full model (see
Table 2), but preferred to the additive model only by a BF10 of
2.11. The rate of true recognition was higher in the immediate
relative to the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.552, 95% CI [2.017,
3.158]). However, no substantial evidence was provided either
way regarding the associative similarity effect. Moreover,
follow-up tests showed a substantial preference for a null effect of
associative similarity in the immediate test (BF10 ⫽ 0.30) and no
substantial preference either way in the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 2.53;
see Figure 6).
False recognition. Although the best model was the model
that included only the effect of time of test (see Table 2), no
substantial evidence was indicated either way for this effect (see
Figure 6).
Verbatim and gist memory. The same analyses were per-
formed (Tables 2 and 6), individual parameter estimations were
computed.6
Verbatim and gist memory for targets. Regarding Vt, the
additive model was the best model, but preferred to the model
including only the effect of time of test only by a BF10 of 1.16.
Substantial evidence was obtained that Vt was larger in the imme-
diate than in the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.964, 95% CI
[2.352, .663]), but no substantial evidence either way was provided
for the associative similarity effect. Regarding Gt, the full model
was the best model. Substantial evidence supported a larger Gt in
the high (vs. low) associative similarity condition in the immediate
test (BF10 ⫽ 1.075e ⫹ 19, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 4.953, 95% CI [3.813,
6.079]) but no evidence either way was obtained in the delayed test
(BF10 ⫽ 1.04).
Verbatim and gist memory for related distractors. Regarding
Vr, the additive model was the best model, but preferred to the
model including only the effect of time of test only by a BF10 of
1.32. There was substantial evidence that Vr was larger in the
immediate than the delayed test (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.497, 95% CI
[1.762, 3.375]), but no substantial evidence either way for the
associative similarity effect. Regarding Gr, the full model was the
best model. Substantial evidence was obtained that Gr was larger
in the high (vs. low) associative similarity condition in the imme-
diate test (BF10 ⫽ 4.07e ⫹ 10, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.859, 95% CI
[2.095, 3.698]) and no preference either way in the delayed test
(BF10 ⫽ 0.49). In sum, Vr was high in the immediate test and could
oppose Gr when a related distractor was presented as retrieval cue.
Both memory traces declined in the delayed test.
6 2
G(df ⫽12) ⫽ 0.74, p ⫽ 1.
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM 1327

True recognition False recognition vented (Experiment 2) with those obtained when only one of them
High similarity Low similarity was available.
1

0.8
Comparison Between Experiments 2 and 3: The Role
0.6 of Attentional Refreshing
0.4
Recall that, in these two experiments, the secondary task in-
0.2 duced articulatory suppression that impaired rehearsal. Experiment
3 was designed to additionally block refreshing. In the immediate
0
Immediate test Delayed test Immediate test Delayed test test, we expected that preventing refreshing would reduce both
verbatim and gist memory for related distractors, definitively
Figure 6. True and false recognition accuracy as a function of time of test knocking out verbatim memory already impacted by rehearsal
and associative similarity in Experiment 4. Error bars represent standard impairment. Therefore, there should be more false memories in the
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deviations. immediate test when refreshing is prevented (Experiment 3). On

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the other hand, in the delayed test, responses to related distractors

Discussion
As expected, when only rehearsal was available, there was no
longer false recognition of related distractors in both immediate
and delayed recognition tests. False recognition rates were very
low in both tests and did not differ as a function of associative
similarity. In the immediate test, verbatim memory for related
distractors was high and led participants to reject related distrac-
tors in most of the cases. Both verbatim and gist memory were
very low in the delayed test, therefore responses to related distrac-
tors were based on guessing, which was high (see online supple-
mentary material). These results suggest that rehearsal might help
to reduce short-term false memories.
Finally, true recognition was reduced in the delayed relative to
the immediate test. Verbatim memory for targets was also reduced
in the delayed test. Gist memory was larger in the high than in the
low associative similarity condition in the immediate test, and it
was reduced and was no longer affected by associative similarity
in the delayed test. In the next section, we compared the experi-
ments in order to disentangle the role of each WM maintenance
mechanism on false memory formation and on true recognition.
Cross-Experiment Comparisons
To examine the role of refreshing and rehearsal on false memory
and on the underlying mental representations, we compared the
results obtained when both maintenance mechanisms were pre-
should be based on the retrieval of gist memory because verbatim
memory, if any remained, declines more rapidly over time. Pre-
venting refreshing should reduce the opportunity to create gist
memory. Therefore, in the delayed test, there should be less false
memories when refreshing is prevented.
A first Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA on false recogni-
tion with time of test as a within-subject factor, and availability of
refreshing and associative similarity as between-subjects factors
showed that the full model was the best (BF10 ⫽ 4.53e ⫹ 7). To
decompose the effects, Bayesian ANOVAs were conducted sepa-
rately on each test. In the immediate test, the model with the main
effect of associative similarity only was the best (BF10 ⫽ 14,442),
with more false recognition of related distractors in the high
associative similarity condition (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 0.894, 95% CI
[0.489, 1.295]). In the delayed test, the full model was the best
(BF10 ⫽ 6.34). There was more false recognition in the high
relative to the low associative similarity condition when refreshing
was available (Experiment 3), while this difference vanished when
refreshing was prevented (Experiment 2) with support for a null
effect in this latter case.
Examining the effect of refreshing on verbatim and gist
memory for related distractors, a Bayesian repeated-measures
ANOVA on Vr with time of test as within-subject factor,
availability of refreshing and associative similarity as between-
subjects factors indicated that the full model was the best
(BF10 ⫽ 2.06e ⫹ 20). In both immediate and delayed tests, Vr
was larger in the high relative to the low associative similarity

Table 6
Parameter Estimates for Verbatim and Gist Memory and Guessing Processes as a Function of Time of Test and Associative Similarity
in Experiment 4

Immediate test Delayed test

Parameters High similarity Evidence for Low similarity High similarity Evidence for Low similarity

Vt .82 (.18) Ø .89 (.04) .25 (.28) Ø .35 (.18)

Gt .92 (.02) ⬎ .39 (.15) .02 (.02) Ø .09 (.21)
Vr .32 (.05) Ø .41 (.28) .01 (.01) Ø .05 (.07)
Gr .78 (.21) ⬎ .25 (.15) .09 (.1) Ø .05 (.12)
b .09 (.10) Ø .07(.01) .61 (.13) ⬎ .40 (.13)
␣ .30 (.15) ⬍ .40 (.03) .65 (.04) ⬎ .42 (.22)
Note. Vt ⫽ verbatim memory for targets; Gt ⫽ gist memory for targets; Vr ⫽ verbatim memory for related distractors; Gr ⫽ gist memory for related
distractors; b ⫽ guessing that an item is either a target or a related distractor; ␣ ⫽ guessing “target”. ⬎ and ⬍ symbolize substantial evidence for an effect
of the similarity condition in one or other direction, ⫽ symbolizes evidence for a null effect, and Ø symbolizes the absence of evidence either way. Values
in brackets are standard deviations. Statistical evidence for difference between the similarity conditions was summarized using symbols.
 1328 ABADIE AND CAMOS
condition when refreshing was impaired (Experiment 2),
whereas the reverse was true when it was available (Experiment
3; BF10 ⫽ 5.69, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 0.769, 95% CI [0.369, 1.166]
in immediate test, and BF10 ⫽ 307, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.205, 95%
CI [0.784, 1.621] in delayed test). The full model was also the
best model on Gr (BF10 ⫽ 1.35e ⫹ 39). In the immediate test,
the analysis provided no evidence either way for the effect of
refreshing (BF10 ⫽ 1.34). There was however a substantial
preference for an effect of associative similarity (BF10 ⫽
3.03e ⫹ 14), Gr being larger in the high associative similarity
condition (Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.037, 95% CI [1.558, 2.509]). In
the delayed test, a substantial preference supported that Gr was
greater in the high than in the low similarity condition when
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refreshing was available (Experiment 3) and no preference
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either way when refreshing was prevented (Experiment 2).
To summarize, in the immediate test, there was as much false
recognition of related distractors whether refreshing was avail-
able or not. Contrary to our expectations, preventing refreshing
did not increase false recognition. By contrast, as predicted, in
the delayed test, the false recognition effect appeared only when
refreshing was available. The pattern of results obtained on gist
memory for related distractors followed the one of false recog-
nition. On the one hand, gist memory for related distractors was
not affected by the availability of refreshing in the immediate
test. On the other hand, in the delayed test, the associative
similarity effect (i.e., more gist memory for related distractors
in the high associative similarity condition) appeared only when
refreshing was available. Verbatim memory for related distrac-
tors was quasi-absent in the immediate test whether refreshing
was available or not. This might explain why false recognition
did not increase when refreshing was prevented. Indeed, ver-
batim memory was already very low when refreshing was
available. It was slightly increased in the delayed test and,
contrary to gist memory, it was lower in the high than in the low
associative similarity condition when refreshing was available
whereas the reverse was true when it was impaired. Therefore,
in the delayed test, when refreshing was available, participants
were more likely to retrieve the gist than the verbatim trace of
a target when they were confronted with a related distractor,
especially when lists of associatively related words were pre-
sented at study. This led them to falsely identify the related
distractors as targets. These results suggest that refreshing
increases gist memory, which can be preserved in the long term
and increases in turn false recognition of related distractors in
the delayed test.
Comparison Between Experiments 2 and 4: The Role
of Articulatory Rehearsal
Recall that in Experiment 4, verbal rehearsal that was pre-
vented in Experiment 2 was available while refreshing was still
impaired. We expected that rehearsal would suppress false
recognition in the immediate test. This decrease on false rec-
ognition should be accompanied by an increase in the retrieval
of verbatim memory for related distractors. We also examined
whether gist memory for related distractors was reduced when
rehearsal was available.
A Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA with time of test as
within-subject factor, and availability of rehearsal and associative
similarity as between-subjects factors, indicated that the full model
was the best (BF10 ⫽ 416199). In the immediate test, there was a
substantial preference for an effect of associative similarity with
more false recognition of related distractors in the high associative
similarity condition when rehearsal was prevented (Experiment 2)
and for a null effect of associative similarity when rehearsal was
available (Experiment 4; BF10 ⫽ 0.36). In the delayed test, false
recognition rate was very low in both experiments and not affected
either by rehearsal nor by associative similarity, the null model
being the best model.
A Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on Vr
showed that the best model was the model that includes main
effects of the three variables and interactions between availability
of rehearsal and time of test, availability of rehearsal and associa-
tive similarity, and time of test and associative similarity (BF10 ⫽
6.15e ⫹ 38). However, it was preferred by only a BF10 of 2.22 to
the model that did not include the interaction between time of test
and associative similarity. In the immediate test, there was sub-
stantial evidence that Vr was greater when rehearsal was available
(BF10 ⫽ 2.15e ⫹ 19, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.505, 95% CI [1.998,
3.043]), whereas the reverse was true in the delayed test (BF10 ⫽
9.17e ⫹ 6, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 1.344, 95% CI [0.911, 1.772]). There
was also substantial evidence that Vr was larger in the high
associative similarity condition when rehearsal was prevented (Ex-
periment 2) and no substantial preference either way when re-
hearsal was available (BF10 ⫽ 0.76). Finally, there was evidence
for an absence of associative similarity effect in both the imme-
diate (BF10 ⫽ 0.313) and the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 0.388).
Finally, on Gr, the best model was the model with the three main
effects and interactions between availability of rehearsal and time
of test and between time of test and associative similarity (BF10 ⫽
1.13e ⫹ 46). Substantial preference for a null effect of availability
of rehearsal was gathered in the immediate test (BF10 ⫽ 0.23). In
the delayed test, evidence supported an effect of availability of
rehearsal (BF10 ⫽ 137) with more Gr when rehearsal was impaired
(Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 0.779, 95% CI [0.374, 1.180]). Finally, substan-
tial evidence was gathered that there was more Gr in the high (vs.
low) associative similarity condition in the immediate test (BF10 ⫽
6.23e ⫹ 17, Cohen’s dunb ⫽ 2.352, 95% CI [1.858, 2.875]), but no
evidence either way in the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 0.76).
Presenting lists of high associatively similar words increased
false recognition of related distractors in the immediate test, but
only when rehearsal could not be used. Gist memory for related
distractors remained quite high in the immediate test whether
rehearsal was available or not. However, verbatim memory for
related distractors strongly increased in the immediate test when
rehearsal was available. Verbatim memory could then oppose gist
memory. This resulted in correct rejection of related distractors.
These findings suggest that rehearsal reduces short-term false
recognition of related distractors through the retrieval of verbatim
memory. In the delayed test, there was no false recognition
whether rehearsal was available or not. Although both verbatim
and gist memory for related distractors were increased in the
delayed test when rehearsal was prevented, both memory traces
remained quite low whether rehearsal was available or not. Hence,
in both experiments, responses to related distractors in the delayed
test resulted probably from guessing processes (see online supple-
mentary material).
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
General Discussion
The present series of experiments tested a new theoretical ac-
count of the emergence of false memories at short and long term
that integrates the FTT conception of memory with the TBRS
functional description of WM. More specifically, this study ex-
plored the role of WM maintenance mechanisms on the creation of
false memories with the respect to three goals: (a) revealing the
importance of WM on the incidence of both short- and long-term
false memory, (b) examining the contribution of verbatim and gist
representations, and (c) disentangling the role of each WM main-
tenance mechanism, attentional refreshing, and articulatory re-
hearsal, in this phenomenon. To address these goals, we conducted
four experiments in which the availability of refreshing and re-
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hearsal was manipulated and reliance of recognition performance
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on gist and verbatim memory was assessed. Results revealed that
rehearsal prevents short-term false recognition of related distrac-
tors through the retrieval of verbatim memory for targets, whereas
refreshing increases long-term false recognition through the re-
trieval of gist memory for related information. We discuss these
results in regard of our three goals.
The Importance of WM on the Incidence of False
Memory
Previous studies showed that false recognition of semantically
related words could occur a few seconds following study (Atkins
& Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Flegal et al., 2010; Flegal & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2014). These results can be interpreted as demonstrating
that WM can give rise to false memory at short term. Our critical
analysis of these previous studies suggested that WM maintenance
could be determinant, and that a detailed examination of the role of
WM mechanisms on the incidence of false memories was needed.
Contrary to previous studies, our results have shown that the
occurrence of the false memory phenomenon in immediate test is
due to the obstruction of WM maintenance mechanisms. Indeed, as
expected, Experiment 1 demonstrated that there are no false mem-
ories a few seconds after study when participants can actively
maintain memory words during the retention interval. By contrast,
the short-term false recognition effect was replicated in Experi-
ment 2 in which WM maintenance was impaired. Hence, the
incidence of false recognition in short-term tests does not mean
that semantic distortions originate necessarily from WM. Rather,
our results suggest that false memory errors found in short-term
tests do not arise from WM, because WM prevents them, but from
LTM. True recognition was also reduced when WM maintenance
was blocked (Experiment 2) relative to when it was not (Experi-
ment 1, BF10 ⫽ 5.72 e ⫹ 7). This replicates several findings
showing that impairing WM maintenance reduces short-term
memory (STM) performance (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Camos et al.,
2009).
Furthermore, WM seems to contribute to the occurrence of
semantic distortions in the long term. Indeed, semantically related
lists elicited high rate of false recognition in the delayed test of
Experiment 1, but false memories disappeared completely in Ex-
periment 2 in which WM maintenance was blocked. True recog-
nition was also reduced in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment 1
in the delayed test (BF10 ⫽ 17). This might indicate that prevent-
ing maintenance of memory words in WM impairs their long-term
1329
retention. This is congruent with findings of several studies show-
ing that long-term retention requires the involvement of WM (e.g.,
Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Camos & Portrat, 2015; Loaiza &
McCabe, 2013). Moreover, false recognition of related information
also decreased when long-term retention of memory words was
reduced. Indeed, we found a positive correlation (r ⫽ .38; BF10 ⫽
263) between true and false recognition rates in the delayed test,
suggesting that true memory is needed so that false memory errors
can arise.
At first sight, these findings seems to be at odds with those of
Flegal et al. (2010) and Flegal and Reuter-Lorenz (2014) showing
false recognition in delayed test while WM maintenance was
blocked. However, the pattern of results obtained in their experi-
ments when comparing true and false recognition (using the dis-
criminability index) is similar to ours: False recognition rate de-
creased when true recognition rate also decreased in the delayed
test. True recognition in the delayed test was also higher in their
experiments than in ours. It is especially the case in the study of
Flegal and Reuter-Lorenz (2014). The main difference between
studies is that participants were given processing instructions at
encoding in their studies: They had to either focus their attention
on shallow (e.g., the morphology) or deep (e.g., the meaning)
characteristics of the memory items. Deep processing of semantic
associates increases the rate of false recognition of related distrac-
tors and also increases accurate memory for the studied items in
the delayed test. Other studies using the DRM paradigm found
similar effects in long-term tests (e.g., Rhodes & Anastasi, 2000;
Thapar & McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin,
1999). This suggests that processing instructions, especially deep
processing instructions, might foster the retrieval of gist memory
for targets in the long term. Retrieving the gist trace of a target
could lead participants to accept as studied both target and related
probes.
Our findings were obtained using a recognition paradigm. One
should ask whether similar results would be obtained using recall
rather than recognition. Recall is considered as a better task to
assess WM than recognition, which could be more indicative of
LTM resources (Malmberg, 2008). However, previous experi-
ments showed false memories in both immediate recall and rec-
ognition tests. Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008) demonstrated that
semantic recall errors are more likely to occur than other types of
errors in a short-term free-recall task when the retention interval
was filled with a difficult distraction. In addition, studies using the
classic DRM paradigm (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995) dem-
onstrated false memory effect using both long-term recognition
and recall tests. Hence, we expect that the current findings ob-
tained using a recognition paradigm would be replicated using a
recall paradigm.
Finally, individual differences in WM capacity could also play
an important role on the occurrence of false memory. Studies
showed that low WM capacity individuals are more likely to recall
intrusions than high WM capacity individuals (Unsworth &
Brewer, 2010b). Other studies indicated that individual differences
in source-monitoring abilities fully mediated the relationship be-
tween WM capacity and intrusions in recall (Unsworth & Brewer,
2010a). Individuals low in WM capacity would be less able to
generate appropriate cues to retrieve memory items from LTM.
Thus, individual differences in WM capacity could also impact the
retrieval of verbatim representations, which is more resource con-
 1330 ABADIE AND CAMOS
suming than gist retrieval (Abadie et al., 2013). Low WM capacity
individuals could be less able to retrieve verbatim memory,
thereby fostering in these individuals the occurrence of false
memory. Moreover, research also indicates that individual differ-
ences in WM capacity also affect the ability to maintain items in
WM (e.g., Unsworth & Robison, 2015). The amount of attention
that low WM capacity individuals can allocate to maintain items in
WM is weaker. Hence, it is likely that preventing WM mainte-
nance mechanisms, especially refreshing, is more detrimental for
high than low WM capacity individuals (as it was previously
observed in developmental differences, Barrouillet, Gavens, Ver-
gauwe, Gaillard, & Camos, 2009). Future research on the relation
between WM and false memory should consider individual differ-
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ence in WM capacity.
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To summarize, WM is known as the structure responsible for the
maintenance of information at short term, affecting in turn long-
term storage. The present study showed that, despite contradicting
previous conclusion that WM gives rise to false memories, WM
has nevertheless a determinant role in the incidence of false
memories, because preventing active maintenance in WM in-
creases them at short term and decreases them at long term.
Mental Representations Underlying False Memory
These experiments also allowed to determine the nature of the
representations underlying short- and long-term false memory.
According to the FTT, memory performance is based on the
retrieval of both verbatim and gist traces (Reyna & Brainerd,
1995). The mix of verbatim and gist traces leading to false memory
formation depends on various factors such as retrieval cues, the
relative accessibility of verbatim and gist traces and forgetting
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Verbatim and gist retrieval have op-
posite effects on false memories for related probes (e.g., items that
preserve the meaning of experience). Gist retrieval supports false
memories because the meaning of an item seems familiar, but
verbatim retrieval suppresses false memories by neutralizing item
familiarity (Reyna & Kiernan, 1994, 1995). Another familiar find-
ing is that verbatim traces become inaccessible more rapidly than
gist. Studies showed that false memories are more persistent than
true memories (Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse, 1995; Payne, Elie,
Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Toglia et al., 1999). The present
experiments are the first to show that the relative accessibility of
verbatim and gist traces, and hence false memory formation, are
also modulated by WM.
Our experiments demonstrated that, in the immediate test, when
verbatim traces are still accessible and strong relative to gist traces,
the ability to keep information active in WM affects the incidence
of false memories through a modulation of verbatim memory.
When WM maintenance was optimal (Experiment 1), verbatim
traces were strong enough to oppose gist traces and the rate of false
memories for related probes was consequently very low. By con-
trast, when information could not be maintained optimally in WM
because WM maintenance mechanisms were blocked (Experiment
2), participants could not retrieve verbatim traces even in the
immediate test. Therefore, they relied on gist memory (which was
also reduced relative to Experiment 1, BF10 ⫽ 22,138) to make
recognition judgment, which increased false recognition of related
distractors.
Our studies also revealed that, in the delayed test, when it is
more difficult to access verbatim traces, WM still has considerable
influence on long-term false memories by affecting gist memory.
When information could be maintained in WM (Experiment 1),
gist traces were strong relative to verbatim traces and produced
false recognition of related probes. By contrast, gist retrieval was
strongly reduced (BF10 ⫽ 22.6) when WM mechanisms were
blocked (Experiment 2). Hence, there were no false memories.
These findings are congruent with previous studies (e.g., Abadie
et al., 2013, 2017) showing a decrease in verbatim retrieval when
information retention period was disrupted by the completion of a
secondary task. The present study has gone further showing that
WM is crucial to prevent the emergence of short-term false mem-
ories by strengthening verbatim memory. A second contribution of
the present study was to reveal the importance of WM on long-
term retention of gist memory. Hence, it is likely that WM rein-
forces short-term verbatim traces that help maintaining long-term
gist memory. This idea was supported by a positive correlation
between short-term verbatim retrieval and long-term gist retrieval
for related probes found when maintenance of information in WM
was optimal (Experiment 1; r ⫽ .54; BF10 ⫽ 436).
Finally, we also examined representations underlying true rec-
ognition of targets. FTT studies (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1999; Brain-
erd & Reyna, 2002) demonstrated that verbatim and gist retrieval
both support true memory for experienced items (e.g., targets),
either because the corresponding items are specifically recollected
(verbatim retrieval) or because the meaning of the items is familiar
(gist retrieval). Our findings (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2)
showed that WM increases immediate true memory by encourag-
ing both gist and verbatim retrieval (BF10 ⫽ 1.57e ⫹ 16 and 16.6,
respectively). In the delayed test, only gist retrieval benefitted
from the use of WM maintenance mechanisms whereas long-term
verbatim retrieval, which was also very low, did not (Experiment
1 vs. Experiment 2). This is congruent with studies showing that
verbatim traces become inaccessible more rapidly than gist (e.g.,
Brainerd et al., 1995).
In sum, in both immediate and delayed tests, gist traces promote
false memories for related information, whereas verbatim traces
minimize the incidence of false memories. These findings repli-
cated other ones suggesting that gist memory is the key ingredient
in fomenting false memories (see Reyna et al., 2016). Moreover,
our study is the first to show that WM modulates also false
memory formation by either preventing them in the immediate test
through verbatim retrieval or fomenting them in the delayed test
through gist retrieval.
The Distinct Role of Attentional Refreshing and
Articulatory Rehearsal on False Memory
Based on our proposed account that integrates the FTT and the
TBRS model, Experiments 3 and 4 tested the role of each WM
maintenance mechanism, refreshing and rehearsal, on false mem-
ories through their potential impact on verbatim and gist represen-
tations. Experiment 3 revealed that the availability of refreshing
increases false recognition in the delayed test, with more false
recognition of related distractors in the delayed test when partic-
ipants could use refreshing (Experiment 3) than when they could
not (Experiment 2). Moreover, refreshing also increased gist re-
trieval in the long-term test, gist memory for related distractors
 FALSE MEMORY AT SHORT AND LONG TERM
being better when refreshing was available (Experiment 3 vs.
Experiment 2). Hence, as expected, refreshing helps to preserve
gist memory over the long term. Contrary to our expectations,
refreshing did not affect the incidence of false memories in the
immediate test when rehearsal is not available. We expected that
preventing refreshing would reduce both verbatim and gist re-
trieval for related information, but gist memory should be less
affected (e.g., Abadie et al., 2013). Hence, false recognition of
related information should have increased when refreshing was
prevented. However, preventing refreshing did not increase false
memories in the immediate test: There was false recognition
whether refreshing was available (Experiment 3) or not (Experi-
ment 2). Consistently, gist memory for related information was not
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reduced by impairing refreshing and verbatim memory was very
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low in both experiments. Thus, false recognition did not increase
when preventing refreshing probably because verbatim memory
for related information was already very low when refreshing was
available.
Although attentional refreshing has attracted an increasing
amount of interest in WM, this mechanism remains rather under-
specified (see Camos et al., 2018). Our study sheds light on the
functioning of refreshing as it reveals the nature of the represen-
tations it manipulates and how it impacts LTM. Until now, the
nature of the characteristics or the type of representations that
refreshing promotes remains an open question. Camos et al. (2011)
suggested that refreshing prompts attention toward nonphonologi-
cal features of the verbal memoranda, such as semantic character-
istics. This is congruent with previous studies suggesting that
semantic processing in WM may be moderated by attention-based
factors (e.g., Loaiza, McCabe, Youngblood, Rose, & Myerson,
2011; Rose et al., 2014; Rose & Craik, 2012). Our findings bring
further converging evidence that attentional refreshing implicates
semantic features by either creating or enhancing gist memory
traces. Moreover, because gist traces are less sensitive to loss than
verbatim traces (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), they can support
memory retrieval after long delay of retention. Impairing refresh-
ing in WM reduces then gist traces, explaining why refreshing also
impacts LTM (Camos & Portrat, 2015; Loaiza & McCabe, 2013).
Contrary to refreshing, articulatory rehearsal has a strong impact
on short-term false memories by reducing them in the immediate
test. The rate of false recognition of related distractors was lower
when rehearsal could be used (Experiment 4) than when it could
not (Experiment 2). As expected, rehearsal encourages verbatim
retrieval in the immediate test (Experiment 4 vs. Experiment 2).
Verbatim traces could then oppose gist traces, thereby reducing
false recognition of related information. These findings are in line
with previous studies (Camos et al., 2013; Camos et al., 2011;
Mora & Camos, 2013) showing that rehearsal strongly emphasizes
surface (phonological) characteristics of memory words and seems
to reduce the importance of semantic processing in WM (Rose et
al., 2014, 2015). For example, Rose and colleagues showed that
participants instructed to rehearse memory words during a reten-
tion interval did not exhibit any LOP effect. In our delayed test, as
predicted, rehearsal did not affect false recognition. Long-term gist
and verbatim retrievals were also not affected by the availability of
rehearsal. This is congruent with previous studies showing that
rehearsal has only transitory and no long-term effect (Greene,
1987; Woodward, Bjork, & Jongeward, 1973), the transfer of
information from a short-term to a long-term store depending on
1331
other processes, like the LOP at encoding (Craik & Lockhart,
1972).
Hence, our findings demonstrate the specific role of each WM
maintenance mechanisms on false memories and enlighten the
underlying representations these mechanisms promote. Whereas
refreshing increases false recognition in the delayed test through
the retrieval of gist memory, rehearsal reduces false recognition in
the immediate test through the retrieval of verbatim memory.
Rehearsal reduces the importance of semantic processing and
enhances shallow processing, and by contrast, refreshing fosters
semantic processing. This last result supports the TBRS model
assuming that refreshing reconstructs degraded memory traces
using information from LTM (Barrouillet & Camos, 2015). Ac-
cordingly, when refreshing is impeded upon by an attention-
demanding secondary task during the retention interval, recall
performance should be less impacted by LTM. This is exactly what
we obtained in the delayed test: There was less false recognition of
related items when refreshing was prevented. However, this result
contradicts another WM model assuming two memory systems
and two maintenance mechanisms in WM, namely the covert
retrieval model (McCabe, 2008). This model suggests that refresh-
ing serves as a covert retrieval bringing back into WM information
that has been displaced in LTM. Accordingly, it predicts that when
refreshing is impeded upon by a high cognitive load, recall would
be dependent on LTM (Rose et al., 2014, 2015). Hence, there
should have been more false recognition when refreshing was
prevented. However, the reverse was found in the present study,
therefore providing further support to the TBRS model.
Besides reinforcing the dissociation between the two WM main-
tenance mechanisms described in the TBRS model (Camos, 2015,
2017), our findings provide also strong support to Baddeley’s
(1986) conception that articulatory rehearsal is a determinant
mechanism in verbal WM. Recently, it has been put forward that
rehearsal may have no causal role in maintaining verbal informa-
tion (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2015). Rehearsal would be either
an epiphenomenon consecutive with strong memory traces or even
harmful to memory traces by introducing some representation-
based interference. Contrary to this suggestion, the current study
shows that articulatory rehearsal, by maintaining and promoting
verbatim traces, has a beneficial effect on verbal maintenance. It is
the only WM mechanism that blocks short-term false memories by
maintaining verbatim traces. This does not reduce the importance
of gist traces because they are sustainable over the long term, but
they lack the precision needed by some cognitive activities (e.g.,
recall information in the correct order, arithmetic problem solving,
reasoning, comprehension, communication). Nevertheless, the
shield against the incidence of false memories at short term is the
maintenance of verbatim traces through rehearsal.
Conclusion
False memory can have dramatic consequences for human be-
ings. At long term, there are well-known tragic examples of the
impact of false memory in eye-witnesses testimony or report of
child abuse. At short term, although consequences of false memory
are less mediatized, there may have considerable impact on the
quality of our decisions or the accuracy of our solutions, because
any distortions of the mental representations stored in WM would
impair ongoing mental processes, for example when reasoning or
 1332 ABADIE AND CAMOS
solving problems. Even a failure in the mere short-term mainte-
nance of information can have dramatic consequences, for exam-
ple if a nurse is told to administrate one drug and mistakenly gives
another. This comprehensive research is the first to investigate
thoroughly the role of WM on the occurrence of short- and
long-term false memory, testing an innovative account that inte-
grates the FTT and the TBRS model. Our four experiments dem-
onstrated that WM maintenance reduces false recognition for re-
lated information in immediate test and increases it in delayed test.
More specifically, articulatory rehearsal prevents short-term se-
mantic distortion by enhancing the retrieval of verbatim memory
for targets. By contrast, using attentional refreshing to maintain
memory words increases long-term false memories through the
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
retrieval of gist memory for related distractors. While previous
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
studies concluded that incidence of false memories at short and
long delay of retention favors the unitary memory view, the current
results showed that distinct processes underlie false memories
when both WM and LTM can be used relative to LTM only, which
supports a dual view of memory.
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Received March 15, 2018
Revision received August 13, 2018
Accepted September 19, 2018 䡲

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