(1) NORMA A.
DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25,
1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their
son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son
came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which
is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to
the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried and
since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife
established a business known as Paree Catering. To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
CRIME CHARGED: violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262
(VAWC)
RTC: DISMISSED on the ground that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an ALIEN.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and
2.Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
HELD:
*Note: petition was allowed to be directly appealed to the SC without violating
hierarchy of courts since the petition involves purely questions of law.
1.
Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the
existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code, respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.
Respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.
He added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner
for any financial support.
Petitioner CANNOT rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. Insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not
to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in
his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or
that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability for the reason that when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because
it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto.
2.YES.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made
liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing
to give support to petitioner’s son.
Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in
relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations."
On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent
in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu
City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not
admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in
the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime. The act of denying support to a child under Section
5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995
but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant
case has clearly not prescribed.
PETITION GRANTED, CASE REMANDED TO RTC.
(2) CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ,
G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014, J. Leonen
Facts:
Muñoz filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with an application
for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Loria with the RTC of
Legazpi City.
Muñoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction under the name,
"Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. Construction." Loria visited Muñoz in his office and
invited Muñoz to advance ₱2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a
₱50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan. Loria represented that
he would makearrangements such that Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest
Construction and Development Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest
bidder for the project. The project to dredge the Masarawag and San
Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan was subjected to public bidding. The project
was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation.
Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco
Rivers without subcontracting Muñoz. With the project allegedly finished,
Muñozdemanded Loria to return his ₱2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not
return the money.
According to the trial court, Muñoz established with preponderant evidence
that Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of the river-
dredging project. Since no part of the project was subcontracted to Muñoz,
Loria must return the ₱2,000,000.00 he received, or he would be "unduly
enriching himself at the expense of [Muñoz]." CA sustained RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether Loria is liable for ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz?
Ruling: YES.
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must
have been benefited without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the
benefit was derived at another person’s expense or damage. In this case,
Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of a government
project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan,
Albay. However, contrary to the parties’ agreement, Muñoz was not
subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the
P2,000,000.00. Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muñoz’s
money without valid basis or justification. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, Loria must return the P2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
Throughout the case’s proceedings, Loria failed to justify why he has the right
to retain Muñoz’s ₱2,000,000.00. As the Court of Appeals ruled, "it was not
shown that [Muñoz] benefited from the delivery of the amount of
₱2,000,000.00 to [Loria]."
Loria, therefore, is retaining the ₱2,000,000.00 without just or legal ground.
This cannot be done. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, he
must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
(3) WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORP VS JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORP
G.R. 195549, September 3, 2014, J. Peralta
FACTS:
- Jesichris (Respondent) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution
of plastic and metal products and has been distributing throughout the
- Willaware (Petitioner) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution
of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of
Jesichris
- Jesichris alleged that in view of the fact that some of its employees has
transferred to Willaware, the latter had developed familiarity with its products,
especially its plastic-made automotive products
- In Nov. 2000, Jesichris discovered that Willaware has been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar
design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower
price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same
customers.
- Jesichris filed this present complaint for damages for unfair competition
with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware from manufacturing
and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of the
respondent
- Willaware, in its answer, denies the allegations except the ff. facts:
o It is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items
made of plastic and metal
o There’s physical proximity between their offices
o Some of Jesichris’ employees transferred to their office
o Over the years, it had developed familiarity with Jesichris’ products,
especially is plastic made automotive products
- Affirmative defenses of Willaware are as follows:
o There can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive
products are mere reproductions of original parts they intend to replace.
o Even assuming that respondent originated the use of these plastic
automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture, and sell
as it has no patent over these products
- RTC ruled IFO Jesichris finding Willaware liable to the ff: P2MM (actual
damages), P100K (attorney’s fees), and P100K (exemplary damages)
- CA affirmed RTC’s decision w/ modification. Actual damages was
deleted as it was not proven but granted the ff: P200K (nominal damages,
P100K (attorney’s fees), and P100K (exemplary damages)
ISSUE: WON Willaware committed acts of unfair competition under Art 28 of
the CC.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffers damage."
What is being sought to be prevented is the use of unjust, oppressive
or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage
in business or to earn a living.
To qualify as unfair competition, the ff. characteristics must concur:
1. It must involve and injury to a competitor or trade rival
2. It must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful
Here, both characteristics were present.
1st. Both parties are competitors being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-
made automotive parts
2nd. Acts of petitioner were clearly contrary to good conscience as he admitted
to having respondent’s employees transfer to him, deliberately copied the
respondent’s products, and selling these products to respondent’s customers.
Petitioner also had a sudden shift on his business, from manufacturing
kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts.
SC- Willaware is guilty of unfair competition under Art. 28 of the CC and it is
entitled to pay Jesichris:
Nominal damages- P200K
Attorney’s Fees- P50K
Exemplary damages- P100K
(4) R.V. Santos Company, Inc. Belle Corporation
G.R. Nos. 159561-62, October 3, 2012

FACTS: The CA affirmed the decision of the CIAC (see below for
decision) declaring overpayment made by respondent Belle to petitioners
RVSCI based on the progress billing made by the latter. The latter’s motion
for reconsideration having been denied, hence, this Petition for Review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
Belle and RVSCI entered into a Construction Contract. RVSCI undertook to
construct a detailed underground electrical network for Belle’s Tagaytay
Woodlands Condominium Project. However, the project was allegedly not
completed within the stipulated time frame. Subsequently, Belle placed
additional work orders with RVSCI.
Later, RVSCI submitted its Progress Billing to Belle, claiming that the value of
the work accordingly was P7,159,216.63 on the main project and
P1,768,000.00 on the additional work order. Parties representative met and
during meeting RVSCI allegedly advised Belle that it will return to the site until
the outstanding balance due to it is paid RVSCI allegedly refused to return the
excess payment despite repeated demands.
ISSUE: Whether RVSCI is entitled to an award damages.
HELD: NO. The rationale underlying the owners right to seek an
evaluation of the contractors work is the right to pay only the true value of the
work as may be reasonably determined under the circumstances. This is
consistent with the law against unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil
Code Expounding on this provision in a recent case, we have held that” the
principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there
is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to
receive it. In the case at bar, we uphold CIAC’s factual that the value of the
total work accomplished by RVSCI on the main project was for a total of
P6,658,885.86. On the other hand, Belle had made payments in the total
amount of P11,598,994.44.36. It is thus undeniable that RVSCI had received
payments from Belle in excess of the value of its work accomplishment.
In light of this overpayment, it seems specious for RVSCI to claim that it has
suffered damages from Belles refusal to pay its Progress Billing, which had
been proven to be excessive and inaccurate. Bearing in mind the law and
jurisprudence on unjust enrichment, we hold that RVSCI is indeed liable to
return what it had received beyond the actually value of the work it had done
for Belle.
Hence, RVSCI is not entitled to any award for damages.
**THIS CASE UNDERWENT ARBITRATION. PLEASE ALSO READ
BELOW FOR BACKGROUND.
Belle and RVSCI entered into a Construction Contract on July 14, 1997. As
stipulated therein, RVSCI undertook to construct a detailed underground
electrical network for Belles Tagaytay Woodlands Condominium Project
located in Tagaytay City with a project cost that shall not be more than Twenty-
Two Million Pesos (P22,000,000.00), inclusive of all taxes, government fees
and the service fee under the Contract. Likewise under said contract, Belle
advanced to RVSCI fifty percent (50%) of the contract price in the amount of
Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) for which RVSCI issued to Belle an
official receipt dated August 8, 1997.
Sometime thereafter, RVSCI commenced work on the project. Under Article
VII (A) of the Construction Contract, the project was supposed to be
completed and ready for operation within 180 calendar days from receipt by
RVSCI of the notice to commence from Belle, provided that all civil related
works necessary for the execution of the project works were in place.
However, the project was allegedly not completed within the stipulated time
frame.
Additional work orders were given and additional cost estimates were likewise
computed. When the two could no longer agree on the work progress and
costs of the construction, Belle engaged the services of an assessor, R.A.
Mojica and Partners (R.A. Mojica), to determine the value of the work done by
RVSCI.
Relying on the arbitration clause in the Construction Contract, Belle brought
the matter before the CIAC. In a Decision dated July 28, 2000, the CIAC found
that, under the Construction Contract and industry practice, Belle had the right
to the true value of the work performed by RVSCI upon termination.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the CIAC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, award is hereby made as follows:
1. Claimants Belles claim for refund of P4,940,108.58, representing
overpayment to the Respondent is hereby granted. Respondent is, therefore,
ordered to pay this amount to Claimant with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of this Award.
2. Claimants claim for liquidated damages and Respondents counterclaims
for an alleged balance due and unpaid on progress billings and for attorneys
fees are denied.
3. Arbitration fees and expenses shall be shared by the parties pro rata on the
basis of the amount of their claims and counterclaims.
4. The amount of P4,940,108.58 found in paragraph 1 of this Award to be due
the Claimant plus interest at 6% per annum shall further earn interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and
executory and the total amount found to be due remains unpaid.
(5) Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa vs. Bona J. Alano and Republic of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011
FACTS:
Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on
October 27, 1973, when Jose, a young lieutenant in the AFP, was assigned
in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her
infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
sometime in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. In 1987,
Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged
participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona
getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin. He got a military
pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she
and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and their foundling,
Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and
Bona, based on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations of marriage. Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist,
one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report
on Bona’s mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and two of his
witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable to her family history. On
January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the
marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court
finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability. OSG
appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the
appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
HELD:
No.
There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present
at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage.The psychiatrist’s testimony on
Bona’s histrionic personality disorder did not meet the standard of evidence
required in determining psychological incapacity as her findings did not
emanate from a personal interview with Bona herself and merely relied on her
interview with Jose and his other witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes
the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for
Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. In view of the
foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the
period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
(6) CHI MING TSOI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 119190, 266 SCRA 324, January 16, 1997)
FACTS: Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the as evidenced by
their Marriage defendant at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros Manila. After the
celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. There, they
slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989 but they did not have sexual intercourse.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up
to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but
he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using
an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And
that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire
or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain
the appearance of a normal man.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect
on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since
the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the
two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one
of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention
of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them.
But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but
he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed
this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be
forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he
is impotent .The results showed that there is no evidence of impotency, and
he is capable of erection. The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said,
that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its
full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
The RTC ruled that their marriage is VOID. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitute psychological incapacity.
RULING: Yes.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that
any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also
claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder
as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with
private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and
avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never
did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out
or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say
"I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must
be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely
not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated
marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
(7) RP vs Dayot
(8) Almelor vs RTC of Las Pinas
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there
must be, as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.
The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on
whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and
present causes of action. If the same evidence would sustain both actions,
they are considered the same and covered by the rule that the judgment in
the former is a bar to the subsequent action. It is with respect to the presence
of the fourth requisite that the Court finds no such identity of causes of action.
The causes of action are based on different periods during which Bondagjy
allegedly neglected or failed to support his family and perform his marital
obligations.

(9) FOUZIY ALI BONDAGJY vs. SABRINA ARTADI (10) RP vs C-Baguio

(G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001)

FACTS:
Petitioner Fouziy Ali Bondagjy and respondent Sabrina Artadi were married
according to Islamic Law. Unfortunately, the marital union turned sour after a
few years. On the ground of neglect or failure to provide support for her and
the family, the Artadi filed a complaint for divorce by faskh before the Third
Sharia Circuit Court at Isabela, Basilan which was dismissed since the
grounds by which she relied upon do not exist and that she does not reside in
Zamboanga City. It was also counter argued he does not neglect his wife and
children, these are but allegations without evidence to support such claims.
After almost two years, the Artadi filed for declaration of nullity of marriage,
custody and support before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City.
The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the parties since they
were Muslims at the time of the marriage, hence, regular courts cannot
acquire jurisdiction and on basis of res judicata because of the previous
dismissal by Sharia Court. Subsequently, Artadi again filed for divorce by
faskh before the Second Sharia Circuit Court at Marawi City for neglect and
failure of the Bondagjy to provide support and to perform his martial
obligations which was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and failure to
comply with the rule on forum shopping. Artadi appealed to the Fourth Sharia
Judicial District Courtof Marawi City which ruled that res judicata does not
apply in the case at bar since the Artadi offered new evidences to prove that
she is indeed entitled to divorce, hence it remanded the case to the Second
Sharia Circuit Court for hearing on the merits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to the case
HELD: