Nationalism As Ideology Behind The Priva PDF

EUROPEAN REGIONAL MASTER’S DEGREE IN DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE
University of Sarajevo – University of Bologna
NATIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY BEHIND THE

PRIVATIZATION THEFT IN CROATIA
MASTER THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL MASTER’S DEGREE IN DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
BY
MLADEN PANIĆ
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR ASIM MUJKIĆ
SARAJEVO, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
13 OCTOBER 2015
64 PAGES
Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 2
1. Theoretical Framework of Social Property, Nationalism and Robbery ............................ 9
1.1. Self-Management ............................................................................................................. 9
1.2. Social Property ............................................................................................................... 11
1.2.1. Marx on Social Property........................................................................................ 13
1.2.2. Kidrič and Kardelj on Social Property ................................................................ 15
1.2.3. Different Schools of Interpretation of Social Property in Yugoslavia and
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 18
1.3. The Great Transformation ........................................................................................... 19
1.4. Theoretical Framework of Ethnicity and Nationalism. Foisted Image of
Nationalism as a Balkan Characteristic ................................................................................. 21
1.4.1. Lie of the Serbo-Croatian Ethnic Hatred ............................................................ 21
1.4.2. Initial Accumulation of Capital and Nationalism: the Creation and Function of
Lumpen-Bourgeoisie or the Comprador Class .................................................................. 23
1.5. Privatization after Privatization ................................................................................... 26
2. Role of the Croatian Government in Nationalism and Robbery ...................................... 30
2.1. Politics of Franjo Tudjman ........................................................................................... 30
2.2. The Notion of Croatian Freedom ................................................................................. 36
2.3. Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) ............................................................................. 38
2.4. A Couple of Examples of Nepotism and Conflict of Interest ..................................... 41
2.5. Sanader and the Return to Power of HDZ .................................................................. 43
3. Croatian Opposition and Other Critiques of Nationalism and Privatization Theft ....... 46
3.1. Programs of Oppositional Parties and Social Property ............................................. 46
3.2. Opposition to the Law of Transformation by the Representatives in Croatian
Parliament ................................................................................................................................. 49
3.3. Branko Horvat and Privatization ................................................................................ 53
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 56
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 59
1
“Nationalism is a fighting mode of the class enemy”
Tito
Introduction
Before the breakup of Yugoslavia, the citizens of Croatia owned such huge economic
enterprises such as INA, Rade Končar, Borovo, Pliva, Shipyards in Rijeka, Pula and Split; Steel
Industry Sisak, Vuteks, Cedevita, Frank, Podravka, Ledo, Maraska, Pik, Kraš, Zdenka,
Gavrilović, Badel, Jugoplastika, Jugoturbina, Djuro Djaković, Riz, Digitron, Konstruktor,
Petrokemija; to name just a few of the industries. This socio-economic right was guaranteed to
them through the system of worker’s self-management and social ownership as its fundamental
element. Today, however, the situation is very different. The process of democratic transition had
brought reforms that have had effectively taken away this property of the masses and left it in the
hands of few. All this was done in the name of privatization at the very delicate time period of
creation of nation states, nationalist violence and propaganda saturation of the everyday life.
The purpose of this research is to try to establish a connection between the privatization
theft and nationalism in the process that follows the breakup of Yugoslavia and independence of
Croatia; while doing this, this research will completely reject the idea of primordial ethnic hatred
between the peoples of the Balkans while paying the necessary attention to the economic
transformations of the society which follow this breakup. The theory of ethnic hatred had
dominated the Yugoslavian space but also the international scene for some time but is now
widely rejected by most of the scholars who show interest in this topic. For example, V. P.
Gagnon explains how ethnic mobilization in Yugoslavia was a product of redefining the
community from class to nation, a process which was enforced by the elites for their own
interest.1 The class identity and the class consciousness were, as a consequence of this change,
put aside while national (ethnic) consciousness had taken its place. Another obvious problem
with the theory of primordial ethnic hatred is that it does not explain the class restructuring of the
society which is, if not the cause, than certainly the consequence of the ethnic divisions and the
ethnic violence that follow the breakup of Yugoslavia. This research wants to pay attention
1
Gagnon, V. P. The Myth of Ethnic War Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 2004. 29.
2
exactly on this restructuring and to try to connect it with the usage of the ideology of nationalism
from the side of establishment in the case of Croatia. Although the circumstances in Croatia are,
of course, unique; this research does not find its purpose in showing how a phenomenon of
robbery and nationalism is only Croatian or more Croatian than Serbian. This comparison is a
topic for another research. Therefore this modest research is dealing with a Croatian case as
important part of a wider process in the European East during the 1990’s.
“The Homeland War” (Domovinski Rat) is often shown as the triumphant result of the
rule of Franjo Tudjman or the first rule of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) while the economic
transformation and the privatization theft seem to be their actual biggest results. These results are
consistently put aside and still attempted to be shown as secondary by the mainstream media and
even the former opposition. This robbery was, in the case of Croatia, executed in two main steps.
The first step of this project was so-called “transformation” (“pretvorba”) of the social property
into state property. It in effect dispossessed the citizens, that is the workers of Croatia, actual
owners of that property, transferring this ownership to the state. The second step was further
transfer of this seized property to the newly-established nationalist elites who sized the role in
this HDZ nation building project. “The Homeland War”, as is popularly called the civil war in
Croatia and the aggression by Serbia, or Croatian War of Independence, among everything else
was a smokescreen behind which this property transferring process took part. Many people have
died, were displaced or robbed as a direct consequence of this ethnic conflict, but as an indirect
result of this conflict the entire nation saw a seizure of its property with little or no resistance
since the class mobilization was completely suppressed in the name of national/nationalistic
mobilization. The formation of national bourgeoisie, whose nonexistence was seen as a problem
in the process of this “great transformation”, from the beginning had meant radical wealth
redistribution or, in effect, the stealing from the workers and peasants in the name of nation,
“Croatian cause”, religion and even capitalism. All of these were suppressed during the time of
socialism as they were seen as reactionary and regressive but were resisting and trying to come
back into the place of dominance.
Two paradoxes of this transformation process could be easily detected. First paradox that
follows this great social transformation that is based on the defense of “national interest” is that
“national interest” had jeopardized the economic, and even the existential interests of great
majority of the nation members. The fight for the “national freedom” had brought abolishment of
3
the socio-economic safety network to the wide masses as well as the accumulation of capital in
the hands of newly-established bourgeoisie. The second paradox is that even this bourgeoisie
does not enjoy any freedom of management over domestic economy nor does the political class
enjoy any freedom in management of the state affairs since the state’s economic and political
sovereignty is highly questionable. In fact both of those social classes, the owning and political
class, find their purpose today in the service of the global capital or the “global over class”2.
As far as Croatian workers go, and they were the majority in this process of nation
building, their rights, which they had enjoyed under the old system, were abolished in three steps.
The first “Law of Transformation” of the 1991 had abolished their right to property which leads
to their property being taken away3. Social property is a very specific form of property that is
very hard to privatize or to be transferred to anyone, as we will see later in the text, but is also a
form of property that in no scenario can be legally seized by the state4. So the fact that the laws
were enacted to follow this process does not make it legitimate. The second step of the
abolishment of the worker’s rights was in the amendment to this infamous law in 1992 which had
abolished the institution of workers’ council (radnički savet5)6 and effectively taken management
rights from the workers. This had also meant abolishment of any kind of democracy and
establishment of a dictatorship in the workplace, place in which workers spend much of their
time. The third step and the final strike to the workers’ rights happens in the very company itself
where newly-appointed owning class often dries companies out of their money and resources and
shows no interest in any investment or production but only in some self interest that can quickly
be satisfied by harming the company. This process is very well known to the workers of whole
Yugoslavia and wider region and through company's bankruptcy it leads to the abolishment of the
right to work itself, workers last mean of subsistence. All of this was only possible thanks to the
nationalistic groups who were during Yugoslavia working very hard against the unity and against
2
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and Social Hope. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. 73.
3
Horvat, Branko. "Ekonomika Brzog Razvoja." Forum Bosne 13/01 (2001). 287. For the text of the law see
http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/254203.html
4
In chapter one we will see Kardelj’s clear position on the relationship of social property and state who can
not be the owner. In chapter three we shall also see Branko Horvat’s position on the question.
5
“Radnički savet“ is a form of workers' councl that exists only in the workers self-managing systems and has
a function of managing the company so it should not be confused with the todays councils (radničo vijeće) which
only have an advisory functon.
6
"Privatizacija U Hrvatskoj." Radnička Prava. May 1, 2014. Accessed October 5, 2015.
http://radnickaprava.org/tekstovi/clanci/armin-protulipac-privatizacija-u-hrvatskoj-tijek-posljedice-mitovi.
4
its socialist system. These groups rose into the power, most importantly in Serbia and in Croatia
and had dismantled socialism in their wish for achievement of a nation state.
Counterrevolutionary activities7 of the nationalist elements had strong impacts on the
actions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. These elements were compiled of militant
fascist diaspora8 but also various domestic groups such were Croatian Springers9, Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), The Young Muslims and others. It seems like these
counterrevolutionary actions are exactly where we should look for the reasons of the extended
party hand in the economy namely in the companies that were self-managing by law. This party
rule is what had cost the self-managing socialism its legitimacy and maybe even its success. The
constant fight against nationalism or nationalisms was, of course, the condition for the success of
the revolution and every indulgence to the nationalists had definitely meant the defeat of
socialism. This is exactly why it is no surprise that the nationalist groups have collaborated; that,
for example, SANU had published „Springers“ in Serbia after they were banned from publishing
in Croatia or that Vladimir Šeks, one of the future leaders of Croatian HDZ was the lawyer of
Serb radical nationalist Vojislav Šešelj etc. This is because these groups had congruous
counterrevolutionary goals no matter how opposed their nationalisms seemed. They obviously
had common enemy. The infamous cooperation between Milošević and Tudjman, who had „as
nationalists well understood each other“, engaged in partitioning Bosnia and building nation
states for themselves is also well known example. Josip Manolić had told us how he was present
when General Kadijević10 had told Tudjman how he would not tear down Tudjman's governance
in Croatia but on the other side how Tudjman should be careful to only talk to Milošević and
nobody else in Serbia „because he was the boss over there“11. Tudjman was, of course, good for
the Serbian nationalists since his apparently opposite viewpoints have given legitimacy to their
7
The term was often misused during Yugoslavia to mean: against government. In this research counter
revolutionary is considered to be against the socialist revolution and for the causes of nationalism, fascism or
capitalism.
8
Josip Manolić, who had served for a long time in Yugoslav counter intelligence agency “UDBA” as well as
Tudjman’s prime minister, claims that in the fighting between UDBA and just Croatian fascist diaspora from the end
of WWII until the breakup of Yugoslavia some 40,000 people had died worldwide.
9
Croatian Spring was national movement in 1971 which was eventually crushed by Tito and had featured
leaders such are Miko Tripalo or Savka Dabčević Kučar; while Franjo Tudjman did participate, he was not in the
forefront of the movement. Croatian spring is arguably the precursor of the wide movemet that HDZ eventualy led
through the changes in the 1990's.
10
This is the general who had led the Jugoslav People’s Army’s attack on Croatia and indirectly the infamous
occupation of Vukovar.
11
Manolić, Josip. Interview by author. July 17, 2015.
5
own nationalist claims, but for Tudjman Serbian nationalists were the key allies as well since
without them he couldn't break up Yugoslavia. This cooperation between nationalist groups had
brought prosperity to the national elites while those who had to fight for this prosperity in the
name of nation were cheated, robbed and left without rights.
The relevance of this research is in the importance of the two problems which it is trying
to connect. Nationalism is still considered by most to be the reason for the wars and the massive
human rights violations of the 90’s and is still if not the largest, one of the largest problems of the
Yugoslav nations. Privatization theft would be, if not equal, than the second main problem, and
even more spread one since just about everyone was a victim of this gross violation of human
rights. This research will than by trying to connect the two great violators of Human Rights try to
offer an alternative view of the possible solutions. The significance of the study for me is in the
fact that the country that I was born in was dismantled in a bloody war with massive human
rights violations. Nationalism is still, today used as one of the main political games of the elites
throughout the region. This may be because nationalism is connected to another problem which
needs to be discussed as a package and not separately. The academic community will find
significance in the expansion of this approach to the Yugoslav conflicts and maybe even find
some inspiration for further research of the possible solutions.
The main question of this research is: can we connect the problems of nationalism and
privatization theft in a causal relationship? Does one lead to the other, or does one allow for the
other? Is it in the nature of nationalism to support the raise of the national bourgeoisie? Did
Croatian nationalist government abuse the nationalist violence in order to rob their own citizens?
We expect to find the relationship between nationalism and privatization theft and to prove that
there is a clear connection between the two and that there was a clear intent of the government
who had planned the mass expropriation of the social property. The Croatian government had
used the nationalist violence to saturate the political discourse and limit it to nationalist topics
while restructuring the economy in the way in which most of its citizens will find themselves
without shares of former social property. We will show in this research how nationalist ideology
and violence were used as a smokescreen for this great theft of Croatian social property. The
main hypothesis of this research therefore is: Croatian nationalist government of the 1990’s has
used ethno-nationalist ideology against its own people in order to rob them off their social
property in the quest for the creation of the new national bourgeois elite.
6
In the first chapter we will take a look at the theoretical background of socialist self
management and social property as well as at the process of privatization and nationalism. For
the purpose of this research we shall describe self management, the system which was abolished
by the nationalist government. We shall also explain the concept of social property, what it is, but
also what did it mean for the theoreticians and lawmakers in Yugoslavia. What did it mean at the
breakup of the country and how could it be justly privatized. This type of property is what
confuses the most people who are not familiar with the concept of self-management. Also
understanding of this type of property is the key to understanding of the process of robbery which
we are trying to connect with the nationalist elites. We shall also tackle the question of
privatization and corruption, possibly being the same problem or the same phenomenon in the
context of former Yugoslav economies and their transitioning. After this we will turn to
nationalism and the critique of the approach of primordial ethnic hatred, and try to present some
alternative argument which again can show to the utilization of nationalism for the purpose of
privatization theft. The literature here was selected from socialist classic Karl Marx to Yugoslav
theoreticians Kidrič and Kardelj. Self management was explained by Branko Horvat and Asim
Mujkić. And in the part criticizing nationalist approach we shall look at the arguments of
Professor V. P. Gagnon Jr. and his work Myth of Ethnic War.
In the second chapter we shall examine the actions of the Croatian nationalist government
of the 1990’s who had lead Croatia through the breakup of Yugoslavia, war and the great
economic transformation. Firstly we shall look at the politics of Franjo Tudjman, the nationalist
leader and the figure which held the absolute power in Croatia in the 1990’s. His political views
from his own work “National Question in the Modern Europe” as well as from the numerous
testimonies from the political figures form both HDZ and the opposition parties as well as the
valuable testimony of the last American ambassador in Yugoslavia. For the purpose of this
research 14 hours of interviews were conducted with current and former politicians Josip
Manolić, Slavko Linić, Vladimir Šeks and Antun Vujić; University Professor Tonči Kursar and
President of Ina labor bard Predrag Sekulić. In this chapter we have also relied a great deal on the
newspapers interviews from the 1990’s and later because the privatization theft in Croatia
remains a topic mainly investigated by the journalists and not so much by the legal investigators
or academic researchers. Branko Horvat in his Ekonomika Brzog Razvoja also offers us some
expertise on the economic processes as well as comments on Tudjman and Milosevic, Serbs and
7
Croats, testimonies which we have found valuable.
In the third chapter we will see what the position was taken by the opposition parties
regarding the ‘Transformation’ and also the position of Branko Horvat, a famous Yugoslav
economist. We will see from the programs of the political parties in Croatia, how they intended to
treat social property if elected or how much respect for the workers ownership they have shown.
We shall also examine the discussion in the Croatian Parliament at the time ‘the Law of
Transformation’ was being passes. The Parliament is the one who enacts the law and for the
interpretation of a law we turn to the parliament discussion. For the purpose of this we have
acquired the transcripts from the Croatian Parliament whose Secretary Lidija Bagarić had issued
us a copy of transcripts on my name on the 17.8.2015. This chapter will show how opposition
parties were well aware of the problems of the proposed transformation and how their concerns
were ignored by the HDZ. This is because HDZ did not intend to do what it had claimed, to
transform the social property into private property. HDZ had wanted to transform social property
into state property and than, later on, to assign it to the new bourgeoisie. This new bourgeoisie is
whom HDZ had planned to further use in order to keep lasting power.
This study will contain the theoretical discussion as well as the data analysis and the
literature overview. It is a combination of the desk and a field research. The field research in
Croatia will be compiled of 6 interviews with relevant figures named above and the visit to the
parliament which will provide us with the necessary data regarding the enactment of the Law of
Transformation. The theoretical background will be crucial for the understanding of the terms
but also of the nature of the privatized property as well as understanding of the utilization of
nationalism for the purpose of goal fulfilment of nationalist elites and the creation of the new
bourgeoisie.
8
1. Theoretical Framework of Social Property, Nationalism and
Robbery
Both concepts of self-management and social property have to do with the abolition of
social monopolies. Self-management has a goal to abolish the monopoly over the decision
making process of the few and to share the authority over this process within the collective which
performs the labor. Social property has a goal of abolishment of monopoly over property of the
few through empowering the workers with ownership of the means of production, thus enabling
the self-management. Self-management has as its goal to abolish any kind of monopoly over
decision making process, weather in the hands of a capitalist entrepreneur or a socialist state.
Democracy in the workplace is seen as the main part of this system which considers it to be the
substantial and alongside social property the cornerstone of democracy in general.
1.1. Self-Management
The organizational model of a capitalist enterprise is a pyramid model with the CEO on
top of the pyramid, managers and clerks below and the workers at the very bottom. The decision
making process is hierarchical, top-down directed and majority of the people make no decisions.
The income distribution functions much in the same way thus the autocratic system of governing
the enterprise creates besides social (order givers and order takers) also economic classes. This
class differentiation is caused by the capitalist mode of production and is the fundament of this
system of repression and exploitation. This class differentiation is exactly what self-management
attempts to abolish.
In the self-management, as Branko Horvat explains the enterprises “are made up of two
pyramids (in the form of hourglass) connected by a dot in which the tips meet.”12 The upper,
upside-down pyramid is made up of the base of workers and the tip which is made up of the labor
lawmakers. The bottom pyramid has a base which is made up of the same workers but here as
labor professionals and the tip which is filled by the management. “The flow of the order in the
12
Horvat, Branko. "Ekonomika Brzog Razvoja." Forum Bosne 13/01 (2001). 279.
9
upper pyramid is political while in the bottom one it is professional.”13This means that in the
upper pyramid political equality is practiced in the decision making process while in the lower
one professional hierarchy remains. The existence of the upper pyramid is what disables the
creation classes.
All of the employees are the owners of a self-managed enterprise and all of them
participate in the election and monitoring of the workers’ council (WC) whose purpose is to see
the workers’ will through. This is the political body of the company and it elects the executive
manager (EM) who than appoints the executive council (EC) which are the two bodies who
occupy the top of the bottom pyramid. EM will come up with the business plan which WC has to
approve and whose mandate shall not be terminated before the plan is executed unless there is a
great volition. However all of the major decisions, such are investments, acceptance of large
loans, changes in salaries and so on, are made jointly by Workers’ Council and Executive
Council. Besides this the Workers’ Council plays a comprehensive monitoring role of the
company comparable to that of board of directors in capitalism. The big difference however is
that Workers’ Council is made up of people who are familiar with the production from the
bottom to top and who are deciding about their own interest. The greatest decisions however are
not even made by the Workers’ Council. These decisions could be, for example about a change in
income distribution or dramatic change in the number of the workers and have to be made by all
of the workers in a form of a referendum. It is democracy which is the main principle of this
mode of production. Hierarchy does exist in the professional manner but politically all of the
workers are equal and making decisions jointly. This also guarantees that there will not be
income inequality of a kind that we see in the capitalist mode of production.14
Why is this democracy in the workplace this important? According to Professor Asim
Mujkić the place of production and capital is the exact place of power and decision making. The
confirmation of this comes even form the neoliberal order where all of the important “decisions
are not made in the Parliaments and Governments, but at the ‘actual place of work’, in the narrow
circles of investors, capitalist speculators or in other words, at the very source of power.” 15 The
problem here is that this ‘place of work’ is not democratically organized but rather is a place
13
Ibid. 279.
14
Ibid. 278-281.
15
Mujkić, Asim. "Alternatives to Capitalism." Lecture, Open University, SARTR, Sarajevo, November 29,
2014.
10
which emphasizes the alienation since it only represents the elitist minority. Self-management, on
the other hand, wants to establish a system with representatives which are easily replaced and
which actually represent the interest of the people and not of the small elitist circle. This is why
the socialist theoreticians have pointed to the connection between ownership and the political
power which always go together. So if the ownership is monopolized, so will be the political
power and other way around, if ownership is democratized, again, the political power will also be
democratized. Bourgeoisie is seeking to gain all of the economic power, not because it needs
more resources but because it wants to gather the political power in its hands.
The fight against oppression or simply democratization has to be seen as the main gal of
self-management. This is also where the critiques of the Yugoslav self-management have the
most complaints. Asim Mujkić talks about the usurpation f the self-managing process in the
Yugoslavia by the communist party. “But this does not tell us abut the defectiveness of the self-
management but abut the defectiveness of the political party which imagines representing
someone by ‘knowing’ the real interests of that group even better than the members of that very
group. This is a typical mechanism of the usurpation of the political power by the political elites
equally used by the bourgeois and the communist parties.”16 As Mujkić further explains, the
argument about the citizens being too tired of their political involvement which they did not in
fact want does not stand. The citizens were tired of formal political participation which was
exhausting to them since it did not have its promised meaning and all of the most important
decisions were made by the party; citizen participation (in many cases) was just a formal
procedure which had to ratify these already made decisions.17
1.2.Social Property
In order for us to understand the changes that had happened in the structure of ownership,
In Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia, first we have to examine the phenomenon of social
property or even better we should give an answer to a common question: what is social property?
And also what did it mean for the people of Yugoslavia? Social property was the basis of the
Yugoslavian self-managing socialist system. Through the concept of social property the workers
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
11
had owned the means of production just like through the concept of self-management they were
the executive power in the companies they worked in. Self-management was the core of the
Yugoslavian democracy18 which had allowed workers to manage their own company through the
labor council which made all of the important decisions including electing executives. Self-
management in Yugoslavia was established by law in 1950 when labor councils were formed and
empowered to manage companies19. The abolishment of the self-management comes to Croatia in
1991 and 1992 with the “Law of Transformation” and an amendment to it. According to Josip
Manolić, whose very government had enacted this law and executed the “transformation” this
abolishment was contrary to the interest of the workers, average Croatians, but was a requirement
of the West or of the “surrounding” countries as Manolić would put it20. Actually this
‘requirement’ was phrased, as elsewhere in the Eastern Europe as transformation to
parliamentary, multiparty democracy and free market society.
Social property was not the only form of property ownership in Yugoslavia but it was the
dominant one which had clearly shown the character of the entire society as socialist and self-
managing21. Social property, as Edvard Kardelj, the writer of the Yugoslav constitutions and
labor law would say, can not have one definition because social property is an evolving
phenomenon22 in a society which is not looking to set its rules in stone, but rather to evolve and
always look for better ways to manage itself. Here is one example of the evolution of social
property that we have imagined during this research. First step is the state ownership as pseudo-
social ownership but a step that was widely considered as a necessary one. Second step is social
ownership in which the workers take the means of production in their own hands in their
enterprises. The third period is when the means of production belong to all of the members of
society equally. And the fourth period of this vision of the evolution of social property is when
the means of production cease to be referred to as property or in other words: when social
property becomes non-property or when inter-personal relationships are in no way defined
through any form of ownership. This is because in socialist humanism the belief is that the
18
Many would say that this is the exact place where Yugoslavian democracy had failed since the communist
party had kept a grip of control over the enterprises. Others again testify that not only party members were in the
labor councils (radnički saveti) and that even CEO’s of some companies were not in the party system while Branko
Horvat also talks about the golden period of the Yugoslavian self-management 1952-1964 (Horvat, Branko.
"Ekonomika Brzog Razvoja." Forum Bosne 13/01 (2001). 113).
19
20
Manolić, Josip. Interview by author. Tape recording. July 17, 2015.
21
Fira, Aleksandar. Ustavno Pravo. 4. Izd. ed. Beograd: Privredni Pregled, 1987. 138.
22
Kardelj, Edvard. Slobodni Udruzeni Rad. Beograd: Radnicka Stampa, 1978. 22.
12
purpose of ownership is to establish hierarchical relationship between people, which is not
possible in the case of even distribution of property rights, as we will see more in Kardelj’s part.
When all of the property belongs to everyone equally and when that is not a subject of change,
the property itself seizes to be the object of desire or the topic of the conversation and more
importantly it seizes to be the ground for the establishment of relations of power and subjection.
1.2.1. Marx on Social Property
Looking from the today’s perspective of a world dominated by neoliberal mode of

production, social property seems like absurd kind of property which doesn’t have intention of
further concentration and appropriation but to be instrumentalized as a tool for progress in
economic democracy and equality. For the purpose of this theoretical part and to get a better
feeling what this social property had meant in Yugoslavia at the time of the breakup we will take
a brief look at writings of three authors: Karl Marx, Boris Kidrič and Edvard Kardelj. In the
Communist Manifesto Marx explains how capital can always only be put in motion by the action
of all of the members of society, not by an individual. “Capital is therefore not only personal; it is
a social power. When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of
all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is
only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character.”23 Marx
explains how capitalists themselves refute the argument about the origin of private property
which supposedly is in mixing personal labor and property. What we see in capitalism is very
opposite to this and the property is being completely alienated from labor or, in other words,
people who do all of the labor, do not own property and people who own property do not do the
labor. This is exactly the problem with the capitalist production, the means of production are not
in the same hands as the labor and the profit does not belong to the laborer but to the exploiter.
This is why the concept of social ownership is introduced to bridge this gap and to put the
ownership of the means of production into the hands of labor.
In his essay “On the Jewish Question” (arguing about the necessary steps for the political
emancipation of the Jews) Marx replies to the idea of Bruno Bauer who had proposed that the
23
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. The Communist Manifesto. 27th ed. New York: International Publishers,
1988. 24.
13
state would make a progress with the abolition of the religion (and also expresses his view on
property and “rights of man”). “Of course, in periods when the political state as such is born
violently out of civil society, when political liberation is the form in which men strive to achieve
their liberation, the state can and must go as far as the abolition of religion, the destruction of
religion. But it can do so only in the same way that it proceeds to the abolition of private
property, to the maximum, to confiscation, to progressive taxation, just as it goes as far as the
abolition of life, the guillotine.”24 If people are ready to kill in the name of the revolution, than
what is the problem with the private property abolition? Marx thinks that abolition of the social
categories of birth and social rank, which was the furthest accomplishment of the bourgeois
revolution, allows the private property, education or employment to act in their way and further
provide lines for the class separation of society. This is why bourgeois revolution doesn’t
eliminate the class differences but rather replaces one way of social hierarchical classification for
the other. This is why, regarding the emancipation, the bourgeois revolution was not enough.
Further in the text Marx turns on the “Rights of Man” and confronts the bourgeois
conception of rights, society, liberty etc. “The right of man to private property is, therefore, the
right to enjoy one’s property and to dispose of it at one’s discretion (à son gré), without regard to
other men, independently of society, the right of self-interest. This individual liberty and its
application form the basis of civil society. It makes every man see in other men not the
realization of his own freedom, but the barrier to it.”25 So, man has his discretion over his goods
and his income, his labor and so on, everything individual, egotistical and without socialization
and solidarity. This is pure bourgeois metaphysics of an abstract, isolated subject, Robinson
Crusoe. What Marx further notices about the rights of man is this: “None of the so-called rights
of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society – that is, an
individual withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice,
and separated from the community. In the rights of man, he is far from being conceived as a
species-being; on the contrary, species-life itself, society, appears as a framework external to the
individuals, as a restriction of their original independence. The sole bond holding them together
is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic
24
Marx, Karl. "On The Jewish Question." February 1, 1844. Accessed October 6, 2015.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/.
25
Ibid..
14
selves.”26 There is no society, like Margaret Thatcher said27, everyone is the world on his own,
solely his own product, and this is the final result of bourgeois revolutions. The results of this
revolution are that “man was not freed from religion, he received religious freedom. He was not
freed from property; he received freedom to own property. He was not freed from the egoism of
business; he received freedom to engage in business”28. Marx is infinitely disappointed with a
view how these results are final goal of social revolution. This egotistical social system needs
further changes, improvements and revolutions and the first hard step is the abolishment of the
private property.
1.2.2. Kidrič and Kardelj on Social Property
In early works of Yugoslav socialist humanism Boris Kidrič writes how social property
can not be seen as a right in the old sense of right to property because its social content is
different. It is expectable to see some kind of residue of the old system in the process of
production and exchange of goods and this is why workers or anyone would consider social
property as actual property right. “For the sociological and historical content of qualitatively new
social relations, which are created through workers’ management of companies, those residues
are only important if we have to confront their reflections in the heads and topics of people whose
consciousness is backwards”29 In other words, property is only a topic due to some backwards
thinking which will only stay around for a short while before permanently disappearing from the
culture and even memory of the society. The worst thing for Kidrič is the idea that social property
is somehow defined as private property, even if that of the workers themselves. This great
thought however does not help us solve the problem of privatization of once established social
property which is the path that Yugoslavian workers found themselves on in the process of
creation of nation-states. This concept of non-property is a concept strictly tied to socialism.
Once the socialism is abolished this concept has to be abandoned as well and the workers and all
of the members of the society have to be able to claim their property right.
26
Ibid
27
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 23.
28
29
Kidrič, Boris. Socijalizam I Ekonomija. Zagreb: Globus, 1978. 173.
15
Edvard Kardelj was both the main Yugoslav theoretician and even legislation writer when
it came to this issue. The last law regulating the social ownership, Law of Associated Labor was
written by Edvard Kardelj and here is what the author of the law says in his “Free Associated
Labor”. First thing is that social-ownership does not and cannot have one universal definition30
since it is an evolving phenomenon so the shape and the content of it change over time. Since
revolution is permanent society is always looking for better ways to manage itself. The first phase
was the state ownership of the social property (means of production) which was clearly seen as
temporary by the Yugoslav theoreticians as well as legislators, due to the fact that the state
monopoly over ownership may bring state monopoly over decision making in the company that is
supposed to be self-managing. In fact, such a deviation had occurred throughout the Eastern
‘Communist’ block where it established alienated relations not only between workers themselves
but between working class and Communist Party nomenclature. This period (of state ownership)
is seen as a necessary period but is still part of the ownership categories in which the ownership
of the means of production is in the hands of one social group while ownership of the labor is in
hands of the other31.
Kardelj says that the concept of the social ownership is mainly here to explain the
relations between the workers themselves and not between the worker and the state. “In that
manner social-property is the collective property of all the working people, and according to that
also a personal property of every working person to that extent and in that shape in which it
allows the worker his right to work with the social means, together with all the other of his rights
that are connected to this essential one”32. In other words, the social ownership is in theoretical as
well as legal terms connected to the self-management and to the work itself. Ownership itself is
not, therefore the purpose of the social ownership. The purpose of the social ownership is the
labor so these phenomena cannot be studied separately since social ownership was created for the
purpose of work. According to Kardelj, the right to work with the socially owned means of
production cannot be taken away from the workers by anybody, including the state. 33 Coming
from a man who wrote Yugoslavian laws and the constitution, this can add another dimension
regarding the legality of state seizure of the social property at the beginning of the 90's. Another
30
Kardelj, Edvard. Slobodni Udruzeni Rad. Beograd: Radnicka Stampa, 1978. 22.
31
Ibid 22.
32
Ibid 24.
33
Ibid 25.
16
point to be made about state’s disability to legitimately seize this property is that Kardelj had
clearly also stated that the workers have right to invest a share of their own income into the social
property or into the means of production which are in their hands, if they wish to increase
production. This is how workers of Yugoslavia had been investing for decades into the social
property and even building social vacation homes or other institutions for the social benefit and
only to see all of this taken away by the state before being given away to few.
Analyzing Marx, Kardelj says that he believed how social property must belong to all of
the working people as well as to all of the members of society. It is the first period of social
ownership it has a class character and belongs to the workers, but it will eventually evolve to the
point when it belongs to the entire population, first in a country and then internationally34.
Kardelj gets to the similar point while explaining how the social property is there not to be
someone’s property that he can claim for himself as opposed to the other one who cannot, but
rather to be a means of production that enables people to work and make living for them and for
the society. This period of social ownership Kardelj sees as just another step toward the abolition
of ownership because of the fact that the “social ownership will, due to the advancement of
production, bring a system in which the distribution of goods will be more and more based on the
needs and less and less on the labor”35. Kardelj, just like Marx, does not want to give certain
shares of the social property to the working people since that is seen as a backwards capitalist
concept, the property is everybody’s until one day it can be nobody’s and we reach the main goal
of this economic revolution in which right to property really becomes a freedom form property
for all. It is very important to understand here why Kardelj does not clearly state that all of the
workers, or all of the citizens are owners. This is not the case because he wanted ownership rights
for the state or ever considered giving some to a private capitalist owner, no, it is because the
whole concept of ownership is clearly seen as reactionary. The right to property is therefore
tolerated only as a temporary measure just like the state monopoly over property was introduced
when it was needed. So, when the time comes people will be freed form the concept of property
ownership and individuals, society and state will not own property since there will be enough
property there for everyone to enjoy according to his needs and ownership will cease to be a
“conversation topic”.
34
Kardelj, Edvard. Slobodni Udruzeni Rad. Beograd: Radnicka Stampa, 1978. 26. Translated by the author.
35
Ibid 32.
17
1.2.3. Different Schools of Interpretation of Social Property in Yugoslavia and Conclusion
When it came to the discussions about the nature of the social property within the authors
of Yugoslavian socialist humanism, both Kardelj and Kidrič have belonged to a “non-property”
group, which believed how social property is not a proper private property. Another group of
scholars, known as “property” group had believed otherwise. This group was grouped around
Belgrade scholars and their claim was that “property without a subject is contradicto in adjecto.
Positive determinations of the subject of social property are tied to: natural person, individual,
worker of the associated labor, working class as a whole.”36 Kidrič had died in 1953 so in 1979
when Kardelj had died as well, the space was opened for the change in the dominance in the
dynamics of the “non-property” vs “property” group. As Professor Hodzić explains, the
“property” school’s interpretation had become dominant in the 1980’s in which “attitudes which
had prevailed were that subjects of the property rights are all of the subjects which appropriate a
share of the income.”37 According to this author by the 1985 this “property” conception had
completely dominated the conferences in Belgrade and Skopje which had offered as a conclusion
how “non-property” conception of social property is the cause of the economic crisis.
This change in the dominant perception of social property had created favorable
conditions for the introduction of the internal privatization process, also known as “Marković
privatization”. Ante Marković, the last Prime Minister of the Federal Executive Council (1987-
1991), came to power through the help of the reformists from Croatia but also other republics,
including Serbia. Marković had defeated Borisav Jović who was Milošević’s candidate and had a
strong reformist vision, a vision that both Milosevic and Tudjman detested.3839 He planed to
introduce specific brand of privatization of socially owned enterprises by changing social
ownership of the means of production with the private ownership by the workers who would then
be ready for the abolishment of socialism which was expected. “Marković’s privatization” model
was initiated in the second half of the 1980’s and was an attempt to transfer the socialist
conception of social property into a private property of the workers and the management. As we
36
Hodžić, Kadrija. "(Re)Privatizacija I Globalizacija." Forum Bosne 22-03. 72.
37
Ibid 72
38
Press, 2004. 82.
39
Here we can also note that Warren Zimmerman reports how Marković had warned him not to think that
Tudjman is better than Milošević (Zimmerman, 27).
18
will see, this process was stopped in Croatia by the Law of Transformation, which was rushed,
according to Vladimir Šeks for the very reason to stop the “Marković privatization”40. Both
models signify the return of the private property, which was at the time seen as inevitable, but the
difference is great in the outcome as HDZ model had no intention to recognize workers property
rights but, on contrary, to introduce the new proprietors’ class.
What we have seen is that social property cannot be privatized justly, since it is a concept
that is meant to go forward in the social evolution and not backwards. The process of
privatization of social property is violent regressive process that amounted greatly to social
injustice, first of all because it reversed the nature of property from a system within which that
property was supposed to be a guarantee of advancement of general human condition. Social
property is a form of property which is there also to be the guarantee for other two types of
socioeconomic rights. These two rights are right to work and right to self-management or right to
democracy in the workplace. This way denying the right to property to the workers also leads to
the abolishment of these two rights. All of these questions present the theoretical difficulty of the
process of privatization of social property, questions which can’t have satisfying answers because
the process of socialization and further development of social property is not anticipated for the
evolutionary setbacks of these proportions. Kardelj was clear that social property in Yugoslavia
cannot belong to the state and that workers are to invest into it like if it was their own. Even if
we accept the unconvincing argument about the society’s wish to abolish the advanced social
systems and instead of them reinstall regressive capitalist relationships, than we still have to
answer to the complicated question of the possible legal way to privatize this peculiar type of
property. The best answers that we have found during this research were the ones given by Antun
Vujić and especially Branko Horvat and as we will see in the third chapter.
1.3.The Great Transformation41
By The Great Transformation we consider the process of change of the state system
which was experienced by all of the republics of former Yugoslavia. The first part of this
transformation is the abolishment of the socialist state and its ownership system as well as
40
Šeks, Vladimir. Interview by author. August 6, 2015.
41
Although the title is browed from Karl Polanyi the transformation discussed here is of a different nature.
19
rejection of the socialist values which became labeled as wrong, backward, totalitarian and anti-
European. It is interesting how socialist thought, although springing from values and heritage of
the European Enlightenment, just as liberal thought, has, during the Cold War been imagined and
described as something un-European by the dominant Western ideology. Socialist state had the
goal to provide its titular group (the proletariat) with the socioeconomic rights which are denied
in capitalism. Now, this project had either failed in Yugoslavia or was abandoned for some other
reason and the socialist state was abolished. The second part of this transformation is the
establishment of the nation state and the bringing about of the new national elite which will rule
and own this state. Nation state looks for its legitimacy in providing the living space to the titular
nation or ethnic group, but it is a form of bourgeois state rather than its alternative because its
economy is based on the same principles of capitalism. In other words, nation state does not
safeguard the interest of all of its citizens equally, like its name would suggest, but it represents
the “guardian dog of the property and the privilege of bourgeoisie class”42. In his critique of the
bourgeois state Marx says how “The executive of the modern state is nothing but a committee for
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”43. This bourgeois class manages the
economy and therefore manages the state as well. According to Marks the state doesn’t represent
anything more than the tool for enforcement of this class order. National liberations, of which
anti-colonial movements are good example, were by definition also bourgeois liberations since
they are based on the change in the ruling/owning class and not in its abolishment. National
liberations do not change the relationships of economic domination but rather replace a foreign
dominating group with a “national” one. Looking from this perspective, in Yugoslavia it was
impossible to achieve national liberation which would not be regressive; the only possible
progress for the benefit of the wider population, was in the reform and improvement of socialism
and not in rising and supposed solution to some national question which had eventually lead to
the abolishment of the socialist state and the return of the bourgeois rule. In fact, the first rallies
of citizens against authoritarian regimes in the European East of 1989, gathered around requests
for democratization that would transform the ‘real existing socialism’ into a ‘socialism with
human face’.
42
Mujkić, Asim. "Etnonacionalizam Kao Politika Prvobitne Akumulacije Kapitala." Odjek 1-4 (2014).48
43
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. The Communist Manifesto. 27th ed. New York: International Publishers,
1988. 11.
20
From its very beginning, the bourgeois state had clearly defined the position towards the
workers and their rights. As Branko Horvat writes in his famous Political Economy of Socialism,
the bourgeois revolution was fully afloat when the Chapelier law was adopted in 1791 and had
banned labor organizing and meetings “aimed against the free running of the industry”. As
Horvat states further in the text, Chapelier had hard time explaining how “nobody plans to
prevent the businessmen to discuss about their mutual interest”44. Of course that the owners of
the means of production were allowed to freely organize, plan and execute the exploitation, while
the state function was to make sure this process can safely happen through guaranteeing safety
and through abolishment of labor organizations. This is not very surprising at all considering the
fact that bourgeois state, a nation state belongs essentially to the bourgeois class and not to all of
its citizens. Labor organizing, on the other hand, is not seen as something that will further this
development but rather as something that will harm it. The state, which doesn’t belong to the
workers, will, at all cost, try to prevent them from organizing in the struggle for their interests.
This is because the interests of the workers are not the interests of the bourgeois state since they
are not the interests of the bourgeoisie that owns the state. The interests of the workers are the
socioeconomic rights which could be provided with the profit accumulated by the labor
performed by these very workers. But this is also the profit which the bourgeoisie wants to keep
for itself in this endless process of the accumulation of capital.
1.4.Theoretical Framework of Ethnicity and Nationalism. Foisted Image of Nationalism as a

Balkan Characteristic
1.4.1. Lie of the Serbo-Croatian Ethnic Hatred
The space where Serbo-Croatian language is spoken had seen a lot of changes of power
and of borders, forced migrations, religious conversions and so on. Over time the religious
identity had become the most important identification which determines one’s ethnicity. So
Catholics who speak Serbo-Croatian will identify themselves as Croats while orthodox Christians
will identify as Serbs or Montenegrins and Muslims as Bosniaks or just Muslims. Branko Horvat
sees the historic development of these “different nations” as pure geographical coincidence. “If
44
Horvat, Branko. Politička Ekonomija Socijalizma. Zagreb: Globus, 1984. 22. Translated by the author.
21
Emperor Theodosius The Great did not have two sons, and because of that in 395 AD divided the
empire in two, where later settled Croats have found themselves in the western half of the
Empire, thus becoming Catholics, while Serbs in the eastern half had became orthodox, these two
peoples would not have developed into two separate nations. They speak the same language, and
this is what linguists have to explain and not look for different words and for that purpose invent
national words.”4546 This fluidity of identity was commonly understood in Yugoslavia and ethnic
hatred was limited to a minority. Ethnic hatred that was expressed during the WWII was rejected
by the Yugoslavs who were looking for prosperity in the unity and antifascism.
As V. P. Gagnon argues it was exactly the lack of ethnic hatred that had shaped the
beginning of the war in Croatia. If there was enough ethnic hatred the war would have looked
much differently and Gagnon proposes two questions which need to be answered before we can
understand these developments: “1. Why was there sustained violence, especially against civilian
targets? 2. Why was the violence being carried out within the discourse of ethnicity? That is, why
were the perpetrators describing it as a conflict that is essentially about ethnic differences?”47
According to the author the violence was a result of the wish for proliferation of the ethnic fear
and hatred and was meant to target especially the influential moderates and especially in the
plural communities. These communities were seen as the worse problems for nationalists since
they were disproving the claim about the impossibility of living together so they were especially
targeted according to this author. This is how the Osijek chief of police got murdered by
Nationalist Croats who did not like his peacemaking activities (which we will talk more about in
the third chapter) or how violence in The Republic of Serb Krajina continued after the Croats
have been expelled. “Indeed, even after Krajina was cleansed, the violence mounted, as moderate
Serbs from the region who criticized the Belgrade-allied Krajina leadership were harassed,
threatened, and even killed.”48 The creation of nation states was taking place and the elites who
came to position to execute the process did not find tolerance and peace building as particularly
helpful in the process of ethno-national mobilization. HDZ could not tolerate an Osijek police
chief who manages to calm down the “rebelled Serbs” since they needed those rebelled Serbs in
45
46
For further explanation of Serbo-Croatian language and nationalism see Language and Nationalism,
Snježana Kordic
47
Press, 2004. 10.
48
Press, 2004. 5.
22
order to continue their own politics. The same way Krajina moderates were spoilers for the rest of
the population which elites tried to radicalize.
The ethnic heterogeneity was the standard of life in the Balkans and how is it possible
now that we all of a sudden have this primordial ethnic hatred? Serbs and Croats have never
fought against each others before the XX century and coexistence of all of the vernacular groups
was the main characteristic of the Balkan relationships. Instead of thesis about ethnic hatred
being a Balkan characteristic, Gagnon offers us a different approach: “Far from being the result
of endemic hatreds or Balkan pathologies, they were the result of a reconceptualization of space
along European lines, in effect, the Europeanization of the Balkans.”49 The construction of nation
states is a violent but liberal project and thus this is often not being discussed. However it is
crucial to understand the ethnic cleansings and genocides not as being primitive Balkan
phenomena but rather as being the part of European liberal tradition. The genocide against
Bosniaks in Srebrenica was part of the process of creation of a Serbian nation state which
borders, as it was imagined, should encompass all ethnic Serbs, a process to which Bosniaks were
seen as misfits. Previous mass murders of Bosniaks by the Serbs in WWII were also committed
by the nationalist army that was, alongside European values and heavily supported by the Great
Britain, attempting to build a Serbian nation state. Similarly in Croatia the great extermination of
the Serb population during the WWII was also committed for the purpose of creation of the first
Croatian nation state. Also, as Gagnon points out, the Turkish genocide against Armenians was
not done by the Ottoman Empire. The empire was maybe brutal in some ways but it was not
genocidal. The genocide comes as a result of the Europeanization, or better put, nationalization,
when Turkish new elites, bourgeois, and not feudal, decided to build a modern nation state. The
Ottoman Empire was not homogenous nor was it attempting to homogenize in the modern liberal
European sense50.
1.4.2. Initial Accumulation of Capital and Nationalism: the Creation and Function of
Lumpen-Bourgeoisie or the Comprador Class
49
Ibid 18
50
Press, 2004. 20.
23
What had happened with the redistribution and accumulation of the capital in the hands of
the few in Croatia and Yugoslavia in general, Asim Mujkić compares to the Marx’s “dramatic
descriptions of the original accumulation of capital.“51 The way to privatize the common is
through use of force and fraud and not in some legitimate romantic way like one that was
described by Adam Smith as an honest endeavor of individual entrepreneur who acquires his
wealth through hard work and effort. No, capital gets accumulated through fighting, murder, and
bullying, stealing or any other use of physical or political force. Mujkić describes this process and
the creation of the new political national elite, or bourgeoisie52 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
process similar to that of Croatia and definitely one which had the same starting point, Yugoslav
socialism. Crystallization of this new owning class comes from its cooperation with the political
class or from the political class actually cashing out its political capital thus making itself the new
bourgeoisie. Another thing to be noticed is that this bourgeois class is not a typical
entrepreneurial one which invests into the production to profit from it. No, the new bourgeoisie
finds itself in a different, non-productive parasitical role.
This new bourgeoisie is not a capable entrepreneurial class which engages in production
but rather it is a comprador class or an intermediary of the foreign capital. Its political position
has brought it into an undeserved economic position which it now enjoys. The capital which it
collects does not come from production but rather from its position of a “middle-man” or a
servant to the foreign capital which operates in a form of financial speculation and position of the
property titular of valuable ex-socially owned real-estate. Exactly contrary to their nationalist,
patriotic ideology of guardian of ‘ vital national interests’ this “new class” is in effect more like a
‘traitor’ to the local poor, former working class of that very nation, now in the new circumstances
of the global class war. The neoliberal reforms they introduce as parts of the package of
transition, in fact, destroy the welfare state while, at the same time significantly improve their
own position. Their role is to deregulate the local economy, making it vulnerable and completely
dependent on the foreign trade. This class is also there to ensure the installment of the foreign
loans and to accept the “necessary austerity measures” which come as stipulation for these loans.
This new class is also called lumpen-bourgeoisie which is the term coined to emphasize the
51
Mujkić, Asim. "Etnonacionalizam Kao Politika Prvobitne Akumulacije Kapitala." Odjek 1-4 (2014). 49.
52
Is, however, the term bourgeoisie obsolete, seems like legitimate question. If we could not talk about the
class of Proletariat today, at least not in the context of industrial, Fordian type, can we then talk about bourgeoisie? I
think we can, since the 'obsolete' paradigm of nation state still persists, and, as Roland Barthes points „the
bourgeoisie merged into the nation“ (Barthes, 1991: 138), and therefore is a Nation.
24
peripheral role of this class and its impotence to represent the real bourgeois class which would
actually manage or even own the society and not just be the “middle-man”. Another characteristic
of this lumpen-bourgeoisie is that it engages actively with the mafia53 and thus further corrupts
the system. This class is the most dependent on the nationalism and
Thus the “strength and the consolidation of a nation state begins with the consolidation of
its ruling class which can only be the bourgeoisie, because the nation state is a product of
capitalist social relations, with its (bourgeois) unity despite the ideological spectralisation.” 54 The
spectrums of ideologies from liberal socialism to the neoconservative liberalism does not
challenge status quo of the rule of the bourgeois class. Its dominance is part of the contract with a
nation state which provides living space for the dominant nation and secures the rule of the
nationally conscious bourgeoisie. Ronald Barthes notices how this national bourgeoisie is a class
which does not wish to be named. Talking about the changes in the set of bourgeois rulers,
without the change of ideology at a deeper level in France Barthes notices how
A remarkable phenomenon occurs in the matter of naming this regime: as an
economic fact, the bourgeoisie is named without any difficulty: capitalism is
openly professed. As a political fact, the bourgeoisie has some difficulty in
acknowledging itself: there are no 'bourgeois' parties in the Chamber. As an
ideological fact, it completely disappears: the bourgeoisie has obliterated its name
in passing from reality to representation, from economic man to mental man. It
comes to an agreement with the facts, but does not compromise about values; it
makes its status undergo a real exnominating operation: the bourgeoisie is defined
as the social class which does not want to be named.55
If the bourgeoisie is the true enemy or at least an opponent of the working class, since it does not
want to provide them with the socio economic rights, than staying nameless seems to be an
excellent strategy. This is what Mujkić claims happened with the 2014 protests in Bosnia and
Hercegovina. People were revolted by outrageous social injustice, protesting, burning
government buildings and fighting police. While protesters were aware of the fact that the enemy
was not a particular person, a particular political party and definitely not a particular ethnicity;
protesters had a hard time determining who this enemy was. And this may be exactly because it
stays nameless. “It is exactly because there is no named center of the ideological and political
power (even though there is a center of economic power) bourgeois ideology is uncatchable, all-
53
Ibid. 49.
54
Mujkić, Asim. "Etnonacionalizam Kao Politika Prvobitne Akumulacije Kapitala." Odjek 1-4 (2014). 49.
55
Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. 25th ed. New York: Hill and Wang, 1991. 137.
25
encompassing.56” This bourgeois strategy is spread into parliaments thus creating the biggest
problem of the representative democracy. While no party claims to represent the bourgeoisie,
they all do and depend on it for economic support. These dynamics have developed in Croatia in
the 1990’s under the rule of the HDZ party and president Tudjman. The national state was
proclaimed, new national bourgeoisie was appointed and national enemy was handled. National
mobilization had replaced the class mobilization and the ruling class had managed to hide itself
under the same Croatian umbrella where everyone else also is.
1.5.Privatization after Privatization
During the research for this paper it happened few times that our interviewees claimed
how some case could not be considered as a case of privatization but rather as a case of
corruption. Contrary to this opinion, we consider that privatization and corruption are two
phenomena that cannot be looked at separately in the states formed after the breakup of
Yugoslavia. Privatization is always presented to us as a legitimate process which is part of
transition that supposedly occurs in the context of: democratization, human rights and freedom.
In reality, privatization in the states formed by the breakup of Yugoslavia means nothing else
than a new, socially unjust redistribution of wealth, or piling up of the people’s property in the
hands of few, chosen or appointed new owners. The fact that the process of privatization is
presented as legitimate as opposed to corruption, which is recognized as an illegal way of getting
rich, doesn’t answer the question about the origin of capital. The privatization, just like the
corruption, has only one source of capital in these new states (which includes Croatia) and this
source is the property which belonged to the workers and the Yugoslavian society, so to the
workers and society of each state that came to being in this breakup. In order for capital to
become concentrated in the hands of ‘chosen’ individuals, newly formed bourgeoisie, after the
abolishment of the socialist system, this capital had to be, in one way or another, seized away
from its legal owners who were the only source of capital. One of the ways of this seizure is
called privatization while other is called corruption.
56
Ibid. 52.
26
If, for example, in the process of “transformation”, through “managerial credits” or
through any other method of privatization robbery57 a socially owned company was assigned to a
member of newly appointed bourgeoisie than the entire society is harmed for the sake of capital
and profit of one person. The same way, if someone misappropriates large funds from the state
budget the whole society is being harmed for the sake of profit and capital accumulation in the
hands of one person. The first case is called privatization while the second is called corruption. It
is important to notice here that acts of damage or misappropriation of social property or social
funds disproportionally harm lower economic classes. The members of the bourgeois elite can
always relay on private doctors, schools or transportation while the poor depend on state to
provide them with services and pay for hospitals, schools, public transportation and the rest of the
social infrastructure that is being financed from the state budget or from the social property. This
is why we can also say how privatization as well as the high level corruption presents method of
class war, war that stays in the shadow of the national/ethnic conflict in which the members of
nations/ethnic groups are tricked into fighting against their own class interest.
Another example on which we can show the same nature of corruption and privatization
in Croatia is the case of former Prime Minister Sanader and the bribe that he had taken while
privatizing Ina, large oil enterprise and the largest Yugoslavian firm. In this case the workers are
harmed because their jobs are put in jeopardy because the new partner, Mol58 is not interested in
investments in Croatian refineries. Mol has modernized the two refineries it has in Hungary and
Slovakia and plans to use Croatia as a market for its ready product while refineries in Sisak and
Rijeka are planned to be used as mere storage facilities.59 Now let us imagine another example in
which a company is handed over to newly-appointed bourgeois elite through the method known
as “managerial credit” and that this new owner has no interest in production or investment in the
company but is rather looking to take out of the company as much capital as possible. In both of
these situations the workers are put in the same position. Firstly their right to property,
guaranteed by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the entitlement to property
guaranteed by the Constitution of SFRJ, was simply erased without due democratic procedures,
57
There were many methods used in this process of privatization theft “Managerial credits” are the best
known one and is executed when an old or new manager, who is approved by the ruling party, buys the company he
manages with a credit for which he uses the very company as a collateral. Darko Petričić describes as amany as 10
methods of privatization theft in his Kriminal U Hrvatskoj Pretvorbi: Tko, Kako, Zašto. Zagreb: Abakus, 2000.
58
Is the Hungarian company which had bought part of Ina.
59
This claim was first told to us by Predrag Sekulić, president of Ina labor council and was later confirmed by
Slavko Linić, former minister of finance in interviews they gave us.
27
such as referendum, required for such fundamental transformation of constitutional order. This
right was simply erased by the adoption of the infamous Law of Transformation60. In both cases
the system is not satisfied with that but attacks their only left mean of subsistence, their very job
through jobs cuts or even company closure. So the right to work is being taken away form the
former owners of the means of production who are now forced to rejoin the labor market where
they will face if any, much worse offers. Corruption, the same way as privatization, leads to the
result in which workers are harmed while the bourgeoisie accumulates wealth from that only
source. In other words, the newly-appointed rich will, using one way or another pile up people’s
wealth in their own, private possession. Calling this process privatization or calling it corruption,
for the workers or for the damaged social system, makes no substantial difference.
The social property which is being transformed, or better, robbed in the process of
privatization is a limited source which will run out one day. On the other hand, the state budget is
a permanent source for this privatization robbery through corruption. We have already said that
the results of these two processes are the same and that privatization is also corruption, because it
represents illegal wealth accumulation of the few at the expense of the society, that is, by
dispossession of many, to put it in Harvey’s terms. At the same time corruption is also
privatization because it allows piling up of the private capital also illegally accumulated at the
social expense. In both processes the damage is made to citizens, workers, lower classes who are
paying for this enrichment of tycoons, ministers and other members of the newly-appointed rich
through their social property or through their high taxes. These same citizens will see their other
socio-economic rights perish, one by one, in this process that had infamously started with the
right to property abolished by the Law of Transformation during the first HDZ rule. Corruption,
therefore, presents the continuation of the politics of privatization and violence against citizens
and leads to the same results for both workers and the new bourgeoisie that manages to
accumulate enormous capital which is not based on labor and whose only connection with labor
is in the fact that it takes away other’s right to work.
There is another mutual characteristic that these two processes have which is especially
important to our topic, this characteristic is that in privatization robbery as well as in corruption
we find many outspoken nationalists,61 people who promise to defend national interests, who are
60
More about the law in 2.4. The Law of Transformation.
61
For example above mentioned prime minister Sanader came to power after a famous “splitska riva” speech
where he used nationalist rhetoric to rally mases to vote for him.
28
also often ready to use violence for the sake of nation, people who precede with the hate speech
and who are the actual organizers of the nationalist mobilization in the society. Careful
examination of the privatization and corruption shows us that the real goal of this national
mobilization is not protection of nation’s interest, like it is claimed, but on contrary, it is the
accumulation of the private wealth of individuals while harming public interest. Those
individuals who have accumulated all the wealth, as we will see further in this study, present the
new bourgeoisie that has triumphed in the counter-revolution and this social grouping is the only
true winner of the tragic events of the 1990’s.
29
2. Role of the Croatian Government in Nationalism and Robbery
Who exactly was Tudjman talking about when he said his famous “we have our Croatia”? It
is clear that he was talking about the secession from Yugoslavia, but it does not precisely answer
to the question who it is that now has Croatia and what it even means “to have a state”. Is it
maybe all of the citizens of Croatia that now supposedly “have Croatia”? Can a bourgeois state,
which is what Croatia has eventually become with the abandonment of socialism and breakup of
Yugoslavia, belong to everyone, or is it clearly defined who does this state belong to? Croatian
journalist Jelena Lovrić in a question for Ivo Banac in 1994 states how, while the war was
ongoing, Croatia was getting sold out in dubious ways. Tudjman’s was one of the richest
families. “Those who grabbed everything, will now, for decades rule those who were left without
anything”62. Stipe Mesić, former highly ranking HDZ figure, while leaving the party because of,
as he was saying, corruption, said how Tudjman’s family was the richest of all statesman families
of post-communism (in the 1994) and that “those from the old regime were charitable sisters in
comparison with the new regime”63. As Miko Tripalo, one of the leaders of the Croatian Spring
said Tudjman “provides for his family all possible social and material privileges” 64. Tudjman’s
rule, like his family after his death, follow numerous economic affairs, but in order to put those in
right context first we should look at the concept of “two hundred families”.
2.1.Politics of Franjo Tudjman
Tudjman had an idea of two hundred rich families, who should own and manage Croatian
wealth and state, or commonwealth and still today are key persons in decision-making process.
This idea also clearly defines economic views of the man who, through nationalist rhetoric and
hate speech got the mandate to lead Croatia in the time of crisis in Yugoslavia. Those views are
not necessarily only connected with the personal economic gain, which was definitely present,
but with views of creation of the new economic class, an elite, a bourgeoisie class which was
nonexistent in socialism. Although economic differences did exist in Yugoslavia they were not
that large, nor politically significant, so that two hundred families could buy and manage the
62
Banac, Ivo. "Interview." Feral Tribune, January 4, 1994, 433rd ed. Translated by the author.
63
Mesić, Stipe. "Interview." Feral Tribune, April 25, 1994, 449th ed. Translated by the author.
64
Tripalo, Miko. "Interview." Feral Tribune, January 11, 1994, 434th ed. Translated by the author.
30
entire socially owned economy of Croatia. In order for this idea to be realized the new
bourgeoisie had to be given, or put in the position to easily acquire the social property.
The obvious question to be asked here is of course, what gives Tudjman the right to
distribute the wealth of Croatian citizens at his will? His government, arguably, had a mandate to
deal with Yugoslavia, which was more and more seen as Serbian imperial project rather than as
mutual anti-imperial one, but it didn’t have a mandate to appoint the new bourgeoisie, to
redistribute the wealth. At the referendum Croatian citizens decided to leave Yugoslavia, the way
it was at that moment and with the help of nationalist propaganda and hate speech, but they didn’t
express their stands on any economic issues, especially not about someone giving their wealth
away. Josip Manolić claims how idea of 200 families managing the economy is actually an old
French story which people used to tell “two hundred families were managing French economy so
what Tudjman thought is that what was good for France would probably be good for little Croatia
as well”.65 Slavko Linić claims how concept had anticipated two hundred families running two
hundred strong businesses. What had actually happened and what mister Linić sees as the main
problem here is that two hundred families have not developed the businesses that they were given
but rather have drained businesses out of money and they today don’t represent the core of strong
Croatian economy like Tudjman had envisioned.66 A larger problem, which Linić avoids to
mention, is the problem of the act of giving away the social property to the few, regime friendly
people in the name of creation of national elite. This process was unfortunately investigated and
described only by the Croatian journalists and not by judiciary or academics. Croatian journalists
have published the list of the 200 Croatian millionaires or the “two hundred families” as they
named them. As stated in the text, some were close to SDP but great majority of them were HDZ
favorites.67
To understand Tudjman’s nationalist practice we will discuss briefly one of his closest
allies Gojko Šušak. Gojko Šušak was according to Tudjman’s own words one of the creators of
the “Croatian freedom”68. Šušak was Tudjman's key partner in the formation of Herceg-Bosnia,
project that was secretly financed from Croatia and also project that had changed the views of the
65
Manolić, Josip. Interview by author. Tape recording. July 17, 2015.
66
Linić, Slavko. Interview by author. Tape recording. July 9, 2015.
67
Pandžić, Ivan; Rašeta, Boris. "Otkrivamo 200 Obitelji Koje Imaju Hrvatsku I Kako Su Se Obogatile."
Express. April 30, 2015. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://www.express.hr/drustvo/otkrivamo-200-obitelji-koje-
imaju-hrvatsku-i-kako-su-se-obogatile-575#.
68
Franjo Tudjman speech at the commemoration for Gojko Šušak
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Sf70lMw1HE
31
international community about Croatia. As Stipe Mesić had testified “in the budget you can’t see
that we are the ones who are financing HVO69, police, government, courts, healthcare system of
Herceg-Bosna” but the truth is that Tudjman could end the whole project easily by simply cutting
its finances.70 The criminal project of Herceg-Bosnia71 had changed the picture about Croats
fighting for liberation and had informed the world that the appetites for the national expansion in
Yugoslavia are not one-sided. Josip Manolić had told us how tribal sentiments have ruled Šušak
and how he had wanted the largest possible territory for his tribe72. Stipe Mesić had claimed how
expulsion of Josip Manolić form HDZ is the consequence of the conflict with Šušak about the
violence in Bosnia73. Martin Špegelj testified that “Manolić was a consistent politician who stood
against the partition of Bosnia and the war against the Muslims so it was natural that he got in a
fight with Tudjman who was insisting on the division of Bosnia just like his minister Šušak”74.
How it is possible that Tudjman’s closest comrades leave the HDZ while this former JNA general
and Yugoslavian partisan stays strong with his “favorite minister” Šušak who was “greeting
people with a fascist salute”?75 Šušak has established a weapons company which was accused of
smuggling guns but Mesić had also accused Šušak of smuggling drugs. According to Mesić
testimony he had confronted Šušak about smuggling drugs and during this confrontation he was
told how Šušak does it for the homeland. For his achievements Šušak was decorated with Grand
Order of King Petar Krešimir IV in 1995, than Grand Order of King Dmitar Zvonimir 1998,
Order of Duke Domagoj also in 1995 as well as Order of Nikola Šubić Zrinski, Order of Ante
Starčević, Order of Stjepan Radić, Order of the Croatian Trefoil and Homeland's Gratitude
Medal76. All of these were awarded by Franjo Tudjman who is also mentioned in The Hague’s
judgement of Croatian aggression on Bosnia.
Tudjman maintained specific brand of nationalistic –welfarism – heavily financial support
for Veteran’s association that burdened weak state budget. That was corrupted form of welfarism
designed to support what we could call, big standing reserve army, a guard of a new system that
69
Croat Council of Defense, ethnic militia of Croats in BiH.
70
Stipe, Mesic. "Nas I Rusa 300 Milijuna." Feral Tribune, July 22, 1996, 556th ed
71
Also judged by the ICTY as aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina by Croatia.
72
Manolić, Josip. Interview by author. July 17, 2015.
73
Manolić, Josip. "Protiv Podele Bosne." Feral Tribune, April 4, 1994, 446th ed.
74
75
Mesić, Stipe. "Šeksolov Na Vještice." Feral Tribune, February 5, 1996, 542nd ed.
76
"Odluka O Odlikovanju Gospodina Gojka Šuška, Posmrtno, Veleredom Kralja Dmitra Zvonimira S Lentom
I Danicom, Redom Nikole Šubića Zrinskog I Redom Stjepana Radića." May 12, 1998. Accessed October 9, 2015.
http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/268562.html.
32
would serve as faithful voters in peace time, yet as some kind of Praetorian Guard during crisis.
This can be seen as the difference from clear cut neoliberal model, specific to nations that had
armed national revolutions. Today in Zagreb’s Savska demonstrations of the veterans are taking
place while it is obvious that Veteran associations still serve as HDZ militia, now representing
the threat to society. Their purpose will be to bring HDZ back to power after which they will
continue to enjoy their benefits which they have received form the very party that took them into
war. One tent belonging to this protest is featuring a famous Tudjman’s quote about the leftovers
of “Yugocommunisam which will ally with the devil himself against the Croatian freedom”. This
freedom has only benefited a few. Besides the new bourgeoisie and the political elite, in this
group arguably belong the veterans as well.
Former Tudjman’s second man in command, Stipe Mesić claims how Mirko Norac was
killing by the orders he had received from Zagreb.77 Mesić also claims how he was present when
one minister had reported to Tudjman how in eastern Slavonia Serbian villages are being burned
in three shifts.78 Again according to Mesić’s testimony Tudjman had calculated with the murders
of civilians of Serb ethnicity but also with the destinies of the Croatian peoples where the case of
Vukovar is very interesting. The city was devastated, the defenders were executed and numerous
war crimes were committed and the destruction of this city had attracted the attention of the
international community and today represents the symbol of Croatian suffering. However, Mesić
claims how he was present when general Antun Tus had reported to Tudjman about the plan for
the defense of Vukovar which Tudjman had rejected by saying “who commands in this war?” and
“didn’t I command not to defend Vukovar?”79. According to this general’s report the city could
be defended but Tudjman had his own reasons not to do it. One possible answer is that he was
planning to sacrifice it in order to get the foreign support; we cannot prove this so we will not
develop the idea too far. However, the truth is that the suffering of the people of Vukovar has
become the symbol of national suffering while Tudjman has become a hero of the national
liberation. This “hero|” was also the leader of the great economic transformation which was being
executed by his government at the very time of this crisis.
77
"Mesić: Vukovar Se Mogao Spasiti, a Norac Je Ubijao Po Naredbama Iz Zagreba." Index.hr. February 13,
2010. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/mesic-vukovar-se-mogao-spasiti-a-norac-je-
ubijao-po-naredbama-iz-zagreba/475544.aspx.
78
` "Vekić: Priču O Paljenju Srpskih Sela U Tri Smjene Je Tuđmanu Rekao Mesić." Index.hr. February 13,
2010. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/vekic-pricu-o-paljenju-srpskih-sela-u-tri-
smjene-je-tudjmanu-rekao-mesic/548489.aspx.
79
Ibid
33
Looking at the events of the 90’s and the entire life of Tudjman, what seems to be the
most striking development of his political being is his betrayal of antifascism and the Croatian
working class. Member of the communist youth, Tudjman had taken initiative against the newly
formed Independent State of Croatia (NDH), which was a German puppet state. According to his
biographer, Darko Hudelist, Tudjman was present at the formation of the first partisan brigade in
Zagorje. In this brigade his role was that of a commissar. He had a political job, to spread the idea
of antifascism and to connect the workers in Zagreb with the unit. He did not see the battle but
was there to cheer up the fighters and to convince the hesitant. But the problem was his father,
who was a “great Croat” and took until 1943 to join the partisans where his sons already were 80.
But Tudjman was not only a Tito’s partisan, and later on, his general, he also was “from 1961
through 1967, (Tudjman was) the Director of the Institute for the History of the Workers'
Movement in Croatia, linked to the Central Committee of the League of Communists. He was a
respected member of the Party and held a number of senior political positions”81. His
involvement in the history of Croatian Workers Movement is especially striking considering the
results that his rule has brought to the Croatian workers. The performed betrayal of antifascism
by Tudjman is therefore a multilevel one.
Tudjman’s partnering with the nationalist and fascist diaspora and nationalist-antisocialist
groups in Croatia is what brought him to power. He had continued to pretend to “sit on both
chairs”, left and right one, and tried to organize reconciliation of the WWII opponents but only of
Croatian nationality. This reconciliation didn’t include Serbs and did not have a fascist
repentance or even change of heart as its element. The reconciliation that Tudjman had organized
was unconditional and had effectively brought fascists to the dominant position in the relation to
antifascists. The two ideologies cannot reconcile. There can only be forgiveness for the crimes
but not without repentance. Another thing is that the reconciliation of fascists and antifascists had
to be organized at the level of Yugoslavia and not at the republic or even worse ethnic level. If
partisans had decided to give unconditional abolition to fascists in Croatia the Serbs, who were a
sizable minority at the time in Croatia, would obviously felt threatened by this coalition.
Branko Horvat said how “this is a failed idea (reconciliation of fascists and partisans)
which obviously only gives negative results. First one to come up with this idea 30 years ago was
80
Hudelist, Darko. Tuđman-- Biografija. Zagreb: Profil, 2004. 57-59.
81
McAdams, C. Michael. "Croatia: Myth and Reality." Studia Croatica. 1998. Accessed October 7, 2015.
http://www.studiacroatica.org/libros/mythe/mtud01.htm.
34
the notorious war criminal Maks Luburić, and from there was extracted some 4-5 years ago by
president Tudjman… This idea is often used for the rehabilitation of Ustaštvo82 and with that we
open space for new clashes and suspicion about the possible fascist character of the Croatian
state. “83 Another example of the Tudjman’s betrayals of antifascism is the changing of the name
of Croatian currency from Dinar into Kuna. This name, kuna was only used as currency in the
time of fascist Independent State of Croatia (ISC), German puppet state, from 1941 till 1945,
never before. Return of kuna in Croatia in 1993 was, as Ivo Goldstein writes for Feral Tribune
the strongest identification of the new Croatian state with the ISC. Author also states how only
one man could have made this decision and that was president Tudjman, who was at that time
making a concession to the HDZ’s right wing.84 This is of course part of the abovementioned
reconciliation which again brings the fascists in the leading role.
Tudjman’s partnering with Milošević was crucial for both of them. Warren Zimmerman,
the last American ambassador to Yugoslavia claims how after Milošević and Tudjman stared
meeting, Croatian anti-Muslim propaganda started to look very much like Serbian. It was certain
that they were cooperating on division of Bosnia. Also Milošević and Tudjman were crucial for
each other always providing with the material for the nationalist propaganda. 85 On another
occasion while Tudjman was defending Milosevic’s position on Bosnia and Zimmerman was
confronting him with question about the reason for the cooperation with Milošević, Tudjman said
“Because I can trust Milošević”. Even Josip Manolić, who is surprisingly gentle when talking
about Tudjman, had told us how they86 have “negotiated with Milošević because he was the
interlocutor for the execution of our goal of independent Croatian state.”87 Milošević was not the
enemy, the enemy was Croatian hesitant citizens who were questioning the creation of nation
state and they are the main reason why the violence was necessary.
Here is how Branko Horvat assesses Tudjman and Milošević:
Serbian Milošević was matching Croatian Tudjman. Tudjman is almost in all aspects
different from typical Croatian politicians such were Strossmayer, Stupilo or Radić and
presents some more civilized version of Pavelić. Tudjman had helped Milošević in every
82
Croatian WWII fascist movement responsible for creation of Nazi-satellite Independent State of Croatia in
1941 and for war atrocities and genocide against Serbs, Roma, Jews and other antifascists.
83
Goldstein, Slavko. "Druga Runda Zločina." Feral Tribune, March 20, 1995, 496th ed.
84
Goldstein, Ivo. "Interview." Feral Tribune, August 10, 1993, 421st ed.
85
Zimmermann, Warren. Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers -- America's Last
Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why. New York: Times Books, 1996. 117.
86
The top HDZ officials at this time are Tudjman, Manolić and Mesic.
87
Manolić, Josip. Interview by author. Tape recording. Zagreb. July 17, 2015.
35
aspect. He had presented himself as an extreme nationalist (“My Croats” without Serbs
and other citizens), with Milošević he was partitioning Bosnia, which had caused horrible
slaughters, and he had attacked Yugoslav’s army’s bases in Croatia, which was proving
Milošević’s claims, later publically proclaimed by Tudjman himself that Croats are
against Yugoslavia. But Milošević had also helped Tudjman a great deal by calling his
new state Yugoslavia and his nationalist party socialist. This is how he had made possible
demonization of both Yugoslavia and socialism. As nationalists, Tudjman and Milošević
have understood each other well.88
Their cooperation was the key for the destruction of Yugoslavia, privatization robbery and the
deterrence and the destruction of the welfare state. This is not to claim that a team of other two
Serbo-Croatian politicians would not be able to do that but this symbiosis seems particularly
unfortunate as Horvat explains. Tudjman’s project of creating a nation state was successful, and
the “founding father”, as some call him, often gets recognition for “timely action in the right
historic moment” even from those who were pretending to be his big opponents.89 Milošević’s
recognition of this kind is still not there and this is mainly for the fact that his genocidal
nationalist project, unlike Tudjman’s is not finished. Tudjman had to give up Herceg-Bosnia but
had successfully reintegrated the Republic of Serbian Krajina in a military operation which had
effectively ethnically cleansed the region. Milošević, on the other hand had to give up Kosovo
but his project will still be celebrated if Republika Srpska manages to join Serbia at some point in
time. Tudjman’s example tells us how war crimes are still forgivable in the context of national
narratives. What is even more striking is that, for the sake of some abstract national goal, people
are even ready to forget their own economic interest and even accept the robbery, deprivation of
rights and deterioration of the welfare state as necessary and unavoidable way of achievement of
some suspicious abstract goal called nation state.
2.2. The Notion of Croatian Freedom
The notion of “Croatian freedom”, which can be considered as the main motif of the
political philosophy of Franjo Tudjman, doesn’t encompass freedom in classical sense of the
word neither at micro nor at the macro level. The economic freedom/security of the wide mases,
which they have enjoyed in Yugoslavia through the social property and self management, was
88
Horvat, Branko. "Ekonomika Brzog Razvoja." Forum Bosne 12/1 (2001). 154. Translated by the author.
89
Plecas, Dusan. Deset Godina Socijaldemokratske Partije Hrvatske: 1990-2000 : Dokumenti. Zagreb:
Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske, 2000. 5.
36
abolished at the beginning of Tudjman government starting with the Law of Transformation
where “transformation” is a euphemism for unjust seizure of property while “law” refers to the
fact that this horrible injustice which had robbed and harmed the entire society was legalized by
the parliament. On the macro level we have the question of freedom of the Croatian state and its
sovereignty which was won against Yugoslavia and against Tito’s concept of bratstvo i jedinstvo
(Brotherhood and unity, two communist principles – popular slogan of the Communist party of
Yugoslavia, that was coined during the Yugoslav People’s Liberation War (1941-1945))90. This
sovereignty was given to the European Union which is in line with the politics of Franjo Tudjman
who believed that the sovereignty only means independence from Yugoslavia. Professor Stefano
Bianchini says how Croatia (as well as Serbia) exercises much less sovereignty than Yugoslavia
did.91 Today’s countries that became in the process of Yugoslav dissolution perform much in a
vassal way towards the international community. Branko Horvat goes a step further and says how
unlike Yugoslavia, which was an “international factor and in the top of the world politics” her “
now separated parts have lost their independence and national sovereignty” and “no one
important decision they can make on their own, they have become toys of the great powers which
intervene whenever they find suitable”.92 This is why the project of “Croatian freedom” (as well
as Serbian) is completely suspicious, if not by the intention than definitely by the results. This
“freedom” that Tudjman goes on about and for which he had mobilized wide masses in reality
comes down to hostility toward the East and toward the brotherhood and unity (which also was
the first target of Serbian nationalism as well as so called economic nationalisms in both
peoples). It is also necessary to mention how this freedom brings no results to the Croatian people
or to the everyday living of Croatian workers (although Serbia is not the topic of this research,
here we can draw another parallel between the two). By insisting on the fact of loss of the
“national sovereignty”, and not on the myth of winning one, Horvat mercilessly breaks the
fairytale which is used to trick the masses of Yugoslavia from the end of 1980’s till today. He
directs our attention to the fact that Croatians (like Serbians) had not only more national
sovereignty within Yugoslavia but also that their national interests were better protected when
“nobody was guarding them” and that the so called freedom that is supposedly won in the name
90
Gow, James, Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State in the New Europe (Revised and
updated ed.). Hurst Publishers Ltd. 2010, p. 48.
91
Bianchini, Stefano, ERMA lectures, 2015
92
37
of the nation is actually something exactly opposite of freedom: slavery and vassal relationship to
the “international community”.
2.3.Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)93
Antun Vujić says how HDZ had come to power through the nationalist rhetoric and the
“agitation of anticommunism, with all of the possible promises of privatization and
denationalization, according to which in the coming capitalism, everyone would be a capitalist”94
This was matched with the interests of the growing nationalist sentiments but also of the global
interests who are anti-social “which is often forgotten”95. For the HDZ to came to power by
mobilizing for national cause the great help came form nationalist Diaspora who had provided
for, in the terms of needs, unlimited funding. This diaspora that lived in foreign nation states and
capitalist economic systems had naturally lacked understanding for socialism and brotherhood
and unity. If we take in consideration the radicalization of diaspora with the influx of fascists
after the end of WWII who were fleeing the partisan revenge as well as anticommunists who are
leaving during socialist Yugoslavia, and to all that we add the growing Serbian nationalism and
calls for the solution to the "Serbian national question”, it is not surprising that Croatian diaspora
was able to raise large sums of money for the final solution of, now, Croatian national question.
Where did all this money end up is a different question. HDZ is infamous for its proliferation of
nationalism and hate speech but also for corruption. About the destiny of this money that the
diaspora was collecting for Croatian independence in 1994 Mesic had said: “First it was in
Switzerland, than in Austria, and those who conjure the most in Croatia, keep the money, which
diaspora had collected for defense and reconstruction of Croatia, on their personal foreign
accounts.”96 So Mesic points to the trail of this money which is being transferred form country to
country and kept on personal accounts instead of used for the purpose which it was collected for.
And this is done by people who are actually running the nationalist propaganda and advocating
violence.
93
Croatian Democratic Union originally Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ hereinafter).
94
Vujić, Antun. Hrvatska I Ljevica: Prilog Socijaldemokratskom Gledišnu. Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2014.
227.
95
Ibid. 227.
96
Mesić, Stipe. "Interview." Feral Tribune, April 25, 1994, 449th ed.
38
The party was run in a strictly hierarchical way as a top-down authoritarian organization
with the Franjo Tudjman making all of the important decisions and always having the right of
veto. As Mesić had claimed: “President’s palace has become a place where all and I mean all
decisions were made, even the smallest ones, from the change of a football club name to what can
97
and what cannot be voted for in parliament.” The Judicial system was also under the strict
control of the HDZ’s vertical structure with Tudjman on the top. Vladimir Primorac, judge of the
Supreme Court of Croatia “Council of national and military security and defense had decided to
gather a group which would be put in charge of determining how much progress was made with
the task of foundation of State Judicial Council. The head of this group is Ivić Pašalić…Pašalić
commission is a branch of the president’s advising body, so, parastate body similar to the
government coordination is a typical example of the parastate body inherited from the old regime.
This commission will, with the presence of the top leadership of HDZ Ivan Milas, Vladimir Šeks,
Ivić Pašalić and others, name by name discuss which persons are suitable for this Judicial
Council” ….”One party is forcing on Croatian state a Judicial Council the way it finds suitable.
This council will, therefore, implement the policy of the state, which means HDZ politics,
because HDZ had equalized itself and the state. This is completely clear”. 98 This means that the
party cell is there to control every part of the state and there is no division of power. Now, this
may be something that was inherited from the old regime but the question we have to raise than is
why do social programs and issues of social justice remained the only victims of transition. The
mechanism of rule which had enforced socio-economic rights in the previous regime was now
being used by the Tudjman, Šeks, Pašalić and others to take away the economic rights that people
have acquired during Yugoslavia. The communist party of Yugoslavia is constantly criticized for
its autocracy while the new, national autocracy is implemented and the benefits of the socialist
regime are being abolished. The only beneficiaries of the new regime are nationalist political elite
and the national bourgeoisie.
HDZ was also keeping the hard grip on the media. Božidar Novak, Vice-president of
Croatian Journalists’ Association and Croatian Helsinki Committee claimed how “HDZ always
tends to keep all of the media under its control” “The fact that the most nationalist authors are
being labeled as traitors is only explained by crisis, recession, lower production, pension cuts,
97
Ibid.
98
Primorac, Vladimir. „Pravdu će Dijeliti HDZ“ Feral Tribune. June 6, 1994, 455th ed.
39
labor strikes… and in these circumstances it is the easiest to create enemies and cause fear, this is
a standard procedure”.99 This ‘standard procedure’ is the known procedure where everyone who
is not on the side of the autocratic party will simply be labeled as anti-Croatian, regardless of how
nationalistic or antinationalistic this person may actually be. The government was determining
how much of a good Croat someone was by how loyal he/she was to the HDZ and that is how the
social property was being redistributed.
Mladen Vedriš was a deputy prime minister for economy in 1992 and the president of the
Chamber of Commerce in 1993-1995 when he had left HDZ and politics in general. He had left
the party because as he had claimed there was no dialog and there was no respect for argument.
His testimony upon leaving suggests how HDZ had purposely created the economic elite hoping
to use the economic system to keep the political power. He also claims how this nationalist
government which insists on Croatian state, protection of national interest and so on actually
doesn’t care about the members of the very nation they are trying to protect. “The creation of
economic classes is necessary for the Croatian government because it finds important for itself to
control those 10 or 50 businessmen and ‘businessman’, while at the same time it doesn’t care that
almost 2 million people live on the edge of existence.”100 Protection of national interests therefore
is not the protection of people who are members of this nation but rather protection of some
abstract interests of a ‘nation’ which can only be labeled as national bourgeoisie as previously
suggested by Roland Barthes. Now this is not a case just in Croatian capitalism, as we have
already said, nation states are bourgeois states based on capitalist economy. What is different in
the case of Croatia (and most “transitioning” countries) is that the Croatian ruling elite had the
power to appoint the bourgeoisie and therefore keep the position to, if playing smart, stay in
power for a long time. This is exactly what had happened in Croatia where the HDZ party which
had devastated the country keeps coming back to power if it loses it at all. 101
Božo Kovačević form HSLS said how “HDZ is behaving as if they got the mandate to
manage the Croatian property. We are against the law which would write-off the debt of the small
share holders until it is investigated who had bought all those shares, because we will be brought
into situation to write-off debt of people who own shares worth several millions of Deutsche
99
Novak, Božidar. "Interview." Feral Tribune, January 16, 1995, 487th ed.
100
Vedriš, Mladen. "Zbogom Arijevci." Feral Tribune, January 8, 1996, 538th ed.
101
HDZ was originally in power from 1990 till 2000, than 2003 till 2010 and at the moment is leading in the
polls for the election at the end of this year (2015).
40
Marks.102 Now, this is one of the examples of techniques used for the fast enrichment of
individuals and the creation of these national bourgeois elite. The tycoons would for cents on a
dollar buy shares from the small shareholders, who had gotten those as part of their right to
discount and deferred payments. Workers would often sell this right in order to acquire a bit of
spending money. Than the government would write off the debt of “small shareholders” but the
fact is that, since shares have already been piled up in the hands of tycoons the debt forgiveness
that was supposed to benefit the poor is actually reinforcing the position of the rich.
2.4.A Couple of Examples of Nepotism and Conflict of Interest
Conflict of interest happens when an individual who is acting as a public servant uses the
opportunity to provide profit for himself or people close to himself through the empowerment of
his public service mandate. So for example Tudjman’s family still today lives in a mansion which
was bought after Tudjman came to power under suspicious circumstances and with money of
unknown background. This mansion is not an isolated case but there are numerous cases of HDZ
officer’s usurpations of social property. Stipe Mesić, who left HDZ “because of corruption”, said:
“In 1991 HDZ was using an old 1986 law in order to assign public apartments to its heads; law
which could not still be valid. Those who have taken apartments worth half a million deutsche
marks and only paid thirty thousand for them have committed robbery.”103 In another affair, a
bank clerk Ankica Lepej had leaked information about the amount of money on the account of
the first lady Ankica Tudjman, money that wasn’t listed on the president’s property card. It was a
large amount of money in foreign currency and the court had infamously decided how this money
is not property and how no law was breached. The only result of this affair was that whistle
blower had lost her job for the act of disrespecting ‘customer privacy’.
Cases of nepotism are cases in which people that are in power positions use that power to
provide prosperity for their family members. A good example of nepotism in the process of
privatization and misappropriation of public money in Croatia is the case of Tudjman’s grandson,
Dejan Košutić who had founded Kaptol Bank in 1996 with the credit that he got from the
bankrupted Croatia Bank. Košutić’s bank had costed Croatian National Bank in 1999 about 3
102
Kovačević, Božo. Feral Tribune, October 31, 1994, 476th ed.
103
41
million kunas after which its operating permit was annulled. After this Kosutić had emigrated
form Croatia to Serbia, where he lives in Belgrade and Bankruptcy Court had approved his 120
000 kunas request.104 Croatian daily Slobodna Dalmacija had reported how Košutić was
appointed on the managing board of the Croatia Bank although he had no banking or financing
experience before that, this very board was also who had than approved his credit with which he
had started the Kaptol Bank. 105 This case is especially interesting because we can see the logic of
nepotistic protection as well as the irony of Croatian nationalist leader whose grandson lives in
Serbia after he had robbed Croatian public.
While Milošević had executed his political goals of Greater-Serbia without openly
defining the goal of Greater-Serbianism, Tudjman’s idea of expansion of the Croatian state was
no secret at all. Tudjman had publically talked against the AVNOJ 106 established borders from
the 1982 when in his work National Question in Modern Europe he talks about the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina (Yugoslavian federal unit) as “historically Croatian land”
which “should have been part of the state of Croatia the same way that Vojvodina is part of
Serbia”107. Tudjman openly talks about Serbian minority and Croatian majority in Bosnia since
he counts Bosniaks, the largest Bosnian ethnic group as Croats, who are the smallest group but
through this math could become majority. Tudjman’s remorse feeling for the Croatian nation is a
repeating motif in this book but is also commonplace in nationalist culture and literature as well
as a tool that nationalists often use in order to create an emotional response of the audience. This
kind of nationalist rhetoric was, of course, a great challenge to the politics of socialism as well as
of brotherhood and unity this is why Tudjman was prosecuted for this book which he had
published abroad. It is interesting to notice how Tudjman in this work, while discussing history of
national struggles in Europe, doesn’t mention at all the Pan-Slavic movement or the Serbo-Croat
nationalism or Yugoslavianism, all of which were national programs for national liberation but
are mutual force developed in unity against the colonial occupiers. At the same time he talks
about other, similar movements which were regional at the time like Mazzini and his Young Italy
104
"Tudjmanov Unuk će Biti Nagrađen Sa 120000 Kuna Jer Je Upropastio Banku." Index.hr. November 17,
2005. Accessed October 9, 2015. http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/tudjmanov-unuk-bit-ce-nagradjen-sa-120000-
kuna-jer-je-upropastio-banku/292482.aspx.
105
Ibid.
106
The revolutionary convent of Yugoslav anti-fascist movement that laid foundations of socialist Yugoslavia
on the convention that was held in Jajce, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in November 29 and 30, 1943.
107
Tuđman, Franjo. Nacionalno Pitanje U Suvremenoj Europi. 2. Izdanje, Ispr. I Dop. ed. München: Knjižnica
Hrvatske Revije, 1982. 140.
42
project which had a purpose in uniting all of the Italian lands and which Tudjman gives as a good
example. In the case of Italy regions had accepted loss of sovereignty and the standardized Italian
language, so how come this was a bad solution for Yugoslavia?
2.5.Sanader and the Return to Power of HDZ
The case of Sanader is especially important for our topic of robbery and nationalism. This
is because he had acquired power through nationalist HDZ party, with cooperation with war
criminals and through the use of hate speech and nationalist propaganda. His Splitska Riva
speech, in which he yelled about Croatian national interest, is one of the classics in the Croatian
political culture. However, Sanader is the highest ranking official to end up in prison in Croatia
and the court evidence had proven his war profiteering and bribe taking in the process of sale of
Ina, former strongest Yugoslav company. Sanader came to power with the support of Slavonian
leaders Branimir Glavaš and Vladimir Šeks. Glavaš is a convicted war criminal, guilty of heinous
crimes of torture and murder of civilians in Osijek. These two were important to provide support
but also security because Sanader was going against the very powerful leader of the extreme right
Ivić Pašalić. His rule was that of a tyrant, just like Tudjman, he did not tolerate confrontation.
“Explanations that he would give were taken for granted; his loyal “army” would attack everyone
who doubts to be a hater of everything Croatian and would be beating their, most Croatian
chest.”108
How crucial was Sanader’s bribe in the process of sale of Ina shares to Hungarian Mol we
have heard from Predrag Sekulić, president of Ina’s labor board who had explained to us these
dynamics. Croatian government was selling a package of Ina’s shares to Mol and Sanader, the
prime minister, was personally negotiating the deal. The result was that the purchase of a package
of shares was accompanied by the surrender of the managerial function and management of all of
the “most important resources” to the partner who owns less than half of the shares. “There is no
partnership of any kind and all of the important departments are in the Hungarian hands and all of
the important decisions are made in Hungary”109. The new executive board of Ina is directly
appointed from Mol who then sends “suggestions” to this board which it adopts. This is the result
108
Popović, Jasmina. "Sanader Kao Pašalić." Večernji List, October 9, 2010.
109
Sekulić, Predrag. Interview by author. July 2, 2015.
43
of the bribe of 10 million euros which Sanader had received during the negotiation. Sekulić also
says how he had watched the video of the sale and how it was obviously an arranged meeting
because Sanader announces the surrender of managerial position with no proper explanation, no
explanation of any kind for this extremely unusual and self-damaging favor110. Now Mol has a
plan to close Ina’s refineries, first the one in Sisak and later one in Rijeka as well. This can be
seen in the dynamics of the meeting of labor council with the management and CEO Zoltan
Aldott. As Sekulić claims both refineries in Croatia are planed for closing and will be used as
storage space for the ready made product from Hungary. This would mean further layoffs till the
whole company, which had 33000 employees in 1990 and today (July 2015) already has under
8000, and would be left with a couple of hundreds of employees111.
The moves that Mol makes are pretty easy to understand. The promise of investment in
the refinery Sisak was forgotten and the coking process was not introduced in Sisak but in the
two refineries in Hungary and Slovakia. Sekulić has visited these two refineries and says how
great investments were made, investments which require work at 80% capacity in order to be
profitable. So this “partner” company produces at about 90% capacity in its refineries and than
imports and sells its product in Croatia at Ina’s gas stations while destroying the domestic
production. This is only possible because Mol was given the right to make decisions due to the
bribe that Sanader had received. Before the war, as Sekulić continues the story, Ina’s fields were
producing about 3 million tons of domestic crude oil, which went down to two million during the
war and in the last ten years down to 500, 000. The Executive Director of the research department
had wanted to increase the extraction for 30%, as a first step, but the management (Mol) had
blocked him. According to Sekulić, this is because they want to close the refinery first, than raise
extraction. Ina is also forbidden from importing crude oil which in combination with inability to
extract is completely paralyzing the domestic production in Croatia and also creating a market for
the Hungarian “partner”. Refinery in Sisak works at the minimal capacity about 35 to 45 days a
year and refines these 500,000 tones of domestic crude oil. It has been almost 3 years that this
management doesn’t allow imports while also not allowing the expansion of the extraction of
domestic crude. What Mol is waiting for now, Sekulić concludes, is for workers and the state to
give up completely, so that they can close and fully take over the market.112
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid
112
Ibid.
44
“We have lost all of the markets”, continues Sekulić and talks about times when Ina’s
trucks, only a few years ago, would pile up at the Bosnian border. Those days are over. There are
also concrete examples of sabotage that Sekulić had payed our attention to. The bid to get a
contract with the Croatian national rail company was made ten minutes late which Sekulić
believes could not happen on accident since the job was worth tens of millions. Second example
is rejection of the contract with the Slovenian Petrol who had a demand of million tons of ready
made product which alone is enough to keep the Rijeka refinery busy all year. Mol has of course
rejected, again, because it wants to stop the production and close Ina’s refineries. Another
example is rejection of contract with Zagreb Holding, a large company which is according to Mol
“not paying on time” Sekulić claims how Ina can easily wait for the payment for hundred
necessary days but the Hungarian partners don’t want Ina doing contracts.113
Sanader had reformed HDZ from a completely nationalistic-populist party to just
bourgeois-client party with preserved nationalist rhetoric. This client servicing characteristic of
HDZ is the main characteristic of many other ruling and opposition parties in the region. It is less
and less politicians and more and more bourgeoisie who rule in Yugoslavian space. The
nationalist rhetoric seems less and less convincing and cannot be justified with the wish for the
creation of a nation state anymore. Nation states are here, but the welfare and freedom are absent
or were brought to the small circle of privileged members of the national bourgeoisie. Leftists in
Croatia today have to be more progressive than ever since their cause is in a constant decline and
the inequality is more and more visible. The corruption within the nationalist elite is brought to
the perfection of functioning and rarely someone dares to raise the voice against it. Corruption in
the privatization process, of many companies was not revealed or investigated and was executed,
just like during Tudjman rule, by the top state officials.114
113
Ibid.
114
Rajković, Dražen. Kako Je Ivo Sanader Ukrao Hrvatsku. Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski I Turk, 2011.
45
3. Croatian Opposition and Other Critiques of Nationalism and
Privatization Theft
HDZ as the party that had all of the state power in the 1990’s and had initiated and
performed most of the “transformation” of social property had a greatest opponent in the Social-
democratic party. This party went through few name changes and merges with smaller parties but
was the only one who would threaten (even if modestly) to the election victories and complete
political domination of HDZ. In this chapter we shall examine the social-democratic nature of
this party and its views on the change of the structure of ownership and the infamous Law of
Transformation. After that we will take a look at the programs of the parties as well as at the
discussion in the Parliament during the enactment of the Law of Transformation.
3.1. Programs of Oppositional Parties and Social Property
SDP’s first version: League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes

(SKH-SDP), which had entered the first democratic elections lead by Ivica Račan, had a clear
position about necessity for the reform of the social property. One part of the companies in social
property, which were of vital interest, should become state owned while the rest should be
privatized.115 According to this suggested way of transition “those employed in the companies
can have a partial recognition of their property rights or discounted purchase of shares which
would also take in consideration number of years spent in companies”. This language clearly
states that there is no guarantee of the right to property to the current owners of the means of
production, but that shares would be sold to them with some benefits included and probably
preventing workers from becoming owners of a majority package of shares. Here we can clearly
see how the program of reformed League of Communists of Croatia, as second major party was
not very different from that of HDZ and similar principles have ended up in this infamous Law of
Transformation. SKH-SDP in its first critique of The Law of Transformation talks mainly about
the crime in the process but also states its support for the necessary “transformation” and
abolishment of the social property for the sake of the greater efficiency in its use and necessity
115
Plecas, Dusan. Deset Godina Socijaldemokratske Partije Hrvatske: 1990-2000: Dokumenti. Zagreb:
46
for the mobility of capital116. Some authors claim how efficiency in Yugoslavia was absent due to
the fact that self-management was false and that republic parties (and federal in the case of
energy industries) had kept a strong grip on the companies. From this opinion we derive an idea
about necessity of reform which was replaced by the complete abolishment of self-management
and social property as its guardian instead of finding ways how to deal with such strong grips and
interferences. This opinion however was labeled as anti-European and backwards. As far as
mobility of capital goes, this is exactly the characteristic, along with lack of good laws and
enforcement, which had allowed social capital to pile up in the hands of few. This is the practice
present in Croatia but also throughout Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe but also part of a world-wide
neoliberal trend.
Another party which had merged with the SKH-SDP in 1994 is Social Democratic Party
(Socijaldemokratska Stranka, SDSH) and formed today’s Social Democratic Party
(Socijaldemokratska partija, SDP) was led by Antun Vujić. On its first congress in 1991 SDSH
had adopted a program which among other states how “civil revolution must be democratic in the
economic sense as well and must preclude robbery and the excess concentration of wealth”.117
According to this we come to conclusion that social property cannot belong to individuals,
nationals or internationals and that “there is only one solution that is just, radical and rapidly
enforceable and that is division of existing social property in the form of shares to the individuals
who have socially acceptable claims to the property”.118The above mentioned “just” solution is
also, which is not stated in the text, the only legal solution. The introduction called “De-
collectivization of the social property” also fails to mention the difference between the social
property in Yugoslavia, which belonged to workers and all the working people and the state
property of the Soviet block of countries. The program still presents “radical” and also “just”
alternative to the programs of HDZ or the SKH-SDP and the privatization “robbery and excess
concentration of wealth” which did follow. The program also states how “this solution avoids the
dangers of the new state confiscation and further step away from the self-managing system,
transforming the self-management rights into the ownership rights”119 This way the SDSH had
clearly informed the citizens how their option would, if only for a while, safeguard their right to
116
Ibid. 169.
117
Ibid. 59.
118
Ibid. 60.
119
Ibid. 60.
47
property. The SDSH had very modest results in the first democratic elections and this can only be
explained with the hate speech, scarcity tactics and nationalist propaganda which were all used to
make people vote against their own economic interest to the point that their social property be
taken away practically without any resistance. Profesor Alex Demirović says how in the whole
Europe it is the case that people don't vote for their economic interest, some 20% of the poorest
citizens do not vote for the parties on the left but rather for some nationalist parties.120 This is
seen as one of the main reasons why the economic interest of the poor is not on the agenda.
The position of SDSH was exactly to the contrary to those of HDZ since they believed
that the very problem of Yugoslavian socialist economy is the involvement of the state apparatus
in the functioning of the companies. This is why SDSH had proposed giving shares to the
workers and taking the state out of the whole process. HDZ, on the other hand had robbed the
workers and taken property rights into its own hands before appointing the new owner. The
problem that even SDSH doesn't address is the fact that small share holders often prefer some
spending money to shares so the companies often end up sold and in possession of individuals
unless workers are properly educated about the value of retention of shares. Slovenian case shows
this well since in Slovenia social property was respected a great deal more, workers were allowed
some shares but a lot of them were quickly sold.121 As Filip Balunović had said once in a private
conversation, the widespread benefit of privatization is an oxymoron. This is because
privatization is not done for the greater or public good, but for the private just like the name says.
Social property was, on the other hand, unacceptable from the position of European Union and
the United Sates of America who have wanted the privatization and the assimilation of the
Yugoslavian market into the neoliberal world.122
The critique of “transformation” had continued after the merge of SDSH and SCH-SDP in
1994 when, now united SDP publishes a “Declaration about Privatization of State and/or Social
Property”. The first objection is about the transformation not reaching the economic goal of
growth. Second objection is a political one and says how citizens do not accept transformation
since it has allowed for redistribution of social property which had brought profit to the state and
a small number of citizens. And only the third objection is social one and states how privatization
120
Demirović:, Alex. "Je Li Koncept Klase Još Uvijek Održiv?" Slobodni Filozofski. June 22, 2015. Accessed
October 10, 2015.
121
For Slovenian case see Mencinger, Joze. "Privatization in Slovenia." Pravna Fakulteta Univerza v Ljubljani.
http://www.pf.uni-lj.si/media/mencinger.privatization.pdf.
122
Radoš, Ivica. "Stranci: Dajte Vi to što Brže Obavite! Šok-raspodjela!" Večernji List, July 9, 2013.
48
“did not achieve expected minimal level of justice for the majority of citizens”. The selection of
such a soft language informs us about the nature of the opposition that we are dealing with here.
While the extreme right, which, if not before at this point HDZ certainly was, is robbing the
workers of Croatia, Social Democratic Party is supposed to be out on the streets rallying and in
confrontation with the police instead of publishing statements full of euphemisms such is
“expected minimal level of justice”. The real violence was present, very bloody one, but only
ethnic. This is how the nationalist rhetoric has prevailed and is still prevailing many years after
the war. This conflict and the nationalist hysteria were the prerequisite for this class war against
the Croatian working class to happen with the almost complete surrender of the workers.
If this declaration of SDP was the strongest hit that was launched from the Croatian left,
than the results of the “transformation” should not be that surprising. It is also worth mentioning
how SDP in its “Ten years of Social Democratic Party of Croatia” has a whole chapter called
“The SDP’s contribution to the creation and the defense of Croatia” in which it tries to prove its
role in the process of creation of the nation state which can be called a counterrevolution and
which is not something that a Social Democratic Party should be proud off. In the text also
recognition is payed to HDZ: “without truing to undermine the merit of HDZ and Tudjman for
having organized a nation wide movement in a timely manner and used the favorable historic
chance for the creation of independent and sovereign Croatia”.123 This clearly illustrates how
SDP is not trying to lead the country in a radically different way than the HDZ but is also ready
to play the nationalist card to an extent. This is almost as if there was a minimum of nationalism
that you have to show in order to practice politics.
3.2.Opposition to the Law of Transformation by the Representatives in Croatian

Parliament
This unfolding of the “transformation” where the state will become the owner of the
means of production was well predicted by the representatives of numerous opposition parties as
well as by some of the HDZ in the Croatian Parliament when the law was being discussed in
1991. At the end of this research let us take a look at the warnings that the Representatives of the
123
Plecas, Dusan. Deset Godina Socijaldemokratske Partije Hrvatske: 1990-2000 : Dokumenti. Zagreb:
49
Croatian people were expressing to the government who had a majority and who had disregarded
all the concerns, predictions and advices. The discussion is completely quoted from the
transcripts which we have gotten from the Croatian Parliament whose Secretary Lidija Bagarić
had issued the copy of transcripts on my name on the 17.8.2015.
Firstly we should notice how HDZ did not need any support from the opposition (due to
the winner take all election system) but had rather needed just to sit through the discussion and
vote its law into effect. The deputy prime minister, in charged for the economy, Franjo Gregurić
had presented the law in front of the parliament and here already we can see fallacy at a very
important place. Talking about the reforms which were started under Ante Marković and which
were leading towards labor owned privatized companies, Gregurić said how the reforms did not
solve the non-property conception of the social property and how, therefore this “transformation”
is necessary in order to transform “social ownership into real ownership”. This transformation is
as we have seen underway but his government had stopped it and instead passed a law which had
made government the owner of the social property.124 The deputy prime minister is engaging in
misinformation since their law will only prevent the workers from getting their share of the
property while the actual privatization will have to wait for the state firstly to takeover the
property and then to give it to the newly forged bourgeoisie.
SDP, as the biggest opposition party, had challenged this law and its many miss-
presentations of reality. So Medarac Ivan, speaking in the party’s name first states how the law is
misleading in its claim to be the law that brings privatization. It will, due to the short deadline for
the “transformation”, bring Croatia back 40 years to state ownership of the means of production.
The law will bring the nationalization of the economy and “workers collectives would be
deprived of any possibility to influence the management of the social capital in whose creation
they have participated for years”125 So the workers’ rights are put in jeopardy but, as Medarac
also points out, the declared prosperity goals of the “transformation” will in no way be met since
the process is not designed to lead to an economic prosperity. The process was designed,
according to SDP to create ties between the political and economic elites which will then bring
about long term negative economic and political consequences. Here SDP had offered some
124
Croatian Parliament. “Joint Session. Discussion of the Law of Transformation” Zagreb, 17. 4.1991.
43/7/HLJ
125
47/4/VM
50
concrete suggestions which would protect the health of companies if not really the social property
of the workers. These suggestions, in the form of law amendments, were among else stating how
companies should apply different models of privatization and not just one and how workers
collectives should keep in their own property company’s un-privatized part as well as their
managerial rights that follow the ownership of the shares. SDP, as the second strongest party, had
also the most to lose with this law, because the law was about to establish a permanent tie
between the HDZ and the class of new proprietors. This did in fact happen and the rule of HDZ
was even characterized as one party rule by some. Needless is to mention that SDP did not use
hate speech, did not hide behind “national goals” and did not participate in the perpetration of
violence against civilians.
At the same session, Gordana Ajduković had presented the views of the Socialist Party.
She said how this law presents new government seizure of the property and the violence against
all existing economic subjects. The law will make the rich richer and the poor poorer and jobless.
According to her, the main rule of any “clean privatization would be in the determination of the
contribution of all natural and legal persons in the creation of the company’s wealth.” All this law
plans to give to those who have invested for years into their socially owned companies is the right
to a discount to buy shares of the company in which they have already invested all of their
money.126 Ajduković same as Medarac previously, presents a spotless account of the illegalities
in this law as well as the economic problems that it is about to create. HDZ did not believe that it
is a problem if few people become extremely rich as long as they could choose them and than
hope for a long term friendship and cooperation in the dominance of the political and economic
affairs of Croatia. While this unfolds the attention of the public will be diverted to the economic
conflict which HDZ had help foster.
This is definitely not a vision which Gordana Ajduković could share since she had
believed in the workers property rights as well as in the prevention of ethnic violence as she was
trying to work with the Josip Reihl Kir127. Kir was the commander of the Osijek police who came
to prominence with his successful handling of the ethnic Serbs and their rebellion. However he
was very unpopular within HDZ since HDZ’s plans and position had heavily depended on the
126
51/1/HV.
127
Hedl, Drago. "Ne Smije Se Suditi Samo Gudelju." Feral Tribune, March 28, 2007.
http://feral.audiolinux.com/tpl/weekly1/article_sngl.tpl?IdLanguage=7&NrIssue=1123&NrSection=15&NrArticle=1
5645
51
creation and proliferation of the ethnic violence. One of the Slavonian leaders of HDZ, Branimir
Glavaš, known for war crimes against civilians, had at that time asked citizens to report all the
suspicious activity to him and not to Kir, who was the legal authority. Kir was murdered during
the efforts to pacify the Slavonian people, and according to minister of police at the time, Josip
Bojkovac, Kir had known that he was going to be killed and had named Vladimir Šeks and
Branimir Glavaš as the people who had threatened him128. The violence in Slavonia was crucial
for the development of the nationalist sentiments and the nationalist domination of the political
discourse. This is why Kir, the peace maker, was the enemy of the establishment.
Later in the discussion a HDZ representative, Ivan Bobetko came out strongly against the
law saying how it was endangering Croatia to become a colony in the short time. “When we
fought for democracy, we did not fight for the sale of the Croatia which even communists did not
sell”. Then Šeks had warned him to stay loyal to the party decision, or to publically state that he
is not loyal to the party (HDZ). Here Bobetko, states how he is “for the party loyalty but not for
the party stupidity.”129 The chair Ivan Vekić breaks up the discussion about the HDZ loyalty,
saying how Bobetko was supposed to express his opinion at the HDZ meeting. It seems like
Bobetko was not informed about the plan to appoint new owning class which will take over the
social property so he was afraid that foreigners would rush to buy out Croatian economy and the
seaside.
Manu more representatives have expressed concerns. Nikola Zigfrid, for example, had
stated support for the Bobetko’s ‘thinking outside of the party lines’. Zigfrid had also called for
the minimal recognition of the rights of those who have invested their money into social property
for years.130 We should notice here an important addition to the humiliation of the working class;
those who were building the social property were not only robed off it but since it was handed
over to lumpen-bourgeois entrepreneurs with no interest or knowledge of business. So the
Croatian citizens have not only gotten nothing form the privatization but they have actually,
“through taxes, paid for all of its expenses and failure, including the implemented robbery and the
128
Zebić, Enis. "Tko Je Naredio Ubojstvo Reihl Kira?" Radio Slobodna Evropa, September 28, 2010.
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/Tko_je_naredio_ubojstvo_Reihl_Kira/2170075.html
129
Croatian Parliament. “Joint Session. Discussion of the Law of Transformation” Zagreb, 17. 4.1991. 52/1/JT.
130
Ibid. 54/2/JT
52
ignorance of the new owners.”131 So this process of robbery of Croatian citizens is never ending
since the elites continue to drain the public wealth through now public budget.
Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) was a parliamentary party which was second
strongest in Croatia for a while under Dražen Budiša and its first president was Slavko Goldstein.
Budiša had attracted attention with his critique of Tudjman’s supposed soft handling of the self
proclaimed Serbian Republic of Kraina. When the discussion about the Law of Transformation
was ongoing in the Croatian Parliament member of HSLS, Jadranko Mijaličić argued in The
Council of Associated Labor how “the most acceptable for him in this moment is distribution of
the property rights equally to all citizens for free” this he explains not with the right that members
of society have when it comes to social property but rather with the lack of domestic capital
which would buy out the companies so this way the property would not fall in the hands of
foreigners.132 Here we have an interesting argument of a nationalist who also wants to give the
social property to the people but exactly because he is nationalist.
3.3. Branko Horvat and Privatization
At this time already completely marginalized in Croatia, but in the world the most known
Yugoslavian economist, Branko Horvat, had truly put up a dignified fight against this tyranny. He
had led a marginal political party Social Democratic Union. This known economist was still
active when the “transformation” was ongoing. He was living in Zagreb where he was still
writing about economics but he had also taken up legal battles against the government whose
actions he had deemed illegal. His resistance could not have succeeded due to the lack of
independent judiciary in Croatia at the time and to the absolute power which HDZ was holding.
Due to his expertise and presence in both systems as well as in the transformation, his arguments
are the key in proving the robbery that was executed by this nationalist government. The entire
process from the beginning of social property until the robbery Horvat summarizes this way:
In 1950 state property had been transferred into the hands of the workers
collectives. This act had established social property whose integral part is workers
131
Družić, Gordan. Hrvatska Obratnica: Stanje I Perspektive Hrvatskoga Gospodarstva. Zagreb: Golden
Marketing-Tehnička Knjiga, 2004. 64.
132
Croatian Parliament. “Allied Labor Council. Discussion of the Law of Transformation” Zagreb, 22. 2.1991.
48/3/SN.
53
self-management. Since then self-managing workers collectives have, by
investing from their own income, increased the value of the social property
twelvefold. With The Law of Transformation the state seizes it and sells, actually
gives it away. At the same time, self-management is being abolished. Seizing the
property of the others is, legally considered stealing [...] The state can give its
property (like it did in the 1950), but once given property it cannot take back,
especially not the twelve times larger value.”133
The state had taken social property for itself by law which clearly violates the constitution and
the international law. Workers were investing and increasing their social property over the forty
years and the state now just comes and takes it away by decree.
Further in the text Horvat explains how the first step in this criminal “transformation“ or
distribution of social property was to just declare it as owned by the state. Identifying the social
property with state property brings identifying the society with the state, which is a characteristic
of totalitarian systems, and not democratic countries such as Croatia supposed to be with its
democratic constitution. HDZ had won just over a third of all of the registered voters and
according to Horvat that was not a mandate for this kind of “transformation”. For the legitimacy
of that kind of law, referendum would be necessary beside which the state would have an
obligation to payout the individual share of social property to all of the members of society who
refuse to give up their right.134 In the lawsuit filed to The Croatian Constitutional Court on the
2/2/1993, Horvat states the articles of the constitution which guarantee the right to compensation
in the case of the state seizure of property for the sake of public ownership. Article 3 states
“Sanctity of property is included into the greatest values of this constitutional order”; than article
48 says “Right to property is guaranteed and article 50 states how “It is possible by the law and in
the interest of the republic to limit or to seize property, with the compensation of the market
value.”135
The property clauses in the constitution are obviously only applying after the robbery of
the social property. The new private property will see its sanctity respected but the sanctity of
social property was to be dismissed since the ability to appoint bourgeoisie was the key element
that had kept HDZ in power. Horvat’s lawsuit had failed and the constitutional court had not
replied to any of his arguments about the illegal seizure of property but had rather written
explanations about the government being able to regulate the economy. Horvat does not believe
133
134
Ibid. 289
135
Ibid. 287.
54
that government should regulate the economy but rather that it cannot retroactively decide on the
ownership rights of workers thus putting them into jeopardy and effectively depriving them of
their right to property, to management and even the right to work itself.
Horvat also challenges the very idea of transformation into the “market economy”
claiming how this form of economy had already existed in Yugoslavian self-managing socialism.
Yugoslavia did not have central planning or the state ownership of the means of production. The
companies were, for the most part making their own decisions and were also competing on the
market. “Self-management is, like private property compatible only with the market economy. In
both cases the economic independence of the companies is what generates the market institutions.
This is why the transition from a market economy into a market economy is clearly nonsense.”136
According to Horvat, the system could have been reformed but not transitioned into the market
economy since it already had market economy, unlike the countries which had central planning
and state ownership of the means of production. The so-called “privatization” was nothing more
than the usurpation of the independence of the enterprises by the state as well as the usurpation of
the property rights of the Croatian workers. The “transformation” law was created in the way that
the “transformation” would not be possible and that the state will end up owning the previously
socially owned enterprises. One the of leaders of the Croatian spring, Miko Tripalo said how the
people’s property which was created during socialism is now being taken away from them and
how “it is not a surprise that the abolishment of the social property is called “transformation” and
not privatization because what is actually happening is the wholesale transformation into state
property, with the robbery and the usage of the governmental and party positions. 137 The
government seizes the property of the citizens through a law that is designed to fail to transform it
into private property because the workers’ rights are not respected. Than, the government gives
this property to whomever it wants through one of the methods of capital concentration.
136
137
Tripalo, Miko. "Interview." Feral Tribune, October 19, 1993, 426th ed.
55
Conclusion
With this thesis I have shown the clear existing connection between two of the main
social problems in Croatia nationalism and privatization theft. The aim was to show how these
two problems should be treated jointly rather than individually since they are connected and since
existing economic order, a product of this great theft, depends on the nationalism in order to
justify itself. The standing point with which we have started and conducted this research was that
the nationalist discourse, hate speech, nationalist violence and overall nationalist saturation of the
political life was used by the political elites in the process of economic transformation. What the
elites did is to establish a national bourgeois class, non-existent in socialism, and to, by being
able to practically appoint them, stay in power together over a lasting period of time. The
connection between the national bourgeoisie and the political elite is what keeps the politicians in
power and the elites of the transitioning countries had a unique opportunity to appoint their own
bourgeoisie. This is all especially clear if we take off the ‘ethnic lenses’ when dealing with the
Croatia of the 90’s and instead put on the ‘class lenses’ which can clearly point us in the right
direction.
Firstly, I have presented the theoretical framework which had shown the nature of the
property which was being expropriated and the nature of the self-managing system which was
being abolished. The social property had a meaning of the means of production in the hands of
the labor. It was the guarantee of their right to work, right to manage and, even if only
collectively, right to property. This property cannot become state’s property as Kardelj explicitly
claims how: the state does not have a right to seize it; but also over the years workers collectives
have increased the value of the social property twelvefold by investments form their own pockets.
I have also shown how a nation state, which is what Croatia became after independence, is not a
state which safeguards the interest of all of its citizens equally but rather is a state which
safeguards the property rights of the rich and their right to freely practice business. I have also
shown how it was exactly the lack of ethnic hatred which had produced ethnic violence since
elites had to turn to extreme methods in order to get the masses rallied up for the national causes.
The new bourgeois class as I have shown is not there to defend some abstract national cause, but
56
rather its own position and in the globalized world functions as a form of a traitor to the local
working class while serving the interest of the “global over-class138”.
After the theoretical debate I have given the evidence to show how the nationalist HDZ
government of the 1990’s has used the nationalism to execute the privatization theft and the
formation of the bourgeois class of its choice. Firstly we have looked at the politics of Franjo
Tudjman who, was maybe ‘a real nationalist’ who “advertised his militancy in the cause of
nationalism in a way the more devious Milošević would never have done”139 but whose idea of
two hundred families was a terror against Croatian citizens who were deprived of their property
for the sake of creation of national bourgeoisie. Furthermore his nationalist project was
completely dependent on the support of the leader of this, supposedly enemy, nation. His ‘trust’
for Milosevic and their joint plans were what raised the question of classes. If the elites are
cooperating well, why should lower classes fight? Exactly because of the elites, in order for elites
to stay in power, to create a nation state with a dominant ethnic group and more importantly with
the ruling economic elite, conflict along the ethno-national lines was necessary. I have also
shown how Tudjman’s concept of “Croatian freedom” is meaningless for most of Curtains, it is a
at best a formal independence for a state. It only refers to independence form Yugoslavia while it
completely covers up the vassal relation to the international community. It also doesn’t answer to
the problems of Croatian working class; as a matter of fact ‘Croatian freedom’ had created
numerous problems for the Croatian working class which was deprived of its rights, starting with
the right to property and all in the name of some abstract ‘national interest’.
I have also demonstrated how the privatization theft could not have happened without
being planned. Croatian opposition was well aware of all of the threats that the infamous law of
Transformation was bringing along. People were being robbed of their social property in the time
of the rise of ethnic violence. This was the concern of some of the opposition parties, coming
form the left. We have also seen that even some politicians from the right were for the equal
distribution of social property since there was no better solution. It was not just the people’s right
to social property which was the concern it was also the fact that the ‘transformation’ was
designed to fail to produce private property. Many representatives in the parliament were
pointing to the fact that transformation will actually bring social property into the hands of the
138
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and Social Hope. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. 73.
139
Zimmermann, Warren. Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers -- America's Last
Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why. New York: Times Books, 1996. 76.
57
state. But as we have seen, this was exactly the idea. HDZ had seized the property so it could
hand it over to its chosen new bourgeoisie. HDZ was sued for this theft by Branko Horvat, whose
arguments did not stand a chance in the judicial system which, as we have also seen, was not
independent.
Nationalism as Ideology behind Privatization Theft, as we have shown in this research is a
justified title for this study. We have not shown how Croatian nationalism was invented for the
purpose of privatization theft, but this was not the goal either. Croatian nationalism, as ideology
of the ‘national liberation’ was merely abused by the political elites to pursue their own goal of
remaining in power and through privatization theft, be in position to appoint the new bourgeoisie,
thus hoping for a long term cooperation. Nationalist usurpation of the media and the entire
society has put aside the questions of class to that extent so the working class would not rise if
their property or other rights are being annulled. The redistribution of capital, which should be
rendered as countrywide class violence of unseen proportions, went by without a lot of noise and
without provoking sizable mobilization of the robbed lower classes. The response of the lower
classes will come only when they reject the national ideology as “the class enemy’s way of
fighting”, when they choose not to be Croatians (or Serbs) and turn to their class problems. The
main hypothesis than, stays the same: Croatian nationalist government of the 1990’s has used
ethno-nationalist ideology against its own people in order to rob them off their social property in
the quest for the creation of the new national bourgeois elite. The question for some further
research can be the same old question: how to reverse this process and to “tighten the belts of the
richest so the belts of the poorest can be loosened a little”?
58
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62
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY
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acknowledged.
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aimed at making correct judgment of the candidate’s expertise, insights and skills impossible.
In case of plagiarism the European Regional Master’s Degree in Democracy and Human
Rights in South East Europe has the right to declare the study results obtained at the Master’s
Program null.
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EUROPEAN REGIONAL MASTER’S DEGREE IN DEMOCRACY

AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

University of Sarajevo – University of Bologna

NATIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY BEHIND THE

MASTER THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR ASIM MUJKIĆ

SARAJEVO, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1.2.1. Marx on Social Property

Looking from the today’s perspective of a world dominated by neoliberal mode of

1.2.2. Kidrič and Kardelj on Social Property

1.3.The Great Transformation41

1.4.Theoretical Framework of Ethnicity and Nationalism. Foisted Image of Nationalism as a

1.4.1. Lie of the Serbo-Croatian Ethnic Hatred

1.5.Privatization after Privatization

2.1.Politics of Franjo Tudjman

2.2. The Notion of Croatian Freedom

2.3.Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)93

2.4.A Couple of Examples of Nepotism and Conflict of Interest

2.5.Sanader and the Return to Power of HDZ

3.1. Programs of Oppositional Parties and Social Property

SDP’s first version: League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes

3.2.Opposition to the Law of Transformation by the Representatives in Croatian

3.3. Branko Horvat and Privatization

Books and Articles:

Družić, Gordan. Hrvatska Obratnica: Stanje I Perspektive Hrvatskoga Gospodarstva. Zagreb:

Hodžić, Kadrija. "(Re)Privatizacija I Globalizacija." Forum Bosne 22-03.

Horvat, Branko. "Ekonomika Brzog Razvoja." Forum Bosne 12/01 (2001).

Horvat, Branko. "Ekonomika Brzog Razvoja." Forum Bosne 13/01 (2001).

Horvat, Branko. Politička Ekonomija Socijalizma. Zagreb: Globus, 1984.

Hudelist, Darko. Tuđman-- Biografija. Zagreb: Profil, 2004.

Kardelj, Edvard. Slobodni Udruzeni Rad. Beograd: Radnicka Stampa, 1978.

Kidrič, Boris. Socijalizam I Ekonomija. Zagreb: Globus, 1978.

Margetić, Domagoj. Karamarko: Najmoćniji Među Najkorumpiranijima. Zagreb: Self Published,

MacDonald, David Bruce. Balkan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian Victim-centred

Plecas, Dusan. Deset Godina Socijaldemokratske Partije Hrvatske: 1990-2000 : Dokumenti.

Vujić, Antun. Hrvatska I Ljevica: Prilog Socijaldemokratskom Gledišnu. Zagreb: Naklada

Zimmermann, Warren. Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers -- America's

Linić, Slavko. Interview by author. Tape recording. Zagreb. July 9, 2015.

Sekulić, Predrag. Interview by author. Tape recording. Zagreb. July 2, 2015.

Mencinger, Joze. "Privatization in Slovenia." Pravna Fakulteta Univerza v Ljubljani.

"Mesić: Vukovar Se Mogao Spasiti, a Norac Je Ubijao Po Naredbama Iz Zagreba." Index.hr.

"Privatizacija U Hrvatskoj." Radnička Prava. May 1, 2014. Accessed October 5, 2015.

Tudjman, Franjo speech at the commemoration for Gojko Šušak

Kovačević, Božo. Feral Tribune, October 31, 1994, 476th ed.

Popović, Jasmina. "Sanader Kao Pašalić." Večernji List, October 9, 2010.

Bianchini, Stefano, ERMA lectures, 2015

Mujkić, Asim. "Alternatives to Capitalism." Lecture, Open University, SARTR, Sarajevo,

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