SECTION 3 - PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
Hence,
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals​ [GR 93833, 28 September 1995]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts:​ A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's
dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript
of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses
of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As a result of Ramirez's
recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case before Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." Ramirez was charged of
violation of the said Act, in an information dated 6 October 1988. Upon
arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order dated 3 May 1989,
the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the
violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication. From the
trial court's Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution (by the First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9
February 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of 3 May 1989 null and void. Consequently,
on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 June 1990.
the petition.
Issue​: Whether the party sought to be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication
Held: ​Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using, any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder,
or however otherwise described." The provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under
said provision of RA 4200. Further, the nature of the conversation is
immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What RA 4200 penalizes
are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein.
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the contention that
the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of RA 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals​ [GR 107383, 20 February 1996]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 3 concur
Facts:​ Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982,
Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and Martin's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized
for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from
the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her
husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and
papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for
Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described
in paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or those further described in the Motion
to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any
person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Issue​: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and

correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved
party.

Held:​ The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The

constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the
FACTS: accused, constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any
​Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
City went to the police station to report an alleged indecent show in one of annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must
the night club establishments in the City. At the station, a heated immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be
confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, which later proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
on led to fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made
below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, which led the victim to fall on by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed
the ground. He later on died while under treatment. The exchange of words that he had no intent to kill the latter.
was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro
after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the
trial, Jalbuena, the other media man, testified. Presented in evidence to
confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro
and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the
two.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view
of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or

threat on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications (Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since
the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES​, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,
CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE
NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, then President Ramos enacted Administrative order
no. 308, which laid down the ground work for the implementation of a
National ID system. The A.O. mandated major government agencies to pool
their resources together to implement a centralized data bank of all citizens
which shall be used to streamline day to day government transactions and
minimize rampant red taping and corruption among government employees.
Herein petitioner Senator Blas Ople, filed the case at bar questioning the
said A.O. on 3 grounds 1) implementation of a national ID system requires a
legislative act, as such A.O. no. 308 is usurpation of legislative functions. 2)
that said A.O. tends to infringe the right to privacy of citizens 3) the
appropriation of funds for the implementation of said A.O. is also an
exclusive legislative function.
On the other hand, herein respondent as Executive Secretary refutes all said
arguments.
Issue:
Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise of the Executive power.
Whether or not the issuance of A.O. 308 by the President in establishing a
national computerized identification reference system is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
In holding the A.O. no. 308 as an invalid exercise of the Presidents
Executive power, the Court provided the following:
As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does indeed infringe upon the
legislature’s exclusive function as it laid down a system whereby compliance
therewith is a condition to transact with the government.
A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to Privacy as it
allows the government to pool various data regarding an individual without
any clear concise direction as to the manner to keeping, safeguards against
improper use, and any definite answer as to what type of information may or
may not be used.
But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth
of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in
clear and present danger.
A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any justifiable reason to allow the would
be infringement. To streamline government transactions and to remove red
taping was not sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to counter act the strict
protection of the individual’s right to privacy.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws.As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive.Corollary to the power of control, the
President has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable
him to discharge his duties effectively.Administrative power is concerned
with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights
of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative
power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that
should be covered by law.From these precepts, the Supreme Court holds
that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by
an administrative order. The dissenting opinions of the Justices unduly
expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erode the
plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established
approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well
stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public.
It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general
policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws."
Thus, Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" was declared null and void
for being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
POLLO VS. CONSTANTINO-DAVID (2011)
Facts:
Ann anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil
Service Commission Chairperson alleging that an officer of the CSC has
been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in
information technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back
up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.”
The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in the hard
disk of computers at the PALD and the Legal Services Division. Within the
same day, the investigating team finished the task. It was found that most of
the files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the
petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative
cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a
Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous
letter-complaint. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his
computer done while he was on leave, and that the files in his computer
were his personal files and those of his relatives and associates, and that he
is not authorize the activities as they are in violation of his constitutional right
to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search
and seizure. Also, the files/documents copied from his computer without his
consent are inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). On 24 July 2007, the CSC
issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of the same merits and meted
the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory
penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein petitioner.
By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondents CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:​ Whether or not the search conducted and the copying of petitioner’s
files without his knowledge and consent lawful?
Held:
Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as
a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but
only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons for
warrantless searches involving public employees for work related reasons to
the case at bar, we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files? (2)
Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair reasonable in its inception and
scope?
The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files for he failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of
privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained
his personal files. He did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors. He did not use passwords nor
adopted any means to prevent access by others of his computer files. The
CSC also implemented a policy which implies on-the-spot inspections may
be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.
The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in
was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy,

there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s
computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace. It bears emphasis that the
Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer
and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a
work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the
warrant requirement. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before
the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case
would have shattering repercussions. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen
to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and
confidence in it. Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse
consequence or fall-out.

Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must

necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication
and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is
also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under
the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that
O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not
involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the
search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground
for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence
relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government
employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners,
vs
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES​, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in
society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire
for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to
others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the
society in which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted
pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in
the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among
others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified
students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their
black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were
barred from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for
habeas data on the following grounds:
Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation
of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data.
The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to
who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose,
that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this
case. (Is there a right to informational privacy in online social network
activities of its users?)
HELD:​ (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the
ruling at the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational
privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting,
or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or
about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business
of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not
necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her
family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for
any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not
prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information
about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social
networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in
this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better
known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what
extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user.
In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook
states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of
digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,”
except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired
privacy setting:
Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks
of the Facebook user; and
Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to
set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile
content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of
view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to
what extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’
daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either
by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed
her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show
that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were
ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their
Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery,
particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not
employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to
the Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at becomes more manifest and palpable.
large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or
profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a
profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more
so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’
argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures
to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did
not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously
enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation
of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
“Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances,
the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being
IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO ET
AL
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT.
GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG,
PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES
IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES,
and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
FACTS:​ Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the
now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment complex,
located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the
security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The
soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The
soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as
the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP
Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian
authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood
incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup
d’etat with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the
soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government
prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial
court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt.
SG Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the
Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a
directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident
except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of
ISAFP.
Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the
same was denied. The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit.
The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of
coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is
unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid
indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even
question.
ISSUE:​ WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid
HELD:​ YES
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a
court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue
the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the
case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After
actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners
are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to
inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not
the proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the
regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of
habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the detention is detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the
ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
can it substitute for an appeal. detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
A mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. inspection in the presence of the detainees.
The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such
sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours

provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time
to confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not
undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate
and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were
the detainees denied their right to counsel.

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the

furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure
intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from
passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded
grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The
diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the
fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a

reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.

AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION​: The letters alleged to

have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the
letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the
RULES ON HABEAS DATA
SECTION 4 - FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
United States v. O’Brien
Citation. 130 S. Ct. 3353; 176 L. Ed. 2d 1245;2010 U.S.78 U.S.L.W. 3700
Brief Fact Summary​. The Defendant, O’Brien (Defendant), was convicted
for symbolically burning his draft card under a federal statute forbidding the
altering of a draft card. His conviction was upheld after the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) found the law constitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law​. First, a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government. Second, if it
furthers a substantial or important governmental interest. Third, if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Facts​. The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948, amended in
1965 to include the applicable provision that made it an offense to “alter,
knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate”� a Selective Service registration
certification. Defendant knowingly burned his draft card on the front steps of
the local courthouse. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment
unconstitutional as a law abridging the freedom of speech.
Issue.​ Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to
Defendant because his act of burning the draft card was protected “symbolic
speech”� within the First Amendment?
Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to notify
registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or tossed into
the waste basket according to the convenience of the registrant?
Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because it was
intended to “suppress freedom of speech?”�
Held​. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be accepted
that there is an endless and limitless variety of conduct that constitutes
“speech”� whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends to express
an idea. However, even if the alleged communicative element of Defendant’s
conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution (Constitution), it does not necessarily follow that the
destruction of a draft card is constitutionally protected activity. First, a
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important
governmental interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. The 1965 Amendment meets all these
requirement
s. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as applied to Defendant.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. Although the initial purpose
of the draft card is to notify, it serves many other purposes as well. These
purposes would be defeated if the card were to be mutilated or destroyed.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The purpose of Congress is
not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional. Therefore, the 1965
Amendment is constitutional as enacted.
Discussion. This case creates a symbolic speech test that was used here to
uphold the 1965 Amendment to the UMTSA.
Schenck v. United States
Citation. 308 U.S. 585; 60 S. Ct. 109;84 L. Ed. 490; 1939 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary​. The distribution of leaflets using impassioned
language claiming that the draft was a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) and encouraging
people to “assert your opposition to the draft”� was held not to be protected
speech.
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect. When a
nation is at war, many things that might be said in a time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right. Therefore, the words used in the leaflets are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to protect.

Synopsis of Rule of Law​. The character of every act depends on the

circumstances in which it is done. The question in every case is whether the Discussion. This case gave birth to the “clear and present danger”� test.
words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to protect.

Facts​. This case is based on a three count indictment. The first charge was
a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. The second alleges a
conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. The third count
alleges an unlawful use of the mails for the transmission of unlawful matter.
The document in question claims that the draft is a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution and encourages people to “assert your
opposition to the draft.”� The Defendants, Schenck and other publishers of
the leaflets (Defendants), were found guilty on all of the counts.

Issue​. Whether the words used in the leaflets are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to protect?

Held.​ Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. In many places and in
ordinary times, the Defendants in saying all that was said in the leaflets
would have been within their constitutional rights. However, the character of
every act depends on the circumstances in which it is done. The question in
every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of
US v. BUSTOS
Facts​: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and
O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges
against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from
persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged
that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against him.
Issue​: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by
virtue of his right to free speech and free press.
Held​: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right
to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine
of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in
good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the
peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance
or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of
these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or
falsity.
Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were
small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution,
on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet
Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion
should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of
the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know
of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of
any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to
inquire into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of
privilege has been the result of this. Privileged communications may in some
instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the “unfettered
administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie
which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in
good faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty in the matter.
Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may
cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of
duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might
also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice
of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching
him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not
have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in
the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official
and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous
matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character,
but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to
convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the
petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the
peace was proper.
People v. Alarcon
A columnist of the Tribune published the copy of a letter in his article. The
letter is about the conviction of 52 tenants of a hacienda.
Facts:
A letter signed by one Luis Taruc was addressed to his Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, and a copy of which, having found its way to a
columnist of the Tribune, was quoted in an article of the said newspaper in
its September 23, 1937 issue. The letter is about the charging and conviction
of 52 tenants in Flroridablance, Pampanga for robbery in band because
“they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the
corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they are
working.” The letter furthers that the tenants have the right to take the palay
for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to given them rations
of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid with their share of
their crop. For this purpose, respondent was required to show cause on
grounds of contempt of court.
Ruling:
The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well-defined by the
cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications
tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise
after cause has ended. It must clearly appear that such publications do
impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the
author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought
to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the
court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or
amend it. That, the Court believes is the case at bar, for here the Court has
a concession that the letter complained of was published after the CFI of
Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and
after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that
a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein
was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is
that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had
rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced
by the question publication.
It is suggested that “even if there had been nothing more pending before the
trial court, this still had jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for
the rule that the publication scandalized the court.” The rule suggested,
which has its origin at common law, is involved in some doubt under modern
English law and in the United States, “the weight of authority, however, is
clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted
under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press.” Other
considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As
stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that “newspaper publications
tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is
otherwise after the case has ended.” In at least two instances, this court has
exercised the power to punish for contempt “on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle” (Villavicencio v. Lukban), “on the corrective and not
on the retaliatory idea of punishment” (In re: Lozano and Quevedo).
Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense, and in considering
the probate effects of the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and
reasonable interference consistent with the theory of defendants’ innocence
will be indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to
the guilt of one of the constructive contempt for interfering with the due
administration of justice, the doubt must be resolved in his favour and he
must be acquitted.
Respondent was acquitted.

Lagunzad v. Soto vda De Gonzales
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-32066
August 6, 1979
FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the
production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based
mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez,
Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla
Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises
Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951
elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in
power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book,
Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla,
there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the
portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales,
private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and
in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain
changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.
On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the
petitioner and private respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement” where
the petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of P20,000.00
payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before
Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or
before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants
authority and permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop
the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the PICTURE, and
in connection with matters incidental to said production, such as advertising
and the like, as well as authority and permission for the use of LICENSOR's
name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed therein, the authority and
permission hereby granted, to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first
committed any of the acts herein authorized.
After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown
in different theaters all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant
to the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the
present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner
1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of
the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture
and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's
fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of
Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and
was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those
incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or
consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion and
threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the
nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on
the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the
private respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the
life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure.
2. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
 assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity
RULING: of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of
freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters
1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the of essentially private concern.
book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need
for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly
episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members
of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis,” a privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the
deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a
person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be.
In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little
romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and
brutality.
2. No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may
be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too
much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted
by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner.
Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the
particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations
Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. V. Capulong
Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. sought to film the EDSA Revolution. They
informed Enrile regarding the motion picture and he wrote that he would not
approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/ore exhibition of his name
or picture or that of any member of his family in any cinema.
Facts:
Hal McElroy owns the production company, Ayer Productions Pty Ltd.
Through this movie production company, he intended to make a movie that
would depict the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA in a six
hour mini-series.The proposed motion picture is entitled “The Four Day
Revolution,” and was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and
Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted.
General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production. Petitioner McElroy had likewise informed Juan Ponce Enrile
about the projected motion picture, enclosing a synopsis of it.
Enrile replied that he would not and will not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name or picture or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television production. Because of
this, petitioners deleted the name of Enrile in the movie script and proceeded
to film the projected motion picture. Despite of the deletion, Enrile still
sought to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie, which was later on
granted.
Ruling:
Petitioners claim that in producing the “The Four Day Revolution,” they are
exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under the
Constitution. Private respondent, on the other hand, asserts a right of
privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected
mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is
entitled to enjoy. The freedom of speech and of expression includes the
freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion
pictures in theatres or to diffuse them through television. In our day and
age, motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and
medium of expression.
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to
foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance
that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected
to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of
speech and of expression. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of
such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude
commercially-owned and operated media from the exercise of
constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can only
result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.
The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture
does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent’s right of
privacy. More so, the motion picture is not principally about, nor is it focused
upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile, but it is compelled, if it is to be historical,
to refer to the role played by Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent
events of the change of government. The privilege of enlightening the public
is not limited to the dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It
extends also to information or education, or even entertainment and
amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning
interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the reproduction
of the public scene in newsreel and travelogues. In determining where to
draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship
over what the public may be permitted to read; and they were
understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt. The line of
equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy,
may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion
picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in
depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution.
There must be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private
respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal
facts. To the extent that the motion picture limits itself in portraying the
participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events
which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA
Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent’s privacy cannot be
regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried
out even without a license from private respondent.

Borjal v Court of Appeals​ 301 SCRA 1 January 14, 1999
Facts:​ A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court
against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are
allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking
among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be
launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted
with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of
the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court
ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before
the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to
be the subject of the published articles.
Issue:​ Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of
petitioners for libel.
Held: ​ In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked
or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify
him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been
complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met
since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said
conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the
press and that privileged communications must be protective of public
opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his
guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that
such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared
objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants,
and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its
activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also
deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public
issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally
guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media members to
practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
A privileged communication may be either:
1. Absolutely privileged communication à those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11,
Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee
thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications à those containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or
remarks."
Reyes v. Bagatsing
The Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It
would start in Luneta Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After
the march, a program would follow whereby two brief speeches were to be
delivered. However, the City Mayor did not act on the request of
organization for permit.
Facts:
Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a
public park, to the gates of the US Embassy which is two blocks away. The
march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference. A short program would be held after the march. During the
program, there would be a delivery of two brief speeches. After which, a
petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International
Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a
representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so
that it may be delivered to the US Ambassador. The Mayor of the City of
Manila however intruded by not acting on the request of the organization for
permit. Rather, he suggested with the recommendation of the police
authorities that a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be held at the
Rizal Coliseum. As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization, filed a suit
for mandamus.
Ruling:
Reyes’ petition was granted. The Court is called upon to protect the exercise
of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the
denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit that “[n]o law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances.” Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty
to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings
unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
State has a right to prevent.” Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of
public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the State has a right to prevent. It is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and
complements the right of free speech. Reiterating the ruling in Thomas v.
Collins, the American Supreme Court held that it was not by accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All
these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore,
where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is
called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental
actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right,
so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger,
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health, of other legitimate public interest. What is
guaranteed by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may not
advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under
the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending
a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to
be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in US
v. Apurado, “[i]t is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark
the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real
or imaginary, because on such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a
high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievances and the more
intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control
of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.” It bears repeating that for must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favourable
the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if
acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one’s destructive so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom,
occupied by intellectual liberty is our scheme of values. It is settled law that are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of strongly stressed that on the judiciary – even more so than on the other
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect
whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying
becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been felicitously termed by
The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.” Nonetheless,
Hughes in these words: “The question, if the rights of free speech and the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the
peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under side of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the
speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom
of speech which the Constitution protects.” There could be danger to public
peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That
would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties
should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here
respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. While prudence requires that there be a realistic
appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur,
given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so
where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the
permit must he for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a
right, in the language of Justice Roberta, speaking for the American
Supreme Court, is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place.” The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there
is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants
Miller v. California
Citation. 08-cv-01932 OWW YNP SMS (PC), 2010 BL 75512 (E.D. Cal. Apr.
05, 2010)
Brief Fact Summary​. The Defendant, Miller’s (Defendant) conviction for
mailing advertisements for “adult”� books to unwilling recipients was
vacated and remanded in an effort to shift the burden of obscenity
determinations to the state and local courts.
Synopsis of Rule of Law​. In determining whether speech is obscene, the
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average
person, applying contemporary community standards”� would find the
material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
The Supreme Court of the Untied States (Supreme Court) does not adopt as
a constitutional standard the “utterly without redeeming social value”� test. If
a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or
construed, First Amendment constitutional values are adequately protected
by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review
of constitutional claims when necess
ary.
Dissent. To send men to jail for violating standards that they cannot
understand due to vagueness, denies them of due process.
The statute in question is overbroad and thus, unconstitutional.
Discussion. This case attempts a new definition and clarification of obscenity
while also trying to shift the burden of obscenity determinations to the state
and local courts.

Facts​. The Defendant was convicted under the California Penal Code for
mailing advertisements for “adult”� material to non-soliciting recipients.

Issue​. Whether state statutes may regulate obscene material without limits?

Held​. No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and remanded for further
proceedings. In determining whether speech is obscene, the basic
guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person,
applying contemporary community standards”� would find the material,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS​ [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT
1989]
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts​: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign
initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements
of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western
Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along
Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials
believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue,
Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and
members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as
superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to
enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the
magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se
obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an
Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The
Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial
upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue​: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of
the petitioner.
Held:​ Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right
to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers
of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if
the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather
for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional
protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is
whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the
"judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The
government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof
to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they
were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to
be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must
apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an
obscenity seizure is in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be
seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil
substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene.
The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s
sound discretion;
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals​, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
I. ​ THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the
religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public
viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and
constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited
by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and
its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board.
The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent
Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent
Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series
of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack
against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. ​THE ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV
program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?
III. ​ THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the
action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series
Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the
CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review
petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV
program.
Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No.
1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should
not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A
contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the
Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public
broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal
belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent,
i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion
can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its
blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in
our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching
the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we
shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when
religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
the airing of petitioner’s religious program. enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a
and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further
burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.”
examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify
were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm
be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
to free exercise of religion. xxx. cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by ground.
petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of
the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where
there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The
bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time
permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by
more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas
that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply

the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of
CASE DIGEST : ​SWS vs Comelec
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001 SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS,
INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing
business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts​ : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private
non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in
various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting
the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including
election surveys Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election
Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels
and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand,
states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of
the elections on May 14,2001
Issue​ : WON §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
HELD​ : What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional
validity of §5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice
Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is
sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most
influential test for distinguishing content-based from content neutral
regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such
laws." is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in
at least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test
because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental
interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free
expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because
of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and
other opinion takers Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted
is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free
expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of
the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary
to further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the
prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of
election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the
regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the
fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly
pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils To
summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression
of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can
be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of
the Plunder Cases against the Former President Joseph Estrada​, A.M.
No. 01-4-03-SC
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the
Plunder Cases against the Former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No.
01-4-03-SC
Nature: Motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners
request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
Keywords: Live telecast of President Estrada’s Plunder Case, right to
information,
MENDOZA, J
Facts​: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP) sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners
invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the
people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be
recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television
coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel
filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to
prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in view of
protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
Issue​: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
right to information of public concern be given more weight than the
fundamental rights of the accused.
Ratio​: The petition is denied.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and
the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial
process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process
which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor
made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the
people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such
coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of
judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely
for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs
to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically
in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would
not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public
trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to
report what they have observed during the proceedings.
Ruling​: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made,
for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the
trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall
be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c)
the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only
and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision
in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of
contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition;
(e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of
the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the
audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN​ G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005
J. Sandoval Gutierrez
Facts​:
Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program
“The Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted
female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their
tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the
façade of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This
caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the
MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review
2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986
and some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and
socio-political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision
on freedom of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of
prior restraint upon respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB
investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for
non-submission of the program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC
rendered a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the
decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that
certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside
Story”, they being a public affairs programs which can be equated to a
newspaper. Hence, this petition
Issue​:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story”
prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV.
Held:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:
Xxx
b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV
programs, including publicity materials
The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to
screen, review and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS
*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not
exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in
the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv
programs whether religious, public affairs, news docu, etc
It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the
power to review it
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power to review are those
mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986
1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and
agencies
2) Newsreels
In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside
Story falls under the category of newsreels.
MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight news reporting, as
distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a
given issue are not considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program
and within petitioner’s power of review.
Issue related to Consti law:
Petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D.
No. 1986 does not amount to “prior restraint.”
Ratio:
It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that
freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental laws, past and present, “designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs x x x.” Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has
been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia
ni Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However,
there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that
freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the
jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there
is no justification to exempt therefrom “The Inside Story” which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments
and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National
Telecommunications Commission​, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
PUNO, J.:
I. ​THE FACTS
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci”
compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation
between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those
who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered
the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations “found
to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and
TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and
permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations
for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of
the “Hello Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a
continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation
shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint
Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped
tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
II. ​THE ISSUES
1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the
NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed
the Constitution?
III. ​THE RULING
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio
Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona,
Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority)
in granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalez’s press
statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the
majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTC’s
press statement was concerned.]
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will
NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based
on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing
of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The
records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and
respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger
test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the
identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the
taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the
public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other,
an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s
and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering
the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of
its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape,
it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different
kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if
violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but
does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but
their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free
speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to
be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom
of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation
to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred
status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and
calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to
determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court
should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means,
violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed
their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation
cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred
right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test,
the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping
law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the
NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were
not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient
that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of
their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his
statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as
the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for
and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule
on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at
bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible
forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
2015 CASE DIGEST: DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS​:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within
a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
“Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored
nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians
who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.
ISSUES​:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power
of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC
did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review
of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it
is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message
and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation
of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong
to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success
or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and
civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is
content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of
its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the
right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize
the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private
property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by
the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates
where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall
be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not
religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion

into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement
an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

It has a secular legislative purpose;

It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS​:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s
decision dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several
petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the
exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to
others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred,
“even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional”, citing in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the
other hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of
contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and
equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
​ the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that
legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to
cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to
infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE​:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING​:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the
law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege
anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by
granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely
subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have
long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the
law does not discriminate against the press because “even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v.
Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a
prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is
not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of
goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment
is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom
under the Constitution.
Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that
even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase
additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still
the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said
that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It
is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and
medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real
property which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum,
medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and
services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the
NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in
claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while
subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is
contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which
provides that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless,
equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has
the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance
applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar
situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the
imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it
simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of
taxation.” The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply
that “direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect
taxes should be minimized.” The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe,
but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts
to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation.
Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are
exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches, and parsonages, by
reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions
by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no
constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld.
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Primicias v. Fugoso
The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda for purposes of petitioning the government for
redress to grievances. However, the City Mayor, founding his actions on
Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, did not issue the permit.
Facts:
The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda on a Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for
the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances.
However, the Mayor of the City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not issue
the permit. For this purpose, the campaign manager of the party (Cipriano
Primicias) instituted this action for mandamus.
Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the power of the
City Mayor of Manila to grant or issue permits for the holding of assembly or
meeting, parade or procession. Moreover, he would be able to determine
where to hold such activities.
Ruling:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic
countries. But, it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of
well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for
it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. Under Section 1119 of the
Revised Ordinances of 1927 of the City of Manila, that the holding of athletic
games, sports or exercises during the celebration of national holidays in any
streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district
may be permitted provided that a permit be issued by the Mayor who shall
determine the streets, or public places or portions thereof where said
activities may be held. From the Revised Ordinance of the City, there is no
express and separate provision regulating the holding of public meeting or
assembly at any street or public places.
As Section 1119 is susceptible to two constructions: one, that the Mayor of
the City is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting in the streets and
other public places of the City, and second, that the applicant has the right to
a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter’s
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to
be used for the purpose, the Court believed that it must adopt the second
construction. It means that the ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor
the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the
permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade
or procession may pass or the meeting be held.
The other alternative when adopted because it would mean that the Mayor
has the power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be
tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other
public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions. Moreover,
said construction would render the ordinance invalid and void as it
contravenes constitutional limitations.
The Mayor reasoned that, in granting the permit, the speeches delivered in
the meeting would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. In reiterating the
pronouncements of the US Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, “[f]ear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result
if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that
the danger apprehended is imminent.”
Malabanan v. Ramento
Student leaders at the Gregorio Araneta University, after holding the
meeting, marched towards the Life Science building using megaphones and
giving utterance to language severely critical of the school authorities.
Classes were disturbed while the non-academic personnel’s work was
interrupted.
Facts:
Petitioners organized a meeting, being officers of the Supreme Student
Council of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted the
permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on August 27, 1982 at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court. However,
they held the general assembly at the second floor lobby of the VMAS,
contrary to what is stated in the permit. During the gathering, they
manifested their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture, in a vehement and vigorous
language. After the assembly, at around 10:30 a.m., they marched toward
the Life Science building and continued their rally, using megaphones and
giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities.
As a result, classes were disturbed aside from the work of non-academic
employees within hearing distance. The petitioners were placed under
preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal
assembly in front of the Life Science building. Respondent, the Director of
NCR of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, found the petitioners
guilty of the charge of having violated paragraph 146(c) of the Manual for
Private Schools, more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which
was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
disturbance of classes and oral defamation.
Ruling:
It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in
the permit and continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too,
they did disturb the classes and caused the work of the non-academic
personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have
been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as
indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of
proportion to their misdeed.
As declared by the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to
freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to
free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the
concept of freedom of expression which is identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without
censorship or punishment and which “is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the state has a right to prevent.”
Petitioners are entitled to invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens, the freedom to express their
views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in
gatherings such as in this case. They do not shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. While,
therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of
students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards.
On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this formulation in
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District: “The principal use to which
the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is
personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an
inevitable part of the process. A student’s rights do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria or on the playing field, or on
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without
‘materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights
of others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason – whether it stems from time, place or type of behaviour – materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.”

If in the course of such demonstration with an enthusiastic audience goading

them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose,
that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident
types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language
of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed
to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the
exuberance of youth.

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students
of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters
affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a
clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the
content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable
character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder
under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to
be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the
time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of
work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations
of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
offense.

Petitioners cannot be totally absolved for the events. There was violation of
the terms of the permit. Accordingly, they could be disciplined.
DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 2. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were neither
exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for
FACTS the grant of backwages in administrative disciplinary cases.

Petitioners are public school teachers who were simultaneously charged,

preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct.
1990. It was alleged that the teachers participated in the mass action/ illegal
strike on Sept. 1990. The teachers also violated the return-to-work order
issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to the DECS despite the
5 day period given. Hence they were found guilty as charged, and
subsequently dismissed from office by Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil
Service Commission, upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service, and imposed upon them the
reduced penalty of six month’s suspension. However in view of the length of
time that the teachers had been out of service due to the dismissal issued by
Sec. Carino, the CSC likewise ordered their immediate reinstatement without
back wages.

ISSUE

1. Whether the teachers’ conducts are prejudicial to the best interest of

service.

2. Whether or not the teachers are entitled to back wages for the period of 3
years pending their appeal deducting the 6 months’ suspension eventually
meted out to them.

HELD

1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of civil service

servants. Although the right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution, this
liberty must be exercised within reasonable limits. The public school
teachers committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging
the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
failing to return despite the return to work order.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization V. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right
is superior to property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of
constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free
assembly and rights of petition
FACTS:
• March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration as a valid exercise of their constitutional right of freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress
of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the
Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers
in the first, second and third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm
respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning
and afternoon where PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has
nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute
with Management. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to report for work
the following morning shall be dismissed for violation of the existing CBA
Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company: REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY
SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there
is no violation since they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass
demonstration for strike against the company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
PBMEO officers directly responsible for ULP losing their status as
employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration – dismissed
since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition
of the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD:
YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the
petitioners.
• In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality
and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people
• The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only
civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to
his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms
the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition
of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in
spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and
the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike
• The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of
the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a
ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police,
not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason
of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay
means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet,
they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy
of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for
redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently
being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article
XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...".
Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined
to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by
encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to
self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined
in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ...
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor
practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief
from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties,
may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the exercise of the
freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in
the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And
in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually
loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can
defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the
financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services
• enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an
accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require."
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza,
and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City
Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen.
ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and
Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006
FACTS​:
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., allege that they are citizens and taxpayers
of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were
violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al.,
who alleged that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful
mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group
they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the
Palace which, they claim, put the country under an “undeclared” martial rule,
and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were
arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al., allege that they conduct peaceful
mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their
individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly,
are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated
Preemptive Response” being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to
be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M.
Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to
several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a
multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed
along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going
towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly
dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and
others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of
CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no
rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to
the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it
is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing”
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government.
Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a
content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit definite standard for administrative action in specific fields… “a clear and
as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions present danger,” and “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil.”
are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger
and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not B.P. No, 880 which delegates powers to the Mayor provides
clear standards.

RULING:

Yes. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise
and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6
(a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in
Sec. 6 (c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent
standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power
independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve
in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our

legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents
to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit
of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power
to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.

RATIO​: Examples of standards held sufficient. – The following are legislative

specifications are among those which have been held to state a sufficiently