OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE CADER P.

INDAR,
presifing Judge and Acting presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City and
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively.

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent
Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar). This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars
of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an
alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by
Judge Indar. To verify, the OCA conducted a judicial audit where the Audit Team found that the list of
cases do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed the annulment decisions did not
exist in the records. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the
Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books.

The Audit Team made the following conclusions: the cases are not found in the list of cases filed,
pending or decided in the Regional Trial Court, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court. There
are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular process.
There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious documents may appear and cause damage to the Courts
Integrity.

The OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a regular administrative matter; (2) the
matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3)
Judge Indar be preventively suspended, pending investigation.

The first notice of hearing directed Judge Indarto to submit in affidavit form his explanation. The
LBC records show that this notice, which was delivered to Judge Indars official stations was received;
however, Judge Indar failed to attend the hearings. This Court directed several justices to conduct further
investigation to determine the authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by
Judge Indar annulling certain marriages. In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to
verify the authenticity of the records of the listed decisions, judgments and orders, it was issued that the
records are bereft of evidence to show that regular and true proceedings were had on these cases.

The Investigating Justices determined that the cases allegedly decided by the Hon.
Judge Indar were clearly doubtful. There is no showing of compliance on the rules prescribed. In a Report,
a certain Justice determined whether the requirements of due process had been complied with since there
was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually received any of the notices sent to him in the course
of the investigation. It was noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the
court notices to him were resorted to, and also concluded that the requirements of due process have been
complied with. Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case against him. The Investigating
Justices proceeded to determine Judge Indars administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious
misconduct and dishonesty.
 Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying with the
stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the
Code of Judicial Conduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

RULING:

The Court agree with the findings of the Investigating Justices. In this case, Judge Indar was given
ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally
received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were
received by authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar. Judge Indar cannot feign
ignorance of the administrative investigation against him suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive
suspension was reported in major national newspapers. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the
charges against him. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more
so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and
integrity. A judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and
confidence of the people. Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.

The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital
unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of
marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice,
and due process.

The Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service. And
considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the
Lawyers Oath, and Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves disbarment.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

FACTS:

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) by virtue of Presidential Decree issued revising the PPAs
Charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage
profession. These rules mandate that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as
probationary pilots in out ports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after
they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by
the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70. Subsequently, then PPA General
Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92, a policy to instill effective discipline and thereby
afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services: that all existing
regular appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992
only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for
a term of one (1) year, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.

Respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association questioned PPA-
AO No. 04-92 (the policy) before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were
informed that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively
with its Board of Directors as its governing body. The PPA issued Memorandum Order which laid down
the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots.

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of the policy PPA-
AO No. 04-92, but insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of
Directors of the PPA. The Office of the President (OP) issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance
the implementation. concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and
purposes, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.

On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality, the exercise of one’s profession falls within the
constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due
process. The OP explained that the policy PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the
exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPAs jurisdictional area.

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority’s implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92 is constitutional.

RULING:

The trial court rendered the judgment that the petitioners have acted in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA
Administrative Order. Hence, such Orders are declared null and void. The respondents are permanently
enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order

The Court affirmed the judgement of trial court and convinced that the policy PPA-AO No. 04-92
was issued in stark disregard of respondents right against deprivation of property without due process of
law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied. The Court discussed that in order to fall within the
aegis of this provision of due process, two conditions must concur: (1) there is a deprivation (2) without
proper observance of due process.

In this case, their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in
pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of the new policy in
questioned, it unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory
retirement. They enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and
undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their
retirement, but under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license
which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation.

The Court ruled in favor of the respondents in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a
urplusage and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

In 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the

municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance as follows:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.

SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each
repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions shall make the violation liable to pay a fine
of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24
days or both.

Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name. The request was
denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the
public plaza. The defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the request was turned
down. Thee defendants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon

The defendants were charged and convicted by the justice of the peace court for violation of the
ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction,
and sentenced appellants to pay a fine, as well as to demolish the building in question because “it hinders
the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza."

From this decision, Fajardo forwarded the records to the Court because the appeal attacks the
constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance issued by the municipal council deprive the defendants of the right to use
their own property.

RULING:

The objection to the validity of the ordinance is that the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or
deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's
action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal
are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking, unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and an undefined and unlimited delegation of
power which are all invalid.

Thus, the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some
and deny it others. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and
abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications. It is contended that the mayor can
refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies
any public property”. With this reason, the Court finds that the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive,
in that it operates to permanently deprive defendants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just
compensation.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
The restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation
would relieve him of that burden.

We rule that the regulation in question was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and
is therefore null and void.
TINA B. BENNIS, petitioner v. MICHIGAN, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged in
sexual activity with a prostitute. Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual
act with a prostitute in the automobile while it was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of
gross indecency. The State then sued both Bennis and his wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have the car
declared a public nuisance.

Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the ground that, when she
entrusted her husband to use the car, she did not know that he would use it to violate Michigan's indecency
law. Petitioner also claims that the forfeiture in this case was a taking of private property for public use in
violation of the Takings Clause. The petitione claims that the Michigan forfeiture statute is unfair because
it relieves prosecutors from the burden of separating co owners who are complicit in the wrongful use of
property from innocent co owners

ISSUE:

Whether Michigan's abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car
without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or has taken her interest for public use
without compensation.

RULING:

The Wayne County Circuit Court rejected this argument, declared the car a public nuisance, and
ordered the car's abatement. The Court took into account the couple's ownership of "another automobile,"
so they would not be left "without transportation."

The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the conduct in question did not qualify as a
public nuisance because only one occurrence was shown and there was no evidence of payment for the
sexual act.

However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement
in its entirety. The Court order to abate an owner's interest in a vehicle, Michigan does not need to prove
that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used in a manner. The Court assumed that petitioner
did not know of or consent to the misuse of the Bennis car, and concluded that Michigan's failure to provide
an innocent owner defense was "without constitutional consequence.” An owner's interest may not be
abated when "a vehicle is used without the owner's consent.”

The gravamen of petitioner's due process claim is not that she was denied notice or an opportunity
to contest the abatement of her car; in fact she was accorded both. Rather, she claims she was entitled to
contest the abatement by showing she did not know her husband would use it to violate Michigan's
indecency law.
 But the Supreme Court has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the
innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not
a violation of the due process clause.

The Court conclude today, as have been concluded 75 years ago, that the cases authorizing actions
of the kind at issue are "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be
now displaced."

The State here sought to deter illegal activity that contributes to neighborhood deterioration and
unsafe streets. The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and was used in criminal activity. Both
the trial court and the Michigan Supreme Court followed our longstanding practice, and the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Michigan is therefore affirmed.
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE
HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a policeman, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted
murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the information, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner
until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, that his suspension should be limited
to ninety (90) days. The respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. Hence, the petition for
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's
preventive suspension.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 47 of R.A. 6975 violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.

RULING:

There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder
under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to
members of the PNP. Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning
than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense. The suspension
cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same does not qualify or
limit the first sentence. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame
within which the trial should be finished.

Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls
squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case
is terminated. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the
suspension. The Court ruled that nothing else should be read into the law. When the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
 The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. The imposition
of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose
such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded. ACCORDINGLY, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
PLESSY, petitioner v. FERGUSON, respondent.

FACTS:

The statute of Louisiana, acts of 1890, c. 111, requiring railway companies carrying passengers in
their coaches in that State, to provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored races,
by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches
by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations; and providing that no person shall be permitted to
occupy seats in coaches other than the ones assigned to them, on account of the race they belong to.

This was a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari filed by Plessy against the Hon. John H.
Ferguson, judge of the criminal District Court. The petitioner was a citizen of the United States mixed
descent, in the proportion of seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood; that the mixture of
colored blood was not discernible in him, and that he was entitled to every recognition, right, privilege and
immunity secured to the citizens of the United States of the white race by its Constitution and laws.

One time, the petitioner engaged and paid for a first-class passage on the East Louisiana Railway
and thereupon entered a passenger train, and took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers
of the white race were accommodated. Railroad company was incorporated by the laws of Louisiana as a
common carrier and was not authorized to distinguish between citizens according to their race.

Despite that, the petitioner was required by the conductor, under penalty of ejection from said train
and imprisonment, to vacate said coach and occupy another seat in a coach assigned by said company for
persons not of the white race, and for no other reason than that petitioner was of the colored race; that upon
petitioner's refusal to comply with such order, he was, with the aid of a police officer, forcibly ejected from
said coach and hurried off to and imprisoned in the parish jail.

A charge made by such officer to the effect that he was guilty of having criminally violated an act.
The petitioner was subsequently brought before the recorder of the city for preliminary examination for a
violation of the above act, which act the petitioner affirmed to be null and void, because in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of carriers authorizing to vacate and assigned seats on the account of race is in
conflict with the Constitution is United States.

RULING:

The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground that it conflicts both with the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits
certain restrictive legislation on the part of the States.
 The Supreme Court held that hat it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which
abolished slavery and involuntary servitude because slavery implies involuntary servitude which is not
shown in this case.

The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races
before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, recognized as
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.

In any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the
white race, is property, in the same sense that a right of action, or of inheritance, is property. Conceding
this to be so, for the purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any
way affects his right to, such property. The reply to all this is that every exercise of the police power must
be reasonable and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion for the public
good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.

The Court oppose that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights
cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. If the two races are to
meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.

U.S. Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation under the
“separate but equal” doctrine. Rejecting Plessy’s argument that his constitutional rights were violated, the
Supreme Court ruled that a law that “implies merely a legal distinction” between whites and blacks was not
unconstitutional.