Ramos v.

CA
Case No. 253
G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967)

FACTS:
The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National
Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement
confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for
additional compensation for overtime work, night work and work rendered on
Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Rice and Corn
Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was possessed with a distinct
and separate corporate existence, they are merely an office directly under the
President, a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to
stabilize the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. To carry out this
function, by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act, RCA
depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the
General Appropriations Act. There has been consistent administrative interpretation
by the Office of the President as to what may, under law, be granted to RCA workers
and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Not a matter
of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act.

ISSUE:
W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA
was created – for the said obligation.

HELD:
While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts, it is entitled to great weight
and consideration. The reason for this is that such
construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to
implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the President specifically
appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to the abovementioned
obligation.
Salaria v. Buenviaje
Case No. 267
G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978)

FACTS:
Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said
land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate the
premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial, the City Court
ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the CFI through
Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. Thus, a
petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot.

HELD:
No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that
“except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of
dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the
only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families.”
Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon
courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to
implement the law. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case, namely, personal use of
property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of
lessees.
50 Phil 259 G.R. No. L-26979 April 1 1927 [Appointing Power of the Chief Executive]

FACTS:
Spinger, Costas and Hilario were elected to be the directors of the Nat'l Coal Company by the
legislative members (Senate President and Speaker of the HoR) of the committee created by
Acts. No. 2705(Sec 4) and 2822 (Sec 2). The GPI instituted an original action of quo warranto
against the newly appointed directors, assailing the validity of the said acts which provide: "The
voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the
Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives."
Reference was made therein that the provisions of the statutes passed by the Phil. Legislature
creating a voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties and powers thereof
with respect to certain corporation in which the Philippine Gov is the owner of stock, are
nullities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Phil Legislature has the power to appoint officials.

RULING:

Sec. 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government must be directly
under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision
and control of the Governor-General." At the very least, the performance of duties appurtenant
to membership in the voting committee is an executive function on the Government, which the
Organic Act requires must be subject to the unhampered control of the Government-General. The
administrative domination of a governmentally organized and controlled corporation is clearly
not a duty germane to the law-making power.
 1. Government vs Springer, GR No. L-26979, April 1, 1927, 50 Phil. 259

Facts:

The National Coal Company was created by the Philippine Congress in 1900 under Act No. 2822 and
provides that “the voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives”. In 1926, the Governor-
General issued E.O No.37 and it emphasized that the voting right should be vested only in the Governor-
General. NCC held its elections and elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of
NCC even though it was objected by the Governor-General.

Issue:

Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House of the Speaker can validly elect the Board
Members of NCC.

Held:

No. EO No. 37 is valid and it is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The power of the
legislature is to create public office and it has nothing to do with designating persons to fill the office. To
appoint members of NCC is already an invasion of executive powers.
G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VENANCIO

CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, sent telegrams and a
confirmation letter to the manager of the Aparri branch of PNB, authorizing an extension of credit
in favour of Puno y Concepcion, S. en C. in the amount of P300,000.00. This special authorization
limited the discretional power of the local manager of the Aparri branch to grant loans and discount
negotiable documents to P5,000, which in certain cases, could be increased to P10,000. Pursuant
to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000 was granted to Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.,
the only security required consisting of six demand notes. This Puno y Concepcion, S. en C., in
reality is a copartnership capitalized at P100,000 wherein, Venancio Concepcion’s wife owns half
of the copartnership. Venancio Concepcion was found guilty by the CFI for violation of Section
354 of Act 2747 which provides that: : "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant
loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch
banks."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership was a “loan” within
the meaning of Section 35 of Act No. 2747.

YES. The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence
or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. A "loan" means the delivery
by one party and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement,
express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. The concession of a "credit"
necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit,"

2. Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership was a “loan” or a
“discount”.

LOAN. Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of an
actual, live, transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of loaning money,
with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in advance, while in a
loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always on double-name paper;
a loan is generally on single-name paper.

Conceding, without deciding, the law covers loans and not discounts, yet the conclusion is
inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not
discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted
from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they were single-name
and not double-name paper.

1. Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnershop was an “indirect
loan” within the meaning of Section 35 of Act 2747.
YES. In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly
to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition against
indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters — that
where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore,
it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business
venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the
prohibition.

Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a conjugal
partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.) A loan,
therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an
indirect loan to such director.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by the
acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and
family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no
established reputation and without asking for collateral security.
G.R. No. L-7927 August 8, 1913

JUAN BARRAMEDA, petitioner,

vs.
PERCY M. MOIR, (Judge of First Instance) ET AL., respondents.

Nature of Action: Petition for Mandamus

FACTS:
Petitioner relates that the he was defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try
title to a parcel of land; that the case was decided adversely to him; that he appealed to the Court
of First Instance; and that the judge of that court, on motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal
with directions to the justice of the peace to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment. At the
request of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was issued by this court to stay the execution of
the judgment, and he now prays that the respondent judge be ordered to proceed with the case
on appeal. The said judge has demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that Acts Nos. 2041
and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real state, are
inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By Act No. 2041, section 3,
it was provided:

Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real estate
or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred
pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos
the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 are unconstitutional.

RULING: The preliminary injunction granted by this court, staying the execution of the judgment, will
be made permanent, and the writ of mandamus prayed for must be denied.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster, it was held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
Courts of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added but to not
diminished by the Philippine Legislature.
Therefore, there will be sufficient reason for declaring the disputed provisions of Acts. Nos. 2041
and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title to realty is involved.

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But
in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligence, and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without
causing results effecting the main purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the
Legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for
any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void
part, since the court has no power to legislate.
G.R. No. L-28997 February 22, 1974
FELICISIMO M. ORENCIA, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Secretary of Justice

Facts:
On June 20, 1967, petitioner-appellant filed the said petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction
before the ManilaCourt of First Instance against respondents docketed as Civil Case No. 69840, alleging
substantially that he is the deputy clerk of courtof the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration
Commission, an he has been performing functions of Assistant Chief of saiddivision and has been
considered and recognized as such until Rep. Act 4040, enacted June 18, 1964 increasing the salaries
of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions, among others, implemented where he was left out while co-assistant
chief of the nine (9) other
divisionsof the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased compensation
, in spite of his protest torespondents Secretary of Justice, Land Registration Commissioner,
and Commissioner of Civil Service; and to add insult to injury,respondent Guillermina M. Gener, was
appointed assistant of the Clerks of Court Division, when there was no vacancy to said positionand given
an increased compensation of P9,600.00 for the said position, while petitioner continued to receive the
old rate of P3,070.08 per annum, and praying that he be extended similar recognition as assistant chief of
the Clerks of Court Division of theLand Registration Commission, and paid the corresponding salary
under Rep. Act 4040 of Court Division of the Land
RegistrationCommission, and paid the corresponding salary under Rep. Act 4040 and that the appointme
nt of respondent Guillermina M.Gener be declared null and void, with damages and attorney's fees. On Ju
ly 17, 1967, respondents filed their answer, and afterusual admissions and denials, interposed a
defense that petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief, Clerks of CourtDivision, and being
a new position created under Republic Act 4040, the same can only be filed by a qualified person; that
respondent[Gener], being a lawyer, is more qualified than petitioner who is only
a high school graduate with second grade civil serviceeligibility, and praying that the petition be
dismissed."On July 6, 1964, petitioner formally requested respondent commissioner of Land Registration
commission for recommendation andpayment of his differential salary, which request was, however,
denied on July 10, 1964. ... On September 1, 1964,
petitionerappealed to the Secretary of Justice, but appeal was likewise denied ... . From the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice, heappealed to respondent Commissioner of Civil Service on June 3, 1965, and,
again, he was rebuffed on February 21, 1966 ... . On July29, 1966, said respondent Gener was appointed
Assistant Chief of the Clerks of Court Division effective July 1, 1966, by therespondent Secretary of
Justice, upon recommendation of respondent Land Registration Commission, and duly attested to by
theCommissioner of Civil Service.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to Assistant Chief position in the Clerk of Court Division of Land
RegistrationCommission.

HELD:
NO.WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of March 26, 1968, dismissing the petition for mandamus, is
affirmed. No costs.Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part
of a tribunal in the performance of an act,which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful
exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he isentitled. According to former
Chief Justice Moran, only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear andcertain.
If the legal rights of the petition are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed.It is
not merely that petitioner does not have a clear legal right. The more accurate way of putting it is that he
has no right at all to theposition of Assistant Chief to the Clerks of Court Division. The ingenuity displayed
by counsel, worthy of a better cause, it might beadded, cannot obscure the undeniable fact that without
Republic Act No. 4040, there would be no such position that is now thesubject of dispute between him
and respondent Gener.On the other hand, it is not disputed that petitioner's scholastic background is
much more limited, he being merely a high schoolgraduate. Under such circumstances, his previous
experience in his capacity as Deputy Clerk of Court attesting to his years of servicecould not avail. The
appointing official, especially so where his position is a constitutional creation, as in this case, must
beleft that necessary latitude of choice as to who can best discharge the responsibilities of the office wher
e the vacancy occurs.The Secretary of Justice, and the Commissioner of Civil Service on the precise
point at issue, "Courts will should respect thecontemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unlesssuch interpretation is clearly erroneous will
ordinarily be controlled thereby."