CASE DIGESTS The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:

(1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
1) SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE
GUTIERREZ AND ANGELA FORNILDA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001
Doctrine:
Damages can be claimed whenever there is abuse of right or
exercise of a suspended or extinguished right.
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20
speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or
duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for
injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus
mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is
legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

Facts: There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in

On May 30, 1986, the petitioner commenced the demolition of bad faith in the filing of the case against private respondent.
the respondent’s house under the authority of a Writ of Demolition Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, records show committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.
that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued by the
Supreme Court (SC) on June 2 , 1986 enjoining the demolition. It 3) GARCIANO vs. CA
was also found out that the copy of the said TRO was also served to
the petitioner on June 4, 1986. But the petitioner did not heed to the
TRO and continued the demolition until mid of 1987.
In this case, the petitioner was contending that the damages
claimed by the respondent are not valid because he is just
exercising his right.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.

Held:
No, the petitioner’s contention is not correct.

Damnum absque injuria is the principle that damage resulting from

legitimate exercise of a person’s right is a loss without injury for
which the law gives no remedy.

However, in the case at bar, the principle of damnum absque

injuria cannot be applied because he abuses his right and exercise
his suspended and extinguished right to demolish the respondent’s
house.

Hence, petitioner is liable for the damages incurred in his abusive

exercise of a suspended right

2) Albenson Enterprises v. CA (1993)

FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao Building mild steel plates which
the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was
issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.

Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due

them, filed a criminal complaint against private respondent Eugenio
S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the amount of the
bouncing check despite demand. However, there was a mistake of
identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting business in
the same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao
III.

It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S.
Baltao and because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case
With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right
against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages
anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he
petitioners. who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean
hands. Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to
ISSUE: recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been at fault
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other
applicable provision of law.

RULING:
No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of rights. What prompted petitioners to file the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent
was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a
bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by
private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding
the origin of the check. Private respondent, however, did nothing to
clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private
respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the
hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an
action for damages.
 4) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and
HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
CASE DIGEST
Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which
caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several
thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior
Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and
General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry
told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one
week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave,
Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a
lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting,
signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners
hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still
incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports
from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police
Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed
with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases
against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from
petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought
employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but
Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed
by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case
for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive,
and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty
thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs; hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when
Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a
hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry)
scornful remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”)
as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a
letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe
Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by
petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that
petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation
of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss
an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal
is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the
employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their
right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
5) (RCPI), petitioner, vs.
C.A & LORETO DIONELA, respondents
No. L-44748. August 29, 1986
Facts:
Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio
Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) due to the telegram
sent through its Manila Office to the former, reading as follows:
176 AS JR 1215 PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-
KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram
sent to him wounded his feelings, caused him undue embarrassment
and affected adversely his business because other people have come
to know of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional
words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and
receiving operators, that they were not addressed to or intended for
plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram, and that the
Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person
reading the same would logically think that they refer to Dionela,
thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P40,
000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the
company was negligent and failed to take precautionary steps to
avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident, and the fact that a
copy of the telegram is filed among other telegrams and open to
public is sufficient publication; however reducing
the amount awarded to P15, 000.00
Issue:
Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily
for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee.
Ruling:
Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts.
19 and 20 of the New Civil Code, as well as on respondent’s breach of
contract thru the negligence of its own employees. By adding
extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private
respondent, there is a clear breach of contract; for upon payment of
the fixed rate, the company undertakes to transmit the message
accurately.
In contracts, the negligence of the employee (servant) is the
negligence of the employer (master). This is the master and servant
rule. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its
employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and
transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the
petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the
pursuit of petitioner’s business is to deprive the general
public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and
adequate remedy.
In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may
recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in
some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the
thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.
The judgment of the CA is affirmed.

6) CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee. (1962)
FACTS:
Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La
Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who
was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners.
Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access
to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old
single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the
house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually
they fell in love with each other.
Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed
to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the
ground of moral, good custom and public policy due to their
illicit affair.
HELD:
Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy
contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant
took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the
praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The
wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the
fact that he is a married man.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed.
Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
7) GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents. (1993)
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
8)
Facts:
Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and
of good moral character and reputation, duly
respected in her community filed a complaint on
October 27, 1987, against Gashem Shookat Baksh, an
Iranian citizen, and an exchange student taking up a
medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
in Dagupan City. The complaint for damages is due to
Baksh’s violation of their agreement to get married.
9)
Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted
Marilou and proposed to marry her. She accepted his
love on the condition that they will get married. They
agreed to get married at the end of the semester,
which was October of that year. They also visited
Marilou’s parents in Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage.
10)
Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to
live with him in Guilig, Dagupan City. It should be
noted that she was a virgin before she lived with him
and not a woman of loose morals. A few weeks after
she begun living with him, Gashem started to
maltreat her, which result to injuries. A confrontation
with the barangay captain of Guilig ensued and
Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement and
said that he is already married to a girl in Bacolod
City.
11)
On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied Article
21 of the New Civil Code in its decision favoring
Marilou Gonzales and ordered Gashem Baksh to pay
PhP 20,000 moral damges, PhP 3,000.00 in attorney’s
fees and PhP 2,000.00 for the litigation expenses.
12)
Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme Court
seeking for the review of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Pangasinan and to set aside the said
decision which was also affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals.
13)
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a
breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
14)
Held:
The Court held that the breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. However, the Court
rules that no foreigner should make a mockery of our
laws. It was evident from the facts presented to the
Court that Gashem Baksh had not intention to marry
Marilou Gonzales on the account of her “ignoble birth,
inferior educational background, poverty and, as
perceived by him, dishonorable employment.”
15)
In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not
motivated by good faith and honest motive when he
proposed his love and promised to marry Marilou
Gonzales. He was merely motivated by lust
and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality
and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women.”
16)
The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court
and the Court of Appeals pursuant to Aticle 21 of the
New Civil Code, not because of the breach of promise
to marry, but due the fraud and deceit employed by
herein petitioner that wilfully caused injury to the
honor and reputation of the herein private
respondent, which committed contrary to the morals,
good customs or public policy.
CASE DIGEST 2
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
at Dagupan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29
years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and
was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the
respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter, which
convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged
that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her
family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the
marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and
maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was
held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that
the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the
respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom
of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his custom.
The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages
incurred by the petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since
the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that
she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since
the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for
payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the
petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to
marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have
her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the
respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage
reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were
caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the
claims of the respondent against the petitioner.
8) CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and
ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents. (1992)
FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual
intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-
appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21
days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications
for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor,
Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped.
ISSUE:
Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court
erred in awarding damages.
RULING:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart
from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to
paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner
in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with
her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to
escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constituteacts
contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly
justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of
Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were
awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of
forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint
therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate
of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if
the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another
and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction
with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary
investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to
institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary
dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules
as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal
and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by
preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be
first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based
on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted
and prosecuted to final judgment.
9) RODRIGO CONCEPCION, Petitioner,
v.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS
and ALLEM NICOLAS, Respondents. (2000)
Facts:
Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas
resided at Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner
Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also resided in the same
compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was
then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and
private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures.
Florence Concepcion joined this venture. Sometime in the second
week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of
the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the
latter’s apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous
relationship with Florence.
Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that should
something happen to his sick mother; in case the latter learned
about the affair, he would kill Florence. As a result of this incident,
Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent
that he could no longer face his neighbors. Consequently, he was
forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason
the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor Nicolas, hence this
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to Nestor Nicolas
and his spouse.
Ruling:
According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is
inconsistent as to time, place and persons who heard the alleged
defamatory statement. The Court finds this to be a gratuitous
observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the
respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened
in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas
spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on,
with the accusation being repeated in the presence of Florence, at
the terrace of her house. All told, these factual findings provide
enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of
Appeals in favor of respondents.
The Court reject petitioner’s posture that no legal provision supports
such award, the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 22,
19, nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. Damages therefore are allowable for
actions against a person’s dignity, such as profane, insulting,
humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. As stated in the Civil
Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury,
although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission. There is no question that private respondent Nestor
Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s
abusive, scandalous and insulting language. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
10) WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORP., Petitioner,
vs. JESICHRIS MANU. CORP., Respondent. (2014)
CASE DIGEST
Facts: Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed this
present complaint for damages for unfair competition
with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin
Willaware Products Corporationfrom... manufacturing
and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar
to those of respondent-jesichris.
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registered
partnership engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of plastic and metal products
[Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner's] office to
[respondent's] office, and in view of the fact that some
of the [respondent's] employees had transferred to
[petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with
[respondent's]... products, especially its plastic-made
automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent]
discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing
and distributing the same automotive parts with
exactly similar design, same material and colors but
was selling these products at a lower price as
[respondent's] plastic-made... automotive parts and to
the same customers.
Issues:
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or
not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is
very much broader than that covered by intellectual
property laws. Under the present article, which follows
the extended concept of "unfair competition" in
American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of
discovery of... trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of
his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor's
contracts, or any malicious interference with the
latter's business.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair
competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a
right of action... by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must
have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve
acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or...
otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence
of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by... unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both
being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made
automotive parts.
Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly
"contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted
having employed respondent's former... employees,
deliberately copied respondent's products and even
went to the extent of selling these products to
respondent's customers.
As aptly observed by the court a quo, the testimony of
petitioner's witnesses indicate that it acted in bad
faith in competing with the business of respondent, to
wit:
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under
Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Principles:
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must
have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve
acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or...
otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence
of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by... unconscionable means.
11) SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,
v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN
CHOACHUY, Respondents. (2013)
An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should
not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where
he has right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying
into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations,
or even situations which an individual considers as private.
FACTS: Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing own a parcel of land adjacent
to the property of Alexander Choachuy, owner of Aldo Devt &
Resources, Inc (ALDO). ALDO filed a case for injuction and damages
against the spouses, claiming that they were constructing a fence
w/o valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the
wall of its building. In order to get evidence to support said case,
ALDO illegaly set-up and installed on the bldg of ALDO Goodyear
Servitec 2 CCTV facing Spuses Hing’s property and also took
pictures of the spouses’ on-going construction. Thus, Spouses Hing
prayed that ALDO be ordered to remove the CCTV at the left side of
their bldg overlooking the side of spouses’ lot and enjoined from
conducting illegal surveillance.

The RTC issued an Order granting the application for a TRO and
directed ALDO to remove immediately the revolving camera that
they installed and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back
where the spouses’ property can no longer be viewed. On appeal
the CA reversed the RTC’s decision explaining that the right to
privacy of residence under Art. 26 of the NCC was not violated
since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.
ISSUE: Did ALDO violate Spouses Hing’s right to privacy?
HELD:
Yes. Article 26(1) of the CC states that every person shall respect
the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. Prying into the privacy of another’s residence,
though it may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief.
An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the CC
should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to
places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,”
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his
right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application
of Article 26(1) of the CC only to residences.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the reasonable expectation of privacy” test. This
determines whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v.
Torres, the court enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a 2-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.”
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or
extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Hence,
the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
The RTC, thus, considered that spouses Hing have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of CCTV
directly facing spouses Hing’s property or covering a significant
portion thereof, w/o their consent, is a clear violation of their right
to privacy. As the Court sees then, the issuance of preliminary
injunction was justified.
12) LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA
and CORAZON, all surnamed MARCIA and represented by
their mother LAURA CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendants-appellees. (1969)
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
December 23, 1956 in Lubao, Pampanga, the passenger bus driven
by Felardo Paje collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia
resulting to Clemente’s death and physical injuries to two other
persons.
A case was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga for homicide
and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. —On November 7, 1960, Paje was found guilty but he
appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On November 21, 1961, while Paje’s appeal was pending decision in
the CA, Corpus instituted in the CFI of Rizal a separate civil action
(Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of
reckless imprudence against Paje & Victory Liner Transportation
Co., Inc.
Corpus was claiming that the defendants be ordered to pay jointly
and separately the amounts of damages. —On November 9, 1962,
CA promulgated its decision in the appeal of Paje reversing the
appealed judgement and acquitting him after finding that the
reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the
collision was a case of pure accident.
On December 29, 1962, Paje & Victory Liner filed in the civil action a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the
acquittal by the CA but the motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Corpus could claim the damages from Paje & Victory
Liner as per the civil case she filed.
Held:
No. Corpus could not claim for any damages filed on the civil case
as the CFI of Rizal dismissed the complaint on May 31, 1966 on the
ground that Corpus’ action was based upon a quasi-delict.
Quasi-delict is an act whereby a person, without malice,
but by fault, negligence or imprudence not legally excusable,
causes injury to another.
As per Article 1146 of the Civil Code, upon a quasi-delict , the
action must be instituted within four years. Corpus filed a civil case
against Paje on November 21, 1961 which was already 4 years & 11
months since the incident happened on December 23, 1956.
Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec.3) the extinction of the criminal
action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal
act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also
the civil action for damages based upon the same act.
13) HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING,
JR., petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS
LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS, respondents. (1997)
FACTS:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr. collided
with the Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and wth a
Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along the North
Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga.. As
a consequence, Guaring died.
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in
the Court of Appealswhere the accused was acquitted based on
reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that
the deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the
claimed appealed in the court that the civil case filed against him be
extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his
civil liability aroused from his criminal liability. The petitioners
disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue.
This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case must be terminated as a consequence of
the termination of the criminal case based on reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was
based on reasonable doubt, which means that the civil case for
damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was
based on quasi delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of
crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar
recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a
finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it
has been held:
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies
of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain
relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil
case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages
of the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to the trial court to
determine the civil liability of the accused.
14) [G.R. NO. 141309 : December 23, 2008]
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, v. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, Respondent.
15) (1990) DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG,
CHANG KA HEE and LU LIONG CORPORATION, Petitioners,
v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO G.
PINEDA, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXI; JAIME NAVOA and MILAGROS DE LEOS, Respondents.
FACTS: Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos
filed a criminal case against before petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias
“Patrick Chang” and Chang Ka Hi alias “Chang Ka Hee” with estafa.
Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong Bi
Chu alias “Patrick Chang”, holding that the transaction between the
parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a
common fund. As an offshoot of the criminal case, private
respondents filed a civil action 4 against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka
Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising from
guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages
filed against them, on the ground that the same is barred by the prior
judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents’
failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action.
The appellate cour held that the civil action for damages under Art.
33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the
dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and
the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do not constitute a bar to the
prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration of said resolution, but the same was
denied.
ISSUE: WON a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art.
33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case.
HELD: NEGATIVE
RATIO DICIDENDI:
Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that “(I)n cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.”
To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision,
only a preponderance of evidence is required. An acquittal in a
criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages,
for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus,
the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or
conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no moment in the
civil action.
The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law
itself already makes the reservation. 10 In the case of Bonite v. Zosa,
11 it was held that:
“Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the
former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in
the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action,
has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an
unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code,
which does not require such a reservation. In fact, the reservation of
the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from
Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in
consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such
requirement of a reservation as ineffective.”
16) (1983) CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner, vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
MADEJA V. CARO [126 S 295 (1983)] - Where accused was charged
with Homicide thru reckless imprudence, pending the criminal
action, an independent civil action under Art. 33 may proceed
independently of the criminal case. Citing Carandang v. Santiago [97
P 94 (1955)], "The term "physical injuries" is used in the generic
sence, not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated,
frustrated and attempted homicide." Defamation and fraud are also
used in their generic sense because there are no specific provisions
in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses
defined therein.
Art. 35. When a person, claimining to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent
civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice
of the peace finds no reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil
action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action
may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the
defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to
be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be
presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code.
Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. - The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action;
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 111, Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in
the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action any time before the prosecution rests. (ibid.)
Bigamy - Art. 349, RPC. Contracting of second or subsequent
marriage:
a. before legal dissolution of first marriage
b. before declaration of presumptive death of absent spouse.
therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution.
The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as
the case at bar, the only difference being the party-plaintiffs or
petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and Renato
Yap suffered physical injuries in the same accident. The heirs of
Clemente Marcia filed Civil Case No. 6880 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against herein respondents. The case was
dismissed and appealed directly to this Court. The order appealed
from was affirmed, as recorded in Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28
SCRA 1062.

17) MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP,
DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO
YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY
LINER, INC., respondents. (1983)
Facts:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a
passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc.
and driven by its employee, private respondent Felardo Paje,
collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the
latter’s death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against
Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records
of the criminal case against Paje, (b) the decision of the Court of
Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the
respondent Paje as accused-appellant, suffice it to say that since
petitioners’ cause of action is based on the alleged recklessness and
imprudence of respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his
acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its declaration that the mishap
was “pure accident” are relevant and material evidence. In fact, the
lower court may even take judicial notice of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in said criminal case.

On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425)
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and
Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the
Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was
due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in
driving the passenger bus.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Felardo paje is criminally held
liable for in the criminal action for homicide and
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
2. Whether or not the Victory Liner Inc. is civilly held
liable for the damages caused by their employee
that resulted of homicide and serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence.
Held:
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr,
acquitting the accused; and copy of the brief of the said defendant
as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appeals case.

Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three

crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil

action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical

injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to
be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with
malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be
instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court states that “(c) Extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.” Otherwise stated, unless the act from
which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final
judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with
homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by
reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has not incurred
any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for
instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently Identified to be
the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His
acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from which civil
liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court,
sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical
injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting
in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries
suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the
three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and,