APPLICATION OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN

INDIA
(Project Report)

Submitted to

Ms. Aditi Singh

Faculty Member in Administration

By

Pravas Naik
B. A. LL. B. (Hons.) Student
Semester – VI, Section – A, Roll No. 119

Hidayatullah National Law University

Uparwara Post, Abhanpur, New Raipur – 493661 (C.G.)
 DECLARATION

I, Pravas Naik hereby declare that, the project work entitled, ‘APPLICATION OF NATURAL
JUSTICE IN INDIA’ submitted to H.N.L.U., Raipur is record of an original work done by me
under the able guidance of Ms. Aditi Singh, Faculty Member, H.N.L.U., Raipur.

Pravas Naik
Roll No-119
Section A
SEM -VI
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thanks to the Almighty who gave me the strength to complete this project with sheer hard work
and honesty. This research venture has been made possible due to the generous co-operation of
various persons. To list them all is not practicable, even to repay them in words is beyond the
domain of my lexicon.

This project wouldn’t have been possible without the help of my teacher Ms. Aditi Singh, Faculty,
Dept. of Political Science at HNLU, who had always been there at my side whenever I needed
some help regarding any information. He has been my mentor in the truest sense of the term. The
administration has also been kind enough to let me use their facilities for research work.
 CONTENTS

Declaration I
Acknowledgement II

1. Introduction 1
1.1. Objectives of the Study 2
1.2. Scope of the Study 2
1.3. Methodology of Study 2
1.4. Organization of the Study 3

2. Background 4

3. Rule against bias 8

3.1 In general 9
3.2 Forms of bias
3.2.1Actual and imputed bias
3.2.2Apparent bias
3.3 Exceptions to the rule against bias
2.3.1Necessity
2.3.2Waiver

3.4 Effect of a finding of bias

4. Right to fair hearing 13

4.1.In general, 13
4.2. Article 6 of the European convention 13
4.3. Aspects of a fair hearing 13
4.3.1. Prior notice of hearing 14
4.3.2. Opportunity to be heard 14
4.3.3. Conduct of the hearing 14
4.3.4. Right to legal representation 14
4.3.5. The decision and reasons for it 14

5. Conclusion 23

6. References 24
 INTRODUCTION

In English law, natural justice is technical terminology for the rule against bias1 and the right to a fair
hearing2. While the term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, it has largely been
replaced and extended by the general "duty to act fairly".

The basis for the rule against bias is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system. Bias
can take the form of actual bias, imputed bias or apparent bias. Actual bias is very difficult to prove in
practice while imputed bias, once shown, will result in a decision being void without the need for any
investigation into the likelihood or suspicion of bias. Cases from different jurisdictions currently apply
two tests for apparent bias: the "reasonable suspicion of bias" test and the "real likelihood of bias" test.
One view that has been taken is that the differences between these two tests are largely semantic and
that they operate similarly.

The right to a fair hearing requires that individuals should not be penalized by decisions affecting their
rights or legitimate expectations unless they have been given prior notice of the case, a fair opportunity
to answer it, and the opportunity to present their own case. The mere fact that a decision affects rights
or interests is sufficient to subject the decision to the procedures required by natural justice. In Europe,
the right to a fair hearing is guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which is said to complement the common law rather than replace it.

1
nemo iudex in causa sua-(the rule against bias)
2
the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem)
1.1. Aims and objectives

The aims and objectives of the Act include:

 To understand, principles of natural justice in India.

1.2. Scope of the Study

This project report would cover the principles of natural justice in India. This report
encompasses the principles of natural justice in India history, and two main principles- Rule
against bias & Right to fair hearing.

1.3. Methodology of Study

Given a study of this kind, a descriptive analytical method has been followed to carry out the
study. Secondary sources have been used to gather data and facts. Book, journal articles,
electronic sources such as online websites, newspaper and magazine articles and research
reports have been used to complete this project report.

1.4. Organization of the Study

The Report has been organized into 5 sections. The first section deals with the introduction
of the problem followed by objectives and methodology adopted for carrying out the study.
The second section deals with understanding the backgrounds of natural justice in India. The
third & forth section deals with two main principles- Rule against bias & Right to fair hearing.
The final section will deal with the concluding observations and suggestions.
 PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

The concept and doctrine of Principles of Natural Justice and its application in Justice delivery
system is not new. It seems to be as old as the system of dispensation of justice itself. It has by
now assumed the importance of being, so to say, "an essential inbuilt component" of the
mechanism, through which decision-making process passes, in the matters touching the rights
and liberty of the people. It is no doubt, a procedural requirement but it ensures a strong
safeguard against any Judicial or administrative; order or action, adversely affecting the
substantive rights of the individuals.

BACKGROUND

Natural justice3 is a term of art that denotes specific procedural rights in the English legal
system4 and the systems of other nations based on it. It is similar to the American concepts
of fair procedure and procedural due process, the latter having roots that to some degree
parallel the origins of natural justice.5

Although natural justice has an impressive ancestry6 and is said to express the close
relationship between the common law and moral principles, the use of the term today is not to
be confused with the "natural law" of the Canonists, the mediaeval philosophers' visions of an
"ideal pattern of society" or the "natural rights" philosophy of the 18th century. Whilst the
term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, in jurisdictions such as Australia and
the United Kingdom it has largely been replaced and extended by the more general "duty to act
fairly". Natural justice is identified with the two constituents of a fair hearing, which are the
rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua, or "no man a judge in his own cause"), and the right
to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem, or "hear the other side").

The requirements of natural justice or a duty to act fairly depend on the context. In Baker v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), the Supreme Court of Canada set

3
The courtroom of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ottawa, Ontario. In 1999, the Court ruled in Baker v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) that the requirements of natural justice vary according to the
context of the matter arising.
4
Frederick F. Shauer (1976), "English Natural Justice and American Due Process: An Analytical Comparison"
5
"Administrative Procedure and Natural Law", Notre Dame Lawyer
6
Lord Woolf; Jeffrey Jowell; Andrew Le Sueur, eds. (2007), "Procedural Fairness: Introduction, History and
Comparative Perspectives", De Smith's Judicial Review (6th ed.), London
out a list of non-exhaustive factors that would influence the content of the duty of fairness,
including the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it, the
statutory scheme under which the decision-maker operates, the importance of the decision to
the person challenging it, the person's legitimate expectations, and the choice of procedure
made by the decision-maker. Earlier, in Knight v. Indian Head School Division No.
19 (1990), the Supreme Court held that public authorities which make decisions of a legislative
and general nature do not have a duty to act fairly, while those that carry out acts of a more
administrative and specific nature do. Furthermore, preliminary decisions will generally not
trigger the duty to act fairly, but decisions of a more final nature may have such an effect. In
addition, whether a duty to act fairly applies depends on the relationship between the public
authority and the individual. No duty exists where the relationship is one of master and servant,
or where the individual holds office at the pleasure of the authority. On the other hand, a duty
to act fairly exists where the individual cannot be removed from office except for
cause. Finally, a right to procedural fairness only exists when an authority's decision is
significant and has an important impact on the individual.

'Natural Justice' is an expression of English common law. In one of the English decisions,
reported In Local Government Board v. Arlidge7, Viscount Haldane observed, "...those whose
duty it Is to decide must act Judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them
without bias and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting
the case made. The decision must come to the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a
tribunal whose duty it is to meet out justice."

In the early part of this century, in another case reported in, Lapointe v. L'Association8, the
Judicial Committee observed that the principle should apply to every tribunal having authority
to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences.

In the United States of America, the expression 'natural justice' as such, is not so frequently
heard of since due process of law is guaranteed by the Constitution whenever an individual's
life, liberty or property is affected by State action. Though 'due process' is a vague and
undefined expression, the Implications of which are not finally settled even today, but

7
(1915) AC 120 (138) HL
8
(1906) AC 535 (539)
observance of principles of natural Justice is secured by taking advantage of the phrase 'due
process'.

In Snyder v. Massachussets9, the Supreme Court of the United States observed that there was
a violation of due process whenever there was a breach of a "principle of Justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Hearing before
decision was one of such fundamental principles as was observed in Hagar v. Reclamation
District10.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

In India the principle is prevalent from the ancient times. We find it Invoked in Kautllya's
Arthashastra. In this context, para 43 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the case
of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner11, may be usefully quoted:

“Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens
legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many
colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when
people are affected by acts of authority. It is the bone of healthy government, recognised from
earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law. Indeed from the legendary days
of Adam-and of Kautllya's Arthashastra-the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice,
which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate
that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-fangled. Today its
application must be sustained by current legislation, case law or other extant principle, not the
hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like
the Anglo-American system."

Different jurists have described the principle in different ways12. Some called it as the unwritten
law (jus non scriptum) or the law of reason. It has, however not been found to be capable of
being defined, but some jurists have described the principle as a great humanising principle
intended to invest law with fairness to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. With

9
(1934) 291 US 97(105)
10
(1884) 111 US 701
11
AIR 1978 SC 851
12
Aristotle, before the era of Christ, spoke of such principles calling it as universal law.
Justinian in the fifth and sixth Centuries A.D. called it "'jura naturalia" i.e. natural law.
the passage of time, some principles have evolved and crystallised which are well recognized
principles of natural justice.

The first principle is that 'No man shall be a judge in his own cause' i.e. to say, the deciding
authority must be impartial and without bias. It Implies that no man can act as a judge for a
cause in which be himself has some Interest, may be pecuniary or otherwise. Pecuniary interest
affords the strongest proof against impartiality. The emphasis is on the objectivity in dealing
with and deciding a matter. Justice Gajendragadkar, as then he was, observed in a case reported
in, M/s Builders Supply Corporation v. The Union of India and others13, “it is obvious that
pecuniary interest, howsoever small it may be, In a subject matter of the proceedings, would
wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge". Lord Hardwick observed in one of the
cases, “In a matter of so tender a nature, even the appearance of evil is to be avoided." Yet it
has been laid down as principle of law that pecuniary interest would disqualify a Judge to
decide the matter even though it is not proved that the decision was in any way affected. This
is thus a matter of faith, which a common man must have, in the deciding authority.

The principle is applicable in such cases also where the deciding authority has some personal
Interest in the matter other than pecuniary Interest. This may be in the shape of some personal
relationship with one of the parties or ill will against any of them. In one of the cases order of
punishment was held to be vitiated, as the officer who was in the position of a
complainant/accuser/witness, could not act as an enquiry officer or punishing authority. There
may be a possibility, consciously or unconsciously to uphold as Enquiry Officer what he alleges
against the delinquent officer14.

In one of the selections, which was held for the post of Chief Conservator of Forest, one of the
members of the Board was himself a candidate for the post. The whole process of selection
was held to be vitiated as the member would be a judge in his own cause. (V.N.Nadgir v. Union
of India15.)

In the case of A.K.Kraipakv. Union of India16, a precaution was taken by a member of the
selection Board to withdraw himself from the selection proceedings at the time his name was
considered. This precaution taken could not cure the defect of being a judge in his own cause

13
AIR 1965 SC 1061
14
. (State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86)
15
1970 SLR 134 (Mysore)
16
AIR 1970 SC 150
since he had participated m the deliberations when the names of his rival candidates were being
considered for selection on merit. The position, however, may be different when merely official
capacity is involved in taking a decision in any matter as distinguished from having a personal
Interest. There are certain statutes which provide that named officers may resolve the
controversy, if any, arising between the organisation and the other persons, e.g., in the matters
relating to nationalisation of routes, Government officers or authorities were vested with the
power to dispose of the objections. In such matters as above, it has been held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that proceeding will not vitiate as It was only In official capacity that the officer
was Involved and It would not be correct to say that he was a judge In his own cause being an
officer of the Government. It Is a kind of statutory duty which Is performed by a public officer,
unless of course bias Is proved in any case. A decision of the Supreme Court can usefully be
referred on the point, viz.; Narayanappa v. State of Mysore17 . In another case reported in
Manak Lal v. Prem Chand18, where a committee was constituted to enquire into the complaint
made against an Advocate, the Chairman of the Committee was one who had once appeared
earlier as counsel for the complainant. Constitution of such a committee was held to be bad and
it was observed, "in such cases the test is not whether in fact the bias has affected the Judgment;
the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias
attributed to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of
the Tribunal." However, such objections about the constitution of committees or Tribunals
consisting of members having bias should be taken at the earliest opportunity before start of
the proceedings otherwise, normally, it would be considered as waiver to that objection. Lord
Denning observed in (1969) 1 OB 577, Metropolitan Properties Ltd. v. Lunnon, “............. The
reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence, and confidence is destroyed when
right minded people go away thinking, the Judge was biased". But we find a caution given that
the suspicion should be that of reasonable people and must not be that of capricious and
unreasonable person. (De-Smith-Judicial Review of Administrative Action.) The principle is
of great Importance. It ensures hearing or consideration of a matter by unbiased and impartial
authority. The next principle is audi alteram partem, i.e. no man should be condemned unheard
or that both the sides must be heard before passing any order. A man cannot incur the loss of
property or liberty for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has a fair opportunity of
answering the case against him. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is

17
AIR 1960 SC 1073
18
AIR 1957 SC 425
given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision Is made, but
there may be instances where though an authority Is vested with the powers to pass such orders
which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision
for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of
natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be
mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision
or not. De Smith, in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1980), at page 161,
observed, I "Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent
on the question of hearing, the courts would apply rule of universal application and founded
on plainest principles of natural justice." Wade in Administrative Law (1977) at page 395 says
that principles of natural justice operate as implied mandatory requirements, non- observance
of which invalidates the exercise of power. In one of the cases, reported in Cooper v. Sandworth
Board of Works19, it was observed, "...Although there is no positive word in the statute
requiring that the party shall be heard, yet justice of common law would supply the omission
of Legislature." In A.K. Kraipak's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the
rules of natural justice operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. These
principles thus supplement the law of the land. In the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India and another20, it has been observed that even where there is no specific provision for
showing cause, yet in a proposed action which affects the rights of an individual it is the duty
of the authority to give reasonable opportunity to be heard. This duty is said to be implied by
nature of function to be performed by the authority having power to take punitive or damaging
action. In one of the recent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported In, C.B. Gautam
v. Union of India and others21, the Hon'ble Supreme Court Invoked the same principle and held
that even though It was not statutorily required, yet the authority was liable to give notice to
the affected parties while purchasing their properties under Section 269-UD of the Income Tax
Act, namely, the compulsory purchase of the property. It was observed that though the time
frame within which an order for compulsory purchase has to be made is fairly tight one but
urgency is not such that it would preclude a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A
presumption of an attempt to evade tax may be raised In case of significant under valuation of
the property but it would be rebuttable presumption, which necessarily implies that a party
must have an opportunity to show cause and rebut the presumption. It was further observed

19
(1863) 14 GB (NS) 4 180
20
AIR 1978 SC 597,
21
(1993) 1 SCC 78
that the very fact that an imputation of tax evasion arises where an order for compulsory
purchase is made and such an Imputation casts a slur on the parties to the agreement to sell lead
to the conclusion that before such an imputation can be made against the parties concerned they
must be given on opportunity to show cause that the under valuation in the agreement for sale
was not with a view to evade tax. It is, therefore, all the more necessary that an opportunity of
hearing is provided. The opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was
considered to be a basic requirement in the court proceeding. Later on, this principle was
applied to other quasi-judicial and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down
that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil
consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was thus observed in A.K.
Kralpak's case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of
justice, one falls to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative
enquiries. As observed earlier, in the case of Maneka Gandhi also the application of principle
of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. In
one of the very old cases of early part of this Century, Lapointe v. L'Association22, it has been
observed, “The rule (Audl alteram partem) is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal
tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to
adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals." There is thus no reason
to doubt that the administrative actions are as much under the strains of principles of natural
Justice as judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. It may, however, be noted that the principles of
natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula.
It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and the extent to which right of a person
is likely to be affected. It may not be necessary to provide a full-fledged oral hearing in every
case though it may be necessary in 5 certain other matters. The provisions, which we find in
the procedural statutes, providing for opportunity of hearing before any final order is passed,
only comply with the principles of natural justice. In certain matters, It may be sufficient to
allow a person only to make a representation and no oral hearing may be necessary, but the
same may not be true In another matter where full-fledged oral hearing Including cross-
examination of the witnesses etc. would be necessary. The application of the principles of
natural justice varies from case to case depending upon the factual aspect of the matter. For
example, in the matters relating to major punishment, the requirement is very strict and full-
fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules before a person is dismissed removed

22
(1906) AC 535(539)
or reduced in rank, but where it relates to only minor punishment, a mere explanation submitted
by the delinquent officer concerned meets the requirement of principles of natural justice. In
some matters oral hearing may be necessary but in others, It may not be necessary, as we find
that in one of the cases, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1093, Union of India v. J.P.Mittar, a matter
relating to correction of date of birth, it was not considered necessary to provide personal
hearing; a mere representation was held to be sufficient to conform to the application of
principles of natural justice. In, Srikrishna v. State of M. P23., It has been observed that the
principles of natural justice are flexible and the test is that the adjudicating authority must be
impartial and fair hearing must be given to the person concerned. Similar view was taken in
AIR 1966 SC 671, MP Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and others where personal hearing was
not considered to be necessary. A mere written representation as provided under the Rules was
held to be sufficient to comply with the principles of natural justice. Similarly it will depend
upon the facts and circumstances of the case in which a delinquent may be allowed to be
represented through counsel; such a demand cannot be made as of right. But there may be
circumstances where a counsel may be permitted, e.g. where the person concerned may not be
in a position to express or to place before the authority complicated nature of facts and law. In
one of the cases, reported in AIR 1973 SC 1260, Hiranath Misra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical
College, the request for opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was refused, which was
upheld by the Supreme Court. The boy students of the Medical College had misbehaved with
the girl students residing in Hostels. A committee of three independent members of the staff
was appointed by the Principal who enquired into the complaints of the inmates and recorded
their statements. Charges were framed and the boy students were made known of the charges
and their explanation was called. This was held to be sufficient to comply with the principles
of natural justice and in the facts and circumstances of the case it was not necessary to allow
them cross-examination etc., as it would have exposed the individual girl students to
harassment by the male students. The arrangement made by the Principal to enquire into the
matter was approved by the High Court. In one of the recent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in, Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills and
another24, it has been observed that the natural Justice cannot be placed in a strait Jacket; rules
are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another.
All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is

23
AIR 1977 SC 1691
24
(1994) 5 SCC 566
put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because
of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand
of law. All will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It was, however, provided that
since a representation was made, the corporation would give post- decisional hearing
considering the offer made in the representation for repayment of loan. As a matter of fact,
sometimes, there 6 may be urgency in taking a particular action failing which the whole purpose
may frustrate. In such circumstances, it has been found advisable to provide post- decisional
hearing, i.e. after a decision is taken, but such a case must be Justified on the facts and
circumstance as to why it was not possible to provide a pre-decisional hearing. In given
circumstances of a case such a step to provide post-decisional hearing may cure the defect of
violation of principles of natural justice. In, State of U.P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshethra Samiti25,
also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in matters, which are urgent, even a post-
decisional hearing is a sufficient compliance of the principle of natural justice, viz audi alteram
partem. In another case reported in, State of U.P. v. Vijai Kumar Tripathi26, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that it is up to the competent authority to decide whether in the given
circumstances the opportunity to be provided should be a prior one or post - decisional
opportunity. Normal rule, of course, is prior opportunity. It is though true that the principles of
natural justice are flexible in application but its compliance cannot be jumped over on the
ground that even if hearing had been provided, it would not have served any useful purpose.
The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose or not is a later stage. Things cannot be
presumed by the authority. This view is supported by observations made in, General Medical
Council v. Spackman27. In one of the cases before the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1970
SC 1039, Board of High School v. Km. Chittra, the authorities took the view that since the
facts were not in dispute, no useful purpose would be served by giving an opportunity of
hearing. The examination of the petitioner was cancelled for shortage of attendance. The Court
held that the Board was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, hence, the principles of natural
justice had to be complied with. Therefore, what defence would be put forward has to be left
to the delinquent and no presumptions can be raised about it. Any hearing provided in appeal
or before the higher tribunal, cannot be said to be a substitute for hearing, which is to be
afforded initially. The third principle which has developed in course of time is that the order
which is passed affecting the rights of an individual must be a speaking order. This is necessary

25
AIR 1995 SC 1512
26
AIR 1995 SC 1130
27
1943 AC 627
with a view to exclude the possibility of arbitrariness in the action. A bald order requiring no
reason to support it may be passed in an arbitrary and irresponsible manner. It is tile reason for
passing an order, which checks the arbitrariness. It is a step in furtherance of achieving the end
where society is governed by Rule of law. The other aspect of the matter is that the party,
against whom an order is passed, in fair play, must know the reasons of passing the order. It
has a right to know the reasons. In Maneka Gandhi's case, it has been held that withholding of
reasons for impounding the passport of the petitioner was violative of the principles of natural
justice. The orders against which appeals are provided must be speaking orders. Otherwise, the
aggrieved party is not in a position to demonstrate before the appellate authority, as to in what
manner, the order passed by the initial authorities is bad or suffers from illegality. To a very
great extent, in such matters bald orders render the remedy of appeal nugatory. However, it is
true that administrative authorities or tribunals are not supposed to pass detailed orders as
passed by the courts of law. They may not be very detailed and lengthy orders but they must at
least show that the mind was applied and for the reasons, howsoever briefly they may be stated,
the order by which a party aggrieved is passed. There cannot be any prescribed form in which
the order may be passed but the minimum requirement as indicated above has to be complied
with. Our Supreme Court has many times taken the view that non-speaking order amounts to
depriving a party of a right 'of appeal. It has also been held in some of the decisions that the
appellate authority, while reversing the order must assign reasons for reversal of the findings.
As a matter of fact, the 7 principles of natural justice apply where there may not be any specific
provisions in the statute. These principles are inherent and natural in application requiring no
statutory provision for the same but the application of these principles can be excluded by
express provision under the law. For example, we have the provisions of Article 311 of the
Constitution of India where it is provided that before an officer is dismissed, removed or
reduced in rank, he must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the
charges levelled against him but at the same time it also provides that it may not be necessary
to afford that opportunity where for reasons recorded in writing it is found that it is reasonably
not practicable to hold an enquiry or where the President or the Governor has specified that in
the interest of security of the State it is not expedient to hold such enquiry. The relevant case
on the question is reported In 1985(3) SCC 398 = 1985 SC 1416 (case of Tulsiram Patel). Thus,
there may be circumstance by reason of which statutorily, application of principles of natural
justice may be excluded. To sum up, one finds that Initially the principles of natural justice
used to be applied to courts of law alone but later on from judicial sphere it extended, to the
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions and then to the statutory authorities and the
administrative authorities, who have upon them, the responsibility of determining civil rights
or obligations of the people. In normal conditions, an action or a decision, judicial or
administrative, affecting rights of an individual and resulting in civil consequence is
unthinkable. In the present day, without affording hearing by an unbiased and impartial
authority who must act objectively and must also give out his mind, as to what weighed in
decision making process, by incorporating reasons to support the decision or, to say so, by
giving a speaking order. This is necessary for a society, which is governed by Rule of law.
How substantive laws are applied and rights are determined is a question not less important, to
say it again, the principles of -natural justice are great humanising principles intended to invest
law with fairness to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice28.

28
J.T.R.I. JOURNAL – First Year, Issue – 3 - Year – July – September, 1995
 RULE AGAINST BIAS

In general

A person is barred from deciding any case in which he or she may be, or may fairly be suspected
to be, biased. This principle embodies the basic concept of impartiality, and applies to courts
of law, tribunals, arbitrators and all those having the duty to act judicially. A public authority
has a duty to act judicially whenever it makes decisions that affect people's rights or interests,
and not only when it applies some judicial-type procedure in arriving at decisions.

The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal
system. The erosion of public confidence undermines the nobility of the legal system, and leads
to ensuing chaos. The essence of the need for impartiality was observed by Lord Denning,
the Master of the Rolls, in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v.
Lannon (1968): "Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-
minded people go away thinking: 'The judge was biased.'"

Public confidence as the basis for the rule against bias is also embodied in the often-quoted
words of Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, that "[i]t is not merely of
some importance, but of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly be seen to be done".

Forms of bias

1. Actual and imputed bias

A portrait of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham (Charles Pepys, 1st Earl of Cottenham,
1781–1851), by Charles Robert Leslie. In Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852),
his Lordship was disqualified from hearing a case as he had a pecuniary interest in the outcome.
Bias may be actual, imputed or apparent. Actual bias is established where it is actually
established that a decision-maker was prejudiced in favour of or against a party. However, in
practice, the making of such an allegation is rare as it is very hard to prove.

One form of imputed bias is based on the decision-maker being a party to a suit, or having a
pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome of the decision. Once this fact has been
established, the bias is irrebuttable and disqualification is automatic – the decision-maker will
be barred from adjudicating the matter without the need for any investigation into the likelihood
or suspicion of bias. A classic case is Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal
Proprietors (1852), which involved an action between Dimes, a local landowner, and the
proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, had
affirmed decrees made to the proprietors. However, it was discovered by Dimes that Lord
Cottenham in fact owned several pounds worth of shares in the Grand Junction Canal. This
eventually led to the judge being disqualified from deciding the case. There was no inquiry as
to whether a reasonable person would consider Lord Cottenham to be biased, or as to the
circumstances which led Lord Cottenham to hear the case.

In certain limited situations, bias can also be imputed when the decision-maker's interest in the
decision is not pecuniary but personal. This was established in the unprecedented case of R. v.
Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) (1999). In
an appeal to the House of Lords, the Crown Prosecution Service sought to overturn a quashing
order made by the Divisional Court regarding extradition warrants made against the ex-
Chilean dictator, Senator Augusto Pinochet. Amnesty International (AI) was given leave
to intervene in the proceedings. However, one of the judges of the case, Lord Hoffmann, was
a director and chairperson of Amnesty International Charity Ltd. (AICL), a company under the
control of AI. He was eventually disqualified from the case and the outcome of the proceedings
set aside. The House of Lords held that the close connection between AICL and AI presented
Lord Hoffmann with an interest in the outcome of the litigation. Even though it was non-
pecuniary, the Law Lords took the view that the interest was sufficient to warrant Lord
Hoffmann's automatic disqualification from hearing the case. In Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Bayfield Properties Ltd. (1999), the Court of Appeal warned against any further extension of
the automatic disqualification rule, "unless plainly required to give effect to the important
underlying principles upon which the rule is based".

2. Apparent bias
Apparent bias is present where a judge or other decision-maker is not a party to a matter and
does not have an interest in its outcome, but through his or her conduct or behaviour gives rise
to a suspicion that he or she is not impartial. An issue that has arisen is the degree of suspicion
which would provide the grounds on which a decision should be set aside for apparent bias.
Currently, cases from various jurisdictions apply two different tests: "real likelihood of bias"
and "reasonable suspicion of bias".

The real likelihood test centres on whether the facts, as assessed by the court, give rise to a real
likelihood of bias. In R. v. Gough (1993), the House of Lords chose to state the test in terms of
a "real danger of bias", and emphasized that the test was concerned with the possibility, not
probability, of bias. Lord Goff of Chievely also stated that "the court should look at the matter
through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the
reasonable man". However, the test in Gough has been disapproved of in some Commonwealth
jurisdictions. One criticism is that the emphasis on the court's view of the facts gives
insufficient emphasis to the perception of the public. These criticisms were addressed by the
House of Lords in Porter v. Magill (2001). The Court adjusted the Gough test by stating it to
be "whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would
conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased". This case therefore
established the current test in the UK to be one of a "real possibility of bias".

On the other hand, the reasonable suspicion test asks whether a reasonable and fair-minded
person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant facts would have a reasonable suspicion
that a fair trial for the litigant is not possible. Although not currently adopted in the UK, this
test has been endorsed by the Singapore courts.

It has been suggested that the differences between the two tests are largely semantic and that
the two tests operate similarly. In Locabail, the judges stated that in a large proportion of the
cases, application of the two tests would lead to the same outcome. It was also held that
"[p]rovided that the court, personifying the reasonable man, takes an approach which is based
on broad common sense, and without inappropriate reliance on special knowledge, the minutiae
of court procedure or other matters outside the ken of the ordinary, reasonably well-informed
members of the public, there should be no risk that the courts will not ensure both that justice
is done and that it is perceived by the public to be done". In the Singapore High
Court decision Tang Kin Hwa v. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners
Board (2005), Judicial Commissioner Andrew Phang observed that the real likelihood test is
in reality similar to that of reasonable suspicion. First, likelihood is in fact "possibility", as
opposed to the higher standard of proof centring on "probability". Secondly, he suggested
that real in real likelihood cannot be taken to mean "actual", as this test relates to apparent and
not actual bias. He also observed that both the court's and the public's perspectives are "integral
parts of a holistic process" with no need to draw a sharp distinction between them.

In contrast, in Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni (2006), Judicial Commissioner Sundaresh
Menon thought that there was a real difference between the reasonable suspicion and real
likelihood tests. In his opinion, suspicion suggests a belief that something that may not be
provable could still be possible. Reasonable suggests that the belief cannot be fanciful. Here
the issue is whether it is reasonable for the one to harbour the suspicions in the circumstances
even though the suspicious behaviour could be innocent. On the other hand, likelihood points
towards something being likely, and real suggests that this must be substantial rather than
imagined. Here, then, the inquiry is directed more towards the actor than the observer. The
issue is the degree to which a particular event is not likely or possible. Menon J.C. also
disagreed with both Lord Goff in Gough and Phang J.C. in Tang Kin Hwa in that he thought
the shift of the inquiry from how the matter might appear to a reasonable man to whether the
judge thinks there is a sufficient possibility of bias was "a very significant point of
departure". The real likelihood test is met as long as the court is satisfied that there is a
sufficient degree of possibility of bias. Although this a lower standard than satisfaction on
a balance of probabilities, this is actually directed at mitigating the sheer difficulty of proving
actual bias, especially given its insidious and often subconscious nature. The reasonable
suspicion test, however, is met if the court is satisfied that a reasonable member of the public
could harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias even though the court itself thought there was no
real danger of this on the facts. The difference is that the driver behind this test is the strong
public interest in ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice. As of September
2011, the Court of Appeal of Singapore had not yet expressed a view as to whether the position
taken in Tang Kin Hwa or Shankar Alanis preferable.

Exceptions to the rule against bias

i. Necessity

There are cases in which a disqualified adjudicator cannot be replaced, as no one else is
authorized to act. It has been observed that "disqualification of an adjudicator will not be
permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power to act". In such cases, natural justice has to
give way to necessity in order to maintain the integrity of judicial and administrative systems.

This issue regarding necessity was raised in Dimes. The Lord Chancellor had to sign an order
for enrolment in order to allow the appeal to proceed from the Vice-Chancellor to the House
of Lords. It was held that his shareholding in the canal company which barred him from sitting
in the appeal did not affect his power to enroll, as no one but him had the authority to do so. It
was mentioned this was allowed "for this [was] a case of necessity, and where that occurs the
objection of interest cannot prevail".

ii. Waiver

The court normally requests that an objection be taken as soon as the prejudiced party has
knowledge of the bias. If an objection is not raised and proceedings are allowed to continue
without disapproval, it will be held that the party has waived its right to do so.

Effect of a finding of bias

In Dimes, the judges advised the House of Lords that Lord Cottenham's pecuniary interest made
his judgment not void, but voidable. This advice is not wrong in the context of a judicial act
under review, where the judgment will be held valid unless reversed on appeal.

However, in the cases of administrative acts or decisions under judicial review, the court can
only intervene on the grounds of ultra vires, hence making the judgment void. Lord Esher said
in Allison v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) that the
participation of a disqualified person "certainly rendered the decision wholly void".

RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING

In general
A hearing of the International Court of Justice in 2006 presided over by its President, Her
Excellency Dame Rosalyn Higgins. A fundamental aspect of natural justice is that before a
decision is made, all parties should be heard on the matter.

It has been suggested that the rule requiring a fair hearing is broad enough to include the rule
against bias since a fair hearing must be an unbiased hearing. However, the rules are often
treated separately. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard. The right
to a fair hearing requires that individuals are not penalized by decisions affecting their rights
or legitimate expectations unless they have been given prior notice of the cases against them,
a fair opportunity to answer them, and the opportunity to present their own cases.

Besides promoting an individual's liberties, the right to a fair hearing has also been used by
courts as a base on which to build up fair administrative procedures. It is now well established
that it is not the character of the public authority that matters but the character of the power
exercised. However, in the United Kingdom prior to Ridge v. Baldwin (1963), the scope of the
right to a fair hearing was severely restricted by case law following Cooper v. Wandsworth
Board of Works (1863). In R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint
Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. (1923), Lord Atkin observed that the right only applied where
decision-makers had "the duty to act judicially". In natural justice cases this dictum was
generally understood to mean that a duty to act judicially was not to be inferred merely from
the impact of a decision on the rights of subjects; such a duty would arise only if there was a
"superadded" express obligation to follow a judicial-type procedure in arriving at the decision.

In Ridge v. Baldwin, Lord Reid reviewed the authorities extensively and attacked the problem
at its root by demonstrating how the term judicial had been misinterpreted as requiring some
additional characteristic over and above the characteristic that the power affected some person's
rights. In his view, the mere fact that the power affects rights or interests is what makes it
"judicial" and so subject to the procedures required by natural justice. This removal of the
earlier misconception as to the meaning of judicial is thought to have given the judiciary the
flexibility it needed to intervene in cases of judicial review.

The mere fact that a decision-maker is conferred wide discretion by law is not reason enough
for a weakening of the requirements of natural justice. In the United Kingdom context, this is
demonstrated by Ahmed v. H.M. Treasury (No. 1) (2010). The Treasury had exercised powers
to freeze the appellants' financial assets and economic resources on the ground that it
reasonably suspected the appellants were or might be persons who had committed, attempted
to commit, participated in or facilitated the commission of terrorism, pursuant to the Terrorism
(United Nations Measures) Order 2006 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations
Measures) Order 2006 made under the United Nations Act 1946. The Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom held that since the Al-Qaida Order made no provision for basic procedural
fairness, it effectively deprived people designated under the order the fundamental right of
access to a judicial remedy and hence was ultra vires the power conferred by the United
Nations Act 1946 for the making of the Order.

Article 6 of the European Convention

The right to a fair hearing is also referred to in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states:

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. ...

Article 6 does not, however, replace the common law duty to ensure a fair hearing. It has been
suggested that Article 6 alone is not enough to protect procedural due process, and only with
the development of a more sophisticated common law will the protection of procedural due
process extend further into the administrative machine. Nonetheless, Article 6 supplements the
common law. For example, the common law does not impose a general duty to give reasons
for a decision, but under Article 6(1) a decision-maker must give a reasoned judgment so as to
enable an affected individual to decide whether to appeal.

Aspects of a fair hearing

1. Prior notice of hearing

Natural justice allows a person to claim the right to adequate notification of the date, time,
place of the hearing as well as detailed notification of the case to be met. This information
allows the person adequate time to effectively prepare his or her own case and to answer the
case against him or her. In Cooper v. Wandsworth, Chief Justice William Erle went so far as
to state that the lack of notice and hearing afforded to Cooper could be said to be a form of
abuse, as he had been treated as if he did not matter. As Lord Mustill famously held in R. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody (1993): "Since the person affected
usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh
against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case
which he has to answer."

It has been suggested that the requirement of prior notice serves three important purposes:

 The interest in good outcomes – giving prior notice increases the value of the
proceedings as it is only when the interested person knows the issues and the relevant
information that he or she can make a useful contribution.
 The duty of respect – the affected person has the right to know what is at stake, and it
is not enough to simply inform him or her that there will be a hearing.
 The rule of law – notice of issues and disclosure of information opens up the operations
of the public authority to public scrutiny.

The British courts have held it is not enough for an affected person to merely be informed of a
hearing. He or she must also be told what is at stake; in other words, the gist of the case.

2. Opportunity to be heard

Every person has the right to have a hearing and be allowed to present his or her own
case. Should a person not attend the hearing, even with adequate notice given, the adjudicator
has the discretion to decide if the hearing should proceed. In Ridge v. Baldwin, a chief
constable succeeded in having his dismissal from service declared void as he had not been
given the opportunity to make a defence. In another case, Chief Constable of the North Wales
Police v. Evans (1982), a chief constable required a police probationer to resign on account of
allegations about his private life which he was given no fair opportunity to rebut. The House
of Lords found the dismissal to be unlawful. Likewise in Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government
of the Federation of Malaya (1962), a public servant facing disciplinary proceedings was not
supplied with a copy of a prejudicial report by a board of inquiry which the adjudicating officer
had access to before the hearing. The Privy Council held that the proceedings had failed to
provide him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

However, this requirement does not necessarily mean the decision-maker has to meet the
complainant face to face – "Natural justice does not generally demand orality". It has been
suggested that an oral hearing will almost be as good as useless if the affected person has no
prior knowledge of the case. In Lloyd v. McMahon (1987), an oral hearing did not make a
difference to the facts on which the case was based. Giving judgment in the Court of Appeal
of England and Wales, Lord Justice Harry Woolf held that an oral hearing may not always be
the "very pith of the administration of natural justice". It has also been suggested that an oral
hearing is only required if issues concerning deprivations of legal rights or legally protected
interests arise.

3. Conduct of the hearing

When deciding how the hearing should be conducted, the adjudicator has to ask whether the
person charged has a proper opportunity to consider, challenge or contradict any evidence, and
whether the person is also fully aware of the nature of the allegations against him or her so as
to have a proper opportunity to present his or her own case. In Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. AF (2009), Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers said:

The best way of producing a fair trial is to ensure that a party to it has the fullest information
of both the allegations that are made against him and the evidence relied upon in support of
those allegations. Where the evidence is documentary, he should have access to the documents.
Where the evidence consists of oral testimony, then he should be entitled to cross-examine the
witnesses who give that testimony, whose identities should be disclosed.

However, when a hearing requires the balancing of multiple polycentric issues such as natural
justice and the protection of confidential information for national security reasons, both the
concerns of public security and the right to a fair trial must be adequately met. It was held by
the House of Lords in AF, applying the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights A. v. United Kingdom (2009), that a person accused of terrorism against
whom a control order has been issued must be given sufficient information about the
allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to his special advocate. If
this requirement is satisfied, a fair hearing can be conducted without detailed disclosure of
confidential information that might compromise national security. On the facts of the case, a
special advocate was not permitted further contact with an applicant or his ordinary legal
representatives except with permission of the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC) after viewing confidential (or "closed") materials. The House of Lords
recognized that although a special advocate's usefulness is stymied somewhat from having no
further instructions after viewing such materials, if the SIAC decides to issue a control order
predominantly on the basis of non-confidential (or "open") materials, an applicant cannot be
regarded as having been denied an opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the
government's beliefs and suspicions about him. If the evidence against the applicant is largely
closed but allegations contained in open material are sufficiently specific, an applicant should
be able to provide his legal representatives and special advocate with information to refute it
(such as an alibi, if the open material alleges he was at a certain place during a certain period)
without having to know the detail or sources of the closed evidence. However, if the evidence
revealed to the person consists only of general assertions and the case against him is based
solely or to a substantive extent on undisclosed adverse evidence, the fair hearing rule under
natural justice will not be satisfied.

In such cases, there are strong policy considerations supporting the principle that a trial
procedure can never be considered fair if a person is kept in ignorance of the case against him
or her. First, since the grounds for a reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in terrorist
activity can span from incontrovertible evidence to an innocent misinterpretation of facts which
can be explained away by the person, in many cases it is impossible for courts to be sure that
the disclosure of the evidence will make no difference to the applicant. Secondly, resentment
will be felt by the person and his family and friends if sanctions are imposed without any proper
explanation of the grounds and when, due to the non-disclosure of information, the person is
put in a position where he is unable to properly defend himself. As Lord Phillips put it, "if the
wider public are to have confidence in the justice system, they need to be able to see that justice
is done rather than being asked to take it on trust".

The right to be heard in answer to charges before an unbiased tribunal is illustrated in the
Singapore case Tan Boon Chee David v. Medical Council of Singapore (1980). During a
disciplinary hearing, council members were either not conscientious about their attendance or
did not attend the whole course of proceedings. This meant they did not hear all the oral
evidence and submissions. The High Court held that this had substantially prejudiced the
appellant and constituted a fundamental breach of natural justice. On the other hand, mere
absence from a hearing does not necessarily lead to undue prejudice. It was held in Re Teo
Choo Hong (1995) that the function of a lay member of a lawyers' disciplinary committee was
to observe and not cast a vote or make a judgment. Thus, the appellant had not suffered undue
prejudice.
On the basis of reciprocity, if one side is allowed to cross-examine his legal opponent at a
hearing, the other party must also be given the same opportunity. In addition, when a tribunal
decides a case on a basis not raised or contemplated by the parties, or decides it without
regarding the submissions and arguments made by the parties on the issues, this will amount
to a breach of natural justice. However, a genuine bona fide mistake by an adjudicator in
omitting to state reasons for not considering a submission is not enough to be a breach of natural
justice. This may occur when the submissions were accidentally omitted, or were so
unconvincing that it was not necessary to explicitly state the adjudicator's findings.

4. Right to legal representation

There is no inherent common law right to legal representation before a domestic tribunal. A
tribunal has the discretion to admit either a legally qualified or unqualified counsel to assist the
person appearing before it, based on the facts of the case. When assessing whether a party
should be offered legal assistance, the adjudicator should first ask whether the right to be heard
applies, and, secondly, whether counsel's assistance is needed for an effective hearing given
the subject matter, bearing in mind the consequences of such a denial.

In R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Tarrant (1983), Webster J. set out
six factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow representation by counsel, namely:

 the seriousness of the charge and the potential penalty;

 whether any points of law are likely to arise.;

 whether the prisoner is capable of presenting his own case;

 whether there are any procedural difficulties faced by prisoners in conducting their own
defence;

 whether there is reasonable speed in making the adjudication; and

 whether there is a need for fairness between prisoners or between prisoners and prison
officers.

It has also been suggested that where a tribunal hearing concerns the individual's reputation or
right to livelihood, there is a greater need for allowing legal representation as this vindicates
the idea of equality before the law.
When one refuses legal representation, one cannot expect to receive a higher "standard" of
natural justice. This was enunciated in Singapore in Ho Paul v. Singapore Medical
Council (2008). Dr. Ho, who had been charged with professional misconduct, chose to appear
before the Council in person and declined to cross-examine the Council's key witness.
Subsequently, he argued that he should have been warned of the legal implications of not being
legally represented. The High Court rejected this argument and held he had suffered no
prejudice. Dr. Ho had been given a fair opportunity of presenting his own case and, most
importantly, had not been deprived of his right to cross-examine the witnesses.

It is also not a court's obligation to provide assistance when a party presents his or her case
without legal representation. In Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor (1998), the accused
had appeared in person before a magistrate and had entered a plea of guilt. He later petitioned
the High Court for criminal revision, arguing that as the magistrate had not informed him of
the defences available to him, his plea had been equivocal. The Court held:

The onus [of informing the accused of his defence options or what could be more advantageous
to his case] does not shift to the judge (or the Prosecution, for that matter) simply because the
accused is unrepresented. That will be placing too onerous a burden on the judge. Furthermore,
the judge will be performing two completely incompatible and irreconcilable roles – one as the
adjudicator, the other as the de facto defence counsel.

In Singapore, the right to legal representation is contingent on the nature of the inquiry.
However, since Article 12 of the Constitution of Singapore guarantees equal protection under
the law, it has been suggested that greater weightage should be accorded to this procedural
right when balancing it against the competing demand of efficiency.

5. The decision and reasons for it

Currently, the principles of natural justice in the United Kingdom and certain other jurisdictions
do not include a general rule that reasons should be given for decisions. In R. v.
Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw (1951), Denning L.J. stated:
"I think the record must contain at least the document which initiates the proceedings; the
pleadings, if any; and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribunal
chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does state its reasons, and those reasons are wrong
in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision." It has been stated that "no single factor has
inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any
general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions".

Historically, uncontrolled public decisions have led to poor outcomes and disrespect for the
decision-makers. Such decisions also lacked the regularity and transparency that distinguish
them from the mere say-so of public authorities. On such grounds, there are obvious benefits
for the disclosure of reasons for decisions. First, procedural participation by people affected by
a decision promotes the rule of law by making it more difficult for the public authority to act
arbitrarily. Requiring the giving of reasons helps ensure that decisions are carefully thought
through, which in turn aids in the control of administrative discretion. Secondly, accountability
makes it necessary for the public authority to face up to the people affected by a decision. When
a public authority acts on all the relevant considerations, this increases the probability of better
decision outcomes and, as such, is beneficial to public interests. Another important benefit is
that respect for decision-makers is fostered, which increases their integrity in the public's eyes.

CONCLUSION

The principles of natural justice have come out from the need of man to protect himself from
the excesses of organized power man has always appealed to someone beyond his own
creation. Such someone is god and his law, divine law or natural law, to which all temporal
law and actions must confirm. Natural law is of the ‘higher law of nature’. Natural law are
not codified and is based on natural ideals ans values which are universal. The concepts of
 social and economic justice that can be seen in the preamble of the constitution of India are
based on the principle of natural justice.

Article 311 Incorporates many of the features of the natural justice without explicitly
mentioning it. violation of natural justice is equal to violation of equality of the article 14.
Natural law is another name for common-sense justice. It is used interchangeably with divine
law, jus gentium and the common law. The principles of natural justice are considered the
basic human rights because they attempt to bring justice to the parties naturally.

REFERENCES

1. www.indianmirror.com
2. www.civilserviceindia.com
3. www.jagranjosh.com
4. www.indianmirror.com