PERSONS: Marriage and Family
MOJICA
1. G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
FACTS:
On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in
Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of the marriage license, Jose
and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both
of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
On July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25.
He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham,
as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife
for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events
which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he
was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter,
he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter
being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing
three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that
his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man
who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa.
He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of
the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused
the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s
allegations and denied Jose’s allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she
had deferred contracting marriage with him on account
of their age difference. In her pre-trial brief, Felisa
R.S.
expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint
against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since
Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without
emolument.
On July 26, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the Complaint for the ground that the
testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on November 24,
1986 was valid. Jose’s claim that he did not consent to
the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote
[Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year
after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his
company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person
to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing
there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he
really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he
would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand,
under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature
of his brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract, and she affirmed when asked by the Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen
by her brother. The testimony of his sister all the more
belied his claim that his consent was procured through
fraud.
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that
Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the
New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the
fraud. Thus, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged
sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any
action to void the marriage at the earliest instance.
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Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated
August 11, 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal
to be without merit. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did
not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa
was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
that the marriage was solemnized under Article 16 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man
and woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded
that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the
period required by Article 76 (now Article 34 of the
Family Code) did not affect the validity of the marriage,
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court
of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose
filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the
Family Code) were not fully attendant in the case at bar.
In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man
and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of
marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.
ISSUE:
Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.
RULING:
YES, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for
lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which the
sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of
paper because they started living together five months
before the celebration of their marriage. That according
to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 34, “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage for a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediments to marry each other…”
It means that a five years period computed back from the
date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.
R.S.MOJICA
It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is
a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage
between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab
initio.
2. G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND
TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M.
ARTICULO, Respondents.
FACTS:
On March 17, 2005, respondents filed with the RTC, an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio
and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the
complaint alleged that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married on June 14, 1962 in Lal-lo, Cagayan. They
begot seven children, herein respondents, namely:
Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle,
and Joseph Lloyd. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On
August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the
Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. Six months later,
or on February 10, 2005, Eulogio passed away.
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio,
respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite marriage license. They argued that
Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man
and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediment from
securing a marriage license, was not applicable to
petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived
together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of
Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s
death, or on May 1, 2004, which was barely three
months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the
additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
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PERSONS: Marriage and Family
Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and
Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one
roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license.
From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco
Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on October 28, 1988
and October 30, 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in
the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized
by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she
sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is
only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On October 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting
the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of
action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, dated March 7,
2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as
basis.
The Administrative Matter provides that a petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to
declare the marriage null and void.
The Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense
in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Complaint filed by the respondents is hereby
DISMISSED with costs de officio.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof,
invoking the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog case, which was
on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased
spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even
after the death of the latter.
RTC granted the motion for reconsideration dated
October 31, 2005 and issued an order for the
reinstatement of the case.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing Order; however, on June 1, 2006, the RTC
denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter
was raised therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of
the marriage of Eulogio and Lolita after the death of the
former?
R.S.MOJICA
RULING:
NO; the respondents have no legal standing to assail the
validity of the second marriage after the death of their
father, pursuant to rule on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
shall govern the said petition. Stated therein is that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.
Stated on Section 2(a) of the aforesaid Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders that:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
2. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern
of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution.
3. G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
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and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court
of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is “rather silent,
obscure, and insufficient” to resolve the following
issues:
1. Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito
G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of
the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Niñal is already dead;
2. Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs'
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;
3. Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing
the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death.
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate
an action for annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition
for review with this Court grounded on a pure question
of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-
compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because “the verification failed
to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the
allegations in the petition are “true and correct”.” It was
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no
legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.
R.S.MOJICA
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic “autonomous social
institution.” Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an “inviolable social institution,” and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage
as “a special contract of permanent union” and case law
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Pepito and Norma living together as
husband and wife for at least five years exempts
them from obtaining a marriage license under
Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause
of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially
so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead.
RULING:
1. On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of cohabitation as
“husband and wife” where the only missing factor is
the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. The five-year period should be the
years immediately before the day the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the five years, and continuity—that
is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-
year cohabitation period is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
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to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
2. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.
4. G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18,
2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and
has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying
his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went
to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree,
an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law. To be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982:
“It would therefore be premature to register the decree
of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages
in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of
R.S.MOJICA
such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine
court.”
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied
Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was
not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only
the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, in order for him or
her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
“All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.”
“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.”
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; the
provision was enacted to “avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.”
ISSUE:
The petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
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NO; the alien spouse can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse.
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages – void and voidable marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of
the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates
the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after
the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording.
5. G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R.
PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
FACTS:
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a
Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to
Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982,
the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge
Perfecto Laguio of Quezon City RTC.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos
and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The
dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the
Shari’a Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District,
Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on
June 18, 1992.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on
December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her
first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson
Pacasum, Sr., her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs
where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-I, Lanao
del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and
Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in an civil
ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the Iligan City
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RTC. However, unlike in Zamoranos’ first marriage to
De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was
blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean,
and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between
Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the
two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for
custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October
18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of
the children in the former, with the latter retaining
visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He
filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos including a
petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy
and dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of
the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones,
issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold
Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos
before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a
Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in favor of
Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack
of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found
that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were
such at the time of their marriage, whose marital
relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum
bigamous?
RULING:
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by
Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by
the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum
on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a
bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is
already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court which
had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
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Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which
heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim,
whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman,
was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the
same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce
from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in
authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is
evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married
another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites.
Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of
such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal
cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of
Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is
not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the
truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should
have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on
the accused contracting a second marriage while a
prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be
dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, should have suspended the proceedings until
Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De
Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and
had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved
despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos
and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the
Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, was enacted to “promote the
advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall
consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in
the formulation and implementation of its policies.”
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the
regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense
defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition
bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book,
unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable
talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to
severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.
R.S.MOJICA
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce
from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge
Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by
Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to
remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. GRANTED.
6. G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
FACTS:
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22,
2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong
City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006),
Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her,
the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed
the American to acquire US citizenship and even
arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent.
Adding that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state and complying with their marital
obligations. The court even sent summons to the
husband but he failed to file an answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring
that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound
by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case
to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to
enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
RULING:
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage.
In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
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Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so.
7. G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of one Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Bohol for four years. Their communication was
broken after school year 1977-1978. In 1984, Lucio
received a letter from Lucia from Singapore. After an
exchange of letters, the two became sweethearts. Lucia
later returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada
to work there. Nonetheless, the sweethearts maintained
a constant communication. Lucia, later came back to the
Philippines. The two agreed to get married, thus, they
were married at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work
in Canada leaving Lucio behind. Barely a year, August
19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition for
divorce which was granted and took effect in February
of 1992. On October that year Lucia married Maria
Lumbago also in Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993,
Lucio filed a complaint for nullity of marriage in
Regional Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there
was no marriage ceremony actually took place. He was
later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal
case invoking prejudicial question. The civil case is a
prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted
unfortunately denied by the motion for reconsideration
of the prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the
case was pending in Court of Appeals, the trial court
granted the petition for nullity of marriage since no
marriage ceremony took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But
the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of
merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid?
R.S.MOJICA
RULING:
The first element of Bigamy as laid down in Bobis v.
Bobis was not present. No marriage ceremony. What
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract
by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. The mere signing of the same bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity.
The Supreme Court need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is moot and academic.
8. G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with
the regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was
dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the regional trial
court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null
and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on
the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
ISSUE:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
RULING:
NO. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppels by
verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of the second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same
rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as
“conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter action
pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a
different cause of action. Therefore, having expressly
and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived
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PERSONS: Marriage and Family
any defects therein. The Court finds then that the present
action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition
is denied for lack of merit.
9. G.R. No. 201988 October 11, 2017
MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-
CRUZ, Petitioner
vs.
NILO SANTOS CRUZ, Respondent
FACTS:
Marivi met Nilo and they became sweethearts in 1986.
The couple married in a civil ceremony followed by a
church wedding. The marriage produced two sons.
Sometime in 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. In support of her claim that she
and Nilo were suffering from psychological incapacity,
Marivi presented Dr. Villegas, a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Encarnacion, a clinical psychologist.
According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate
each other’s’ weaknesses and that the incapacities of the
parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their
own needs rather than to give in to the other’s needs
. manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas’ diagnosis.
The RTC denied the Petition.
From the RTC’s verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA united with the RTC in rejecting the alleged
existence of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall
under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and
applying this provision. In Republic v. De Gracia, we
reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, “that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by:
R.S.MOJICA
a. gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage);
b. juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage); and
c. incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved).”
Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated the
well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, as embodied
in Republic v. Court of Appeals, viz.:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological – not physical, although its
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the
time of the celebration’ of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted
as root causes.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
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PERSONS: Marriage and Family
Notably, “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’
and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present case,] in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.” “Nor does
failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons” amount to psychological
incapacity. We further elucidated in Yambao v.
Republic that the psychological condition should render
the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic
marital obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations
and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This
incapacity consists of the following:
a. a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage;
b. this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; and
c. the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality.
It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.
Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court
believes that the protagonists in this case are in reality
simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s
personality differences, and have thus become
overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a marriage,
even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.
10. G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had
been married to Estela Galang, asked petitioner to marry
him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then,
married Santos. Four months after the solemnization of
their marriage, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F.
Santos faced Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded
“not guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the
criminal suit.
R.S.MOJICA
Petitioner asserted that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been
under the belief that Santos was still single when they
got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should
be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she
argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the
first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.
She alleged that she had met petitioner on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife
of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred
that she met Galang only or after she had already
married Santos.
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner
married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was
denied. On appeal, the CA gave more weight to the
prosecution witnesses' narration.
ISSUE:
Is the second marriage of Santiago valid, for there to be a
conviction for bigamy?
RULING:
YES. It is clear that the marriage between petitioner and
Santos took place without a marriage license. The
absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in
their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their
union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties have
actually lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact
opposite of this fact. Although the records do not show
that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears
that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer
and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for
at least five years before they married each other.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and
Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by
them that they were eligible to contract marriage without
a license. Petitioner now seeks to be acquitted of bigamy
based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos
without a marriage license despite knowing that they had
not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law;
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PERSONS: Marriage and Family
and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,
petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that
they had not yet complied with the five-year
cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family
Code. It will be the height of absurdity for this Court to
allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
No less than the present Constitution provides that
“marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.” It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping therefore
with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the
conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
11. G.R. No. 209031 APRIL 16, 2018
ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN, Petitioner
vs
MARCO DAN, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent
Marco Dan - an Italian national - met “in a chatroom
[o]n the internet” sometime in May, 2005. They soon
became “chatmates” and “began exchanging letters
which further drew them emotionally closer to each
other” even though petitioner was in the Philippines
while respondent lived in Italy.
In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The
following year, he flew in from Italy and tied the knot
with petitioner on January 23, 2006.
Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy.
Petitioner followed thereafter, or on February 23, 2006.
The couple lived together in Italy.
On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew
back into the country.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition8 for
declaration of nullity of her marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. LP-07-0155with the RTC of Las Piñas City,
Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General
representing the Republic of the Philippines opposed the
petition.
On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision
dismissing the petition on the ground that petitioner’s
R.S.MOJICA
evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. It held, thus:
Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner
stated that sometime in May 2005, she chanced upon the
respondent, an Italian, in the internet xxx and they
became regular chatmates. In their exchanges of chat
messages and letters, she found respondent to be sweet,
kind and jolly. He made her feel that he really cared for
her. He was romantic. [A]lthough at times, respondent
was impatient and easily got irritated.
On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines
and they got married on 23 January 2006. During their
honeymoon, petitioner noticed that the respondent was
not circumcised, x x x [R]espondent (also) asked her
where to find marijuana since he had to sniff some. This
made petitioner angry and she quarreled with him.
Respondent apologized later.
On 29 January 2006, respondent flew back to Italy and
on 26 February 2006, petitioner left to join respondent in
Italy. After a few days, respondent started displaying
traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco
whom she had known thru the internet. He was
immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He
depended on his mother to do or to decide things for
him. It was even his mother who decided where they
lived and how the house should be arranged. When they
transferred to a separate house. it was respondent's
mother who managed the household.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During
work days, playing video games was always the first
thing he does when he wakes up and the last thing he
does before retiring. During rest days, he would play
video games the whole day. There was never a quality
time he spent with her, the kind of time that a
responsible husband would spend with his wife.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During
work days, playing video games was always the first
thing he does when he wakes up and the last thing he
does before retiring. During rest days, he would play
video games the whole day. There was never a quality
time he spent with her, the kind of time that a
responsible husband would spend with his wife.
Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her
in doing all the household chores. He also has extremely
poor hygiene. He seldom takes a bath and brushes his
teeth. For him to be able to take a bath, petitioner would
literally push him to the bathroom or hand him his
toothbrush with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to
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PERSONS: Marriage and Family
put deodorant on his underarms for he would not do it
himself. He refused circumcision.
Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house
while using marijuana. When confronted, he get mad
and pushed her [hard] and hit her in the arm, [and told]
her to go back to the Philippines.
In October 2006, they transferred to another house.
Living in a separate house from his mother did not
improve their marital relationship. His addiction to video
games worsened. They seldom talk to each other as he
did not want to be disturbed while playing games. His
addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He would often
invite his friends to their house for pot sessions, to her
extreme fright and discomfort.
On 18 April 2007. she flew back to the Philippines.
XXX Since then, there was no communication between
them. XX x Petitioner took this as lack of interest on his
part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to
file this petition
She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her
moncy for food. He spent most of his income for video
games. If they ran out of food, it was her mother-in-law
who supported them.
Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical
psychologist, who testified in her direct-examination that
petitioner was subjected to a series of psychological
tests, written and oral form. She likewise subjected the
mother of the petitioner to clarificatory analysis.
In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of
major psychological incapacity of the petitioner, while
respondent is suffering from A Dependent Personality
Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his
parasitic attitude, allowing other people to be the handler
of his own personal sustenance, even hygienic wise,
which somehow distorted the notion on how to handle
marital obligations in terms of mutual understanding,
communication and emotional intent. She was able to
arrive at these findings on respondent although he did
not submit himself for the same psychological tests,
through the clinical assessments and information
supplied by the petitioner, and the description of the
petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the
respondent.
On cross-examination, she described respondent as
“Mama's Boy”, which attitude can be narcissistic
because of his attachment to the mother. He can do
whatever he wants because the mother will always be at
his back. She likewise stated that the respondent is an
R.S.MOJICA
unhygienic person and the reason why he opted to lure
herein petitioner to be his wife was because he wanted
her to be an extension of his maternal needs to sustain
his own desire.
On clarificatory questions of the Court Ms. Tayag
testified that she was able to describe the respondent xxx
because of the description made by the petitioner and her
mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her
by the petitioner, she (petitioner) was not able to have a
bonding or to know well the respondent because more
often than not the respondent was always in the company
of the mother that a pathological symbiotic relationship
developed between the mother and son.
Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA,
the mother of herein petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x
x x was adopted as her direct-testimony, which was
entirely in corroboration of the testimony of petitioner
Abigael An Espina-Dan.
On cross-examiration, she testified that respondent had
not assumed his responsibilities as a married man, his
dependency on drugs, his dependency on his mother
with regard to their finances were just toid by her
daughter, petitioner herein, during their conversations in
the internet and therefore she has no personal knowledge
to what happened to her daughter, petitioner herein.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration of marriage, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DENIED,
for lack of merit and accordingly, the same petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. In its assailed
December 14, 2012 Decision, however, the CA denied
the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring
thus:
“There is no ground to declare the marriage xxx null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus, the court a
quo correctly denied the petition for annulment of
marriage.”
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