CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT

SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.

RA 6713 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always
uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government
resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in
public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge
their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and
skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty.
They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall
at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to
their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to
appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as
members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to
everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or
preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend
prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by
law or when required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall
provide information of their policies and procedures in clear and understandable
language, ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings
whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules
and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of
the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed
rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be
loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally produced
goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country
and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty
against foreign intrusion.
 (g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit
themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public
accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority over the
military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country
above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest
lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant
or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance
of these standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops
authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of
employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of
ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on measures which
provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising the general level of
observance of these standards.

Collantes v. Renomeron

f:

-disbarment complaint against collantes(register of deeds) by renomeron due to unreasonable inaction

regarding the registration of the deeds of absolute sale file by renomeron

-extortion also present: collantes asked for round trip tickets and pocket money from renomeron in
exchange for acting favorably with the registration of the deeds of sale. renomeron did not comply

-renomeron consulted LRA: deeds are registerable

-jan: filed deeds to may: collantes denied all the registration

-admin complaint: dismissal of collantes grave misconduct

I;

whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his
malfeasances as a public official.

H;

yes. misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

-The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes
upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action

-The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars.
[c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything
of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office
(See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or
delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest

-A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

-disbarred

ali v bubong

f:

-admin case against bubong(register of deeds) for illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu
and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law for his relatives

-dismissed from govt service

-On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of bubong

-IBP found that the investigation of the Office of the pres was proven properly through preponderance
of evidence and thus adopted its findings. IBP recommended 2yrs. Investigating commissioner
recommended 5yrs.

i:

is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of
the government.

h:

rule 6. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he
has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he
may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member
of the legal profession.

-a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

-violated. Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
-complainant died pending the case in the IBP. Daughter of complainant requested withdrawal of the
case.

-SC; No. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.

OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN V LADAGA

FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, a RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in a criminal
case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as required by the
Administrative Code. An administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law
without permission from the Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his
appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative and that he was on an approved leave
of absence during his appearances as such counsel. He never took advantage of his position as branch
clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the
criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment. Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to which he is assigned knew his appearances as
such counsel.

Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2)
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees," which provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

x x x
 (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions;

Investigation report: There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in
behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
"Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the
appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as
such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his
Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her.
Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her
out of his compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a
member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as
counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service,
he has maintained his integrity and independence.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes practice of
law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.

HELD: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said
section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession
in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to
the public as a lawyer.

No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be customarily or habitually
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. It does not
pertain to isolated court appearances as in this case. Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as required by law, respondent was reprimanded.
Revised Civil Service Rules, requires permission for public officials to yad yad

Pimentel v Fabros
F;

-dibarment case filed against Vitaliano Fabros and Pacifico Paas by Sen. Aquilino Pimentel for "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" in relation to the discharge of their duties as chairman and
vice-chairman, respectively, of the provincial board of canvassers, Province of Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in
the 1995 elections.

-disbarment case filed against Vitaliano Fabros by Sen. Aquilino Pimentel because he signed the
Provincial Certificate of Canvass and the Statement of Votes per Municipality for the Province of Isabela,
well aware that the same contained false statements which has altered the results of the senatorial
elections in said province.(padded votes for Enrile, Honasan, and Mitra). Their submission of these
falsified documents to the COMELEC is an act constituting a gross violation of the Omnibus Election
Code and existing penal laws, and a serious breach of public trust and of their oaths as duly licensed
members of the Philippine Bar.

- For under section 27 of R.A. 6646 it is provided that any member of the board of canvasser who tampers,
increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election shall be guilty of [an] election
offense.

- And, under provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or

- More than simply affixing their signatures for the purpose of identifying the documents, respondents
signed the documents certifying (and vouching) for the correctness and accuracy of their contents. Even if
they allegedly had no participation in the misdeed, they nevertheless remained responsible for it as officials
of PBC-Isabela. Respondents must bear the consequences of any misstatement or falsehood arising from
such certification.11 They cannot evade responsibility by pointing to other persons who supposedly prepared
the documents in question.12 They had the opportunity to check, as they should have checked, the accuracy
of the figures they were certifying to.13 By certifying to false figures, they committed misconduct subject to
disciplinary action.14 In fact, by invoking the defenses of honest mistake, oversight due to fatigue, even
simple negligence, respondents virtually admitted the existence of the discrepancies in the number of votes
reflected in the questioned documents.15

As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence
and skill required of them.16 As lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful conduct.17 They also violated their oath as officers of the court to foist no falsehood on anyone.
Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of
such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the government service:

CANON 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even greater obligation to observe the
basic tenets of the legal profession because public office is a public trust.

-fined 10k and warned lol

F:

-This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer
(complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and
Pedro Vega (Vega).
-Berenguers=owners of a 58-hectare land.notice of coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

-he Berenguers protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift
coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock pursuant
to DAR Administrative Order No. 09

-DAR Sec did not act on the application as it was found out that it is used for coconuts, cancelled the
Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in
favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative

-pending appeal by berenguers, Florin as Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) directed the
issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession

-Complaint for the disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional
Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and
confederating in the commission for KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND
RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS

ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND PETITIONERS

-IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended that Florin be
"suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants." based on:

-Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted to pasture and
livestock and already classified as residential and industrial land, hence, outside the coverage of
Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate of
Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void

-Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR awarded them to
members of respondent Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL

-We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our observation on the actuations of Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ
of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in
petitioners’ application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug.
Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also knew that petitioners appealed to the
DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners’ application for
exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory when she issued the assailed writs of
execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would be set aside.

-Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and Vega be
dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against them

Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to be imposed.
H:

-if a misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a
lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar

-A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is
clear from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

-Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions of a RARAD
that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be likened that of a judge
whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an administrative complaint

as to the case

-1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution may be had, namely: (1) after a decision
or order has become final and executory;48 (2) pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in
a special order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate or partial judgments

-2009 Rules of the DARAB

Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.

Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator
pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon meritorious grounds,
upon the posting of a sufficient bond

In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying the
Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as it was
seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show whether
BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.

=While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with
a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s
issuance of the writ clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued
only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory

=Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do
injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first time
that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith
attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin
executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ
of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard
of the applicable laws and jurisprudence

-suspension 3mos.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

people v pineda

f:

-3 people, using rifles and a homemade gun fired at the house of the Mendozas resulting in the death of
5 people

-criminal case was filed but the accused moved for consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case."
Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."

-fiscal sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than
one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed."

-respondent judge denied motion

-judge reasoned that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating
the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the
statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained
by respondent Judge could easily be remedied

-not a complex crime

-Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

-in this case, according to jurisprudence separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply
rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.

We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of the
witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts
constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If
true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a
complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

-The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the
elements of that offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the
real intent to kill.

-We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney,
by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is
not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on
the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be
unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit
thereof.

-[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of
offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party.

- A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is
necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the
present case fits into any of the situations just recited.

-reinstatement of the 5 criminal cases

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Misamin v atty San Juan

A.C. No. 1418. August 31, 1976

Fernando, J.

Facts: respondent admits appearing as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in the proceeding for
violations of minimum wage law before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila
Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise
of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is
not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.
The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15,
1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said
counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the
reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel
for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that his
lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he
was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared,
apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he
brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took
active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person."

Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable.

Held: No. There can only be suspicion that he used his public office, despite being a public trust, and not
his legal knowledge, it shall not pass being unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member
of the bar, should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not
only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of
membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied.
The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent
of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his
oath
. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a
public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at

Vitriolo v Dasig

Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. Almost all complainants in the instant case are
high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December
4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED,
committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:

She demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in
Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of
name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a
student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of
name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a
student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable
amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED.

Issue: Whether the Respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in
violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests
pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a
lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and Rule 6.02
of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross
misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three
years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the
IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys
upon finality of this decision.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.

A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006 HUYSSEN

vs. GUTIERREZ
Fact: Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all
American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration
Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a
period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit
was indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent
prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the
complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After
one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured
her that said amount would be returned. Respondent promised to return the money and
issued worthless checks. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant in
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On 5
November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report
recommending the disbarment of respondent. On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors approved the Investigating Commissioner’s report with modification.

Issue: Whether the Respondent, a Government Officer and a Lawyer is liable thus must
be Disbarred in the Practice of Law.

Held: Yes, The court agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be
severely sanctioned. We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service
in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private
practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds
a responsible public office. Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in
consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging
or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service
from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office
or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office
betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from
one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts are more despicable,
for not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts
with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds.

Disbarred

Canon 6: CANNONS APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

CASE No. 32

[A. C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007 ]

DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG respondent.

PONENTE: PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Nature of the Complaint: Disbarment or Suspension against Atty. Jose R.

Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

1992, Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Imbang in filing civil and criminal

actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.

o She gave Imbang P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt

for P5,000 only.

o Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the

Jovellanoses. Imbang never allowed her to enter the courtroom and

always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several

hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and

rescheduled. This happened six times and for each “appearance” in court,

respondent charged her P350. (*Ito ‘yung sinasabing case ni Atty. Canlas

na nagdedelay ng case, lagging suspend )

o Ramos was shocked to learn that Imbang never filed any case against the

Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's

Office (PAO). (*Utak ni Imbang!)

IMBANG’s CONTENTIONS:

o Ramos knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In

fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in

the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan,

Laguna and was assigned as counsel for Ramos' daughter.

o In 1992, Ramos requested him to help her file an action for damages

against the Jovellanoses. Because he was with the PAO and aware that

Ramos was not an indigent, he declined. (*Alibi)

o Nevertheless, he advised Ramos to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative

who was a private practitioner. Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the

case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.

o Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, Ramos allegedly remained

adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she “might

spend” the cash on hand, Ramos asked Imbang to keep the P5,000 while

she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee. (*Utak talaga!

Galing mag-alibi!)

o On April 15, 1994, Imbang resigned from the PAO. A few months later or

in September 1994, Ramos again asked Imbang to assist her in suing the

Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, Imbang

agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as

he lost contact with Ramos.

IBP findings (CBD):

o The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of

the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property

collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which

he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.

However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is

competent on the matter.

o CBD Recommendations: Suspension from the practice of law for three

years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the

amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.

o Board of Governors: adopted and approved the findings of the CBD,

however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the

restitution ofP5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from

1995 or, in case of Imbangs failure to return the total amount, an

additional suspension of six months.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.

HELD: YES, as per SC’s decision.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and

integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more

conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not

only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public

service.

The SC supported this with three explanations:

1. Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees

Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and

Employees provides:

o Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the

Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts

and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby

declared unlawful:

o (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public

officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

o (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their

official function.

In this instance, Imbang received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a

receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance

of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.

2. Revised Administrative Code

Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code

provides:

o The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending

free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,

administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.

As a PAO lawyer, Imbang should not have accepted attorney's fees from the

complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.

3. Code of Professional Responsibility

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

o CANON 1. — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the

observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by Imbang

when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in

consideration of his legal services.

Consequently, Imbang's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule

18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the

private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as Ramos' counsel.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of

Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON – ON THE
PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON – ON THE
PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009

BRION, J.:
Facts:
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public
officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment
for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section
7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year
prohibition shall likewise apply.
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-
year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of
law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public
employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict
or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired,
resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private
practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of
her separation from government employment.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private counsel before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon within
the 1 year prohibition.
Held:
NO!
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees.
Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an
exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions:
first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to
conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee's
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under
subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an
exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public
officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any
impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government
official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote
the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to
contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision
provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an incumbent court official or court employee may
undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business with
the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnel's duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render
services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar
institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential information acquired
while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects
adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment.
[Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the practice of
law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under both provisions, a common objective is
to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use
confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with court personnel still
with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it
applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent
discussed above. Atty. Buffe's situation falls under Section 7.
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's admission that she immediately engaged in private
practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her
separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section
7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year
before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated
official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has
the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only
for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the
Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves
Atty. Buffe's basic premises.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of
professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has
pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

PNB V Cedo

Facts: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02 that states: A lawyer shall
not, after leaving gov’t. service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
which he had intervened with in said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset
management Group of PNB.

During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of
steel sheets to Ms. Ong and 2.) intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil
action arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms.
Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firm
Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner.
Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of Ms. Ong’s case. He
also claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by
Atty. Ferrer.

Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02.

Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02.

In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the
atty. utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere
fact that their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
other side.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
the parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.