TITLE Tecson vs.

Lim

GR NUMBER 161434, 161634 and 161824

DATE March 3, 2004

PONENTE Vitug, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Citizenship, Natural-born citizen as a requirement to be

elected as President of the Philippines

FACTS
This is a consolidated petitions of GR Nos. 161434, 161634
and 161824 where the petitioners wanted to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of the respondent. Respondent
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ)
filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to

disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by
claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines.

RULING(S) Yes. Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution

expresses: “No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day
of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election”.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the
evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is
the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of
Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11,
1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo
Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound
to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. Considering that the allegations of
petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since
Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902,
there is no doubt that Allan Poe, father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter
was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935
Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the
Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is
legitimate or illegitimate.
TITLE Kulayan v. Tan

GR NUMBER 187298

DATE July 3, 2012

PONENTE Sereno, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Calling out power; power of the Governor to Declare State

of Emergency and to Issue Proclamation No. 1-09

FACTS On 15 January 2009, three members from the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.1 Andreas
Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in
Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and
ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer,
were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project
for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three
armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).2 The leader of the alleged
kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at
the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader
Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the

Department of Interior and Local Government, announced
to the media that government troops had cornered some
one hundred and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along
with the three (3) hostages.9 However, the ASG made
contact with the authorities and demanded that the military
pull its troops back from the jungle area.10 The
government troops yielded and went back to their
barracks; the Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp,
while police and civilian forces pulled back from the
terrorists’ stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen (15) kilometers.
Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the
ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military
camps and bases in the different barangays in Jolo.11 The
authorities were given no later than 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply.12

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No.

1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu.13 It cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration,
describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human
Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which
bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder
and lawless violence.

ISSUE(S) Whether of not, the Governor has the calling out power?

RULING(S) No. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with

the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding.
In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police,
and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is
the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code.
TITLE Tañada v. Angara

GR NUMBER 118295

DATE May 2, 1997

PONENTE Panganiban, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Art. 2, preliminary issue, Sec. 2, Sec. 19 and Art. 7, Sec.

21; review of treaty-making/signing; entry into WTO as
legislative wisdom

FACTS To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought

by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of
three multilateral institutions—inspired by that grand
political body, the United Nations—were discussed at
Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the
World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation
and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing
countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the
third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was
to foster order and predictability in world trade and to
minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for
a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the
United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took
off. What remained was only GATT—the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties
governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with
no institutionalized body administering the agreements or
dependable system of dispute settlement.

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of

negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo
Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth
to that administering body—the World Trade Organization—
with the signing of the “Final Act” in Marrakesh, Morocco
and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members.
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined
WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articu lated by
President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra),
of improving “Philippine access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners, through the reduction
of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of
the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97 ratiying the WTO Agreement.

RULING(S) No. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave

abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the
Senate’s processes, this Court cannot find any cogent
reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate’s
exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement
granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution.64 It
is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional
principles require the State to develop an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to
protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true
that such principles—while serving as judicial and legislative
guides—are not in themselves sources of causes of action.
Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the
promotion of industries “which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers
is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.
TITLE Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land
Bank of the Philippines

GR NUMBER 164195

DATE April 5, 2011

PONENTE Chico-Nazario, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Transcendental importance

FACTS Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the

government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
Government took petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996.
Land Bank valued the properties atP165,484.47 per hectare,
but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount.
Consequently, on instruction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), Land Bank deposited for AFC and HPI
P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, respectively, or a total
of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the expropriated
properties, Land Bank eventually made additional deposits,
placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32
(P71,891,256.62 + P339,877,911.70), an increase of nearly
five times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still,
they filed separate complaints for just compensation with
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was
dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a case with the RTC for the proper
determination of just compensation.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of

petitioners’ properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest
plus attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to the Third
Division of the Supreme Court where the RTC ruling was
upheld. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Third Division
deleted the award of interest and attorney’s fees and entry
of judgment was issued. The just compensation of which
was only settled on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed a second
motion for reconsideration with respect to denial of award of
legal interest and attorney’s fees and a motion to refer the
second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted
accordingly, restoring in toto the ruling of the RTC.
Respondent filed their second motion for reconsideration as
well for holding of oral arguments with the Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-
Intervention by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the standard of “transcendental importance”

cannot justify the negation of the doctrine of immutability of
a final judgment and the abrogation of a vested right in
favor of the Government that respondent LBP represents.

RULING(S) No. The doctrine “transcendental importance,” contrary to

the assertion it is applicable only to legal standing
questions, is justified in negating the doctrine of
immutability of judgment. It will be a very myopic reading
of the ruling as the context clearly shows that the phrase
“transcendental importance” was used only to emphasize
the overriding public interest involved in this case. The
Supreme Court said in their resolution:

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental

importance is not hard to discern from these discussions. A
constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the
all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can
compensation in an eminent domain case be “just” when the
payment for the compensation for property already taken
has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed
Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this
case is to forget that an expropriation involves the
government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that under
eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply
to government who carries the burden of showing that these
standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case
as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted
view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.

More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter

before us is of transcendental importance to the nation
because of the subject matter involved – agrarian reform, a
societal objective of that the government has unceasingly
sought to achieve in the past half century.

From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the

higher interests of justice are duly served.
TITLE Roque v. COMELEC

GR NUMBER 188456

DATE September 10, 2009

PONENTE Velasco, Jr., J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Venture agreement of COMELEC; contract-award

implementation

FACTS Petitioners filed a petitioner for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction and are suing as taxpayers and
concerned citizens. They seek to nullify respondent
COMELEC’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project
to the joint venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation
(Smartmatic)1 and to permanently prohibit the Comelec,
TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the
corresponding contract-award.

On Dec 22, 1997 Congress enacted RA 8346 authorizing the

adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the May
11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. However
during 1998, 2001 and 2004, purely manual elections were
done. On Jan 23, 2007, the amendatory of RA 9369 was
passed authorizing again the COMELEC to use the AES.
However, the COMELEC did not use any AES in the May 14
2007 elections. On July 19, 2009, the COMELEC and the TIM
and Smartmatic (provider) signed the contract for the
automated tallying and recording of votes cast nation-wide
in the May 2010 elections. For around P7 billion, the
COMELEC leased 82,200 optical scanners, related equipment
and hired ancillary services provider to be used in the May
2010 elections.

Hence this petition was filed to enjoin the signing of the

Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of
the terms of the contract and other agreements between the
provider and its subcontractors.

ISSUE(S) Was there an invalid joint venture agreement between

COMELEC and the provider during the bidding that would be
in violation of the SC’s holding in the Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC
(Infotech) which requires a joint venture to include a copy
of its JVA DURING the bidding?

RULING(S) None. As petitioners observed, that the TIM- Smartmatic

joint venture remained an unincorporated aggroupment
during the bid- opening and evaluation stages. It ought to
be stressed, however, that the fact of non-incorporation was
without a vitiating effect on the validity of the tender offers.

For the bidding ground rules, as spelled out primarily in the

RFP and the clarificatory bid bulletins, does not require, for
bidding purposes, that there be an incorporation of the
bidding joint ventures or consortiums. In fact, Bid Bulletin
Nos. 19 and 20 recognize the existence and the acceptability
of proposals of unincorporated joint ventures. In response to
a poser, for example, regarding the 60% Filipino ownership
requirement in a joint venture arrangement, the SBAC, in its
Bid Bulletin No. 22, stated: “In an unincorporated joint
venture, determination of the required Filipino participation
may be made by examining the terms and conditions of the
[JVA] and other supporting financial documents submitted
by the joint venture.” And the Court held that petitioners
have not shown that incorporation is part of the pass/fail
criteria used in determining eligibility.
TITLE Bayan v. Romulo

GR NUMBER 159618

DATE February 1, 2011

PONENTE Velasco, Jr. J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Public right; principles of international law; contracts

FACTS Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group

established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs during the period material to thiscase.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity
as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key

determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions

The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered

grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On
December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d·Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and concurrence
process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab

initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or
otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles
of international law.

RULING(S) No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as

void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being
at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles
of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the
fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it
precludes our country from delivering an American criminal
to the ICC.

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners’

earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that
the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated
its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to
international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard

that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its
desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence
of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national
criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
Petitioner, labors under the erroneous impression that the
Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing
high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial
and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who
may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute
can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the
US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC,
assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both
countries to the Rome Statute have been met.

Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually prohibits

is the surrender by either party of individuals to
international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of
the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime
under its existing laws. With this view, there is nothing
immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act
of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant
to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered
criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
TITLE People v. Duavis (can’t find this case)

GR NUMBER 190681

DATE December 7, 2011

PONENTE

NATURE/KEYWORDS

FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING(S)
TITLE Chavez v. JBC

GR NUMBER 202242

DATE April 16, 2013

PONENTE Mendoza, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS 8th member of the Judicial Bar Council; representative from

Congress

FACTS In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth

member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this

petition. It should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent
contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers
that both houses of congress should have one representative
each, and that these two houses are permanent and
mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral
system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE(S) Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the

Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of
7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art
VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

RULING(S) Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as
to having only one representative that would come from
either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution
only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral

body refers to its primary function in government – to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in
the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The
same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of
these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of
JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.
TITLE Komatsu v. CA

GR NUMBER 127682

DATE April 24, 1998

PONENTE Regalado, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Dismissal of 2nd motion for reconsideration

FACTS Before the Court is a pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in

behalf of petitioner and denominated as a Motion for Leave
to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of September 10, 1997. This resolution does
not in the least depart from or enervate the specific
prohibition against second motions for reconsideration
which are applicable thereto. Considering however, the
increasing practice by defeated parties of conjuring
scenarios which they blame for their debacle instead of
admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is
constrained to once again express its displeasure against
such unethical disregard of the canons for responsible
advocacy, with the warning that this insidious pattern of
professional misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to
pass with impunity.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Resolution dated September 10, 1997 is

a decision of the Supreme Court.

RULING(S) No. As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., it

has been stressed that these “resolutions” are not
“decisions” within the above constitutional requirements;
they merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain
the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision.

On top of that, it now veers towards this Court, spinning the

yarn that retired Justice Teodoro Padilla first approached
the ponente to whom its petition had been raffled, and
asked for a disposition in favor of respondents as a
“birthday and parting gift”; that said ponente declined and
unloaded the case such that it was again raffled to a good
friend of Justice Padilla. The records, however, show that
this case was directly raffled to the Second Division on
January 28, 1997 and there was no prior ponente to whom
it was assigned who then supposedly unloaded it; and under
the internal rules of this Court, when a case is unloaded,
there is no need for holding a second raffle.
TITLE Mamburao v. Ombudsman

GR NUMBER 139141-42

DATE November 15, 2000

PONENTE Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Ombudsman’s power and duties

FACTS Sometime in October, 1994, Mamburao, Inc. (Mamburao),

as represented by its general manager Peter H. Messer,
applied for a P6 million loan with the Balagtas Branch of
Landbank of the Philippines (Landbank) in order to finance
the construction of a restaurant in Bocaue, Bulacan.
According to petitioners, they were initially informed by the
bank that, based upon an appraisal of their proposed
collateral, a loan of about P5 million could be expected.
Petitioners claim that sometime in February, 1995, the
amount of the loan was subsequently reduced to P2 to 3
million because the newly appointed branch manager,
respondent Rodolfo D. Abella, ordered the reappraisal of
their collateral. On 21 April 1995, Messer requested for
another appraisal, but was turned down by Abella, resulting
in a shouting match between the two. Consequently, by
means of a letter dated 24 April 1995, petitioners withdrew
their loan application from the Balagtas Branch. Sometime
in June, 1995, petitioners re-applied for a loan with the
Landbank branch located in Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioners
contend that they were informed by the officers of the
Baliuag Branch that a loan in the amount of P6.3 million
could be expected provided the lessors of the construction
site, spouses Felipe P. Mendoza and Maria G. Mendoza,
signed a “Consent and Waiver” document prepared by the
bank. On 13 June 1996, the Mendozas signed the waiver.
However, instead of submitting the loan application of
Mamburao to the board of directors of Landbank,
respondent Lydia P. Fernandez, Head of the Northern and
Central Luzon Banking Group, ordered the “rollback” of the
loan application to the Provincial Lending Center (PLC) of
the Baliuag Branch headed by respondent Nanny P. Garcia,
who was appointed thereto by Fernandez on 18 June 1996,
just five days after the Mendozas signed the “Consent and
Waiver” document. Petitioners insist that the rollback of
their loan application was instigated by Abella since the
latter would be embarrassed if the Baliuag Branch
accommodated petitioners with a P6.3 million loan after the
Balagtas Branch had reduced the loan amount to P2 to 3
million. The loan application of petitioner was formally
denied by the Baliuag Branch in a letter dated 29 August
1996, prompting petitioners to file with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan the following complaints:
(1) slander and libel against Garcia (; (2) falsification of
documents against Abella and use of falsified documents
against Garcia; and (3) perjury against Garcia and Abella.

ISSUE(S) Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of

 discretion when he dismissed the criminal charges against
private respondents.

RULING(S) No. The Ombudsman’s decision not to issue the subpoena

duces tecum requested for by petitioners was not made in
grave abuse of its discretion. Section 1, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure defines preliminary
investigation as “an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial. Under Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman has
the power to investigate and conduct preliminary
investigations. Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting
it, the courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s
supervision and control over the preliminary investigation
conducted by him. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power
to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a
preliminary investigation.
TITLE Salvador v. Desierto

GR NUMBER 135249

DATE January 16, 2004

PONENTE Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Denial of motion for reconsideration, Ombudsman’s power

FACTS From March 19, 1975 to April 22, 1977, Hotel Mirador, Inc.
(Hotel Mirador) obtained three (3) loans from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) amounting to a
total of P95,000,000.00, to finance the construction and
development of its hotel building. On October 8, 1992, then
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
134 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) to inventory all
behest loans, determine the parties responsible therefor,
and recommend the appropriate actions to be taken by the
government. In determining a behest loan, he also issued
Memorandum Order No. 615 dated November 9, 1992,
specifying the criteria.

Among the accounts acted upon by the Committee were the

loans obtained by Hotel Mirador from the DBP. Petitioner
Atty. Orlando Salvador was then the PCGG consultant
detailed with the Committee. Based on the criteria provided
by Memorandum Order No. 61, the Committee, through
petitioner, found that the loans obtained by Hotel Mirador
from the DBP were behest loans. Thus, petitioner filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint6 dated
September 18, 1996 against the directors and officers of
Hotel Mirador for violation of Section 3(e) and (g), of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.

On May 8, 1998, then Ombudsman Desierto issued the

assailed Resolution dated April 27, 1998 dismissing
petitioner’s complaint.

ISSUE(S) Does the respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his

discretion in ruling that the complaint against respondents
was barred by prescription and that Hotel Mirador had
sufficient assets at the time the DBP loans were granted?

RULING(S) On the issue of whether respondent Ombudsman

committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint against respondents, let it be stressed that the
Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal
case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint
forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or
substance or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his
view, the complaint is in due and proper form and
substance.

In Espinosa vs. Office of the Ombudsman, we held: “The

prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is
vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the
Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the
Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a
wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention. This Court consistently refrains from
interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman
who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.”

Indeed, we have consistently ruled that unless there are

good and compelling reasons, we cannot interfere in the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigating and prosecutory
powers.
TITLE Biraogo v. PTC

GR NUMBER 192935

DATE December 7, 2010

PONENTE Mendoza, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Presidential Truth Commission; equal protection clause

FACTS
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth

Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.PTC is a

mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President

with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and

corruption committed by third-level public officers and

employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories

during the previous administration, and to submit its finding

and recommendations to the President, Congress and the

Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative

body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot

adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in

disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,

collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and

make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but

it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order

their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot

determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to

warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and

to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.

ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of

separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public
offices, agencies and commissions.
2. Whether E.O. is constitutional.

RULING(S)
1. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of

the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no

need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the

operation of the commission because, whatever funds the

Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be

the very source of the funds for the commission. The

amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject

to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no

impropriety in the funding.

2. The Court finds difficulty in upholding the

constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its

apparent transgression of the equal protection clause

enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987

Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly

situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred

and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and

institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar

manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to

secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against

intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned

by the express terms of a statue or by its improper

execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined

according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause

permits classification. Such classification, however, to be

valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has

four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial

distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)

It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It

applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the

members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to

rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of

the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth

commission is to investigate and find out the truth

concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during

the previous administration only. The intent to single out the

previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

TITLE Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan

GR NUMBER 160 SCRA 843

DATE April 27, 1988

PONENTE Per Curiam

NATURE/KEYWORDS Powers;

FACTS
In G.R. Nos. 79690–707 “Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,

and Mandamus under Rule 65," petitioner Enrique A.

Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to

restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez

from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of

Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163–12177 on

the ground that said cases were filed by said Tanodbayan

without legal and constitutional authority, since under the

1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2,1987, it

is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent

Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases with the

Sandiganbayan.

In G.R. No. 80578, petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, on

substantially the same ground as the first petition, prays

that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting

preliminary investigations and filing similar cases with the

Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE(S)
What is the duty of Ombudsman and the Tanodbayan?

RULING(S)
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as

distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged

with the duty to: “Investigate on its own, or on complaint by

any person, any act or omission of any public official,

employee, office or agency, when such act or omission

appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.”

Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to

the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special

Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is

supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the

Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct

preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal

cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the

Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February

2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such

authority.
TITLE Quimpo v. Tanodbayan

GR NUMBER 72553

DATE December 2, 1986

PONENTE Melencio-Herrera, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS

FACTS On July 17, 1984, petitioner filed with respondent

Tanodbayan a complaint against private respondents for
violation of Republic Act No. 3091 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) approved on August 17, 1960. "Petitioner
alleged that Admiral Adjusters and Surveyors, Inc. (AASI),
of which he was the president, was engaged by Petrophil
Corporation to render survey services for one (1) year from
March 1, 1982 to February 28, 1983; that upon the
expiration of the contract, it was renewed for another period
of one (1) year, from March 1, 1983 to February 2, 1984;
that sometime in October, 1983, private respondents Greg
Dimaano and Danny Remo, as manager and analyst,
respectively, of the Bulk Distribution Department and MPED
of Petrophil Corporation, caused the withholding of the fees
due AASI and required AASI to submit an explanation of the
losses caused by leaking valves as reflected in ASSI's
survey reports; that despite AASI's explanation, private
respondents still refused to release the payments and even
threatened to forfeit AASI's performance bond and claim
damages and losses from AASI; that despite AASI's
submission of several explanations, private respondents
refused to release the fees amounting to P147,300.00.
"Petitioner further alleged that private respondents favored
Greater Marine Cargo Surveyors to enable it to win the
bidding in January 1984.

Private respondents moved to dismiss the Complaint

alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, which Motion
was opposed by the petitioner, On March 15, 1985, the
Tanodbayan issued his questioned Decision maintaining that
he had no jurisdiction over government-owned or controlled
corporations created under the Corporation Law. He relied
on Opinion No. 62, Series of 1976 of then Secretary of
Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, holding that when Section 6,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution mentions "government-
owned or controlled corporations," "the intent is only to
those created by special law."

ISSUE(S) Whether or not PETROPHIL Corporation, a subsidiary of the

Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), is a government-
owned or controlled corporation, whose employees fall
under Tanodbayan jurisdiction.

RULING(S) While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created"

as a government-owned or controlled corporation, after it
was acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or
controlled corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of
PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded
and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to
perform functions related to government programs and
policies on oil, a vital commodity in the economic life of the
nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent
adjunct to perform essential government or government-
related functions, as the marketing arm of PNOC to assist
the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum
products to assure and maintain an adequate and stable
domestic supply.

The fact remains that it was acquired with capital belonging

to the Government and Government money is utilized in its
operations. In other words, there can be no gainsaying that
as of the date of its acquisition by the Government utilizing
public funds, PETROPHIL, while retaining its own corporate
existence, became a government-owned or controlled
corporation within the Constitutional precept. Its
employees, therefore, are public servants falling within the
investigatory and prosecutory jurisdiction of the
Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act.
TITLE Acop v. Ombudsman

GR NUMBER 120422

DATE September 27, 1995

PONENTE Davide, Jr., J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Office of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction

FACTS On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the

notorious robbery gang, “Kuratong Baleleng,” were killed in
an alleged shootout with composite teams of the National
Capital Regional Command (NCRC), Traffic Management
Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC), Central Police District Command (CPDC) and
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC).

On May 22, 1995, Senior Police Office (SPO) 2 Eduardo de

los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command (CIC) made
an exposé, stating that there was no shootout. De los Reyes
stated that the eleven (11) suspected members of the
“Kuratong Baleleng” gang were victims of summary
execution. The following day, he executed a sworn
statement to this effect. . . . On May 24, 1995, the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received the separate
sworn statements of Myrna Abalora, Nenita G.

Alap-ap and Imelda Pancho Montero, who are relatives of

the slain suspected gang members, accusing the PACC,
NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder. On May 26, 1995,
Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, in a handwritten
note, directed public respondent Deputy Ombudsman
Casaclang to monitor the investigations being conducted by
the Commission on Human Rights, the Senate Committee
on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Director for Investigation regarding the alleged
shoutout.

In response to the above directive, public respondent

Casaclang issued on the same date Office Order No. 95-17,
Series of 1995, directing Ombudsman Investigator
Bienvenido C. Blancaflor and Associate Graft Investigation
Officers Richard U. Correos and Ricardo A. Sullano to
monitor the investigations being conducted by the above-
mentioned agencies.

On June 1, 1995, public respondent Casaclang issued Office

Order No. 95-18, creating a panel of investigators with
Ombudsman Investigator Bienvenido Blancaflor as head of
the panel and Investigators Avelino C. Macamus, Jr. and
Domingo Doctor Jr. as members. . . . On the same date,
respondent P/Chief Supt. Job A. Mayo, Jr., in a letter-
complaint addressed to the Ombudsman, charged
petitioners and several others with murder in connection
with the killing of the eleven (11) suspected “Kuratong
Baleleng” gang members. He attached to his letter-
complaint the Investigation Report dated May 31, 1995,
signed by him in his capacity as Chairman of the Special
 Investigating Committee, PNP. . . . The letter-complaint was
docketed at the Office of the Ombudsman as case OMB-
AFP-CRIM-95-0084.

On June 2, 1995, respondent Casaclang directed the Panel

of Investigator[s] to terminate the investigation and submit
its resolution within 60 days from receipt of his order.

On June 7, 1995, respondent Casaclang issued a subpoena

duces tecum/ad testificandum addressed to PNP Director
General Recaredo Sarmiento, directing him or his duly
authorized representative to appear before the Panel of
Investigators and to submit the “After Operations Report” of
the PNP relative to the operations which resulted in the May
18, 1995, incident. . . . On June 8, 1995, the Panel of
Investigators submitted their Evaluation Report in OMB-
AFP-CRIM-95-0084 to public respondent Casaclang. The
report recommended that a preliminary investigation be
conducted against herein petitioners and all the
participating personnel of the NCRC, PACC, CIC, TMC and
CPDC listed in the After Operations Report of the PNP. . . .

On June 13, 1995, respondent Mayo, in behalf of the PNP

Director General, submitted to the Ombudsman the
required After Operations Report of the PNP. The report
contained the list of personnel and officers involved in the
May 18, 1995, operations against the “Kuratong Baleleng”
gang. . . . On June 14, 1995, public respondent Casaclang
issued the questioned order directing petitioner[s] and nine
others to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence within ten days from receipt thereof.

ISSUE(S) 1. Whether it is the Office of the Ombudsman or the Office

of the Special Prosecutor which has jurisdiction over the
complaint in question; and

2. Whether or not public respondent Deputy Ombudsman

for Military Manuel Casaclang committed grave abuse of
discretion when he set the case for preliminary
investigation and required the petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits before any preliminary evaluation of
the complaint as required by Section 2, Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

RULING(S) 1. Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one

considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may “exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law
,” it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to
place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress
may remove some of the powers granted to the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the
Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special
Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties
as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did
through the passage of R.A. No. 6770. Through the said
law, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman.
2. No. The deliberations on the Deputy for the military
establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that
such deputy is prohibited from performing other
functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On
the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional
provisions reveal otherwise. Therefore, nothing can
prevent Congress from giving the Ombudsman
supervision and control over the Ombudsman’s
deputies, one being the deputy for the military
establishment. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer
cases involving non-military personnel for investigation
by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at
bench, therefore, no irregularity attended the referral
by the Acting Ombudsman of the Kuratong Baleleng
case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a
panel of investigators.
TITLE Camanag v. Hon Guerrero

GR NUMBER 121017

DATE February 17, 1997

PONENTE Hermosisima, Jr., J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Powers of the Ombudsman

FACTS On August 2, 1993, the Professional Regulations

Commission (PRC) issued the Table of Results of those who
failed the May, 1993 Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
Licensure Examinations. On Page 11 thereof, Sequence No.
493, petitioner Olivia B. Camanag was listed as having
failed with a general average of 50.00%.

However, on December 15, 1993, petitioner in

accomplishing her Personal Data sheet (CSC form No. 212)
as employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
indicated under question No. 18 that she passed the May,
1993 Board Examinations with a rating of 75.42%. On July
4, 1994, an anonymous letter was sent to PRC Chairman
Hermogenes P. Pobre ‘claiming that certain BIR employees
allegedly passed the CPA Licensure Exams under anomalous
circumstances’.

Still, on July 28, 1994, petitioner claimed to have received

what was purportedly a ‘Certified True Copy’ of her passing
rating sheet, allegedly signed by PRC Acting Assistant Chief
Leandro O. Ordenes (Mr. Leandro O. Ordenes is actually the
Records Officer of the PRC.

On August 24, 1994, PRC Chairman Pobre wrote

Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez that BIR employees Marilyn
Lee, Connie Dimapilis, Eilene Purificacion, Elenita Villamor,
Lodiminda Crizaldo, petitioner Olivia Camanag and Maria
Rosario de los Reyes, did not actually pass the CPA
licensure examinations.

On October 5, 1994, Associate Ombudsman Investigator

(AOI) Joaquin S. Bumanlag set the fact-finding investigation
of the matter on October 11, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. He also
issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Chief of the BIR
Personnel Division.

On December 1, 1994, AOI Bumanglag concluded his

factfinding investigation with a Report finding probable
cause against petitioner for violation of Article 171(4) of the
Revised Penal Code. AOI Bumanglag recommended a
preliminary investigation to be conducted on the case, and
at the same time, he executed under oath the
corresponding affidavit-complaint against petitioner. On
December 19, 1994, Ombudsman Investigator (OI) Rainier
C. Almazan, acting on the said affidavit-complaint, directed
petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit.

ISSUE(S) Does the office of the Ombudsman have the power to

investigate and prosecute individuals on matters filed before
 it?

RULING(S) Yes. The inevitable conclusion is that the Ombudsman,

under the 1987 Constitution, particularly under paragraph
8, Section 13, Article XI, may be validly empowered with
prosecutorial functions by the legislature, and this the latter
did when it passed R.A. No. 6670, which gave the
Ombudsman, among others, the power to investigate and
prosecute individuals on matters and/or complaints referred
or filed before it.
TITLE Macalinao v. Sandiganbayan

GR NUMBER 140199-200

DATE February 6, 2002

PONENTE Pardo, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman’s jurisdiction

FACTS On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of

the Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman,
filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against
petitioner and Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa
through falsification of official documents (Criminal Case No.
18022) and frustrated estafa through falsification of
mercantile documents.

FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then the Assistant Manager

of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans
Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-
controlled corporation with offices at EDSA corner Reliance
St., Mandaluyong, and hence, a public officer, while in the
performance of his official functions, was alleged to take
advantage of his position, committing the offense in relation
to his office and conspiring and confederating with his
spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the owner of Wacker
Marketing, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and by means of deceit defraud the Philippine
National Construction Corporation.

That he prepared the application with the Philippine National

Bank, Buendia Branch for the issuance of a demand draft in
the amount of NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO & 11/100 PESOS
(P983,682.11), Philippine Currency, in favor of Bankers
Trust Company, accused FELICITO S. MACALINO
superimposed the name “Wacker Marketing” as payee to
make it appear that the demand draft was payable to it,
when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well
knew, it was the Bankers Trust Company which was the real
payee as indicated in Check Voucher No. 3-800-89 and PNB
Check No. B236746 supporting said application for demand
draft.

ISSUE(S) Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public

officer within the coverage of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

RULING(S) No. Petitioner contends that an employee of the PNCC is not

a public officer as defined under Republic Act No. 3019, as
follows: “Sec. 2. (b) Public officer includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the unclassified or classified or
exempted service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government as defined in the preceding
paragraph.” We agree. To resolve the issue, we resort to
the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, on the Accountability of
Public Officers, provides:

“Section 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as

protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations x x x.”

“Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the

following powers, functions and duties: Investigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper and
inefficient. x x x Direct, upon complaint or at its instance,
any public official or employee of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of
any government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse
or impropriety in the performance of duties.
TITLE Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera

GR NUMBER

DATE September 30, 2005

ponente Callejo, Sr., J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Powers of the Ombudsman

FACTS Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of office on
August 3, 2001 and assumed his post on August 7, 2001.
He is in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group.

On August 20, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received

the Sworn Complaint dated July 28, 2003 filed by then
Director Eduardo S. Matillano of the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNPCIDG). In the said sworn complaint, Director Matillano
charged respondent Valera with criminal offenses involving
violation of various provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019,2 the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
(TCCP), Executive Order No. 38,3 Executive Order No. 2984
and R.A. No. 67135 as well a s administrative offenses of
Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn
complaint was respondent Valera’s brother-in-law Ariel
Manongdo for violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE(S) Does the office of the Ombudsman have the power to hear
the complaint filed before it?

RULING(S) Yes. R.A. No. 6770 was enacted to provide for the functional
and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman.
It substantially reiterates the constitutional provisions
relating to the Office of the Ombudsman. In addition, R.A.
No. 6770 granted to the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial functions and made the Office of the Special
Prosecutor an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman. As such, R.A. No. 6770 vests on the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, under the supervision and control
and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, the following
powers: (a) To conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; (b) To enter into plea bargaining
agreement; and (c) To perform such other duties assigned
to it by the Ombudsman. Based on the pertinent provisions
of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, the powers of the
Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the
following: investigatory power; prosecutory power; public
assistance functions; authority to inquire and obtain
information; and function to adopt, institute and implement
preventive measures. The Ombudsman’s investigatory and
prosecutory power has been characterized as plenary and
unqualified: The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient
TITLE Perez v. Sandiganbayan

GR NUMBER 166062

DATE September 26, 2006

PONENTE Chico-Nazario, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Powers of the Ombudsman

FACTS Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer of San

Manuel, Pangasinan, respectively. They “willfully, unlawfully,
and criminally caused the purchase of 1 computer unit
costing P120,000 acquisition by personal canvass,” violating
Sec. 362 and 367 of the LGC. No public bidding occurred
and no Committee of Awards was constituted to approve the
procurement Salvador and Juanita gave Mobil Link
Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or
preference through manifest partiality, showing evident bad
faith and gross, inexcusable negligence, but this was not
included in the original information, so it was recommended
by the Special Prosecutor that the information be amended
to show the manner of the commission of the offense, based
on the Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original
information.

The amended information was admitted. The petitioners

challenge this, saying that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in accepting the amended
information, which had no approval from the Ombudsman,
amounting to denial of due process.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Office of the Special Prosecutor has the
power to file information without delegation from the
Ombudsman.

RULING(S) No. The Ombudsman’s margin notes order was to "study

whether the accused, assuming arguendo that there was no
overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the seller of the subject computer” and
“submit your recommendation soonest.”

It is clear that the recommendation must be submitted to

one who has authority to implement such recommendation.
The Ombudsman has the power to file information, as well
as the power to delegate his powers. Office Order No. 40-05
delegates the disposition of administrative and criminal
cases (filing information) to the Deputy Ombudsman, but
NOT the Special Prosecutor (which is included in the Office
of the Ombudsman). All that is delegated to the Special
Prosecutor is the discretional authority to review and modify
the Deputy Ombudsman-authorized information, but without
departing from the basic resolution.

Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor are given the

same rank and salary (RA 6770), but they do NOT have the
same functions.
Since there is no express delegation, the Court looked into
whether or not there was an implied delegation. RA 6770
provides that the powers of the OSP include: conducting
preliminary investigations and prosecute criminal cases w/in
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, enter into plea-bargaining
agreements, and perform other duties assigned by
Ombudsman. Respondents argue the doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency, saying that since the amended information
has not been disapproved by the Ombudsman, it has his
tacit approval. The Supreme Court said no. This doctrine
does not apply to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is an
apolitical agency.
TITLE Calingin v. Desierto

GR NUMBER 145743-89

DATE August 10, 2007

PONENTE Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Power and duties of the Ombudsman

FACTS Petitioner Antonio P. Calingin is a former mayor of Claveria,

Misamis Oriental. During his incumbency, the municipality
undertook a low-cost housing project. The Commission on
Audit (COA) of Region X, Cagayan de Oro City conducted a
special audit of the housing project for calendar years 1995
and 1996. The members of the COA Special Audit Team
executed a Joint Affidavit embodying their findings for the
purpose of filing criminal charges against Calingin and other
public officials. They then submitted their Audit Report and
Joint Affidavit to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao.

In a Resolution dated December 2, 1998, Graft Investigation

Officer Jocelyn R. Araune of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended the filing of
criminal charges against the petitioner and co-accused for
violation of Section 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, and
for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon
review, however, Special Prosecution Officer Alberto B.
Sipaco, Jr., Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
recommended that the said Resolution be disapproved and
the charges be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. On
August 13, 1999, then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
respondent, disapproved the Memorandum of Sipaco and
approved the Resolution of Araune.

Consequently, 47 Information for violation of Section 3 (e)

and (h) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Calingin and his co-accused.

Calingin filed a motion for reinvestigation which was granted

by the Sandiganbayan. It then ordered the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to reinvestigate the cases.

In a Resolution dated July 20, 2000, Special Prosecutor

Norberto B. Ruiz recommended the dismissal of all the cases
against all the accused for lack of probable cause. In a
Memorandum dated August 10, 2000, the Chief of the Office
of Legal Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman, reversed the Ruiz
Resolution and recommended that Calingin and his co-
accused be prosecuted. The Ombudsman approved the
recommendation.

Hence, Calingin filed a petition for certiorari, contending that

the Office of Legal Affairs which recommended his
 prosecution has no authority to review the findings and
recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
since the latter is not subject to the control and supervision
of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether respondent Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disapproving the recommendation of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to dismiss all the
charges against herein petitioner and his co-accused.

2. Is the Special Prosecutor co-equal to the Ombudsman

or to his deputies?

RULING(S)
1. No. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the
Special Prosecutor are creatures of the 1987
Constitution as provided by Sections 5, 7 and 13 of
Article XI. In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, the Court
ruled that under the Constitution, the Special
Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman
and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the
latter’s authority or orders. R.A. No. 6770, also known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the
Special Prosecutor has the power and authority, under
the supervision and control of the Ombudsman, to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and perform
such other duties assigned to him by the Ombudsman.

2. Verily, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a

mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is subject to
his supervision and control. In Perez v.
Sandiganbayan, this Court held that control means
“the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.” Clearly,
in disapproving the recommendation of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor to dismiss all the charges
against petitioner and his co-accused, respondent
Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion.