On the other hand the jurisdiction of the SEC is defined by P.D. No.

902-
A, as amended. . . . For the SEC to acquire jurisdiction over any
controversy under these provisions, two elements must be considered:
(1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. The first element
requires that the controversy must arise "out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership
or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates,
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association
and the State in so far as it concerns their individual franchises."
Petitioners are not stockholders, members or associates of respondent.
They are lot buyers and now homeowners in the subdivision developed
by the respondent. The second element requires that the dispute among
the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation or the internal
affairs of the corporation, partnership or association. The controversy in
this case is remotely related to the "regulation" of
respondent corporation or to respondent's "internal affairs." . . . Their
claim for reimbursement should be viewed in the light of respondent's
alleged failure to observe its statutory and contractual obligations to
provide petitioners a "decent human settlement" and "ample
opportunities for improving their quality of life." |||

(Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 131683, [June 19, 2000], 389 PHIL 318-
337) (Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 131683, [June 19, 2000], 389 PHIL
318-337)

Under the Executive Order creating it, the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to
"hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or
salesmen; and cases of specific performance." Accordingly, in United
Housing Corporation v. Dayrit, we ruled that it is the HLURB, not the trial court,
which has jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance filed against
subdivision developers to compel the latter to execute deeds of absolute sale
and to deliver the certificates of title to buyers. (Siasoco v. Narvaja, G.R. No.
ACIDSc|||

130460, [September 23, 1999], 373 PHIL 766-772)

In a condominium, common areas and facilities are "portions of the

condominium property not included in the units," whereas, a unit is "a
part of the condominium property which is to be subject to private
ownership." Inversely, that which is not considered a unit should fall
under common areas and facilities. Hence, the parking spaces not being
subject to private ownership form part of the common area over which
the condominium unit owners hold undivided interest. As such, petitioner
cannot invoke Sec. I, Art. III, of the Bill of Rights which provides that "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Petitioner alone does not own the parking area. The parking space
is owned in common by the developer and the unit owners. (G.O.A.L., Inc. |||

v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118822, [July 28, 1997], 342 PHIL 321-329)

A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of

action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the factual averments
in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the allegations constituting the
cause of action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment on the prayers. This test implies that the issue must be passed
upon on the basis of the bare allegations in the complaint. The court does not
inquire into the truth of such allegations and declare them to be false. To do
so would constitute a procedural error and a denial of the plaintiff's right to due
process. (Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association v. Spouses Gaston, G.R. No.
|||

141961, [January 23, 2002], 425 PHIL 221-240)

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