EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal,
EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents. G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013
FACTS:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980.
They never had common children, but had children from prior marriages: Esteban had
a daughter named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was
the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin)
when she married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage
was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban.
While Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s
death in 1960.
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated
at Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter
purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in 1970. The Vitas property
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline
and her husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino). Esteban passed away on 11 September
1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the
sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds
of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was
fraudulent because Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents,
on the other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs
can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and
respondents.
RTC: The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The RTC-Manila ruled
that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning.
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and
are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary
shall be void.
unless the contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition
of the properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot
claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
CA: the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The CA ruled, however, that the
RTC-Manila should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code, and not Articles 144
and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of the Family Code provides for the property
relations for unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each
other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct that Art. 148 governs the property relations
between the deceased spouses?
RULING: YES. Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during
the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the
parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar24 in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.25
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the
assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered
common property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and
Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone.1âwphi1 The
phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does
not show that Socorro co-owned the property.27The evidence on record also shows that
Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro,
even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage.
Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.

Edilberto claims that Esteban’s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations.28 Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed
to the acquisition of the Del pan property. We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Even if
payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such
payment was made on behalf of her father.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014
FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta
N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City,
consisting of a house and lot. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain
their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter
refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the
MTCC of Bacolod City.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already
been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo.
MTCC: The Bacolod MTCC rendered a decision applying Article 129 of the Family
Code adjudicating their conjugal dwelling to defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
RTC: reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly
applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in
adjudicating the subject property to Barrido and ordered the equitable partition of the
house.
CA: affirmed the RTC Decision. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still
correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not he CA is correcting holding that Article 147 governs the property
relations between the parties?
RULING: YES
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’
property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for
Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are
present. The term "capacitated" inthe first paragraph of the provision pertains to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been
shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively
with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance
of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already
vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the
property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said document of
safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the
notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public
document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity.
In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the
subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should
be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000
FACTS:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition
and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against
respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent,
both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited
after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted.
During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with
petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-
president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's
name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner
demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused
alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name.
Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with
petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was
organized with other individuals and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife
because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses.
She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in
petitioner's action for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her
own money and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 4 in
accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court contending that even if she and petitioner
actually cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim a part of the subject real and
personal properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules
on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab
initio, applies only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to contract
marriage.7 In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether
they lived together as husband and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist
between them.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.8 He contended that
the case presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been
repealed by the Family Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership
even though a man and a woman living together are not capacitated to marry each
other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was constituted when he and
respondent agreed to register the properties solely in the latter's name although the
same were acquired out of the profits made from their brokerage business.
RTC: the trial court rendered its decision9 granting respondent's motion for summary
judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues involved
were purely legal. The trial court also sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's
action for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of
title covering the subject properties. It held that even if the parties really had cohabited,
the action for partition could not be allowed because an action for partition among co-
owners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present
case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in question. For these reasons, the
trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.
CA: The Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996, ordered the case remanded to the
court of origin for trial on the merits. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's action for
partition was a collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of
Appeals held that since petitioner sought to compel respondent to execute documents
necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was his share, petitioner was not
actually attacking the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally,
the appellate court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been
repealed by Art. 148 of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. On May 7,
1998, nearly two years after its first decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's
motion and reconsidered its prior decision.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its resolution dated December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.
The petitioner contends that he Court of Appeals correctly rules in its first decision that
Art. 148 of the Family Code governs the co-ownership between the parties, hence, the
complaint for partition is proper;
ISSUE: Whether or not CA correctly ruled in its first decision that Art 148 governs the
property relations between the parties?
RULING: YES
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not
incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each other, or in which the marriage
is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties
living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides
for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry
each other. It states:
 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, 16 only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credits.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided
in the last paragraph of the preceding article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are
in bad faith.

It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not
capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living
together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code, in
addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if
the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through
their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple
are not capacitated to marry each other.

In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein. Consequently,
whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in
the case are part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine and material. All but one of
the properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code
took effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code,
then it should be excluded.

Petitioner contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase property and by
common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all,
a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of
each." We do not think this is correct. The legal relation of the parties is already
specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the properties
acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contributions of money, property or
industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-
owner is a trustee for the other. The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil
Code, then are no longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-
ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003
FACTS:
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article
36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno
Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997. 1
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is
dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation of property between the
said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family
Code, without prejudice to the rights previously acquired by creditors.
Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR and
PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is hereby awarded to petitioner, she being the innocent
spouse.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries
in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.3
On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order finding that the following properties
are to be excluded from the conjugal properties, namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232,
considering that the same is owned by petitioner’s parents, Herminio Mercado
and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 14735, considering that the same was purchased on installment
basis by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx
Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondent shall be
distributed in the following manner:
TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:
a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 sq. m., covered
by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14734; and
b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)
TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:
a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180.81 sq. m. and
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and
b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)
Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 sq. m. and covered
by Condominium Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby
directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name of respondent, covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, being respondent’s exclusive property,
acquired prior to his marriage.
Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the subject properties,
namely the Ground Floor Front (Friday’s Club), Ground Floor Rear Apartment and
Upper Basement at LGC Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the same shall
be shared by the parties in common, in proportion to one-half each or share and share
alike, after deducting all expenses for Income Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes,
Municipal License fees, clearances, etc. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to
deliver to respondent the following: a) the balance of his share of the monthly rentals
from February 1998 to May 1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of the monthly rentals
of the aforesaid properties from June 1998 up to this date. Thereafter, the parties shall
own and enjoy their respective share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties
adjudicated to them as stated above.
The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor
children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and medical
expenses.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the
adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner
alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner
and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance
with Article 147 of the Family Code.
RTC: the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and respondent
was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation
and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family
Code. The court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to
divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them
and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the
children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium was
acquired prior to the couple’s cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to
respondent.7
CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in the manner of partition of parties’
properties?
RULING: YES
The crux of the petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how
the properties acquired by petitioner and respondent should be partitioned.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years
of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in
the latter’s residence in Metro Manila. They had a child and got married on March 14,
1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204,
at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed
by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller.
Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr".
Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name
of petitioner.
In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioner’s submission that Suite 204
was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the
Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The
Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of their family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. (emphasis
supplied)
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,20 as in
the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties
they acquire during their cohabitation.
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry
each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union
is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are
present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent
suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and
were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to
comply with essential marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment
basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living
together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and
respondent.
As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we
hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is nothing in
the records that support the pronouncement of the trial court that the parties have
agreed to divide the properties into three—1/3 share each to the petitioner, the
respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition before this Court
that the parties have agreed on a four-way division of the properties—1/4 share each
to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover,
respondent’s argument that the three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable
marriages and exceptionally to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. 22
In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium
is a common property of petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the
parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 for liquidation of the properties of
petitioner and respondent in accordance with this Court’s ruling.
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY,
respondents. G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July
1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house
built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father. Their cohabitation was not blessed with any
children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid
Brothers." Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an
entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacinto’s relatives
turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with
petitioner’s relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, Gina filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac,
Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in
Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished
house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to
acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a
total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these
personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution
to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Gina testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First
Allied Development Bank.7 Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a
balance of P21,046.08.8 She further stated that she had a total of P35,465.009 share in
the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained with the same
bank.10 Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction
materials, appliances and other personal properties.11
Petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed
solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private
respondent’s meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the
construction of said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such,
she was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips.
Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to
1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was repaired and
improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses
because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her
parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of
P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a joint account deposit with private
respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent in purchasing the disputed
personal properties.
RTC: Rendered in favor of private respondent:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiff’s Exhibit C and D
and directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the
amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter actually
contributed to its construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties
listed on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid
personal properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
CA: affirmed the RTC but dropped the award of moral damages
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the trial court is correct? NO.
RULING:
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other
because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation
with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in
a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "…only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ..."31 Proof of actual contribution is required.32
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in
1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998,
Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.33 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state
of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.34
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. In the case at bar,
the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion
of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts41 in her name for the purchase of
construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total
amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed
personal properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development
Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of
extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and
value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.

The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted
the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established,
the extent of private respondent’s co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to
the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. Anent
the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the amount
of P55,687.50.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64166 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S.
Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the
extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is
ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the
house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondent’s claim.
LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent. G.R. No.
169698 November 29, 2006
FACTS:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager
of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services
of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate.
Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in
consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were born.
However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they
parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for
the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-
Air Subdivision, Makati City. In his complaint, Lupo alleged that the subject property
was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence
the property is co-owned by them. He averred that the property in question was
acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title
thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolanda’s name without his knowledge and
consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was
still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda
allowed her new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his
share thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupo’s allegations. According to her, she acquired the
same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,600,000.00) using her
exclusive funds.
RTC: rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the contested property as owned in
common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal shares.
CA: reversed and set aside that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property as
exclusively owned by Yolanda. The CA ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of
the Family Code vis-à-vis the evidence on record and attending circumstances,
Yolanda’s claim of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by
competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his
allegation that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.
Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article
144 of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed to the
acquisition of the subject property because with or without the contribution by either
partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article 4847 of Civil Code,
as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital
union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the
rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner Lupo is correct?
RULING: NO
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other
because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of
his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by
Article 1488 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, …only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ... 9 Proof of actual contribution
is required.1
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other
civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. Favorable relief
can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence.
Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this burden.
Perusing the records of the case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of
judgment in its findings of fact and appreciation of evidence with regard to the source
of the funds used for the purchase of the disputed property and ultimately the rightful
owner thereof. Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled to respect and shall
not be disturbed, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked or misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the disposition
of the case.
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence
be formally entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the
purchase money used as consideration for the disputed property, [Lupo] diverted the
burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting her as a shrewd and scheming
woman without the capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his ownership,
or the extent thereof, over the subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere
attack on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents pertaining to the
ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately
failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that
[Yolanda] had a limited access to the funds of the said corporations and had repeatedly
withdrawn money from their bank accounts for their behalf do not prove that the money
she used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter, came from
said withdrawals.

As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent financial
capacity of the parties. 1 On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the
President and General Manager of two corporations and on the other is [Yolanda], a
Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo] is financially well heeled than
[Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda] had taken
advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)

As we see it, petitioner’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis
because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase
thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary
proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say
so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case,
the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by
sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not evidence.

All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in
rendering the herein challenged decision and resolution.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA
are AFFIRMED.