G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014 Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate and SILVERIO JR.
and SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS,
INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173
and 122024 are concerned, and
Resolution2 dated July 4, 2013 denying
petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
The CA nullified the preliminary injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City ("intestate court"), Branch 57 in Sp.
Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed said court's
Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the
sales and derivative titles over two properties
subject of intestate proceedings as null and
void.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the
case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving
a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by
her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
(husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo
S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son),
Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S.
proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-2629) for the
settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO,
SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties
filed different petitions and appeal challenging
several orders ofthe intestate court that went
all the way up to the Supreme Court. To better
understand the myriad of factual and
procedural antecedents leading to the instant
consolidated case, this court will resolve the
petitions in seriatim.
The Petitions
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated
petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein
petitioner, RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO
JR.") assails the Order ofthe intestate court
dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO
SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator
to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court
was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by
virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3
November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D.
SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as
administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved
by the intestate court and in his stead,
SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new
administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange
of pleadings to remove and appoint a new
administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR.
of administrator is summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR.
was removed as administrator and in his stead,
SILVERIO, JR. was designated as the new
administrator. A motion for reconsideration
was separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and Nelia
Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May
2005, the intestate court issued an Omnibus
Order affirming among others, the Order of 3
January 2005. Inthe same Order, the intestate
court also granted the motion of SILVERIO JR.
to take his oath as administrator effective upon
receipt of the order and expunged the
inventory report filed by SILVERIO SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court
acting on the motion filed by SILVERIO SR.
recalled the Order granting letters of
administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated
SILVERIO SR. as administrator. Then again, the
intestate court acting on the motion for partial
consideration to the Order dated 12 December
2005 filed by SILVERIO JR. issued an Omnibus
Order dated 31 October 2006 upholding the
grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO
JR. and removed SILVERIO SR., ad administrator
for gross violation of his duties and functions
under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the
above Order whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the
other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 97196. On 28 August 2008, the Court of
Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision
Page 1 of 50
reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the
decretal portion of the Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the
grant of letters of administration to and the
taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo
Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued
is MADE PERMANENT in regard to the said
portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator
to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against
the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on
Certioraribefore the Supreme Court docketed
as G.R. No. 185619 challenging the 28 Augsut
2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11
February 2009, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution denying the petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error inthe
assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by
the Court of discretionary appellate
jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO JR.’s motion for
reconsideration, the Supreme Court on 11
February 2011, denied the motion with finality.
An entry of judgment was made on 29 March
2011.
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the
intestate court, an urgent motion to be
reinstated as administrator of the estate.
Acting on the motion, the intestate court
issued the now challenged Order dated 16 June
2011, the pertinent portion of the Order reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the
sum of TEN MILLION PESOS, the same to be
approved by this Court, Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as the
Administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz
Silverio and to immediately take his oath as
such, and exercise his duties and functions as
are incumbent under the law upon the said
position. xxx."
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR.,
EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her
legal guardian moved for the disqualification
and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR.
based on the following grounds: (1) Absence of
the written consent of all parties in interest
allowing JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. to continue
hearing the case considering that he appeared
once as counsel in the intestate proceedings;
(2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and
partiality in favor of SILVERIO SR. by allowing
the latter to pursue several motions and even
issued a TRO in violation of the rules against
forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA’s Petition for
Support and Release of Funds for Medical
Support has not been resolved; and (4) It is in
the best interest of all the heirs that the
proceedings be presided and decided by the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR.
issued an order denying the Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition. The movants
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied in an order dated 14 June 2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated
31 October 2006, ordered among others, the
sale of certain properties belonging to the
estate. The portion of the order which is
pertinent to the present petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this
Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to
grant the following:
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties
located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle,
Forbes Park, Makati City, covered by
T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of
Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia
Page 2 of 50
 Road, Forbes Park, Makati City covered
by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati City; and
(3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd.
Makati City covered by TCT No. 137156
issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to partially settle the
intestate estate of the late Beatriz S.
Silverio, and authorizing the
Administrator to undertake the proper
procedure or transferring the titles
involved to the name of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale
mentioned in Number 3 above to the
payment of taxes, interests, penalties
and other charges, if any, and
todistribute the residue among the
heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio
represented by Legal Guardian Nestor
S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio
and Nelia S. SilverioDee in accordance
with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR.
on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of
Absolute Salein favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS,
Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at
No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
CITRINE became the registered owner thereof
on 06 September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No.
006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed
in favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on
September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No.
82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City.
On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-
2011000050 was issued toMonica P. Ocampo.
The latter subsequently sold said property to
ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-
2011000190 was issued on 11 February 2011
under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006
SILVERIO-DEE filed a petition for
certioraribefore the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with prayer for
injunctive relief. As prayed for, the Court of
Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on 5 February 2007. On 4 July 2007, the
Court issueda Writ of Preliminary Injunction
conditioned upon the posting of the bond in
the amount of two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-DEE posted the
required bond on February 5, 2007 but in an
order dated 3 January 2008, the Court ruled
that the bond posted by SILVERIO-DEE failed to
comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court,
however, did not reverse the ruling granting
the injunction but instead ordered SILVERIO-
DEE to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The
Court also increased the bond from two million
to ten million. On 29 February 2008, the Court
issued a Resolution approving the ten million
bond and issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the
Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) issued a
decision reinstating SILVERIO SR. as
administrator and declaring the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction permanent in regard to
the appointment of administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an
Urgent Application for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the
Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others,
that a TRO be issued restraining and/or
preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO,
CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-
in-interest from committing any act that would
affect the titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null
and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16
September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c)
To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr.
and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S.
Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued
an Order granting a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining SILVERIO JR., their agent or
anybody acting in their behalf from committing
any act that would affect the titles to the
properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds
of Makati City from accepting, admitting,
approving, registering, annotating or in any
way giving due course to whatever deeds,
instruments or any other documents involving
voluntary or involuntary dealings which may
have the effect of transferring, conveying,
Page 3 of 50
encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating, or
disposing in favor of any individual or any entity
of the subject properties. Subpoena ad
testificandumand duces tecumwas also issued
by the intestate court requiring SILVERIO, JR.,
MONICA OCAMPO and ALEXANDRA GARCIA of
CITRINE to testify and bring with them any
books and documents under their control to
shed light on the circumstances surrounding
the transaction involving the properties in
question.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion
dated 14 February 2011. On 18 August 2011,
the intestate court rendered the now assailed
Order the decretal portion of the Order is
quoted hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16
September 2010 as VOID:
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No.
006-2011000050 in the name of
defendant MONICA OCAMPO or any of
her successors-in-interestincluding all
derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT
No. 006-2011000190 in the name of
ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC. or any of its
successors-in-interest including all
derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati
City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2011000050, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000190
and all of its derivative titles; and 5.
Reinstating the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 2236121 in the name of
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. AND THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS TO THE
INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds
ofMakati City to CANCEL
Transfer Certificate ofTitle No.
006-2010000063, in the name
of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and
all of its derivative titles; and
2. The reinstatement of
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
223612 in the name of
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and
the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
x x x x3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by
respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio,
Jr.") before the CA questioned the following
issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No.
121172 – Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating
Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No.
121173 – (1) Order dated March 23,2011
granting Silverio, Sr.’s application for
preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or
anyone acting on their behalf from committing
any act that would affect the titles to the
subject properties and enjoining the Register of
Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting,
approving, registering, annotating or in any
way giving due course to whatever deeds,
instruments or any other documents involving
the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order
dated March 23, 2011 which denied Silverio,
Jr.’s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition
of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June
14, 2011 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order
(granting application for preliminary
injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 –
Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the
Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative
titles over the Cambridge and Intsiaproperties
as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its
Decision, the falloof which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises,
the Court hereby disposes and orders the
following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No.
121172is DENIEDfor lack of merit.
Accordingly, the 16 June 2011 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57 reinstating MR. RICARDO C.
SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is
AFFIRMED.
Page 4 of 50
 2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No.
121173is partly DENIEDfor lack of merit
insofar as it questions the 23 March
2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO,
JR’s Motion for Disqualification and/or
Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao,
Jr. The petition is partly GRANTEDin
that the Preliminary Injunction issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 57 is herebydeclared NULL
and VOID for being issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No.
122024is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18
August 2011 Order declaring the Deed
of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of
Title and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia Property null and
void is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
4 attacked and may be cancelled only in a direct
SO ORDERED.
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration5 "insofar as
its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024" praying
that the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate
court be affirmed. By Resolution dated July 4,
2013, the CA denied his motion for partial
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA
committed a reversible error in upholding the
validity of the Intsia and Cambridgeproperties
upon the ground that the intestate court
cannotannul the sales as it has a limited
jurisdiction only and which does not
includeresolving issues of ownership. It is
asserted that the CA should nothave stopped
there and looked into the nature of the
properties sold, which formed part of the
conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and
Beatriz S. Silverio.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order
of the intestate court annulling the sales of the
Cambridge and Intsia properties. In the
alternative, should the said sales be upheld,
petitioner prays that this Court (1) declare the
sales to be valid only to the extent of 50% net
remainder share of the late Beatriz less the
corresponding shares therefrom of petitioner
and the other legal compulsory heirs, and (2)
order respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the
proceeds of sales for distribution of the residue
among the legal/compulsory heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr.,
Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc.
argued that the intestate court should not have
ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject
properties to third parties after it itself had
authorized their disposal in partial settlementof
the estate, especially so when separate actions
assailing the new titles issued to said third
parties were already instituted by petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent
of petitioner to the aforesaid sales as the
surviving spouses with a 50% conjugal share in
the subject properties, respondents point out
that such is belied by the October 31, 2006
Order of the intestate court, which clearly
showed that counsels of all the heirs were
present at the hearing of June 16, 2006 and no
objection was made by them to the sale of the
properties and the partial settlement of the
Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio, together with the
transfer of titles of these properties in the
name of the Estate as prayed for in petitioner’s
Manifestation and Motion dated April 19, 2006.
Petitioner had not challenged or appealed the
said order authorizing the sale of the subject
properties. Thus, it is too late in the day for
petitioner to raise this factual issue before this
Court, not to mention that it cannot be
ventilated in the present appeal by certiorari as
thisCourt is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed
its Comment contending that the intestate
court improperly nullified the titles despite the
fact that the present registered owners, who
are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
Indeed, a Torrens title cannot be collaterally
proceeding brought for the purpose.
Respondent points out that petitioner himself
recognized thata direct action is required to
annul a Torrens title ashe initially instituted two
civil complaints before the RTC of Makati City
seeking to annul, among others, the TCT’s
issued to respondent Ocampo for the
Cambridge property. After failing to secure
restraining orders in these two civil cases,
petitioner filed in the intestate court his Urgent
OmnibusMotion dated February 14, 2011 to
annul the said titles, including that of ZEE2. In
any case, respondent maintains that it is a
buyer of good faith and for value, of which the
intestate court never made a determination
Page 5 of 50
nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion
and Supplement to the Omnibus Motion dated
March 4, 2011 contain allegations indicating
that respondent ZEE2 was not a buyer in good
faith and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioner’s act
of filing a separate complaint with application
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in
another court (Civil Case Nos. 11-084 of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes
willful and deliberate forum shopping asthe
former also prayedsimilar primary reliefs and
setting up the alleged nullity of the subject
deeds of absolute sale as those raised in the
Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement to
the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the
intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate
court having jurisdiction over properties under
administration has the authority not only to
approve any disposition or conveyance, but
also to annul an unauthorized sale by the
prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we
held in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 856:
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate, without court
approval. It is well-settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of
the decedent’s estate. In the early case of
Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that
the sale of the property of the estate by an
administrator without the order of the probate
court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that: x x x x
It being settled that property under
administration needs the approval of the
probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the
estate and is null and void. Asearly as 1921 in
the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We
laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased,
which is not authorized by the probate court is
null and void and title does not pass to the
purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate
court can declare null and void the disposition
of the property under administration, made by
private respondent, the same having been
effected without authority from said court. It is
the probate court that has the power to
authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4
and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court
that can declare it null and void for as long as
the proceedings had not been closed or
terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention
that the probate court cannot annul the
unauthorized sale, would render meaningless
the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga
vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our
jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2)
any unauthorized disposition of estate property
can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul
the unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties
was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with
prior approval of the intestate court under its
Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006.
Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled
by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court’s order
annulling the sale of the subject properties, the
CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the
fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the
time when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was
still in effect. It then concluded that the
eventual decision in the latter case making the
writ of preliminary injunction permanent only
with respect to the appointment of petitioner
as administrator and not to the grant of
authority to sell mooted the issue of whether
the sale was executed at the time when the
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in
effect.
The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder
quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be
addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the
properties in question granted under the
October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified
by the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive
portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196
Page 6 of 50
would lead us to reasonably conclude that the
grant of authority to sell is still good and valid.
The fallo of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the
grant of letters of administration to and the
taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo
Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued
is made permanent in regard to the said
portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator
of the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against
the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the
testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the
saleof the three properties in question was not
declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division as null and void.It is axiomatic that it is
the dispositive portion of the decision that
finally invests rights upon the parties, sets
conditions for the exercise of those rights, and
imposes the corresponding duties or
obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
intestate court when it ordered the sale of the
Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as
NULL and VOID citing as justification the
decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division in CAG.R. SP No. 97196. To reiterate,
the injunction order which was made
permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh
Division) was declared to be limited only to the
portion ofthe Omnibus Order that upheld the
grant of letters of administrationby SILVERIO,
JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as
administrator and nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the
intestate court in its Order dated 23 March
2011 and challenged by SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R.
SP No. 121173, we find that it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion as it was directed
against acts which were already [fait]accompli.
The preliminary injunction sought to: 1)
restrain SILVERIO JR., their agents, or anybody
acting in their behalf or any person from
committing any act that would affect the titles
to the subject properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and
(2) enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati
City from accepting, admitting, approving,
registering, annotating or in any giving due
course to whatever deeds, instruments or any
other documents involving voluntary or
involuntary dealings which may have the effect
of transferring, conveying, encumbering,
ceding, waiving, alienating or disposing in favor
of any individual or any entity the above-
enumerated properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
However, the records show that when the
preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March
2011 new titles over the disputed properties
were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC.
and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.7 (Emphasis
supplied.)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate
court acting upon pending motions filed by
petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father
and son, respectively, who are the central
figures in the now decade-old controversy over
the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S.
Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in
appointing as administrator of the estate
petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., their
personal conflicts becoming more evident to
the intestate court as the proceedings suffered
delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion
filed by Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject
properties and partially settle the estate, the
much awaited opportunity came when the
heirs represented by their respective counsels
interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually
reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the
August 28, 2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia
Silverio-Dee), weagree with the CA that the
permanent injunction issued under the said
decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo,
pertained only to the portions of the October
31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of
letters of administration to and taking of an
oath of administration by respondent Silverio,
Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly
set aside as well the directive in the same
Page 7 of 50
Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject
properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained
finality only on February 11, 2011 when this
Court denied with finality respondent Silverio,
Jr.’s motion for reconsideration of the February
11, 2009 Resolution denyinghis petition for
review (G.R. No. 185619).1âwphi1

The CA therefore did not err in reversing the

August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court
annulling the sale of the subject properties
grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo,
Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by
the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator
by the intestate court, having relied in good
faith that the sale was authorized and with
prior approval of the intestate court under its
Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which
remained valid and subsisting insofar as it
allowed the aforesaid sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated March 8, 2013 and Resolution
dated July 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are
AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Page 8 of 50
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review
assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and set aside the September
12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15,
1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out
of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo
married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had
a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971,
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court
of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He
had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by
his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San
Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to
dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in
Page 9 of 50
1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that
the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the
Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein
petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order
denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage
with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of
the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of
Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion
to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as
widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador
S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against
Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does
not state the facts and law on which it was
based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued
an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided
by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the
parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On
May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth
in his previous motion for reconsideration as
his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo
filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee
was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and
for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but
said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12,
1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section
1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode of a person as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as
governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
Page 10 of 50
letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo
had legal capacity to marry respondent by
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee
was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of
paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind
the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
— sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel,
that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever."
Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give
force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained
by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason,
the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a
bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family
Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x
x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate
motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court
via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation
and motion to adopt the said petition which
was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and
Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a
person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s
marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry
Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent
cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue
was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent
has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province "in which
he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence – as contradistinguished from
domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word
Page 11 of 50
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
"residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence"
and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing
venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and
43
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the
Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center
and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990
sent by the deceased’s children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address
is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was
a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal
personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue
of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved
a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by
the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not
Page 12 of 50
valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected.
The Court, however, recognized the validity of
the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated
by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce
from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino
wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer
be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still marriedto private
respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that
"the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the
Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling
in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case
was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce
in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling
has long been interpreted as severing marital
ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
60
Recio, the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido
III, 62 the historical background and legislative
intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which
took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
Page 13 of 50
All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of
the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As
so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces
its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the
law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive
of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such
is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the
Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a
law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of
our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
Page 14 of 50
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these
words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian
defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin
with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case,
the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the
trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states
that letters of administration may be granted
to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as
one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect
or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as
an interested person who has a direct interest
in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity
of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws
of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a
co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It
Page 15 of 50
provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the
validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of
the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples
living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the
property regime under this provision as
follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to
the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of
the extent thereof, their contributions and reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be REMANDED to the trial court for further
equal. proceedings.
xxxx SO ORDERED.
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co- Associate Justice
ownership of properties acquired by the parties
to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof
of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests
upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved
by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that
respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise
from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144
of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
Page 16 of 50
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177192
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us are the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G.
Agtarap (Sebastian)1 and Eduardo G. Agtarap
(Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated
November 21, 20063 and the Resolution dated
March 27, 20074 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.
The antecedent facts and proceedings—
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay
City, a verified petition for the judicial
settlement of the estate of his deceased father
Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate
on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known debts or obligations. During his
lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and second with
Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24,
1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three children—
Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three children, namely,
Gloria,6 Joseph, and Teresa7). Joaquin married
Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had
three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and
Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At
the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels
of land with improvements in Pasay City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a
grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and
improving the said realties and had been
appropriating for himself ₱26,000.00 per
month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an
imperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of
the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending
the appointment of a regular administrator. In
addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a)
confirming and declaring the named
compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be
entitled to participate in the estate; (b)
apportioning and allocating unto the named
heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in
accordance with law; and (c) entitling the
distributees the right to receive and enter into
possession those parts of the estate
individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an
order setting the petition for initial hearing and
directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his
comment, generally admitting the allegations
in the petition, and conceding to the
appointment of Eduardo as special
administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two
subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership
of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s
death in April 1924, they became the pro
indiviso owners of the subject properties. They
said that their residence was built with the
exclusive money of their late father Jose, and
the expenses of the extensions to the house
were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while
the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built
with the exclusive money of Joseph and his
business partner. They opposed the
appointment of Eduardo as administrator on
the following grounds: (1) he is not physically
and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the
lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the
desire to earn. They claimed that the best
interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be
appointed as special or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a
resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquin’s estate.
Consequently, it issued him letters of
administration.
Page 17 of 50
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a
an answer in intervention, alleging that true and just accounting of his administration
Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter from his date of assumption up to the year TCT LOT AREA/SQ ZONAL
Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also ending December 31, 1996 per Financial and AMOUNT
NO. NO. .M. VALUE
averred that there is a need to appoint a Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which
3825 745- 1,335 sq. ₱5,000.0 ₱6,675,0
special administrator to the estate, but claimed was approved by the Court. The accounting
4 B-1 m. 0 00.00
that Eduardo is not the person best qualified report included the income earned and
for the task. received for the period and the expenses 3825 745- 1,331 sq. ₱5,000.0 ₱6,655,0
incurred in the administration, sustenance and 5 B-2 m. 0 00.00
After the parties were given the opportunity to allowance of the widow. In accordance with
be heard and to submit their respective said Financial and Accounting Report which was TOTAL--------------------------------------- ₱13,330,
proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on duly approved by this Court in its Resolution ---------------------- 000.00
October 23, 2000, issued an Order of dated July 28, 1998 – the deceased JOAQUIN
Partition,8 with the following disposition— AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
following:
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) --------- ₱350,000.0
respective proposed projects of partition and I LAND: --------------------- 0
the payment of inheritance taxes due the
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) -------- 320,000.00
estate as early as 1965, and there being no Two lots and two buildings with one garage ---------------------
claim in Court against the estate of the quarter located at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay
deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Building Improvements ------------- 97,500.00
now consequently – ripe – for distribution Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with the -------------------------
among the heirs minus the surviving spouse Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, Restaurant ----------------------------- 80,000.00
Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999. described as follows: -------------------------

TOTAL ----------------------------------- ₱847,500.0

Considering that the bulk of the estate property ---------------------- 0
were acquired during the existence of the
second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) TOTAL NET WORTH ------------------ ₱14,177,50
----------------------- 0.00
and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face
that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia,
which fact oppositors failed to contradict by WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the
evidence other than their negative allegations, late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value of
the greater part of the estate is perforce ₱14,177,500.00, together with whatever
accounted by the second marriage and the interest from bank deposits and all other
compulsory heirs thereunder. incomes or increments thereof accruing after
the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996,
after deducting therefrom the compensation of

Page 18 of 50
the administrator and other expenses allowed Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs
by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as are as follows: ₱295,364.57 – as
follows: compulsory heir of
COMPULSORY HEIRS:
TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00 ₱531,656.23 Jose
1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos – Agtarap
CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her
conjugal share – ₱7,088,750.00, the other half - ₱295,364.57 3) WALTER ₱236,291.66 – share
of ₱7,088,750.00 – to be divided among the DE SANTOS - from Milagros Agtarap
compulsory heirs as follows: 2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57

3) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57 ₱295,364.57 – as

1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30 compulsory heir of
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30 ₱531,656.23 Jose
Agtarap
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - Hence,
₱1,181,548.30 Priscilla Agtarap will inherit
₱295,364.57.
4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181,548.30 HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the
5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181,548.30
following heirs of the first marriage stand to a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August
6) CARIDAD - receive the total amount of:
₱1,181,548.30 25, 1999
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE: ₱7,088,750.0 - as
The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory 0 conjugal
heir in the amount of ₱1,181,548.30 and who
1avvphi1 share
died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and
Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half 1) JOSEPH ₱236,291.66 – share ₱1,181,458.3 - as
brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in AGTARAP - from Milagros Agtarap 0 compulsor
equal proportions. y heir
₱295,364.57 – as
compulsory heir of Total of ₱8,270,208.3
TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 0
JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 ₱531,656.23 Jose
b) ₱1,181,458.3 – as
Agtarap
WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66 SEBASTIA 8 compulsor
2) TERESA ₱236,291.66 – share N y heir
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 AGTARAP - from Milagros Agtarap AGTARAP
- ₱ 236,291.66 – share
EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 from
Page 19 of 50
 Milagros ₱5,522,85 from WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
4.06 Milagros appeals are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
c) ₱1,181,458.3 – as assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is
EDUARDO 8 compulsor EDUAR ₱4,135,10 – share AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the subject
AGTARAP y heir DO – 4.10 from properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254]
- ₱1,181,45 Caridad and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the
₱ 236,291.66 – share 8.30 Garcia estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby
from ₱ – as partitioned as follows:
Milagros 236,291.6 compuls
d) as represented by 6 ory heir The two (2) properties, together with their
MERCEDE Abelardo Dagoro as the – share improvements, embraced by TCT No. 38254
S- surviving spouse of a ₱5,522,85 from and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be
compulsory heir 4.06 Milagros distributed among the following:

₱1,181,458.3 Lucia Mendietta - ½ of the property. But since

SO ORDERED.9
8 she is deceased, her share shall be inherited by
Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP: shares.
Teresa filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP Joaquin Agtarap - ½ of the property and ¼ of
the other half of the property which pertains to
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a
Lucia Mendietta’s share.
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP resolution10 denying the motions for
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and
Caridad Agtarap) granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also Jesus Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share.
declared that the real estate properties But since he is already deceased (and died
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo belonged to the conjugal partnership of without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be
Agtarap stand to inherit: Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of
Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the Milagros Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s
SEBASTI ₱4,135,10 – share share. But since she died in 1996 without issue,
heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a
AN – 4.10 from 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by
new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian
₱1,181,45 Caridad Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de
both appealed to the CA.
8.30 Garcia Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
₱ - as Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation
236,291.6 compuls On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which of Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each
6 ory heir shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by
- share reads—
her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her

Page 20 of 50
daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all
surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But
since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be
acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children
Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de
Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtarap’s estate, comprising
three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties
and its improvements, shall be distributed as
follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she
died in 1999, her share shall be inherited by her
children namely Mercedes Agtarap
(represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro
and her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap
and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since
she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her
inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos
and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap
and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each
shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by
her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile), Sebastian and Eduardo, all
surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he
died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired
by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos
and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap
and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since
she died in 1984, her inheritance shall be
acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
her daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their
respective motions for reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA
denied both motions. Hence, these petitions
ascribing to the appellate court the following
errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. – The Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the aforementioned
important facts12 which alter its
Decision;
2. – The Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the necessity of hearing
the issue of legitimacy of respondents
as heirs;
3. – The Court of Appeals erred in
allowing violation of the law and in not
applying the doctrines of collateral
attack, estoppel, and res judicata.13
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH
DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION
OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP
AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER
INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE
OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE
OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH
DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION
APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED
AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER COURT
HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND
COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.)
38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE
CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED
TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION
UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP, CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA.
UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE
PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO
Page 21 of 50
DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN
APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A
TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED
WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN
SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED IN THE
LAW ITSELF.14
As regards his first and second assignments of
error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and
Teresa failed to establish by competent
evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of
their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather
Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate
of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating
that the wife of their father Jose is
Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their
mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage
contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do
not qualify as the best evidence of Jose’s
marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were
not authenticated and formally offered in
evidence. Sebastian also asseverates that he
actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph
and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to
exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their
opposition to the said motion. He further
claims that the failure of Abelardo Dagoro and
Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to
exclude them as heirs had the effect of
admitting the allegations therein. He points out
that his motion was denied by the RTC without
a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error,
Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title
of real estate properties subject of the
controversy are in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as such
are conclusive proof of their ownership
thereof, and thus, they are not subject to
collateral attack, but should be threshed out in
a separate proceeding for that purpose. He
likewise argues that estoppel applies against
the children of the first marriage, since none of
them registered any objection to the issuance
of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin
only. He avers that the estate must have
already been settled in light of the payment of
the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros,
Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of
TCT No. 8925 in Milagros’ name and of TCT No.
8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He
also alleges that res judicata is applicable as the
court order directing the deletion of the name
of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of
Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and
executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first
assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the
CA erroneously settled, together with the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates
of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and
Milagros, in contravention of the principle of
settling only one estate in one proceeding. He
particularly questions the distribution of the
estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings
despite the fact that a proceeding was
conducted in another court for the probate of
the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo
whatever share that she would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. He states that this violated
the rule on precedence of testate over
intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo
contends that the CA gravely erred when it
affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of
this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin
to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates
of title were registered in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad
Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting as an
intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was
not vested with the power and authority to
determine questions of ownership, which
properly belongs to another court with general
jurisdiction.
The Court’s Ruling
As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue
on the ownership of the subject real properties,
we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had
jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the
trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with
the probate of the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the
15
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court merely exercises special and
limited jurisdiction.16 As held in several
cases,17 a probate court or one in charge of
estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
Page 22 of 50
to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate. All that the said
court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is
no dispute, there poses no problem, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action before a court exercising
general jurisdiction for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to the final determination of
ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or
the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate,
such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether the property in the inventory
is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.20
We hold that the general rule does not apply to
the instant case considering that the parties are
all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third
parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the
probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate
of Joaquin.1auuphi1
It should be remembered that when Eduardo
filed his verified petition for judicial settlement
of Joaquin’s estate, he alleged that the subject
properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad
since the TCTs state that the lots were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in
his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting
marriage with Caridad, contracted a first
marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition,
Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to
present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos.
38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother
title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in
the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y
JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con
Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia
Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y
JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia
Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided
between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap,
TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued
for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of
the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case
No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368,
consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same
lot was covered by TCT No. 5577
(32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia
Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that
Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently,
on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad.
It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184)
contained an annotation, which reads—
Ap-4966 – NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente
certificado de titulo, tal como aparece,
tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia
Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre
lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras "en
segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en
complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril
de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal,
en el expediente cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad.
Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido
presentada con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario,
Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No.
32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of
Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con
Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and
replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad
Page 23 of 50
Garcia, referring to the second marriage of
Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid,
therefore, that prior to the replacement of
Caridad’s name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon
her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half
(1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia’s
share in the property covered by the said TCT
was carried over to the properties covered by
the certificates of title derivative of TCT No.
32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as
found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was
survived by her compulsory heirs – Joaquin,
Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the marriage is dissolved by
the death of the husband or the wife, the
community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid; in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if
both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC
had jurisdiction to determine whether the
properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate
the conjugal partnership to determine the
estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph
and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding
for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same
should be consolidated with the settlement
proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s
spouse.24 Accordingly, the CA correctly
distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and
38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory
heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as
correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the
claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos.
38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the
owners of the properties covered therein were
Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the
registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia,
deserves scant consideration. This cannot be
said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs.
Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of
title is not necessarily conclusive of a holder’s
true ownership of property.25 A certificate of
title under the Torrens system aims to protect
dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument
for the deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the
fact that the properties were registered in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses’
coverture.27The phrase "married to Caridad
Garcia" in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the
civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner,
and does not necessarily prove that the realties
are their conjugal properties.28
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s
estate could have already been settled in 1965
after the payment of the inheritance tax be
upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se,
does not settle the estate of a deceased
person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court—
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of
residue made. -- When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if
any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or
of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession.
If there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive share to which
each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed
among the heirs only after the payment of the
debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses
of administration, allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax. The records of these cases do
not show that these were complied with in
1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the
legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to
Page 24 of 50
say that both the RTC and the CA found them
to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC
found that Sebastian did not present clear and
convincing evidence to support his averments
in his motion to exclude them as heirs of
Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations.
The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and
Teresa being the children of Jose was never
questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the
latter two even admitted this in their petitions,
as well as in the stipulation of facts in the
August 21, 1995 hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA
affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21,
2006 Decision.30
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo
Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to
the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per
its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC
found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on
May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the
proceedings below by her husband Walter de
Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de
Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC
likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995,
Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of
court to intervene, alleging that he is the
surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the
father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his
answer in intervention. The RTC later granted
the motion, thereby admitting his answer on
October 18, 1995.31 The CA also noted that,
during the hearing of the motion to intervene
on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo
did not interpose any objection when the
intervention was submitted to the RTC for
resolution.32
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and
there appears no compelling reason to hold
that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph,
Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro
rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin.
It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present
competent evidence to refute his and
Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and Teresa
were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of
Joaquin, and to timely object to the
participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo
Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do
so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and
Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in
the estate in representation of the Joaquin’s
compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes,
respectively.33
This Court also differs from Eduardo’s
asseveration that the CA erred in settling,
together with Joaquin’s estate, the respective
estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and
Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA
Decision would readily show that the
disposition of the properties related only to the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as
cited above, the RTC was specifically granted
jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful
heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective
shares after the payment of the obligations of
the estate, as enumerated in the said provision.
The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes,
and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was
merely a necessary consequence of the
settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his
legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardo’s position
that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s
estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor
of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a
separate proceeding was instituted for the
probate of the will allegedly executed by
Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay
City.34 While there has been no showing that
the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of
her share from Joaquin’s estate in favor of
Eduardo, has already been probated and
approved, prudence dictates that this Court
refrain from distributing Milagros’ share in
Joaquin’s estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died
on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of
Death.35 He is survived by his wife Teresita B.
Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin
Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma.
Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the
assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the
March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be
affirmed with modifications such that the share
of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until
after the final determination of the probate of
her purported will, and that Sebastian shall be
represented by his compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is
DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in
G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such
that the Decision dated November 21, 2006
and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the
Page 25 of 50
following MODIFICATIONS: that the share
awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not
be distributed until the final determination of
the probate of her will, and that petitioner
Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on
January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his
wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children
Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap
Panlilio.

These cases are hereby remanded to the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for
further proceedings in the settlement of the
estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 26 of 50
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, Petitioner, v. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY*and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan, Respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ration
decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the
primary issue in this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner
Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent
Isabels petition for appointment as
administratrix of her grandmothers estate by
virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son
of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the
Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this
marriage, three children were born namely:
Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and
Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco
Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so
that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a
criminal case1 against her husband Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio
Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI)2 a complaint for legal separation
against his wife, charging her, among others,
with infidelity and praying for the custody and
care of their children who were living with their
mother.3 The suit was docketed as civil case
number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a
decision the dispositive portion which reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null
and void and of no effect as between the
parties. It being admitted by the parties and
shown by the records that the question of the
case and custody of the three children have
been the subject of another case between the
same parties in another branch of this Court in
Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot
be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the
manifestation of counsel that the third party
defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for
damages and that defendant is willing to accept
the offer instead of her original demand
for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded the
sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to
pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied)
As basis thereof, the CFI said:
From February 1965 thru December 1965
plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial
Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of
parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient
was already out of the hospital he continued to
be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the
symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made
themselves manifest even as early as 1955;
that the disease worsened with time, until 1965
when he was actually placed under expert
neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if
the subject has shown marked progress, the
remains bereft of adequate understanding of
right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage
between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had
set in.This fact would justify a declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for
nay of the following causes after (sic) existing
at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind,
unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife.
Page 27 of 50
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the
marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of the plaintiff; and there is proof
that plaintiff continues to be without sound
reason. The charges in this very complaint add
emphasis to the findings of the neuro-
psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff
really lives more in fancy that in reality, a
strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).5 (emphasis supplied)
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent
Isabels paternal grandmother. The decedent
died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a
will.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Five years later or on October 26 1995,
respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)7 a
petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of her
late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay
which case was docketed as Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged
among others, that she is one of the legitimate
grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that
she be appointed as administratrix of the
estate.8cräläwvirtualibräry
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an
Opposition claiming that he is the surviving
spouse of the decedent, that he has been
managing the conjugal properties even while
the decedent has been alive and is better
situated to protect the integrity of the estate
than the petitioner, that petitioner and her
family have been alienated from the decedent
and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30)
years and thus, prayed that Letters of
Administration be issued instead to
him.9cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years
after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to
dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in
the main that respondent Isabel should not be
appointed as administratrix of the decedents
estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues
that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an
illegitimate child has no right to succeed by
right of representation the legitimate relatives
of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased
his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay
and thus, opened succession by representation.
Petitioner contends that as a consequence of
the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the
marriage of the respondent Isabels parents is
null and void, the latter is an illegitimate child,
and has no right nor interest in the estate of
her paternal grandmother the decedent.10 On
October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the
assailed order denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss.11 When his motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court in an order dated
January 9, 1998,12 petitioner, as mentioned
above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
respondent court in denying his motion to
dismiss as well as his motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a
motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was
timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring the marriage of respondent
Isabels parents null and void must be upheld;
and (d) said decision had long become final and
had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts
that petitioners motion to dismiss was late
having been filed after the opposition was
already filed in court, the counterpart of an
answer in an ordinary civil action and that
petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to
specifically deny respondent Isabels allegation
that she is a legitimate child of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedents son. She
further contends that petitioner proceeds from
a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise
that there is a conflict between the body of the
decision and its dispositive portion because in
an action for annulment of a marriage, the
court either sustains the validity of marriage or
nullifies it. It does not, after hearing a marriage
voidable otherwise, the court will fail to decide
and lastly, that the status of marriages under
Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are
annulled is voidable.
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed
of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has acted
Page 28 of 50
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding.13 There must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it
to prosper.14cräläwvirtualibräry
A reading of the assailed order, however,
shows that the respondent court did not abuse
its discretion in denying petitioners motion to
dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder. To with:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and
objectively assessed and the pertinent laws
applied, the Court finds that a motion to
dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate
considering the peculiar nature of this special
proceeding as distinguished from an ordinary
civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was
not adversarial in nature and the petitioner was
not called upon to assert a cause of action
against a particular defendant. Furthermore,
the State has a vital interest in the
maintenance of the proceedings, not only
because of the taxes due it, but also because if
no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the
estate by escheat.
xxx xxx xxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing
the personality of the petitioner to file ad
maintain this special proceedings, that in the
case at bench, the body of the decision
determines the nature of the action which is
for annulment, not declaration of nullity.
The oppositors contention that the fallo of the
questioned decision (Annex A Motion) prevails
over the body thereof is not of a final decision
is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be
wholly given effect without need of
interpretation or construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the
opinion or body of the decision may be
referred to for purposes of construing the
judgement (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go
Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang).
The reason is that the dispositive portion must
find support from the decisions ratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance
Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex A of
oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of
the Civil Code which refers to marriages which
are considered voidable. Petitioner being
conceived and born of a voidable marriage
before the decree of annulment, she is
considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code
of the Phils.).15cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to
dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
procedure to be observed in actions, civil or
criminal and special proceedings.16 The Rules
do not only apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions
under the coverage of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed
thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16
thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to
dismiss may be filed within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint.
Clearly, the motion should have been filed on
or before the filing of petitioners
opposition.17 which is the counterpart of an
answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed
out of time, it was filed almost two years after
respondent Isabel was already through with
the presentation of her witnesses and evidence
and petitioner had presented two witnesses.
The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only
improper but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or
straying off course from established
jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner
asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law
and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the
alleged conflict between the body of the
decision and the dispositive portion thereof
which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in
the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable.
The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents is clear under
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code,
Page 29 of 50
the law in force prior to the enactment of the
Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the
dispositive portion of the CFI decision has
categorically declared that the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents is null and void and
that the legal effect of such declaration is that
the marriage from its inception is void and the
children born out of said marriage is
illegitimate. Such argument cannot be
sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 8318 of the
New Civil Code classify what marriages are void
while Article 85 enumerates the causes for
which a marriage may be
19
annulled. cräläwvirtualibräry
The fundamental distinction between void and
voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The
effects of void marriages, with respect to
property relations of the spouses are provided
for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children
born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 8920 irrespective of
whether or not the parties to the void marriage
are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil
effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of
a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage
dissolves the special contract as if it had never
been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The
status of children born in voidable marriages is
governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights
and obligations as acknowledged natural
children, and are also called natural children by
legal fiction.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the annulment of the
marriage by the court abolishes the legal
character of the society formed by the putative
spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical
consequences which the marital union
produced during its
continuance.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have
different legal connotations and implications.
Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate;
obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish; to do away with23 whereas
null and void is something that does not exist
from the beginning. A marriage that
is annulled presupposes that it subsists but
later ceases to have legal effect when it is
terminated through a court action. But in
nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares
a status condition which already exists from the
very beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners
argument that it is the dispositive portion of
the decision which must control as to whether
or not the marriage of respondent Isabels
parents was void or voidable. Such argument
springs from a miscomprehension of the
judgment of the Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the
erroneous premise that there is a conflict
between the body of the decision and its
dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of
procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part
of a decision or order is the controlling factor
as to settlement of rights of the parties and the
questions presented, notwithstanding
statement in the body of the decision or order
which may be somewhat confusing,24 the same
is not without qualification. The foregoing rule
holds true only when the dispositive part of a
final decision or order is definite, clear and
unequivocal and can be wholly given effect
without need of interpretation or construction
which usually is the case where the order or
decision in question is that of a court not of
record which is not constitutionally required to
state the facts and the law on which the
judgment is based.25cräläwvirtualibräry
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists
between the dispositive portion and the body
of the decision, effort must be made to
harmonize the whole body of the decision in
order to give effect to the intention, purpose
and judgment of the court. In Republic v. delos
Angeles26 the Court said:
Page 30 of 50
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states
that [i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot
be any less binding upon the courts in relation
to its judgments.
x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety,
and must be construed as a whole so as to
bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this
can be done by fair and reasonable
interpretation and so as to give effect to every
word and part if possible, and to effectuate the
intention and purpose of the Court, consistent
with the provisions of the organic law. (49
C.J.S., pp. 863-864 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the
decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows
that the marriage is voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the
symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made
themselves manifest even as early as 1955;
that the disease worsened with time, until 1965
when he was actually placed under expert
neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if
the subject has shown marked progress, he
remains bereft of adequate understanding of
right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage
between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had
set in. This fact would justify a declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any
of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind,
unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
xxx xxx xxx
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the
marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that
plaintiff continues to be without sound reason.
The charges in this very complaint add
emphasis to the finding of the neuro-
psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff
really lives more in fancy than in reality, a
strong indication of schizophernia
27
(sic). cräläwvirtualibräry
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal
declared null and void the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph
3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal
consequences as to the rights of the children
are therefore governed by the first clause of
the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary
interpretation would be anathema to the rule
just above-mentioned. Based on said provision
the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived
and born prior to the decree of the trial court
setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967
are considered legitimate. For purposes of
seeking appointment as estate administratrix,
the legitimate grandchildren, including
respondent Isabel, may invoke their
successional right of representation in the
estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo
Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother.
This is, however, without prejudice to a
determination by the courts of whether Letters
of Administration may be granted to her.
Neither do the Court adjudged herein the
successional rights of the personalities involved
over the decedents estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at
this point what the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all
magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy
that extreme degree of care should be
exercised in the formulation of the dispositive
portion of a decision, because it is this portion
that is to be executed once the decision
becomes final. The adjudication of the rights
and obligations of thoe parties, and the
dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises
in conformity with the body of the decision,
must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and
unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for
dispute, debate or
interpretation.28cräläwvirtualibräry
Page 31 of 50
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of
discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Endnotes:
* Should read Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay.
1 Allegedly for parricide.
2Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 9,
Quezon City.
3Decision dated October 3, 1967 of the CFI of Rizal
penned by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, p. 3; Annex A
of Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.
4
Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
5
Ibid.
6 Annex I of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 111-119.
7 Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78.
8
Annex I, Petition.
9 Annex J, Petition; Rollo, pp. 116-118.
10Motion to Dismiss, Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-
36.
11Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos
Bulacan, Branch 78; Annex D of the Petition; Rollo, pp.
60-61.
12Order of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78
Annex H of the Petition; Rollo, p. 110.
13
Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617 (1996).
14 Zarate, Jr., v. Olegario, 263 SCRA 1 (1996).
15 Annex D, Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
16 Rules 1&3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
17 February 7, 1996.
18Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages of
sixteen and fourteen years by male and
female respectively, even with the
consent of the parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character;
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 83, number 2;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article
81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting
parties have been found guilty of killing of
the spouse of either of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and
stepsisters and other marriages specified
in Article 82. (n)
Article 81. Marriage between the following are
incestuous and void from their performance, whether
the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate;
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of
any degree;
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether in
the full or half blood;
(3) Between collateral relatives by blood
within the fourth degree. (28a)
Article 82. The following marriages shall also be void
from the beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters,
and stepmothers and stepsons;
(2) Between adopting father or mother and
the adopted, between the latter and the
surviving spouse of the former, and
between the former and the surviving
spouse of the latter.
(3) Between the legitimate children of the
adopter and the adopted. (28a)
Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouses of
such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than
seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee
is presumed dead according to Articles
390 and 391. The marriage contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a
competent court.(29a)
Article 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a
widow till after three hundred days following the death
of the husband, unless in the meantime she has given
birth to a child. (n)
19 Article 85 of the New Civil Code reads:
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought
to have the marriage annulled was
between the ages of sixteen and twenty
years, if male, or between the ages of
fourteen to eighteen years, if female, and
the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parent, guardian or person
having authority over the party, unless
after attaining the ages of twenty or
eighteen years, as the case may be, such
party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83,
Number 2, that the former husband or
wife believed to be dead was in fact living
and the marriage with such former
husband or wife was then in force;
(3) That either party was of unsound mind,
unless such party, after coming to
Page 32 of 50
 reason, freely cohabited with the other
husband or wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was
obtained by force or intimidation, unless
the violence or threat having
disappeared, such party, afterwards
freely cohabited with the other as her
husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(5) That the consent of either party was
obtained by force or intimidation, unless
the violence or threat having
disappeared, such party, afterwards
freely cohabited with the other as her
husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(6) That either party was, at the time of marriage,
physically incapable of entering into the married state,
and such incapacity continues, and appear to be
incurable.

20Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages

which are void from the beginning shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.

xxx xxx xxx.

21 See Tolentino, New Civil Code, Vol. I, pp. 244-245.

22
Sy Loc Lieng, et al., v. Sy Quia, et al., 16 Phil. 137
(1910).

23 Nuguid v. Nuguid, 123 Phil. 1305 (1966).

Page 33 of 50
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their
capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippines
International Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE
GROUP, petitioners
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M.
AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y.
ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85,
MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special
Administratrix, and other persons/ public
officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals,
First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R.
59736, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee and
Alma Aggabao (in their capacities as president
and secretary, respectively, of Philippine
International Life Insurance Company) and
Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
The antecedent facts follow.
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the
Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of
the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez
owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed
capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left
behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio
Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya
Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo,
Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed
Ortañez).2
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City) a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Dr.
Ortañez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which
petition to date remains pending at Branch 85
thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes
and her siblings filed an opposition to the
petition for letters of administration and, in a
subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the
intestate court appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño,
then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed
Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint special
administrators of their father’s estate. Hearings
continued for the appointment of a regular
administrator (up to now no regular
administrator has been appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special
administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez
submitted an inventory of the estate of their
father which included, among other properties,
2,0293 shares of stock in Philippine
International Life Insurance Company
(hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725%
of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana
S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned
1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her
conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares
with right to repurchase in favor of herein
petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group
(FLAG), represented by its president, herein
petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to
repurchase the shares of stock within the
stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was
consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator
Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity
and claiming that he owned the remaining
1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares
with right to repurchase also in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG, represented by its president,
herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year,
petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the
ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock
when Jose Ortañez failed to repurchase the
same.
Page 34 of 50
It appears that several years before (but
already during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortañez and
her two children, Special Administrators Rafael
and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum
of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate
(including the Philinterlife shares of stock)
among themselves. This was the basis of the
number of shares separately sold by Juliana
Ortañez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by
Jose Ortañez on October 30, 1991 (1,011
shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent
Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings
(hereafter referred to as private respondents
Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment
of special administrator of Philinterlife shares
of stock. This move was opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court
granted the motion of private respondents
Enderes et al. and appointed private
respondent Enderes special administratrix of
the Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix
Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare
void ab initio the memorandum of agreement
dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she
filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of
the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s
estate. These motions were opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix
Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare
void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife
shares of stock, which move was again opposed
by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortañez filed an
omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the
deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock
and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-
Enderes as special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that
there were no longer any shares of stock for
her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied
the omnibus motion of Special Administrator
Jose Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of
sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in
substance that a sale of a property of the
estate without an Order of the probate court is
void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since
the sales in question were entered into by
Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez in their
personal capacity without prior approval of the
Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the
approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of
stock and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-
Enderes as Special Administratrix is hereby
denied.6
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued
another order granting the motion of Special
Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of
the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement
or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court
reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court
dated August 11, 1997 DENYING the approval
of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stocks and
release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as
Special Administratrix, the "Urgent Motion to
Declare Void Ab Initio Memorandum of
Agreement" dated December 19, 1995. . . is
hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar as
the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the
Philinterlife shares of stock are concerned, in
particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of the
Memorandum of Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the
Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4,
1982 executed by Juliana S. Ortañez, Rafael S.
Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez as partially void ab
initio insofar as the
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the
7
Philinterlife shares of stocks are concerned.
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the
intestate court, Jose Ortañez filed, on
December 22, 1997, a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
denied his petition, however, ruling that there
was no legal justification whatsoever for the
extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose
Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and mother
Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the
Page 35 of 50
settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez,
without the requisite approval of the intestate
court, when it was clear that there were other
heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced
thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose
Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to
FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly
appropriated for themselves, without approval
of the intestate court, was void.8
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision but it was denied. He elevated
the case to the Supreme Court via petition for
review under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court
dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality.
His motion for reconsideration was denied with
finality on January 13, 1999. On February 23,
1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court
dismissing the petition of Special Administrator
Jose Ortañez became final and was
subsequently recorded in the book of entries of
judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and
Alma Aggabao, with the rest of the FLAG-
controlled board of directors, increased the
authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting
in the process the 50.725% controlling interest
of the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the
insurance company.9 This became the subject
of a separate action at the Securities and
Exchange Commission filed by private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes
against petitioner Jose Lee and other members
of the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife on
November 7, 1994. Thereafter, various cases
were filed by Jose Lee as president of
Philinterlife and Juliana Ortañez and her sons
against private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil
courts.10 Somehow, all these cases were
connected to the core dispute on the legality of
the sale of decedent Dr. Ortañez’s Philinterlife
shares of stock to petitioner FLAG, represented
by its president, herein petitioner Jose Lee who
later became the president of Philinterlife after
the controversial sale.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a
motion for execution of the Orders of the
intestate court dated August 11 and August 29,
1997 because the orders of the intestate court
nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court) had long
became final. Respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes served a copy of the
motion to petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao as president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife,11 but petitioners
ignored the same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the
motion for execution, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of
execution issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of
the 2,029 Philinterlife shares in the
name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez to Filipino Loan Assistance
Group (FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the
Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to
reinstate in the stock and transfer book
of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife
shares of stock in the name of the
Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as the
owner thereof without prejudice to
other claims for violation of pre-
emptive rights pertaining to the said
2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the
Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to
issue stock certificates of Philinterlife
for 2,029 shares in the name of the
Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as the
owner thereof without prejudice to
other claims for violations of pre-
emptive rights pertaining to the said
2,029 Philinterlife shares and,
4. Confirming that only the Special
Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortañez-
Enderes, has the power to exercise all
the rights appurtenant to the said
shares, including the right to vote and
to receive dividends.
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any
other person or persons claiming to
represent it or otherwise, to
acknowledge and allow the said Special
Administratrix to exercise all the
aforesaid rights on the said shares and
Page 36 of 50
 to refrain from resorting to any action
which may tend directly or indirectly to
impede, obstruct or bar the free
exercise thereof under pain of
contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary,
any responsible officer/s of
Philinterlife, or any other person or
persons claiming to represent it or
otherwise, are hereby directed to
comply with this order within three (3)
days from receipt hereof under pain of
contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera
and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to
implement the writ of execution with
dispatch to forestall any and/or further
damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.12
In the several occasions that the sheriff went to
the office of petitioners to execute the writ of
execution, he was barred by the security guard
upon petitioners’ instructions. Thus, private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes filed
a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and
Alma Aggabao (president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife) in contempt.13
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate court
gravely abused its discretion in (1) declaring
that the ownership of FLAG over the
Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void;
(2) ordering the execution of its order declaring
such nullity and (3) depriving the petitioners of
their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition outright:
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the
light of the following considerations:
1. The assailed Order dated August 11,
1997 of the respondent judge had long
become final and executory;
2. The certification on non-forum
shopping is signed by only one (1) of
the three (3) petitioners in violation of
the Rules; and
3. Except for the assailed orders and
writ of execution, deed of sale with
right to repurchase, deed of sale of
shares of stocks and omnibus motion,
the petition is not accompanied by
such pleadings, documents and other
material portions of the record as
would support the allegations therein
in violation of the second paragraph,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14
The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners Lee and Aggabao of the above
decision was denied by the Court of Appeals on
October 30, 2000:
This resolves the "urgent motion for
reconsideration" filed by the petitioners of our
resolution of July 26, 2000 dismissing outrightly
the above-entitled petition for the reason,
among others, that the assailed Order dated
August 11, 1997 of the respondent Judge had
long become final and executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.15
On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the
case to the Supreme Court through a petition
for review under Rule 45 but on December 13,
2000, we denied the petition because there
was no showing that the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any reversible
error to warrant the exercise by the Supreme
Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.16
However, upon motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao, the
Supreme Court granted the motion and
reinstated their petition on September 5, 2001.
Page 37 of 50
The parties were then required to submit their
respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes, on July 19, 2000, filed a
motion to direct the branch clerk of court in
lieu of herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao to
reinstate the name of Dr. Ortañez in the stock
and transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the
corresponding stock certificate pursuant to
Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "the court may direct the act to
be done at the cost of the disobedient party by
some other person appointed by the court and
the act when so done shall have the effect as if
done by the party." Petitioners Lee and
Aggabao opposed the motion on the ground
that the intestate court should refrain from
acting on the motion because the issues raised
therein were directly related to the issues
raised by them in their petition for certiorari at
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, the intestate
court granted the motion, ruling that there was
no prohibition for the intestate court to
execute its orders inasmuch as the appellate
court did not issue any TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and
Aggabao filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
62461, questioning this time the October 30,
2000 order of the intestate court directing the
branch clerk of court to issue the stock
certificates. They also questioned in the Court
of Appeals the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale made in their favor by Juliana
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez. On November 20,
2002, the Court of Appeals denied their
petition and upheld the power of the intestate
court to execute its order. Petitioners Lee and
Aggabao then filed motion for reconsideration
which at present is still pending resolution by
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao
(president and secretary, respectively, of
Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following
errors for our consideration:
The Court of Appeals committed grave
reversible ERROR:
A. In failing to reconsider its previous
resolution denying the petition despite
the fact that the appellate court’s
mistake in apprehending the facts had
become patent and evident from the
motion for reconsideration and the
comment of respondent Enderes which
had admitted the factual allegations of
petitioners in the petition as well as in
the motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, the resolution of the
appellate court denying the motion for
reconsideration was contained in only
one page without even touching on the
substantive merits of the exhaustive
discussion of facts and supporting law
in the motion for reconsideration in
violation of the Rule on administrative
due process;
B. in failing to set aside the void orders
of the intestate court on the erroneous
ground that the orders were final and
executory with regard to petitioners
even as the latter were never notified
of the proceedings or order canceling
its ownership;
C. in not finding that the intestate court
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction (1)
when it issued the Omnibus Order
nullifying the ownership of petitioner
FLAG over shares of stock which were
alleged to be part of the estate and (2)
when it issued a void writ of execution
against petitioner FLAG as present
owner to implement merely provisional
orders, thereby violating FLAG’s
constitutional right against deprivation
of property without due process;
D. In failing to declare null and void the
orders of the intestate court which
nullified the sale of shares of stock
between the legitimate heir Jose S.
Ortañez and petitioner FLAG because
of settled law and jurisprudence, i.e.,
that an heir has the right to dispose of
the decedent’s property even if the
same is under administration pursuant
to Civil Code provision that possession
of hereditary property is transmitted to
the heir the moment of death of the
decedent (Acedebo vs. Abesamis, 217
SCRA 194);
Page 38 of 50
 E. In disregarding the final decision of
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 128525
dated December 17, 1999 involving
substantially the same parties, to wit,
petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma
Aggabao were respondents in that case
while respondent Ma. Divina Enderes
was the petitioner therein. That
decision, which can be considered law
of the case, ruled that petitioners
cannot be enjoined by respondent
Enderes from exercising their power as
directors and officers of Philinterlife
and that the intestate court in charge
of the intestate proceedings cannot
adjudicate title to properties claimed to
be part of the estate and which are
equally CLAIMED BY petitioner FLAG.17
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao,
representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail
before us not only the validity of the writ of
execution issued by the intestate court dated
July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August
11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying
the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of
stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose
Ortañez, in their personal capacities and
without court approval, in favor of petitioner
FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the
issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife
shares of stock in their favor because this was
already settled a long time ago by the Court of
Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was
effectively upheld by us in our resolution dated
October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing
the petition for review on a technicality and
thereafter denying the motion for
reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the
ground that there was no compelling reason to
reconsider said denial.18 Our decision became
final on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly
entered in the book of entry of judgments. For
all intents and purposes therefore, the nullity
of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock
made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez in
favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed
case. To reopen said issue would set a bad
precedent, opening the door wide open for
dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable
decisions no end. This is completely inimical to
the orderly and efficient administration of
justice.
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46342 affirming the nullity of the
sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother
Juliana Ortañez of the Philinterlife shares of
stock read:
Petitioner’s asseverations relative to said
[memorandum] agreement were scuttled
during the hearing before this Court thus:
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Counsel for petitioner, when the
Memorandum of Agreement was
executed, did the children of Juliana
Salgado know already that there was a
claim for share in the inheritance of the
children of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your
Honor, it is already known to them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for
extrajudicial settlement of a property
subject of intestate proceedings when
there is an adverse claim of another set
of heirs, alleged heirs? What would be
the legal justification for extra-judicially
settling a property under
administration without the approval of
the intestate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-
judicial settlement there is an approval
of the honorable court as to the
property’s partition x x x. There were as
mentioned by the respondents’
counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No…
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Page 39 of 50
 The point is, there can be no
adjudication of a property under
intestate proceedings without the
approval of the court. That is basic
unless you can present justification on
that. In fact, there are two steps: first,
you ask leave and then execute the
document and then ask for approval of
the document executed. Now, is there
any legal justification to exclude this
particular transaction from those
steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
None, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
With that admission that there is no
legal justification, Your Honor, we rest
the case for the private respondent.
How can the lower court be accused of
abusing its discretion? (pages 33-35,
TSN of January 29, 1998).
Thus, We find merit in the following postulation
by private respondent:
What we have here is a situation where some
of the heirs of the decedent without securing
court approval have appropriated as their own
personal property the properties of [the]
Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme
prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other
words, these heirs, without court approval,
have distributed the asset of the estate among
themselves and proceeded to dispose the same
to third parties even in the absence of an order
of distribution by the Estate Court. As admitted
by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no
legal justification for this action by the heirs.
There being no legal justification, petitioner has
no basis for demanding that public respondent
[the intestate court] approve the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and
Jose Ortañez in favor of the Filipino Loan
Assistance Group.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the
Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4,
1982 (see Annex 7 of the Comment). . . are not
the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate
left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez. The records of
this case. . . clearly show that as early as March
3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for
Issuance of Letters of Administration was filed
by the acknowledged natural children of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortañez with Ligaya Novicio. . . This
claim by the acknowledged natural children of
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez is admittedly known to
the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement
before they executed the same. This much was
admitted by petitioner’s counsel during the oral
argument. xxx
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable
jurisprudence, public respondent can never be
faulted for not approving. . . the subsequent
sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his
mother [Juliana Ortañez] of the Philinterlife
shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio
P. Ortañez." (pages 3-4 of Private Respondent’s
Memorandum; pages 243-244 of the Rollo)
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
want of jurisdiction committed by respondent
judge.19
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana
Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and
Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly
entered into a memorandum of agreement
extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate
among themselves, despite their knowledge
that there were other heirs or claimants to the
estate and before final settlement of the estate
by the intestate court. Since the appropriation
of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and
her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortañez)
was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by
Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without
court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or
participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code
which provides that possession of hereditary
property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of
death of the decedent.20 However, an heir can
only alienate such portion of the estate that
may be allotted to him in the division of the
estate by the probate or intestate court after
final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall
have been given their shares.21 This means that
an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
share in the estate, not any specific property
therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez
and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the
Page 40 of 50
estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This
they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate
court because of the undue prejudice it would
cause the other claimants to the estate, as
what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate, without court
approval. It is well-settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of
the decedent’s estate. In the early case
of Godoy vs. Orellano,22 we laid down the rule
that the sale of the property of the estate by an
administrator without the order of the probate
court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court
of Appeals,23 we ruled that:
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned
properties (fishpond) were included in the
inventory of properties of the estate submitted
by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera
on November 14, 1974. Private respondent was
appointed as administratrix of the estate on
March 3, 1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon
Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the questioned
deed of sale of the fishponds was executed
between petitioner and private respondent
without notice and approval of the probate
court. Even after the sale, administratrix Aurora
Carreon still included the three fishponds as
among the real properties of the estate in her
inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In
fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner, at the time of the sale of the
fishponds in question, knew that the same
were part of the estate under administration.
xxx xxx xxx
The subject properties therefore are under the
jurisdiction of the probate court which
according to our settled jurisprudence has the
authority to approve any disposition regarding
properties under administration. . . More
emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate
of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 767) where We
stated that when the estate of the deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot
enter into any transaction involving it without
prior approval of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals (149 SCRA 174), We held that the
sale of an immovable property belonging to the
estate of a decedent, in a special proceedings,
needs court approval. . . This pronouncement
finds support in the previous case of Dolores
Vda. De Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797)
wherein We emphasized that it is within the
jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the
sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. x x x
It being settled that property under
administration needs the approval of the
probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the
estate and is null and void. As early as 1921 in
the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil 347),
We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased,
which is not authorized by the probate court is
null and void and title does not pass to the
purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate
court can declare null and void the disposition
of the property under administration, made by
private respondent, the same having been
effected without authority from said court. It is
the probate court that has the power to
authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4
and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court
that can declare it null and void for as long as
the proceedings had not been closed or
terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention
that the probate court cannot annul the
unauthorized sale, would render meaningless
the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga
vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1)
any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2)
any unauthorized disposition of estate property
can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul
the unauthorized disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or
probate court execute its order nullifying the
invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate
court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of
Page 41 of 50
estate property, otherwise its power to annul
the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of
estate property would be meaningless. In other
words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of
the intestate or probate court’s power to annul
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to
prevent the dissipation of estate property
before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the
intestate court nullifying the sale was affirmed
by the appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and
subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of
the decision of the Supreme Court was entered
in the book of entry of judgments on February
23, 1999. Considering the finality of the order
of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as
affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct
for private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of
execution and for the intestate court to grant
it.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG,
however, contend that the probate court could
not issue a writ of execution with regard to its
order nullifying the sale because said order was
merely provisional:
The only authority given by law is for
respondent judge to determine provisionally
whether said shares are included or excluded in
the inventory… In ordering the execution of the
orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law and
jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a
probate or intestate court of whether a
property is included or excluded in the inventory
of the estate being provisional in nature, cannot
be the subject of execution.24 (emphasis ours)
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. There is no
question, based on the facts of this case, that
the Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the
estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the very
start as in fact these shares were included in
the inventory of the properties of the estate
submitted by Rafael Ortañez after he and his
brother, Jose Ortañez, were appointed special
administrators by the intestate court.25
The controversy here actually started when,
during the pendency of the settlement of the
estate of Dr. Ortañez, his wife Juliana Ortañez
sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in
favor petitioner FLAG without the approval of
the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortañez later
sold the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares
also in favor of FLAG without the approval of
the intestate court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of
inclusion or exclusion of properties in the
inventory of the estate because there is no
question that, from the very start, the
Philinterlife shares of stock were owned by the
decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are
concerned here with the effect of the sale
made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez
and Jose Ortañez, without the required
approval of the intestate court. This being so,
the contention of petitioners that the
determination of the intestate court was
merely provisional and should have been
threshed out in a separate proceeding is
incorrect.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao
next contend that the writ of execution should
not be executed against them because they
were not notified, nor they were aware, of the
proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of
stock.
We are not persuaded. The title of the
purchaser like herein petitioner FLAG can be
struck down by the intestate court after a clear
showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is
the logical consequence of our ruling
in Godoy andin several subsequent cases.26 The
sale of any property of the estate by an
administrator or prospective heir without
order of the probate or intestate court is void
and passes no title to the purchaser. Thus,
in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon. Melencio Geneto,
G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the
probate court to cancel the transfer certificate
of title issued to the vendees at the instance of
the administrator after finding that the sale of
real property under probate proceedings was
made without the prior approval of the court.
The dispositive portion of our decision read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed Order dated
February 18, 1981 of the respondent Judge
approving the questioned Amicable Settlement
is declared NULL and VOID and hereby SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero
Page 42 of 50
Dioniosio III and by the latter to William Go is
likewise declared NULL and VOID. The Transfer
Certificate of Title issued to the latter is hereby
ordered cancelled.
It goes without saying that the increase in
Philinterlife’s authorized capital stock,
approved on the vote of petitioners’ non-
existent shareholdings and obviously calculated
to make it difficult for Dr. Ortañez’s estate to
reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife,
was likewise void ab initio.
Petitioners next argue that they were denied
due process.
We do not think so.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons
known only to them, did not appeal the
decision of the intestate court nullifying the
sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the
vendor, Jose Ortañez, appealed the case. A
careful review of the records shows that
petitioners had actual knowledge of the estate
settlement proceedings and that they knew
private respondent Enderes was questioning
therein the sale to them of the Philinterlife
shares of stock.
It must be noted that private respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes filed before the
intestate court (RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85)
a "Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Deeds of
Sale of Philinterlife Shares of Stock" on March
22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners
already knew of the pending settlement
proceedings and that the shares they bought
were under the administration by the intestate
court because private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes and her mother Ligaya
Novicio had filed a case against them at the
Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 7, 1994, docketed as SEC No. 11-94-
4909, for annulment of transfer of shares of
stock, annulment of sale of corporate
properties, annulment of subscriptions on
increased capital stocks, accounting, inspection
of corporate books and records and damages
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order.27 In said
case, Enderes and her mother questioned the
sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to
petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in
his resolution dated March 24, 1995, deferred
to the jurisdiction of the intestate court to rule
on the validity of the sale of shares of stock
sold to petitioners by Jose Ortañez and Juliana
Ortañez:
Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife
shares of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez who died, in
1980, are part of his estate which is presently
the subject matter of an intestate proceeding
of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85. Although,
private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] presented
the documents of partition whereby the
foregoing share of stocks were allegedly
partitioned and conveyed to Jose S. Ortañez
who allegedly assigned the same to the other
private respondents, approval of the Court was
not presented. Thus, the assignments to the
private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] of the
subject shares of stocks are void.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial
partition of the shares of stock owned by the
late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, we rule that the
matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of
the regular court where the intestate
proceedings are currently pending.28
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer
dated as early as March 24, 1995 recognizing
the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
determine the validity of the extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Dr. Ortañez and the
subsequent sale by the heirs of the decedent of
the Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioners,
how can petitioners claim that they were not
aware of the intestate proceedings?
Furthermore, when the resolution of the SEC
hearing officer reached the Supreme Court in
1996 (docketed as G.R. 128525), herein
petitioners who were respondents therein filed
their answer which contained statements
showing that they knew of the pending
intestate proceedings:
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not
within the jurisdiction of the SEC but with the
Regional Trial Court; Ligaya Novicio and
children represented themselves to be the
common law wife and illegitimate children of
the late Ortañez; that on March 4, 1982, the
surviving spouse Juliana Ortañez, on her behalf
and for her minor son Antonio, executed a
Memorandum of Agreement with her other
sons Rafael and Jose, both surnamed Ortañez,
Page 43 of 50
dividing the estate of the deceased composed
of his one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
properties; that in the said Memorandum of
Agreement, Jose S. Ortañez acquired as his
share of the estate the 1,329 shares of stock in
Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, Juliana and
Rafael assigned their respective shares of stock
in Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the
contentions of petitioners, private respondents
Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma
Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife
on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortañez, the
principal stockholder at that time, executed a
deed of sale of his shares of stock to private
respondents; and that the right of petitioners
to question the Memorandum of Agreement
and the acquisition of shares of stock of private
respondent is barred by prescription.29
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes offered additional proof of actual
knowledge of the settlement proceedings by
petitioners which petitioners never denied: (1)
that petitioners were represented by Atty.
Ricardo Calimag previously hired by the mother
of private respondent Enderes to initiate cases
against petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao
for the nullification of the sale of the shares of
stock but said counsel made a conflicting turn-
around and appeared instead as counsel of
petitioners, and (2) that the deeds of sale
executed between petitioners and the heirs of
the decedent (vendors Juliana Ortañez and Jose
Ortañez) were acknowledged before Atty.
Ramon Carpio who, during the pendency of the
settlement proceedings, filed a motion for the
approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of
stock to the Knights of Columbus Fraternal
Association, Inc. (which motion was, however,
later abandoned).30 All this sufficiently proves
that petitioners, through their counsels, knew
of the pending settlement proceedings.
Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases
such as libel (Criminal Case No. 97-7179-81),
grave coercion (Criminal Case No. 84624) and
robbery (Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919) against
private respondent’s mother Ligaya Novicio
who was a director of Philinterlife,31 all of
which criminal cases were related to the
questionable sale to petitioners of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
Considering these circumstances, we cannot
accept petitioners’ claim of denial of due
process. The essence of due process is the
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where the
opportunity to be heard has been accorded,
there is no denial of due process.32 In this case,
petitioners knew of the pending instestate
proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez’s estate but for reasons they alone
knew, they never intervened. When the court
declared the nullity of the sale, they did not
bother to appeal. And when they were notified
of the motion for execution of the Orders of
the intestate court, they ignored the same.
Clearly, petitioners alone should bear the
blame.
Petitioners next contend that we are bound by
our ruling in G.R. No. 128525 entitled Ma.
Divina Ortañez-Enderes vs. Court of
Appeals, dated December 17, 1999, where we
allegedly ruled that the intestate court "may
not pass upon the title to a certain property for
the purpose of determining whether the same
should or should not be included in the
inventory but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which
may be constituted by the parties."
We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No.
128525. The issue therein was whether the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
resolution of the SEC that Enderes et al. were
not entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. We ruled that the Court
of Appeals was correct in affirming the
resolution of the SEC denying the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction because
injunction is not designed to protect contingent
rights. Said case did not rule on the issue of the
validity of the sale of shares of stock belonging
to the decedent’s estate without court
approval nor of the validity of the writ of
execution issued by the intestate court. G.R.
No. 128525 clearly involved a different issue
and it does not therefore apply to the present
case.
Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under
them are hereby warned not to further delay
the execution of the Orders of the intestate
court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing
petitioners’ petition for certiorari and affirming
Page 44 of 50
the July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which
ordered the execution of its (trial court’s)
August 11 and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales,

JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., no part.

Page 45 of 50
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND
RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth
Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ,
MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
annul and set aside the decision dated
November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated
January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario
M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as
his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes, and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond
Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties
and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
Immediately thereafter, the cash component of
his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz
and private respondents in accordance with the
decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons,
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any
action for the probate of his father's
holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the
testator's death, it was private respondent
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario
Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,3 Surprisingly,
Edmond opposed the petition on the ground
that the will was executed under undue
influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of
the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva
Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator
bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline4 — was leased
out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court
ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch
Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments
totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-
year lease of the Valle Verde property. In
compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond
turned over the amount of P348,583.56,
representing the balance of the rent after
deducting P191,416.14 for repair and
maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release
of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on
the real properties of the estate. The probate
court approved the release of P7,722.00.6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his
opposition to the probate of the will.
Consequently, the probate court, on May 18,
1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered
the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00. The letters
testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of
Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor,
filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds."
It prayed for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.
Respondent Montes opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of
Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate
Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said
rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the
distribution of the testator's properties,
specifically the Valle Verde property and the
Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the
provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied
petitioner's motion for release of funds but
granted respondent Montes' motion in view of
petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered
the release of the rent payments to the
decedent's three granddaughters. It further
ordered the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the
Page 46 of 50
three granddaughters and respondent Montes
upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging
that he actually filed his opposition to
respondent Montes's motion for release of rent
payments which opposition the court failed to
consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his
previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through
counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing
his motion for release of funds in view of the
fact that the lease contract over the Valle
Verde property had been renewed for another
year.7
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate
court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the
release of the funds to Edmond but only "such
amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their
share in the inheritance. The court, however,
held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three
granddaughters until the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice
to creditors.8 The court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments
set forth thereon by the parties the
court resolves to allow Administrator
Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of
the rental payments deposited with the
Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial
Court, but only such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for
support of Maria Cathryn Veronique,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli,
which are subject to collation and
deductible from the share in the
inheritance of said heirs and insofar as
they exceed the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles
bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar
Ruiz-Montes and the above-named
heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered
and held in abeyance until the lapse of
six (6) months from the date of first
publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond
M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an
accounting of the expenses necessary
for administration including provisions
for the support Of Maria Cathryn
Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz
and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the
amount required can be withdrawn
and cause the publication of the notice
to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court
of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent judge, the appellate
court dismissed the petition and sustained the
probate court's order in a decision dated
November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated
January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE
ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156,
DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH
WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ
TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL
AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE
ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING
THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT
OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS
NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3)
PREMATURELY PARTITION AND
DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO
THE PROVISIONS OF THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS
INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN
DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate
court, after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estate's debts and
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obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the
support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to
order the release of the titles to certain heirs;
and (3) to grant possession of all properties of
the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule
83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family.
— The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the
estate, shall receive therefrom under
the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives
the widow and the minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased the right to receive
allowances for support during the settlement
of estate proceedings. He contends that the
testator's three granddaughters do not qualify
for an allowance because they are not
incapacitated and are no longer minors but of
legal age, married and gainfully employed. In
addition, the provision expressly states
"children" of the deceased which excludes the
latter's grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under
Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to
the "minor or incapacitated" children of the
deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the
time of the testator's death, provides that
during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse
and children, regardless of their age, civil status
or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the
estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not
entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits
the allowance to "widow and children" and
does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's
order granting an allowance to the
grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they
ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents
six months after the date of first publication of
notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to
properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only
under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special
proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its
discretion and upon such terms as it
may deem proper and just, permit that
such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal
be distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these
Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of
residue made. — When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of
administration the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on
the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested
in the estate, and after hearing upon
notice shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the
proportions or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
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 No distribution shall be allowed until
the payment of the obligations above-
mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed
by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the
distribution of the estate properties can only
be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance
to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
(2) before payment of said obligations only if
the distributees or any of them gives a bond in
a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered
the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the
private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the
notice to creditors. The questioned order
speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of
debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left
no debts when he died but the taxes on his
estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the
rule requires that the distributees post a bond
or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time
the order was issued the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate
court to order the release of the titles six
months after admitting the will to probate. The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles
only the question of whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and
efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality
of any devise or legacy may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated.23
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will
was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes'
Opposition to his motion for release of
funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of
the August 26, 1993 order of the said
court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
inasmuch as his father's will included the estate
of his mother and allegedly impaired his
legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The
Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to
who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and
their distributive shares in his estate, the
probate court shall proceed to hear and decide
the same as in ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim
that the assailed order deprived him of his right
to take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate. The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession
and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and
can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the
Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to
retain whole estate to pay debts, and to
administer estate not willed. — An
executor or administrator shall have
the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long
as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for
administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of
the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he
had been previously granted by the probate
court certain amounts for repair and
maintenance expenses on the properties of the
estate, and payment of the real estate taxes
thereon. But petitioner moved again for the
release of additional funds for the same
reasons he previously cited. It was correct for
the probate court to require him to submit an
accounting of the necessary expenses for
administration before releasing any further
money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court
that petitioner had deposited with it only a
Page 49 of 50
portion of the one-year rental income from the Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with
Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit dispatch in the proceedings below.
its succeeding rents after renewal of the
lease.29Neither did he render an accounting of SO ORDERED.
such funds.
Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of
ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned.30 As
executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's
estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are
trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself
and possess all his parents' properties and the
fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true
account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations
and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity,
propriety and justness.32

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045
affirming the order dated December 22, 1993
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in
SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the
modification that those portions of the order
granting an allowance to the testator's
grandchildren and ordering the release of the
titles to the private respondents upon notice to
creditors are annulled and set aside.

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