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Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No.

91649) - Digest

Facts: ​Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right to impose taxes and license
fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local
government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

Issue: ​Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise
the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a
legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
“inherent power to tax.”
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
“municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create
and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant
the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power.

2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked
by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the
National Government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No.
1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a
dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local
taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local Government.

4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated
by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and
to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.”

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes
and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides,
the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.”
It does not make local governments sovereign within the state. Wherefore, the petition is


FACTS: ​The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the
goal of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The President also saw in the WTO the
opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs and uncertainty
associated with exporting and the attraction of more investments into the country. On April
15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On
December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification of the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments. On December 16, 1994,the President signed the Instrument
of Ratification.

1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated economic nationalism by the

2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs Philippine
sovereignty, specifically the legislative power vested in the Congress

3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion

1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national
economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international

2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on
the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to
by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from
the rest of the world. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
laws. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation on the parties. By their inherent
nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. The Philippines has
effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain
and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to
the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the same
commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act. The Court held that a final act is an
instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and
not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what
multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts. It should be added that
the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the member’s

Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: ​DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local health system. It
formed in order to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals, secure funding for
priority public programs, promote the development of local health systems and ensure its
effective performance, strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies and expand
the National Health Insurance program. However, the petitioners alleged that the
implementation of the HSRA had resulted in making free medicine and medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. They alleged that the HSRA is void
for being in violation of several constitutional provisions (e.g. Art III Sec 1, Art II Sec 5, Art II
Sec, 9, etc.). EO 102 was the order to redirect the functions and operations of the
Department of health which provided for the changes in the roles functions and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed order, DOH refocused its
mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific
health services and technical assistance, as a result of being the devolution of basic
services to local government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in excess of the
Presidential Authority.

ISSUE:​ Whether or Not the HSRA and EO no. 102 are unconstitutional

RULING: ​No, HSRA and EO 102 are not unconstitutional. The HSRA cannot be nullified
solely on petitioners’ allegations that it violates the general principles. The argument that the
EO 102 is in excess of the presidential authority due is without basis. Records are devoid of
any explanation of how HSRA violated the equal protection and due process clauses that
are embodied in the Sec 1 Art III of Consti. Petitioners failed to substantiate how the
constitutional guarantees were breached and petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing
the relevance of this provision to the petition. With the EO 102, the constitution clearly
states that the president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Furthermore, DOH is among the cabinet level departments enumerated under the
Book IV of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work
of the president.

Oposa vs Factoran

LANDMARK CASE: In 1990, 44 children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR
Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right to a healthful environment.
They brought the case in the name of all the children in the Philippines and in the name of
the generations yet unborn!

FACTS:​ A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents
against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting on his behalf

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE: ​Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD: ​Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation, and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to
sue on behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
generations to come.

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

FACTS:​ In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3%
of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net
receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own
personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may
purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA
invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was
same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing
can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's
reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power
to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO
does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have
a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES​: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since
the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The
parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still
apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot
again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a
different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an
instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in
the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.


FACTS:​ Before the Court of Industrial Relations a petition was filed in case No. 36-V
entitled “National Labor Union, versus Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran),”
wherein petitioner alleged that it was a legitimate labor organization, thirty of whose
affiliated members were working and under the employ of the respondent; that the
respondent “is a semi-governmental transportation entity, popularly known as ‘Metran,’ and
after several other allegations concluded with the prayer that its nine demands at length set
forth in said petition be granted.
On behalf of the so-called respondent an oral petition for dismissal of the case was made
before the court on October 22, 1946. “on the ground that the respondent belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines and as such, it cannot be sued”
ISSUE:​ W/N METRAN can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit or Sec 3 of Art XVI of
the 1987 Constitution (The State may not be sued without its consent)

HELD:​ “Upon the whole, we are clearly of opinion that the proceedings had in the Court of
Industrial Relations and now subject of this appeal are null and void [and] that the said court
should be, as it is hereby, enjoined from taking any further action in the case inconsistent
with this decision.”

RATIO:​ It is beyond dispute that the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is and
was at the time covered by the petition in the Court of Industrial Relations an office created
by Executive Order No. 59 and operating under the direct supervision and control of the
Department of Public Works and Communications. The said office not being a juridical
person, any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would in
practice be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, of which the said
Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is a mere office or agency. The Bureau of
Public Works under whose supervision the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran)
has been organized and functions in is an integral part of the government, just as the said
office or agency. And apart from the consideration that neither said Bureau nor said office
has any juridical personality to be sued for reasons already set forth, any suit or action
attempted against either will necessarily be a suit or action against the government itself In
a republican state, like the Philippines, government immunity from suit without its consent is
derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government “of the
people, by the people, and for the people”


FACTS: February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino
was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Now, Mr.
Marcos, on his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.

Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode
of the Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor
may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or
agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.

• Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
• Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcos’ to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their

HELD:​ The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

RATIO: ​The obligation of the President to protect the people, promote their welfare &
advance national interest is a residual & discretionary power not stated in the Constitution.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and
intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos.

The freedom of movement and abode embedded in the Constitution connotes within the
territory of a state only. The right to leave a country, and the right to enter one’s country are
separate and distinct rights and such rights may be restricted by necessary laws to protect
national security, public order, public health or morals.

PANTRANCO vs. Public Service Commission (PSC)

FACTS: ​PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying

to operate additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been engaged
in transporting passengers in certain provinces by means of public transportation utility.
Patranc applied for authorization to operate 10 additional trucks. The PSC granted the
application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s compliance. One is that the
service can be acquired by government upon payment of the cost price less depreciation,
and that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time.

ISSUE:​ Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions. If so, wouldn’t this power of the
PSC constitute undue delegation of powers?

RULING: ​The Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at the
same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of
powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and the
increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation.”

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the
use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition,
the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.


FACTS: ​RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed
by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on the ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral
resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold
its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while
40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the
transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated
assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a
treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract
that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD: ​First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states
that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The
same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary
feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is
an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical
agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat
these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
contrary to the fundamental law.
Second Issue:​ RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional
since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right
to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced
from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall
provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and
are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987
Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils
that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck

Maceda vs. Vasquez

Facts:​ Respondent Napoleon Abiera of Public Attorney’s Office filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. alleged
that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner Maceda also
falsified his certificates of service in 1989 and 1990.

Maceda filed an ex-parte motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court. The Ombudsman,
however, denied the same. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Thus,
Maceda filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order with the Supreme Court.

Maceda contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days
to decide the aforementioned cases. He also contends that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over said case since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of
his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

Issue: ​Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

Held: ​The office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by a
judge even if the charged is unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct
and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

However, in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the
1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all
courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Bondoc v Pineda
- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member of
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for 4TH district of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc
because he was ‘consistent with truth, justice and self-respect’ and that they would abide by
the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.
- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a complete
betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the tribunal.
- Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its


Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS: ​During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was
declared duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member
of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted
for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority
had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader
informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue
thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader
of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator

(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution
Held: ​Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined
by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled
to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court
has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply
means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby
elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing
who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Romulo v. Yniguez

FACTS:​ Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan, filed
Resolution No. 644, calling for the impeachment of President Marcos together with a
verified complaint by impeachment. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the
Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government (CJHRGG).
The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its
further consideration and disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all the charges
contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the
Batasan and sent to the Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion
praying for the recall from the archives of RN 644 and the verified complaint attached
thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. The present petition was then filed
with the Court praying that pertinent provisions of the Batasan Rules granting power to the
Batasan to determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power to
approve of deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also pray that dismissal
by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the impeachment complaint attached thereto be declared
null and void. It is the petitioner’s contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are
unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without
complying with the amendatory process provided in the Constitution. Further, the said
provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide whether to impeach or not, which
should be decided by the Batasan as a collegiate body and not by a small body of the
Batasan. They also content that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal
condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before
the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval
of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose at least 1/5 of
all the members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings.


1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the Archives and report
out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?

2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled
from the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint?

3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional?


No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for the recall from the
Archives of RN 644 and the complaint for impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of
the CJHRGG dismissing said complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that no
official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of its members. In
this case, a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the
CHRGG makes mathematically impossible the required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of
all the members. It would serve no purpose to proceed any further when it is obvious that
the require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained. Dismissal of the impeachment
proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the
resolution and complaint for impeachment – as in the dismissal of Mitra’s motion in the case
– makes irrelevant under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The dismissal by the
majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the
Batasan as a body in the exercise of the powers vested upon it by the Constitution beyond
the power of the court to review. The court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the
impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the CJHRGG to recall from the
Archives the complaint and resolution would produce the effect of ordering the Batasan to
proceed with the impeachment proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed
provisions are constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to adopt rules of its
proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings.
The Batasan Rules of Procedure in impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an
impeachment complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when sufficient
grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not been established, or
requiring majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of a resolution setting
forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1973
Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the
Rules (aside from the fact that the question involved is a political one), because the acts of
the committee sought to be restrained had already been consummated. They are fait

Philippines Interisland Shipping Association vs CA

FACTS:​ An increase in pilotage rates was given by the then President Marcos through the
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of
the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.” During that time the President was
exercising legislative power and was authorized. However, PPA was reluctant to enforce
the same arguing that it was issued hastily and it was just an Administrative Order whereby
PPA has the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No. 43-86, which
fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the
agreement of the parties to a contract.

Issue: ​Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is valid and petitioners are bound to obey it

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he issued E.O. No. 1088,
President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to
exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973
Since E.O No. 1088 is a statute, such could only be amended or revised by law. What
determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its
nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services,
including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.

David v. Arroyo
FACTS: ​In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery
of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be
implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally
permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day,
the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they
seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was
also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that
the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen
averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is
actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The
Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care of power
and take over power.

1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the
dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in
the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of
the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming
powers incident to Martial Law are used?

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call
by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes
necessary as prescribed under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there
were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining
"acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military];
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires
and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore,
the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in
the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or
any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune
offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the state has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct
injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is
congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers
that will serve as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.