ESTATE of TAMPOY, deceased V.

ALBERASTINE, petitioner and appellant

G.R. No. L-14322 February 25, 1960

FACTS: On 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested

with Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her
house in Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November 1939, which he did in the
presence of three instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena,
and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of the testament, she
requested Minoza to write her name at the foot of the testament in the second
page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark between her
name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Minoza
also signed at the foot of the testament, in the second page, in the presence of
the testator and all three above named witnesses. However, the testator, just like
Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of the first page of the
testament. All the three instrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the
acknowledgment written in the second page of the testament, and the left margin
of the first and second page, in the presence of the testator, Minoza, Atty.
Kintanar, and the others.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of the testator’s signature on the first page is
a fatal defect.

RULING: Where a will consist of two pages and the last page had been duly
signed by the testatrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the
first page but the testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page, the court
ruled that the will was not executed in accordance with law. Section 618 of Act
190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement
should be expressed in the attestation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for
failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will.
TEODORO CANEDA ET AL. V. HON. CA,
G.R. NO. 103554 MAY 28, 1993

FACTS: In the course of the probate proceedings of the estate of Mateo

Caballero, herein petitioners, who claim to be nephews and nieces of the
deceased, appeared as oppositors raising the issue of genuineness of the
signature of the testator. The probate court found the last will and testament to
be in order. On appeal to the CA petitioners assert that the will in question is null
and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails
to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. What
appears in the attestation clause is as follows: "we do certify that the testament
was read by him and the testator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the
foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each
page numbered correlatively in letters of the upper part of each page, as his Last
Will and Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of
the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us.” The CA found the
quoted clause in order and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the above attestation clause is in substantial compliance

with the requirements of the Civil Code and merits the allowance of the wills.

RULING: NO. Among the requirements of the contents of the attestation under
Article 805 of the Civil Code is the it must state that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the
attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form
of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of
the substantial compliance rule.

The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or

relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation
clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the
attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred
that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually
complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar,
contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting
witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall
appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such
facts may be plausibly deduced.
GABUCAN V. HON. JUDGE MANTA
G.R. No. L-51546 January 28, 1980

FACTS: In 1977, Judge Luis Manta dismissed a probate proceeding because the
notarial will presented in the said case lacked a documentary stamp. Judge
Manta ruled that the lack of of documentary stamp made the will inadmissible in
evidence and as such there is no will and testament to probate. Jose Gabucan, a
party in the said case, thereafter affixed the required documentary stamp and
then moved for reconsideration but the judge refused to reconsider his ruling.
Hence, Gabucan filed a petition for mandamus to compel the judge to admit the
notarial will.

ISSUE: Whether or not a notarial will presented in court which originally has no
documentary stamp may still be admitted after the required documentary stamp
was affixed.

RULING: The court held that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that,
because no documentary stamp was affixed to the will, there was “no will and
testament to probate” and, consequently, the alleged “action must of necessity
be dismissed”. What the probate court should have done was to require the
petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to
the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that
document. A notarial will without a documentary stamp may not be admitted in
evidence. However, once the said documentary stamp is affixed, then the
deficiency is cured and it can now be admitted in evidence. The documentary
stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in evidence.
MAGLASANG V. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN
G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002

FACTS: On 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother,

petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter
Vivos for House and Lot". Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently
executed by Conchita Cabatingan on 1995. When Conchita died in May 9, 1995,
respondents filed an action to annul the said four (4) deeds of donation.
Respondents allege that petitioners, taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's
fragile condition considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners
deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely,
knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.

ISSUE: Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or
inter vivos.

HELD: In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following

characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to
the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee. In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is
confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that
intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The
phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to petitioners during her lifetime/
GONZALES V. CA
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

FACTS: Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private

respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A
will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog
and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the
death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of
all the pages. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The
petitioner opposed the probate. The lower court denied the probate on the
ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the
issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to

the validity of a will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications
under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no
requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for
trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed
and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that
evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the
the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being
determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good
standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.
ALVARADO V. GAVIOLA
44 SCRA 73 September 14, 1993

FACTS: The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead,
private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the
same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them. Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil
was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering from
glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in
the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of
the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence
and in the presence of the three instrumental witnessesand the notary public who
followed the reading using their own copies.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is substantial compliance to the reading of the will.

HELD: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for
one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will
should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness.
However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this
case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator
from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and
inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. In this case, private
respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents
read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place.
APOLONIO TABOADA V. AVELINO ROSAL
GR L-36033 NOVEMBER 5, 1982

FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the
late Dorotea perez. The will consisted of two pages, the first page containing all
the testamentary dispositions of the testator and was signed at the end or bottom
of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three
instrumental witnesses. The second page consisted of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment was signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three
witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The trial court disallowed
the will for want of formality in its execution. The judge opined that compliance
with the formalities of the law required that the witnesses also sign at the end of
the will because the witnesses attest not only the will itself but the signature of
the testatrix. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate.

RULING: Yes. The law must be interpreted liberally. Further, there is substantial
compliance with the law. It would be absurd that the legislature intended to place
so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the signatures are
to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are
found is consistent with good faith. The failure to include in the attestation clause
of the number of pages used in writing the will would have been a fatal defect.
But then again, the matter should be approached liberally. There were only two
pages in the will left by Perez. The first page contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions and signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom
while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which
is marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. Further, the acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will
and Testament consists of two pages including this page.”
ROXAS V. DE JESUS JR
G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985

FACTS: After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special
proceeding was instituted by Simeon, brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then
appointed administrator of the estate and consequently, he delivered to the lower
court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which was then
set for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the compulsory heirs filed an opposition to
probate assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed in
accordance with law. However, the lower court issued an order allowing the
probate which was found to have been duly executed in accordance with law. A
motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the alleged
holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and
contending that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and
year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. The court then
reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will
on the ground that the word “dated” has generally been held to include the
month, day, and year.

ISSUE: Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of
the deceased Bibian Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of
the Civil Code.

RULING: As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic will should include the
day, month and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there
is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date
“FEB/61” appearing on the holographic will is a valid compliance with Article
810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under
the principle of substantial compliance.
AJERO V. CA
236 SCRA 488

FACTS: The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate. Private
respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament’s
body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will
was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The
petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will
of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by
decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. However, the trial court
still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. The trial court held that
since it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply
with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the
testatrix. On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did
not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain
dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It
also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been
authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC
were not complies with.

RULING: Yes. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the
whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
IN RE: WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED ABADIA
G.R. NO. L-7188, AUGUST 9, 1954

FACTS: The deceased Father Sancho Abadia executed a holographic will in his
own handwriting, numbered and signed by the testator himself and attested by
three (3) witnesses on September 6, 1923. He died on January 14, 1943 in
Cebu. The will was admitted to probate on January 24, 1952. Some of the
cousins and nephews, who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no
will, filed opposition.

ISSUE: What law should apply as to the validity of the holographic will: the old
Civil Code when the will was executed or the new Civil Code which could have
validated the will?

RULING: It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took effect
August 30, 1950, provides in Art. 795: “The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.” Here,
the validity of the holographic will is to be judged not by the law enforced at the
time when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution, just like in this case,
then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate. This is because the general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate
void wills.
CODOY V. CALUGAY
G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999

FACTS: The holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal,
was submitted for probation and was attested to the genuineness and due
execution of the will. Codoy and Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the
will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least
three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine
signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory. (2) Whether or not the
witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceased’s holographic will.

RULING: (1) YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption
is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. (2) NO. We cannot
be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The
clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing
in the holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not
able to produce the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and
did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. The
former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
signature in the holographic will and many other instances enumeratedvin the
case. As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not
complied with. The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce
evidence in support of their opposition.
SEANGIO V. HON. AMOR A. REYES
508 SCRA 177 NOVEMBER 27, 2006

FACTS: On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the

settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo. Petitioners opposed
assailing among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a
declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private respondents.
Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the holographic will
did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. RTC dismissed the
petition for probate easoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered

as a holographic will.

RULING: A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deducted from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative deposition of
the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself.
The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory
heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundo’s last
expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo.
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON
G.R. NO. 12767. NOVEMBER 16, 1918

FACTS: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a

naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will
disposing an estate with an estimated amount of P231,800. The will was written
in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses
only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. This will was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law
generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence
could not have been proved under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a
petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the
probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a
citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly
executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be
probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the
petition

RULING: No. Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court
through the three-week publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The
Supreme Court also asserted that in view of the statute concerned which reads
as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another
state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not capitalized, does not
mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because during this time,
Philippines was still a territory of the US).
GONZALES V. CA
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

FACTS: Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private

respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A
will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog
and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the
death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of
all the pages. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The
petitioner opposed the probate. The lower court denied the probate on the
ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the
issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to

the validity of a will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications
under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no
requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for
trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed
and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that
evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the
the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being
determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good
standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.
MACAM V. GATMAITAN
No. 40445 August 17, 1934

FACTS: On March 27, 1933, petitioner filed in CFI Bulacan a petition to probate
the will of Leonarda [July 12, 1932] and the codicil thereof [February 17, 1933].
During hearing, the clerk of CFI, upon the instructions of the judge who is absent,
took the evidence relative to the probate of the will since no opposition was filed
relative thereto. However, the clerk refrained to take the evidence of oppositor
relative to the probate of the codicil since he deemed himself unauthorized. On
April 28, 1933, the CFI issued an order allowing the will, which order became
final and executory. During the hearing for codicil on July 6, 1933, Juana
presented evidence in opposition thereof. However, the CFI denied probate of
the codicil as well as the opposition thereto on the ground that the will has
already become final and executory. Hence, the present appeal by both parties.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the order allowing the will, which order has become final and
executory, bars the presentation and probate of the codicil. [NO]
(2) Whether or not the failure to file an opposition to the probate of the will
prevents the filing of an opposition to the probate of the codicil thereof. [NO]

RULING: The fact that a will has been probated and the order allowing the same
has become final and executory, is not a bar to the presentation or probate of a
codicil, although its existence was known at the time of the probate of the will.
And the fact that the oppositor to the probate of a codicil has not opposed the
probate of the will, having knowledge of such proceedings, does not constitute an
abandonment of a right, nor does it deprive her of the right to oppose the probate
of said codicil.
MALOTO V. CA
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto- Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private
respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did
not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. While the case was
still in progress, they executed an extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate
dividing it into four equal parts among themselves. They presented the same and
successfully gained court approval. Three years later, a document was
discovered entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),”
purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Malotos oppposed the
probate of the Will stating among others that the said will was revoked. Two
witnesses were presented to prove that the will was burned by Adriana herself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was validly revoked.

RULING: No, the will was not validly revoked. A valid revocation must be done
with animus revocandi or the intention to revoke coupled with an overt physical
act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
The document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established–that such was the will of Adriana Maloto. And that the
burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of
Adriana. Also the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses stated that
they were the only ones present at the place where papers were burned. The act
done by the witnesses could not have constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s
Will.
RODELAS V. ARANZA
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

FACTS: The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the
ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise. The
lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will
was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a

photocopy

RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be

admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
CUA V. VARGAS
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

FACTS: A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in

Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4,
1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and
among Paulina Vargas' heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the
lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester,
Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive
weeks. On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with
Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property
and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan,
Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling
55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein. Respondents
argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it was executed
without their consent and participation.

ISSUE: Whether or not said Settlement would bind the respondents who did not
give their consent.

RULING: No. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the following
reason. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex-parte
proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate
or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of
settlement and/or partition is agreed upon and not after such an agreement has
already been executed19 as what happened in the instant case with the
publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.