Case Digest1

PROPERTY
I. Classification of property, NCC 414

Article 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or
(2) Movable or personal property.
A. Immovable or real, 415

Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the
owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the
tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has
placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a
permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either running or
stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place
on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.
B. Movable, 416, 417

Article 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:
(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not included in the preceding article;
(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personalty;
(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and
(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real property to
which they are fixed.
Article 417. The following are also considered as personal property:
(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables or demandable sums; and
(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities, although they may have real estate.
PLM College of Law Batch 2014

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Civil Law Review – Atty. Katrina Legarda
1 Lopez v Orosa, 103 Phil. 98
Lopez v. Orosa
LOPEZ V. OROSA AND PLAZA THEATREG.R. Nos. L-10817-18 February 28, 1958
FACTS:
-Petitioner Lopez was engaged in doing business under the trade name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill.
Orosa, a resident of the same province as Lopez, invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre
business. Lopez declined to invest but agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction of the
proposed theatre. They had an oral agreement that Orosa would be personally liable for any account
that the said construction might incur and that payment would be on demand and not cash on delivery
basis.
Lopez delivered the which was used for construction amounting to P62,255.85. He was paid only
P20,848.50, leaving a balance of P41,771.35.
The land on which the building was erected previously owned by Orosa, was later on acquired by the
corporation.
As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment, the latter and president of the corporation promised to
obtain a bank loan by mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre., out of which the unpaid balance
would be satisfied. But unknown to Lopez, the corporation already obtained a loan with Luzon Surety
Company as surety, and the corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor
of the said company as counter-security.
Due to the persistent demands of Lopez, Orosa executed a ‚deed of assignment‛ over his shares of stock
in the corporation.
As it remained unsettled, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza theatre praying that they be
sentenced to pay him jointly and severally of the unpaid balance; and in case defendants fail to pay, the
land and building owned by the corporation be sold in public auction with the proceeds be applied to
the balance; or the shares of stock be sold in public auction.
The lower court held that defendants were jointly liable for the unpaid balance and Lopez thus acquired
the material man’s lien over the construction. The lien was merely confined to the building and did not
extend to the on which the construction was made.
Lopez tried to secure a modification of the decision, but was denied.
ISSUES:
Whether the material man’s lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building
attaches to said structure alone and doesn’t extend to the land on which the building is adhered to.

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Whether the lower court and CA erred in not providing that the material mans liens is superior to the
mortgage executed in favor of surety company not only on the building but also on the land.
HELD:
-The material man’s lien could be charged only to the building for which the credit was made or which
received the benefit of refection, the lower court was right in, holding at the interest of the mortgagee
over the land is superior and cannot be made subject to the material man's lien.
-Generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the
inclusion of the building in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one
thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property.
-In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property
irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
owner.
-The law gives preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon
which the refectionary or work was made.
- The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which
the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber
used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the
obligors.
oOo
FACTS
1. Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill.
2. Orosa, who lived in the same province as Lopez, one dayapproached Lopez and invited the latter to
make an investment inthe theatre business.
3. Orosa, his family and close friends apparently were forming acorporation named Plaza Theatre.
4. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, therewas an oral agreement between Lopez
and Orosa that Lopezwould be supplying the lumber for the construction of the theatre.The terms were
the following: one, Orosa would be personallyliable for any account that the said construction would
incur; two,payment would be by demand and not by cash on delivery.
5. Pursuant to the agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber for theconstruction. Lopez was only paid one-
third of the total cost.
6. The land on which the building has been erected was previously owned by Orosa, which was later on
purchased by the corporation.
7. Due to the incessant demands of Lopez, the corporation mortgaged its properties.
8. On an earlier relevant date, the corporation obtained a loan with Luzon Surety Company as surety
and in turn, the corporation executed a mortgage over the land and building. In the registration of the
land under Act 496, such mortgage wasn’t revealed.
9. Also due to the demands of Lopez, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock in the
corporation.
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10. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza theatre. He asked
that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance; and in case defendants
failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to
the balance; or
that the shares of stock be sold in public auction. Lopez also had lis pendens be annotated in the
Original Certificate of Title.
11. The trial court decided that there was joint liability between defendants and that the materialman’s
lien was only confined tothe building.
ISSUES:
W/N the materialmen’s lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building
attaches to said structure alone and doesn’t extend to the land on which the building is adhered to?
HELD:
The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of materials used for the construction and
repair of a building is also extended to land on which the building was constructed is without merit. For
while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties
could only mean one thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, in the
absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.
Appelant invoked Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides—‚With respect to
determinate real property and real rights of the debtor, the following are preferred: xxx Credits for
reflection, not entered or recorded, and only with respect to other credits different from those
mentioned in four next preceding paragraphs.‛ Close examination of the abovementioned provision
reveals that the law gives preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real
estate upon which the refectionary or work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be
that the lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of
which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the
lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property
of the obligors.
2 Associated Insurance v Iya, 103 SCRA
FACTS:
Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty
Corporation. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond subscribed by
petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house in favor of the surety
company. The spouses didn’t own yet the land on which the house was constructed on at the time of the

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undertaking. After being able to purchase the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the
spouses executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Iya.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay. The
spouses weren’t able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the company foreclosed the
chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and lot secured by the
spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses. Also, Iya filed another civil
action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over the property.
TC: heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had a preferred right over the
building since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the land wasn’t owned yet by the spouses
making the building then a chattel and not a real property.
ISSUE:
WON the auction sale was null and void
WON the house can be considered as personal property.
HELD:
A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is
constructed belongs to another. To hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would
result in confusion, for to cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on ownership of
the land, would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the
ownership of the land changes hands. In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the only subjects
of a chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is null and void.
Appellant Isabel Iya's right to foreclose not only the land but also the building erected thereon is hereby
recognized, and the proceeds of the sale thereof at public auction (if the land has not yet been sold),
shall be applied to the unsatisfied judgment in favor of Isabel Iya. This decision however is without
prejudice to any right that the Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., may have against the spouses
Adriano and Lucia Valino on account of the mortgage of said building they executed in favor of said
surety company.
3 Tumalad v Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143
Facts: On 1 September 1955 Vicencio and Simeon, defendants-appellants, executed a chattel mortgage in
favor of the Tumalads, plaintiff-appellees, over their house of strong materials over a lot in Quiapo,
which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage was executed to guarantee a
loan of P4,800.00 received from the Tumalads, payable within one year at 12% per annum. The mode of
payment was P150.00 monthly, It was also agreed that default in the payment of any of the
amortizations would cause the remaining unpaid balance to become immediately due and payable, the
Chattel Mortgage enforceable, and the Sheriff of Manila authorized to sell the Mortgagor’s property
after necessary publication. When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the
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said contract. As highest bidder, the Tumalads were issued the corresponding certificate of sale. On 18
April 1956, the Tumalads commenced case in the municipal court of Manila, praying that the house be
vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and Simeon to pay rent of P200.00
monthly up to the time the possession is surrendered. The municipal court rendered its decision in favor
of the Tumalads. Defendant-appellants impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage claiming that they
are still the owner of the house but waived their rights to introduce evidence. Nearly a year after the
foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been demolished on 14and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a
decision obtained by the lessor of the land on which the house stood for non-payment of rentals.
Issues: 1.WON the subject matter of the mortgage which is a house of strong material canbe subject of
real estate mortgage or a chattel mortgage.
2.Whether or not the defendants are legally bound to pay rentals to the plaintiffs during the period of 1
year provided by law for the redemption of the extrajudicially foreclosed house.
Held: The inclusion of the building separate and distinct from the land in the enumeration of what may
constitute real property, that the building is by itself an immovable property. However deviations have
been allowed for various reasons specially if it is stipulated in the subject of contract. In the case at bar,
although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as a personal property, yet by
ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage, defendants-appellants could only
have meant to convey the house as a chattel. Hence if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented
land belonging to another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in the
document of mortgage. It should be noted that the principle is predicated on statements by the owner
declaring his house to be chattel. Party in a chattel mortgage cannot question the validity of the chattel
mortgage entered into. The doctrine of estoppels therefore applies to the defendant-appellants. Since the
defendant-appellants were occupying the house at the time the auction of sale, they are entitled to
remain in possession during the period of redemption or within one year from the date of auction sale
and to collect the rents or profits during the said period. And since the plaintiff-appellees right to posses
was not yet born at the filing of the complaint, there could be no violation or breach thereof. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and entered another dismissing the complaint,
with costs against plaintiffs-appellee
4 Board of Assessments v Meralco, 10 SCRA 68
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to
grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street railway and electric light, heat and
power system in the City of Manila. Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant
located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric
transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission
wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers constructed
by respondent at intervals, from its hydroelectric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila.
The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging
to it. The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under
Tax. Respondent paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax
Appeals.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Meralco poles constitute real properties so as they can be subjected to a real property
tax?
Held
Pole – long, comparatively slender, usually cylindrical piece of wood, timber, object of metal or the like;
an upright standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is supported.
MERALCO's steel supports consists of a framework of 4 steel bars/strips which are bound by steel cross-
arms atop of which are cross-arms supporting 5 high-voltage transmission wires, and their sole function
is to support/carry such wires. The exemption granted to poles as quoted from Part II, Par.9 of
respondent's franchise is determined by the use to which such poles are dedicated.
It is evident that the word ‚poles‛, as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's franchise,
should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for which the
franchise was granted. The poles should be taken and understood as part of MERALCO's electric power
system for the conveyance of electric current to its consumers.
Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property:

(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxx
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an
industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Following these classifications, MERALCO's steel towers should be considered personal property. It
should be noted that the steel towers:
(a) are neither buildings or constructions adhered to the soil;
(b) are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner – they can be separated without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;
are not machineries, receptacles or instruments, and even if they are, they are not intended for an
industry to be carried on in the premises.
The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its
franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers were considered personal because
they were removable and merely attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be
moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled. Furthermore, they are not attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.
5 Berkenkotter c Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil 663
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FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff, B. H. Berkenkotter, from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing said plaintiff’s complaint against Cu Unjieng e Hijos et al
Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from
the defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels and
land ‚with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus,
utensils and whatever forms part or is necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill, steel railway,
telephone line, now existing or that may in the future exist is said lots.‛
Shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase the
capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment, so that instead of milling
150 tons daily, it could produce 250. The estimated cost of said additional machinery and equipment
was approximately P100,000. B.A. Green, president of said corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B.H.
Berkenkotter, to advance the necessary amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment,
promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the mortgagees, the
herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Berkenkotter agreed to the said proposition and delivered to him
a total sum of P25,750. Berkenkotter had a credit of P22,000 against said corporation for unpaid salary.
With the loan of P25,750 and said credit of P22,000, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., purchased the
additional machinery and equipment now in litigation.
B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional
loan of P75,000 offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A.
Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed, together with
whatever additional equipment acquired with said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said loan.
Appellants contention: the installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by him in the sugar
central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company, Inc., was not permanent in character inasmuch as B. A. Green,
in proposing to him to advance the money for the purchase thereof, that in case B. A. Green should fail
to obtain an additional loan from the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos, said machinery and equipment
would become security therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment,
as improvement incorporated with the central are subject to the mortgage deed executed in favor of the
defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos.
HELD: No error was committed by trial court. The additional machinery and equipment are included in
the first mortgage.
Article 334, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to ‚machinery, liquid
containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in
connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet
the requirements of such trade or industry.‛
If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co.,
Inc., in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein, for its sugar industry, converted them into real
property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not
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permanent in character because, as essential and principal elements of a sugar central, without them the
sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was
established. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment
installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessary be
permanent.
Furthermore, the fact that B. A. Green bound himself to the plaintiff B. H. Berkenkotter to hold said
machinery and equipment as security, as nothing could prevent B. A. Green from giving them as
security at least under a second mortgage.
As to the alleged sale of said machinery and equipment to the plaintiff and appellant after they had been
permanently incorporated with the sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., and while the
mortgage constituted on said sugar central to Cu Unjieng e Hijos remained in force, only the right of
redemption of the vendor Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., in he sugar central with which said machinery and
equipment had been incorporated, was transferred thereby, subject to the right of the defendants Cu
Unjieng e Hijos under the first mortgage.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the installation of a
machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the
purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production, constitutes a
permanent improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the
mortgage constituted thereon (article 1877, Civil Code); (2) that the fact that the purchaser of the new
machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person supplying him the purchase money to hold
them as security for the payment of the latter’s credit, and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering them does not alter the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and
equipment with the central; and (3) that the sale of the machinery and equipment in question by the
purchaser who was supplied the money, after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar
central, does not vest the creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment but simply with the
right of redemption.
6 Davao Sawmill v Castillo, 61 Phil. 709
Topic: Movable Property

Facts: Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession. It operated a sawmill on a land, which it doesn’t
own. Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation in which after the lease agreement, all buildings and
improvements would pass to the ownership of the lessor, which would not include machineries and
accessories. In connection to this, petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other equipment
wherein some were bolted in foundations of cement. In another action, wherein the Davao Light &
Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against the defendant in that action; a writ of execution
issued thereon, and the properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff..
Indeed the bidder, which was the plaintiff in that action, and the defendant herein having consummated
the sale, proceeded to take possession of the machinery and other properties described in the
corresponding certificates of sale executed in its favor by the sheriff of Davao
Issue: WON the machineries should be considered as personal property entitling respondents the right
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to levy on it under the execution upon the judgment in their favor, and the exercise of that right did not
in a legal sense conflict with the claim, since as to him the property was a part of the realty which, as the
result of his obligations under the lease, he could not, for the purpose of collecting his debt, proceed
separately against
Held: the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention and
impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties
The machinery must be classified as personal property. Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil
Code, is in point. According to the Code, real property consists of —
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or
land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly
adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.
It is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by the owner of any building or
land for use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land
by the latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment of the lease.
The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the
lessor on the expiration of the lease agreement. The lessee also treated the machinery as personal
property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The machinery was levied
upon by the sheriff as personalty pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being
registered.
Furthermore, machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the
property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary or any person having temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
. Following the Code Napoleon, the Porto Rican Code treats as immovable (real) property, not only land
and buildings, but also attributes immovability in some cases to property of a movable nature, that is,
personal property, because of the destination to which it is applied. "Things," says section 334 of the
Porto Rican Code, "may be immovable either by their own nature or by their destination or the object to
which they are applicable." "Machinery, vessels, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenements for the industrial or works that they may carry on in any building or upon any land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works." (See also Code Nap., articles 516,
518 et seq. to and inclusive of article 534, recapitulating the things which, though in themselves
movable, may be immobilized.) So far as the subject-matter with which we are dealing — machinery
placed in the plant — it is plain, both under the provisions of the Porto Rican Law and of the Code
Napoleon, that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a
plant by the owner of the property or plant. Such result would not be accomplished, therefore, by the
placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary or any person having only a temporary
right. (The distinction rests, as pointed out by Demolombe, upon the fact that one only having a
temporary right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied
movable property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization
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to become the property of another. It follows that abstractly speaking the machinery put by the
Altagracia Company in the plant belonging to Sanchez did not lose its character of movable property
and become immovable by destination. But in the concrete immobilization took place because of the
express provisions of the lease under which the Altagracia held, since the lease in substance required the
putting in of improved machinery, deprived the tenant of any right to charge against the lessor the cost
such machinery, and it was expressly stipulated that the machinery so put in should become a part of
the plant belonging to the owner without compensation to the lessee. Under such conditions the tenant
in putting in the machinery was acting but as the agent of the owner in compliance with the obligations
resting upon him, and the immobilization of the machinery which resulted arose in legal effect from the
act of the owner in giving by contract a permanent destination to the machinery.
II. Character of Ownership, NCC 419-425

Article 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. (338)
Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (339a)
Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property. (340a)
Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)
Article 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. (343)
Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice
to the provisions of special laws. (344a)
Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.
A. Public domain
7 Government v Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112
FACTS:
In 1896, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of Manila Bay, part of said
land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained submerged until 1912 when the government
decided to make the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land
had been recovered A took possession of it.

11 | P a g e -
Issue: the ownership of the reclaimed land.
HELD: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public
dominion, because
in letting it remain submerged, A may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of
the sea or the seashore,
it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again, its status
as public dominion remained
unchanged; therefore, A is not entitled to the land.
1 MIAA v City of Pasay, April 2, 2009, G.R. No. 163072
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates and administers the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex under Executive Order No. 903 (EO 903),3 otherwise known as
the Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority, issued by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. The NAIA Complex is located along the border between Pasay City and Parañaque City.
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Property Tax Delinquency from the City of Pasay for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. The Court of Appeals upheld the power of the City of Pasay to impose and collect
realty taxes on the NAIA Pasay properties. MIAA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
of Appeals denied.
ISSUE: The issue raised in this petition is whether the NAIA Pasay properties of MIAA are exempt
from real property tax.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties
devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are
owned by the State or the Republic. Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
The term "ports x x x constructed by the State" includes airports and seaports. The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least intended for public service.
Whether intended for public use or public service, the Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of
public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the
Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.
2 MIAA v CA, et al., July 20, 2006, G.R. No. 155650
12 | P a g e -
Facts:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under EO 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of
the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA Charter). It was issued on 21 July 1983 by then
President Marcos. Subsequently, EO Nos. 909 and 298 amended the MIAA Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of
land,3 including the runways and buildings then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. 4 The MIAA
Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through
sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines. 5
21 March 1997: Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061: Local
Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA Sec 21 MIAA
Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed
by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
28 June 2001: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque
for the taxable years 1992 to 2001.
17 July 2001: City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy
on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public
auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA thus sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No. 061. (Sec21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof
that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax)
1 October 2001: MIAA filed with CA an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. - restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing
real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. –
CA dismissed
January 2003: City of Parañaque posted notices of auction sale; published the notices in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer.
A day before the public auction, MIAA filed before this Court an Urgent Ex-Parte and Reiteratory
Motion for the Issuance of a TRO - Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective
immediately.
Issue: Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws? Y
SC:
First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the

13 | P a g e -
National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are
owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like
"roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State," are owned by the State. The
term "ports" includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a "port"
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and
other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as
properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway does not change the character
of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road, either the public
indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among the public who actually use
the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system is even a more
efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of
public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one
"intended for public use." Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still "intended for public
use" if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The
charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions and
other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines,
14 | P a g e -
constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees
does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user's
tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all
the public including those who never use the particular public facility. A user's tax is more equitable —
a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.21
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the "principal airport of the
Philippines for both international and domestic air traffic,"22 are properties of public dominion because
they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.
Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the
commerce of man. The Court has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion are outside the
commerce of man.
Article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the
provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades,
and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces."
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will
happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of
the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
Before MIAA can encumber26 the Airport Lands and Buildings, the President must first withdraw from
public use the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Domain of the Government. — (1) The
President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public
purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated
until otherwise provided by law or proclamation;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question, therefore, that unless the Airport Lands and Buildings are withdrawn by law or
presidential proclamation from public use, they are properties of public dominion, owned by the
Republic and outside the commerce of man.

15 | P a g e -
Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.
Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet the test of economic viability. MIAA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing essential public services
pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government
instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local governments under Section 133(o) of
the Local Government Code. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA
because MIAA is not a taxable entity under the Local Government Code. Such exception applies only if
the beneficial use of real property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable entity.
Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and thus are
properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic.
(Article 420 of the Civil Code)
The term "ports x x x constructed by the State" includes airports and seaports. The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least intended for public service.
Whether intended for public use or public service, the Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of
public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the
Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which governs
the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices within the entire government
machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government
instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind"
by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a "taxable person"
as provided in Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the specific real property
leased becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased
to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to
public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. Article 420 specifically mentions "ports x x x constructed by the State," which includes
public airports and seaports, as properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As
properties of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport
Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not
subject to execution or foreclosure sale.
3 Republic v Vega, GR 177790, January 17, 2011 (FULL TEXT)

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This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals,1 which
affirmed a lower court’s grant of an application for original registration of title covering a parcel of
land located in Los Baños, Laguna.
The facts of the case as culled from the records of the trial court and the appellate court are
straightforward and without much contention from the parties.
On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega and
Heirs of Gloria R. Vega – namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap
and Francisco V. Yap, Jr. (respondents Vegas) – filed an application for registration of title. The
application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baños, Laguna,
with a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land). The case
was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92.
Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria Revilleza
Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mother’s siblings (two
brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without leaving any offspring.
On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas’ application for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public
domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.
During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, respondents Vegas presented several
exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents
Vegas’ ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the registration. Significant was the
testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna, under the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). He attested to having conducted an inspection of the subject land2 and identified
the corresponding Report dated 13 January 1997, which he had submitted to the Regional Executive
Director, Region IV. The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely within the
alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land by
the applicant or by any other person.3
During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo, Francisco G. Buhay, Arceli G.
Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad G. Buhay-Vasquez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa, Florendo
G. Buhay, Oscar G. Buhay, Erlyn Buhay-Ginorga, Evelyn Buhay-Grantea and Emilie Buhay-Dallas
(respondents-intervenors Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to intervene in respondents
Vegas’ application for registration.4 Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject
land consisting of eight hundred twenty-six (826) square meters, purportedly sold by respondents
Vegas’ mother (Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega) to the former’s predecessors-in-interest - the sisters
Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio - by virtue of a "Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan"
dated 14 January 1951.5 They likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan Csd-04-024336-D,
which indicated the portion of the subject land, which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-
interest.6
In a Decision dated 18 November 2003, the trial court granted respondents Vegas’ application and
directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in the
17 | P a g e -
name of respondents Vegas and respondents-intervenors Buhays’ predecessors, in proportion to their
claims over the subject land.
Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing that respondents Vegas failed to
prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not
contain the date when the land was declared as such. Unpersuaded by petitioner Republic’s
arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the earlier Decision of the trial court. Aggrieved by
the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition with this Court.
Respondents Vegas, who are joined by respondents-intervenors Buhays (collectively, respondents),
raise procedural issues concerning the filing of the instant Petition, which the Court shall resolve first.
Briefly, respondents found, in the instant Petition, procedural deficiencies that ought to warrant its
outright dismissal. These deficiencies are as follows: (a) petitioner Republic failed to include the
pertinent portions of the record that would support its arguments under Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the
Rules of Court, specifically the Appellee’s Brief of respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings; and
(b) it raised questions of fact, which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.7
The Court is not persuaded by respondents’ arguments concerning the purported defects of the
Petition.
First, petitioner Republic’s failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas’ Appellee’s Brief to the instant
Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The
requirement that a petition for review on certiorari should be accompanied by "such material portions
of the record as would support the petition" is left to the discretion of the party filing the
petition.8 Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment sought to be appealed
from,9 there are no other records from the court a quo that must perforce be attached before the Court
can take cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.
Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings, documents or records in the
lower court, which to their mind would assist this Court in deciding whether the Decision appealed
from is sound. Petitioner Republic is left to its own estimation of the case in deciding which records
would support its Petition and should thus be attached thereto. In any event, respondents are not
prevented from attaching to their pleadings pertinent portions of the records that they deem necessary
for the Court’s evaluation of the case, as was done by respondents Vegas in this case when they
attached their Appellee’s Brief to their Comment. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the
merits of the suit that will ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records attached are
sufficient to support the Petition.
Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply
takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and
character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a
review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into
their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a
question of law is raised.
In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan,10 the Court reiterated
the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in this wise:
We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists
when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set
18 | P a g e -
of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability
of the situation. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the
evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. It, however, questions whether the
evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court’s conclusion that the subject land is
alienable and disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas
in the proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and
jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a
pure question of law, which calls for a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given
set of facts.
Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the Court the question of
whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have sufficiently established that the
subject land is alienable and disposable. Was it erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed
the trial court’s grant of registration applied for by respondents Vegas over the subject land? We find
no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for the
instances when a person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land:
Section 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x.
Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the
following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.11 Section 14
(1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration is filed.12
Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first requisite:
specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and
disposable.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the same in the
concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public
lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the
inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.13
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof.14 To prove that
19 | P a g e -
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute.15 The applicant may also secure a certification from
the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.16
Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was sufficient to
establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in
the absence of contradictory evidence.17
However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,18 the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the
lower courts of an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that
a CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for original registration of
title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to
establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.19
To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration of title under the Property
Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should have submitted a CENRO certification and a certified
true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable,
together with their application. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, respondents Vegas
failed to submit a CENRO certification -- much less an original classification by the DENR Secretary --
to prove that the land is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.20 If the
stringent rule imposed in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., is to be followed, the absence of these
twin certifications justifies a denial of an application for registration. Significantly, however, the
Court’s pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., was issued after the decisions of the trial
court21 and the appellate court22 in this case.
Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano,23 the Court affirmed the findings of the trial and the
appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and disposable. The Court
held that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification, which is annotated on the subdivision
plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and
disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director
Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes
substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as
20 | P a g e -
belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It
bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the
DENR to contest respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are
inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the
Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a
certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a
certified true copy of the DENR’s original classification of the land. The Court, however, has
nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and
convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground
of substantial compliance.
Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO
and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial
compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable
based on the evidence on record.
First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified that the
subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection of the
subject land.
In the Report,24 Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that (1) the "area is entirely within the alienable and
disposable zone" as classified under Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December
1925;25 (2) the land has never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; (3)
the land is not within a previously patented/decreed/titled property;26 (4) there are no public land
application/s filed by the applicant for the same land;27 and (5) the land is
residential/commercial.28 That Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified before an open court only added
to the reliability of the Report, which classified the subject land as alienable and disposable public
land. The Court affirms the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Mr. Gonzales’ testimony and written
report under oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the subject
land.
Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondents-intervenors
Buhays,29expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable. Similar to Republic v. Serrano,
Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director
for Operations of the DENR, approved the said subdivision plan, which was annotated with the
following proviso: "[T]his survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C.
Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925." Notably, Mr. De Leon’s annotation pertaining to the
identification of the land as alienable and disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr.
Gonzales.
Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas’ application for original registration, the LRA
never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. In the
Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings,30 the LRA did not interpose any
objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land. It simply noted that the subject
subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505, but
21 | P a g e -
that there was no decree of registration issued therefor. Thus, the LRA recommended that "should the
instant case be given due course, the application in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505 with
respect to plan Psu-51460 be dismissed." In addition, not only did the government fail to cross-examine
Mr. Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing evidence to support its opposition. In
contrast to the other cases brought before this Court,31 no opposition was raised by any interested
government body, aside from the pro forma opposition filed by the OSG.
The onus in proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains with the applicant in an
original registration proceeding; and the government, in opposing the purported nature of the land,
need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise.32 In this case though, there was no effective opposition,
except the pro forma opposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicant’s claim as to the character of
the public land as alienable and disposable. The absence of any effective opposition from the
government, when coupled with respondents’ other pieces of evidence on record persuades this Court
to rule in favor of respondents.
In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to testify as to when
the land was declared as alienable and disposable. Indeed, his testimony in open court is bereft of any
detail as to when the land was classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the date
when he conducted the investigation. However, these matters could have been dealt with extensively
during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic waived because of its repeated absences and
failure to present counter evidence.33 In any event, the Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan, readily
reveals that the subject land was certified as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and
was even classified as residential and commercial in nature.
Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas, coupled with the absence of
any countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic, substantially establishes that the land applied for
is alienable and disposable and is the subject of original registration proceedings under the Property
Registration Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the appellate
court in granting the registration.
Respondents-intervenors Buhays’ title to that portion of the subject land is likewise affirmed,
considering that the joint claim of respondents-intervenors Buhays over the land draws its life from the
same title of respondents Vegas, who in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale of that
portion of the land to the former’s predecessors-in-interest.
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac
vice.1âwphi1 It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and
similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and
disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were
rendered prior to these rulings.34 To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the
Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified
true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence
presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial
compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character
of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only
22 | P a g e -
apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and
shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated 30 April 2007 and the trial court’s Decision dated 18 November 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
4 Victoria v Republic, G.R. No. 179673, June 8, 2011
This case is about the need for an applicant for registration of title to land to prove that the same has
been officially declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Facts
On November 2, 2004 Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied for registration under the lawa lot in
Bambang, City of Taguig, before MeTC. The OSG, representing the respondent Republic of the
Philippines, opposed the application in the usual form.
Victoria testified and offered documentary evidence to show that the subject lot is a portion of a parcel
of land originally owned by Victoria’s father Genaro Sta. Ana and previously declared in his name for
tax purposes. Upon Genaro’s death, Victoria and her siblings inherited the land and divided it among
themselves via a deed of partition.
The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed that the land is inside the
alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the Bureau of
Forest Development on January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and
in the concept of owners since the early 1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared as
owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The Republic did not present any evidence in
support of its opposition.
On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision, granting the application for registration and
finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim and right under the land registration law to
have the subject property registered in her name.
On June 19, 2007 the CA rendered judgment, reversing and setting aside the MeTC decision
On the other hand, the CA could not take cognizance of the DENR Certification of November 6, 2006
that she submitted together with her appellee’s brief even if it were to the same effect since she did not
offer it in evidence during the hearing before the trial court. The CA found it unnecessary to pass upon
the evidence of Victoria’s possession and occupation of the subject property. It denied Victoria’s
motion for reconsideration on September 11, 2007.
Issue
1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and
23 | P a g e -
2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property.
Held
Court’s Ruling
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for registration of title: (a) that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There are no material differences
between Sec. 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Sec. 14(1)
operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that
the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must
also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as
declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
On July 28, 2010 the Court issued a resolution requiring the OSG to verify from the DENR whether the
Senior Forest Management Specialist of its National Capital Region, Office of the Regional Technical
Director for Forest Management Services, who issued the Certification in this case, is authorized to
issue certifications on the status of public lands as alienable and disposable, and to submit a copy of
the administrative order or proclamation that declares as alienable and disposable the area where the
property involved in this case is located, if any there be.
In compliance, the OSG submitted a certification from the DENR stating that Senior Forest
Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno, who signed Victoria’s DENR Certification, is authorized
to issue certifications regarding status of public land as alienable and disposable land. The OSG also
submitted a certified true copy of Forestry Administrative Order 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968, signed
by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., which declared portions
of the public domain covered by Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968, as
alienable and disposable.
Since the OSG does not contest the authenticity of the DENR Certification, it seems too hasty for the
CA to altogether disregard the same simply because it was not formally offered in evidence before the
24 | P a g e -
court below. More so when even the OSG failed to present any evidence in support of its opposition to
the application for registration during trial at the MeTC. The attack on Victoria’s proof to establish the
nature of the subject property was made explicit only when the case was at the appeal stage in the
Republic’s appellant’s brief. Only then did Victoria find it necessary to present the DENR Certification,
since she had believed that the notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan of the property was
sufficient.
The Court allowed consideration of a CENRO Certification though it was only presented during
appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. The rules of procedure being mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, the Court is empowered to suspend their application to a particular
case when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. Denying the
application for registration now on the ground of failure to present proof of the status of the land
before the trial court and allowing Victoria to re-file her application would merely unnecessarily
duplicate the entire process, cause additional expense and add to the number of cases that courts must
resolve. It would be more prudent to recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the matter now.
Besides, the record shows that the subject property was covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig
conducted by the government at its expense. Such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage
landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not make sense to
raise an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public
domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court that Victoria amply established her right
to have the subject property registered in her name, given that she has met all the requisites for
registration of title under the Property Registration Decree.
B. Patrimonial property of the State

5 Laurel v Garcia, 187 SCRA 797
FACTS:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents
from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-
Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, and is part of
the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering
during World War II.
As intended, the subject property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary
25 | P a g e -
funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm where, at
the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine
government. On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities
to avail of reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four
properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first ‚Whereas‛ clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property
has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at $225 million.
ISSUES:
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property?
In G.R. NO. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to alienate the Roppongi
property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296, the petitioner also questions the
bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government
Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by
denying them the right to be informed about the bidding requirements.
HELD:
The petition is granted. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in
Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
26 | P a g e -
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership ‚until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being
such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property
(See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi
property’s original purpose.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an ‚authority to sell‛, does not have a provision in
this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government
sector. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in
case of a sale, lease or other disposition.
Rep Act No. 6657, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It
merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian
Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.
Moreover, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell
the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public
character of the Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law since the President
already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year.
Assuming that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its
sale by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court sees no
compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitioner Ojeda.
6 Rep. v Rizalvo, GR 172011, March 7, 2011
Topic: Patrimonial property of the State

Facts: On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La
Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration[3] of a parcel of land La
Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he
obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer[5] dated December 31, 1962 from his
mother, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among
others, Tax Declaration No. 22206[6] for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment[7] of real
property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application. On April 20, 2001, the
27 | P a g e -
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax declarations and tax
payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership. The OSG also
asserted that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition.
the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its
Decision[11] on November 29, 2001, approving respondent’s application. On December 21, 2001 the
Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. In its Brief,[13] the OSG argued
that the trial court erred in ruling that the applicant proved a registrable title to the
property. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed
Decision[14] on March 14, 2006, affirming the trial court’s decision
The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG now comes to this Court by way of petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to seek
relief.
In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion over all lands of
public domain and that the grant to private individuals of imperfect title by the Republic over its
alienable and disposable lands is a mere privilege. Hence, judicial confirmation proceeding is strictly
construed against the grantee/applicant.[15]
Issue: whether respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, adverse, and
public possession of the land in question in the manner and length of time required by law as to entitle
respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Held: We answer in the negative.

Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529[18] or the Property
Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
xxxx
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report[19] dated July 17,
28 | P a g e -
2001 submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La
Union, states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified
as such since January 21, 1987.
In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic,[20] we have ruled that a certification and report
from the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to show the
classification of the land described therein.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC and
the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to
show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent
any showing that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts. In Buenaventura v. Pascual,[23] we reiterated,
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy
of the Deed of Absolute Sale[24] dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P.
Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration No. 11078[25] for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina
Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952.[26] In Llanes v. Republic,[27] the Court held
that tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession.[28] However, even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina
Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still,
respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is
categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[29]
But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject land since 1948, is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of
P.D. No. 1529? To this question we likewise answer in the negative.
An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing laws. The laws
on prescription are found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence. It is well settled that prescription is one
of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty years.[30]
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.[31] In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court ruled,
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
29 | P a g e -
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2)[32], and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.[33]
In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO
dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable
zone since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that it does not encroach
any area devoted to general public use.[34] Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough
in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is no evidence
in this case indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no basis for the
application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case.
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to signify
that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth,
respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable
in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years
after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription.
Although we would want to adhere to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the
distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social
justice[35] we are constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow respondent’s
application for registration
C. Private ownership, NCC 421

Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
7 Tan Toco v Muni. Of Iloilo, GR 24950, 25 March 1926
The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the
purchase price of two strips of land, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening
said street.
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment,
wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality, by
virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete
structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao

30 | P a g e -
After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few days before the sale, the provincial
fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion which the Court of First Instance praying that the attachment on the said
property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and violative
of the rights of the defendant municipality.
Plaintiffs counsel objected on the fiscal's motion but the court, by order of August 12, 1925, declared
the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the defendant municipality null and
void, thereby dissolving the said attachment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property levied upon is exempt from execution.
HELD: Art. 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces and towns (municipalities) into
property for public use and patrimonial property. According to article 344 of the same Code,
provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains and public waters, drives and public
improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or provinces, are property for
public use.
The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and,
consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public of the
municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently,
said property is also inalienable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where not used for a public purpose but for
quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a judgment against the municipality, and may be
sold. This rule applies to shares of stock owned by a municipal corporation, and the like. But the mere
fact that corporate property held for public uses is being temporarily used for private purposes does
not make it subject execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporation proper are not personally liable for the debts of
the municipality, except that in the New England States the individual liability of the inhabitant is
generally maintained.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for governmental
purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The
supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is
devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the municipality
be exempt from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of private individuals in
accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted authorities, is exempt from levy and
execution. In volume 1, page 467, Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that:

31 | P a g e -
Municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme authority of a state for the public good. They
exercise, by delegation from the legislature, a portion of the sovereign power. The main object of their
creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state, and to provide for the police and local
government of certain designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they are invested with
certain governmental powers and charged with civil, political, and municipal duties. To enable them
beneficially to exercise these powers and discharge these duties, they are clothed with the authority to
raise revenues, chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes as by licenses, fines, and
penalties. The revenue of the public corporation is the essential means by which it is enabled to
perform its appointed work. Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue, such a
corporation is practically destroyed and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based upon considerations
of this character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that only the public property but also the taxes and
public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in
the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The doctrine
of the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained, although the corporation is in
debt, and has no means of payment but the taxes which it is authorized to collect.
1 Zamboanga v Zamboanga, G.R. No. L-24440, June 30, 1969
Zamboanga vs Zamboanga 1968 case

Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was
approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also
provided that ‚Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the
capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed
by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed
thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in
the name of Zamboanga Province.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two
(2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the
Auditor General. However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act39 by providing that ‚All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of
charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.‛
Issue:
WON Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its private properties without due process and just
32 | P a g e -
compensation.
Ruling:
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in
question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a
municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is
owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its
private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under
the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide:1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public
use and patrimonial property.
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of
the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as
High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works
for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be
for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first
paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service
are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough
that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc. Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it
affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the
high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga
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province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. But
Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the
rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for
distinctly, governmental purposes.
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more along the
domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law.
Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service
is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private
properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse possession
— all these to the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other than
those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is "...
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles,
obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should
prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
1969 CASE
The movant City contends that the 26 lots aforestated were not patrimonial property of the
former Province of Zamboanga, for the reason that said 26 lots have always been used for public
purposes, such as school sites, playgrounds and athletic fields for schools. Therefore, the City prays
that the main decision be partly reconsidered and that all title to, and ownership of, the 26 lots be
declared to have been validly vested in said City free of charge by Republic Act No. 3039.
The motion for reconsideration is vigorously opposed by plaintiff-appellee Province of

Zamboanga del Norte, which contends that the evidence sought to be filed by the appellant City is not
newly discovered evidence and is, therefore, inadmissible at this stage of the proceedings.
Alternatively, the appellee Province of Zamboanga contends that the 26 lots are vacant, or that the
buildings existing thereon were constructed in bad faith; and that the said Province has additional
evidence to show that most of these properties are not actually devoted to public use or governmental
purposes.
RULING:
The Court resolved that, in the interest of justice and equity, its main decision and that of the
court below be reconsidered and set aside, in so far as they affect the twenty-six lots heretofore
enumerated, and the monetary indemnities awarded. Instead, the records are ordered remanded to the
court of origin for a new trial, wherein the parties shall be given opportunity to adduce and submit any
evidence in their possession to show whether or not the 26 lots aforesaid were or were not actually
devoted to public use or governmental purposes prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 3039.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance shall decide the issues anew, taking into account the evidence
submitted by the parties and the principles of law laid down by this Supreme Court in its main

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decision of the present case, dated 28 March 1968.
2 Casimiro v Mateo, GR 175845, July 27, 2011
The focus of this appeal is the faith that should be accorded to the Torrens title that the seller holds at
the time of the sale.
Facts:
A registered parcel of land with an area of 6,693 sm, more or less, located in Las Piñas City, was
originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondent’s maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Isaias
(1930), the property passed on to his children, namely: Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad, and a
grandson, Rosauro (son of Perfecta who had predeceased Isaias in 1920).
1962: co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad (whose married
surname was Lara-Mateo) - Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman.
Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely: Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and
Leonardo. With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property
was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967, applied for land registration. - application was granted,
OCT No. 6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.
The property was used as collateral to secure a succession of loans: Bacoor Bank, Perez, Pe, and China
Bank.
In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property in
1985 after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China
Bank.
1988: CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of the property,
with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose. -CDC was issued TCT No. T-
34640 in its own name.
In the meanwhile, (February 28, 1991) Felicidad died intestate.
June 6, 1991: CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the MeTC Las Piñas against the
respondent’s siblings, namely: Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and the other occupants of the
property.
The defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because the land
was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had been in continuous and open possession of the land even
before World War II and had presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of the land; and
that CDC’s title was invalid, considering that the land had been registered before its being declared
alienable.
MeTC ruled in favor of CDC
The classification of the land in a tax declaration certificate as a "fishpond" merely refers to the
use of the land in question for the purpose of real property taxation. This alone would not be
sufficient to bring the land in question under the operation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
It should be noted that the subject land is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name
of plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest China Banking Corporation. Certificates of Title under the
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Torrens System is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As between two persons claiming
possession, one having a [T]orrens title and the other has none, the former has a better right.
The certificate of title over the property must be respected by this Court until it has been
nullified by a competent Court.
RTC: against CDC, and held that the MeTC had acted without jurisdiction because the land, being a
fishpond, was agricultural; hence, the dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB
CA: in favor of CD
SC: affirmed CA -became final.
June 29, 1994: the respondent brought an action for quieting of title, reconveyance of four-fifths of the
land, and damages against CDC and Laura (RTC Las Piñas)
RTC: in favor of CDC; CA: reversed
SC: dismiss TCT in the name of Casimiro Development Corporation valid and subsisting.
Indefeasibility of title in the name of Laura
There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has already
been placed under the Torrens system of land registration. The Government is required under the
Torrens system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person
named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.11 The objective is to obviate
possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate
and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the
registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as
he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.12
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after
all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the
system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even
more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens
system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid
down by the law are satisfied.13
Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not create
or vest title.14 The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular
property described therein.15 In that sense, the issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person
does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real
property therein described with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may be
holding the property in trust for another person.16
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under the Torrens system becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible.17
The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of
Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from China
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Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing the
various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in
the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-
Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive registration
in her sister Laura’s name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership
for the first time through this case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after
CDC had commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.
Worthy of mention is that Candido, Jr., Leonardo, and Cesar’s defense in the ejectment case brought by
CDC against them was not predicated on a claim of their ownership of the property, but on their being
agricultural lessees or tenants of CDC.
Moreover, the respondent’s suit is exposed as being, in reality, a collateral attack on the title in the
name of Laura, and for that reason should not prosper. Registration of land under the Torrens System,
aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by
law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack.19 A collateral attack occurs when, in another
action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the
judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a
judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the
enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under
the judgment had been disposed of.20
CDC was an innocent purchaser for value
To start with, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond
the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title.21 He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.22 Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. — Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines
which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the
acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right
of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such
highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.
Considering that China Bank’s TCT No. 99527 was a clean title, that is, it was free from any lien or
encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face of the
certificate of title in the name of China Bank.24
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The possession did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership that should have put CDC on actual
notice of a defect or flaw in the China Bank’s title, for the respondent’s siblings themselves, far from
asserting ownership in their own right, even characterized their possession only as that of mere
agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on tenancy a status that might create a
defect or inflict a flaw in the title of the owner. Consequently, due to his own admission in his
complaint that the respondent’s own possession was not any different from that of his siblings, there
was really nothing – factually or legally speaking – that ought to have alerted CDC or, for that matter,
China Bank and its predecessors-in-interest, about any defect or flaw in the title.
The vendee’s notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in order for it to amount to bad faith,
should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious person to make
further inquiry into the vendor’s title,25 or facts and circumstances that would induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. 26 In other words, the
presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond
the certificate and to investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. 27
The as-is, where-is clause (deed of sale) did not affect the title of China Bank because it related only to
the physical condition of the property upon its purchase by CDC. The clause only placed on CDC the
burden of having the occupants removed from the property.
III. Essential Form
IV. Designation
V. Susceptibility to Substitution
VI. Aptitude for repeated use, NCC 418

Article 418. Movable property is either consumable or nonconsumable. To the first class belong those movables
which cannot be used in a manner appropriate to their nature without their being consumed; to the second class
belong all the others.
VII. Susceptibility to Division
VIII. Existence in Time
IX. Dependence
3 Arriola v Arriola, GR 177703, January 28, 2008
Facts: Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola (respondent) ,his son
with his first wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola
(petitioners).
On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by

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TCT No 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C.
Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each
without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned property and so the
respondent proposed to sell it though public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to
include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the respondent elevated the case to the
CA with a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the
subject land including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public
auction sale of the subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion. Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition
Ruling: The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in
view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, the subject house
immediately partitioned to the heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on
which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from
the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
Fidel died March 10, 2003, the house cannot be auctioned up until March 10 2013.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule
shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis
supplied
BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
A. Ownership, NCC 427 – 439
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Article 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. (n)
Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. (348a)
Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)
Article 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. (388)
Article 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a third person.
(n)
Article 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the
interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to the damage arising
to the owner from the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity
for the damage to him. (n)
Article 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of ownership. The true
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. (n)
Article 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. (n)
Article 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority and for public use and
always upon payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner
in his possession. (349a)
Article 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or
security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or
seizure is unjustified. (n) ARTICLE 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he
may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain
of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. (350a)
Article 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and
by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any
share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State may acquire them at their just price, which shall be
divided in conformity with the rule stated. (351a)
Article 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or
other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not appear.
4 Lunod v Meneses, G.R. No. 4223, August 19, 1908
On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez, Fernando Marcelo,
Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, they each owned and
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possessed farm lands, situated in Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran filed a
written complaint against Higino Meneses.
Menses is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on
one side, and the River Taliptip on the other
1901 Meneses without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by
means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through said place into the
Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the
stagnant waters, there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan;
They therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring that the said tract of
land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of water from the property of
the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the defendant be
ordered to remove and destroy the obstructions that impede the passage of the waters through
Paraanan, and that in future he abstain from closing in any manner the aforesaid tract of land;
O the 13th of March, 1907, entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in
their favor.
The defendant excepted to the above judgment and furthermore asked for a new trial which was
denied and also excepted to, and, upon approval of the bill of exceptions, the question was submitted
to this court.
Issue
Whether the said tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of
water from the property of the plaintiffs.
Held
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one estate for the
benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which the easement
is established is called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to
the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not
constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had
imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in the altitude of the lands in the
barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend
from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this easement, nor the one of
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the higher estate works increasing the burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to which this section refers
shall be governed by the special law relating thereto in everything not provided for in this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural
easements relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow naturally, without the work
of man, from the higher lands together with the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or prevent such an easement
or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of the higher lands
belonging to different owners; neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend the easement.
According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant, Meneses, had no right to construct
the works, nor the dam which blocks the passage, through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip
River, of the waters which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment
of the easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which protects and guarantees the
respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the fields in Calalaran and Paraanan.
It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by means of walls,
ditches fences or any other device, but his right is limited by the easement imposed upon his estate.
The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and maintain a fish pond
within his own land, but he was always under the strict and necessary obligation to respect the
statutory easement of waters charged upon his property, and had no right to close the passage and
outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip
River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estates by obstructing the outlet to the
Taliptip River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the plaintiffs.
It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other owners of high lands in Calalaran, in
addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, to have another
made by the defendant at the border of Paraanan adjoining the said river, for the purpose of
preventing the salt waters of the Taliptip River flooding, at high tide, not only the lowlands in
Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake, since the plaintiffs can not prevent the
defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water; but the defendant could never be
permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands to the Taliptip River during the heavy
rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby impairing the
right of the owners of the dominant estates.
Meneses, as the owner of the servient estate, is obliged to give passage to and allow the flow of the
waters descending from the Calalaran Lake and from the land of the plaintiffs through his lands in
Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip River;
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5 NAPOCOR v Ibrahim, GR No. 168732, June 29, 2007
Facts:
Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, without respondents' knowledge and consent, constructed

underground tunnels in the sub-terrain areas of the lands of the latter.
These tunnels were discovered only in 1992
The tunnels were being used by the NAPOCOR in their operations
Because of the said tunnels, the respondents were denied application of construction of deep well
because it would pose a health hazard to the community
RTC decided in favor of the respondent and ordered NPC to pay the market value and damages.
Petitioner asserts:
- the right to the subsoil does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all
the utility and convenience that such property can normally give
- petitioners were still able to use the subject property even in the existence of the tunnels
- underground tunnels are easements because there is no loss of title or possession
Issue: W/N respondents are owners of the sub-terrain, thereby entitling them to just compensation
Held:
YES, they are still the owners of the sub-terrain portion of their land - the ownership of land extend
from the surface to the subsoil
According to Art 437
- The owner of the parcel of land is the owner of its surface and everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make ay plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, respondents were not able to enjoy the use of their property
because:
- they were not allowed to construct deep well in their lands because the tunnel may cause
hazard in the community
- the value of the land was reduced and owners were even denied loan application because of the
tunnels
The manner of the easement violates due process rights of the respondents as it did not go through
proper expropriation proceedings
JUST COMPENSATION
General Rule: value of the property is based on the date of the filing of the complaint
The time of the taking must coincide with the filing of the complaint
Exception: value of the property is based on the date when it was taken and not the date of the
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commencement of the expropriation proceedings
o This is only applied to avoid giving undue incremental advantage
o Must be based on a legal taking
à Absent the consent, the taking during 1978 is not considered legal and to follow the 2nd rule
would be to agreeing with the scheme that was made by the petitioner
à The basis of the computation must be based on the value of the property in 1992 – when the tunnels
were discovered.
6 Aneco Realty v Landex, 560 SCRA 182
Topic: Ownership
Facts: Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San
Francisco Del Monte, QuezonCity. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots.[3] It later sold
twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.[4]
The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To
restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction[5] with
the RTC in Quezon City. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental complaints seeking to demolish the
newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages.[6]
Landex filed its Answer[7] alleging, among others, that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due
to the construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed that Aneco has its own entrance to its
property along Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco del Monte
Street. The Resthaven access, however, was rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building
on said street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based
on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own
subdivision project.
On June 19, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] granting the complaint for injunction, On March 31,
1997, the RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and dismissing the
complaint of Aneco. Since, the property in question never did exist as a subdivision, the limitations
imposed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 440, that no portion of a subdivision road lot shall be closed
without the approval of the Court is clearly in appropriate to the case at bar.
The records show that the plaintiff’s property has access to a public road as it has its own ingress and
egress along Miller St.; That plaintiff’s property is not isolated as it is bounded by Miller St.
and Resthaven St. in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City; that plaintiff could easily make an access
to a public road within the bounds and limits of its own property; and that the defendant has not yet
been indemnified whatsoever for the use of his property, as mandated by the Bill of rights. The

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foregoing circumstances, negates the alleged plaintiffs right of way.[15]
On March 31, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision[17] affirming the RTC order,
In affirming the RTC dismissal of the complaint for injunction, the CA held that Aneco knew at the
time of the sale that the lots sold by FHDI were not subdivision units based on the express stipulation
in the deed of sale that FHDI, the seller, was no longer interested in pursuing its subdivision project,
thus:
The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) sold it
to appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and without the intention of pursuing the subdivision
project. The law in point is Article 624 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in
order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply
in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
Viewed from the aforesaid law, there is no question that the law allows the continued use of an
apparent easement should the owner alienate the property to different persons. It is noteworthy to
emphasize that the lot in question was provided by the previous owner (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) as
a road lot because of its intention to convert it into a subdivision project. The previous owner even
applied for a development permit over the subject property. However, when the twenty-two (22) lots
were sold to appellant Aneco, it was very clear from the seller’s deed of sale that the lots sold ceased to
be subdivision lots.
Appellant Aneco insists that it has the intention of continuing the subdivision project earlier
commenced by the former owner. It also holds on to the previous development permit granted to
Fernandez Hermanos, Inc
.Issue: WON ANECO IS JUSTIFIED IN RESTRAINING LANDEX FROM FENCING HIS OWN LAND
Held: Anent the substantive issue, We agree with the RTC and the CA that the complaint for injunction
against Landex should be dismissed for lack of merit. What is involved here is an undue interference
on the property rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall on his own property. It is a simple case
of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking to restrain a landowner, respondent Landex, from fencing his
own land.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of
ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and
restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as here, We will not interfere
with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.

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Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court when affirmed by
the CA are accorded great weight and respect. Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the
factual findings and conclusion of law of the trial court and the appellate court. We have meticulously
reviewed the records and agree that Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less
restrain, Landex from fencing its own property.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the
time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. This is clear from the
deed of sale between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer interested in
pursuing its own subdivision project. If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision
project, it must make its own provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of
the defunct subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and the
CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.
7 Padilla v Velasco, et al, GR No. 169956, January 19, 2009
Artemio Velasco acquired Lot No. 2161 consisting of 7,791 square meters situated at Barangay
Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, from spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial, evidenced by a
deed of sale dated February 14, 1944.
In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr. and Teresita Padilla (Solomon
spouses).
Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property, but the latter refused. The matter was
referred to the barangay for conciliation; however, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Thereafter, petitioners caused the cutting of trees in the area, fenced it and built a house thereon. They
harvested the crops and performed other acts of dominion over the property.
On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana, accounting and damages
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. They asked the court
to order petitioners to vacate the property and to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and cost of suit.
Isauro A. Velasco (Isauro), the brother of the deceased Artemio, as administrator of the property,
testified that Artemio owned the property. As evidence thereof, he presented the Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan executed by spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial in favor of Artemio. He
offered in evidence tax declarations and tax receipts covering Lot No. 2161 which were all in the name
of Artemio.
On the other hand, petitioners averred that the Solomon spouses owned the property; that the said
spouses bought it from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced by a deed of sale dated September 4,
1987

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Velasco obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan, with Hector Velasco as co-maker, and the
land was mortgaged by Valeriano as collateral. Valeriano's failure to pay the loan caused the
foreclosure of the land, and on September 17, 1980, Lot No. 76-pt was sold at a public auction by the
Provincial Sheriff. The Rural Bank of Pagsanjan was the highest bidder.
the RTC rendered a Decision, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] ordering the
[petitioners] to vacate the land presently occupied by them and restore possession thereof to the
[respondents], to render an accounting of the proceeds from the crop harvested therefrom starting
September 1987 up to the time the property is returned to the [respondents], and to remove at their
expense all the structures they constructed thereon.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, but on February 11, 2005, the CA issued the assailed decision
affirming the decision of the RTC.
Issue: WON the Velasco, have a better right of possession over the property lot.2161
The Ruling of the Court
YES. Respondents are legally entitled to the possession of Lot No. 2161.
Based on the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA, respondents were able to
establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161 when the petitioners occupied the property. Lot No. 2161
was the subject of Decree No. 403348 based on the decision dated October 10, 1930 in Cadastre (Cad.)
Case No. 11, LRC Record No. 208. The Original Certificate of Title to the land was issued to Brigido
Sacluti and Melitona Obial. On February 14, 1944, the original owners of the land sold the same to
Artemio. From the date of sale, until Artemio's death on January 22, 1949, he was in continuous
possession of the land. When Artemio died, Isauro acted as administrator of the land with Tomas
Vivero as caretaker. In 1987, petitioners occupied the property by virtue of a deed of sale between the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and the Solomon spouses. The land bought by the Solomon spouses from the
Bank is denominated as Lot No. 76-pt and previously owned by Valeriano. However, it was proved
during trial that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161 in the name of Artemio, whereas
the land sold by the bank to the petitioners was Lot No. 76-pt.
The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The action was filed with the
RTC on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed respondents of the property in October 1987. At the
time of the filing of the complaint, only four (4) years had elapsed from the time of dispossession.
Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the real right of possession is not lost till after
the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy of accion publiciana prescribes after the lapse of ten
years. Thus, the instant case was filed within the allowable period.
In accion publiciana, the principal issue is possession, and ownership is merely ancillary thereto. Only in
cases where the possession cannot be resolved without resolving the issue of ownership may the trial

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court delve into the claim of ownership.
1 Datu v Lantud, GR 162551, July 18, 2011
FACTS:
On September 14, 1984 Lantud, the plaintiff in the lower court, filed an action to quiet title with
damages1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 8, Marawi City (trial court),
against petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), the defendant in the lower court, who has been
substituted by his heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-Macabando.2
Respondent:
- he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential lot located at Marinaut, Marawi City, with
an area of 897 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-658
- On August 25, 1984, Sampaco, through his daughter Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with several
armed men, forcibly and unlawfully entered his property and destroyed the nursery buildings,
cabbage seedlings and other improvements therein worth P10,000.00
- On August 30, 1984, Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen prepared and
issued a decision in writing stating that petitioner Sampaco is the owner of the subject parcel of
land.
- Respondent stated that the acts of petitioner and the said decision of the Barangay Captain may
cast a cloud over or otherwise prejudice his title.
- Respondent stated that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public and
exclusive possession of the subject property. He prayed that the acts of petitioner and the
decision of Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared invalid, and
that petitioner be ordered to pay respondent damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and
attorney’s fees.
Petitioner:
- he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in open, public, continuous, and
exclusive possession of the property in dispute
- that OCT No. P-658 was secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception and
misrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title
issued is a free patent
- respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual possession or occupied the
land under litigation
- petitioner has all the evidence of actual possession and ownership of permanent improvements
and other plants on the land in dispute.
On trial:
- Lantud testified that he acquired the subject lot from his grandmother, Intumo Pagsidan, a
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portion thereof from his grandmother’s helper, Totop Malacop, pursuant to a court decision
after litigating with him
- Lantud had been residing on the lot for more than 30 years, applied for a title thereto and was
issued OCT No. P-658.7 He paid the corresponding real estate taxes for the land.8 He planted
assorted trees and plants on the lot like bananas, jackfruits, coconuts and others.9 He testified
that he was not aware of the alleged litigation over the lot before Barangay Captain Hadji
Hassan Abato, although he was furnished a copy of the decision.
- Sampaco testified that the land under litigation is only a portion of the 1,800 square meters of
land that he inherited in 1952 from his father, Datu Sampaco Gubat.
- Since then, he had been in adverse possession and ownership of the subject lot, cultivating and
planting trees and plants through his caretaker Hadji Mustapha Macawadib.
- In 1962, he mortgaged the land (1,800 square meters) with the Development Bank of the
Philippines, Ozamis branch.13 He declared the land (1,800 square meters) for taxation
purposes14 and paid real estate taxes, and adduced in evidence the latest Tax Receipt No.
1756386 dated September 15, 19[9]3.
RTC: DISMISSED plaintiff’s complaint.

The issuance of respondent’s title, OCT No. P-658, was tainted with fraud and irregularities and the
title is, therefore, spurious; hence, it is null and void, and without any probative value and that
respondent failed to establish with competent and credible evidence that he was in prior possession of
the subject property.
CA: REVERSED lower court’s decision.
There is no controversy that respondent is a holder of a Torrens title; hence, he is the owner of the
subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No. P-658 and in confirming respondent as the
owner of the property in dispute
RULING:
No.
The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings.26 Tax

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declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof
of ownership.27 An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative
proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings.28 However, the
Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation.29
The trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance of respondent’s free
patent title on the ground that it covered residential land based only on the Complaint which stated
that the property was residential land when it was not shown that it was the President who classified
the disputed property as residential, and OCT No. P-658 itself stated that the free patent title covered
agricultural land. It has been stated that at present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential
lands, have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born
Filipino citizen.31 Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the free patent title was granted over
agricultural land as stated in OCT No. P-658.
Petitioner contends in his petition that the Certification32 dated July 24, 1987 issued by Datu
Samra I. Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Bureau of Lands, Marawi
City, certifying that the data contained in OCT No. P-658 in respondent’s name had no records in the
said office, showed that respondent’s Torrens title was spurious.
The Court holds that the certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the alleged fraud. Fraud
and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be
presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not
being adequate.33 Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved. Thus, the evidence on record is
insufficient to prove that fraud was committed in the issuance of respondent’s Torrens title. Hence,
respondent’s Torrens title is a valid evidence of his ownership of the land in dispute.
Petitioner claims ownership of the subject lot, which is merely a portion of a larger property
(1,800 square meters) that he allegedly inherited from his father in 1952, by virtue of open, public and
continuous possession of the land in the concept of owner making it petitioner’s private property.
Hence, petitioner prays for reconveyance of the said property.
Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for reconveyance, thus:
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership
of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the
identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.35
In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
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location, area and boundaries thereof.36
In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger property.
However, petitioner failed to identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and
bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in the title
of respondent, which would have shown whether the disputed property really formed part of
petitioner’s larger property. The appellate court correctly held in its Resolution dated May 13, 2004 that
petitioner’s claim is solely supported by testimonial evidence, which did not conclusively show the
metes and bounds of petitioner’s larger property in relation to the metes and bounds of the disputed
property; thus, there is no sufficient evidence on record to support petitioner’s claim that the disputed
property is part of his larger property.
In regard to the second requisite of title to property, both petitioner and respondent separately
claim that they are entitled to ownership of the property by virtue of open, public, continuous and
exclusive possession of the same in the concept of owner. Petitioner claims that he inherited the subject
property from his father in 1952, while respondent claims that he acquired the property from his
grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his grandmother’s helper Totop Malacop
pursuant to a court decision after litigating with him.37 Respondent has OCT No. P-658 to prove his
title to the subject property, while petitioner merely claims that the property is already his private land
by virtue of his open, public, continuous possession of the same in the concept of owner.
The Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as he failed to
prove the identity of his larger property in relation to the disputed property, and his claim of title by
virtue of open, public and continuous possession of the disputed property in the concept of owner is
nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject
property. As stated in Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,38 it is relatively easy to declare and
claim that one owns and possesses public agricultural land, but it is entirely a different matter to
affirmatively declare and to prove before a court of law that one actually possessed and cultivated the
entire area to the exclusion of other claimants who stand on equal footing under the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) as any other pioneering claimants.
2 Corpuz v Agustin, GR 183822, Jan. 18, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Ruben C. Corpuz filed a complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) against Spouses
Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of 2 parcels of land located in Laoag (5,759
and 20,745 square meters)
Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Duldulao in whose name OCT was issued.
Duldulao sold said properties to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben. The elder Corpuz allowed
spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.
Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.
Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the same
from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his (March 15, 1971).

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Spouses Agustin defense: June 5, 1971 - Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a
Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of P11,150.00.
MTC: in favor of the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.
RTC and CA: affirmed
Issue: Who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties -- petitioner, who
is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered
Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties?
SC:
Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to possession in
relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of
petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an
issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.
Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The
only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will
not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in
the complaint and sufficiently proven.
Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real
property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally
lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful
possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance
of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’ continued possession of the subject properties
was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not
established when respondents’ possession of the properties became unlawful – a requisite for a valid
cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the
date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.
The petitioner’s father engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case
show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his
father to 1976 when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title
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registered in his name under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their
possession of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify
their ownership.
It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. 27
Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.28 It is a well-established doctrine that the
title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a
collateral proceeding.29 Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be
decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents
on petitioner's title is proscribed
3 Edralin v PVB, 2011
pactum commissorium is a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given as
guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to his
undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public sale. The
elements of pactum commissorium, which enable the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged
property without the need of any foreclosure proceedings, are: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by
way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for
automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal
obligation within the stipulated period.
The second element is missing to characterize the Deed of Sale as a form of pactum
commissorium. Veterans Bank did not, upon the petitioners’ default, automatically acquire or
appropriate the mortgaged property for itself. On the contrary, the Veterans Bank resorted to
extrajudicial foreclosure and was issued a Certificate of Sale by the sheriff as proof of itspurchase of the
subject property during the foreclosure sale. That Veterans Bank went through all the stages of
extrajudicial foreclosure indicates that there was no pactum commissorium.
The right to possess a property follows the right of ownership; consequently, it would be illogical to
hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,1 assailing the
Decision2 dated June 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89248. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ
prayed for accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated November 8, 2004 and January 28, 2005
dismissing the ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of possession and denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, respectively, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby
DIRECTED to issue the writ of possession prayed for by the petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank over
the subject property covered by TCT No. 78332 of the Registry of Deeds for Parañaque City, Metro
Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
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SO ORDERED.3
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (Veterans Bank) is a commercial banking institution created
under Republic Act (RA) No. 3518,4 as amended by RA No. 7169.5
On February 5, 1976, Veterans Bank granted petitioner spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin
(Edralins) a loan in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00). As security
thereof, petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM)6 in favor of Veterans Bank over a real
property situated in the Municipality of Parañaque and registered in the name of petitioner Fernando
Edralin. The mortgaged property is more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 204889. The REM was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.7 The REM
and its subsequent amendments8 were all duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 204889.9
The Edralins failed to pay their obligation to Veterans Bank. Thus, on June 28, 1983, Veterans Bank
filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure10 of the REM with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Rizal.
In due course, the foreclosure sale was held on September 8, 1983, in which the Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Rizal sold the mortgaged property at public auction. Veterans Bank emerged as the highest bidder at
the said foreclosure sale and was issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale.11 The said Certificate of
Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal and annotated at the back of
TCT No. 204889 under Entry No. 83-62953/T-No. 43153-A on October 25, 1983.12
Upon the Edralins’ failure to redeem the property during the one-year period provided under Act No.
3135, Veterans Bank acquired absolute ownership of the subject property. Consequently, Veterans
Bank caused the consolidation of ownership of the subject property in its name on January 19, 1994.13
The Register of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila cancelled TCT No. 204889 under the name of
Fernando Edralin and replaced it with a new transfer certificate of title, TCT No. 78332,14 in the name
of Veterans Bank on February 3, 1994.
Despite the foregoing, the Edralins failed to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to
Veterans Bank. Thus, on May 24, 1996, Veterans Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession, docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 06-060 before Branch 274 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City. The same, however, was dismissed for Veterans Bank’s
failure to prosecute.15
On July 29, 2003, Veterans Bank again filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession,16
this time docketed as Land Registration Case No. 03-0121, before the RTC of Parañaque City. Veterans
Bank divulged in its Certification against Forum-Shopping17 that the earlier case, LRC No. 96-060,
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involving the same subject matter and parties, was dismissed.
The Edralins moved to dismiss18 the petition on the ground that the dismissal of LRC No. 96-060
constituted res judicata.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss explaining that the ground of failure to present evidence is
not a determination of the merits of the case hence does not constitute res judicata on the petition for
issuance of a writ of possession.19
Nevertheless, the trial court found no merit in the Veterans Bank’s application and dismissed the same
in its Order dated November 8, 2004.20 The trial court explained that, under paragraph (d) of the REM,
the Veterans Bank agreed to take possession of the Edralins’ property without any judicial
intervention. The court held that granting the writ of possession to the Veterans Bank will violate the
contractual agreement of the parties. Paragraph (d) reads:
(d) Effective upon the breach of any condition of this mortgage and in addition to the remedies herein
stipulated, the Mortgagee is hereby likewise appointed attorney-in-fact of the Mortgagor with full
powers and authority, with the use of force, if necessary to take actual possession of the mortgaged
property, without the necessity of any judicial order or any permission, or power, to collect rents, to
eject tenants, to lease or sell the mortgaged property or any part thereof, at a private sale without
previous notice or advertisement of any kind and execute the corresponding bills of sale, lease or other
agreement that may be deemed convenient, to make repairs or improvements on the mortgaged
property and pay for the same and perform any other act which the Mortgagee may deem convenient
for the proper administration of the mortgaged property. The payment of any expenses advanced by
the Mortgagee in connection with the purposes indicated herein is also guaranteed by this Mortgage
and such amount advanced shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Any amount received
from sale, disposal or administration above-mentioned may be applied to the payment of the repairs,
improvements, taxes and any other incidental expenses and obligations and also the payment of the
original indebtedness and interest thereof. The power herein granted shall not be revoked during the
life of this mortgage, and all acts that may be executed by the Mortgagee by virtue of said power are
hereby ratified. In addition to the foregoing, the Mortgagor also hereby agrees, that the Auditor
General shall withhold any money due or which may become due the Mortgagor or debtor from the
Government or from any of its instrumentalities, except those exempted by law from attachment or
execution, and apply the same in settlement of any and all amount due to the Mortgagee;21
The trial court held that, assuming the contract allowed for the issuance of a writ of possession,
Veterans Bank’s right to seek possession had already prescribed. Without citing authority and
adequate explanation, the court held that Veterans Bank had only 10 years from February 24, 1983 to
seek possession of the property.

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Veterans Bank moved for the reconsideration22 of the adverse decision. It directed the court’s attention
to paragraph (c) of the real estate mortgage, which expressly granted the mortgagee the right to avail
itself of the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure in case of the mortgagor’s default. Paragraph (c) reads:
(c) If at any time the Mortgagor shall fail or refuse to pay the obligations herein secured, or any of the
amortizations of such indebtedness when due, or to comply with any of the conditions and
stipulations herein agreed, or shall, during the time this mortgage is in force, institute insolvency
proceedings or be involuntarily declared insolvent, or shall use the proceeds of this loan for purposes
other than those specified herein, or if this mortgage cannot be recorded in the corresponding Registry
of Deeds, then all the obligations of the Mortgagor secured by this Mortgage and all the amortization
thereof shall immediately become due, payable and defaulted, and the Mortgagee may immediately
foreclose this mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extra-judicially in
accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended, and under Act 2612, as amended. For the purpose of extra-
judicial foreclosure the Mortgagor hereby appoints the Mortgagee his attorney-in-fact to sell the
property mortgaged under Act No. 3135, as amended, to sign all documents and perform any act
requisite and necessary to accomplish said purpose and to appoint its substitutes as such attorney-in-
fact with the same powers as above specified. x x x23
The motion for reconsideration was set for hearing on January 28, 2005. Due to a conflict of schedule,
Veterans Bank’s counsel moved24 to reset the hearing on its motion. In apparent denial of the motion
to reset, the trial court proceeded to deny Veterans Bank’s motion for reconsideration in the Order
dated January 28, 2005.25 The trial court reiterated that paragraph (d) of the REM allowed Veterans
Bank to take immediate possession of the property without need of a judicial order. It would be
redundant for the court to issue a writ of possession in its favor.
This prompted Veterans Bank to file a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction26 before the CA.
First among its arguments, Veterans Bank maintained that it was the trial court’s ministerial duty27 to
grant a writ of possession to the mortgagee who has consolidated and registered the property in its
name.
Veterans Bank then assailed the trial court’s holding that its right to a writ of possession had already
prescribed. Respondent maintained that the writ can be issued at any time after the mortgagor failed to
redeem the foreclosed property.28
Lastly, Veterans Bank argued that, contrary to the trial court’s finding, it did not contract away its right
to an extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135, as amended, by the inclusion of paragraph (d) in
the REM. Veterans Bank pointed out that, as evidenced by paragraph (c) of the REM, it expressly
reserved the right to avail of the remedies under Act No. 3135.29
Ruling of the Court of Appeals30

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The appellate court ruled in favor of Veterans Bank.
It held that the contractual provision in paragraph (d) to immediately take possession of the
mortgaged property without need of judicial intervention is distinct from the right to avail of
extrajudicial foreclosure under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, which was expressly reserved by Veterans
Bank in paragraph (c) of the REM. The fact that the two paragraphs do not negate each other is
evidenced by the qualifying phrase "in addition to the remedies herein stipulated" found in paragraph
(c).
Having availed itself of the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure, Veterans Bank, as the highest bidder,
has the right to a writ of possession. This right may be availed of any time after the buyer consolidates
ownership. In fact, the issuance of the writ of possession is a ministerial function, the right to which
cannot be enjoined or stayed, even by an action for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale
itself.
The trial court’s ruling that Veterans Bank’s right to possess has prescribed is likewise erroneous. As
already stated, Veterans Bank’s right to possess the property is not based on their contract but on Act
No. 3135.
Since the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial act of the trial judge, mandamus lies to
compel the performance of the said duty.
Petitioners immediately filed this petition for review.
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether mandamus was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal
2. Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to seek a review of the final orders of the trial court
3. Whether the consolidation of ownership of the extrajudicially foreclosed property through a Deed of
Sale is in accordance with law
4. Whether the issuance of a writ of possession under Act [No.] 3135 is subject to the statute of
limitations31
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Remedy of Mandamus

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Petitioners argue that Veterans Bank availed itself of the remedy of mandamus as a substitute for a lost
appeal.32 Petitioners narrate the relevant dates that allegedly show the belatedness and impropriety of
the petition for mandamus. Veterans Bank received the Order dated November 8, 2004 on November
18, 2004, thus it had until December 3, 2004 to file a motion for reconsideration. Since December 3, 2004
was declared a non-working holiday, Veterans Bank filed its motion for reconsideration on the next
working day, December 6, 2004. With the said dates, it had only one day left from receipt of the
January 28, 2005 Order, or until February 10, 2005, to file an appeal (citing Section 2, Rule 22) of the
Rules of Court. Since Veterans Bank did not file an appeal on the following day, it had lost its right to
appeal and the assailed orders allegedly attained finality.
Respondent counters that the issuance of a writ of possession is not an ordinary action for which the
rules on appeal apply. The writ being a mere motion or an order of execution, appeal is not the proper
remedy to question the trial court’s ruling. In fact, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that
no appeal may be taken from an order of execution, but Rule 65 special civil actions are available.33
Given that the issuance of the writ of possession is a ministerial act of the judge, respondent maintains
that a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy.
Respondent adds that, even if appeal were available, the same is not the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to compel the performance of the ministerial act.34 Respondent maintains that Section 3 of
Rule 65 recognizes that the remedy of mandamus is available in conjunction with an appeal. The
qualifying phrase "and there is no appeal [available]," which appears in certiorari and prohibition
petitions, is conspicuously missing for petitions for mandamus.
We rule that mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the issuance of a writ of possession. The
purpose of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A ministerial act is "one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done."35
The issuance of a writ of possession is outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, which provides:
SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First
Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him
possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use
of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale
was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of [this] Act.
Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court
shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

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During the period of redemption, the mortgagee is entitled to a writ of possession upon depositing the
approved bond. When the redemption period expires without the mortgagor exercising his right of
redemption, the mortgagor is deemed to have lost all interest over the foreclosed property, and the
purchaser acquires absolute ownership of the property. The purchaser’s right is aptly described thus:
Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption
period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the
bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of
title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right
to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ
of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function.
Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.
Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is
proper. We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such
instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment x x x36
With the consolidated title, the purchaser becomes entitled to a writ of possession and the trial court
has the ministerial duty to issue such writ of possession.37 Thus, "the remedy of mandamus lies to
compel the performance of [this] ministerial duty."38
Does the charter of Veterans Bank prohibit extrajudicial foreclosures?
Petitioners then assail Veterans Bank’s power to extrajudicially foreclose on mortgages. They maintain
that the legislature intended to limit Veterans Bank to judicial foreclosures only,39 citing Section 18 of
the Veterans Bank’s charter, RA No. 3518, which provides:
Section 18. Right of redemption of property foreclosed. – The mortgagor shall have the right, within
one year after the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem the
property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at the
rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the Bank by
reason of the execution and sale, and for the custody of said property.
Respondent counters that the inclusion of the phrase "fixed by the Court" in Section 18 of RA No. 3518
does not necessarily mean that only judicial foreclosures are available to Veterans Bank. Moreover,
resort to an extrajudicial foreclosure was voluntarily entered into by the contracting parties in their
REM.40
There is no merit in petitioners’ contention.
The aforequoted Section 18 grants to mortgagors of Veterans Bank the right to redeem their judicially
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foreclosed properties. This provision had to be included because in judicial foreclosures, mortgagors
generally do not have the right of redemption unless there is an express grant by law.41
But, contrary to petitioners’ averments, there is nothing in Section 18 which can be interpreted to mean
that Veterans Bank is limited to judicial foreclosures only, or that it cannot avail itself of the benefits
provided under Act No. 3135,42 as amended, allowing extrajudicial foreclosures.
Moreover, the availability of extra-judicial foreclosure to a mortgagee depends upon the agreement of
the contracting parties. Section 1 of Act No. 3135 provides:
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate
mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and
redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, paragraph (c) of the parties’ REM granted Veterans Bank the special power as
attorney-in-fact of the petitioners to perform all acts necessary for the purpose of extrajudicial
foreclosure under Act No. 3135. Thus, there is no obstacle preventing Veterans Bank from availing
itself of the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure.
Was the consolidation of title done in accordance with law?
Petitioners argue that Veterans Bank is not entitled to a writ of possession because it failed to properly
consolidate its title over the subject property.43 They maintain that the Deed of Sale executed by the
Veterans Bank in the bank’s own favor during the consolidation of title constitutes a pactum
commissorium, which is prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil Code.44
Respondent contends that petitioners never questioned the validity of the foreclosure proceedings or
the auction sale. The failure to do so resulted in the ripening of the consolidation of ownership.45
There is no merit in petitioners’ argument.
Pactum commissorium is "a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given as
guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to his
undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public sale."46 "The
elements of pactum commissorium, which enable the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the
mortgaged property without the need of any foreclosure proceedings, are: (1) there should be a
property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there
should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of
non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period."47

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The second element is missing to characterize the Deed of Sale as a form of pactum commissorium.
Veterans Bank did not, upon the petitioners’ default, automatically acquire or appropriate the
mortgaged property for itself. On the contrary, the Veterans Bank resorted to extrajudicial foreclosure
and was issued a Certificate of Sale by the sheriff as proof of its purchase of the subject property
during the foreclosure sale. That Veterans Bank went through all the stages of extrajudicial foreclosure
indicates that there was no pactum commissorium.
Does the right to a writ of possession prescribe?
Petitioners assail the CA’s ruling that the issuance of a writ of possession does not prescribe.48 They
maintain that Articles 1139,49 1149,50 and 115051 of the Civil Code regarding prescriptive periods
cover all kinds of action, which necessarily include the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners
posit that, for purposes of the latter, it is the five-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1149 of
the Civil Code which applies because Act No. 3135 itself did not provide for its prescriptive period.
Thus, Veterans Bank had only five years from September 12, 1983, the date when the Certificate of Sale
was issued in its favor, to move for the issuance of a writ of possession.52
Respondent argues that jurisprudence has consistently held that a registered owner of the land, such as
the buyer in an auction sale, is entitled to a writ of possession at any time after the consolidation of
ownership.53
We cannot accept petitioners’ contention. We have held before that the purchaser’s right "to request for
the issuance of the writ of possession of the land never prescribes."54 "The right to possess a property
merely follows the right of ownership,"55 and it would be illogical to hold that a person having
ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof. In Calacala v. Republic of the
Philippines,56 the Republic was the highest bidder in the public auction but failed for a long period of
time to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation and to seek a writ of possession. Calacala insisted that,
by such inaction, the Republic’s right over the land had prescribed, been abandoned or waived. The
Court’s language in rejecting Calacala’s theory is illuminating:
*T+he Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law
or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a
foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from
the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property
has been previously foreclosed and sold. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligors’
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right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of
sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the
purchaser. x x x57
Moreover, the provisions cited by petitioners refer to prescription of actions. An action is "defined as
an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."58 On the other hand "[a] petition for the
issuance of the writ, under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, is not an ordinary action filed in
court, by which one party ‘sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or prevention or
redress of a wrong.’ It is in the nature of an ex parte motion *in+ which the court hears only one side. It
is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one party, and without notice to or consent by
any party adversely affected. Accordingly, upon the filing of a proper motion by the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale, and the approval of the corresponding bond, the writ of possession issues as a matter
of course and the trial court has no discretion on this matter."59
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The CA Decision dated
June 10, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89248 is AFFIRMED.
4 Ermitano v Paglas, GR 174436, Jan. 2013
Facts:On November 5, 1999, herein respondent and petitioner through her representative , Isabelo
Ermitano, executed contract of lease wherein petitioner leased a residential lot and a house located in
Davaocity. Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondentreceived information that
sometime in March 1999, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie
Yap.The property was foreclosed with yap as the purchaser of the lot inan extra judicial foreclosure
which was registered on February 22,2000. Yap later sold the property to the respondent. It was made
clear in the deed of sale that the property is still subject to petitioner’s right of redemption.Prior to
respondent's purchase of the property, petitioner filed a suitfor the declaration of nullity of the
mortgage. Petitioner then sent aletter on May 2000 demanding the respondent to pay rent which isdue
and to vacate the premises. Petitioner then filed a case with theMTCC a case for unlawful detainer
against respondent. The MTCCdismissed the case. It was then appealed to the RTC. The RTC heldthat
petitioner posses the right to redeem subject property, pendingexpiration of the redemption period she
is entitled to receive rentsearnings and income derived from the property. The CA assailed
thedecisions of the RTC.
Issue:1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing theunlawful detainer case
2. Whether or not the petitioner can enforce his right to the rentalsduring the time that he is still
entitled to the physical possession of theproperty
Held:It bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only questionthat the courts resolve in ejectment
proceedings is: who is entitled tothe physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession
defacto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if aparty's title to the property is
questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material
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possessionof the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership byany of the party
litigants.
Regarding the first issue, the CA did not erred in dismissingthe unlawful detainer case. The MTCC,
RTC and CA were unanimousin sustaining the presumption of validity in the performance of dutiesof
the public officers who subsequently conducted its foreclosuresale and issued a provisional certificate
of sale. The Supreme Courtfinds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the MTCC, RTCand
CA.On the second issue, the petitioner is entitled to his right of rentals. The petitioner’s right of
redemption as a mortgagor has not expired yet. During that period of redemption, it cannot be said
thatthe mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property. Theright of a purchaser at a
foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right
beingexercised. The title to the land remains in the mortgagor until theexpiration of the redemption
period and conveyance of the master deed. During the period of redemption the mortgagor still being
theowner of the foreclosed property is entitled to the physical possessionsubject to the purchaser right
to petition the court to give himpossession and file a bond pursuant to act 3135. The mere purchaseand
certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the possession and beneficial use of the premises.
Respondent’s failure of filing such petition and bond prior to the expiration of period ofredemption
coupled with her failure to pay rent, she did not havethe right to posses the subject property. Petitioner
is entitled not onlyto the possession but also to the rents and earnings and incomederived there from,
that is from may 2000 until February 23, 2001
5 Isip v Quintos, G.R. No. 172008, AUG-2012-
PONTINO OWNS A LOT. ROGELIO SR. TOOK POSESSION OF THE LOT. PONTINO SOLD HIS
LOT TO DATU BUT DATU FAILED TO PAY THE FULL PRICE. DESPITE NON-PAYMENT OF THE
FULL PRICE, DATU SOLD THE LOT TO TOYO KEIKI WHO EMPLOYED ROGELIO SR. TO
MANAGE ITS WATER SYSTEM PUT UP IN SAID LOT. THE LOT WAS ULTIMATELY SOLD FROM
PONTINO TO DE GUZMAN. DE GUZMAN WITH RESPONDENTS PUT UP THE RONIRO
ENTERPRISES WHICH TOOK THE WATER SYSTEM. ROGELIO SR. DIED BUT HIS HEIRS WERE
STILL OCCUPYING THE LOT. RESPONDENTS ENTICED THE HEIRS TO PUT UP A CAR REPAIR
SHOP TO UNDERTAKE REPAIRS FOR AN INSURANCE COMPANY. ON THE PRETEXT BY
RESPONDENTS THAT DURING AN INSPECTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY THE HEIRS
MUST FIRST VACATE THE PROPERTY, THE HEIRS VACATED THE PROPERTY. WHEN THEY
CAME BACK THEY WERE NO LONGER ALLOWED BY RESPONDENTS TO ENTER THE
PREMISES. PETITIONER FILED AN EJECTMENT CASE ON GROUND OF FORCIBLE ENTRY.
PETITIONERS ARGUE THAT RESPONDENTS DEPRIVED THEM OF THE POSSESSION OF THEIR

LOT THROUGH DECEIT, STRATEGY, AND STEALTH. THEY AVER THAT RESPONDENTS
DECEIVED THEM TO TEMPORARILY VACATE THE PREMISES ON THE PRETEXT THAT THEY
MUST CONVINCE THE INSURANCE INSPECTORS THAT THE PREMISES ARE BEING USED
SOLELY FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES. THEY WERE THUS ALLEGEDLY TRICKED TO MOVE
OUT AND ONCE THE RESPONDENTS ACHIEVED THEIR GOAL, THEY WERE PREVENTED
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FROM ENTERING THE PREMISES BY POSTING SECURITY GUARDS AT THE GATES.
DID RESPONDENTS COMMIT FORCIBLE ENTRY?
NO. THERE IS FORCIBLE ENTRY IF POSSESSION IS ILLEGAL FROM THE BEGINNING.

RESPONDENTS HAVE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. THEIR POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS
THEREFORE NOT ILLEGAL. THUS, THEY DID NOT COMMIT FORCIBLE ENTRY DESPITE THEIR
ALLEGED STRATEGY.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case of forcible entry may be filed by, ‚a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth x x
x.‛ In cases of forcible entry, ‚the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers
on who has the prior possession de facto.‛
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
PETITIONERS FURTHER ASSERT THAT THE LOT THEY OCCUPY IS DIFFERENT FROM THE LOT
OCCUPIED BY THE RESPONDENTS. THEY CLAIM THAT THEIR LOT IS LOCATED AT NO. 2,
BARRAMEDA ST., UPPER BICUTAN, TAGUIG WHILE THE LOT OCCUPIED BY THE
RESPONDENTS IS LOCATED IN LOWER BICUTAN.
CAN SC INQUIRE INTO SUCH FACT?
NO. THE POINT RAISED BY THE [PETITIONERS] X X X IN RESPECT OF THE IDENTITY OF THE
PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE CONTROVERSY MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED ANYMORE AT THIS
POINT SINCE IT WAS NEVER RAISED AS AN ISSUE IN THEIR APPEAL, NAY EVEN WHEN THE
CASE WAS HEARD BY THE COURT A QUO. THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.
ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE ENTERTAINED SUBJECT ONLY TO CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS,
NONE OF WHICH ARE PRESENT IN THE INSTANT PETITION.
IT IS THE FUNCTION OF TRIAL COURTS TO RESOLVE ACTUAL ISSUES WHOSE FINDINGS ON

THESE MATTERS ARE ACCORDED RESPECT AND CONSIDERED BINDING BY THE SUPREME
COURT ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF BOTH
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE APPELLATE COURT. IN THIS CASE, THE METC, THE RTC AND
THE CA ARE ONE IN THEIR FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT FORCIBLY ENTER THE
SUBJECT PREMISES. ALL THREE TRIBUNALS FOUND THAT RESPONDENTS’ POSSESSION IS
LAWFUL AND LEGAL FROM THE BEGINNING.
6 Villondo v Quijano, C.R No. 173606, December 3, 2012
Topic: Ownership
Facts: Complaint4 for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction before the MTCC in Cebu
City, Valeriana claimed that in the morning of August 14, 1999, respondent Carmen Quijano (Carmen)
and her farm laborers, respondents Adriano Alcantara and Marcelino Ebena, intruded into her land
with the help of three policemen and other barangay officials. They destroyed the plants therein,
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harvested the root crops, corn, and banana, built a hut, fenced off the area, and posted a "NO
TRESPASSING" sign, thus preventing Valeriana and her family from entering the premises where they
have always resided and depriving them of their harvest.
Valeriana argued that Carmen can never assert ownership over the property because it is a
government land. She claimed that Carmen’s parents, Rufo and Constancia Bacalla, were themselves
aware that an ownership claim is worthless. Thus, they ceded their plantations on the subject land to
her husband Daniel Villondo (Daniel) for P2,000.00 as declared in a "Kasabutan".5
Valeriana based her and her family’s right of possession on Certificate of Stewardship No. 146099 in
the name of ‘Daniel T. Villondo’,6 which she claimed to have been awarded to her now-deceased
husband whose actual name is ‘Daniel P. Villondo.’ Said Certificate was issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources on February 14, 1994. Valeriana averred that her family had prior
possession of the land as her husband started tilling the same even before the war. When she married
him in 1948, they continued to occupy and cultivate the land together with their five children. an
affidavit of Regino Habasa (Regino), a Bureau of Forestry employee and a Barangay Sinsin resident,
who attested that the Villondo family had been tilling the land since 1951.10
On the other hand, Carmen interposed that the alleged "Kasabutan" was never brought to her attention
by her parents. In any case, she asserted that such allegation of Valeriana even supports her claim of
prior possession.
Carmen tacked her possessory right to that of her parents Rufo and Constancia Bacalla who in 1948
purchased11from Liberato and Vicente Abellanosa a 4.51 hectare land in Taop, Pardo, Cebu City
covered by Tax Declaration No. 92638. According to her, said 4.51 hectare land includes the disputed
area which her parents also cultivated and developed. Carmen submitted to the court her tax
declarations over the land.12
, the MTCC adjudged that the Daniel T. Villondo under whose name the Certificate of Stewardship
was issued, is actually Valeriana’s son, Romualdo. The MTCC pointed out that the boundaries of the
lot as reflected in Romualdo’s Certificate of Stewardship are way different from the boundaries
mentioned in Tax Declaration No. 92638 that Carmen has been relying upon. In fact, the land covered
by Romualdo’s Certificate of Stewardship made no mention that it is bounded by Carmen’s land or the
land of her predecessors-in-interest.21 This thus disproved respondents’ claim that Certificate of
Stewardship No. 146099 was issued over a land that constitutes a portion of Carmen’s property.
the RTC found Valeriana’s Complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action,viz.:
Based on the foregoing findings of the court a quo, the complaint should have been initiated by
Romualdo Villondo, who is using the name of Daniel T. Villondo, because he is the real party-in-
interest and not by his mother, the herein appellee Valeriana Villondo. The CA however was not
convinced. In its March 31, 2005 Decision,31 it ruled: *Valeriana’s+ allegation that she and her family
were deprived of their possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the subject land may be true;
Issue Whether Valeriana is a real party-in-interest in the forcible entry case she filed.
Held: Notably, even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry cases as it has already been held
that ejectment proceedings may involve all kinds of land.35 Thus, in the case at bench, while the
parties are fighting over the possession of a government land, the courts below are not deprived of
jurisdiction to render judgment thereon.36Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the
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parties to the ejectment suit are mere informal settlers.37
For a court to restore possession, two things must be proven in a forcible entry case: prior physical
possession of the property and deprivation of the property by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth.38"Possession de facto, [i.e., the physical possession of a property,] and not
possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry case. This rule holds true regardless of the
character of a party’s possession, provided that he has in his favor priority in time. x x x"39 As used in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, ‘possession’ refers to "physical possession, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law."40
Here, Valeriana is one of those in prior physical possession of the land who was eventually
dispossessed.
Carmen failed to present evidence that she was in actual physical possession of the land she claims.
Her "[t]ax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership, or even of possession."41 They only
constitute proofs of a claim of title over the declared property.42 Her acts betray her claim of prior
possession. Her counsel wrote Valeriana’s son Esteban and demanded that the subject land be vacated.
Carmen had to seek help from the authorities in order to fence the lot. Furthermore, by filing criminal
cases for grave threats and grave coercion, she herself acknowledged that Valeriana, together with
Esteban, another son and daughter-in-law, were the ones occupying the subject property and who
allegedly prevented her from conducting a land survey. These circumstances are indicative of the
Villondo family’s possession of the premises.
With this in mind, is Valeriana the appropriate party to file a forcible entry case against the
respondents? We rule that the CA has no reason to withhold the relief she prays for on the ground of a
lack of cause of action.
Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship, the provision clearly allows
Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical possession of the property against the
alleged usurper. She has a right or interest to protect as she was the one dispossessed and thus, she can
file the action for forcible entry. Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry
action will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess the subject property. The fact that Valeriana
is not the holder of the Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case. This matter
already delves into the character of her possession. We emphasize that in ejectment suits, it does not
even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable.45Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
specifies who may be the plaintiff in an action for forcible entry, viz:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - x x x a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action
in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.(Emphasis supplied.)
The MTCC correctly considered Valeriana as a real party-in-interest and correctly delved strictly with
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the issue of physical possession. Notably, the CA, other than dismissing the case for lack of cause of
action, did not seem to dispute the MTCC’s factual finding of Valeriana’s prior physical possession.
Absent any evidence of respondents’ prior physical possession. Valeriana, who has cogently convinced
us that she was dispossessed of the land by force is entitled to stay on the property until she is lawfully
ejected by others who can prove in a separate proceeding that they have a better right.
We then end by highlighting the principle behind ejectment proceedings:
xxx Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful
withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.46
7 Top Management v Fajardo, June 15, 2011
Emilio Gregorio filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1 to 4 of Plan Psu-204785 situated
at Mag-asawang Mangga, Las Piñas, Rizal, before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal; said court
issued an order declaring as abandoned the reserved oppositions ofJose T. Velasquez and Pablo
Velasquez. Meanwhile, Jose T. Velasquez filed an application for registration of title over six lots before
the same court. The CFI rendered a decision declaring Gregorio to be the absolute owner of Lots 1, 2, 3
and 4 described in Plan Psu-204785. On March 9, 1966, an order was issued by said court for the
issuance of the decree of registration. The LRA called the attention of the Director of Lands regarding
the overlapping of several lots awarded to Velasquez, with lots adjudicated to Gregorio, and requested
that portions of these lots that are not in conflict be segregated. LRA informed the CFI that Lots 1 and 7
had been amended by the Bureau of Lands to exclude there from portions covered by Lot 2, Psu-64894,
Psu-96904, and Lots 1 to 4, Psu-204785 of Gregorio. Velasquez petitioned the CFI to set aside the award
earlier made in favor of Gregorio. The CFI issued an Order declaring that the application of Velasquez
be given due course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 of Ap-11135 which are identical to Lots 1 to 4, Plan Psu-
204785 in favor of Gregorio respecting the same lots as null and void. Certificates of Title were issued
in favor of Velasquez. Gregorio appealed the decision of the CFI to the CA. Sometime after this, he
entered into an agreement with TomasTrinidad (Trinidad) and Luis Fajardo (Fajardo) entitled
‚Kasunduan na may Pambihirang Kapangyarihan.‛ By virtue of this agreement, Fajardo would finance the
cost of the litigation and in return he would be entitled to one-half of the subject property after
deducting twenty per cent (20%) of the total land area as attorney’s fees for Trinidad if the appeal is
successful. Fajardo and Trinidad filed Civil Case before the RTC of Pasig to enforce their agreement
with Gregorio. The court rendered judgment in their favour. Meanwhile, herein petitioner Top
Management Programs Corporation sought the annulment of the CFI orders on the ground of extrinsic
fraud. Petitioner claimed that by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, the heirs of Gregorio sold
to it a parcel of land and a TCT coveringthe said property was issued in its name. The CA rendered its
decision dismissing the petition for annulment.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may quiet title and order the cancellation of the TCT in favor of Luis Fajardo.
HELD: No. In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or
contrary interest over the subject real property, but that they have a valid title to it. The court is tasked
to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things
in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not
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disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the
improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.
The TCT in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio, on its face showed badges of irregularity in its
issuance. First, the technical description. Second, the decree number and date of issuance, as well as
OCT number clearly indicate that the original decree pertained to Velasquez and not Gregorio. Third,
the name of the registered owner in the original certificate is not Velasquez or Gregorio but ‚Delta
Motor Corp.‛ And fourth, the certificate from which TCT No. 107729 was supposedly a transfer should
have been the OCT (of Gregorio) and not those unfamiliar TCT numbers indicated therein.
There are serious discrepancies in the registration process. In fact, it is not far-fetched that the
erroneous entries could have been intended to create the impression that TCT No. 107729 was a
separate and distinct title from the previously issued TCT No. S-91911 even if they pertain to one and
the same lot adjudicated to Emilio Gregorio. Such conclusion is reinforced by the unexplained inaction
or failure of the heirs of Gregorio to rectify the alleged errors in their title before selling the property to
petitioner. The heirs of Gregorio knew that their TCT bore encumbrances in favor of third parties,
notably the notice of pending litigation (Lis Pendens) involving the property covered by said title before
the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case, which Trinidad caused to be annotated thereon. The
issuance of a new certificate with exactly identical entries would mean that the aforesaid annotations
had to be carried over to such new certificate. Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the
decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case had become final and executory, it is bound by the said
judgment which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey the lots in favor of private respondent
and Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to be conveyed to private respondent pursuant to the
court’s decree with notice that said properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped into the shoes
of its vendors who lost in the case. Such vested right acquired by the private respondent under the
final judgment in his favor may not be defeated by the subsequent issuance of another certificate of
title to the heirs of Gregorio respecting the same parcel of land. For it is well-settled that being an
involuntary transaction, entry of the notice of lis pendens in the primary entry book of the Register of
Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such claim.
1 Mananquil v Moico, G.R. No. 180076, Nov, 21, 2012
FACTS
Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously expropriated by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) and placed under its Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project – where occupants, applicants or beneficiaries may purchase lots on installment
basis. In October 1984, Lot 18 was awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil under a
Conditional Contract to Sell. Lot 19, on the other hand, was sold to Prescilla in February 1980 by its
occupant.
In 1991, Iluminardo and Prescilla died without issue, but it turned out that Prescilla had a child by a
previous marriage – namely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio). After the spouses’ death,
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Iluminardo’s supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) – his brothers and sisters and herein petitioners
Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao), Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor (Laudencia), and
Dianita Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita) – executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and
adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession of Lots 18 and 19
and leased them out to third parties.
Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two others, Eulogio Baltazar
Maypa and Brenda Luminugue, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla,
had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico).
In May 1997, Moico began evicting the Mananquils’ tenants and demolishing the structures they built
on Lots 18 and 19. In June, the Mananquils instituted Civil Case No. 2741-MN for quieting of title and
injunctive relief.
RTC: Permanent injunction was issued enjoining defendant Roberto Moico to refrain from threatening
the tenants and destroying the improvements standing on the subject properties and from filing the
ejectment suits against the tenants; Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale
and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1997 was cancelled for having no force and effect;
declared plaintiffs to be rightfully entitled to the subject properties and the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Heirs of the plaintiffs to be valid and enforceable.
CA: REVERSED RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the case for quieting of title may be maintained
RULING: The petition lacks merit.
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent
court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and
not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But "for an
action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.‛
If the petitioners are legitimate successors to or beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his death – under the
certificate of title, award, or grant, or under the special law or specific terms of the NHA
program/project – then they possess the requisite interest to maintain suit; if not, then Civil Case No.

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2741-MN must necessarily be dismissed.
Petitioners have failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under
the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification
from the NHA or proper government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have
become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are
qualified successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over
Iluminardo’s rights after his death. They did not call to the witness stand competent witnesses from
the NHA who can attest to their rights as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to
present proof, at the very least, of the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern the Tondo Dagat-
Dagatan Foreshore Development Project which would indicate a modicum of interest on their part. For
this reason, their rights or interest in the property could not be established.
RTC and CA should have required proof that petitioners had, either: 1) a certificate of title, award, or
grant from the proper agency (NHA or otherwise) in the name of their predecessor Iluminardo, or, in
the absence thereof, 2) a right to succeed to Iluminardo’s rights to Lots 18 and 19, not only as his heirs,
but also as qualified legitimate successors/beneficiaries under the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project terms and conditions as taken over by the NHA.8 Petitioners should have shown,
to the satisfaction of the courts that under the NHA program project governing the grant of Lots 18
and 19, they are entitled and qualified to succeed or substitute for Iluminardo in his rights upon his
death. As earlier stated, this takes the form of evidence apart from proof of heirship, of course – of the
specific law, regulation or terms covering the program/project which allows for a substitution or
succession of rights in case of death; the certificate of title, award or grant itself; or the testimony of
competent witnesses from the NHA.
Proof of heirship alone does not suffice; the Mananquils must prove to the satisfaction of the courts
that they have a right to succeed Iluminardo under the law or terms of the NHA project, and are not
disqualified by non-payment, prohibition, lack of qualifications, or otherwise.
2 Chung v Mondragon, 179754, Nov. 21, 2012
In making the indictment that a court’s decision fails in the fundamental mandate that no decision
shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, the demurring party should not mistake brevity for levity.
Facts:
Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and Mansueto Maceda are descendants of Rafael
Mondragon by his first wife, Eleuteria, while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon is Rafael’s
descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos.
OCT No. 22447 is registered in the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda"
and covers 16,177 square meters of land in S Leyte.
Petitioners claim that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of the land in its tax declaration,
and that a free patent was issued in 1987 in the name of Andrea’s heirs upon application of Teofila,
who is petitioners’ sister.

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Respondents claim that Andrea is the exclusive owner of the land, having inherited the same from her
father Blas Baldos. They add that during Andrea’s lifetime, she was in lawful, peaceful and continuous
possession thereof in the concept of owner; that in 1954, Andrea conveyed a portion thereof to one
Crispina Gloria de Cano via a document written in the vernacular wherein she categorically stated that
she inherited the land from her father and she was the true and exclusive owner of the land; that after
Andrea died in 1955, her son Fortunato Mondragon took over, paying taxes thereon religiously; and
when Fortunato died, his son, respondent Jack Daniel came into possession and enjoyment thereof.
Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter portion of the land to his co-respondent Clarinda Regis-Schmitz
(Regis-Schmitz).
Petitioners filed a complaint with a prayer that Jack Daniel be declared without right to sell the land or
a portion thereof.
RTC: dismissed; CA: affirmed
Issue: Whether Jack Daniel has the capacity to dispose of a portion of the land? Y
Held:
In quieting of title, the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated
differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real
property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy."15
It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafael’s
second wife. The land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he is not even named in OCT No.
22447. With greater reason may it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are
Rafael’s children by his first wife Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood – such
fact is not borne out by the record – they could not be heirs to each other. "Heirs of Rafael and Andrea
Mondragon", not written in OCT.
Add to this is the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. Also, her sister’s name appears
therein only a representative of Andrea’s heirs. As mere representative, she could have no better
right.16
Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable title to be land, such that the only recourse left for the trial
court was to dismiss the case.
The constitutional requirement that every decision must state distinctly and clearly the factual and
legal bases therefor should indeed be the primordial concern of courts and judges. Be that as it may,
there should not be a mechanical reliance on this constitutional provision. The courts and judges
should be allowed to synthesize and to simplify their decisions considering that at present, courts are
harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints.
The Court finds in this case no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must express clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The trial court’s Decision is complete,
clear, and concise. Petitioners should be reminded that in making their indictment that the trial court’s
Decision fails to express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, they should
not mistake brevity for levity.

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B. Right of Accession, NCC 440 – 474
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or
which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. (353)
SECTION 1
Right of Accession with Respect to What is Produced by Property
Article 441. To the owner belongs:
(1) The natural fruits;
(2) The industrial fruits;
(3) The civil fruits.
Article 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amount of perpetual or
life annuities or other similar income. (355a)
Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third person in their
production, gathering, and preservation. (356)
Article 444. Only such as are manifest or born are considered as natural or industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in the womb of the mother, although unborn.
SECTION 2
Right of Accession with Respect to Immovable Property
Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or repairs made
thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles. (358)
Article 446. All works, sowing, and planting are presumed made by the owner and at his expense, unless the
contrary is proved. (359)
Article 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings, constructions or
works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to
the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so
without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed.
However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a
right to be indemnified for damages. (360a)
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity. (362)
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand
the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former
condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay
the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
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Article 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower. (n)
Article 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of
preservation of the land. (n)
Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of
another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though
both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge
and without opposition on his part. (364a)
Article 454. When the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower proceeded in good faith, the
provisions of article 447 shall apply. (n)
Article 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person who has not acted in bad faith, the owner of
the land shall answer subsidiarily for their value and only in the event that the one who made use of them has no
property with which to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner makes use of the right granted by article 450. If the owner of the
materials, plants or seeds has been paid by the builder, planter or sower, the latter may demand from the
landowner the value of the materials and labor. (365a)
Article 456. In the cases regulated in the preceding articles, good faith does not necessarily exclude negligence,
which gives right to damages under article 2176. (n)
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters. (336)
Article 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the natural
decrease of the waters, or lose that inundated by them in extraordinary floods. (367)
Article 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged
retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years. (368a)
Article 460. Trees uprooted and carried away by the current of the waters belong to the owner of the land upon
which they may be cast, if the owners do not claim them within six months. If such owners claim them, they shall
pay the expenses incurred in gathering them or putting them in a safe place. (369a)
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof,
which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. (370a)
Article 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes, opens a new bed through a private estate,
this bed shall become of public dominion. (372a)
Article 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof
isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the
estate by the current. (374)
Article 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on lakes, and on
navigable or floatable rivers belong to the State. (371a)
Article 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non-navigable and
non-floatable rivers, belong to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them, or to the owners of both
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margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be divided longitudinally in halves. If a
single island thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the other, the owner of the nearer margin
shall be the sole owner thereof. (373a)
SECTION 3
Right of Accession with Respect to Movable Property
Article 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different owners are, without bad faith, united in such a
way that they form a single object, the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory, indemnifying the
former owner thereof for its value. (375)
Article 467. The principal thing, as between two things incorporated, is deemed to be that to which the other has
been united as an ornament, or for its use or perfection. (376)
Article 468. If it cannot be determined by the rule given in the preceding article which of the two things
incorporated is the principal one, the thing of the greater value shall be so considered, and as between two things of
equal value, that of the greater volume.
In painting and sculpture, writings, printed matter, engraving and lithographs, the board, metal, stone, canvas,
paper or parchment shall be deemed the accessory thing. (377)
Article 469. Whenever the things united can be separated without injury, their respective owners may demand
their separation.
Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the use, embellishment or perfection of the other, is much more precious
than the principal thing, the owner of the former may demand its separation, even though the thing to which it has
been incorporated may suffer some injury. (378)
Article 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing has made the incorporation in bad faith, he shall lose the
thing incorporated and shall have the obligation to indemnify the owner of the principal thing for the damages he
may have suffered.
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the principal thing, the owner of the accessory thing shall have
a right to choose between the former paying him its value or that the thing belonging to him be separated, even
though for this purpose it be necessary to destroy the principal thing; and in both cases, furthermore, there shall be
indemnity for damages.
If either one of the owners has made the incorporation with the knowledge and without the objection of the other,
their respective rights shall be determined as though both acted in good faith. (379a)
Article 471. Whenever the owner of the material employed without his consent has a right to an indemnity, he
may demand that this consist in the delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and in all other respects, to that
employed, or else in the price thereof, according to expert appraisal. (380)
Article 472. If by the will of their owners two things of the same or different kinds are mixed, or if the mixture
occurs by chance, and in the latter case the things are not separable without injury, each owner shall acquire a
right proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind the value of the things mixed or confused.
Article 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two things of the same or different kinds are mixed
or confused, the rights of the owners shall be determined by the provisions of the preceding article.
If the one who caused the mixture or confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing belonging to him thus
mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages caused to the owner of the other thing
with which his own was mixed. (382)

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Article 474. One who in good faith employs the material of another in whole or in part in order to make a thing of
a different kind, shall appropriate the thing thus transformed as his own, indemnifying the owner of the material
for its value.
If the material is more precious than the transformed thing or is of more value, its owner may, at his option,
appropriate the new thing to himself, after first paying indemnity for the value of the work, or demand indemnity
for the material.
If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner of the material shall have the right to appropriate the
work to himself without paying anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter that he indemnify him for the
value of the material and the damages he may have suffered. However, the owner of the material cannot
appropriate the work in case the value of the latter, for artistic or scientific reasons, is considerably more than that
of the material.
3 Bachrach v Siefert, 87 Phil. 117
Facts:The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald
Bachrach, in his last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his
estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining
Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said
108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate,
petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the
estate of E. M. Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and
delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out
in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant.
Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that
the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged
not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an
income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely represents an addition to the invested
capital.
Issue: Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary.
Held:The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the
property in usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares
of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of
the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares
may be sold independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be
sold independently of its mother. If the dividend be in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it
should be held to be income. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and,
consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as
a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were declared out of the
capital it would be a serious violation of the law.
Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and belongs to the
remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as
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dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The
Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule
4 Bachrach v Talisay-Silay, 56 Phil. 117
Facts: On 22 December 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the PNB. To secure the
payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma,
to mortgage their land to the bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were
running with their property under that mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on the
same date, and amended on 23 March 1928, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus
mortgaged every year with a sum equal to 2% of the debt secured according to the yearly balance, the
payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from time to time, as soon as the central became
free of its obligations to the bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision, and
had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such
payment.
<It seems Mariano Lacson Ledesma is indebted from Bachrach Motor; the circumstance of which is not
found in the case facts.>
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of
the amount of P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on 30
June 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The complaint further prays that the sugar
central be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of
bonus, dividends, or otherwise, and to pay Bachrach Motors a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment
mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null
and void. The PNB filed a third
party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might
be entitled from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay-Silay answered the complaint that Mariano
Lacson Ledesma’s credit (P7,500) belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it. Cesar
Ledesma claimed to be an owner by purchase in good faith. At the trial all the parties agreed to
recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the P7,500 part of the credit in
question, for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar
Ledesma authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7,500. And upon conclusion of the
hearing, the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the amount of
P11,076.02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s bonus, and it ordered the central to deliver said sum
to Bachrach Motors. PNB appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, as it found no merit in the appeal;, without
express finding as to costs.
1. Civil Fruits under Article 355 of the Civil Code

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Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second,
the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other
similar sources of revenue. According to the context of the law, the phrase ‚u otras analogas‛ refers
only to rents or income, for the adjectives ‚otras‛ and ‚analogas‛ agree with the noun ‚rentas,‛ as do
also the other adjectives ‚perpetuas‛ and ‚vitalicias.‛ The ‚civil fruits‛ the Civil Code understands one
of three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of
income.
2. Bonus not a civil fruit; not an income of the land
The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the
value, importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the
debt thereby secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and
independent of the property referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from the land, it is not civil fruits
of that land. It is neither rent of buildings, proceeds from lease of lands, or income under Article 355 of
the Civil Code.
5 Tuatis v Escol, Oct. 27, 2009, GR No. 175399
FACTS:
Tuatis and Visminda, entered into a Deed of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment in the
amount of P10,000 under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER [Visminda] the amount of THREE
THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00), as downpayment;
2. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER [Visminda] the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), on or before December 31, 1989;
3. That the remaining balance of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) shall be paid by the
BUYER [Tuatis] to the SELLER [Visminda] on or before January 31, 1990;
4. That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the remaining balance within the period of three
months from the period stipulated above, then the BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this
contract to the SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all the amount
paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].
Tuatis claimed that she already paid the entire purchase price and in the meantime, took possession of
the subject property and constructed a residential building thereon. Tuatis requested Visminda to sign
a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the subject property, but the latter refused, contending that
the purchase price had not yet been fully paid.
Visminda countered that, except for the P3,000.00 down payment and P1,000.00 installment paid by
Tuatis on 19 December 1989 and 17 February 1990, respectively, Tuatis made no other payment to
Visminda. Despite repeated verbal demands, Tuatis failed to comply with their agreement. Litigation
occurs and the RTC decreed the dismissal of Tuatis' Complaint for lack of merit, the return by Tuatis of
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physical possession of the subject property to Visminda, and the return by Visminda of the P4,000.00
she received from Tuatis.
Tuatis appeal to the CA however the appellate court dismissed the appeal for failure of Tuatis to serve
and file her appellant's brief within the second extended period for the same.
Visminda filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the RTC on 14 January 2002. The
RTC granted Visminda's Motion in a Resolution dated 21 February 2002, and issued the Writ of
Execution on 7 March 2002.
Tuatis thereafter filed before the RTC on 22 April 2002 a Motion to Exercise Right under Article 448 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Tuatis moved that the RTC issue an order allowing her to buy the
subject property from Visminda. While Tuatis indeed had the obligation to pay the price of the subject
property, she opined that such should not be imposed if the value of the said property was
considerably more than the value of the building constructed thereon by Tuatis. Tuatis alleged that the
building she constructed was valued at P502,073.00, but the market value of the entire piece of land
measuring 4.0144 hectares, of which the subject property measuring 300 square meters formed a part,
was only about P27,000.00. Tuatis maintained that she then had the right to choose between being
indemnified for the value of her residential building or buying from Visminda the parcel of land
subject of the case. Tuatis stated that she was opting to exercise the second option.
ISSUE: Who has the right of choice under article 448 of the civil code?
HELD:
The options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of the subject property. There is
no basis for Tuatis' demand that, since the value of the building she constructed is considerably higher
than the subject property, she may choose between buying the subject property from Visminda and
selling the building to Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for Visminda, not
Tuatis, to make. And, depending on Visminda's choice, Tuatis' rights as a builder under Article 448 are
limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and subject property
until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second option, a right not to be obliged to
pay for the price of the subject property, if it is considerably higher than the value of the building, in
which case, she can only be obliged to pay reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in
accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to
remove it from the land.
6 Vda. De Roxas v Our Lady, GR 182378, March 2013

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Topic: Rights of Accession
Facts: On 1 September 1988, Salve Dealca Latosa filed before the RTC a Complaint for the recovery of
ownership of a portion of her residential land located at Our Lady’s Village, Bibincahan, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 5403. According to her, Atty. Henry Amado Roxas (Roxas),
represented by petitioner herein, encroached on a quarter of her property by arbitrarily extending his
concrete fence beyond the correct limits.
In his Answer, Roxas imputed the blame to respondent Our Lady’s Village Foundation, Inc., now Our
Lady’s Foundation, Inc. (OLFI). He then filed a Third-Party Complaint against respondent and claimed
that he only occupied the adjoining portion in order to get the equivalent area of what he had lost
when OLFI trimmed his property for the subdivision road. The RTC admitted the Third-Party
Complaint and proceeded to trial on the merits.
, the trial court held that Latosa had established her claim of encroachment by a preponderance of
evidence. , Roxas appealed to the CA, which later denied the appeal. Since the Decision had become
final, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution6 to implement the ruling ordering OLFI to reimburse Roxas
for the value of the 92-square-meter property plus legal interest to be reckoned from the time the
amount was paid to the third-party defendant. The trial court then approved the Sheriff’s Bill,7 which
valued the subject property at P2,500 per square meter or a total of P230,000. Opposing the valuation
of the subject property, OLFI filed a Motion to Quash the Sheriff’s Bill and a Motion for Inhibition of
the RTC judge. It insisted that it should reimburse Roxas only at the rate of P40 per square meter, the
same rate that Roxas paid when the latter first purchased the property. It insisted that it should
reimburse Roxas only at the rate of P40 per square meter, the same rate that Roxas paid when the latter
first purchased the property. Nevertheless, before resolving the Motions filed by OLFI, the trial court
approved an Amended Sheriff’s Bill,8 which reduced the valuation to P1,800 per square meter.
Eventually, the RTC denied both the Motion for Inhibition and the Motion to Quash the Sheriff’s Bill. It
cited fairness to justify the computation of respondent’s judgment obligation found in the Amended
Sheriff’s Bill Although it might be true that the property was originally purchased at P40.00 per square
meter, the value of the Philippine Peso has greatly devaluated since then P40.00 may be able to
purchase a square meter of land twenty (20) or more years ago but it could only buy two (2) kilos of
rice today.
Refusing to pay P1,800 per square meter to Roxas, OLFI filed a Rule 65 Petition before the
CA.11 Respondent asserted that since the dispositive portion of the Decision ordered it to reimburse
Roxas, it should only be made to return the purchase price that he had originally paid, which was P40
per square meter for the 92-square-meter property.
Issue: WON the lower courts are correct when it did not allow respondent to pay petitioner the
purchase price he had originally paid
Held The RTC pegged the reimbursable amount at P1,800 per square meter to reflect the current value
of the property, while the CA maintained the original amount of the lot atP40 per square meter.
To settle the contention, this Court resorts to the provisions of the Civil Code governing encroachment
on property. Under Article 448 pertaining to encroachments in good faith, as well as Article 450
referring to encroachments in bad faith, the owner of the land encroached upon – petitioner herein –
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has the option to require respondent builder to pay the price of the land.
Although these provisions of the Civil Code do not explicitly state the reckoning period for valuing the
property, Ballatan v. Court of Appeals15 already specifies that in the event that the seller elects to sell
the lot, "the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment." More recently,
Tuatis v. Spouses Escol16illustrates that the present or current fair value of the land is to be reckoned
at the time that the landowner elected the choice, and not at the time that the property was purchased.
We quote below the relevant portion of that Decision:17
Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige
Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land. The P10,000.00 price of the subject property,
as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment executed in November 1989, shall no longer apply, since
Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights
under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be
statutory, and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under Article 448 of
the Civil Code.
Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property herein,
turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to
pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and
Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sarmiento v. Agana,18 we reckoned the valuation of the property at the time that the real owner of
the land asked the builder to vacate the property encroached upon. Moreover, the oft-cited case Depra
v. Dumlao19likewise ordered the courts of origin to compute the current fair price of the land in cases
of encroachment on real properties.
From these cases, it follows that the CA incorrectly pegged the reimbursable amount at the old market
value of the subject property – P40 per square meter – as reflected in the Deed of Absolute
Sale20 between the parties. On the other hand, the RTC properly considered in its 2 December 2004
Order the value of the lot at P1,800 per square meter, the current fair price as determined in the
Amended Sheriff’s Bill. Thus, we reverse the ruling of the CA and reinstate the 2 December 2004 Order
of the RTC directing OLFI to reimburse petitioner at P1,800 per square meter.
7 Ortiz v Kayanan, 92 SCRA 146
Facts: Homestead Application Lot belonged to Dolorico II, Ortiz’s ward located in Barrio Cabuluan,
Calauag, Quezon1.Dolorico II named as successor and heir his uncle Dolorico, then died. All this time
Ortiz was in possession and cultivation of the property. Dolorico relinquished rights over property in
favour of Comintan and Zamora.
Court found Ortiz to be in good faith, but held the public bidding to be valid. If petitioner was not
found to be the winner, Comintan and Zamora are to reimburse him for P13,632. Ortiz is to retain
possession until the amount is paid.
CA affirmed RTC
Respondent Judge discovered that after the decision of the lower courts, Ortiz collected tolls on
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portions of the land even if he had not introduced any improvements on said portions estimated to
amount to P25,000.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the fruits of the property while the P13,632 has yet to be paid,
this being considered as civil fruits.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to fruits while Comintan and Zamora have yet to pay the indemnity
duepetitioner.
HELD: NO.
Before possession is legally interrupted, possessor in good faith is entitled to fruits. This right ceases
upon defects being known. This is known as a right to retention, for the creditor to obtain payment of a
debt.
Also we must consider that tolls were collected from portions with no improvements of petitioner,
therefore he really has no right to said fruits.
1 Narvaez v Alciso, July 27, 2009, GR No. 165907
FACTS:
Larry A. Ogas (Ogas) owned a 1,329-square meter parcel of land situated in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet
covered by TCT No. T-1068, and a portion was subject to a 30-year lease agreement4 with Esso
Standard Eastern, Inc. Ogas sold the property to his daughter Rose O. Alciso (Alciso). TCT No. T-1068
was cancelled and TCT No. T-124225 was issued in the name of Alciso.
On 25 August 1979, Alciso entered into a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase,6 selling the property
to Jaime Sansano (Sansano) for P10,000. Alciso later repurchased the property from Sansano and, on 28
March 1980, she entered into another Deed of Absolute Sale,7 this time selling the property to Celso S.
Bate (Bate) for P50,000. The Deed stated that:
The SELLER warrants that her title to and ownership of the property herein conveyed are free from all
liens and encumbrances except those as appear on the face of the title, specifically, that lease over the
said property in favor of ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., the rights over which as a lessor the
SELLER likewise hereby transfers in full to the buyer.8
TCT No. T-12422 was cancelled and TCT No. T-160669 was issued in the name of Bate. On 14 August
1981, Bate entered into a Deed of Sale of Realty,10 selling the property to the spouses Dominador R.
Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez (Spouses Narvaez) for P80,000. TCT No. T-16066 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-1652811 was issued in the name of the Spouses Narvaez. In 1982, the Spouses Narvaez built
a commercial building on the property amounting to P300,000.
Alciso demanded that a stipulation be included in the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty allowing
her to repurchase the property from the Spouses Narvaez. In compliance with Alciso’s demand, the
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Deed stated that, "The SELLER (Bate) carries over the manifested intent of the original SELLER of the
property (Alciso) to buy back the same at a price under such conditions as the present BUYERS
(Spouses Narvaez) may impose." The Spouses Narvaez furnished Alciso with a copy of the Deed.
Alciso alleged that she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the property. The
Spouses Narvaez demanded P300,000, but Alciso was willing to pay only P150,000. Alciso and the
Spouses Narvaez failed to reach an agreement on the repurchase price.
Alciso file a Complaint in the RTC and prayed that (1) the 25 August 1979 Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase, the 28 March 1980 Deed of Absolute Sale, and the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty
be annulled; (2) the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel TCT Nos. T-16066 and T-16528; (3) the
Spouses Narvaez be ordered to reconvey the property; and (4) Sansano, Bate, and the Spouses Narvaez
be ordered to pay damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. Alciso claimed that the intention
of the parties was to enter into a contract of real estate mortgage and not a contract of sale with right of
repurchase. She stated that:
[C]ontrary to the clear intention and agreement of the parties, particularly the plaintiffs herein,
defendant JAIME SANSANO, taking advantage of the good faith and financial predicament and
difficulties of plaintiffs at the time, caused to be prepared and induced with insidous [sic] words and
machinations, prevailed upon plaintiff to sign a contract denominated as "Sale With Right to
Repurchase", instead of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage as was the clear intention and agreement of the
parties.
xxxx
Defendant JAIME SANSANO caused to be prepared a contract denominated as DEED OF ABSOLUTE

SALE, covering the lot in question, contrary to the clear intention and understanding of plaintiff who
was inveigled into signing said contract under the impression that what she was executing was a real
estate mortgage.13
RTC: Decided in favor of Alciso. The 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a
stipulation pour autrui in favor of Alciso — Alciso could repurchase the property. Also, Alciso
communicated to the Spouses Narvaez her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour
autrui.
Spouses Narvaez appealed to CA. They claimed that (1) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty did
not contain a stipulation pour autrui — not all requisites were present; (2) the RTC erred in setting the
repurchase price at P80,000; (3) they were purchasers for value and in good faith; and (4) they were
builders in good faith.
CA: (1) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a stipulation pour autrui; (2) Alciso
accepted the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui; (3) the RTC erred in setting the repurchase
price at P80,000; (4) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty involved a contract of sale with right of
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repurchase and not real estate mortgage; (5) the Spouses Narvaez were builders in good faith; and (6)
Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the
Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the
building. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the RTC for determination of the property’s
reasonable repurchase price.
ISSUE: (1) Whether Alciso communicated her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour
autrui;
If in the affirmative, then Alciso may repurchase the property. Otherwise, she may not.
(2) Whether Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the
indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was
considerably more than that of the building
RULING:
(1) YES. Alciso may repurchase the property. According to the RTC, Rose Alciso communicated her
acceptance of such favorable stipulation when she went to see defendant Lillia [sic] Narvaez in their
house. Under the foregoing circumstances, there is no question that plaintiff Rose Alciso can maintain
her instant action for the enforcement and/or fulfillment of the aforestated stipulation in her favor to
by [sic] back the property in question.
(2) NO. The CA ERRED when it ruled that:
‚[T]he contract between defendants-appellants Bate and Narvaez spouses is a contract of sale with a
stipulation granting plaintiffs-appellees the right to repurchase the property at a reasonable price.
Being the absolute owners of the property in question, defendants-appellants Narvaez spouses have
the undisputed right to use, enjoy and build thereon.
Having built the improvement on the land they own and registered in their names, they are likened to
builders in good faith and their rights over the improvement shall be governed by Article 448 of the
Civil Code which provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to
buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or tress. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.

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Applying said Article, plaintiffs-appellees, after repurchasing the land, will have the following options:
(1) to appropriate for themselves the building upon payment of its value to defendants-
appellants Narvaez spouses; OR
(2) to compel the defendants-appellants Narvaez spouses to buy the land, unless the value of
thereof [sic] be considerably more than that of the building, in which case, said spouses may
lease the land instead. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the courts shall fix the terms thereof.‛
According to the SC, Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of
repurchase — it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter. In Pecson
v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that:
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco
v. Regalado:
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed the house
on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a
person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It
does not apply to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be
no question as to good or bad faith on the part of the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of the works on his own land, the issue
of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses Narvaez built the commercial
building on the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy the land, which they own, would
be absurd.
2 New Regent v Tanjautco, April 16, 2009, GR No. 168800
Facts:
Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. filed a Complaint3 for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of
Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the RD of Calamba before the
RTC Laguna.
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on
its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas
purportedly applied for the lots in his name then executed a Voting Trust Agreement 4 over their shares
of stock in the corporation. Pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas
assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000.5 On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands
released an Order,6 which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. TCT were then
issued in the name of Tanjuatco.
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Tanjuatco affirmative defense: complaint stated no cause of action against him. According to
Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He averred further that
the complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
Summons was served on respondent Cuevas through publication,11 but he was later declared in
default for failure to file an answer.12
RTC: dismissed
Issue:
Whether NRSI can claim the land through right of accretion? N
Held:
Primarily, NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of accretion. It
submitted in evidence, titles30 to four parcels of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of
Tanjuatco.
But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 31 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.32 Thus, it is not enough to be a
riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must
show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has
notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing
requisites.
Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from OCT registered in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, 33
which under Article 502 (1)34 of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion.
3 Fernando v Acuna, Sept. 14, 2011
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75773, entitled "Jose Fernando, Jr., et al. v. Heirs of Germogena Fernando, et al.," which reversed
and set aside the Decision2 dated May 16, 2002 of Branch 84, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan in Civil Case No. 256-M-97.
At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
RO-487 (997)3 registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A.
Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When they died
intestate, the property remained undivided. Petitioners herein – namely, Jose Fernando, Jr., Zoilo
Fernando, Norma Fernando Banares, Rosario Fernando Tangkencgo, the heirs of Tomas Fernando, the
heirs of Guillermo Fernando, the heirs of Iluminada Fernando and the heirs of Germogena Fernando –
are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased registered owners. However, petitioners failed
to agree on the division of the subject property amongst themselves, even after compulsory
conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.
Thus, petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint4 for partition on
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April 17, 1997 against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. In the Complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among
others, that they and defendants are common descendants and compulsory heirs of the late spouses
Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio, and the late spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez. They
further claimed that their predecessors-in-interest died intestate and without instructions as to the
disposition of the property left by them covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). There being no settlement,
the heirs are asking for their rightful and lawful share because they wish to build up their homes or set
up their business in the respective portions that will be allotted to them. In sum, they prayed that the
subject property be partitioned into eight equal parts, corresponding to the hereditary interest of each
group of heirs.
In their Answer5 filed on May 20, 1997, defendants essentially admitted all of the allegations in the
complaint. They alleged further that they are not opposing the partition and even offered to share in
the expenses that will be incurred in the course of the proceedings.
In his Complaint in Intervention6 filed on January 12, 1998, respondent Leon Acuna (Acuna) averred
that in the Decision7 dated November 29, 1929 of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, the portion
of the property identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated to: (a) Antonio Fernando, married to
Felisa Camacho; (b) spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; (c) spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and
Salud Wisco; and (d) Jose Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest.
He likewise claimed that in a 1930 Decision of the Cadastral Court, the portion identified as Lot 1302
was also already adjudicated to other people as well.
Respondent Acuna further alleged that Salud Wisco, through her authorized attorney-in-fact, Amador
W. Cruz, sold her lawful share denominated as Lot 1303-D with an area of 3,818 square meters to
Simeon P. Cunanan,8 who in turn sold the same piece of land to him as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.9
He also belied petitioners’ assertion that the subject property has not been settled by the parties after
the death of the original owners in view of the Decision10 dated July 30, 1980 of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Baliuag, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 80-389 which ordered the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan to issue the corresponding certificates of title to the claimants of the portion of the subject
property designated as Lot 1302.11 Norma Fernando, one of the petitioners in the instant case, even
testified in LRC Case No. 80-389. According to respondent Acuna, this circumstance betrayed bad faith
on the part of petitioners in filing the present case for partition.
Respondent Acuna likewise averred that the action for partition cannot prosper since the heirs of the
original owners of the subject property, namely Rosario, Jose Jr., Norma, Tomas, Guillermo, Leopoldo,
Hermogena, Illuminada and Zoilo, all surnamed Fernando, and Lucila Tinio, purportedly had already
sold their respective one-tenth (1/10) share each in the subject property to Ruperta Sto. Domingo
Villasenor for the amount of P35,000.00 on January 25, 1978 as evidenced by a "Kasulatan sa Bilihang
Patuluyan."12 He added that he was in possession of the original copy of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and
that he had not commenced the issuance of new titles to the subdivided lots because he was waiting
for the owners of the other portions of the subject property to bear their respective shares in the cost of
titling.
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Subsequently, a Motion for Intervention13 was filed on June 23, 1998 by respondent Hermogenes
Fernando (Hermogenes), for himself and on behalf of the heirs of the late spouses, Antonio A.
Fernando and Felisa Camacho. According to him, in the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Bulacan,
their predecessors-in-interest had already been adjudged owners of Lots 1302-A, 1302-F, 1302-G,14
1302-H and 1302-J of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and any adverse distribution of the properties would
cause respondents damage and prejudice. He would also later claim, in his Answer-in-Intervention,15
that the instant case is already barred by res judicata and, should be dismissed.
In the interest of substantial justice, the trial court allowed the respondents to intervene in the case.
The plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved to have the case submitted for judgment on the pleadings
on May 7, 1999.16 However, the trial court denied said motion in a Resolution17 dated August 23, 1999
primarily due to the question regarding the ownership of the property to be partitioned, in light of the
intervention of respondents Acuna and Hermogenes who were claiming legal right thereto.
In their Manifestation18 filed on April 12, 2000, petitioners affirmed their execution of a Deed of Sale in
favor of Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor in 1978, wherein they sold to her 1,000 square meters from
Lot 1303 for the sum of P 35,000.00.
After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. On September 19, 2000, petitioner Elizabeth Alarcon
testified that they (plaintiffs) are not claiming the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997)
but only the area referred to as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan. She also admitted that Lot 1302 had
already been divided into ten (10) sublots and allocated to various owners pursuant to the July 30, 1980
Decision of the CFI of Baliuag, Bulacan and these owners already have their own titles. She likewise
claimed that the entire area consisting of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan is based on the subdivision plan
of Lot 1303. She admitted that plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest was only allocated a portion of Lot
1303 based on the said plan. However, she claimed that the November 29, 1929 Decision subdividing
Lot 1303 was never implemented nor executed by the parties.19
Petitioner Norma Fernando testified on October 3, 2000 that she is one of the children of Jose A.
Fernando and Lucila Tinio. She affirmed that plaintiffs were only claiming Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan.
She also testified that Sapang Bayan was supposedly included in Lot 1302 and was previously a river
until it dried up. Unlike Lot 1302, the rest of the property was purportedly not distributed. She
likewise averred that she is aware of a November 29, 1929 Decision concerning the distribution of Lot
1303 issued by the cadastral court but insisted that the basis of the claims of the petitioners over Lot
1303 is the title in the name of her ascendants and not said Decision.20
On November 16, 2000, as previously directed by the trial court and agreed to by the parties, counsel
for respondent Hermogenes prepared and submitted an English translation of the November 29, 1929
Decision. The same was admitted and marked in evidence as Exhibit "X"21 as a common exhibit of the
parties. The petitioners also presented Alfredo Borja, the Geodetic Engineer who conducted a
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relocation survey of the subject property.
After plaintiffs rested their case, respondent Hermogenes testified on December 7, 2000. In his
testimony, he claimed to know the plaintiffs and defendants as they were allegedly his relatives and
neighbors. He confirmed that according to the November 29, 1929 Decision, portions of Lot 1303 was
designated as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C and 1303-D which were adjudicated to certain persons,
including Jose Fernando, while the rest of Lot 1303 was adjudicated to his parents, Antonio A.
Fernando married to Felisa Camacho. According to respondent Hermogenes, his family’s tenant and
the latter’s children occupied the portion of Lot 1303 allotted to his (Hermogenes) parents while the
rest of Lot 1303 was occupied by the persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision. He
admitted, however, that nobody among the purported possessors of Lot 1303 registered the lots
assigned to them in the Decision.22
On January 18, 2001, respondent Hermogenes presented a witness, Engineer Camilo Vergara who
testified that the subject land is divided into Lots 1302 and 1303 with a creek dividing the two lots
known as Sapang Bayan. He also identified a Sketch Plan numbered as PSD-45657 and approved on
November 11, 1955.23 During the hearing on January 30, 2001, respondent Hermogenes made an oral
offer of his evidence and rested his case. On the same date, respondent Acuna, in lieu of his testimony,
offered for the parties to simply stipulate on the due execution and authenticity of the Deeds of Sale
dated April 6, 1979 and December 28, 1980, showing the transfer of Lot 1303-D from Salud Wisco to
Simeon Cunanan and subsequently to respondent Acuna. When counsel for plaintiffs and defendants
agreed to the stipulation, albeit objecting to the purpose for which the deeds of sale were offered, the
trial court admitted Acuna’s exhibits and Acuna rested his case.24
On February 15, 2001, plaintiffs recalled Norma Fernando as a rebuttal witness. In her rebuttal
testimony, she identified the tax declaration25 over the said property in the name of Jose A. Fernando;
an official receipt26 dated October 3, 1997 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of
Baliuag, Bulacan for payment of real property taxes from 1991 to 1997; and a real property tax
clearance27 dated October 6, 1997, to show that plaintiffs have allegedly been paying the real property
taxes on the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). However, she further testified that they
were now willing to pay taxes only over the portion with an area of 44,234 square meters, which is
included in their claim.28
In a Decision dated May 16, 2002, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs and defendants (petitioners
herein) were indeed the descendants and successors-in-interest of the registered owners, Jose A.
Fernando (married to Lucila Tinio) and Antonia Fernando (married to Felipe Galvez), of the property
covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). After finding that the parties admitted that Lot 1302 was already
distributed and titled in the names of third persons per the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Baliuag,
Bulacan the trial court proceeded to rule on the allocation of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan.
With respect to Lot 1303, the trial court found that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral
Court, adjudicating said lot to different persons and limiting Jose Fernando’s share to Lot 1303-C, was
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never implemented nor executed despite the lapse of more than thirty years. Thus, the said decision
has already prescribed and can no longer be executed. The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot 1303
to the ownership of spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio and spouses Antonia A. Fernando and
Felipe Galvez under OCT No. RO-487 (997) and allowed the partition of Lot 1303 among petitioners as
successors-in-interest of said registered owners. Excluded from the partition, however, were the
portions of the property which petitioners admitted had been sold or transferred to Ruperta Sto.
Domingo Villasenor and respondent Acuna.
As for the ownership of Sapang Bayan, the trial court found that the same had not been alleged in the
pleadings nor raised as an issue during the pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court, the
parties failed to clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot 1302 or
Lot 1303. Neither was there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river that just dried up or that it was an
accretion which the adjoining lots gradually received from the effects of the current of water. It was
likewise not established who were the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan. The trial court
concluded that none of the parties had clearly and sufficiently established their claims over Sapang
Bayan.
The dispositive portion of the May 16, 2002 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the reversion of Lot
1303, except the portions allotted to Acuna and Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor, to the ownership of
Jose Fernando and Lucia Tinio and Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT No. 997 and
thereafter allowing the partition of said Lot 1303 among the plaintiffs and the defendants as
successors-in-interest of Jose and Lucia as well as Antonia and Felipe after the settlement of any
inheritance tax, fees, dues and/or obligation chargeable against their estate.29
All the parties, with the exception of respondent Acuna, elevated this case to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed November 24, 2003 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated May 16, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. 256-M-97, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the complaint dated April 17, 1997 filed by plaintiffs-appellants is dismissed.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.30
Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in the court a quo elevated the matter for our review through the
instant petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues for consideration:
1. Whether or not the ownership of Lot 1303 and the Sapang Bayan portion of the piece of land covered
by O.C.T. No. RO-487 (997) or Plan Psu-39080 should revert to the descendants and heirs of the late
spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and Antonia Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez;
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2. Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original certificate of title is
the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.31
The petition is without merit.
Petitioners based their claims to the disputed areas designated as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan on their
ascendants’ title, OCT No. RO-487 (997), which was issued on February 26, 1927 in the name of Jose A.
Fernando married to Lucila Tinio and Antonia A. Fernando married to Felipe Galvez. The Court now
rules on these claims in seriatim.
Petitioners’ claim with respect to Lot 1303
As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan (in
Cadastral Record No. 14, GLRO Cad. Record No. 781) which was written in Spanish, Lot 1303 had
already been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio; spouses Antonia
A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez; spouses Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa Camacho; spouses Jose
Martinez and Gregoria Sison; and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco from whom respondent
Acuna derived his title. The English translation of the said November 29, 1929 Decision was provided
by respondent Hermogenes and was adopted by all the parties as a common exhibit designated as
Exhibit "X." The agreed English translation of said Decision reads:
Lot No. 1303 – This lot is decreed in record No. 448, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25414 and actually with
Original Certificate No. 997 (exhibited today) in the name of Jose A. Fernando and Antonia A.
Fernando, who now pray that said lot be subdivided in accordance with the answers recorded in the
instant cadastral record, and the sketch, Exh. "A", which is attached to the records.
A part or portion of the lot has been claimed by Antonio A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felisa
Camacho; another portion by the spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; another portion by
Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felipe Galvez; another portion by Jose A. Fernando, of
legal age, married to Lucila Tinio; and another portion by the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud
Wisco, both of legal age. The part claimed by the spouses Jose A. Martinez and Gregoria Sison is Lot
1303-A of Exh. A; the part claimed by Antonia A. Fernando is Lot 1303-B of said exhibit; the part
claimed by Jose A. Fernando is Lot 1303-C of said exhibit, and the part claimed by the spouses Ignacio
de la Cruz and Salud Wisco is Lot 1303-D of the aforementioned Exhibit.
The subdivision of said lot is hereby ordered, separating from the same the portions that correspond to
each of the claimants, which portions are known as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C, and 1303-D in the
sketch, Exh. "A", and once subdivided, are adjudicated in favor of the spouses, Jose Martinez and
Gregoria Sison, of legal age, Lot No. 1303-A, in favor of Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age, married to
Felipe Galvez, Lot No. 1303-B; in favor of Jose A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Lucila Tinio, Lot
1303-C; in favor of the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco, of legal age, Lot 1303-D; and the
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rest of Lot 1303 is adjudged in favor of Antonio A. Fernando married to Felisa Camacho. It is likewise
ordered that once the subdivision plan is approved, the same be forwarded by the Director of Lands to
this Court for its final decision.
It is ordered that the expense for mentioned subdivision, shall be for the account of the spouses Jose
Martinez and Gregoria Sison, Antonia A. Fernando, Jose A. Fernando, the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz
and Salud Wisco, and Antonio A. Fernando.32
From the foregoing, it would appear that petitioners’ ascendants themselves petitioned for the
cadastral court to divide Lot 1303 among the parties to the 1929 case and they were only allocated Lots
1303-B and 1303-C. Still, as the trial court noted, the November 29, 1929 Decision was never fully
implemented in the sense that the persons named therein merely proceeded to occupy the lots
assigned to them without having complied with the other directives of the cadastral court which
would have led to the titling of the properties in their names. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the
persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision and, subsequently, their heirs and assigns have
since been in peaceful and uncontested possession of their respective lots for more than seventy (70)
years until the filing of the suit for partition on April 17, 1997 by petitioners which is the subject matter
of this case. Respondent Hermogenes, who testified that petitioners were his relatives and neighbors,
further affirmed before the trial court that the persons named in the November 29, 1929 Decision took
possession of their respective lots:
ATTY. VENERACION:
Q – This Jose A. Fernando married to Lucila Tinio, you testified earlier are the parents of the plaintiffs.
Did they take possession of lot 1303-C?
A – Yes, sir. They took possession.
Q – Did they take possession of the other lots?
A – No. Yes, the portion<
Q – The other lots in the name of the other persons. Did they take possession of that?
A – Yes, they took took possession of the other< No, sir.
Q – I am asking you whether they took possession, the children<
ATTY. SANTIAGO:
The questions are already answered, your Honor.

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ATTY. VENERACION:
What is the answer?
ATTY. SANTIAGO:
It’s in the record.
COURT:
The persons named in the Decision already took possession of the lots allotted to them as per that
Decision. So that was already answered. Anything else?
ATTY. VENERACION;
No more question, Your Honor.33
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not dispute that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the cadastral
court already adjudicated the ownership of Lot 1303 to persons other than the registered owners
thereof. Petitioners would, nonetheless, claim that respondents’ purported failure to execute the
November 29, 1929 Decision over Lot 1303 (i.e., their failure to secure their own titles) meant that the
entire Lot 1303 being still registered in the name of their ascendants rightfully belongs to them. This is
on the theory that respondents’ right to have the said property titled in their names have long
prescribed.
On this point, we agree with the appellate court.
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, states
that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession." Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover possession of
registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership.34
However, in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan,35 the Court had
recognized the jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is
true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right
to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
Thus, in Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan,36 the Court had held that while a person may not
acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the
title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back
the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.

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In the more recent case of Bartola M. Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion,37 we similarly held that while
jurisprudence is settled on the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally
an abundance of cases where we unequivocally ruled that registered owners may lose their right to
recover possession of property through the equitable principle of laches.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in
equity.38 The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant’s rights
after he had knowledge of defendant’s acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of
knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.39
In view of respondents’ decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by virtue of
a court judgment and the erstwhile registered owners’ inaction and neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right to
recover the same, it is clear that respondents’ possession may no longer be disturbed. The right of the
registered owners as well as their successors-in-interest to recover possession of the property is already
a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.
In the same vein, we uphold the finding of the Court of Appeals that the title of petitioners’ ascendants
wrongfully included lots belonging to third persons.40 Indeed, petitioners’ ascendants appeared to
have acknowledged this fact as they were even the ones that prayed for the cadastral court to
subdivide Lot 1303 as evident in the November 29, 1929 Decision. We concur with the Court of
Appeals that petitioners’ ascendants held the property erroneously titled in their names under an
implied trust for the benefit of the true owners. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
As aptly observed by the appellate court, the party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their
title over the property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value.41 As we held in Medizabel v. Apao,42 the essence of an action for reconveyance is
that the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to
its rightful owner or to one with a better right. It is settled in jurisprudence that mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only
be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title.43
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We cannot subscribe to petitioners’ argument that whatever rights or claims respondents may have
under the November 29, 1929 Decision has prescribed for their purported failure to fully execute the
same. We again concur with the Court of Appeals in this regard. An action for reconveyance of
registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date
of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
However, this Court has ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period applies only when the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming
to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right.44
Petitioners’ claim with respect to Sapang Bayan
As for the issue of the ownership of Sapang Bayan, we sustain the appellate court insofar as it ruled
that petitioners failed to substantiate their ownership over said area. However, we find that the Court
of Appeals erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable. The said principle is embodied
in Article 457 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." We
have held that for Article 457 to apply the following requisites must concur: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.45 The character of the
Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the nature that is being referred to in the provision
which is an accretion known as alluvion as no evidence had been presented to support this assertion.
In fact from the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not agree how Sapang Bayan came
about. Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or a dried-up creek bed
connected to the main river could not be ascertained.
Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420, paragraph 146 and
Article 502, paragraph 147 of the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public
dominion. In the absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some
other person, it must continue to belong to the State.
We ruled on this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals,48 to wit:
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified
as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null
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and void.49 1avvphi1
Furthermore, in Celestial v. Cachopero,50 we similarly ruled that a dried-up creek bed is property of
public dominion:
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.51
Therefore, on the basis of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, Sapang Bayan cannot be adjudged
to any of the parties in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75773 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
4 Republic v Santos, November 12, 2012
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the
water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of
the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public
dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by
the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also
owned by Arcadio Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as
his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had
been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and
adverse possession for more than 30 years.2
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed
the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20
meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal
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easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the
property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and
ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of
the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an
area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan
Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and
orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the
Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS
AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE
ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT
FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF
THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
DESPITE APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
III
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED
THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR

ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE
REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL
TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY,

OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or
not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
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Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was
previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.,
after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New
Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land
which was previously part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained
by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil
Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but
instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic’s submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits
of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to
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claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they
established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.12 The deposit of soil,
to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the
grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-
B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque
River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was
previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot
4 was issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land
formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil
and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River,
resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects
of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are
several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in
fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish
at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the
effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that
ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual
and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of
time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at
which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness
Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only
plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the
Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the
property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687
confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the
drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the
consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along
line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14
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That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was
described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio
Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level
from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the
water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical
language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply
the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the
language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502
of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the
State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up
river beds should belong to some other person.19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they
had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30
years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the
river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30)
years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along
the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management
Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
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Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing
reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all
the requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are
not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following,
namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with
such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized
exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on
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speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings
the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and
that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible.
Hence, the Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land
for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty
years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along
the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management
Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty
years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of
land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their
possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The
decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to
be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of
realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the
tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the
causing of surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to
make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because
it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the
deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land
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adjacent to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot
4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot
4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents
themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes
only from 199928 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the
filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than
thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by
other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its
public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion,
namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that
rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question
that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case involving the
registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court
held:
As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the
Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-
interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property
from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or
Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
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ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the
subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change
in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course,"
and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only
when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is
uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional
Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the
National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there
is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or
artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.
Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by
the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence,
the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a
river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry
river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is
a showing of a title from the State.31 Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the
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owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the
right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds
remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B
was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be
deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by
the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following
notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director
issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the
property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we
said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
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domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof."
(Emphasis supplied)
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved

the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the
alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. x x x."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
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that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has
no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the
Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the
effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by

respondent.1âwphi1 The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before
the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B
falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23
of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis
supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to
the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly,
respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

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WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and
Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as
exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
B. Co-Ownership, NCC 484 – 494

Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title.
Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proved. (393a)
Article 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied. (394a)
Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)
Article 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself
from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership. (395a)
Article 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable,
first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be
decided upon by a majority as determined in article 492. (n)
Article 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not
specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on
the subject, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of
all the owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door,
common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with
the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the
expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and so on successively. (396)

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Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or
more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief. (397a)
Article 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the resolutions of the
majority of the co-owners shall be binding.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co-owners who represent the controlling
interest in the object of the co-ownership.
Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in
the property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested party, shall order such measures as it
may deem proper, including the appointment of an administrator.
Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common,
the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in common. (398)
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. (399)
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall
be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
NOTE: Condominium Law, RA 4762 as amended by RA 7899. EXCLUDED
5 Pardell v Bartolome, G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912
CASE DOCTRINES
Hereditary succession gives rise to co-ownershipCo-ownership; extent
"Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their
object andin such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners
from utilizing themaccording to their rights." (Article 394 of the Civil Code, now Art. 486)
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house
of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any
detriment tothe interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from
utilizing the said upperstory according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor
were rented and an accountingof the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.Each co-owner of realty
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use andenjoy the same with no
other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for thereason that, until a
division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the
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coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, inaddition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Co-owner not required to pay rent upon using the co-owned property; stranger to pay rent
Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house
onCalle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital
of thatprovince, strict justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the monthly
rent which thesaid quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. Xxx
even as the husband of thedefendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use
gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to
the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did notreceive one-half of the rent which those quarters
could and should have produced, had they been occupied by astranger, in the same manner that rent
was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used asstores.
FACTS: Appeal by bill of exceptions.Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior toher death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative
will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children,named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde,
surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all herproperty. Manuel and Francisca were
already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar),
without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicialagreement, took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despite repeated demands todivide the
properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the
partitionand delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.Vicenta
filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of
damages. It held that the revenues and the expenseswere compensated by the residence enjoyed by the
defendant party, that no losses or damages were eithercaused or suffered, nor likewise any other
expense besides those aforementioned,Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and
moved for a new trial on the grounds that theevidence presented did not warrant the judgment
rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motionwas denied by the lower court. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property.
RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:"Each co-owner may use the things owned in common,
provided he uses them in accordance with their object andin such manner as not to injure the interests
of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing themaccording to their rights."
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house
of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any
detriment tothe interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from
utilizing the said upperstory according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor
were rented and an accountingof the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.Each co-owner of realty
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use andenjoy the same with no
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other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for thereason that, until a
division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the
coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, inaddition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and
MatildeOrtiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last
named, assisted byher husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of
the said province the greaterpart of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for
Spain, it is not at all strange that delaysand difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect
the rents and proceeds from the property held incommon and to obtain a partition of the latter,
especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, thecountry was in a turmoil; and for
this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-ownership of thedefendants, who took upon
themselves the administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposesof their
preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of
therents which might have been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and,
much less,because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some
belongings andeffects of common ownership between the litigants.
The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with herhusband the upper floor of the said house, did
not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor didshe prevent the latter from living
therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a coownerof the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled
thedefendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet, in view of the fact that the record shows
it to havebeen proved that the defendant Matilde's husband,
Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or apart of the lower floor of the same house on
Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, aposition which he held in the capital of
that province, strict justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law, theplaintiff, one-half of the monthly
rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased toanother person.
The amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in appearance with the evidence shown in
therecord. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of
the defendantcoowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of
the lower floor of thehouse in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff
Vicenta who did not receiveone-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced,
had they been occupied by astranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on
the lower floor that were used asstores.
Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768,
thetotal amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four years from the quarters
occupied as anoffice by the justice of the peace of Vigan.
HELD: partial reversal of RTC judgment.
6 Dailisan v CA, 560 SCRA 351

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Topic: Co-ownership
Facts: On 8 July 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint6 for partition before the RTC of Quezon
City,7 alleging that he purchased one-fourth (¼) of the land of Federico Pugao (Federico) in Bago
Bantay, Quezon City.
According to petitioner, he and Federico had initially agreed to the sale of one-half (1/2) portion of the
same land for P12,000.00 and that he had paid Federico several installments from 1976 to 1979, which
all in all totaled toP6,000.00, but was told to stop further payments because per Federico’s
representation he could only sell one-fourth ( ¼) of the lot.8 Federico could not deliver the title to him
because the property was still mortgaged to a bank. When the mortgage was released, petitioner
demanded the execution of a deed of absolute sale. Instead of acceding, Federico proposed to
mortgage the property to petitioner as security for a P10,000.00 loan, payable in three (3) months, and
upon payment of the loan the deed of absolute sale would be executed. Petitioner agreed, and they
executed a deed of real estate mortgage.9 The loan was paid after three (3) months, after which
petitioner and Federico executed a deed of absolute sale on 5 February 1979.
Petitioner asked for the partition of the lot and caused a resurvey to expedite the partition.10 However,
Federico still refused to effect the partition and even sent a notice of eviction11 against petitioner.
Federico denied having voluntarily executed the deed of absolute sale, and instead alleged that when
he was seriously ill in January of 1992, petitioner, with a certain Atty. Juanitas, made him sign pages of
what the former told him to be parts of the real estate mortgage he had earlier executed in favor of
petitioner.
On 3 September 2003, the trial court, finding that respondents failed to disprove the validity of the
deed of absolute sale, ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the partition of the subject property. The
Court of Appeals granted the appeal. It noted that petitioner should have filed an action for specific
performance to compel Federico to honor the deed of absolute sale;19 yet the right to file such action,
had already expired.20 It further noted that petitioner "filed the instant action for partition simply
because it is not barred by prescription."21 It ruled against the validity of the sale between Federico
and petitioner, finding that there was no consent on Federico’s part and that there was no proof of
payment of the price or consideration on the part of petitioner.22 It concluded that the deed of sale is
fictitious and invalid, and hence could not serve as basis of any claim of ownership.23
Petitioner now claims that the appellate court’s decision is contrary to law. He argues that his action is
"actually a case of ‘specific performance’ for the delivery/surrender of title in view of the duly executed
‘Deed of Absolute Sale,’ and thus, the validity of the said deed cannot be collaterally attacked, but
must be raised in an independent action."25 He insists that his action for specific performance has not
prescribed because upon the execution of the deed of sale, ownership of the subject property has
passed to him, the buyer, and an action for specific performance is only incidental to his claim of
ownership; on the contrary, it is respondents’ right (duty)26 to question the validity of the deed of sale,
which they did not do despite knowledge of the existence of the said instrument as early as 1984
respondents point out that this is the first time that petitioner alleged that his action for partition is
actually a case of specific performance for the delivery/surrender of the title of the subject property.
This being so, respondents believe that petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed since more
than ten (10) years have already lapsed since the execution of the deed of sale.

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Issue: WON petitioner is a co-owner entitled to demand his right to partition
Held: All told, respondents were unable to overcome the presumption of validity of the deed of
absolute sale as well as the regularity in its execution.1avvphi1
With the issue of the deed of sale’s validity already settled, the question of prescription of action
becomes easy to resolve. We note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner’s cause of action has
prescribed following its conclusion that petitioner’s action is actually one for specific performance, not
partition. Interestingly, petitioner, after having triumphed in the trial court with his action for
partition, suddenly changed tack and declared that his original action was indeed an action for specific
performance. He should not have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault. In light of the
facts which impelled petitioner to seek judicial relief, there is no discernible change in the ultimate
relief he seeks, as his complaint for partition is also an action for specific performance. His objective is
to make Federico honor their contract and perform his obligation to deliver a separate title covering
the lot he sold to him but which can be done only after the portion is segregated from the rest of
Federico’s property.37
Petitioner’s action before the trial court was properly captioned as one for partition because there are
sufficient allegations in the complaint that he is a co-owner of the property. The regime of co-
ownership exists when ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.38 By the
nature of a co-ownership, a co-
owner cannot point to a specific portion of the property owned in common as his own because his
share therein remains intangible.39 The pertinent portion of the deed reads:
2. That for and in consideration of the sum of Six Thousand (P6,000.00), Pesos, Philippine Currency,
paid unto the VENDOR by the VENDEE, the VENDOR hereby SELLS, TRANSFERS, CEDES, and
CONVEY unto the VENDEE, his heirs, successors or assigns an undivided ONE-FOURTH (1/4)
portion (50 square meters, more or less, in the particular portion of the lot where the house of the
VENDEE now stands) of the above-described residential lot together with all improvements thereon
free from all liens and encumbrances. 40 (Emphasis supplied)
The description "undivided ONE-FOURTH (1/4) portion (50 square meters, more or less, in the
particular portion of the lot where the house of the VENDEE now stands)" shows that the portion sold
is still undivided and not sufficiently identified. While the description provides a guide for identifying
the location of the lot sold, there was no indication of its exact metes and bounds. This is the reason
why petitioner was constrained to cause the survey of the property.41 As a co-owner of the property,
therefore, petitioner has the right to demand partition, a right which does not prescribe.42
Ownership of the thing sold is acquired only from the time of delivery thereof, either actual or
constructive. Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred.43 The Court notes
that Federico had already delivered the portion he sold to petitioner, subject of course to the execution
of a technical survey, when he executed the deed of absolute sale, which is a public instrument.44 In
view of the delivery in law, coupled with petitioner’s actual occupation of the portion where his house
stands, all that is needed is its segregation from the rest of the property.
7 Cruz v Catapang, GR No. 164110, Feb. 12, 2008

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Facts: Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land covering
an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. Sometime in
1992, Teofila Catapang, with the consent of Norma Maligaya as one of the aforementioned co-owners,
built a house on a lot adjacent to the subject parcel of land. The house built by Catapang intruded on a
portion of the co-owned property.
In September 1995, Cruz learned about the intrusion and made several demands for Catapang to
demolish and vacate the part of the structure encroaching upon their property. However, Catapang
refused and disregarded the demands of Cruz.
Cruz then filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang before the MCTC of Taal, Batangas.
The MCTC decided in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient
to justify defendant’s construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in question. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC.
Catapang filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision and
ruled in favor of her. The Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this
case because respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma
Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause
of action for forcible entry. Thus, the case went to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the consent given by one of the co-owners is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of a
complaint for forcible entry.
DECISION: No, Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership. In this case, the act of Norma Maligaya is tantamount to devoting the
property to her exclusive use. Under Article 491 of the Civil Code, none of the co-owners shall, without
the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. The Court ruled that it
would necessarily follow that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners,
validly give consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as Catapang in this case, in
the thing owned in common.
In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not
to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
their rights. The Court ruled that, to give consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
owned property would be to injure the interest of the co-ownership and would prevent other co-
owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
In this case, the consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the respondent Catapang. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of her other co-owners did not grant Catapang any right to enter and even build
upon the co-owned property. According to the Supreme Court, the respondent Catapang’s act of
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getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in
the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into
the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
The petition was GRANTED.

1 Plasabas v CA, March 31, 2009, GR No. 168139
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioners3 filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of
First Instance (now, Regional Trial Court [RTC]) of Maasin, Southern Leyte against respondents. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-1949. The property subject of the case was a parcel of coconut
land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, declared under Tax Declaration No. 3587 in the name of
petitioner Nieves with an area of 2.6360 hectares.4 In their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment
be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering the defendants
to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages.5
Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners’ allegation of ownership and possession of the premises,
and interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their
common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.6
Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the
complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land. Based on the testimonies of petitioners’
witnesses, the property passed on from Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner
Nieves’ grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her siblings—Jose,
Victor and Victoria.7
After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should
have been terminated at inception for petitioners’ failure to implead indispensable parties, the other
co-owners – Jose, Victor and Victoria.
RTC: DISMISSED
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Further, the CA declared that the non-joinder of the
indispensable parties would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code
could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a
reivindicatory action.
ISSUE: IF THE PROPERTY IS UNDER THE STATE OF CO-OWNERSHIP, CAN A SUIT FOR
EJECTMENT BE BROUGHT WITHOUT IMPLEADING THE OTHER CO-OWNERS? MOREOVER, IN
THE SAME SUIT, ARE THE CO-OWNERS CONSIDERED INDISPENSABLE PARTIES?
RULING:

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Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment.
The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and
a reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court
in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same
cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.13
With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners’ complaint is one for
ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only
exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless
the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.14
Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in
litigation is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-
owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to
pursue the case on the latter’s behalf.15Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory,
because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed
the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on
the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-
party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
CASE REMANDED.
2 Republic v Heirs, 549 SCRA 58
Facts: Lot Nos. 2296 and 2316 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon, Lapu-lapu City were adjudicated on
December 7, 1929 by the then CFI Cebu in favor of the following in four equal shares: Francisca, Tito,
Isabel et al and Silveria et al
It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito sold for P2,565.59 the entire two lots to the then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale"
executed on October 11, 1957, without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest
were the adjudicatees of the rest of the ¾ portion of the two lots.6

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In 1996, CAA’s successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA),
erected a security fence traversing Lot No. 2316 and relocated a number of families, who had built their
dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security in line with
the standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Federal Aviation Authority.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of Tax Declaration No. 00548 covering Lot No. 2296 and
Tax Declaration No. 00568 covering Lot No. 2316.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the
lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed on January 8, 1996 a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City,7
alleging that the existence of the tax declarations "would cast a cloud on their valid and existing titles"
to the lots. They alleged that "corresponding original certificates of title in favor of the decreed owners
were . . . issued but the same could no longer be found and located, and in all probability, were lost
during the Second World War."8 (This claim was not specifically denied by petitioner in its Answer
with Counterclaim.)9
Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated or
disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession.
Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them
any written notice of its acquisition of the ¼ share of Tito Dignos.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the MCIAA (hereafter petitioner), in its Answer with
Counterclaim,11 maintained that from the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive
prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value;
and assuming arguendo that it did not have just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years, acquired
ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription.
At all events, petitioner contended that respondents’ action was barred by estoppel and laches.
TC: found for respondents.
CA: affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Issue: Who has better right? (Heirs)
Held: Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the

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division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of
Tito Dignos, which is only ¼ undivided share of the two lots.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to petitioner’s right
to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.
3 Monteroso v CA, 533 SCRA 66 (2008)
4 Quimpo v Abad, 545 SCRA 174 (2008)
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the July 22, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56187, and the October 16, 2003 Resolution denying the motion for its reconsideration.
Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad (Eustaquia) was the owner of several parcels of land in Goa, Camarines Sur,
described as follows:
Parcel I - Residential land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area of 684 square-
meters;
Parcel II – Coconut land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area of 4.3731 hectares;
Parcel III – Residential land situated at San Jose Street, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area of 1,395
square meters; and
Parcel IV – Abaca and coconut land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area
42.6127 hectares.[2]
Eustaquia died intestate in 1948 leaving these parcels of land to her grandchild and great
grandchildren, namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents Consuelo, Ireneo, Danilo, Marites, Anita
and Helen, all surnamed Abad.
In 1966, Joaquin and respondents undertook an oral partition of parcel III (San Jose property) and
parcel IV. Half of the properties was given to Joaquin and the other half to the respondents. However,
no document of partition was executed, because Joaquin refused to execute a deed. Consuelo and
Ireneo occupied their respective shares in the San Jose property, and installed several tenants over

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their share in parcel IV. Joaquin, on the other hand, became the administrator of the remaining
undivided properties and of the shares of respondents Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, who were
still minors at that time.
In 1989, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted to them,
but Joaquin prevented them from occupying the same. Joaquin also refused to heed respondents’
demand for partition of parcels I and II, prompting respondents to file a complaint for judicial
partition and/or recovery of possession with accounting and damages with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Camarines Sur.[3]
Joaquin denied the material allegations in the complaint, and averred, as his special and affirmative
defenses, lack of cause of action and prescription. He asserted absolute ownership over parcels III and
IV, claiming that he purchased these lands from Eustaquia in 1946, evidenced by deeds of sale
executed on August 23, 1946 and December 2, 1946. He, likewise, claimed continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of these lots since 1946, and alleged that Consuelo’s occupation of the portion of
the San Jose property was by mere tolerance.[4]
During the pendency of the case, Joaquin died. Accordingly, he was substituted by his wife, Estela
Tena-Quimpo and his children, namely, Jose, Adelia, Joaquin, Anita, Angelita, Amelia, Arlene, Joy and
Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo (the Quimpos).
On December 12, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents, declaring them as co-
owners of all the properties left by Eustaquia. It rejected Joaquin’s claim of absolute ownership over
parcels III and IV, and declared void the purported deeds of sale executed by Eustaquia for lack of
consideration and consent. The court found that at the time of the execution of these deeds, Joaquin
was not gainfully employed and had no known source of income, which shows that the deeds of sale
state a false and fictitious consideration. Likewise, Eustaquia could not have possibly given her
consent to the sale because she was already 91 years old at that time. The RTC also sustained the oral
partition among the heirs in 1966. According to the trial court, the possession and occupation of land
by respondents Consuelo and Ireneo, and Joaquin’s acquiescence for 23 years, furnish sufficient
evidence that there was actual partition of the properties. It held that Joaquin and his heirs are now
estopped from claiming ownership over the entire San Jose property as well as over parcel IV.
The RTC disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Consuelo Vda. de Beltran, Ireneo
Abad, Marites Abad, Danilo Abad, Anita Abad and Helen Abad and against defendant Joaquin
Quimpo, substituted by the latter’s wife Estela Tena and their children, Amparo, Jose, Amelia, Joaquin
Jr., Adelia, Arlene, Anita, Joy, Angelita and Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo, as follows:
1. Ordering the above-named substituted defendants, and the plaintiffs to execute their written
agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. III and IV more particularly described in paragraph
7 of the complaint, and for them to execute an agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. I and
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II, both parcels are more particularly described in paragraph 7 of the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiffs Danilo Abad, Marites Abad, Anita Abad and Helen Abad the owner of six
(6) hectares a portion included in parcel No. IV also described in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and
therefore, entitled to its possession and ordering the said substituted defendants to deliver that portion
to them as their share thereto;
3. Ordering the above-named substituted defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of Six Thousand
Pesos (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency, as reasonable attorney’s fees and the sum of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) also of Philippine Currency, as litigation expenses and for the said defendants to pay
the costs.
The counterclaim, not being proved, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Sustaining the RTC, the CA declared that it was plausible
that Eustaquia’s consent was vitiated because she was then 91 years old and sickly. It was bolstered by
the fact that the deeds of sale only surfaced 43 years after its alleged execution and 23 years from the
time of the oral partition. The CA also rejected petitioners’ argument that the action was barred by
prescription and laches, explaining that prescription does not run against the heirs so long as the heirs,
for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. The CA found no repudiation on Joaquin’s part. It, therefore, concluded that respondents’
action could not be barred by prescription or laches.
The Quimpos, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari imputing the following
errors to the CA:
1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS DID NOT
ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OVER [THE] SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND BY WAY OF DEEDS OF
ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN THEIR FAVOR;
2) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT CO-OWNERSHIP EXISTS

AMONG PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND;
3) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE

PROVEN THEIR FILIATION TO THE ORIGINAL OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND
BY MERE SCANT EVIDENCE;
4) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT LACHES HAS TIME–
BARRED THE RESPONDENTS FROM ASSAILING THE ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP OF
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PETITIONERS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND; AND
5) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE

ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES.*7+
The Quimpos insist on the validity of the deeds of sale between Joaquin and Eustaquia. They assail the
probative value and weight given by the RTC and the CA in favor of the respondents’ pieces of
evidence while refusing to give credence or value to the documents they presented. Specifically, they
contend that the notarized deeds of sale and the tax declarations should have adequately established
Joaquin’s ownership of parcels III and IV.
The contention has no merit. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme Court’s role in a petition
under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court. Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive on the parties. Since such findings are generally not reviewable, this Court is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below,
unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support from the evidence on record or the
assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[8]
Petitioners fail to convince us that the CA committed reversible error in affirming the trial court and in
giving no weight to the pieces of evidence they presented.
The stated consideration for the sale are P5,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively, an amount which was so
difficult to raise in the year 1946. Respondents established that at the time of the purported sale
Joaquin Quimpo was not gainfully employed. He was studying in Manila and Eustaquia was the one
supporting him; that when Eustaquia died two (2) years later, Joaquin was not able to continue his
studies. The Quimpos failed to override this. Except for the incredible and unpersuasive testimony of
Joaquin’s daughter, Adelia Magsino, no other testimonial or documentary evidence was offered to
prove that Joaquin was duly employed and had the financial capacity to buy the subject properties in
1946.
In Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals,[9] reiterated in Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corp,[10] we held

that a deed of sale, in which the stated consideration has not been, in fact, paid is a false contract; that it
is void ab initio. Furthermore, Ocejo v. Flores,[11] ruled that a contract of purchase and sale is null
and void and produces no effect whatsoever where it appears that the same is without cause or
consideration which should have been the motive thereof, or the purchase price which appears thereon
as paid but which in fact has never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.
Likewise, both the trial court and the CA found that Eustaquia was 91 years old, weak and senile, at
the time the deeds of sale were executed. In other words, she was already mentally incapacitated by
then, and could no longer be expected to give her consent to the sale. The RTC and CA cannot,
therefore, be faulted for not giving credence to the deeds of sale in favor of Joaquin.
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Petitioners also presented Tax Declaration Nos. 3650,[12] 3708,[13] and 3659[14] to substantiate
Joaquin’s claim of absolute dominion over parcels III and IV. But we note that these tax declarations
are all in the name of Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad. These documents, therefore, do not support their
claim of absolute dominion since 1946, but enervate it instead. Besides, the fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Joaquin Quimpo does not
necessarily prove ownership for it is well settled that a tax declaration or tax receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership.[15] The CA, therefore, correctly found this proof inadequate to
establish Joaquin’s claim of absolute dominion.
For forty-three (43) years, Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their portions of the San Jose property and
significantly, Joaquin never disturbed their possession. They also installed tenants in parcel IV, and
Joaquin did not prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his ownership over the same. These
unerringly point to the fact that there was indeed an oral partition of parcels III and IV.
In Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot,[16] we held, viz.:
[P]artition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus,
after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that recitals
in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years,
and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land
either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded.
Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal,[17] we explained that:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced
oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to
each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has
been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual
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for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has
been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance,
a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in sustaining the oral partition over parcels III and IV
and in invalidating the deeds of sale between Eustaquia and Joaquin.
Similarly, we affirm the CA ruling that respondents are co-owners of the subject four (4) parcels of
land, having inherited the same from a common ancestor – Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad. Petitioners’
assertion that respondents failed to prove their relationship to the late Eustaquia deserves scant
consideration.
During the pre-trial, Joaquin Quimpo admitted that:
Eustaquia Perfecto Abad and Diego Abad had two (2) children by the names of Leon Abad and
Joaquin Abad; that Leon Abad has three (3) children namely: Anastacia, Wilfredo and Consuelo, all
surnamed Abad; that Joaquin Abad has only one (1) child, a daughter by the name of Amparo; that
Wilfredo has four (4) children, namely, Danilo, Helen, Marites and Anita; Amparo has one child, son
Joaquin Quimpo, x x x [18]
Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia, while respondents Danilo, Helen, Marites, Anita and also
Joaquin Quimpo were Eustaquia’s great grandchildren. As such, respondents can rightfully ask for the
confirmation of the oral partition over parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and II.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does
not prescribe and is not subject to laches.[19]
Finally, petitioners challenge the attorney’s fees in favor of respondents.
The grant of attorney’s fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of
the court. It may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its
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interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other,[20] as in this case.
In fine, we find no reversible error in the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56187, are AFFIRMED.
5 Lacbayan v Samoy, GR 165427, March 21, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite
respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to
respondent’s son on October 12, 1979.
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of land were also acquired during
the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and
wife. The lands are briefly described as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No.
303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. ‚married to Betty Lacbayan.‛*5+
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No.
23301 and registered in the name of ‚Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan.‛*6+
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No.
RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. ‚married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy.‛*7+
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT No.
335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. ‚married to Betty L. Samoy.‛*8+
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. ‚married to Betty L. Samoy.‛*9+
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner
left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City.
Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter
property in Don Enrique Heights.[10]
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991.
In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by
executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over
the three other properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional
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demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner
filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31,
1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and
wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real
properties amounting to P15,500,000.00. Respondent, in his Answer, however, denied petitioner’s
claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without
any contribution from petitioner.
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983
until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning.
Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the
company which she and respondent established.
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries,
dividends, allowances and commissions. He countered that the said properties were registered in his
name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his
legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a
heavy gambler. Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the
intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building.
TC – dismissed petition for lack of merint. As to ownership, it was petitioner’s own admission that the
properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower
services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.
CA – Petition denied
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action
for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia[28] is definitive. There, we explained that the
determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or
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not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end
with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does
not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and
profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that ‚the parties are unable to agree upon the partition‛
directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled
of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro
indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the
subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue
of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner
in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.[31]
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties
to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,[32] but that rule is
not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the
title itself.[33] The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document.[34] Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used.[35]
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the
latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in
the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or
that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title.[37] Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may
be the best evidence thereof.
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Finally, as to whether respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission
against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership
between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.[38] Admission
against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and
definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests,
otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.[39]
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit
against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-
ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.[40]
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing
the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the
contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial court’s view that
respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with
respondent’s predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the
services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorney’s
fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that
she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondent’s act of representing himself and
petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation
to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his
deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is
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hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal
wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees in
respondent’s favor is DELETED.
6 Tecson v Francisco, GR 180683, June 1, 2011
Topic: Co-ownership
Facts: Sometime in 1945, Atty. Agustin Fausto (Atty. Fausto) acquired in co-ownership with his sister,
Waldetrudes Fausto-Nadela (Waldetrudes), Lot 2189—in Pagadian City, Zamboanga Del Sur.
In 1970, following a cadastral proceeding, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes were recognized as co-owners
of Lot 2189.
Not long after, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes decided to partition Lot 2189. For this purpose,
Waldetrudes hired one Engr. Ernesto D. Aguilar (Engr. Aguilar) to prepare a subdivision plan for the
lot. On 25 March 1974, Engr. Aguilar prepared subdivision plan Psd-09-06-000110 (First Plan)9 that
divided Lot 2189 into two (2) lots, i.e., Lot 2189-A with an area of 507 square meters, and Lot 2189-B
with an area of 508 square meters. An illustration of the First Plan shows this division:On 6 April 1974,
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands approved the First Plan.
On 15 April 1974, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes formalized their decision to subdivide Lot 2189 by
executing an Agreement of Partition.10 Under this agreement (First Partition Agreement),
Waldetrudes was to be given absolute ownership over Lot 2189-A, while Atty. Fausto was to be
conferred separate dominion over Lot 2189-B.11 The First Partition Agreement, however, was never
registered with the Register of Deeds.
On 14 March 1975, Atty. Fausto died. He was survived by herein respondents, who are his wife12 and
children.13
On 7 July 1977, however, Waldetrudes entered into a Contract to Sell14 with herein petitioner Aurora
L. Tecson (Aurora). In it, Waldetrudes undertook to sell, among others, her "ideal share" in Lot 2189 to
Aurora upon full payment of the purchase price.15
On 28 July 1977, Engr. Aguilar prepared a second subdivision plan (Second Plan)16 for Lot 2189. The
Second Plan, designated as Psd-268803, drastically altered the division of Lot 2189 under the First Plan.
On 28 September 1977, a second partition over Lot 2189 (Second Partition Agreement)20 was executed
between the respondents in their capacity as heirs of Atty. Fausto on one hand, and Waldetrudes on
the other. Presumably with the Second Plan as a new basis, the agreement named Waldetrudes as the
owner of Lot 2189-B while the respondents were allocated Lot 2189-A.
On 8 May 1978, Waldetrudes sold Lot 2189-B, with an area of nine hundred sixty-four (964) square
meters, to Aurora.21
Meanwhile, it would seem that the Register of Deeds had refused registration of the Second Partition
Agreement in view of the fact that several of the respondents, namely Jose, Romualdo, Elizabeth and
Victor were still minors..23
The sale of Lot 2189-B in favor of Aurora was likewise registered with the Register of Deeds.
3. Aurora executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,29 conveying Lot 2189-B to her brother, herein petitioner
Atty. Jose L. Tecson (Atty. Tecson).. On the very same day, the above deed was registered with the
Register of Deeds.30On 20 February 1980, TCT No. T-4,338 was cancelled. In its place, TCT No. T-
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4,34231 was issued, this time, in the name of Atty. Tecson.
Seven (7) years after, or on 28 May 1987, the respondents filed a Complaint32 for the Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Titles, Reconveyance and Damages against Waldetrudes and the petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City. In essence, the respondents seek the recovery
of four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land from TCT No. T-4,342, which they believe was
unlawfully taken from the lawful share of their predecessor-in-interest, Atty. Fausto, in Lot 2189.33
The respondents allege that Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes are, in actual fact, co-owners in equal share
of Lot 2189.34 They insist on the First Partition Agreement as the only true, correct and binding
division of Lot 2189.35Hence, Atty. Fausto is entitled not merely to the meager fifty-one (51) square
meter lot actually given to him under the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement, but to the five
hundred eight (508) square meters of land allotted for him under the original partition.36
Verily, Waldetrudes could not have sold more than her rightful share of only five hundred seven (507)
square meters.37 The respondents, thus, ask for the nullification of the sale of Lot 2189-B to the
petitioners, at least with respect to the excess amounting to four hundred fifty-seven (457) square
meters.38
In its decision dated 8 December 2000, the RTC dismissed the complaint of the respondents. As earlier
mentioned, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court on appeal.58 Hence, the present
appeal by the petitioners.
Issue whether the respondents may recover the four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land
from TCT No. T-4,342, registered in the name of petitioner Atty. Tecson.
Held: The petitioners would like this Court to answer in the negative.
The claim of petitioner Atty. Tecson over the entire nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters of
land covered by TCT No. T-4,342 is intricately linked with the validity of the Second Plan and the
Second Partition Agreement. As a perusal of the facts reveal, TCT No. T-4,342, along with its
precursors TCT Nos. T-4,338 and T-4,336, are but derivates of the division of Lot 2189 fixed by the
Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement.
We are not convinced.
Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are Co-owners in Equal Share
After reviewing the arguments and evidence presented in this case, We rule that Waldetrudes and
Atty. Fausto are, indeed, co-owners of Lot 2189. Moreover, We hold that the siblings have equal shares
in the said lot.
First. The mother title of Lot 2189, OCT No. 734, states in no unclear terms that Waldetrudes and Atty.
Fausto were co-owners of the subject lot. The inscription in the original title for Lot 2189 carries more
than sufficient weight to prove the existence of a co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto.
Second. Other than the bare assertion of the petitioners, there is absolutely no proof on record that
Waldetrudes was the sole beneficial owner of Lot 2189. Tax Declaration No. 6521 simply cannot prevail
over OCT No. 734 as conclusive evidence of the true ownership of Lot 2189.71
Third. During the cadastral proceeding involving Lot 2189, Waldetrudes herself stated that Atty.
Fausto was a co-owner of the subject lot. The transcript taken from the proceeding shows
Fourth. There was likewise no evidence behind the petitioners’ allegation that the registered co-
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ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto was based on their actual occupancy of Lot 2189.
On the contrary, OCT No. 734 categorically states that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are co-owners "in
undivided share" of Lot 2189. The conspicuous silence of OCT No. 734 as to the definite extent of the
respective shares of Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes in Lot 2189 gives rise to a presumption that they are
in equal measure. We are at once reminded of Article 485 of the Civil Code,73 to wit:
Article 485. x x x.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved.
Fifth. The equality in terms of share in Lot 2189, was affirmed by Waldetrudes when she testified in
open court, to wit:74
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Atty. Tecson was behind the execution of the
Second Partition Agreement.75 It was Atty. Tecson who misled Waldetrudes and the respondents into
signing the Second Partition Agreeement without giving them notice of the existence of a Second
Plan.76 As a consequence, Waldetrudes and the respondents were misinformed as to the true nature of
the Second Partition Agreement. These factual findings are adequately supported by the positive
testimonies of respondents Romualdo Fausto,77Minerva Fausto78 and Isabel
The established facts have several legal consequences:
First. The Second Plan, having been prepared without the knowledge and consent of any of the co-
owners of Lot 2189, have no binding effect on them.
Second. The Second Partition Agreement is null and void as an absolute simulation,80 albeit induced
by a third party. The fraud perpetrated by Atty. Tecson did more than to vitiate the consent of
Waldetrudes and the respondents. It must be emphasized that Waldetrudes and the respondents never
had any intention of entering into a new partition distinct from the First Partition Agreement. The
established facts reveal that Waldetrudes and the respondents assented to the Second Partition
Agreement because Atty. Tecson told them that the instrument was merely required to expedite the
sale of Waldetrudes’ share.81
In other words, the deceit employed by Atty. Tecson goes into the very nature of the Second Partition
Agreement and not merely to its object or principal condition. Evidently, there is an absence of a
genuine intent on the part of the co-owners to be bound under a new partition proposing a new
division of Lot 2189. The apparent consent of Waldetrudes and the respondents to the Second Partition
Agreement is, in reality, totally wanting. For that reason, the Second Partition Agreement is null and
void.1avvphi1
Third. The Second Partition Agreement being a complete nullity, it cannot be ratified either by the
lapse of time or by its approval by the guardianship court.82
Fourth. The First Plan and the First Partition Agreement remain as the valid and binding division of
Lot 2189. Hence, pursuant to the First Partition Agreement, Waldetrudes is the absolute owner of Lot
2189-A with an area of only five hundred seven (507) square meters. Atty. Fausto, on the other hand,
has dominion over Lot 2189-B with an area of five hundred eight (508) square meters.
Fifth. Inevitably, Waldetrudes can only sell her lawful share of five hundred seven (507) square meters.
The sales in favor of Aurora and, subsequently, Atty. Tecson, are thereby null and void insofar as it
exceeded the 507 square meter share of Waldetrudes in Lot 2189. Nemo dat quod non habet.83
7 Ampil v Manahan, 11 October 2012
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Exequiel Ampil, as representative of the heirs of Albina Ampil filed a complaint for ejectment against
the Manahans (Perfecto, Virginia, Teresita, Almario, and Irene). In the complaint, it was alleged that
Albina was the owner of two adjoining residential lots in Bulacan, as evidenced by tax declarations,
and that Albina had allowed Perfecto and his family to occupy a portion of the properties, on the
condition that they would vacate the same, should the need arise.
After the death of Albina, Exequiel and the rest of the heirs requested Perfecto and family to vacate the
property, but the latter refused.
The matter was brought to the Lupong Tagapamayapa, who issued a Certification to File an Action for
failure of the parties to amicably settle their dispute.
The Heirs sent a demand letter to the Manahans to surrender possession of the lands, but to no avail.
So, the Heirs filed a complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
The Manahans filed their answer, averring that the lots belonged to them, their predecessor-in-interest
having been in peaceful and continuous possession thereof since time immemorial, and that Albina
was never the owner of the property.
The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the Heirs, on the basis of the tax declarations.
The RTC affirmed.
The CA reversed, ruling that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive proof of ownership or
right of possession, and only becomes strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by proof of
actual possession. The CA denied the Heirs’ motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Who has the better right to the physical possession of the disputed property?
HELD: THE HEIRS.
As a rule, petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court are limited only to
questions of law and not of fact. The rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Here, the factual
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the MTC and the RTC. Hence, a review of the case is
imperative.
In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties, is the sole issue for resolution. But where
the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said issue in order to determine who has the
right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is only an initial determination of ownership
for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked
thereto. As such, the lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.
In the case at bar, the Court sustains the findings of both the MTC and the RTC. The bare allegation of
the Manahans, that they had been in peaceful and continuous possession of the lot in question because
their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner from time
immemorial, cannot prevail over the tax declarations and other documentary evidence presented by
petitioners. In the absence of any supporting evidence, that of the Heirs deserves more probative
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value.
A perusal of the records shows that Manahans’ occupation of the lot in question was by mere
tolerance. To prove ownership over the property, the Heirs presented the tax declarations covering the
properties and a certification issued by the Municipality, showing that their mother, Albina, had been
paying the corresponding real property taxes thereon. The Heirs also submitted a survey plan, in
support of Albina’s application for land registration over the disputed lots. In fact, the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan issued Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo conferring title over the lot in the names of
the heirs of Albina.
Also, one of the Heirs verbally demanded that the Manahans vacate the property and when the latter
refused, they filed a complaint before the Barangay Lupon. From the minutes of the meeting in the
Barangay Lupon, Perfecto admitted Albina allowed them temporary use of the lots and that they could
not leave the premises because they had nowhere else to go. When the parties failed to reach a
settlement, the Heirs, in order to protect their rights to the lot in question, filed a case for violation of
P.D. No. 772, an Act Penalizing Squatting and other Similar Acts against Perfecto, before the Regional
Trial Court. In the said case, Perfecto executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein he admitted that
Albina was the owner of the lots in question and that he was merely allowed by her to use the
property on condition that they would vacate it on demand. As a result, the court dismissed the
complaint because it found out that Perfecto and his family’s stay in the questioned lots was lawful
because Albina permitted them to use the lots on the condition that they would vacate the same should
Albina need it.
On the other hand, the Manahans could not present proof that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time immemorial. Granting that the
Manahans or their predecessors-in-interests had been in possession in the concept of an owner since
time immemorial, none of them declared the disputed lots for taxation purposes and, thus, never paid
taxes thereon. The Manahans' allegation that they were in peaceful, continuous and adverse possession
of the lots in question, unsupported by any evidence, is not substantial to establish their interest over
the property.
Well established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot be acquired by mere occupation.
While it is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they, nevertheless,
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. It strengthens one's bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE + RATIO:
Does Exequiel have authority to file the complaint on behalf of his co-heirs? YES.
Art. 487, CC provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, without joining
the others. The action is not limited to ejectment cases but includes all kinds of suits for recovery of
possession, because the suit is presumed to have been instituted for the benefit of all.
Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago – As co-owner of the properties, each of the heirs may
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properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry, or any kind of action for the recovery of
possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman – Only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit
for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are
not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in
the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of
all co-owners.
In the case at bench, the complaint clearly stated that the disputed property was held in common by
the Heirs; and that the action was brought to recover possession of the lots from respondents for the
benefit of all the heirs of Albina. Hence, Exequiel, a co-owner, may bring the action for unlawful
detainer even without the special power of attorney of his co-heirs, for complete relief can be accorded
in the suit even without their participation because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all the co-owners.
CA reversed; MTC/ RTC reinstated. (Judgment in favor of the Heirs)
1 Figuracion v Gerilla, February 13, 2013
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children: petitioner
and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-
Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six
children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 of the Cadastral Survey
of Urdaneta consisting of 7,547 square meters with TCT No. 4221-P in the name of "Leandro
Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento" and (2) Lot 705 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an
area of 2,900 sq. m. with TCT No. 4220-P also in the name of "Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina
Adviento." Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents,5 as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 16731 and 16610, respectively, issued by the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Pangasinan.
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT No. 4221-P was
cancelled and TCT No. 101331 was issued to "Lazaro Adviento, married to Rosenda Sagueped" as
owner of the 162 sq. m. and "Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento" as owner of 7,385 sq.
m. This lot continued to be in the name of Leandro in Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her
sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an
area of 3,164 sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867 issued on February 9, 1916.

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When Adviento died, his two daughters, Agripina Adviento (his daughter by his first wife) and
respondent Carolina (his daughter by his second wife), succeeded him to it. On November 28, 1961,
Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707.
Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and without any issue. Before her half-sister’s death, however,
respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter two immediately had
OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A new title, TCT No. 42244, was then issued in the
names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years.
Returning in 1981,6 she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707.
She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon.
It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all
properties held in common by her and respondents. On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint in
the RTC of Urdaneta City, Branch 49, for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of
title and damages against respondents, praying, among others, for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and
705; (2) the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot
707, the deed of absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a
declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707 and (4) damages. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-5826.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandro’s estate should first undergo settlement
proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of
expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.
RTC: nullified Carolina’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707; declared
Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate;
dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that it could not grant
the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of
title of the properties should first be effected
CA: dismissed petitioner’s action for partition for being premature; reversed the decision with respect
to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale.
Upholding the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolina’s one-
half pro-indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707.
ISSUE: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate (that is, an
accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus
compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed

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RULING:
There appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot 705. The records refer to a case
entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejo currently pending in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or
information regarding what exactly this case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say
that partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute.10
Petitioner faces a different problem with respect to Lot 2299. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment
of death of the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner
has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she compel partition at this stage?
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section
211 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.12
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate.
While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property’s income
(rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition,13 there is no provision for the accounting of
expenses for which property belonging to the decedent’s estate may be answerable, such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and
respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that
"certain expenses" including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly
settled.14 Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for
which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the
properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file
a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate’s obligations
D. Possession

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Possession in the concept of a holder, NCC 525, 554, 561, 552, 1128, 526
Article 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the concept of owner, or
in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person.
Article 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at some previous time, is presumed to have held
possession also during the intermediate period, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Article 561. One who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all purposes which
may redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it without interruption.
Article 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing possessed, except
in cases in which it is proved that he has acted with fraudulent intent or negligence, after the judicial summons.
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused by a fortuitous event.
Article 1128. The conditions of good faith required for possession in articles 526, 527, 528, and 529 of this Code
are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith in the prescription of ownership and other real rights.
Article 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
2 Aranda v Republic, GR 172331, August 24, 2011
Petition for original registration before the RTC a land situated in Batangas (9,103 square m) filed by
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI) represented by its Chairman, Razon, Jr. The Republic through
OSG filed its opposition - land is part of the public domain and the applicant has not acquired a
registrable title.
ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application: (1) not accompanied by a certification of non-
forum shopping; (2) statement of technical description was based merely on the boundaries set forth in
the tax declaration; and (3) due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant corporation
cannot push through and consequently the tax declaration is still in the name of vendor Ramon
Aranda and the land cannot be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.6
The trial court admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title, this time filed in the name
of Ramon Aranda petitioner.
In support of the application: Petitioner’s sister testified that in 1965 her father Anatalio Aranda
donated the subject land to his brother (petitioner). She recalled there was such a document but it was
eaten by rats; Luis Olan, testified that his father originally owned the land then sold it in 1946 to
Anatalio Aranda. The children of Anatalio then took over in tilling the land, planting it with rice and
corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not have any copy of the document of sale because his
mother gave it to Anatalio.11
TC: granted; CA: reversed
SC: denied
P.D. 1529 provides for original registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under
Section 14(1)14 thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the following requisites: (a)
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
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exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.15
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.16 The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable.17
In this case, petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of classification20 in the
government certifications they presented. Consequently, the status of the land applied for as alienable
and disposable was not clearly established.
The petitioner’s evidence failed to show that he possessed the property in the manner and for the
duration required by law.
Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale from the original
owner (Lucio Olan) to Anatalio Aranda and the 1965 donation made by the latter in favor of petitioner.
But the history of the land shows that it was declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in
1981. On the other hand, the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar stated that
petitioner, who supposedly received the property from his father in 1965, had been paying the
corresponding taxes for said land "for more than 5 consecutive years including the current year [1999],"
or beginning 1994 only or just 3 years before the filing of the application for original registration.
While, as a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession –
they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 21
Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest. His witness
Luis Olan testified that he had been visiting the land along with his father Lucio since he was 6 years
old (he was 70 years old at the time he testified), or as early as 1936. Yet, there was no evidence that
Lucio Olan declared the property for tax purposes at anytime before he sold it to Anatalio Aranda.
There is also no showing that Anatalio Aranda declared the property in his name from the time he
bought it from Lucio Olan. And even assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and corn on the land,
such statement is not sufficient to establish possession in the concept of owner as contemplated by law.
Mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would
give rise to ownership.22 Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant.
A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and
his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove
his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. 23
Furthermore, the court has the bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the
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petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as
possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to register. 24
Concept of Owner, NCC 540

Article 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring
dominion.
3 Decaleng v Bishop, G.R. No. 171209, June 27, 2012
4 Abobon v Abobon, GR 155830, August 12, 2012
Presumption of just title, NCC 541

Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a
just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.
5 Casimiro Development v Mateo, GR 175485, July 27, 2011
In 1988, petitioner purchased from China Bank the land in question which was previously sold by the
mother of Mateo to Rodolfo Pe who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China
Bank as security for a loan. China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and consolidated its ownership of the
property after Rodolfo failed to redeem. A TCT was issued in the name of China Bank. In 1991, CDC
brought an action for unlawful detatiner against the respondent’s siblings. Respondent counters that
CDC acquired the property from China Bank in bad faith because it had actual knowledge of the
possession of the property by the respondent and his siblings.
ISSUE: WON CDC was an innocent purchaser for value.
HELD: One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. China Bank’s TCT’s was a clean title, that is, it was
free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely
upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank. The respondent’s siblings’ possession
did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership. They even characterized their possession only as
that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on tenancy a status that
might create a defect or inflict a law in the title of the owner. CDC having paid the full and fair price of
the land, was an innocent purchaser for value. The TCT in the name of CDC was declared valid and
subsisting.
Good Faith, NCC 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 1132, 1134, 552
Article 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted.
Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time they are gathered or severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the possessor in good faith in that proportion. (451)

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Article 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor shall
have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time
of the possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two possessors.
The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the possessor in good faith the right to finish the cultivation
and gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the expenses of cultivation and the net
proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason whatever should refuse to accept this concession, shall lose
the right to be indemnified in any other manner. (452a)
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
Article 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the principal thing, the possessor in
good faith may remove them, unless the person who recovers the possession exercises the option under paragraph 2
of the preceding article. (n)
ARTICLE 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but
he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and
if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Article 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need
of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he has been illegally deprived, as
well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or market, or from a merchant's store the provisions
of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed. (1955a)
Article 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years.
6 Cabigas v Limbaco, GR 175291, July 27, 2011
Topic: Good Faith
Facts: On February 4, 2003, the petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles of various
parcels of land registered with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, The complaint alleged that
petitioner Lolita Cabigas and her late husband, Nicolas Cabigas, purchased two lots (Lot No.
742[4] and Lot No. 953[5]) from Salvador Cobarde on January 15, 1980. Cobarde in turn had purchased
these lots from Ines Ouano[6] on February 5, 1948.
Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and Cobarde, and because the two lots remained registered
in her name,[7] Ouano was able to sell these same lots to the National Airports Corporation on
November 25, 1952 for its airport expansion project. The National Airports Corporation promptly had
the titles of these properties registered in its name.
When the airport expansion project fell through, respondents Melba Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and
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Linda Logarta, the legal heirs of Ouano, succeeded in reclaiming title to the two lots through an action
for reconveyance filed with the lower court;[8] the titles over these lots were thereafter registered in
their names.[9]
On August 23, 2005, the RTC issued a resolution,[11] granting the motion for summary judgment filed
by AWG, Petrosa and UCB, and dismissing the petitioners’ complaint. According to the RTC, while the
petitioners alleged bad faith and malice on the part of Ouano when she sold the same properties to the
National Airports Corporation, they never alleged bad faith on the part of the buyer, the National
Airports Corporation. Since good faith is always presumed, the RTC concluded that the National
Airports Corporation was a buyer in good faith and its registration of the properties in its name
effectively transferred ownership over the two lots, free from all the unrecorded prior transactions
involving these properties, including the prior sale of the lots to Cobarde.
the CA remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the Motion to Set Case for Hearing on
Special and Affirmative Defenses filed by respondents. its October 4, 2006 resolution, the CA resolved
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondents Henry See, Freddie Go, and Benedict Que. The CA observed that it did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since it raised a pure question of law. Since it dismissed the appeal
based on a technicality, it did not have the jurisdiction to order that the case be remanded to the RTC.
Issue: a) Whether or not the National Airports Corporation acted with good faith when it purchased
the properties from Ouano;
b) Whether the heirs of Ouano acted with good faith in recovering the properties from the National
Airports Corporation; and
c) Whether the subsequent buyers of the properties acted with good faith in purchasing the
properties from the heirs of Ouano.
Held: . Cabigas spouses are not buyers in good faith

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time
of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person.[21] It is a well-settled rule that
a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His
mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor’s title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the
defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.[22]
We are dealing with registered land, a fact known to the Cabigas spouses since they received the
duplicate owner’s certificate of title from Cobarde when they purchased the land. At the time of the
sale to the Cabigas spouses, however, the land was registered not in Cobarde’s name, but in Ouano’s
name. By itself, this fact should have put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted them to check
with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent certificates of title to discover if there were any liens,
encumbrances, or other attachments covering the lots in question. As the Court pronounced in Abad v.
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Sps. Guimba:[23]
[The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself.
Corollarily, it] requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the
registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys from
the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who
is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual
circumstances necessary for [one] to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in
[the] capacity to transfer the land. (emphasis supplied)
Instead, the Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobarde’s representation that he owned the
properties in question, and did not even bother to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by
checking the properties’ titles with the Registry of Deeds. Had the Cabigas spouses only done so, they
would easily have learned that Cobarde had no legal right to the properties they were acquiring since
the lots had already been registered in the name of the National Airports Corporation in 1952. Their
failure to exercise the plain common sense expected of real estate buyers bound them to the
consequences of their own inaction.
ii. No allegation that the National Airports Corporation registered the lots in bad faith
All the parties to this case trace their ownership to either of the two persons that Ouano sold the
properties to – either to Cobarde, who allegedly purchased the land in 1948, or to the National Airports
Corporation, which bought the land in 1952. Undoubtedly, the National Airports Corporation was the
only party that registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds. For this registration to be binding, we
now have to determine whether the National Airports Corporation acted with good faith when it
registered the properties, in accordance with Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine ownership of an immovable
property is the good or bad faith not of the seller, but of the buyer; specifically, we are tasked to
determine who first registered the sale with the Registry of Property (Registry of Deeds) in good faith.
As accurately observed by the RTC, the petitioners, in their submissions to the lower court, never
imputed bad faith on the part of the National Airports Corporation in registering the lots in its name.
This oversight proves fatal to their cause, as we explained in Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate
Development Corporation:
In a case for annulment of title, therefore, the complaint must allege that the purchaser was aware of
the defect in the title so that the cause of action against him will be sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the
case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the court cannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser
who is presumed to be in good faith in acquiring the said property. Failure to prove, much less impute,
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bad faith on said purchaser who has acquired a title in his favor would make it impossible for the court
to render a valid judgment thereon due to the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his title.[24]
Since the petitioners never alleged that the National Airports Corporation acted with bad faith when it
registered the lots in its name, the presumption of good faith prevails. Consequently, the National
Airports Corporation, being a registrant in good faith, is recognized as the rightful owner of the lots in
question, and the registration of the properties in its name cut off any and all prior liens, interests and
encumbrances, including the alleged prior sale to Cobarde, that were not recorded on the titles.
Cobarde, thus, had no legal rights over the property that he could have transferred to the Cabigas
spouses.
Bad faith, NCC549, 1132, 1137, 552

Article 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor
could have received, and shall have a right only to the expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of article 546 and in
article 443. The expenses incurred in improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in bad faith, but he may remove the objects for which such expenses have been incurred, provided that
the thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the
value they may have at the time he enters into possession.
of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.
Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Applicable presumptions, NCC 541, 527, 559, 1505, 1132, 1518, 528, 529, 554, 561, 542, 426
Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a
just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.
Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof.
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of
the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at
a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Article 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof,
and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to

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the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's
authority to sell.
Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:
(1) The provisions of any factors' act, recording laws, or any other provision of law enabling the apparent owner of
goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof;
(2) The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of competent
jurisdiction;
(3) Purchases made in a merchant's store, or in fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of Commerce and
special laws.
of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.
Article 1518. The validity of the negotiation of a negotiable document of title is not impaired by the fact that the
negotiation was a breach of duty on the part of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact that the owner of
the document was deprived of the possession of the same by loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistake, duress, or
conversion, if the person to whom the document was negotiated or a person to whom the document was
subsequently negotiated paid value therefor in good faith without notice of the breach of duty, or loss, theft, fraud,
accident, mistake, duress or conversion.
Article 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment
facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Article 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired,
until the contrary is proved.
Article 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at some previous time, is presumed to have held
possession also during the intermediate period, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Article 561. One who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all purposes which
may redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it without interruption.
Article 542. The possession of real property presumes that of the movables therein, so long as it is not shown or
proved that they should be excluded.
Article 426. Whenever by provision of the law, or an individual declaration, the expression "immovable things or
property," or "movable things or property," is used, it shall be deemed to include, respectively, the things
enumerated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Whenever the word "muebles," or "furniture," is used alone, it shall not be deemed to include money, credits,
commercial securities, stocks and bonds, jewelry, scientific or artistic collections, books, medals, arms, clothing,
horses or carriages and their accessories, grains, liquids and merchandise, or other things which do not have as
their principal object the furnishing or ornamenting of a building, except where from the context of the law, or the
individual declaration, the contrary clearly appears.
7 Luga v Arciaga, GR 175343, July 27, 2011
Facts:

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The case involves a 911 sq. m. parcel of land in Davao City. The property was initially owned by Y.
Furukawa Daliao Plantation before being turned over to the Philippine government, pursuant to
which the land came under the administration of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation
(NAFCO), and later by the Board of Liquidators (BOL).
In 1957, Loreto Luga (Luga), a former tenant of NAFCO and after that of BOL, occupied the parcel of
land and built a house of light materials thereon. However, in 1960, a certain Honorio Romero
(Romero), an employee of NAFCO, executed an Occupant’s Affidavit over a 2.5 hectare property in the
same area, including the lot Luga was occupying. Romero later sold the land to Elena Arciaga
(Arciaga), who, in 1988, upon a favorable indorsement by the BOL to the Registry of Deeds, was able to
register a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) over the property in her name.
Upon learning about Arciaga’s title, Luga filed a complaint for reconveyance of title. Arciaga
countered this by saying that Luga’s occupation of the property was only through the mere tolerance
of their predecessor-in-interest. The RTC ruled in favor or Luga, reasoning that Arciaga obtained title
through fraud and falsification of document with the BOL.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, holding that Luga did not occupy the land in the concept of
an owner but was merely allowed to stay there by Romero.
Issue: Whether or not Luga occupied the land in the concept of an owner. Held: No, he did not occupy the
property in the concept of an owner.
Ratio: The disposition of the land in litigation is governed by Republic Act No. 477, as amended, which
provides that ‚such lands of the public domain, except commercial and industrial lots, shall be sold by
the BOL to persons who are qualified to acquire public lands, giving preference first to bona fide
occupants thereof on or before 12 December 1946 but not later than 31 October 1960 and who shall be
limited to the area they have actually and continuously improved and maintained.‛
Luga failed to prove that he was a bona fide occupant of the land in litigation. Despite his testimony
and that elicited from his witnesses to the effect that he occupied the subject parcel in 1957, Luga’s
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by the NAFCO and BOL simply showed that he
was a tenant on the plantation from 1955 to 1957, remitting a portion of the produce harvested
therefrom to said government agencies. On cross-examination, Loreto also admitted that he did not file
any application for the land and/or declare the same for taxation purposes because he knew that he
was not the owner thereof.
Since possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another and it is not necessary for the owner or
holder of the thing to personally exercise his possessory rights, Loreto’s tolerated occupancy of the land cannot be
said to have ousted the possession claimed by Arciaga.
3. Acquisition and loss of possession, NCC 531, 532, 555, 1125, 1189, 1120-1124

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Article 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact
that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right.
Article 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal representative, by his
agent, or by any person without any power whatever: but in the last case, the possession shall not be considered as
acquired until the person in whose name the act of possession was executed has ratified the same, without
prejudice to the juridical consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case.
Article 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer
than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
Article 1125. Any express or tacit recognition which the possessor may make of the owner's right also interrupts
possession.
Article 1189. When the conditions have been imposed with the intention of suspending the efficacy of an obligation
to give, the following rules shall be observed in case of the improvement, loss or deterioration of the thing during
the pendency of the condition:
(1) If the thing is lost without the fault of the debtor, the obligation shall be extinguished;
(2) If the thing is lost through the fault of the debtor, he shall be obliged to pay damages; it is understood that the
thing is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or disappears in such a way that its existence is unknown
or it cannot be recovered;
(3) When the thing deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the impairment is to be borne by the creditor;
(4) If it deteriorates through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may choose between the rescission of the obligation
and its fulfillment, with indemnity for damages in either case;
(5) If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor;
(6) If it is improved at the expense of the debtor, he shall have no other right than that granted to the
usufructuary.
Article 1120. Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly. (1943)
Article 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause it should cease for more than one year.
The old possession is not revived if a new possession should be exercised by the same adverse claimant.
Article 1122. If the natural interruption is for only one year or less, the time elapsed shall be counted in favor of
the prescription.
Article 1123. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor.
Article 1124. Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption:
(1) If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;
(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse;
(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
In all these cases, the period of the interruption shall be counted for the prescription.
1 Republic v Aldana, 175578, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
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Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of land, professing themselves to
be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by succession from their predecessors. That until the
time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful,
adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and that they
had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation. In support of
their application, respondents submitted to the court the pertinent tax declarations, together with the
receipts of payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application for the reason that the tax declaration
submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition in
good faith or of prior possession in the concept of an owner.
ISSUE:
WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously, exclusively and
notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership.
HELD:
Respondents’ possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937 when the
property had already been declared for taxation by respondent’s father. Respondents could have
produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, the relevant portions of the tax
records on file with the Provincial Assessor had been burned when its office was razed by fire in
1997. With the tax assessments therecame next tax payments. Respondents’ receipts for tax
expenditures were likewise in therecords and in these documents the predecessors of respondents
were the named owners of the property. Tax declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive
evidence ofownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of an
owner. No one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at
least constructive possession. Indeed, respondents herein have been in possession of the land
in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from
the government or from any private individual. Itself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled
and hence, deserving of protection under the law.
E. Usufruct
Objects of Usufruct
Elements in a Usufruct
Classes of Usufruct - NCC 563, FC 226, NCC 564, 756, 863, 869, 564, 574, 573, 564, 598-599, 758-759
Article 563. Usufruct is constituted by law, by the will of private persons expressed in acts inter vivos or in a last
will and testament, and by prescription.

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FC 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and
education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
Article 564. Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing, in favor of one more
persons, simultaneously or successively, and in every case from or to a certain day, purely or conditionally. It may
also be constituted on a right, provided it is not strictly personal or intransmissible.
Article 756. The ownership of property may also be donated to one person and the usufruct to another or others,
provided all the donees are living at the time of the donation.
Article 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted
with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid
and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted,
and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the
testator.
Article 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves to a person the whole or part of the inheritance, and to another
the usufruct, shall be valid. If he gives the usufruct to various persons, not simultaneously, but successively, the
provisions of article 863 shall apply.
Article 564. Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing, in favor of one more
persons, simultaneously or successively, and in every case from or to a certain day, purely or conditionally. It may
also be constituted on a right, provided it is not strictly personal or intransmissible.
Article 574. Whenever the usufruct includes things which cannot be used without being consumed, the
usufructuary shall have the right to make use of them under the obligation of paying their appraised value at the
termination of the usufruct, if they were appraised when delivered. In case they were not appraised, he shall have
the right to return the same quantity and quality, or pay their current price at the time the usufruct ceases.
Article 573. Whenever the usufruct includes things which, without being consumed, gradually deteriorate
through wear and tear, the usufructuary shall have the right to make use thereof in accordance with the purpose
for which they are intended, and shall not be obliged to return them at the termination of the usufruct except in
their condition at that time; but he shall be obliged to indemnify the owner for any deterioration they may have
suffered by reason of his fraud or negligence.
Article 598. If the usufruct be constituted on the whole of a patrimony, and if at the time of its constitution the
owner has debts, the provisions of articles 758 and 759 relating to donations shall be applied, both with respect to
the maintenance of the usufruct and to the obligation of the usufructuary to pay such debts.
The same rule shall be applied in case the owner is obliged, at the time the usufruct is constituted, to make
periodical payments, even if there should be no known capital.
Article 599. The usufructuary may claim any matured credits which form a part of the usufruct if he has given or
gives the proper security. If he has been excused from giving security or has not been able to give it, or if that given
is not sufficient, he shall need the authorization of the owner, or of the court in default thereof, to collect such
credits.
The usufructuary who has given security may use the capital he has collected in any manner he may deem proper.
The usufructuary who has not given security shall invest the said capital at interest upon agreement with the

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owner; in default of such agreement, with judicial authorization; and, in every case, with security sufficient to
preserve the integrity of the capital in usufruct.
Article 758. When the donation imposes upon the donee the obligation to pay the debts of the donor, if the clause
does not contain any declaration to the contrary, the former is understood to be liable to pay only the debts which
appear to have been previously contracted. In no case shall the donee be responsible for the debts exceeding the
value of the property donated, unless a contrary intention clearly appears. (642a)
Article 759. There being no stipulation regarding the payment of debts, the donee shall be responsible therefor only
when the donation has been made in fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors, when at the time thereof the donor did not reserve
sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the donation.
Rights of Usufructuary – NCC 566-569, 438, 570, 571-572, 590, 578-579, 594, 580
Article 566. The usufructuary shall be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property in
usufruct. With respect to hidden treasure which may be found on the land or tenement, he shall be considered a
stranger.
Article 567. Natural or industrial fruits growing at the time the usufruct begins, belong to the usufructuary.
Those growing at the time the usufruct terminates, belong to the owner.
In the preceding cases, the usufructuary, at the beginning of the usufruct, has no obligation to refund to the owner
any expenses incurred; but the owner shall be obliged to reimburse at the termination of the usufruct, from the
proceeds of the growing fruits, the ordinary expenses of cultivation, for seed, and other similar expenses incurred
by the usufructuary.
The provisions of this article shall not prejudice the rights of third persons, acquired either at the beginning or at
the termination of the usufruct.
Article 568. If the usufructuary has leased the lands or tenements given in usufruct, and the usufruct should
expire before the termination of the lease, he or his heirs and successors shall receive only the proportionate share of
the rent that must be paid by the lessee.
Article 569. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily, and belong to the usufructuary in proportion to the time the
usufruct may last.
Article 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and
by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any
share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State may acquire them at their just price, which shall be
divided in conformity with the rule stated.
Article 570. Whenever a usufruct is constituted on the right to receive a rent or periodical pension, whether in
money or in fruits, or in the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each payment due shall be considered
as the proceeds or fruits of such right.
Whenever it consists in the enjoyment of benefits accruing from a participation in any industrial or commercial
enterprise, the date of the distribution of which is not fixed, such benefits shall have the same character.
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in the manner prescribed in the preceding
article.

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Article 571. The usufructuary shall have the right to enjoy any increase which the thing in usufruct may acquire
through accession, the servitudes established in its favor, and, in general, all the benefits inherent therein.
Article 572. The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right
of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title; but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate
upon the expiration of the usufruct, saving leases of rural lands, which shall be considered as subsisting during the
agricultural year.
Article 590. A usufructuary who alienates or leases his right of usufruct shall answer for any damage which the
things in usufruct may suffer through the fault or negligence of the person who substitutes him.
ARTICLE 578. The usufructuary of an action to recover real property or a real right, or any movable property, has
the right to bring the action and to oblige the owner thereof to give him the authority for this purpose and to
furnish him whatever proof he may have. If in consequence of the enforcement of the action he acquires the thing
claimed, the usufruct shall be limited to the fruits, the dominion remaining with the owner.
Article 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses
for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no
right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so
without damage to the property.
Article 594. If the owner should make the extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to demand of the
usufructuary the legal interest on the amount expended for the time that the usufruct lasts.
Should he not make them when they are indispensable for the preservation of the thing, the usufructuary may
make them; but he shall have a right to demand of the owner, at the termination of the usufruct, the increase in
value which the immovable may have acquired by reason of the repairs.
Article 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any
damage to the same.
As to the Legal Right of Usufruct Itself – NCC 580, 572

Article 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any
damage to the same.
Article 572. The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right
of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title; but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate
upon the expiration of the usufruct, saving leases of rural lands, which shall be considered as subsisting during the
agricultural year.
Obligations of the Usufructuary – NCC 583, 586, 599, 585, 584, 587, FC 226, NCC 584
Article 583. The usufructuary, before entering upon the enjoyment of the property, is obliged:
(1) To make, after notice to the owner or his legitimate representative, an inventory of all the property, which shall
contain an appraisal of the movables and a description of the condition of the immovables;
(2) To give security, binding himself to fulfill the obligations imposed upon him in accordance with this Chapter.
Article 586. Should the usufructuary fail to give security in the cases in which he is bound to give it, the owner
may demand that the immovables be placed under administration, that the movables be sold, that the public bonds,
instruments of credit payable to order or to bearer be converted into registered certificates or deposited in a bank or
public institution, and that the capital or sums in cash and the proceeds of the sale of the movable property be
invested in safe securities.
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The interest on the proceeds of the sale of the movables and that on public securities and bonds, and the proceeds of
the property placed under administration, shall belong to the usufructuary.
Furthermore, the owner may, if he so prefers, until the usufructuary gives security or is excused from so doing,
retain in his possession the property in usufruct as administrator, subject to the obligation to deliver to the
usufructuary the net proceeds thereof, after deducting the sums which may be agreed upon or judicially allowed
him for such administration.
Article 599. The usufructuary may claim any matured credits which form a part of the usufruct if he has given or
gives the proper security. If he has been excused from giving security or has not been able to give it, or if that given
is not sufficient, he shall need the authorization of the owner, or of the court in default thereof, to collect such
credits.
The usufructuary who has given security may use the capital he has collected in any manner he may deem proper.
The usufructuary who has not given security shall invest the said capital at interest upon agreement with the
owner; in default of such agreement, with judicial authorization; and, in every case, with security sufficient to
preserve the integrity of the capital in usufruct.
Article 585. The usufructuary, whatever may be the title of the usufruct, may be excused from the obligation of
making an inventory or of giving security, when no one will be injured thereby.
Article 584. The provisions of No. 2 of the preceding article shall not apply to the donor who has reserved the
usufruct of the property donated, or to the parents who are usufructuaries of their children's property, except
when the parents contract a second marriage.
Article 587. If the usufructuary who has not given security claims, by virtue of a promise under oath, the delivery
of the furniture necessary for his use, and that he and his family be allowed to live in a house included in the
usufruct, the court may grant this petition, after due consideration of the facts of the case.
The same rule shall be observed with respect to implements, tools and other movable property necessary for an
industry or vocation in which he is engaged.
If the owner does not wish that certain articles be sold because of their artistic worth or because they have a
sentimental value, he may demand their delivery to him upon his giving security for the payment of the legal
interest on their appraised value.
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and
education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
During the Usufruct – NCC 589, 610, 590, 591, 592, 593,594, 595, 596-597, 610, 602
Article 589. The usufructuary shall take care of the things given in usufruct as a good father of a family.
Article 610. A usufruct is not extinguished by bad use of the thing in usufruct; but if the abuse should cause
considerable injury to the owner, the latter may demand that the thing be delivered to him, binding himself to pay
annually to the usufructuary the net proceeds of the same, after deducting the expenses and the compensation
which may be allowed him for its administration.
Article 590. A usufructuary who alienates or leases his right of usufruct shall answer for any damage which the
things in usufruct may suffer through the fault or negligence of the person who substitutes him.

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Article 591. If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or herd of livestock, the usufructuary shall be obliged to
replace with the young thereof the animals that die each year from natural causes, or are lost due to the rapacity of
beasts of prey.
If the animals on which the usufruct is constituted should all perish, without the fault of the usufructuary, on
account of some contagious disease or any other uncommon event, the usufructuary shall fulfill his obligation by
delivering to the owner the remains which may have been saved from the misfortune.
Should the herd or flock perish in part, also by accident and without the fault of the usufructuary, the usufruct
shall continue on the part saved.
Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be considered, with respect to its effects, as though constituted
on fungible things.
Article 592. The usufructuary is obliged to make the ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in usufruct.
By ordinary repairs are understood such as are required by the wear and tear due to the natural use of the thing
and are indispensable for its preservation. Should the usufructuary fail to make them after demand by the owner,
the latter may make them at the expense of the usufructuary.
Article 593. Extraordinary repairs shall be at the expense of the owner. The usufructuary is obliged to notify the
owner when the need for such repairs is urgent.
Article 594. If the owner should make the extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to demand of the
usufructuary the legal interest on the amount expended for the time that the usufruct lasts.
Should he not make them when they are indispensable for the preservation of the thing, the usufructuary may
make them; but he shall have a right to demand of the owner, at the termination of the usufruct, the increase in
value which the immovable may have acquired by reason of the repairs.
Article 595. The owner may construct any works and make any improvements of which the immovable in usufruct
is susceptible, or make new plantings thereon if it be rural, provided that such acts do not cause a diminution in
the value of the usufruct or prejudice the right of the usufructuary.
Article 596. The payment of annual charges and taxes and of those considered as a lien on the fruits, shall be at the
expense of the usufructuary for all the time that the usufruct lasts.
Article 597. The taxes which, during the usufruct, may be imposed directly on the capital, shall be at the expense
of the owner.
If the latter has paid them, the usufructuary shall pay him the proper interest on the sums which may have been
paid in that character; and, if the said sums have been advanced by the usufructuary, he shall recover the amount
thereof at the termination of the usufruct.
Article 602. The expenses, costs and liabilities in suits brought with regard to the usufruct shall be borne by the
usufructuary.
At the Time of the Termination of the Usufruct – NCC 612

Article 612. Upon the termination of the usufruct, the thing in usufruct shall be delivered to the owner, without
prejudice to the right of retention pertaining to the usufructuary or his heirs for taxes and extraordinary expenses
which should be reimbursed. After the delivery has been made, the security or mortgage shall be cancelled.
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Special Cases of Usufruct – NCC 570, 582, 591, 575-576, 578, 600, 598, 573, 574
Article 570. Whenever a usufruct is constituted on the right to receive a rent or periodical pension, whether in
money or in fruits, or in the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each payment due shall be considered
as the proceeds or fruits of such right.
Whenever it consists in the enjoyment of benefits accruing from a participation in any industrial or commercial
enterprise, the date of the distribution of which is not fixed, such benefits shall have the same character.
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in the manner prescribed in the preceding
article.
Article 582. The usufructuary of a part of a thing held in common shall exercise all the rights pertaining to the
owner thereof with respect to the administration and the collection of fruits or interest. Should the co-ownership
cease by reason of the division of the thing held in common, the usufruct of the part allotted to the co-owner shall
belong to the usufructuary.
Article 591. If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or herd of livestock, the usufructuary shall be obliged to
replace with the young thereof the animals that die each year from natural causes, or are lost due to the rapacity of
beasts of prey.
If the animals on which the usufruct is constituted should all perish, without the fault of the usufructuary, on
account of some contagious disease or any other uncommon event, the usufructuary shall fulfill his obligation by
delivering to the owner the remains which may have been saved from the misfortune.
Should the herd or flock perish in part, also by accident and without the fault of the usufructuary, the usufruct
shall continue on the part saved.
Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be considered, with respect to its effects, as though constituted
on fungible things.
Article 575. The usufructuary of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs may make use of the dead trunks, and even of
those cut off or uprooted by accident, under the obligation to replace them with new plants.
Article 576. If in consequence of a calamity or extraordinary event, the trees or shrubs shall have disappeared in
such considerable number that it would not be possible or it would be too burdensome to replace them, the
usufructuary may leave the dead, fallen or uprooted trunks at the disposal of the owner, and demand that the latter
remove them and clear the land.
ARTICLE 578. The usufructuary of an action to recover real property or a real right, or any movable property, has
the right to bring the action and to oblige the owner thereof to give him the authority for this purpose and to
furnish him whatever proof he may have. If in consequence of the enforcement of the action he acquires the thing
claimed, the usufruct shall be limited to the fruits, the dominion remaining with the owner.
Article 600. The usufructuary of a mortgaged immovable shall not be obliged to pay the debt for the security of
which the mortgage was constituted.
Should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the
usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.
Article 598. If the usufruct be constituted on the whole of a patrimony, and if at the time of its constitution the
owner has debts, the provisions of articles 758 and 759 relating to donations shall be applied, both with respect to
the maintenance of the usufruct and to the obligation of the usufructuary to pay such debts.
The same rule shall be applied in case the owner is obliged, at the time the usufruct is constituted, to make
periodical payments, even if there should be no known capital.
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Article 573. Whenever the usufruct includes things which, without being consumed, gradually deteriorate
through wear and tear, the usufructuary shall have the right to make use thereof in accordance with the purpose
for which they are intended, and shall not be obliged to return them at the termination of the usufruct except in
their condition at that time; but he shall be obliged to indemnify the owner for any deterioration they may have
suffered by reason of his fraud or negligence.
2 Fabie v David, 75 Phil. 536
The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at Binondo (Juan
Grey-owner), and Ongpin, under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey
In June 1945 Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer against the herein respondent Ngo Boo
Soo. Fabie very badly needs the said house to live in, as her house was burned by the Japanese; that
defendant was duly notified to leave the said premises, but he refused"; and she prayed for judgment
of eviction and for unpaid rentals.
The defendant answered alleging that he was and since 1908 had been a tenant of the premises in
question, which he was using and had always used principally as a store and secondarily for living
quarters; that he was renting it from its owner and administrator Juan Grey; "that plaintiff is merely
the usufructuary of the income therefrom, and by agreement between her and said owner, which is
embodied in a final judgment of the CF Manila, her only right as usufructuary of the income is to
receive the whole of such income; that she has no right or authority to eject tenants, such right being in
the owner and administrator of the house, Juan Grey.
Juan Grey intervened in the unlawful detainer suit, alleging in his complaint in intervention that he is
the sole and absolute owner of the premises in question; that the plaintiff Josefa Fabie is the
usufructuary of the income of said premises.
Municipal court: ordering the defendant Ngo Soo to vacate the premises; complaint in intervention
was dismissed.
CFI Manila: dimiissed-issues were beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
Issue: Who has the right to manage or administer the property — to select the tenant and to fix the
amount of the rent? (usufructuary)
Held:
There is no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of the parties in the property in question.
The naked title to the property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the right to all the
rents thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes and insurance premiums and make the necessary
repairs, is, also admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa Fabie, during her lifetime.
The action is purely possessory.
For the disposal of the case on the merits, we deem it necessary and proper to construe the judgment
entered by the CFI Manila: an agreement - usufructuary shall collect all the rents of the property in
question; shall, at her own cost and expense, pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and
insurance premiums, including the documentary stamps, and make all the necessary repairs on the
property; and in case of default on her part the owner shall the right to do any or all of those things, in
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which event he shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents until the amounts paid by him are fully
satisfied, after which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. It was further stipulated by the
parties and decreed by the court that "the foregoing shall be in effect during the term of the usufruct
and shall be binding on the successors and assigns of each of the parties."
Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y
Grey, we find that the said usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. All the
acts of administration — to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all
necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums thereon —
were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary. The pretension of the respondent Juan Grey that he
is the administrator of the property with the right to choose the tenants and to dictate the conditions of
the lease is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause of the will, the stipulation of the
parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot manage or administer the property after all the acts
of management and administration have been vested by the court, with his consent, in the
usufructuary. He admitted that before said judgment he had been collecting the rents as agent of the
usufructuary under an agreement with the latter. What legal justification or valid excuse could he have
to claim the right to choose the tenant and fix the amount of the rent when under the will, the
stipulation of the parties, and the final judgment of the court it is not he but the usufructuary who is
entitled to said rents? As long as the property is properly conserved and insured he can have no cause
for complaint, and his right in that regard is fully protected by the terms of the stipulation and the
judgment of the court above mentioned. To permit him to arrogate to himself the privilege to choose
the tenant, to dictate the conditions of the lease, and to sue when the lessee fails to comply therewith,
would be to place the usufructuary entirely at his mercy. It would place her in the absurd situation of
having a certain indisputable right without the power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it.
3 Baluran v Navarro, 79 SCRA 309
The manner of terminating the right of usufruct may be stipulated by the parties such as in this case,
the happening of a resolutory condition.
FACTS: Baluran and Paraiso (ancestor of Obedencio) entered into a contract which they called barter,
but in fact stipulated that they would only transfer the material possession of their respective
properties to each other. Thus, Baluran will be allowed to construct a residential house on the land of
Paraiso while Paraiso is entitled to reap the fruits of the riceland of Baluran. The contract prohibited
them from alienating the properties of the other and contained a stipulation that should the heirs of
Paraiso desire to re-possess the residential lot, Baluran is obliged to return the lot. Indeed, years after,
Obedencio (grandchild of Paraiso) acquired the ownership of the residential lot from his mother and
demanded that Baluran, who was in possession, vacate.
Baluran now counters that the barter already transferred ownership.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract was a barter or usufruct
RULING: IT IS USUFRUCT. First, the contract is what the law defines it to be and not what the parties
call it. It is very clear that what the parties exchanged was not ownership, but merely material
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possession or the right to enjoy the thing.
Now, because it is usufruct, the law allows the parties to stipulate the conditions including the manner
of its extinguishment. In this case, it was subject to a resolutory condition which is in case the heir of
Paraiso (a third party) desires to repossess the property. Upon the happening of the condition, the
contract is extinguished.
Therefore, Baluran must return the land to Obedencia. But since Art. 579 allows the usufructuary to
remove improvements he made, Baluran may remove the house he constructed.
One last point. At the time of this case, the Obedencias were also in possession of the riceland of
Baluran. Although it was not proper to decide the issue of possession in this case, the Court
nevertheless decided on the matter and order the Obedencias to vacate the property inasmuch as there
was an extinguishment of a reciprocal obligations and rights.
---
Summary: Two property owners agreed to "barter" their respective properties with each other. The
agreement was covered by a contract with a condition that requires the return of the property if any of
the children of the other party's daughter decided to use it. On inheriting the property from his
mother, the son of the other party's daughter filed for recovery of the "exchanged" property.
Rule of Law: To determine the nature of a contract, the courts are not bound by the name or title given
to it by the contracting parties.
Facts: Spouses Domingo and Fidela Paraiso owned of a residential lot which they bartered with
spouses Avelino and Benilda Baluran (D) for their unirrigated riceland. The agreement was covered by
a document entitled "BARTER" wherein they agreed to "barter and exchange" their properties subject
to a condition that stated that if any of the children of spouses Paraiso's daughter shall choose to reside
in the municipality and build his/her own house in the residential lot, spouses Baluran (D) shall be
obliged to return the lot to such children.
Eleven years thereafter, Antonio Obendencio (P) filed a case to recover the bartered property from
Baluran (D). In his answer, Baluran (D) alleged that the "barter agreement" transferred to him the
ownership of the residential lot in exchange for the unirrigated riceland.
Issues: Was there transfer of ownership of the properties covered in the "barter agreement"?
Ruling: No. It is a settled rule that to determine the nature of a contract courts are not bound by the
name or title given to it by the contracting parties. (Shell Co. of the Philippines vs. Firemen's Insurance
Co., 100 Phil. 757, 1957.) This Court has held that contracts are not what the parties may see fit to call
them but what they really are as determined by the principles of law. (Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals,
47 SCRA 65, 1972.)

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Thus, the use of the term "barter" in describing the agreement is not controlling. The agreement is clear
that there was no intention on the part of the signatories thereto to convey the ownership of their
respective properties; all that was intended, and it was so provided in the agreement, was to transfer
the material possession thereof. It is also clear that the parties retained the right to alienate their
respective properties, which right is an element of ownership.
All that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the
property of another.
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
—Article 562, Civil Code
Under the agreement, spouses Paraiso would harvest the crop of the unirrigated riceland while
Baluran (D) could build a house on the residential lot, subject to the condition that if any of the
children of spouses Paraiso's daughter shall choose to reside in the municipality and build his house
on the residential lot, Baluran (D) shall be obliged to return the lot to said children "with damages to be
incurred." Thus, the mutual agreement of each party enjoying "material possession" of the other's
property was subject to a resolutory condition the happening of which would terminate the right of
possession and use.
A resolutory condition is one which extinguishes rights and obligations already existing. (Tolentino,
Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, pp. 140, 143.) The right of "material
possession" granted in the agreement ends if and when any of the children of spouses Paraiso's
daughter would reside in the municipality and build his house on the property. Inasmuch as the
condition opposed is not dependent solely on the will of one of the parties to the contract, but is
dependent on the will of third persons, the same is valid.
4 Gaboya v Cui, 38 SCRA 85
FACTS:
Don Mariano sold his 2 lots to two of his children. Later on, he and his children became co-owners of
the property. Don Mariano executed a deed authorizing the children to apply for a loan w/ mortgage
with a stipulation reserving his right to the fruits of the land. The children then constructed a building
on the land and collected rent from the lessee thereof. Much later, when Don Mariano died, his estate
was claiming the fruits of the building.
ISSUE: Whether or not Don Mariano had a right to fruits of the building?
RULING: NO. The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the land. He only owned
the rent for the portion of land occupied by the building; thus, the estate could only claim the rent on
that piece of land and not on the entire parcel of land. The children are entitled to the rents of the

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building. (A usufruct on the land may be separate from the building.
There should be no rescission of the contract coz the exact amount of rent due and owing to the Don
Mariano’s estate is still unliquidated and undetermined. The trial court has the discretion to grant the
debtor (children) a period within which to pay the rental income from the portion of land owned by
the building because the same has not yet been determined. Article 1191 of the Civil Code grants the
right to rescind but subject to the period that the court will grant.
Moreover, on the issue of co-ownership, the court held that a co-owner cannot simultaneously be a
usufructuary of the same land owned.
Rights of the Naked Owner – NCC 574, 581

Article 581. The owner of property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, but he cannot alter its
form or substance, or do anything thereon which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary.
Extinguishment of the usufruct, NCC 603, 611, 606, 605, 607, 608, 1381, 709
Article 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition
provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
Article 611. A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be
extinguished until the death of the last survivor.
Article 606. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, shall
subsist for the number of years specified, even if the third person should die before the period expires, unless such
usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of such person.
Article 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more than fifty
years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation
or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof.
Article 607. If the usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter
should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and the
materials.
The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is constituted on a building only and the same should be destroyed.
But in such a case, if the owner should wish to construct another building, he shall have a right to occupy the land

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and to make use of the materials, being obliged to pay to the usufructuary, during the continuance of the usufruct,
the interest upon the sum equivalent to the value of the land and of the materials.
Article 608. If the usufructuary shares with the owner the insurance of the tenement given in usufruct, the former
shall, in case of loss, continue in the enjoyment of the new building, should one be constructed, or shall receive the
interest on the insurance indemnity if the owner does not wish to rebuild.
Should the usufructuary have refused to contribute to the insurance, the owner insuring the tenement alone, the
latter shall receive the full amount of the insurance indemnity in case of loss, saving always the right granted to
the usufructuary in the preceding article.
Article 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than
one-fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without the
knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.
Article 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons.
5 Calingasan v Rivera, GR 171555, April 17, 2013
During their lifetime, respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels
of land in Lipa City, Batangas, two of which were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
22290 and T-30557.6 On July 29, 1982, Loreto died, leaving Wilfredo and their two daughters, Evangeline
and Brigida Liza, as her surviving heirs.7
About eleven (11) years later, or on March 29, 1993, Loreto’s heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of
her one-half share of the conjugal estate, adjudicating all the properties in favor of Evangeline and
Brigida Liza; Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary rights
during his lifetime.8 On September 23, 1993, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, Batangas cancelled TCT
Nos. T-22290 and T-30557 and issued TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495 in the names of Evangeline and
Brigida Liza, with an annotation of Wilfredo’s usufructuary rights.9
Almost a decade later, or on March 13, 2003,10 Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc.,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0019-03.
Wilfredo claimed that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land located along C.M.
Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, covered by TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495, with a building used for
his furniture business. Taking advantage of his absence due to his hospital confinement in September
2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took possession and caused the renovation of the building on
the property. In December 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred
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him from entering the property.11
Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced his
usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights dated March 4, 1996,12 and that
another action between the same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (an action for
the annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo), docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-0773.
The MTCC Ruling – dismissed the complaint
The RTC Ruling – Affirmed MTC; that Wilfredo lacked cause of action to evict petitioners.
In its November 30, 2004 decision,14 the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s findings. I Et held that Wilfredo
lacked a cause of action to evict the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. since Evangeline is the registered
owner of the property and Wilfredo had voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights.
Wilfredo sought reconsideration of the RTC’s decision and, in due course, attained this objective; the
RTC set aside its original decision and entered another, which ordered the eviction of the petitioners
and Star Honda, Inc.
In its April 6, 2005 decision,15 the RTC held that Wilfredo’s renunciation of his usufructuary rights could
not be the basis of the complaint’s dismissal since it is the subject of litigation pending with the RTC of
Lipa City, Branch 13. The RTC found that the MTCC overlooked the evidence proving Wilfredo’s prior
possession and subsequent dispossession of the property, namely: (a) Evangeline’s judicial admission of
"J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence since May 2002; (b) the Lipa City Prosecutor’s
findings, in a criminal case for qualified trespass to dwelling, that the petitioners are not residents of the
property; (c) the affidavit of Ricky Briones, Barangay Captain of Barangay 9, Lipa City where the
property is located, attesting to Wilfredo’s prior possession and the petitioners’ entry to the property
during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement; and (d) the petitioners, with the aid of armed men, destroyed
the padlock of the building on the property. The RTC ordered the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. to
pay P620,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property, andP20,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
The petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. filed separate motions for reconsideration.
In its July 8, 2005 order,16 the RTC modified its April 6, 2005 decision by absolving Star Honda, Inc. from
any liability. It found no evidence that Star Honda, Inc. participated in the dispossession.
The petitioners then filed a Rule 42 petition for review with the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its February 10, 2006 decision,17 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s findings, noting that: (a)
Evangeline’s admission of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence (a place different and
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distinct from the property) rendered improbable her claim of possession and occupation; and (b)
Evangeline’s entry to the property (on the pretext of repairing the building) during Wilfredo’s hospital
confinement had been done without Wilfredo’s prior consent and was done through strategy and
stealth. The CA, however, deleted the award ofP20,000.00 as attorney’s fees since the RTC decision did
not contain any discussion or justification for the award.
The petitioners then filed the present petition.
Wilfredo died on December 27, 2006 and has been substituted by his second wife, Ma. Lydia S. Rivera,
and their children, Freida Leah S. Rivera and Wilfredo S. Rivera, Jr. (respondents).18
The Petition
The petitioners submit that the CA erred in equating possession with residence since possession in
forcible entry cases means physical possession without qualification as to the nature of possession, i.e.,
whether residing or not in a particular place. They contend that the pronouncements of the RTC of Lipa
City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773, in the March 11, 2003 order,19 that they have been "occupying
the premises since 1997"20 and Wilfredo’s own admission that he padlocked the doors of the building
contradict Wilfredo’s claim of prior possession.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents counter that the petitioners mistakenly relied on the statements of the RTC of Lipa
City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 on the petitioners’ occupation since 1997; such statements had
been rendered in an interlocutory order, and should not prevail over Evangeline’s admission in her
answer of "Poblacion, Rosario, Batangas"21 as her residence, compared to Wilfredo’s admission in his
complaint of "C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas" as his residence, the exact address of the
disputed property.22
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior
physical possession of the property.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto.
"Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The
only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
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not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable."23 Thus, "an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property." 24
Indeed, possession in ejectment cases "means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law."25 In a forcible entry case, "prior physical possession is
the primary consideration."26 "A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects him."27 "The party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence, or terror."28
The respondents have proven prior physical possession of the property.
In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and that the
petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth.
The CA did not err in equating residence with physical possession since residence is a manifestation of
possession and occupation. Wilfredo had consistently alleged that he resided on "C.M. Recto Avenue,
Lipa City, Batangas," the location of the property, whereas Evangeline has always admitted that she has
been a resident of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas." The petitioners failed to prove that they have
occupied the property through some other person, even if they have declared their residence in another
area.
We note that in another proceeding, a criminal complaint for qualified trespass to dwelling, the Lipa
City Prosecutor also observed that the petitioners did not reside on or occupy the property on December
16, 2002,29about three (3) months before Wilfredo filed the complaint for forcible entry on March 13,
2003. The petitioners also alleged therein that they are residents of "J. Belen St., Rosario, Batangas" and
not "No. 30 C.M. Recto Ave., Lipa City."30
Furthermore, the petitioners failed to rebut the affidavit of Barangay Captain Briones attesting to
Wilfredo’s prior possession and the petitioners’ unlawful entry to the property during Wilfredo’s
hospital confinement.31
The petitioners’ claim of physical possession cannot find support in the March 11, 2003 order32 of the
RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 stating that the petitioners "have been occupying
the premises since 1997." We note that the order was a mere interlocutory order on Wilfredo’s motion
for the issuance of a cease and desist order. An interlocutory order does not end the task of the court in
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities against each other. "It is
basically provisional in its application."33 It is the nature of an interlocutory order that it is subject to
modification or reversal that the result of further proceedings may warrant. Thus, the RTC’s
pronouncement on the petitioners’ occupation "since 1997" is not res judicata on the issue of actual
physical possession.

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In sum, we find no reversible error in the decision appealed from and, therefore, affirm it.
Wilfredo’s death did not render moot the forcible entry case.
The death of Wilfredo introduces a seeming complication into the case and on the disposition we shall
make. To go back to basics, the petition before us involves the recovery of possession of real property
and is a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in an ejectment case is
conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action; hence, it is enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased.1âwphi1 This judgment
entitles the winning party to: (a) the restitution of the premises, (b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent
or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and (c) attorney’s fees and
costs.
The complicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredo’s possession; he was holding the
property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputed before his death,
hand in hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case. Without need, however, of
any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo
since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development deprives
the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of the property even if the
ejectment judgment directs its restitution.
Thus, what actually survives under the circumstances is the award of damages, by way of
compensation, that the RTC originally awarded and which the CA and this Court affirmed. This award
was computed as of the time of the RTC decision (or roughly about a year before Wilfredo’s death) but
will now have to take into account the compensation due for the period between the RTC decision and
Wilfredo’s death. The computation is a matter of execution that is for the RTC, as court of origin, to
undertake. The heirs of Wilfredo shall succeed to the computed total award under the rules of
succession, a matter that is not within the authority of this Court to determine at this point.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal and accordingly AFFIRM the February 10, 2006 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90717 with the MODIFICATION that, with the termination,
upon his death, of respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s usufructory over the disputed property, the issue of
restitution of possession has been rendered moot and academic; on the other hand, the monetary award
of P620,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property up to the time of
the Regional Trial Court decision on April 6, 2005, survives and accrues to the estate of the deceased
respondent Wilfredo Rivera, to be distributed to his heirs pursuant to the applicable law on succession.
Additional compensation accrues and shall be added to the compensation from the time of the Regional
Trial Court decision up to respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s death. For purposes of the computation of this
additional amount and for the execution of the total amount due under this Decision, we hereby remand
the case to the Regional Trial Court, as court of origin, for appropriate action. Costs against petitioners
Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises.
Conditions Not Affecting Usufruct – NCC 609, 610, 607, 608

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Article 607. If the usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter
should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and the
materials.
The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is constituted on a building only and the same should be destroyed.
But in such a case, if the owner should wish to construct another building, he shall have a right to occupy the land
and to make use of the materials, being obliged to pay to the usufructuary, during the continuance of the usufruct,
the interest upon the sum equivalent to the value of the land and of the materials. (517)
Article 608. If the usufructuary shares with the owner the insurance of the tenement given in usufruct, the former
shall, in case of loss, continue in the enjoyment of the new building, should one be constructed, or shall receive the
interest on the insurance indemnity if the owner does not wish to rebuild.
Should the usufructuary have refused to contribute to the insurance, the owner insuring the tenement alone, the
latter shall receive the full amount of the insurance indemnity in case of loss, saving always the right granted to
the usufructuary in the preceding article. (518a)
Article 609. Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for public use, the owner shall be obliged either to
replace it with another thing of the same value and of similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary the legal
interest on the amount of the indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct. If the owner chooses the latter
alternative, he shall give security for the payment of the interest. (519)
6 Albar v Carandang, 106 Phil. 855
Topic: Conditions Not Affecting Usufruct

Facts: Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a building and
improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly probated she devised the
naked ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa
Fabie for life.
During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many portions of Manila,
the building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other improvements that were
not destroyed by the fire.
One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five years, at the same time
agreeing to construct on the lot a new building provided the naked owners as well as the
usufructuary sign the agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the
exclusive right to cede the property by lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her right
to usufruct while on the other hand the naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was
extinguished when the building was destroyed, the right of the usufructory being limited to the legal
interest on the value of the lot and the materials, in order that the agreement of lease may be affected,
the parties agreed on a temporary compromise whereby the naked owners would receive P100.00, or
20% of the monthly rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the balance of 80% or P400.00 of said
monthly rental. It was likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title to the building to be
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constructed would accrue to the land upon it completion as an integral part of the lot covered by the
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the naked owners but subject to the right of usufruct
of Josefa Fabie. The parties expressly reserved the right to litigate their respective claims after the
termination of the contract of lease to determine which of said claims was legally correct.
By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United States War Damage
Commission approved the claim that was presented for the damage caused to the property, paid to
and received by the naked owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due
on the property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.
Issue: Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the usufructuary
(FABIE) or naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction? W/N the
usufructuary should pay the real estate taxes?
Held: The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is clear that
when the deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin and Sto.
Cristo streets, she meant to impose the encumbrance both the building and the land on which it is
erected for indeed the building cannot exist without the land. And as this Court well said, "The land,
being an indispensable part of the rented premises cannot be considered as having no rental value
whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish language, the term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not
only building but land as well. (Diccionario Ingles-Español, por Martines Amador) Since only the
building was destroyed and the usufruct is constituted not only on the building but on the land as
well, then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished by the destruction of the building for under the
law usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance (Article
603, old Civil Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is addressed to
the wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the
administrator of the property. This has been clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil.,
536, which was litigated between the same parties and wherein the scope of the same provision of the
will has been the subject of interpretation.
The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the real estate
taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for several years previous to the present
litigation should be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound
herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the
same parties and the same properties subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable
agreement which was approved by the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound
herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the
necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the usufruct and in accordance with said
agreement, respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.
F. Easements
1. Characteristics, NCC 613, 617, 618
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Article 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject
thereto, the servient estate.
Article 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Article 618. Easements are indivisible. If the servient estate is divided between two or more persons, the easement
is not modified, and each of them must bear it on the part which corresponds to him.
If it is the dominant estate that is divided between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its
entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way.
7 Privatization v Legaspi Towers, July 22, 2009, GR No. 174957
FACTS
Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard,
Manila. On December 1975, Caruff obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to
finance the construction of a 21-storey condominium along Roxas Boulevard. The loan
accommodation was secured by a real estate mortgage over three (3) parcels of land where Caruff
planned to erect the condominium.
However, for Caruff’s failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and
acquired some of the properties of Caruff at the sheriff’s auction sale held on January 30, 1985.
Thereafter, Proclamation No. 50 was issued. It was aimed to promote privatization "for the prompt
disposition of the large number of non-performing assets of the government financial institutions,
and certain government-owned and controlled corporations, which have been found unnecessary or
inappropriate for the government sector to maintain." It also provided for the creation of the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT). By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14 and the Deed of Transfer
executed by PNB, the National Government, thru the APT, became the assignee and transferee of all
its rights and titles to and interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the properties it acquired
from the foreclosure of Caruff’s mortgage.
Caruff filed a case against PNB before the RTC of Manila, whereby Caruff sought the nullification of
PNB’s foreclosure of its properties. A Compromise Agreement dated August 31, 1988 was later
entered into by Caruff, PNB, and the National Government thru APT. The parties agreed, among
other things, that Caruff would transfer and convey in favor of the National Government, thru the
APT, where it built the generating set and sump pumps.
On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for Declaration of the existence of an easement alleged that
the act of Caruff of constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its property constituted a
voluntary easement in favor of the respondent. It prayed, among other things, that judgment be
rendered declaring the existence of an easement over the portion of the property being occupied by
the powerhouse and the sump pumps.
APT alleged that respondent had no cause of action against it, because it was but a mere transferee of
the land. It acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue of the Compromise Agreement free from
any liens and/or encumbrances. It was not a privy to any transaction or agreement entered into by
and between Caruff, respondent, and the bank.
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the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the existence of an easement over the portion of the land
ISSUE
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE COURT A QUO IN FINDING THAT [THE] PRESENCE OF THE GENERATOR SET
(GENERATING SET) AND SUMP PUMPS CONSTITUES AN EASEMENT.
HELD:
An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on another’s property, corporeal and immovable,
by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person." The statutory basis of this right
is Article 613 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which
is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two sources of easements: by law or by the will of the owners. Article 619 of the Civil Code
states:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called
legal and the latter voluntary easements.
In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted over the subject property.
In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary easement when it constructed
the generating set and sump pumps over the disputed portion of the subject property for its benefit.
However, it should be noted that when the appurtenances were constructed on the subject property,
the lands where the condominium was being erected and the subject property where the generating
set and sump pumps were constructed belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the Civil Code
does not apply, since no true easement was constituted or existed, because both properties were
owned by Caruff.
Also, Article 624 of the Civil Code is controlling, as it contemplates a situation where there exists an
apparent sign of easement between two estates established or maintained by the owner of both. The
law provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in
order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also
apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.16
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties alienates one of them
and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless
there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before the
execution of the deed.
Thus, when the subject property was assigned to the National Government thru the APT, no
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easement arose or was voluntarily created from the transfer of ownership, considering that the
parties, more particularly, Caruff, pledged that it was assigning, transferring, and conveying the
subject property in favor of the National Government thru the APT "free from any and all liens and
encumbrances."
Considering that Caruff never intended to transfer the subject property to PMO, burdened by the
generating set and sump pumps, respondent should remove them from the subject property.
1 Velasco v Cui, 105 SCRA 616
2 Valisno v Adriano, 161 SCRA 398
FACTS:
Adriano siblings previously owned two parcels of land. On the land of Honorata was an existing
irrigation which passes through the land of Felipe, whose property adjoins the river. When Valisno
bought the property, he cultivated therein different fruits and crops. Felipe then enclosed the
irrigation providing water to the land of Valisno, causing the latter prejudice.
HELD:
Water rights appurtenant to a parcel of land pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance.
This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more
persons (Civil Code)
Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters:
Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters
from a single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title,
between two or more owners, the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to
give free passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower
estates, and without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in
the deed of conveyance. (Art. 122, Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.)
No enlightened concept of ownership can shut out the Idea of restrictions thereon, such as easements.
Absolute and unlimited dominion is unthinkable, inasmuch as the proper enjoyment of property
requires mutual service and forbearance among adjoining estates (Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil. 403).
As indicated in the decision dated March 22, 1960 of the Bureau of Works "the principal issue
involved in this case falls under the subject of servitude of waters which are governed by Article 648
of the new Civil Code and the suppletory laws mentioned in the cases of Lunod vs. Meneses 11 Phil.
128) and Osmena vs. Camara (C.A. 380 62773) which are the irrigation law and the Spanish Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866, specifically Article 122 thereof.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant
to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371 19
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C.J. 868-897). The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity
does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity
(Benedicto vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145).
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free
from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of
levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
2. Kinds of easements, NCC 613, 615, 616, 619

Article 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject
thereto, the servient estate.
Article 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of
man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that
reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Nonapparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence.
Article 616. Easements are also positive or negative.
A positive easement is one which imposes upon the owner of the servient estate the obligation of allowing
something to be done or of doing it himself, and a negative easement, that which prohibits the owner of the servient
estate from doing something which he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist.
Article 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and
the latter voluntary easements.
3 La Vista v CA, 278 SCRA 498
Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by
voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the
dominant lots.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide
road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north
and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was
originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation.
Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned
its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption
of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason developed
their land which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the
voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their
half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the
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other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of
Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road.
However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical
concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of
Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party
complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had
adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the
negotiation of the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?
RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the
Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t think I can find
the details regarding it in the case< I just saw the one regarding ‚acknowledgement‛ between admu
and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met. And like
any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the
contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at
bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement and there
was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by
the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.
The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one (there no
such thing as a judicial easement)
4 Liwag v Happy Glen, July 4, 2012
PRIVATE ACTS AND CONTRACTS STATUTE

EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Respondent
G. R. No. 189755July 04, 2012Sereno, J.
FACTS
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo,
ownerof T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he
assigned all hisrights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the
receivables from the lotsalready sold.As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers,
the National Housing Authority (NHA)and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
that a water facility is available in thesubdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of
water of the residents for thirty (30) years.In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to
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Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the
latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the
respondent Association demanding the removal of the overheadwater tank over the parcel of land. The
latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo
Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes.The HLURB ruling was in favor
of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was theexistence of an easement for water
system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099wherein the deep well and
overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the
Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space
ISSUE
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an ‚open space‛ as defined in
P.D. 1216.
RULING
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an ‚open space.‛ The Court used the
basicstatutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls
under‚other similarfacilities and amenities‛ since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas
reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular
andspecific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include –or to
berestricted to –things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically
mentioned.Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved
for the commonwelfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase ‚other similar facilities and
amenities‛ should beinterpreted in like manner.It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the
benefit of the community. Water is a basicnecessity, without which, survival in the community would
be impossible
Modes of acquiring easements, NCC 623, 624

Article 623. The absence of a document or proof showing the origin of an easement which cannot be acquired by
prescription may be cured by a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate or by a final judgment.
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the
owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should
be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution
of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more
persons.
Effects of Easement, NCC 625, 641, 626, 627, 628

Article 625. Upon the establishment of an easement, all the rights necessary for its use are considered granted.
Article 641. Easements for drawing water and for watering animals carry with them the obligation of the owners
of the servient estates to allow passage to persons and animals to the place where such easements are to be used,
and the indemnity shall include this service.

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Article 626. The owner of the dominant estate cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
originally contemplated. Neither can he exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established.
Article 627. The owner of the dominant estate may make, at his own expense, on the servient estate any works
necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude, but without altering it or rendering it more burdensome.
For this purpose he shall notify the owner of the servient estate, and shall choose the most convenient time and
manner so as to cause the least inconvenience to the owner of the servient estate.
Article 628. Should there be several dominant estates, the owners of all of them shall be obliged to contribute to
the expenses referred to in the preceding article, in proportion to the benefits which each may derive from the work.
Any one who does not wish to contribute may exempt himself by renouncing the easement for the benefit of the
others.
If the owner of the servient estate should make use of the easement in any manner whatsoever, he shall also be
obliged to contribute to the expenses in the proportion stated, saving an agreement to the contrary.
5 Valderrama v North Negros, G.R. No. L-23810, December 18, 1925
What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in extending the line or repairing or using the same, a larger area
of land is occupied or excavations or materials deposited are outside the area occupied not by causing
wagons to pass just because of a change of ownership of the objects being transported.
FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel
Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the
milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would
furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution
of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co.,
Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made
other milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda
owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so
the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros. This prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros.
The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that
North Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation of
sugar cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane from
the hacienda owners’ lands
HELD: NO
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
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The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the North
Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of
sugar cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is clear
that the easement was established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the
intent of the milling contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation, it
is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient estates
since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of
easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract prohibiting the
central from obtaining other sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art.
543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or deposit
excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the North Negros
transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy the same
area and the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it passes through the
estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the owners
no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the right to the
easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the canes produced by
the owners has no basis.
6 Goldcrest v Cypress, GR No. 171072, April 7, 2009
Topic: Effects of Easement

Facts: Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress Gardens,
Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions[3] which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated
respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium
project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the condominium stands
was transferred to Cypress under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-67513. But Goldcrest retained
ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium
registered under Condominium. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled
the management and administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to the board of
directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were
being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with
damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to
compel the latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures
it built thereon. Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between
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the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal
of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the
exclusive use of the roof deck’s limited common area by Section 4(c)[4]of the condominium’s Master
Deed. It likewise argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security purposes, and
that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and inaccessible to other
condominium unit owners.
Upon the directive of HLURB Arbiter San Vicente, two ocular inspections[5] were conducted on the
condominium project. During the first inspection, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the
common area fronting the two elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise
discovered that Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which encroached 68.01 square meters of
the roof deck’s common area.[6]
During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure an alteration approval for the
said permanent structure.
In his Decision[7] dated December 2, 1999, Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. On review,
the HLURB Special Division modified the decision of Arbiter San Vicente. It deleted the award for
actual damages after finding that the encroached areas were not actually measured and that there was
no evidentiary basis for the rate of compensation fixed by Arbiter San
Vicente. Aggrieved, Cypress appealed to the Office of the President. It The Office of the President
dismissed the appeal. It ruled that the deletion of the award for actual damages was proper because
the exact area encroached by Goldcrest was not determined. Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals, which partly granted its appeal. The appellate court noted that the right of
Goldcrest under Section 4(c) of the Master Deed for the exclusive use of the easement covering the
portion of the roof deck appurtenant to the penthouse did not include the unrestricted right to build
structures thereon or to lease such area to third persons.
Issue:
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
IMPAIRED THE EASEMENT ON THE PORTION OF THE ROOF DECK DESIGNATED AS A
LIMITED COMMON AREA.[12]
Held:
Anent the second issue, Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof deck’s common limited area
is for its exclusive use, building structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons do not impair
the subject easement.
For its part, Cypress insists the said acts impair the subject easement because the same are already
beyond the contemplation of the easement granted to Goldcrest.
In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the
limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrest’s
act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22[18] of
Presidential Decree No. 957.[19]
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its
rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the
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easement;[20] (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated;[21] (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established;[22] (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and
preservation of the easement;[23] (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome;[24] (6) it
must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient
estate;[25] and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to
cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate.[26] Any violation of the above
constitutes impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows that it breached a number of the aforementioned
restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure were neither
necessary for the use or preservation of the roof deck’s limited area. Second, the weight of the office
structure increased the strain on the condominium’s foundation and on the roof deck’s common
limited area, making the easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the
condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project plan and
violated Section 4[27] of the condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.[28]
7 NPC v Heirs of Makabangit, GR 165828, August 24, 2011
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
– Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution
FACTS
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the
National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the
1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric
plants.
respondents, Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land sued NPC in the RTC for the
recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just
compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of
NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in
Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of
the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation
NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of
Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their
cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having
been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement,
any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
ISSUE:
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WON the demand for payment of just compensation has prescribed
NAPOCOR is liable to pay the market value of the affected property
HELD:
I
The demand for payment of just compensation
has not prescribed
Petitioner maintains that, in the event respondent spouses have not been adequately compensated for
the entry into their property, their claim for just compensation would have already prescribed,[26]
pursuant to Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 380, 395, 758, 938,
1360 and 1443. This provision empowers the NAPOCOR to do as follows:
x x x [E]nter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business or
purposes, including the construction of the transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of
such private property shall be paid the just compensation therefor in accordance with the provisions
hereinafter provided; Provided, further, that any action by any person claiming compensation and/or
damages shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-of-way, transmission lines, substations,
plants or other facilities shall have been established; Provided, finally, that after the said period no
suit shall be brought to question the said right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other
facilities nor the amounts of compensation and/or damages involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
NAPOCOR’s reliance on this provision is misplaced.
The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in
clear and categorical language that ‚*p+rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.‛*27+ This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription.*28+
Thus, we have ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to
an action to recover just compensation.[29] It would be a confiscatory act on the part of the
government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their
right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings
within five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the
duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to
institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their property. In the normal course of events,
before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an action for eminent
domain[30] and deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property.[31] Due to its omission, however, respondents were constrained to file
inverse condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court.
We therefore rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat
respondent spouses’ constitutional right to just compensation.
II
NAPOCOR is liable to pay the full market value
of the affected property
NAPOCOR submits that it should pay for only ten percent (10%) of the fair market value of the
landowners’ property because, under its Charter,*32+ it is only authorized to acquire easements of
right-of-way over agricultural lands.[33]
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Petitioner’s arguments fail to convince.
We have ruled that ‚when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable
to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.‛*34+
In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,[35] the petitioner likewise argued that it should only be made
to pay easement fees instead of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. In
striking down its argument and ruling that the property owners were entitled to the full market value
of the land in question, we ruled:
x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually
deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon
defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed.
Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to
life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all,
plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on
said affected portion of their property.[36]
Similarly, in this case, while respondent spouses could still utilize the area beneath NAPOCOR’s
transmission lines provided that the plants to be introduced underneath would not exceed three
meters,*37+ danger is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents’ farm workers, such that the property
is no longer suitable for agricultural production.[38]Considering the nature and effect of the Davao-
Manat 138 KV transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually deprives
respondents of the ordinary use of their land.
Moreover, we have ruled that Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon this
Court.*39+ ‚*T+he determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function
and . . . any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.‛*40+
We therefore rule that NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents the full market value of the affected
property as determined by the court a quo.
III
The trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on the Approved Schedule of
Market Values for
Real Property for the Year 2000
As its final argument, petitioner contends that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court
is unjust, unlawful and contrary to existing jurisprudence, because just compensation in expropriation
cases must be determined from the time of the filing of the complaint or the time of taking of the
subject property, whichever came first.[41] It therefore posits that since the taking of the property
happened in the 1970s, the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation with reference to
real property market values in the year 2000.[42]
Petitioner’s contention holds no water.
We have ruled in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay[43] that the reckoning
value of just compensation is that prevailing at the time of the filing of the inverse condemnation
proceedings for the following reason:
[c]ompensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered x
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x x would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by
NPC's entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land x x x. NPC's entry denied
elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the
owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the
necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law
to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just
compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation
proceedings is entirely warranted.
Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of the
property is pegged back to its value in the 1970s. To reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted
eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses’ property. Because it failed to
comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the instant Complaint for just
compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s until the present, they were deprived of just
compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property with its transmission lines.
This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to comply with the mandate of the law. We
therefore rule that, to adequately compensate respondent spouses from the decades of burden on their
property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the time of the filing of the
instant Complaint when respondent spouses made a judicial demand for just compensation.
1 Cabahug v Napocor, January 30, 2013
FACTS: The Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land situated in Barangay Capokpok,
Tabango, Leyte, registered in their names under TCT Nos. T-9813 and T-1599 of the Leyte provincial
registry. They were among the defendants in Special Civil Action No. 0019-PN, a suit for expropriation
earlier filed by NPC before the RTC, in connection with its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. The
suit was later dismissed when NPC opted to settle with the landowners by paying an easement fee
equivalent to 10% of value of their property in accordance with Section 3-A of Republic Act (RA) No.
6395. On 9 November 1996, Jesus Cabahug executed two documents denominated as Right of Way
Grant in favor of NPC. . For and in consideration of the easement fees, Cabahug granted NPC a
continuous easement of right of way for the latter’s transmissions lines and their appurtenances over
24,939 and 4,750 square meters of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-9813 and T-1599,
respectively. By said grant, Jesus Cabahug agreed not to construct any building or structure
whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the Right of Way that will adversely affect or obstruct the
transmission line of NPC, except agricultural crops, the growth of which will not exceed three meters
high. Under paragraph 4 of the grant, however, Jesus Cabahug reserved the option to seek additional
compensation for easement fee, based on the Supreme Court’s 18 January 1991 Decision in G.R. No.
60077, entitled National Power Corporation v. Spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit, et al.
(Gutierrez). On 21 September 1998, the Spouses Cabahug filed the complaint for the payment of just
compensation, damages and attorney’s fees against NPC before the RTC. In its answer, NPC averred
that it already paid the full easement fee mandated under Section 3-A of RA 6395 and that the
reservation in the grant referred to additional compensation for easement fee, not the full just
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compensation sought by the Spouses Cabahug. The RTC rendered a Decision dated 14 March 2000,
brushing aside NPC’s reliance on Section 3-A of RA 6395. Aggrieved by the foregoing decision, the
NPC perfected the appeal before the CA which, on 16 May 2007, rendered the herein assailed decision,
reversing and setting aside the RTC’s appealed decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was
denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners are entitled to full just compensation.
RULING:
The rule is settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its
stipulations which, when couched in clear and plain language, should be applied according to their
literal tenor. Courts cannot supply material stipulations, read into the contract words it does not
contain or, for that matter, read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain
import. Neither can they rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction,
relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those
which he did not.
The power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator in
an easement of right of way. Just compensation which should be neither more nor less than the money
equivalent of the property is, moreover, due where the nature and effect of the easement is to impose
limitations against the use of the land for an indefinite period and deprive the landowner its ordinary
use. It has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if,
as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of
the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the
attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create
or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land
is necessary. Measured not by the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss, just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function and no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court's findings. Any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the
court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
Hence, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon this Court.
Legal Easements - Water Code, Arts. 31-52, NCC 640-641, 642-646, 647, 649-657, 658-666, 667-673

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WATER CODE - UTILIZATION OF WATERS
WC 31. Preference in the development of water resources shall consider security of the State, multiple use,
beneficial effects, adverse effects and costs of development.
WC 32. The utilization of subterranean or ground water shall be coordinated with that of surface waters such as
rivers, streams, springs and lakes, so that a superior right in one not adversely affected by an inferior right in the
other.
For this purpose the Council shall promulgate rules and regulations and declare the existence of control areas for
the coordinated development, protection, and utilization of subterranean or ground water and surface waters.
Control area is an area of land where subterranean or ground water and surface water are so interrelated that
withdrawal and use in one similarly affects the other. The boundary of a control area may be altered from time to
time, as circumstances warrant.
WC 33. Water contained in open canals, aqueducts or reservoirs of private persons may be used by any person for
domestic purpose or for watering plants as long as the water is withdrawn by manual methods without checking
the stream or damaging the canal, aqueduct or reservoir; Provided, That this right may be restricted by the owner
should it result in loss or injury to him.
WC 34. A water permittee or appropriator may use any watercourse to convey water to another point in the
watercourse for the purpose stated in a permit and such water may be diverted or recaptured at that point by said
permittee in the same amount less allowance for normal losses in transit.
WC 35. Works for the storage, diversion, distribution and utilization of water resources shall contain adequate
provision for the prevention and control of diseases that may be induced or spread by such works when required by
the Council.
WC 36. When the reuse of waste water is feasible, it shall be limited as much as possible, to such uses other than
direct human consumption. No person or agency shall distribute such water for public consumption until it is
demonstrated that such consumption will not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.
WC 37. In the construction and operation of hydraulic works, due consideration shall be given to the preservation
of scenic places and historical relics and, in addition to the provisions of existing laws, no works that would
required the destruction or removal of such places or relics shall be undertaken without showing that the
distribution or removal is necessary and unaviodable.
WC 38. Authority for the construction of dams, bridges and other structures across of which may interfere with
the flow of navigable or flotable waterways shall first be secured from the Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications.
WC 39. Except in cases of emergency to save life or property, the construction or repair of the following works
shall be undertaken only after the plans and specifications therefor, as may be required by the Council, are
approved by the proper government agency; dams for the diversion or storage of water; structures for the use of
water power, installations for the utilization of subterranean or ground water and other structures for utilization
of water resources.
WC 40. No excavation for the purpose of emission of a hot spring or for the enlargement of the existing opening
thereof shall be made without prior permit.
Any person or agency who intends to develop a hot spring for human consumption must first obtain a permit from
the Department of Health.
WC 41. No person shall develop a stream, lake, or spring for recreational purposes without first securing a permit
from the Council.
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WC 42. Unless-otherwise ordered by the President of the Philippines and only in time of national calamity or
emergency, no person shall induce or restrain rainfall by any method such as cloud seeding without a permit from
the proper government emergency.
WC 43. No person shall raise or lower the water level of a river stream, lake, lagoon, or marsh nor drain the same
without a permit.
WC 44. Drainage systems shall be so constructed that their outlets are rivers, lakes, the sea, natural bodies of
water, or such other water course as may be approved by the proper government agency.
WC 45. When a drainage channel is constructed by a number of persons for their common benefit, the cost of
construction and maintenance of the channel shall be borne by each in proportion to the benefits drived.
WC 46. When artificial means are employed to drain water from higher to lower land, the owner of the higher land
shall select the routes and methods of drainage that will cause the minimum damage to the lower lands, subject to
the requirements of just compensation.
WC 47. When the use, conveyance or storage of waters results in damage to another, the person responsible for the
damage shall pay compensation.
WC 48. When a water resources project interferes with the access of landowner to a portion of his property or with
the conveyance of irrigation or drainage water, the person or agency constructing the project shall bear the cost of
construction and maintenance of the bridges, flumes and other structures necessary for maintaining access,
irrigation, or drainage, in addition to paying compensation for land and incidental damages.
WC 49. Any person having an easement for an aqueduct may enter upon the servient land for the purpose of
cleaning, repairing or replacing the aqueduct or the removal of obstructions therefrom.
WC 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man flow
from the higher estate, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate can not construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless he provides an
alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this
natural flow.
WC 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and
within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in
forest areas, along their margins are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
WC 52. The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of easements of water not expressly determined by the
provisions of this Code shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.
Article 640. Compulsory easements for drawing water or for watering animals can be imposed only for reasons of
public use in favor of a town or village, after payment of the proper indemnity. (555)
Article 641. Easements for drawing water and for watering animals carry with them the obligation of the owners
of the servient estates to allow passage to persons and animals to the place where such easements are to be used,
and the indemnity shall include this service. (556)
Article 642. Any person who may wish to use upon his own estate any water of which he can dispose shall have
the right to make it flow through the intervening estates, with the obligation to indemnify their owners, as well as
the owners of the lower estates upon which the waters may filter or descend. (557)
Article 643. One desiring to make use of the right granted in the preceding article is obliged:
(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended;
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(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to third persons;
(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws and regulations. (558)
Article 644. The easement of aqueduct for private interest cannot be imposed on buildings, courtyards, annexes, or
outhouses, or on orchards or gardens already existing. (559)
Article 645. The easement of aqueduct does not prevent the owner of the servient estate from closing or fencing it,
or from building over the aqueduct in such manner as not to cause the latter any damage, or render necessary
repairs and cleanings impossible. (560)
Article 646. For legal purposes, the easement of aqueduct shall be considered as continuous and apparent, even
though the flow of the water may not be continuous, or its use depends upon the needs of the dominant estate, or
upon a schedule of alternate days or hours. (561)
Article 647. One who for the purpose of irrigating or improving his estate, has to construct a stop lock or sluice
gate in the bed of the stream from which the water is to be taken, may demand that the owners of the banks permit
its construction, after payment of damages, including those caused by the new easement to such owners and to the
other irrigators.
Article 647. One who for the purpose of irrigating or improving his estate, has to construct a stop lock or sluice
gate in the bed of the stream from which the water is to be taken, may demand that the owners of the banks permit
its construction, after payment of damages, including those caused by the new easement to such owners and to the
other irrigators. (562)
Article 648. The establishment, extent, form and conditions of the servitudes of waters, to which this section refers,
shall be governed by the special laws relating thereto insofar as no provision therefor is made in this Code. (563a)
SECTION 3
Easement of Right of Way
Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is
entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others
and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist
in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)
Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. (565)
Article 651. The width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. (566a)
Article 652. Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates of the
vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be indemnified by the donee for the establishment of the right of way.
(567a)

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Article 653. In the case of the preceding article, if it is the land of the grantor that becomes isolated, he may
demand a right of way after paying a indemnity. However, the donor shall not be liable for indemnity. (n)
Article 654. If the right of way is permanent, the necessary repairs shall be made by the owner of the dominant
estate. A proportionate share of the taxes shall be reimbursed by said owner to the proprietor of the servient estate.
(n)
Article 655. If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to be necessary because its owner has joined
it to another abutting on a public road, the owner of the servient estate may demand that the easement be
extinguished, returning what he may have received by way of indemnity. The interest on the indemnity shall be
deemed to be in payment of rent for the use of the easement.
The same rule shall be applied in case a new road is opened giving access to the isolated estate.
In both cases, the public highway must substantially meet the needs of the dominant estate in order that the
easement may be extinguished. (568a)
Article 656. If it be indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a
building, to carry materials through the estate of another, or to raise therein scaffolding or other objects necessary
for the work, the owner of such estate shall be obliged to permit the act, after receiving payment of the proper
indemnity for the damage caused him. (569a)
Article 657. Easements of the right of way for the passage of livestock known as animal path, animal trail or any
other, and those for watering places, resting places and animal folds, shall be governed by the ordinances and
regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the usages and customs of the place.
Without prejudice to rights legally acquired, the animal path shall not exceed in any case the width of 75 meters,
and the animal trail that of 37 meters and 50 centimeters.
Whenever it is necessary to establish a compulsory easement of the right of way or for a watering place for
animals, the provisions of this Section and those of articles 640 and 641 shall be observed. In this case the width
shall not exceed 10 meters. (570a)
SECTION 4
Easement of Party Wall
Article 658. The easement of party wall shall be governed by the provisions of this Title, by the local ordinances
and customs insofar as they do not conflict with the same, and by the rules of co-ownership. (571a)
Article 659. The existence of an easement of party wall is presumed, unless there is a title, or exterior sign, or proof
to the contrary:
(1) In dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the point of common elevation;
(2) In dividing walls of gardens or yards situated in cities, towns, or in rural communities;
(3) In fences, walls and live hedges dividing rural lands. (572)
Article 660. It is understood that there is an exterior sign, contrary to the easement of party wall:
(1) Whenever in the dividing wall of buildings there is a window or opening;
(2) Whenever the dividing wall is, on one side, straight and plumb on all its facement, and on the other, it has
similar conditions on the upper part, but the lower part slants or projects outward;
(3) Whenever the entire wall is built within the boundaries of one of the estates;
(4) Whenever the dividing wall bears the burden of the binding beams, floors and roof frame of one of the
buildings, but not those of the others;
(5) Whenever the dividing wall between courtyards, gardens, and tenements is constructed in such a way that the
coping sheds the water upon only one of the estates;
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(6) Whenever the dividing wall, being built of masonry, has stepping stones, which at certain intervals project
from the surface on one side only, but not on the other;
(7) Whenever lands inclosed by fences or live hedges adjoin others which are not inclosed.
In all these cases, the ownership of the walls, fences or hedges shall be deemed to belong exclusively to the owner of
the property or tenement which has in its favor the presumption based on any one of these signs. (573)
Article 661. Ditches or drains opened between two estates are also presumed as common to both, if there is no title
or sign showing the contrary.
There is a sign contrary to the part-ownership whenever the earth or dirt removed to open the ditch or to clean it is
only on one side thereof, in which case the ownership of the ditch shall belong exclusively to the owner of the land
having this exterior sign in its favor. (574)
Article 662. The cost of repairs and construction of party walls and the maintenance of fences, live hedges, ditches,
and drains owned in common, shall be borne by all the owners of the lands or tenements having the party wall in
their favor, in proportion to the right of each.
Nevertheless, any owner may exempt himself from contributing to this charge by renouncing his part-ownership,
except when the party wall supports a building belonging to him. (575)
Article 663. If the owner of a building, supported by a party wall desires to demolish the building, he may also
renounce his part-ownership of the wall, but the cost of all repairs and work necessary to prevent any damage
which the demolition may cause to the party wall, on this occasion only, shall be borne by him. (576)
Article 664. Every owner may increase the height of the party wall, doing so at his own expense and paying for
any damage which may be caused by the work, even though such damage be temporary.
The expenses of maintaining the wall in the part newly raised or deepened at its foundation shall also be paid for
by him; and, in addition, the indemnity for the increased expenses which may be necessary for the preservation of
the party wall by reason of the greater height or depth which has been given it.
If the party wall cannot bear the increased height, the owner desiring to raise it shall be obliged to reconstruct it at
his own expense and, if for this purpose it be necessary to make it thicker, he shall give the space required from his
own land. (577)
Article 665. The other owners who have not contributed in giving increased height, depth or thickness to the wall
may, nevertheless, acquire the right of part-ownership therein, by paying proportionally the value of the work at
the time of the acquisition and of the land used for its increased thickness. (578a)
Article 666. Every part-owner of a party wall may use it in proportion to the right he may have in the co-
ownership, without interfering with the common and respective uses by the other co-owners. (579a)
SECTION 5
Easement of Light and View
Article 667. No part-owner may, without the consent of the others, open through the party wall any window or
aperture of any kind. (580)
Article 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be counted:
(1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or
(2) From the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the window is
through a wall on the dominant estate. (n)
Article 669. When the distances in article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall which is not party wall,
adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to another, can make in it openings to admit light at the height of

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the ceiling joints or immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty centimeters square, and, in every case,
with an iron grating imbedded in the wall and with a wire screen.
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or property adjoining the wall in which the openings are made can close
them should he acquire part-ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to the contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a building on his land or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to that
having such openings, unless an easement of light has been acquired. (581a)
Article 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct view upon or
towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two meters between the wall in
which they are made and such contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be a distance
of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription. (582a)
Article 671. The distance referred to in the preceding article shall be measured in cases of direct views from the
outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer line of the latter when they do, and in cases
of oblique view from the dividing line between the two properties. (583)
Article 672. The provisions of article 670 are not applicable to buildings separated by a public way or alley, which
is not less than three meters wide, subject to special regulations and local ordinances. (584a)
Article 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon at less than a distance of
three meters to be measured in the manner provided in article 671. Any stipulation permitting distances less than
those prescribed in article 670 is void.
2 Valdez v Tabisula, 560 SCRA 332 92008
Facts: Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute
Sale[1] (the deed) from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula andCaridad Tabisula a 200 square meter
(sq.m.) portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union.
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject property.Believing
that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed, petitioners, through their
representative, reported the matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed
to attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file in April 1999
or more than six years after the execution of the deed a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages[3] against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La
Union.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject property on the strength of
respondents’ assurance of providing them a road right of way. They thus prayed that respondents be
ordered to provide the subject property with a 2½-meter wide easement and to remove the concrete
wall blocking the same. Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages
and attorney’s fees),[5] averred that the 2 ½-meter easement should be taken from the western portion
of the subject property and not from theirs; and petitioners and their family are also the owners of two
properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways.
Respondents further averred that they could not have agreed to providing petitioners aneasement ‚on
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the western side of their lot‛ as there exists a two-storey concrete house on their lot where the
supposed easement is to be located, which was erected long before the subject property was sold to
petitioners.
Branch 26 of the RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners’ complaint and granted respondents’
Counterclaim . On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 29,
2006,[12] affirmed that of the trial court
ISSUES:
1. Is the right of way not part of the absolute deed of sale?
2. Is the provision of the absolute deed of sale granting a right of way vague and obscure?
HELD:
An easement or servitude is ‚a real right constituted on another’s property, corporeal and immovable,
by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person.‛ The statutory basis of this right
is Article 613 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to source – by law or by the will of the owners. So Article
619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called
legal and the latter voluntary easements.
From the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is clear that what they seek to enforce is an
alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: ‚they shall be provided a 2 ½ meters
wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.”
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of
real property must be in writing. The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they ‚shall be
provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not
included in this sale‛ is not a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended grant of right
of way is ‚not included in this sale‛ could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a
separate and distinct agreement for the purpose. The use of the word ‚shall,‛ which is imperative or
mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive where, as in the case
at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of
Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code call for, viz:

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Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the inscription or annotation of acts and contracts
relating to the ownership and other rights over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For to be
entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code
must be established.
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites
must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by otherimmovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the
owner of the dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein petitioners.
3 St. Michael v Masaito, GR 166301, Feb. 29, 2008
The core issue in this petition for review under Rule 45 is what constitutes a sufficient cause of action
for a complaint for easement of right-of-way. Petitioners assail the August 13, 2004 Resolution1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85558, dismissing their petition for defective verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, and the November 23, 2004 CA Resolution2 rejecting their plea
for reconsideration. In effect, the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-2001-60
before the Bacoor, Cavite Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 was upheld by the CA.
Petitioner St. Michael School of Cavite, Inc. (St. Michael) is a duly registered non-stock corporation3
owned by petitioners-spouses Crisanto S. Claveria and Gloria M. Claveria. It is represented by
petitioner Gloria M. Claveria. Respondents Masaito Development Corporation (Masaito) and Rexlon
Realty Group, Inc. (Rexlon) are domestic corporations that own, operate, and manage Citihomes
Molino IV, Bacoor, Cavite (Citihomes). St. Michael is located outside the northern perimeter fence of
Citihomes. Its passageway occupies a portion of the 61-square meter lot described as Lot 4, Block 7,
Phase 1 of Citihomes. The gate to the school is located at the subdivision’s northern perimeter fence
and is the only entrance and exit for the entire school population.
On July 28, 1998, Rexlon informed petitioners that the value of the Citihomes lots when fully
developed was PhP 3,872 per square meter as appraised by the Home Insurance and Guarantee
Corporation.4 In a letter dated January 29, 2001, Masaito advised petitioners to purchase Lots 1-9,
Block 7, Phase 1, fronting the school at PhP 3,579,000.5 On April 6, 2001, Masaito sent another offer to
sell Lot 4, Block 7 of the subdivision with the right-of-way through the private roads/drainage facilities
of Citihomes at the price of PhP 2 Million. Petitioners refused both proposals, reasoning that the school

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did not need the entire area mentioned in the first proposal. St. Michael also said that the second offer
was grossly overpriced.
Petitioners, with four other homeowners, filed a complaint against respondents before the Bacoor,
Cavite RTC, Branch 19 entitled St. Michael School of Cavite, Inc., Spouses Crisanto S. Claveria and
Gloria M. Claveria, Pancho R. Navo, Vivencio B. Asuncion, Isaurito S. Hernandez and Elias Namit v.
Masaito Development Corporation and Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. for easement of right-of-way with
damages under Article 649 of the Civil Code and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order (TRO).
The trial court issued a TRO on June 5, 20016 for 72 hours which was extended to June 24, 2001
through the June 13, 20017 Order enjoining respondents from blocking the passageway and school gate
of St. Michael. On July 17, 2001, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
failed to state a cause of action against them.
On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued an order,8 dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint as to
Pancho R. Navo, Vivencio Asuncion, Isaurito S. Hernandez, and Elias Namit, as plaintiffs a quo, and
denying petitioners’ application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 9, 2002, respondents filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the July 29, 2002 RTC
Order, on the grounds that (1) St. Michael was not a real party in interest; and (2) petitioners-spouses
failed to state a cause of action.
On September 25, 2003, the trial court granted respondents’ partial motion for reconsideration and
likewise dismissed the complaint of St. Michael and spouses Claverias for failure to state a cause of
action.9 Petitioners filed an omnibus motion/motion for reconsideration on December 18, 2003,
reiterating their defenses, which the RTC denied on May 5, 2004 for lack of merit.10
Petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, seeking to annul and set aside the May 5, 2004 RTC Order. The
CA dismissed the petition. In its August 13, 2004 Resolution, the CA held that the petition for certiorari
was dismissible for the following infirmities:
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping [did] not fully comply with [Section 4, Rule
7] of the Rules of Court, because it failed to give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are
true and correct based on authentic records.
2) [S]aid verification and certification was signed by petitioner Gloria M. Claveria in behalf of her co-
petitioners without the accompanying special power of attorney or board resolution authorizing her to
sign the same x x x; and
3) Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his Roll of Attorney’s Number x x x.11
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On September 6, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,12 which the CA
denied.13 Hence, we have this petition that raises the following issues:
(a)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND

APPLICATION OF SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHICH,
ACCORDING TO ITS INTERPRETATION, REQUIRES PETITIONERS TO STILL SUBMIT AN
AMENDED VERIFICATION STATING THEREIN THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITION
ARE TRUE AND CORRECT NOT ONLY OF THEIR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE BUT ALSO BASED
ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS DESPITE CLEAR COMPLIANCE BY PETITIONERS OF THE SAID
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT THROUGH THE SUBMISSION OF THE THREE (3) DOCUMENTS
ATTACHED TO THEIR URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED SEPTEMBER 6, 2004.
(b)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT THE COURT A QUO
DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; THAT THE PETITION IS PATENTLY WITHOUT MERIT; AND THE QUESTIONS
RAISED THEREIN ARE TOO [UNSUBSTANTIAL] TO REQUIRE CONSIDERATION, THE SAID
FINDINGS BEING MERE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UNSUPPORTED BY ANY STATEMENT OR
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONTRADICTED BY THE PERTINENT PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
OF THE CASE WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WILL JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION
AND DEMONSTRATE THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT ONLY REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST BUT
HAVE VALID CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENTS.14
In sum, the twin issues for our consideration are: (1) Did the CA err in dismissing the petition and
ruling that Section 4, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure still requires petitioners to submit an
amended verification that the allegations in the petition are true and correct not only from their
personal knowledge but also based on authentic records, even if they had already submitted three
other documents attached to their September 6, 2004 motion for reconsideration?; and (2) Did the CA
err in finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the
petition has no merit, that the questions raised were unsubstantial, and that the findings were
conclusions of law unsupported by facts and contradicted by the records?
On the first issue, petitioners aver that Gloria M. Claveria is expressly authorized by her co-petitioners
to represent them in filing the petition for certiorari with the CA, evidenced by her Affidavit,15 a
Special Power of Attorney, and Secretary’s Certificate. They claim that there was no need for them to
submit an Amended Verification as the three aforementioned documents satisfied the requirement.
In its November 23, 2004 Resolution, the CA stated:

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Considering that petitioners did not cure the first deficiency mentioned in Our August 13, 2004
Resolution dismissing the petition by submitting an amended verification and stating therein that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct not only of their personal knowledge but also based on
authentic records, the Court is constrained to deny their Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution
(emphasis supplied.)
The CA erred.
Petitioners correctly point out that paragraph 3 of Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court uses the
conjunction "or" not "and":
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records x x x .A pleading
required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or lacks a
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Moreover, petitioners, in their September 6, 2004 Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, attached the
following:
(1) Affidavit executed by petitioner Gloria M. Claveria, stating:
1. That I am one of the petitioners in C.A.- G.R. SP [No.] 85558 for Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order pending before the Special Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals;
2. That I hereby certify that I am duly authorized by my husband Crisanto S. Claveria and the St.
Michael School of Cavite, Inc. who are my co-petitioners in the said case, to sign for all petitioners, to
file said petition and represent them in the proceedings;
3. That I further certify that I am one of the Incorporators, a Trustee the incumbent Treasurer and the
Directress of the Saint Michael School of Cavite, Inc.;
4. That I am also the registered owner together with my husband Crisanto S. Claveria, of the two (2)
parcels of land upon which the said school stands and is a direct party in interest in the case;
5. That I am the Founder of the said school, managed, supervised and oversaw its operation from its
opening up to the present and I have received, read and understood all the documents annexed to the
said petition;
6. That I also participated in the collation and completion of all the documents attached as Annexes to
the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals and which were ALL previously
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submitted to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 of Bacoor, Cavite and verified the truth and
correctness of the contents of the Petition from the records and files in my possession. Thus, I attest to
the truth and correctness of the allegations of the said Petition of my own personal knowledge and
based on authentic documents.16
(2) Special Power of Attorney17 executed by petitioner Crisanto S. Claveria, authorizing his spouse,
Gloria M. Claveria, to represent him in the petition for certiorari with the CA, make, sign, execute for
and in his behalf all documents necessary to the case; appear in court; and enter into a compromise
agreement or alternative mode of dispute settlement; and
(3) Secretary’s Certificate18 signed by Sanett M. Claveria, Corporate Secretary of St. Michael, attesting
that Mrs. Gloria M. Claveria is authorized to represent St. Michael as approved in a special meeting of
the board of directors dated September 1, 2004.
We have held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is intended to assure that the
pleading’s allegations are accurate, filed in good faith, and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation.19 While courts and litigants alike are directed to abide strictly by the procedural
rules,20 we have relaxed these rules on the basis of justifiable circumstances and substantial
compliance.21
Although petitioners did not file their amended pleading to include the special power of attorney or
board resolution authorizing Gloria M. Claveria to represent her co-petitioners, they, however,
attached to their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration the special power of attorney; authorization
signed by Crisanto S. Claveria for Gloria M. Claveria to make, sign, and execute all documents
pertaining to the case; and the Board Resolution authorizing Gloria M. Claveria to represent the
corporation. The submission of authorization, special power of attorney and certification issued by the
corporate secretary is considered substantial compliance of the requirements under Rule 7, Sec. 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. We thus hold that petitioners were able to substantially comply with the
requirements under the Rules of Court.
On the second issue. In its July 29, 2002 Order, the RTC resolved respondents’ Motion to Dismiss by
holding that plaintiffs Pancho Navo, Vivencio Asuncion, Isaurito Hernandez, and Elias Namit, as
parents of some of the students in petitioners’ school, have no cause of action to file the complaint for
right-of-way. It ruled that the claimant in such an action must be the owner of a dominant estate and as
such, the parents were not real parties-in-interest.
In its September 25, 2003 Order, the RTC resolved respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration by ruling
that St. Michael is not a registered owner of any property that is the subject matter of the easement
case, hence not a real party-in-interest. It thus dismissed the case because petitioners failed to state a
cause of action against respondents.
Petitioners claim that the lower court’s orders are baseless. They argue that concrete evidence is
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necessary for a reliable judgment on the merits.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the initiatory pleading does not aver the first two basic
requisites for the establishment of a legal easement of right-of-way: (1) that the dominant property is
surrounded by estates of others and (2) there is no adequate outlet to a public highway. The rest of the
co-plaintiffs, they point out, did not even allege if they are co-owners or possessors of any real right
over the estate of the petitioners-spouses which is a requisite for the right to demand the establishment
of a legal easement of right-of-way over a servient estate.
We held in Dabuco v. Court of Appeals that what is determinative in a dismissal for failure to state a
cause of action is the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.22 These allegations,
hypothetically speaking, must aver ultimate facts that constitute plaintiff’s cause of action which may
entitle plaintiff to an advantageous decision as a matter of law.23
An examination of petitioners’ Complaint is necessary to determine if the lower court’s orders were in
accordance with the law. Petitioners’ "allegations in support of plaintiffs’ demand for an easement of
right-of-way" read:
10. That the students, their parents, school teachers and school staff who reside within Citihomes
(nearly 50% of the school population) including the four (4) plaintiffs namely Pancho R. Navo,
Vivencio B. Asuncion, Isaurito S. Hernandez and Elias Namit who are parents of certain school
children of St. Michael School of Cavite have incontrovertibly the full right of passage as well as the
free right to use the roads, lanes and pathways of Citihomes including those leading to and from the
school;
11. That, for the last five (5) years, apart from the major access road shown in the Subdivision Plan,
Annex "A," the land area actually used by the school population to and from the school, inclusive of
the passageway and the school gate is only a portion of a SIXTY-ONE (61) SQUARE METERS LOT
described as Lot 4, Block 7 of Citihomes owned and/or operated and managed by defendants;
12. That the school has only one (1) gate which serves as both entry and exit points for the entire school
population which defendants threaten to fence off and to close;
13. That, other than the right of way fronting the school and shown in the Subdivision plan, Annex "A,"
there are no other developed nor practical entry and exit points at the rear and at the two sides of the
school site readily and immediately accessible for use by the school population as right of way and/or
entrance to and exit from the school especially by those who reside within Citihomes including the
four (4) plaintiffs/parents abovementioned which constitute almost 50% of the total school population;
xxxx
15. That through an appraisal report/letter dated October 16, 1997 and July 28, 1998 respectively,
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[plaintiffs] were advised by defendant Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. that the appraisal value of lots at
Citihomes when fully developed is P3,872.00 per square meter x x x;
16. That through a letter dated June 16, 1998, defendant Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. approved the use of
the 61 square meters property described as Lot 4, Block 7 of Citihomes as a right of way for plaintiff St.
Michael School of Cavite x x x;
17. That, however, under a letter dated January 29, 2001, [plaintiffs] were advised by defendant
Masaito Development Corporation that instead of the sixty-one (61) square meter property, Lot 4,
Block 7, plaintiffs should instead purchase Lot 1-9, Block 7, phase I, of Citihomes with a total lot area of
one thousand and seventy-four (1,074) square meters at a total contract price of P3,759,000.00 which
lots are all fronting the school x x x;
18. That, despite Annexes "D" and "D-1" of the complaint, on April 6, 2001, [plaintiffs] again received a
new proposal from defendant Masaito Development Corporation proposing that plaintiff should pay
the sum of P2,000.000.00 for the puchase of the sixty-one (61) square meters property, Lot 4, Block 7,
Phase I, of Citihomes, plus the right to pass through the private roads/drainage facilities of said school
x x x;
19. That plaintiffs do not need the entire 1,074 lot area covered by Lot 1-9, Block 7, Phase I, Citihomes
which exceeds the requirements for the school’s right of way; while plaintiffs find unacceptable
defendant Masaito Development Corporation’s proposal for plaintiffs to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00
for the sixty-one (61) square meter property, Lot 4, Block 7 of Phase I, Citihomes which amount is
clearly unconscionable, excessive, unreasonable and unjust;
20. That plaintiffs and the school population only require a portion of the sixty-one (61) square meters
property Lot 4, Block 7 of Phase I, Citihomes for their permanent right of way and accept the price of
P3,872.00 per square meter as reasonable as quoted in the Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation’s appraisal report/letter, x x x;
21. That in support of plaintiffs’ application for the *above-described] right of way plaintiffs further
state:
21-A. That the St. Michael School of Cavite is surrounded by immovable properties belonging to other
persons including Citihomes owned and/or operated and managed by herein defendants such that
plaintiffs and the school population have at present no immediate and adequate outlet to a public
highway other than the major Access Road and the sixty-one (61) square meters lot of Citihomes
described in the Subdivision Plan, x x x;
21-B. That plaintiffs are willing and able to pay the proper indemnity to defendants pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code;

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21-C That the isolation of plaintiffs’ property is not due to plaintiffs’ own acts but was caused by the
expansion of the land area owned by Citihomes and the rapid increase in the number of homeowners
which now has reached more than a thousand residents[.]24
Three elements must be present for a complaint to state a cause of action: (1) the legal right of the
plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
violating said legal right.25 For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case, more
specifically, Art. 649 of the Civil Code has laid down the following requirements: (1) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is
payment of proper indemnity; and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate.
We rule that the Complaint satisfies these three elements and thus sufficiently alleges a cause of action.
The Complaint, first, asserts that petitioners have a right to an easement of right-of-way that cuts
across respondents’ property; second, it refers to respondents’ correlative obligation not to fence off
and close the single gate which is used as the only entry and exit points of the school population; and
third, it refers to respondents’ expansion and excessive terms and conditions, constituting the acts
violating petitioners’ right. We thus hold that the Complaint’s material allegations are enough to
entitle petitioners to a favorable judgment if these are assumed to be true.
The four corners of the initiatory pleading do not reveal any averment that the properties in question
are bounded by public roads and there is an adequate access to a public highway. On the contrary, par.
13 of the Complaint alleges that "other than the right of way fronting the school and shown in the
Subdivision Plan, Annex ‘A,’26 there are no other developed nor practical entry and exit points at the
rear and at the two (2) sides of the school site readily and immediately accessible for use by the school
population x x x."27
Pars. 11 and 21-A of the Complaint as aforequoted confusingly refer both to a major "access road" and
the sixty-one (61) square meter lot (Lot 4, Block 7 of Citihomes) as an immediate and adequate outlet to
the public highway. The paragraphs are not equivocal about petitioner school’s lack of an adequate
outlet to a public highway and give the impression that such road is an adequate outlet to a public
highway.
A complete examination of the Complaint, however, unmistakably shows petitioners’ sufficient cause
of action. To be more precise, Annexes "A," "A-1," and "A-2" plainly demonstrate that the requisites for
a legal easement of right-of-way under Art. 649 of the Code have been met.
Annex "A" of the Complaint which is the location plan of Citihomes clearly shows that the school’s
only access to the public highway is Lot 4, Block 7 that abuts the major "access road" of Citihomes
which in turn is connected to the public highway. The photographs (Annexes "A-1"28 and Annex "A-
2"29 of the Complaint) showing the school building and adjoining areas easily reveal that it is bounded
by other immovable properties, which explains why it only has one entry and exit point. Without the
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right-of-way on Lot 4, Block 7 of Citihomes, the school has no adequate access to a public highway.
Annex "A," as well as Annexes "A-1" and "A-2" of the Complaint, supports petitioners’ averments as
these show that the school has a lone entry and exit point which is the right-of-way in front of the
school. The reference to a major access road, therefore, must be understood in the context of all the
allegations of fact contained in the Complaint. Petitioners’ cause of action is not solely found in the
paragraphs referred to. The annexes cited likewise form part of the material allegations of the
Complaint. Pars. 11 and 21-A of the Complaint and Annexes "A," "A-1," and "A-2" read together, the
averments of the Complaint amply show a sufficient cause of action as prescribed by Art. 649 of the
Code.
However, in the September 25, 2003 Order dismissing the case, the RTC made the following findings:
Finding the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by the defendants to be well taken, it appearing
that indeed the properties (the alleged dominant estates) of plaintiffs Sps. Crisanto S. Claveria and
Gloria M. Claveria are bounded by public roads, hence, they have adequate outlet to a public highway.
Likewise, insofar as plaintiff St. Michael School of Cavite, Inc., it is not a real party in interest
considering that it is not the registered owner of any property subject matter of the instant case.30
It is settled that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint.31 Such being the case, the RTC erred when it apparently considered matters not embodied
in the Complaint. The Complaint, contrary to the lower court’s Order, does not aver that the properties
of petitioners-spouses are bounded by public roads. The location plan and photographs of the subject
lot and the school building appended to the Complaint, without doubt, demonstrate that the lot and
school building are enclosed, not by public roads, but by other lots in the subdivision.
The Court has previously held that it is not for the trial court to inquire into the truth or falsity of a
complaint’s allegations before a hearing on its merits.32 In ordering the dismissal, it is apparent that
the trial court relied on matters not encompassed by the Complaint. This is proscribed by the rules and
jurisprudence. The dismissal of the Complaint has thus no leg to stand on.
In the same matter, the trial court erred when it ruled that the school, not being the registered owner of
the subject lot, is not a real party-in-interest.
It will suffice under Art. 649 of the Civil Code that "any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons
and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way." Clearly, the
school is a real party-in-interest since it has established a right to use the passageway for the benefit of
its students. More importantly, the records reveal that petitioners-spouses are the owners of the lot
where the school is located and they are the incorporators, trustees, and officers of St. Michael.33 They
are also authorized to represent the corporation in the complaint and subsequent actions. Thus,
petitioners are real parties-in-interest and we rule that the dismissal of the complaint is patently
erroneous and bereft of any legal basis. Petitioners must be allowed to pursue their case before the trial
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court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed August 13, 2004 and November 23, 2004 CA
Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85558 and the July 29, 2002 and September 25, 2003 Orders of the
Bacoor, Cavite RTC, Branch 19 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is directed to reinstate
petitioners’ complaint and conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. BCV-2001-60.
4 Quintanilla v Abangan, 544 SCRA 494
HELD: Petitioners Apolinardito and Perfecta Quintanilla owned a corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their business, they used vans to
haul and transport raw materials and finished products. Because they wanted to expand their business
and construct a warehouse on their property (the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from
Pedro sometime in April 1994. However, Pedro had already sold his lot to DARYL’S on March 24,
1994. Thereafter DARYL’S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the same with a
concrete fence. Petitioner, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way, six meters in
width, or a total area of 244 square meters, over the servient estate.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence and
concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right of way against
respondents. It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was
not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Here, the fourth requisite is absent. The Court quoted with
approval the findings of the CA, to wit: ‚As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the
New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, as in the instant case, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it
will not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of the shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way
may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constructions or
walls which can be avoided by a round-about way< Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.‛
5 Obra v Sps Badua, GR 149125, Aug. 9, 2007
G.R. No. 149125 August 9, 2007Resurreccion Obra, petitioner vs Sps. Victoriano Badua, respondentThe
present Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the annulment of the Orders of the San Fernando City,
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La UnionRTC, directing petitioner Obra to demolish the fence she constructed on the southern portion
of her property which blocked a portion of respondents’ right-of-way.
Facts:1. The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents against
Anacleto andResurreccion Obra, Donato and Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino and Crisanta Badua before
the RTC. DefendantAnacleto Obra of that case is the husband of the petitioner now.
> In that case, the respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned
by them werelocated west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to
the national highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of petitioner’s property and the
southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. The pathway was more than one
meter wide and sixteen meters long. They claimed that thispathway had been established as early as
1955. In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a fence on thenorthern boundary of their property;
thus, blocking respondents’ access to the national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of
the fence, but petitioner refused.
> In her Answer, petitioner averred that respondents had not established any easement of right-of-way
either by law oragreement. She claimed that respondents failed to satisfy the requisites provided in
Articles 649 and 650 of the CivilCode in order to establish an easement of right-of-way on the northern
portion of her property. Moreover, she allegedthat respondents had another access as ingress and
egress to the public road other than the one traversing herproperty.
> The spouses Badua and Bucasas, the other respondents, failed to file an answer; consequently, they
were declaredin default
.> The RTC dismissed the complaint and held that the respondents ‚were not able to satisfy all the
requisites neededfor their claim of an easement of right of way.‛
> It observed that when petitioner fenced the northern portion of her property, respondents were able
to use another pathway as ingress and egress to the highway. It stated further that ‚the new pathway
is more than adequate‛ for respondents’ use. Thus, the applied easement of right-of-way on the
northern portion of petitioner’s property was not allowed. The said Decision became final and
executory.
2. It must be noted that the ‚new‛ pathway used by respondents, however, traversed the southern
portion of petitioner’s property.
3. Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again restricted the
use of respondents’ ‚new‛ pathway.
4. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioner’s action, respondents filed a Motion to Enforce the July 7,
2000 Decision ofthe RTC. They alleged that the Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based on
the existence of a newpathway which they had been using since 1995. Thus, they asserted that
petitioner was prohibited from closing saidpassage.
> The RTC granted the said motion.> Petitioner Obra filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
rejected in the trial court Order.5. Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20,
2001 Order, held that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioner’s representation that she
was allowing respondents to use the southern portion of her property as an alternative pathway. Since
the southern portion was an ‚agreed pathway,‛ petitioner could not reduce its width; thus, the trial
court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking the passage.
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The Issue Essentially, petitioner questions the propriety of the trial court’s issuance of an order
clarifying its final andexecutory decision and effectively establishing an easement on petitioner’s
property without proper adjudication.
The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the legality of an easement of right-of-way
over the pathway located south of petitioner’s property, nevertheless, concluded that the said passage
was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way which petitioner should respect.
The trial court was in error.
It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable.[14] Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter a final judgment and is left
only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. Any amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.[15]
To recapitulate, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033 meant that no easement was ever established
on petitioner’s property. However, the trial court, by issuing its March 20, 2001 Order directing
petitioner to remove the fence that limited respondents’ passage, effectively created a right-of-way on
petitioner’s property in favor of respondents allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement between
the parties. This directive was in contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void
for having been issued outside of the court’s jurisdiction.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary easement of right-of-way, subject of
the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant, and material to the issue of right-of-way as
averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5033, still, the conclusion that there was an agreed or
voluntary easement of right-of-way had no basis. The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal any
agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the
arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper
indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that there was a verbal
agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it should be
drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must be in
writing.[16] No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the assailed March 20, 2001 and June 20, 2001 Orders
are null, void, and without any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 20, 2001 and March 20, 2001 Orders of the San
Fernando City, La Union RTC, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. 5033 are hereby ANNULLED AND SET
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ASIDE.
6 Dichoso v Marcos, GR 180282, April 11, 2011
Topic: Legal Easements - Water Code
Facts:
On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent
Patrocinio L. Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553
of Laoag City, while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As petitioners had no access to a public road
to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since
1970. Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand.
Respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway. He stated that
petitioners’ claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not necessity. He also maintained that
there is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce.
Thus, there is no need to establish another easement over respondent’s property.
RTC: The Court found that petitioners adequately established the requisites to justify an easement of
right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise
declared petitioners in good faith as they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity
CA: Reversed and set aside the RTC decision and consequently dismissed petitioners’ complaint.
Considering that a right of way had already been granted by the (other) servient estate, designated as
Lot No. 21559-B and owned by the Spouses Arce, the appellate court concluded that there is no need to
establish an easement over respondent’s property. It emphasized that the convenience of the dominant
estate is never the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. Thus, the opening of another
passageway is unjustified.
Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to a legal easement
Held: No. The petition is without merit. Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy
the enumerated requirements under Art. 650 (NCC).
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the

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shortest.
By its very nature, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient
owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the
owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the
preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.
We find petitioners’ concept of what is ‚adequate outlet‛ a complete disregard of the well-entrenched
doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not
fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. The convenience of the dominant estate has
never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true standard for the grant of the
legal right is "adequacy." In order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must
be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. As such, when there is already an existing adequate
outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.
Petitioners had already been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot. There is an existing
outlet to and from the public road. Other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from
the public highway.
7 Regala v Carin, GR 188715, April 6, 2011 (About damages tong case eh..nagfocus na lang ako sa
wall..nagdiscuss na rin about damages..)
Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City.
In his complaint, respondent alleged in the main that, instead of boring just one hole as agreed upon,
petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into five parts for the purpose
of constructing a second floor with terrace; and that debris and dust piled up on respondent’s property
ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other things, shut some of the windows of his house.
Respondent thus prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages.
Petitioner, denying respondent’s allegations, claimed in his Answer6 that he was the sole and exclusive
owner of the wall referred to as a perimeter wall, the same having been built within the confines of his
property and being part and parcel of the house and lot package he purchased from the developer, BF
Homes, Inc., in 1981; that the issue of its ownership has never been raised by respondent or his
predecessor; and that securing the consent of respondent and his neighbors was a mere formality in
compliance with the requirements of the Building Official to facilitate the issuance of a building
permit, hence, it should not be taken to mean that he (petitioner) acknowledges respondent to be a co-
owner of the wall. He added that he eventually secured the requisite building permit7 in March 1999
and had duly paid the administrative fine.8
Further, petitioner, denying that a demolition of the whole length of the wall took place, claimed that
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he and his contractor’s laborers had been diligently cleaning respondent’s area after every day’s work
until respondent arrogantly demanded the dismantling of the scaffoldings, and barred the workforce
from, and threatening to shoot anyone entering the premises; and that the complaint was instituted by
respondent as leverage to force him to withdraw the criminal case for slander and light threats9 which
he had earlier filed against respondent for uttering threats and obscenities against him in connection
with the construction work.
In finding for respondent, the trial court declared that, apart from the fact that petitioner knowingly
commenced the renovation of his house without the requisite building permit from the City Engineer’s
Office, he misrepresented to respondent his true intent of introducing renovations. For, it found that
instead of just boring a hole in the perimeter wall as originally proposed, petitioner divided the wall
into several sections to serve as a foundation for his firewall (which ended up higher than the
perimeter wall) and the second storey of his house. – CA affirmed with modifications TC regarding
want of evidence to grant moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner lawfully exercised his property rights to introduce renovations to his
abode.
HELD: Yes. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real
intent when he initially sought respondent’s consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since
it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.1avvphi1
The testimony of petitioner and his witnesses, specifically Architect Punzalan, demonstrates that they
had actually taken measures to prevent, or at the very least, minimize the damage to respondent’s
property occasioned by the construction work. Architect Punzalan details how upon reaching an
agreement with petitioner for the construction of the second floor, he (Punzalan) surveyed petitioner’s
property based on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and Tax Declarations22 and found that the
perimeter wall was within the confines of petitioner’s property; that he, together with petitioner,
secured the consent of the neighbors (including respondent) prior to the start of the renovation as
reflected in a Neighbor’s Consent23 dated June 12, 1998; before the construction began, he undertook
measures to prevent debris from falling into respondent’s property such as the installation of GI sheet
strainers, the construction of scaffoldings24 on respondent’s property, the instructions to his workers to
clean the area before leaving at 5:00 p.m;25 and that the workers conducted daily clean-up of
respondent’s property with his consent, until animosity developed between the parties. 26
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad
faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.27 While the
Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and
anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was
malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award ofmoral damages under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code.

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Necessarily, the Court is not inclined to award exemplary damages.28
Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever. Respondent and his family’s
rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the
incident borne of petitioner’s construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage suffered by
respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the
same. Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, respondent
herein, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Granted. Only nominal damages are awarded.

1 Fabie v Lichauco, 11 Phil. 15
Facts:
Petitioner Miguel Fabie applied for the registration of his property in Manila free from any
encumbrances except the easement of right of way in favor of respondents Julita Lichauco and Hijos de
Roxas. In addition to the said right of way,respondents also claim that of light and view and drainage.
However, the claim was later reduce only to that of the light and view. Lichauco claimed that when
Juan Bautista Coloma, the original owner of both estates, established not only an easement of right of
way but also that of light and view and that when both the properties were alienated, the apparent
signs were not removed.
The apparent sign allegedly consists of a gallery with windows through which light is admitted. It was
supported on columns erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner and the balcony on
Lichauco’s property is supported by uprights erected on the land by petitioner. The parties admitted
the existence of such gallery. The house was now a frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of which
16 meters and 60 centimeters correspond to the main part of the same, and 1 meter and 90 centimeters to the
gallery in question. It results, therefore, that at the present day, the house has nearly 2 meters more frontage than when
it was alienated by Coloma.
Therefore, at the present day the house is erected partly on the land belonging to the owner and partly, the
gallery, over a lot belonging to another; that is, over that of the petitioner. When it was sold in October,
1848, no portion of the house occupied the lot last mentioned, but the entire building was erected over
a lot belonging to the owner
as set forth in the instrument of sale.
The lower court held that the right of way and drainage exist in favor of the respondents’ respective
properties. The claim as to the easement of light and view was dismissed by the court.
Issue:

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Whether or not Respondents are entitled to the easement of light and view.
Held:
No. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what time the gallery in controversy
was constructed inasmuch as he limits himself to sustaining and defending the freedom of
his property, denying the easement o flight and view of the respondent pretends to impose over it. A
property is assumed to be from all encumberance unless the contrary is proved. Respondent who
claims the said easement is obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the apparent sign
of the easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the time of ownership of her property and that of the
petitioner were separated. And inasmuch as this issue has not been proved, the claim of the
respondents as to the easements of the light and view which the petitioner does not admit, must of
necessity be dismissed.
Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement of the parties that the respondents has balconies
over the land of the petitioner; and as it is, since it has been positively shown that the said balconies
exceed the limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they invade the atmospheric area of the
lot belonging to the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory maintained by the
respondents with which on account of its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal herein as to
its other aspect, the easement of view, which might result in such case from the existence of the
balconies alluded to, would be negative and not a positive one, because the erection of the same
would not constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion of the right of another, but the
lawful exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the respondents to construct within their own
lot.
And as said easement is negative, it cannot have prescribed in favor of the property of the respondents
in the absence of any act of opposition, according to the agreement, by which they or their principals
would have prohibited the petitioner or his principals to do any work which obstruct the balconies in
question, inasmuch as said act of opposition is what constitutes the necessary and indispensable point
of departure for computing the time required by law for the prescription of negative easements. Thus,
the judgment appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court.f
Other easements – NCC 674-676, 677-681, 682-683,667-673

Drainage of Buildings
Article 674. The owner of a building shall be obliged to construct its roof or covering in such manner that the rain
water shall fall on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the land of his neighbor, even though the
adjacent land may belong to two or more persons, one of whom is the owner of the roof. Even if it should fall on his
own land, the owner shall be obliged to collect the water in such a way as not to cause damage to the adjacent land
or tenement. (586a)
Article 675. The owner of a tenement or a piece of land, subject to the easement of receiving water falling from
roofs, may build in such manner as to receive the water upon his own roof or give it another outlet in accordance

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with local ordinances or customs, and in such a way as not to cause any nuisance or damage whatever to the
dominant estate. (587)
Article 676. Whenever the yard or court of a house is surrounded by other houses, and it is not possible to give an
outlet through the house itself to the rain water collected thereon, the establishment of an easement of drainage can
be demanded, giving an outlet to the water at the point of the contiguous lands or tenements where its egress may
be easiest, and establishing a conduit for the drainage in such manner as to cause the least damage to the servient
estate, after payment of the property indemnity. (583)
SECTION 7
Intermediate Distances and Works for Certain Constructions and Plantings
Article 677. No constructions can be built or plantings made near fortified places or fortresses without compliance
with the conditions required in special laws, ordinances, and regulations relating thereto. (589)
Article 678. No person shall build any aqueduct, well, sewer, furnace, forge, chimney, stable, depository of
corrosive substances, machinery, or factory which by reason of its nature or products is dangerous or noxious,
without observing the distances prescribed by the regulations and customs of the place, and without making the
necessary protective works, subject, in regard to the manner thereof, to the conditions prescribed by such
regulations. These prohibitions cannot be altered or renounced by stipulation on the part of the adjoining
proprietors.
In the absence of regulations, such precautions shall be taken as may be considered necessary, in order to avoid any
damage to the neighboring lands or tenements. (590a)
Article 679. No trees shall be planted near a tenement or piece of land belonging to another except at the distance
authorized by the ordinances or customs of the place, and, in the absence thereof, at a distance of at least two
meters from the dividing line of the estates if tall trees are planted and at a distance of at least fifty centimeters if
shrubs or small trees are planted.
Every landowner shall have the right to demand that trees hereafter planted at a shorter distance from his land or
tenement be uprooted.
The provisions of this article also apply to trees which have grown spontaneously. (591a)
Article 680. If the branches of any tree should extend over a neighboring estate, tenement, garden or yard, the
owner of the latter shall have the right to demand that they be cut off insofar as they may spread over his property,
and, if it be the roots of a neighboring tree which should penetrate into the land of another, the latter may cut them
off himself within his property. (592)
Article 681. Fruits naturally falling upon adjacent land belong to the owner of said land. (n)
SECTION 8
Easement Against Nuisance (n)
Article 682. Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor
from committing nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust, water, glare and other causes.
Article 683. Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations, factories and shops may be
maintained provided the least possible annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.
Easement of Light and View

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Article 667. No part-owner may, without the consent of the others, open through the party wall any window or
aperture of any kind. (580)
Article 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be counted:
(1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or
(2) From the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the window is
through a wall on the dominant estate. (n)
Article 669. When the distances in article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall which is not party wall,
adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to another, can make in it openings to admit light at the height of
the ceiling joints or immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty centimeters square, and, in every case,
with an iron grating imbedded in the wall and with a wire screen.
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or property adjoining the wall in which the openings are made can close
them should he acquire part-ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to the contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a building on his land or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to that
having such openings, unless an easement of light has been acquired. (581a)
Article 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct view upon or
towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two meters between the wall in
which they are made and such contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be a distance
of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription. (582a)
Article 671. The distance referred to in the preceding article shall be measured in cases of direct views from the
outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer line of the latter when they do, and in cases
of oblique view from the dividing line between the two properties. (583)
Article 672. The provisions of article 670 are not applicable to buildings separated by a public way or alley, which
is not less than three meters wide, subject to special regulations and local ordinances. (584a)
Article 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon at less than a distance of
three meters to be measured in the manner provided in article 671. Any stipulation permitting distances less than
those prescribed in article 670 is void.
2 Calma v CA, 176 SCRA 556
Facts: Sometime in 1990, the Hukbalahap Veterans Association (Hukvets) filed a letter complaint with
the SEC alleging that petitioners Calma, Liwanag, Cayanan and Maglangue surreptitiously arrogated
unto themselves the powers and functions of trustees and officers of Hukvets.
SEC, through its Prosecution and Enforcement Department issued a resolution directing the Board of
Trustees to call within 30 days a general membership meeting for the election of 7 new members of the
board. Petitioners objected to this. SEC denied their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners went to the CA contending that the SEC Prosecution and Enforcement Department was
without jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate corporate election contests. CA was unpersuaded.
Hence, this petition before the SC.

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Issue: Whether or not the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC has jurisdiction to
investigate the letter complaint filed by Hukvets.
Held: Yes.
(1) SEC has both regulatory and adjudicative functions. Relative to the latter, SEC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies and cases involving (a) intra-corporate and
partnership relations between the corporation, officers and stockholders, including elections or
appointments; (b) state and corporate affairs in relation to the legal existence of the corporation,
partnership or to their franchises; (c) investors and corporate affairs; (d) petitions for suspension of
payments.
(2) The Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC has the inherent power, according to Sec.
6 of P.D. 1758 amending P.D. 902-A, to investigate, on complaint or motu propio, any act or omission
of the Board of Directors/Trustees of corporations, their stockholders, officers or partners, including
any fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law.
Hence, SEC, under its adjudicative jurisdiction, has the power to hear and decide controversies
involving intra-corporate relations between and among members and officers of a corporation. The
Prosecution and Enforcement Department was established as its adjudicative arm. As such, it is vested
with the authority to investigate, on complaint or motu propio, any act or omission of the Board of
Directors of corporations, as in the case at bar.
3 Gancayco v QC, GR 177807, October 11, 2011
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] promulgated on 18 July 2006 and the Resolution[2] dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648.
The Facts
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue (EDSA),[3] Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.
On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled ‚An Ordinance
Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones
Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation
Thereof.‛*4+
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk
beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.[5]
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50
meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot after
Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council,
there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the
construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular
ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the
ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner
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is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or
shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an
arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon City-
San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This
ordinance was further amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial
buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March 1966 meanwhile
reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings along V. Luna Road, Central District,
Quezon City.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice
Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the
application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued
Resolution No. 7161, S-66, ‚subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner
shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public
interest so demands.‛*6+
Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted
operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila
Council’s (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.[7] The resolution authorized the MMDA and
local government units to ‚clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.‛*8+
On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of
his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code)[9] in relation to
Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the
building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.[10]
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the
MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the ‚wing walls,‛ of the
ground floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the
demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the
affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.
On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11] with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City
from demolishing his property. In his Petition,[12] he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking
of private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an
arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that
the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the
owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete
to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of
Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just
compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
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regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was
already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance
that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It
further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of
pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement
established by Ordinance No. 2904.[13]
The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco.[14] It held that the
questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice
Gancayco’s 375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the public’s
benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated
owners’ right to equal protection of laws. The dispositive portion thus states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares Quezon City Ordinance
No. 2094,[15] Series of 1956 to be unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are
hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing and implementing the said ordinance, and the
respondent MMDA is hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of the party wall or wing
wall of the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July 2006, the Court of
Appeals (CA) partly granted the appeal.[16] The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and
lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general
welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance
established a valid classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their
respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of
private property, since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property, to wit:
Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his commercial lot,
appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said property. Thus, there is no ‚taking‛ for public
use which must be subject to just compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public
good, for providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same still redounds
to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The
arcaded sidewalks, by their nature, assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind
of protection from accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon
to the business activity therein engaged. [17]
Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject
property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys,
bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private
property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or
abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated:
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WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon City, is MODIFIED, as follows:
1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,[18] Series of 1956, issued by the City
Council of Quezon City, is UPHELD; and
2) The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration.[19]
On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not present new issues nor
offer grounds that would merit the reconsideration of the Court.[20]
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective Petitions
for Review before this Court. The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
II. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A
PUBLIC NUISANCE.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCO.
The Court’s Ruling

Estoppel
The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was
estopped from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the
application of the ordinance. According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of
the city government to regulate the construction of buildings.
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1)
whether the ordinance ‚takes‛ private property without due process of law and just compensation;
and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions
from its application.
On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the
ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a ‚taking‛ of private property
without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly
deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was
granted an exemption in 1966, there was no ‚taking‛ yet to speak of.
Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held:
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner
acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not
preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority
of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority
208 | P a g e -
are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect
to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22] we likewise held:
We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all
issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false
misrepresentation or misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to
comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only later on filing the subject
case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law
results in what it perceives to be unlawful discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been relied
upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for
considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the
question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the
ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice
Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was
eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as
there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with
regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is
not the proper person to do so.
Zoning and the regulation of the
construction of buildings are valid
exercises of police power .
In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,[23] we discussed the nature of police powers exercised by
local government units, to wit:
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there
was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of
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Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power
by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City,[24] which
states:
To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the
City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter
also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and
structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing
them.[25]
With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we
apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza.[26] In that case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City
enacted an ordinance on 28 November 2001 reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to
commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those areas were no longer
allowed. Though the oil companies contended that they stood to lose billions of pesos, this Court
upheld the power of the city government to pass the assailed ordinance, stating:
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And
to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare
must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the
area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a
local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given
political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the
zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no
longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is
derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be
unjust... (Emphasis supplied)
In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[27] we also held:

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare.
210 | P a g e -
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the
mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it
issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the
city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along
the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so
because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business
zone along EDSA.
Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,[28] which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance,
supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:
Section 102. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life,
health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings
and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their
location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and maintenance.
Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning ordinances
require it. Apparently, the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are
necessary within their respective jurisdictions.
Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the
arcade should be constructed above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not need
to address this argument inasmuch as it raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter
we will not and need not delve into.
To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to
guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council
from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.
The ‚wing walls‛ of the building are not
nuisances per se.
The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.
We disagree.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade
is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per
se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may
declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.

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Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition
or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of
necessity.[29]
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the
city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of
persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing
the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the
power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,[30]
we held:
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order
its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance
when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the
manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang
Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA illegally demolished

the property of Justice Gancayco.
MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to
demolish Justice Gancayco’s property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA
and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other
public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it
demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished.
The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent
provisions of the Building Code provide:
SECTION 205. Building Officials. — Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building Official
shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as the enforcement
of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.

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Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District
Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as Building Officials in their respective areas of
jurisdiction.
The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular positions of
Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for causes provided by law or decree.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. — In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the
Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this Code as
well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the official charged with the
duties of issuing building permits.
In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all
reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and the
terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official
may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed
to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy
or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the
provisions of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. — When any building or structure is found
or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or
demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to
further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.[31] is applicable to the
case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled
the advertising media installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held:
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks'
billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to
dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the
MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that
MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration.
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Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:
...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for
the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative
in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro
Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of local government units concerning purely local
matters.
The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and
other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to
the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the
prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks'
billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3,
and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA.
Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition.
MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and
its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the
Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA,
considering the law's following provision, thus:
Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. -

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of
penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."
There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the
Building Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of
illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of ‚a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30)
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days, or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court, Provided, that if the
violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the Manager, managing
partner, or any person charged with the management thereof shall be held responsible therefor.‛ The
ordinance itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a
violation of the ordinance.
As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it
cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution
No. 02-28.
Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have
approved the demolition of the structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R.
Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers
to the MMDA. The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and abate a
nuisance[32] and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by
the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner.[33]
MMDA’s argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA.
Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the
acts of the former. In its Answer,*34+ the city government stated that ‚the demolition was undertaken
by the MMDA only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City.‛ Therefore, the MMDA
acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice
Gancayco’s building.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648
is AFFIRMED.
4 Unisource Commercial v Chung, July 17, 2009, GR No. 73252
Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land covered
by a title. It contains a memorandum of encumberance of a voluntary easement which has been carried
from the OCT belonging to Sandico. The voluntary easement is in favor of Hidalgo. The Sandico
property has been transferred to several owners. The Hidalgo property has likewise been transferred
to several owners, the respondents. Unisource filed a petition to cancel the encumberance of voluntary
right of way alleging that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road. It was granted
by the RTC ruling that the dominant estate has no more use since it has another adequate outlet to a
public road. The CA reversed on appeal. The appellate court ruled that Article 631(3) of the Civil Code,
which was cited by the trial court, is inapplicable since the presence of an adequate outlet to a highway
extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like in the instant case.
There having been an agreement between the original parties for the provision of an easement of right
of way in favor of the dominant estate, the same can be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
ISSUE: Is the ruling of the CA correct?
Yes. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary easements. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
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easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity. (La Vista Assn. Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 95252, September 5, 1997, 287 SCRA
498). A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. (Unisource Commercial &
Dev. Corp. v. Chung, et al., G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009).
Property; easement. An easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are
established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter,
voluntary easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of
respondents. Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal
easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it
has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. The opening of an adequate
outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like
in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of
the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished
only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely
mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or
assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is not binding on
them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally
effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Petitioner cites City of Manila v. Entote in justifying that the easement should bind only the parties
mentioned therein and exclude those not so mentioned. However, that case is inapplicable since the
issue therein was whether the easement was intended not only for the benefit of the owners of the
dominant estate but of the community and the public at large. In interpreting the easement, the Court
ruled that the clause ‚any and all other persons whomsoever‛ in the easement embraces only ‚those
who are privy to the owners of the dominant estate, Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-2672‛ and excludes ‚the
indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of the right-of-way easement.‛
Although the easement does not appear in respondents’ title over the dominant estate, the same
subsists. It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without the
annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it
is the registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary
easement, which extinguishes the easement.
Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the easement.
Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided between two or more
persons, each of them may use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or

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making it more burdensome in any other way. Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation
vs. Joseph Chung, et al
Extinguishment of Easements – NCC 631, 655

Article 631. Easements are extinguished:
(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed from the day
on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which an act contrary
to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but it shall revive
if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when the use
becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding
number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates.
Article 655. If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to be necessary because its owner has joined
it to another abutting on a public road, the owner of the servient estate may demand that the easement be
extinguished, returning what he may have received by way of indemnity. The interest on the indemnity shall be
deemed to be in payment of rent for the use of the easement.
The same rule shall be applied in case a new road is opened giving access to the isolated estate.
In both cases, the public highway must substantially meet the needs of the dominant estate in order that the
easement may be extinguished.
DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
A. In general, NCC 712

Article 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and
intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription.
5 Acap v CA, 251 SCRA 30
Doctrine: Ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process.While title
is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a
thing in question.FACTS: Teodoro Acap has been a tenant of a portion of land of Lot No. 1130
HinigaranCadastre since 1960. Said lot was formerly owned by Spouses Vasquez and Lorenza
Oruma,which upon their death was inherited by Felixberto. In 1975, Felixberto sold the lot to
CosmePido. Acap remained to be a registered tenant of the said land and religiously paid his
leaseholdrentals to Pido and thereafter, upon his death, to his widow Laurenciana. On 1981, Pido’s
wifeand children executed a notarized document denominated ‚Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights‛ of the land in favor Edy delos Reyes. Delos Reyes alleged that he and Acap enteredinto an oral
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lease agreement whereby Acap undertook to pay him 10 cavans of rice per year aslease rental. From
1983 onwards Acap refused to pay further lease rentals. In defense, Acapdenied having entered in an
oral lease agreement with delos Reyes and that he did notrecognize his ownership over the land. As a
matter of fact he alleged that he continued to payLaurenciana, Pido’s wife. Delos Reyes filed a suit of
recovery of possession against Acap andfor the payment of rentals accruing to him as owner of the
said lot. Trial court rendered decisionin favor of delos Reyes ruling that there was a perfected sale
between heirs of Pido and delosReyes over the said lot and ordered Acap to deliver possession of the
same to delos Reyes.Upon appeal, CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether delos Reyes acquired ownership over the lot in question.
HELD: NO. The Court noted that an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over athing
arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise toownership over the
res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditionsimposed by law. Hence,
ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the
juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in
question. Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, modes of acquisition may either be original or
derivative. Original modes of acquisition include occupation,acquisitive prescription, law or
intellectual creation. Derivative modes of acquisition on the other hand include succession mortis
causa and tradition as a result of certain contracts such as sale,barter, donation, assignment or
mutuum. In the instant case, the Court determined whether delos Reyes acquired ownership over the
lot in question through any of the modes mentioned. Itwas ruled that he had not acquired ownership
by virtue of sale, as opposed to the ruling of bothRTC and CA. The execution of the heirs of Pido the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights was held to be not tantamount to sale. Such declaration
is only one whereby heirsadjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as
they see fit. TheCourt further noted that waiver of hereditary rights is different from sale of hereditary
rights. Saleof hereditary rights presupposes an existence of a contract of sale whereas waiver of
hereditaryrights is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with a knowledge of
itsexistence and intention to relinquish it in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in thesuccession.
As delos Reyes is a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, he cannot claimownership over the lot on
the sole basis of the document executed. Hence, private respondentdelos Reyes had not acquired
ownership over Lot 1130 and consequently had no right to exactlease rentals from petitioner Acap.
B. Modes of Acquiring Ownership
1. Intellectual Creation
* Now governed by the Intellectual Property Code and the TRIPS Agreement.
2. Occupation, NCC 713-720
Article 713. Things appropriable by nature which are without an owner, such as animals that are the object of
hunting and fishing, hidden treasure and abandoned movables, are acquired by occupation. (610)
Article 714. The ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. (n)
Article 715. The right to hunt and to fish is regulated by special laws. (611)
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Article 716. The owner of a swarm of bees shall have a right to pursue them to another's land, indemnifying the
possessor of the latter for the damage. If the owner has not pursued the swarm, or ceases to do so within two
consecutive days, the possessor of the land may occupy or retain the same. The owner of domesticated animals may
also claim them within twenty days to be counted from their occupation by another person. This period having
expired, they shall pertain to him who has caught and kept them. (612a)
Article 717. Pigeons and fish which from their respective breeding places pass to another pertaining to a different
owner shall belong to the latter, provided they have not been enticed by some article or fraud. (613a)
Article 718. He who by chance discovers hidden treasure in another's property shall have the right granted him in
article 438 of this Code. (614)
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If the latter
is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding
has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he deems best.
If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration, or without expenses which considerably diminish its value, it
shall be sold at public auction eight days after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the thing found, or its value,
shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the
expenses. (615a)
Article 720. If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged to pay, as a reward to the finder, one-tenth of
the sum or of the price of the thing found.
6 Palero-Tan v Urdaneta, A.M. P-07-2399, June 18, 2008
Topic: Occupation
Facts:
Plaintiff discovered that her ring and bracelet worth fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) were missing.
Complainant remembered her younger sister went to the RTC to ask for her necklace. Complainant
took out from her table drawer a transparent plastic sachet which contained her ring and bracelet, and
her sister’s necklace, and after handing over to her sister the necklace, she returned the plastic sachet,
still containing the bracelet and ring, to her table drawer. She maintained that the only person who
was present and saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was respondent, whose table is
adjacent to hers.
Plaintiff heard from his landlady, Nable, that respondent and his wife, Milagros, had a quarrel because
the latter discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondent’s coin purse. Complainant was certain that the
jewels Milagros saw in respondent’s purse were hers based on Milagros’s description of the said ring
and bracelet.
Hence, she filed a case against the respondent.
Issue: WON the respondent should be held administratively liable.

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Held:
Yes. The court found respondent’s actions inconsistent with his claim that he had no intention to take
the jewelry for his personal gain. For reasons only known to him, respondent never bothered to
inform his officemates about the jewelry placed in a plastic sachet that he allegedly found under his
table ‚at the side nearest to the adjacent table of the complainant.‛ Although there is no direct evidence
that would show that respondent stole complainant’s ring and bracelet, nonetheless, respondent is not
immaculately innocent as regards the loss of the same. The declarations of the wife, the plaintiff, and
his testimony constitute substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings.
The Court has emphasized, time and again, that the conduct of every one connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Every employee of the judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Even a court janitor is as duty-bound to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility as all other public officers. Those who work in the judiciary must
adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the court’s good name and standing. They should be
examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence since they are officers of the court and agents of the law. Indeed, any
conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be
countenanced. The conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. As
forerunners in the administration of justice, they ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty
and integrity, considering that their positions primarily involve service to the public.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, an unlawful behavior willful in character, an improper or wrong behavior, while
‚gross‛ has been defined as ‚out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as
is not to be excused.‛ Gross misconduct has been defined as the transgression of some established or
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence.
Pursuant to Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292,
Grave Misconduct, being in the nature of grave offenses, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in government service.
However, it is an undeniable fact that respondent has rendered some years of commendable service in
the judiciary. Respondent has been with the judiciary for twenty-three (23) years and this is the only
administrative case filed against him. Records also show that respondent had availed himself of
optional retirement which became effective on 30 November 2006, and his retirement benefits were
withheld pending the outcome of the instant administrative complaint. Considering the foregoing and
for humanitarian reasons, the Court finds a fine of P30,000.00 to be an appropriate penalty for
respondent, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

220 | P a g e -
3. Law, NCC 681, 1434, 1456
Article 681. Fruits naturally falling upon adjacent land belong to the owner of said land.
Article 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller
or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
4. Tradition, NCC 1496-1501

Article 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in
any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
Article 1501. With respect to incorporeal property, the provisions of the first paragraph of article 1498 shall
govern. In any other case wherein said provisions are not applicable, the placing of the titles of ownership in the
possession of the vendee or the use by the vendee of his rights, with the vendor's consent, shall be understood as a
delivery.
5. Donation, NCC 725 – 769

Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. (618a)
Article 726. When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter's merits or of the services
rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon
the donee a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation. (619)
Article 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and remuneratory donations shall be considered as not
imposed. (n)
Article 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)
Article 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the
property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
property from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides
otherwise. (n)
Article 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take place beyond the
natural expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a donation inter vivos, unless a
contrary intention appears. (n)
Article 731. When a person donates something, subject to the resolutory condition of the donor's survival, there is
a donation inter vivos. (n)
Article 732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on
contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in this Title. (621)
Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed. (622)
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Article 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)
CHAPTER 2
Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation
Article 735. All persons who may contract and dispose of their property may make a donation. (624)
Article 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them. (n)
Article 737. The donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation. (n)
Article 738. Al those who are not specially disqualified by law therefor may accept donations. (625)
Article 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or
donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. (n)
Article 740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be applicable to donations inter vivos. (n)
Article 741. Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done
through their parents or legal representatives. (626a)
Article 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would
legally represent them if they were already born. (627)
Article 743. Donations made to incapacitated persons shall be void, though simulated under the guise of another
contract or through a person who is interposed. (628)
Article 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be governed by the provisions
concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more different persons. (n)
Article 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power
for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be void. (630)
Article 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and of the donee. (n)
Article 747. Persons who accept donations in representation of others who may not do so by themselves, shall be
obliged to make the notification and notation of which article 749 speaks. (631)
Article 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right
donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be
made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)
Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take
effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments. (633)

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CHAPTER 3
Effect of Donations and Limitations Thereon
Article 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he
reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at
the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such
reservation, the donation shall be reduced in petition of any person affected. (634a)
Article 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation. (635)
Article 752. The provisions of article 750 notwithstanding, no person may give or receive, by way of donation,
more than he may give or receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation. (636)
Article 753. When a donation is made to several persons jointly, it is understood to be in equal shares, and there
shall be no right of accretion among them, unless the donor has otherwise provided.
The preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to donations made to the husband and wife jointly, between whom
there shall be a right of accretion, if the contrary has not been provided by the donor. (637)
Article 754. The donee is subrogated to all the rights and actions which in case of eviction would pertain to the
donor. The latter, on the other hand, is not obliged to warrant the things donated, save when the donation is
onerous, in which case the donor shall be liable for eviction to the concurrence of the burden.
The donor shall also be liable for eviction or hidden defects in case of bad faith on his part. (638a)
Article 755. The right to dispose of some of the things donated, or of some amount which shall be a charge thereon,
may be reserved by the donor; but if he should die without having made use of this right, the property or amount
reserved shall belong to the donee. (639)
Article 756. The ownership of property may also be donated to one person and the usufruct to another or others,
provided all the donees are living at the time of the donation. (640a)
Article 757. Reversion may be validly established in favor of only the donor for any case and circumstances, but
not in favor of other persons unless they are all living at the time of the donation.
Any reversion stipulated by the donor in favor of a third person in violation of what is provided in the preceding
paragraph shall be void, but shall not nullify the donation. (614a)
Article 758. When the donation imposes upon the donee the obligation to pay the debts of the donor, if the clause
does not contain any declaration to the contrary, the former is understood to be liable to pay only the debts which
appear to have been previously contracted. In no case shall the donee be responsible for the debts exceeding the
value of the property donated, unless a contrary intention clearly appears. (642a)
Article 759. There being no stipulation regarding the payment of debts, the donee shall be responsible therefor
only when the donation has been made in fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors, when at the time thereof the donor did not reserve
sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the donation. (643)
CHAPTER 4
Revocation and Reduction of Donations
Article 760. Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having no children or descendants, legitimate or
legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as provided in the next article, by
the happening of any of these events:
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(1) If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate children, even though they
be posthumous;
(2) If the child of the donor, whom the latter believed to be dead when he made the donation, should turn out to be
living;
(3) If the donor subsequently adopt a minor child. (644a)
Article 761. In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it
exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the
time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child. (n)
Article 762. Upon the revocation or reduction of the donation by the birth, appearance or adoption of a child, the
property affected shall be returned or its value if the donee has sold the same.
If the property is mortgaged, the donor may redeem the mortgage, by paying the amount guaranteed, with a right
to recover the same from the donee.
When the property cannot be returned, it shall be estimated at what it was worth at the time of the donation.
(645a)
Article 763. The action for revocation or reduction on the grounds set forth in article 760 shall prescribe after four
years from the birth of the first child, or from his legitimation, recognition or adoption, or from the judicial
declaration of filiation, or from the time information was received regarding the existence of the child believed
dead.
This action cannot be renounced, and is transmitted, upon the death of the donor, to his legitimate and illegitimate
children and descendants. (646a)
Article 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of
the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.
In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations made by the donee and the
mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with the limitations established, with regard to third persons, by
the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the
heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (647a)
Article 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the
following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his
wife or children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he
should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children
under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
(648a)
Article 766. Although the donation is revoked on account of ingratitude, nevertheless, the alienations and
mortgages effected before the notation of the complaint for revocation in the Registry of Property shall subsist.
Later ones shall be void. (649)
Article 767. In the case referred to in the first paragraph of the preceding article, the donor shall have a right to
demand from the donee the value of property alienated which he cannot recover from third persons, or the sum for
which the same has been mortgaged.
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The value of said property shall be fixed as of the time of the donation. (650)
Article 768. When the donation is revoked for any of the causes stated in article 760, or by reason of ingratitude,
or when it is reduced because it is inofficious, the donee shall not return the fruits except from the filing of the
complaint.
If the revocation is based upon noncompliance with any of the conditions imposed in the donation, the donee shall
return not only the property but also the fruits thereof which he may have received after having failed to fulfill the
condition. (651)
Article 769. The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action
prescribes within one year, to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for
him to bring the action.
a. Features
Seventh Day Adventist v. Northeastern Mindanao, 496 SCRA 215
Spouses Felix Cosio and Felisa Cuysona donate a parcel of land to South Philippine [Union] Mission of
Seventh Day Adventist Church, and was received by Liberato Rayos, an elder of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church, on behalf of the donee.
However, twenty years later, the spouses sold the same land to the Seventh Day Adventist Church of
Northeastern Mindanao Mission.
Claiming to be the alleged donee’s successors-in-interest, petitioners asserted ownership over the
property. This was opposed by respondents who argued that at the time of the donation, SPUM-SDA
Bayugan could not legally be a donee because, not having been incorporated yet, it had no juridical
personality. Neither were petitioners members of the local church then, hence, the donation could not
have been made particularly to them.
ISSUE: Should the Seventh Day Adventist Church of Northeastern Mindanao Mission's ownership of
the lot be upheld?
HELD: We answer in the affirmative.
Donation is undeniably one of the modes of acquiring ownership of real property. Likewise,
ownership of a property may be transferred by tradition as a consequence of a sale.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another person who accepts it. The donation could not have been made in favor of an entity yet
inexistent at the time it was made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet no one to accept it.
The deed of donation was not in favor of any informal group of SDA members but a supposed SPUM-
SDA Bayugan (the local church) which, at the time, had neither juridical personality nor capacity to
accept such gift.

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(regarding de facto corporation and law of sales.)
Corporate existence begins only from the moment a certificate of incorporation is issued. No such
certificate was ever issued to petitioners or their supposed predecessor-in-interest at the time of the
donation. Petitioners obviously could not have claimed succession to an entity that never came to exist.
Neither could the principle of separate juridical personality apply since there was never any
corporation15 to speak of. And, as already stated, some of the representatives of petitioner Seventh Day
Adventist Conference Church of Southern Philippines, Inc. were not even members of the local church
then, thus, they could not even claim that the donation was particularly for them. In view of the
foregoing, petitioners’ arguments anchored on their supposed de facto status hold no water. We are
convinced that there was no donation to petitioners or their supposed predecessor-in-interest.
Well-entrenched is the rule that a Certificate of Title is generally a conclusive evidence of

[ownership] of the land. There is that strong and solid presumption that titles were legally issued and
that they are valid. It is irrevocable and indefeasible and the duty of the Court is to see to it that the
title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. xxx The title shall be
received as evidence in all the Courts and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein.
*This action was instituted almost seven years after the certificate of title in respondents’ name was
issued in 1980.]
Petition Denied.
b. Classifications
7 Del Rosario v Ferrer, 630 SCRA 683
FACTS:
(Doctrine: Irrevocabilityof the donation is the standard thatidentifies the donation as intervivos. It is a
quality absolutelyincompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa.)
Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed adocument entitled ‚Donation MortisCausa‛ in
favor of their 2 children Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter Jarabini. The Deed of
Donation statedthat, ‚it is our will that thisdonation mortis causa shall beirreovocable and shall be
respectedby the surviving spouse.‛ Although denominated as adonation mortis causa, which inlaw is
equivalent to a will, the deed has no attestation clause and was witnessed only by two persons.Before
the death of donor Leopoldo, heexecuted a deed of assignment of his rights and interest in thesubject
property to their daughter Asuncion. subsequently, granddaughter Jarabini filed a petition for the
probate of the deed of donation mortis causain the RTC. Asuncion opposed the petition,invoking
Leopoldo’s assignment of hisrights to her. Decision wasrendered by the RTC, ordering the registration
of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares. The court ruled that the donation was one
made inter vivos,thus the assignment of Leopoldo of hisrights was void. CA reversed thedecision of

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the RTC and ruled that the donation, being one given
mortis causa, did not complywith the requirements of a notarialwill, rendering the same void.
WON the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa (effective upon death), as in fact
designated, or actually a donation inter vivos (effective during the lifetime of the Donors)
HELD: IT IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS. That the document in question in this case was captioned
"Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter
vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In Austria-Magat v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea
of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis
causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is
"our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving
spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in
reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the
property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that
such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors
parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while
they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required.
This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form
of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.
c. Form
1 Pajarillo v IAC, 176 SCRA 340

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Topic: Modes of Acquiring Ownership – Donation, as to Form
The petitioners are the widow and children of the brother of the principal private respondent. She and
her brother appear to be the only remaining issue of the mother who seems to have caused all the
present confusion. The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who had a brother named Felipe Balane
and a sister named Perfecta Balane de Cordero. Perfecta died in 1945 leaving inter alia a tract of land
consisting of about 28 hectares. On May 20, 1946, Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument
entitled "Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero‛, disposing
the property.
These instruments were never registered nor was title transferred in Salud's (herein respondent) name
although she says she immediately took possession of the land. Meantime, intestate proceedings were
instituted on the estate of Perfecta and the said land was among those included in the inventory of the
properties belonging to the decedent. No objection was interposed by Salud. Salud interposed no
objection to its inclusion nor did she oppose its subsequent adjudication to her mother Juana in the
project of partition. It is not clear if the land was ever registered in Juana's name. However, there is
evidence that Juana confirmed the earlier donation of the land to Salud but requested that she be
allowed to possess the same and enjoy its fruits, until her death. It has also not been controverted that
Salud paid the P1,000.00 loan for which the land was mortgaged. In 1951, said possession of the land
was transferred to Salud’s mother who was residing with Claudio’s family. Since then, Claudio’s
family had paid the realty taxes.
In 1956, Juana, Salud’s mother executed a deed of sale to Claudio – in turn, Claudio registered the
same in his name. In 1961, Claudio died and soon after, in 1963, so did Juana.
In 1965, Respondents herein filed for reconveyance alleging that the deed of sale was fictitious. Salud
(joined by her husband) alleged that she was unaware until later of the supposed sale of the land to
Claudio. She faulted it as having been procured through fraud and improper influence on her sick and
aged mother. She claimed that no compensation was actually paid by Claudio and that the transaction
was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the defendants
In their defense, the defendants assailed the donation to Salud as legally inefficacious and defective
and contended that her complaint was barred by prescription, estoppel and res judicata. They also
filed a counterclaim questioning the sale to Salud by her mother of another tract of land, in which they
said they were entitled to share as Juana's heirs.
CFI – Reconveyance ordered.
Issue: Form of acceptance –
Held:

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Petition Denied. Reconveyance proceeds.
It was pointed out that the donation is defective in form because of non-compliance with the
requirements of the law regarding its acceptance. As it was executed in 1946, the applicable rule is
Article 633 of the old Civil Code reading as follows:
Art. 633. In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made by public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described and the amount
of the charges to be assumed by the donee expressed.
The acceptance may be made, in the deed of gift or in a separate public writing; but it
shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made, by separate public instrument, authentic notice thereof shall be
given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate public instrument and that it was
duly communicated to the donors. Even the petitioners cannot deny this. But what they do contend is
that such acceptance was not "noted in both instruments," meaning the extrajudicial partition itself and
the instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that "authentic notice"
of the acceptance was made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first instrument contains the
statement that "the donee does hereby accept this donation and does hereby express her gratitude for
the kindness and liberality of the donor," the only signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and Juana
Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the separate instrument of acceptance signed by
Salud a month later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion than the annulment of the
donation for being defective in form as urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with the
unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision. However, we find that under the circumstances
of the present case, a literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the
parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such an
intepretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the
acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered
during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare
the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's
acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also
disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate instrument

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dated June 20,1946, and as later acknowledged by Juana.
First, the problem with the petitioners' theory is that it would regard Juana and Salud as strangers
when they are in fact mother and daughter. One may expect a person to be vigilant of his rights when
dealing with an acquaintance or associate, or even with a friend, but not when the other person is a
close relative, as in the case at bar. To begin with, the land came from Juana herself. Second, Salud only
acceded to her mother’s request. If Salud did not protest the inclusion of the land in the inventory of
Perfecta's properties and its subsequent adjudication to Juana in the intestate proceedings, it was
because she did not feel threatened by these acts. She did not distrust her mother. Moreover, Juana had
herself acknowledged the donation when she was asked in whose name the property would be
registered following the intestate proceedings. Salud felt safe because she had the extrajudicial
settlement to rely on to prove that her mother and her uncle had donated the subject land to her.
There is nothing in this instrument to suggest that the donation was to take effect upon the death of the
donors as to make it a donation mortis causa, as urged by the petitioners. The donation became effective
upon acceptance by Salud except that, in obedience to her mother's request, she chose not to register
the land in the meantime and to allow her mother to enjoy its fruits. What was deferred was not its
effectivity but only its enjoyment by Salud. Registration was not necessary to make the donation a
binding commitment insofar as the donors and the donee were concerned. 17
As for her inaction against the deed of sale in favor of her brother Claudio, it should be noted in the
first place that she was not aware of it when it was executed in 1956. Her mother, who was already 76
years old at the time, never informed her about it, nor did her brother or any of the defendants, for
reasons of their own. It was only later, when the sale was registered in 1958 and a new title to the land
was issued to Claudio, that she started asking questions. Even then, being a sister to Claudio, she did
not immediatey take legal steps.
It is natural, even among non-relatives, to seek a non-judicial settlement through extra-legal measures
before going to court. It is more so in the case of relatives, who should avoid as much as possible the
asperity and bitterness of litigation. That is what Salud did when she repeatedly asked the petitioners
for the return of the property albeit to no avail. It was only when it became clear that amicable
persuasion was not possible that she decided to sue the wife and children of her departed brother.
The petitioners stress that it took Salud all of seven years from the registration of the land in Claudios's
name before she filed the complaint for reconveyance against them. That is true. But if one remembers
that her brother died only in 1961 and her own mother only in 1963, at the age of 83, it will be easy to
understand the reason for the delay, which would otherwise have been unjustified. Suits among
brothers and sisters are especially painful to their parents. Salud must have thought many times about
filing her complaint against her brother Claudio while her old mother was still alive. In fact, Salud
hesitated still even after her mother's death and took two more years before she finally filed her
complaint against Claudio's wife and children.
It is clear that Juana Balane de Suterio had no right to sell the subject land to Claudio because she was
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no longer its owner, having previously donated it to her daughter Salud. Juana herself was holding the
land merely as a trustee of Salud, who had transferred possession to her mother at the old woman's
request. The deed of sale was itself vitiated by bad faith as Claudio is presumed to have known of the
previous donation to his sister Salud, whose acceptance of the donation was formally witnessed by
hiw own wife, the herein principal petitioner. 18 When Claudio registered the land in his name
knowing there was a flaw in his title, an implied trust was created in favor of Salud as the real owner
of the property in accordance with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:
If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
As trustor, Salud had every right to sue for the recovery of the land in the action for reconveyance
against Claudio's heirs. As we said in Vda. de Jacinto, et al. v. Vda. de Jacinto, et al. ... 19
Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or at least, of breach of trust, should not be
allowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his own wrongdoing.
The petitioners do not insist on prescription as a bar to the action for reconveyance, and
understandably so. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent and the person
in whose name the land is registered thus holds it as a mere trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an
action for reconveyance of the property within a period of ten years. As we have held in many cases:
Where the action is one for reconveyance based on constructive trust, a ten-year period is allowed. 20
An action for reconveyance of realty, based upon a constructive or implied trust resulting from fraud,
may be barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is reckoned from the issuance of the title which
operates as a constructive notice. 21
While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribe in 10 years from registration of the property,
private respondents' right commenced from actual discovery of petitioner's act of defraudation. 22
The record shows that while the land was registered in the name of Claudio Suterio, Sr. in 1958, the
complaint for reconveyance was filed by the petitioners in 1965, or still within the ten-year prescriptive
period.
The last issue raised by the petitioners, viz., the validity of the deed of sale executed by Juana Balane
de Suterio on January 29,1950, in favor of Salud Suterio, 23 need not detain us too long. The trial court
sustained the contract for lack of sufficient evidence to invalidate it and was upheld by the respondent
court. We see no reason to disturb their factual finding, absent a showing that it was reached
arbitrarily. Interestingly, it occurred to the petitioners to question the transaction only when they were
sued by the private respondents, after ten years from the date of the sale. This is an even longer period
than the nine years during which the petitioners say Salud Suterio was sleeping on her rights
following the sale of her land to Claudio Suterio.

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2 Echavez v Dozen, GR 192916, October 11, 2010
Facts: Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu CityOn September 7,
1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction
and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of
Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew, filed a petition for the
settlement of Vicente’s intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s
donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in
favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed
Manuel’s petition to approve the donation and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale.2 The
RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had
donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue: Did the CA err in not applying the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will to
Vicente’s donation mortis causa?
Held: The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities
prescribed by law for the validity of wills otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect. Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied.
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The exception to this rule in
Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of
this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that
although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the
number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present
case.
Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not
prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of
the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts
that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a
competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will
refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the
instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.
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d. Distinctions between inter vivos and mortis causa
3 Del Rosario v Ferrer, 630 SCRA 683
FACTS:
(Doctrine: Irrevocabilityof the donation is the standard thatidentifies the donation as intervivos. It is a
quality absolutelyincompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa.)
Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed adocument entitled ‚Donation MortisCausa‛ in
favor of their 2 children Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter Jarabini. The Deed of
Donation statedthat, ‚it is our will that thisdonation mortis causa shall beirreovocable and shall be
respectedby the surviving spouse.‛ Although denominated as adonation mortis causa, which inlaw is
equivalent to a will, the deed has no attestation clause and was witnessed only by two persons.Before
the death of donor Leopoldo, heexecuted a deed of assignment of his rights and interest in thesubject
property to their daughter Asuncion. subsequently, granddaughter Jarabini filed a petition for the
probate of the deed of donation mortis causain the RTC. Asuncion opposed the petition,invoking
Leopoldo’s assignment of hisrights to her. Decision wasrendered by the RTC, ordering the registration
of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares. The court ruled that the donation was one
made inter vivos,thus the assignment of Leopoldo of hisrights was void. CA reversed thedecision of
the RTC and ruled that the donation, being one given
mortis causa, did not complywith the requirements of a notarialwill, rendering the same void.
WON the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa (effective upon death), as in fact
designated, or actually a donation inter vivos (effective during the lifetime of the Donors)
HELD: IT IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS. That the document in question in this case was captioned
"Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter
vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In Austria-Magat v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea
of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis
causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is
"our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving
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spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in
reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the
property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that
such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors
parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while
they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required.
This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form
of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.
e. Limitations
a. Who may donate, NCC 735, 41, 1390 (1)
Article 735. All persons who may contract and dispose of their property may make a donation.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed
born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Voidable Contracts
Article 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to
the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
xxx
b. Who may be a donee, NCC 738

Article 738. Al those who are not specially disqualified by law therefor may accept donations.
c. Void donations, 739 (1), 736

Article 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
Article 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.
4 Insular Life v Ebrado, L-44059, Oct. 28, 1977
Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., a policy for P5,882.00 with a rider
forAccidental Death. He designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He
referred to her as his wife.
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Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Insular Life was made liable to pay the
coverage in the total amount of P11,745.73, representing the face value of the policy in the amount of
P5,882.00 plus the additional benefits for accidental death.
Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds as the designated beneficiarytherein,
although she admited that she and the insured were merely living as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she
is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds.
Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before the trial court as to who should be given the
proceeds. The court declared Carponia as disqualified.
Issue: WON a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married
man can claim the proceeds in case of death of the latter?
Held: No. Petition
Ratio:
Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "the insurance shall be applied exclusively to the
proper interest of the person in whose name it is made"
The word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the "insured" and not to
thebeneficiary, since a contract of insurance is personal in character. Otherwise, the prohibitory laws
against illicit relationships especially on property and descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same
could easily be circumvented by modes of insurance.
When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is
governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same
Code, any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be
named beneficiary of a fife insurance policy by the person who cannot make a donation to him.
Common-law spouses are barred from receiving donations from each other.
Article 739 provides that void donations are those made between persons who were guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of donation.
There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and those between
illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies since the same are based on similar
consideration. So long as marriage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate
that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed upon extra-marital
relationship.
A conviction for adultery or concubinage isn’t required exacted before the disabilities mentioned in
Article 739 may effectuate. The article says that in the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
The underscored clause neatly conveys that no criminal conviction for the offense is a condition
precedent. The law plainly states that the guilt of the party may be proved ‚in the same acting for
declaration of nullity of donation.‛ And, it would be sufficient if evidence preponderates.
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The insured was married to Pascuala Ebrado with whom she has six legitimate children. He was also
living in with his common-law wife with whom he has two children.
5 Republic v AFP, citing Tayato v Heirs of Kusop, Jan. 16, 2013
The processes of the State should not be trifled with. The failure of a party to avail of the proper
remedy to acquire or perfect one's title to land cannot justify a resort to other remedies which are
otherwise improper and do not provide for the full oppot1unity to prove his title, but instead require
him to concede it before availment.
Certificates of title issued covering inalienable and non-disposable public land, even in the hands of an
alleged innocent purchaser for value, should be cancelled.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 questioning the October 26, 2007 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75170, which reversed the November 5, 2001 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of General Santos City in Civil Case No. 6419.
Factual Antecedents
Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 – lands of the public domain consisting of 52,678 square meters located in Barrio
Dadiangas, General Santos Municipality (now General Santos City) – were reserved for recreation and
health purposes by virtue of Proclamation No. 1684 (Proc. 168), which was issued in 1963. In 1983,
Proclamation No. 22735 (Proc. 2273) was issued amending Proc. 168, and removing and segregating
Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the reservation and declaring them open for disposition to qualified applicants.
As a result, only Lot X – which consists of 15,020 square meters – remained part of the reservation now
known as Magsaysay Park.
The record discloses that respondents-intervenors waged a campaign – through petitions and pleas
made to the President – to have Lots Y-1 and Y-2 taken out of the reservation for the reason that
through their predecessor Cabalo Kusop (Kusop), they have acquired vested private rights over these
lots. This campaign resulted in Proc. 2273, which re-classified and returned Lots Y-1 and Y-2 to their
original alienable and disposable state.
In 1997, respondents-intervenors filed applications6 for the issuance of individual miscellaneous sales
patents over the whole of Lot X with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
regional office in General Santos City, which approved them. Consequently, 16 original certificates of
title7 (OCTs) covering Lot X were issued in the names of respondents-intervenors and several others. In
September 1997, these 16 titles were simultaneously conveyed8 to herein respondent AFP-Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), resulting in the issuance of 16 new titles (the AFP-RSBS
titles) – Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. T-81051 through T-81062, T-81146-T-81147, and T-
81150-T-81151.9
On September 11, 1998, herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines instituted Civil Case No. 6419,
which is a Complaint10 for reversion, cancellation and annulment of the AFP-RSBS titles, on the thesis
that they were issued over a public park which is classified as inalienable and non-disposable public
land.
Respondents-intervenors intervened11 in Civil Case No. 6419, and, together with the defendant AFP-
RSBS, argued that their predecessor-in-interest Kusop had acquired vested interests over Lot X even
before Proc. 168 was issued, having occupied the same for more than 30 years. They claimed that these
vested rights, taken together with the favorable recommendations and actions of the DENR and other
government agencies to the effect that Lot X was alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
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as well as the subsequent issuance of sales patents and OCTs in their names, cannot be defeated by
Proc. 168. They added that under Proc. 168, private rights are precisely recognized, as shown by the
preliminary paragraph thereof which states:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the
authority vested in me by law, I, Diosdado Macapagal, President x x x, do hereby withdraw from sale
or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort site purposes, under the administration of
the municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any there be x x x12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 5, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment nullifying the AFP-RSBS titles and ordering
the return of Lot X to the Republic, with the corresponding issuance of new titles in its name. The trial
court ruled that the respondents-intervenors – having benefited by the grant, through Proc. 2273, of
Lots Y-1 and Y-2 to them – can no longer claim Lot X, which has been specifically declared as a park
reservation under Proc. 168 and further segregated under Proc. 2273. In other words, their private
rights, which were guaranteed under Proc. 168, have already been recognized and respected through
the subsequently issued Proc. 2273; as a consequence, the succeeding sales patents and OCTs in the
names of the respondents-intervenors should be declared null and void not only for being in violation
of law, but also because respondents-intervenors did not deserve to acquire more land.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reduced the issues for resolution to just two: 1) whether the respondents-intervenors acquired
vested rights over Lot X, and 2) whether AFP-RSBS is a buyer in good faith.13 It went on to declare that
Lot X was alienable and disposable land, and that respondents-intervenors’ predecessor-in-interest
acquired title by prescription, on the basis of the documentary evidence presented:
1. Report to the President of the Republic dated August 2, 1982 by the Board of Liquidators,
recommending the amendment of Proc. 168 to recognize and respect the rights of respondents-
intervenors’ predecessors-in-interest, who have been in possession of portions of the reservation since
time immemorial;14
2. Report of District Land Officer Buenaventura Gonzales of the Bureau of Lands, dated May 26, 1975,
likewise stating that respondents-intervenors’ predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
portions of the reservation since time immemorial, and that for this reason, Proc. 168 was never in
force and effect;15
3. Report of Deputy Public Land Inspector Jose Balanza of the Bureau of Lands, dated May 6, 1976,
finding that the property covered by Proc. 168 is private property and within an area declared as
alienable and disposable under Project No. 47 per L.C. Map No. 700 established by the then Bureau of
Forestry;16
4. Tax Declaration No. 716 in the name of Cabalo Kusop and its subsequent revisions;17
5. Certifications issued by the (then) municipal treasurer of General Santos and official receipts
showing payment of taxes from 1945-1972;18
6. Sworn declaration of ownership submitted to the Philippine Constabulary;19
7. 1975 letter of then General Santos Mayor acknowledging that Kusop was in possession of Lot X even
before the war; and20
8. Statements and testimonies of several witnesses.21
The CA added that as a consequence of their predecessor’s possession of Lot X since time immemorial,
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respondents-intervenors have acquired title without need of judicial or other action, and the property
ceased to be public land and thus became private property.22 It stressed that while "government has the
right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a private individual who possessed and
cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should not
be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated."23
The CA went on to justify that the reason why Proc. 2273 did not take Lot X out of the public domain is
not because the Executive wanted it to remain a recreational park reserve – but because the
respondents-intervenors were in the process of donating said Lot X to General Santos City, and the
President deemed it unnecessary to still place it within the coverage of Proc. 2273.
The CA further ruled that the miscellaneous sales patents issued in the names of the respondents-
intervenors affirm their claim of ownership over Lot X, while the OCTs subsequently issued in their
names rendered their claim indefeasible.
Finally, the appellate court declared that since respondents-intervenors’ titles to Lot X were duly
obtained, the sale and transfer thereof to respondent AFP-RSBS should be accorded the same treatment
as a sale or transfer made to a purchaser in good faith. Besides, it having been shown that the
petitioner is not entitled to Lot X since it already belonged to the respondents-intervenors, petitioner
had no right to raise the issue of AFP-RSBS’ good or bad faith.
Thus, petitioner’s Complaint for reversion was dismissed.
Issues
The petition now enumerates the following issues for resolution:
I
BY APPLYING FOR MISCELLANEOUS SALES PATENT, THE HEIRS HAVE ADMITTED THAT LOT
X IS PUBLIC LAND. THE EVIDENCE THEY SUBMITTED TO ESTABLISH THEIR ALLEGED
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IS THEREFORE UNAVAILING.
II
THE ALLEGED "VESTED RIGHTS" OF THE HEIRS OVER LOT X CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC LAND UNDER THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE.
III
THERE IS NO BASIS TO CONCLUDE THAT PROCLAMATION 2273 RECOGNIZED THE
OWNERSHIP OF LOT X BY THE HEIRS. NEITHER IS THERE BASIS TO CLAIM THAT THE HEIRS
RETAINED OWNERSHIP OF LOT X DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS
TO ACCEPT THE DONATION OF LOT X.
IV
AFP-RSBS IS NOT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Apart from echoing the pronouncements of the trial court, the Republic, in its Petition and
Consolidated Reply,25submits that respondents-intervenors’ applications for miscellaneous sales
patents constitute acknowledgment of the fact that Lot X was public land, and not private property
acquired by prescription.
Petitioner argues further that with the express recognition that Lot X is public land, it became
incumbent upon respondents-intervenors – granting that they are entitled to the issuance of
miscellaneous sales patents – to prove that Lot X is alienable and disposable land pursuant to
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Commonwealth Act No. 14126 (CA 141); and that in this regard respondents-intervenors failed. They
offered proof, in the form of reports and recommendations made by the Bureau of Lands and the
Board of Liquidators, among others, which were insufficient to establish that Lot X was alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Besides, under the law governing miscellaneous sales patents,
Republic Act No. 73027 (RA 730), it is specifically required that the property covered by the application
should be one that is not being used for a public purpose. Yet the fact remains that Lot X is being
utilized as a public recreational park. This being the case, Lot X should not have qualified for
distribution allowable under RA 730.
Petitioner next insists that if indeed respondents-intervenors have become the owners of Lot X by
acquisitive prescription, they should have long availed of the proper remedy or remedies to perfect
their title through an action for confirmation of imperfect title or original registration. Yet they did not;
instead, they resorted to an application for issuance of miscellaneous sales patents. By so doing,
respondents-intervenors conceded that they had not acquired title to Lot X.
Petitioner next advances the view that respondents-intervenors’ vested rights cannot prevail as against
the State’s right to Lot X under the Regalian doctrine. Petitioner argues that the presumption still
weighs heavily in favor of state ownership of all lands not otherwise declared private and that since
Lot X was not declared open for disposition as were Lots Y-1 and Y-2 by and under Proc. 2273, it
should properly retain its character as an inalienable public recreational park.
Finally, petitioner submits that the good or bad faith of AFP-RSBS is irrelevant because any title issued
on inalienable public land is void even in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.28
Respondents’ Arguments
AFP-RSBS and the respondents-intervenors collectively argue that the grounds relied upon by the
Republic in the petition involve questions of fact, which the Court may not pass upon. They add that
since private rights are explicitly recognized under Proc. 168, the respondents-intervenors’
predecessor’s prior possession since time immemorial over Lot X should thus be respected and should
bestow title upon respondents-intervenors.
They argue that if respondents-intervenors chose the wrong remedy in their attempt to perfect their
title over Lot X, this was an innocent mistake that in no way divests such title, which was already
perfected and acquired by virtue of their predecessor’s open, continuous and uninterrupted possession
of Lot X.
Finally, they argue that the reports and recommendations of the Bureau of Lands and the Board of
Liquidators constitute findings of facts of administrative agencies which thus bind the Court. They add
that the presumption arising from the Regalian doctrine may be overcome by proof to the contrary,
and that it has in fact been overcome by the evidence presented before the trial court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
From the wording of Proc. 168, the land it comprises is subject to sale or settlement, and thus alienable
and disposable – Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Diosdado Macapagal, President x x x,
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort site
purposes, under the administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if
any there be x x x29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
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However, this alienable and disposable character of the land covered by the proclamation was
subsequently withdrawn, and the land was re-classified by then President Macapagal to pave the way
for the establishment of a park reservation, subject only to previously acquired private rights.
Respondents-intervenors then lobbied for the exclusion of certain portions of the reservation which
they claimed to be theirs, allegedly acquired by their predecessor Kusop through prescription. They
were successful, for in 1983, then President Marcos issued Proc. 2273, which excluded and segregated
Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the coverage of Proc. 168. In addition, Proc. 2273 declared Lots Y-1 and Y-2 open
for distribution to qualified beneficiaries – which included the herein respondents-intervenors.
However, Lot X was retained as part of the reservation.
Respondents-intervenors did not question Proc. 2273, precisely because they were the beneficiaries
thereof; nor did they object to the retention of Lot X as part of the park reserve. Instead, in 1997, they
applied for, and were granted, sales patents over Lot X.
Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time the sales patents were applied
for and granted, the land had lost its alienable and disposable character. It was set aside and was being
utilized for a public purpose, that is, as a recreational park. Under Section 83 of CA 141, "the President
may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the
use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in
accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes, when
the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks,
public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and other improvements for the public
benefit." And under the present Constitution, national parks are declared part of the public domain,
and shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law.30
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. Then the
1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. x x x31(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents-intervenors no longer had any right to Lot X – not by acquisitive prescription, and
certainly not by sales patent. In fact, their act of applying for the issuance of miscellaneous sales
patents operates as an express acknowledgment that the State, and not respondents-intervenors, is the
owner of Lot X. It is erroneous to suppose that respondents-intervenors possessed title to
Lot X when they applied for miscellaneous sales patents, for the premise of such grant or privilege is
precisely that the State is the owner of the land, and that the applicant acknowledges this and
surrenders to State ownership. The government, as the agent of the State, is possessed of the plenary
power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as
under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the
way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. 32
Respondents-intervenors’ actions betray their claim of ownership to Lot X. When Proc. 168 was issued,
they did not institute action to question its validity, using as cause of action their claimed ownership
and title over the land. The same is true when Proc. 2273 came out. They did not file suit to invalidate
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it because it contravenes their claimed ownership over Lot X. They simply sat and waited for the good
graces of the government to fall on their laps. They simply waited for the
State to declare them beneficiaries of the land. And when the President failed to include Lot X in Proc.
2273 and declare it open for disposition to them as beneficiaries, they filed their applications for
issuance of miscellaneous sales patents over said lot. All these actions are anathema to a claim of
ownership, and instead indicate a willingness to abide by the actions of the State, a show of respect for
its dominion over the land.
Under the law, respondents-intervenors are charged with knowledge of the law; they cannot feign
ignorance. In fact, they could not claim to be unaware of Proc. 168, for precisely they hid under its
protective mantle to seek the invalidation of a donation claimed to have been made by them to one
Jose Tayoto. Thus, in Tayoto v. Heirs of Kusop,33 an alleged donee (Tayoto) of property located within
Lots X, Y-1, and Y-2 filed a case for quieting of title against the donors – herein respondents-
intervenors – to protect the property which they allegedly donated to him, which was then in danger
of being lost for the reason that respondents-intervenors supposedly reneged on the donation.
Respondents-intervenors filed an urgent motion to dismiss the Complaint claiming, among others, the
"invalidity of the donation as the subject thereof had not yet been
excluded from the Magsaysay Park."34 In disposing of the case, the Court made the following
pronouncement:
Be that as it may, the donation is void. There are three essential elements of donations: [1] the
reduction of the patrimony of the donor, [2] the increase in the patrimony of the donee, and [3] the
intent to do an act of liberality (animus donandi). Granting that there is an animus donandi, we find
that the alleged donation lacks the first two elements which presuppose the donor's ownership rights
over the subject of the donation which he transmits to the donee thereby enlarging the donee's estate.
This is in consonance with the rule that a donor cannot lawfully convey what is not his property. In
other words, a donation of a parcel of land the dominical rights of which do not belong to the donor at
the time of the donation, is void. This holds true even if the subject of the donation is not the land itself
but the possessory and proprietary rights over said land.
In this case, although they allegedly declared Magsaysay Park as their own for taxation purposes, the
heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not have any transmissible proprietary rights over the donated property at
the time of the donation. In fact, with respect to Lot Y-2, they still had to file a free patents application
to obtain an original certificate of title thereon. This is because Proclamation No. 2273 declaring as
‘open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act’ some portions of the Magsaysay
Park, is not an operative law which automatically vests rights of ownership on the heirs of Cabalo
Kusop over their claimed parcels of land.
The import of said quoted proviso in a presidential proclamation is discussed in the aforecited
Republic v. Court of Appeals case which dealt with the validity of a donation by a sales awardee of a
parcel of land which was later reserved by presidential proclamation for medical center site purposes.
We held therein that where the land is withdrawn from the public domain and declared as disposable
by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act, the Sales Award covering the same confers on a
sales awardee only a possessory and not proprietary right over the land applied, for. The disposition of
the land by the Director is merely provisional as the applicant still has to comply with the
requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only after the compliance with such
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requirements that the patent is issued and the land applied for considered ‘permanently disposed of
by the Government.’
The interpretation of said proviso should even be more stringent in this case considering that with
respect to Lot Y-1, the heirs of Cabalo Kusop do not appear to have taken even the initial steps
mandated by the Public Land Act for claimants of the land excluded from the public domain. The
alleged donation was therefore no more than an exercise in futility.35 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
For obvious reasons, respondents-intervenors should have, as early as 1990 when the above Decision
was promulgated, taken exception to its pronouncements if they rightfully believed that the property
covered by Proc. 168 (which included Lot X) rightfully belonged to them. Yet they did not. Instead,
after seven long years or in 1997, they filed their applications for the issuance of miscellaneous sales
patents over Lot X. This act of filing applications for the issuance of miscellaneous sales patents in their
name, taken in conjunction with all the other attendant circumstances, constitutes an express
acknowledgment that the land does not belong to them, but to the State.
Neither may respondents-intervenors claim innocent mistake for all their missteps in claiming the
subject property as their own. The mistakes are simply too numerous, and respondents-intervenors’
inaction since 1963 is too glaring. To repeat, their actions are anathema to a claim of ownership. While
it is true that possession since time immemorial could result in the acquisition of title without need of
judicial or other action, respondents-intervenors’ actions and conduct, as shown above, not only negate
the application of such principle, but in fact point to the opposite.
The principle of estoppel "bars [one] from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the contemplation
of law, become settled by the acts and proceedings of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the
party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in pais." 36
Besides, respondents-intervenors should not be allowed to trifle with the processes of the
State.1âwphi1 They cannot resort to other remedies which are improper and do not provide for the
opportunity to prove their title, but instead require them to concede it before availment.
Contrary to the CA’s pronouncements, proof or evidence of possession since time immemorial
becomes irrelevant and cannot support a claim of ownership or application for a patent, not only
because respondents-intervenors have conceded ownership to the State, but also on account of the fact
that Lot X has been withdrawn from being alienable and disposable public land, and is now classified
and being used as a national park. It has ceased to be alienable, and no proof by the respondents-
intervenors will operate to bolster their claim; Lot X will never be awarded to them or to anybody so
long as it is being used as a public park or reserve.
The CA justifies that Proc. 2273 was issued on the assumption that respondents-intervenors were about
to donate Lot X to the city (General Santos City); thus, the President has seen fit not to include it in the
proclamation. This is specious. If the President indeed knew of the intended donation, then it was all
the more necessary for him to have included Lot X in Proc. 2273 and withdrawn it from the coverage of
Magsaysay Park; or else the donation to the city would be null and void, for want of right to donate.
Yet he did not. Lot X was retained as part of the park reserve precisely because the respondents-
intervenors had no vested right to it. And, far from confirming ownership over Lot X, the Republic is
correct in the opinion that the miscellaneous sales patents amount to an acknowledgment that
respondents-intervenors’ rights are inferior, and cannot defeat ownership over Lot X by the State.
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Given the above pronouncements, the CA’s ruling on other matters, as well as the respondents’
arguments on specific points, become irrelevant and inapplicable, if not necessarily invalidated.
Finally, as regards AFP-RSBS’ rights, the Court sustains the petitioner’s view that "any title issued
covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be
cancelled."37 We deem this case worthy of such principle. Besides, we cannot ignore the basic principle
that a spring cannot rise higher than its source; as successor-in-interest, AFP-RSBS cannot acquire a
better title than its predecessor, the herein respondents-intervenors.38 Having acquired no title to the
property in question, there is no other recourse but for AFP-RSBS to surrender to the rightful
ownership of the State.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The October 26, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75170 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The November 5, 2001
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of General Santos City in Civil Case No. 6419 is
REINSTATED.
The Register of Deeds of General Santos City is ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-81051, T-81052, T-81053, T-81054, T-81055, T-81056, T-81057, T-81058, T-81059, T-81060, T-81061, T-
81062, T-81146, T-81147, T-81150, and T-81151, and ISSUE in lieu thereof, new titles in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
No costs.
d. Others, NCC 740, 1027, 1028, 1027 (ex par. 4), 741 –744, 1544, 745, 746
Article 740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be applicable to donations inter vivos.
Article 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness, or the minister of the gospel who
extended spiritual aid to him during the same period;
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the church, order, chapter,
community, organization, or institution to which such priest or minister may belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his favor before the final accounts of
the guardianship have been approved, even if the testator should die after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any
provision made by the ward in favor of the guardian when the latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother, sister,
or spouse, shall be valid;
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or children, or any one claiming under
such witness, spouse, parents, or children;
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of the testator during his last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by law to inherit.
Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

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Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Article 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power
for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be void. (630)
Article 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and of the donee.
6. Reduction and revocation, NCC 760-773
Article 760. Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having no children or descendants, legitimate or
legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as provided in the next article, by
the happening of any of these events:
(1) If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate children, even though they
be posthumous;
(2) If the child of the donor, whom the latter believed to be dead when he made the donation, should turn out to be
living;
(3) If the donor subsequently adopt a minor child. (644a)
Article 761. In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it
exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the
time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child. (n)
Article 762. Upon the revocation or reduction of the donation by the birth, appearance or adoption of a child, the
property affected shall be returned or its value if the donee has sold the same.
If the property is mortgaged, the donor may redeem the mortgage, by paying the amount guaranteed, with a right
to recover the same from the donee.
When the property cannot be returned, it shall be estimated at what it was worth at the time of the donation.
(645a)
Article 763. The action for revocation or reduction on the grounds set forth in article 760 shall prescribe after four
years from the birth of the first child, or from his legitimation, recognition or adoption, or from the judicial
declaration of filiation, or from the time information was received regarding the existence of the child believed
dead.
This action cannot be renounced, and is transmitted, upon the death of the donor, to his legitimate and illegitimate
children and descendants. (646a)
Article 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of
the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.
In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations made by the donee and the
mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with the limitations established, with regard to third persons, by
the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the
heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (647a)
Article 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the
following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his
wife or children under his parental authority;

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(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he
should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children
under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
(648a)
Article 766. Although the donation is revoked on account of ingratitude, nevertheless, the alienations and
mortgages effected before the notation of the complaint for revocation in the Registry of Property shall subsist.
Later ones shall be void. (649)
Article 767. In the case referred to in the first paragraph of the preceding article, the donor shall have a right to
demand from the donee the value of property alienated which he cannot recover from third persons, or the sum for
which the same has been mortgaged.
The value of said property shall be fixed as of the time of the donation. (650)
Article 768. When the donation is revoked for any of the causes stated in article 760, or by reason of ingratitude,
or when it is reduced because it is inofficious, the donee shall not return the fruits except from the filing of the
complaint.
If the revocation is based upon noncompliance with any of the conditions imposed in the donation, the donee shall
return not only the property but also the fruits thereof which he may have received after having failed to fulfill the
condition. (651)
Article 769. The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action
prescribes within one year, to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for
him to bring the action. (652)
Article 770. This action shall not be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, if the latter did not institute the same,
although he could have done so, and even if he should die before the expiration of one year.
Neither can this action be brought against the heir of the donee, unless upon the latter's death the complaint has
been filed. (653)
Article 771. Donations which in accordance with the provisions of article 752, are inofficious, bearing in mind the
estimated net value of the donor's property at the time of his death, shall be reduced with regard to the excess; but
this reduction shall not prevent the donations from taking effect during the life of the donor, nor shall it bar the
donee from appropriating the fruits.
For the reduction of donations the provisions of this Chapter and of articles 911 and 912 of this Code shall govern.
(654)
Article 772. Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and
successors in interest may ask for the reduction or inofficious donations.
Those referred to in the preceding paragraph cannot renounce their right during the lifetime of the donor, either by
express declaration, or by consenting to the donation.
The donees, devisees and legatees, who are not entitled to the legitime and the creditors of the deceased can neither
ask for the reduction nor avail themselves thereof. (655a)
Article 773. If, there being two or more donations, the disposable portion is not sufficient to cover all of them,
those of the more recent date shall be suppressed or reduced with regard to the excess.
6 Central Philippines University v CA, 246 SCRA 511

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Topic: Reduction and revocation
Facts:
When Don Ramon was still part of the board of trustees of the school, he donated together with the
following conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called ‚Ramon Lopez Campus‛ and any income from that land shall be put in
the fund to be known as ‚Ramon Lopez Campus Fund‛.
However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of
donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also
argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land
owned by the latter. Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had
prescribed.
Trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with the resolutory conditions of the donation and
declared it null and void.
CA ruled that the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until
a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, petitioner could not be considered as having
failed to comply with its part of the bargain. Reversed.
Issue: WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioner’s
certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions?
Held:
Yes. Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or
loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the
condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build
upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of
the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case,
the donation may be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost
and extinguished.
When the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that
a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which
provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself
cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and such
period has arrived.
In this case there is no need to fix the period for compliance. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50)
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years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition
even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to
do so.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to
incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission
of rights and interests. Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed
of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its
obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it
is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes,
revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor,
private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
7 Lagazo v CA, 287 SCRA 18
FACTS: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded a
60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide
tenants under its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot.
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed a
special power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing him to execute all
documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted
to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada. Simultaneous
with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor
plaintiff-appellee.
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-
appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found out
that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the
remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name of Catalina Jacob.
Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant asking him to vacate the
premises. A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee’s counsel to defendant. However, defendant-
appellant refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee
instituted the complaint for recovery of possession and damages against defendant-appellant.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be
stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose any charge,
burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality
paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an
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onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of
the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His
payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of possession against private
respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.
ISSUE:
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden — the expressed consideration
being purely one of liberality and generosity — but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on the
property like land taxes and installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus
governed by the law on ordinary contracts?
2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not formally
communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and
subsisting?
HELD:
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous one. A simple or
pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation
is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing
donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment of
the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however
imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The
words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the
payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his
testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden or charge had been imposed by his
grandmother.
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina
Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment
of her obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the
donation.
2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The donation, following
the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows
of the acceptance by the donee.‛ Furthermore, ‚*i+f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
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the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.‛
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation
null and void.
1 Imperial v CA, GR 112483, October 8, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Eloy Imperial purchased a parcel of land from his father Leoncio Imperial. Although the
transaction was denominated as a sale, both admit that it was a donation.
Subsequently, Leoncio filed an action for the annulment of the supposed deed of sale but a
compromise agreement was then made by both parties. When Leoncio died, his adopted son, Victor,
substituted him in the Compromise agreement. When Victor also died, his heirs (herein private
respondents) filed an action for annulment of the donation on the ground that the conveyance of said
property in favor of petitioner Eloy impaired the legitime of Victor, their natural brother and
predecessors-in-interest.
Petitioner Imperial raises the defense that the donation did not impair Victor’s legitime and that the
action of respondents has already prescribed.
Issue: Was the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner Eloy Imperial inofficious and
should be reduced?
Held: No. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of
title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. CA, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the
donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this
is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any
increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir of the donee.
7. Prescription NCC 1106-1155

Article 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the
manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by prescription. (1930a)
Article 1107. Persons who are capable of acquiring property or rights by the other legal modes may acquire the
same by means of prescription.
Minors and other incapacitated persons may acquire property or rights by prescription, either personally or
through their parents, guardians or legal representatives. (1931a)
Article 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives;

249 | P a g e -
(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before their disappearance, or appointed by the
courts;
(3) Persons living abroad, who have managers or administrators;
(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.
Persons who are disqualified from administering their property have a right to claim damages from their legal
representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription. (1932a)
Article 1109. Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even though there be a separation of property
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or by judicial decree.
Neither does prescription run between parents and children, during the minority or insanity of the latter, and
between guardian and ward during the continuance of the guardianship. (n)
Article 1110. Prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, runs in favor of, or against a married woman. (n)
Article 1111. Prescription obtained by a co-proprietor or a co-owner shall benefit the others. (1933)
Article 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but not the
right to prescribe in the future.
Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply the
abandonment of the right acquired. (1935)
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription. (1936a)
Article 1114. Creditors and all other persons interested in making the prescription effective may avail themselves
thereof notwithstanding the express or tacit renunciation by the debtor or proprietor. (1937)
Article 1115. The provisions of the present Title are understood to be without prejudice to what in this Code or in
special laws is established with respect to specific cases of prescription. (1938)
Article 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously
in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse,
the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required. (1939)
CHAPTER 2
Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights
Article 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law. (1940a)
Article 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (1941)
Article 1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not
be available for the purposes of possession. (1942)
Article 1120. Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly. (1943)
Article 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause it should cease for more than one year.
The old possession is not revived if a new possession should be exercised by the same adverse claimant. (1944a)
Article 1122. If the natural interruption is for only one year or less, the time elapsed shall be counted in favor of
the prescription. (n)
Article 1123. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. (1945a)
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Article 1124. Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption:
(1) If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;
(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse;
(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
In all these cases, the period of the interruption shall be counted for the prescription. (1946a)
Article 1125. Any express or tacit recognition which the possessor may make of the owner's right also interrupts
possession. (1948)
Article 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of ownership or real
rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and the
time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
As to lands registered under the Land Registration Act, the provisions of that special law shall govern. (1949a)
Article 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. (1950a)
Article 1128. The conditions of good faith required for possession in articles 526, 527, 528, and 529 of this Code
are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith in the prescription of ownership and other real rights.
(1951)
Article 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but
the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. (n)
Article 1130. The title for prescription must be true and valid. (1953)
Article 1131. For the purposes of prescription, just title must be proved; it is never presumed. (1954a)
of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed. (1955a)
Article 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through prescription by the offender.
(1956a)
Article 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years. (1957a)
Article 1135. In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less than that expressed in his
title, prescription shall be based on the possession. (n)
Article 1136. Possession in wartime, when the civil courts are not open, shall not be counted in favor of the
adverse claimant. (n)
Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (1959a)
Article 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of
his grantor or predecessor in interest;
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in
possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary;
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(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a)
CHAPTER 3
Prescription of Actions
Article 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. (1961)
Article 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost,
unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to articles 1132, and
without prejudice to the provisions of articles 559, 1505, and 1133. (1962a)
Article 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by
prescription. (1963)
Article 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. (1964a)
Article 1143. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this Code, are not extinguished by
prescription:
(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in article 649;
(2) To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance. (n)
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
Article 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
Article 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
(1) For forcible entry and detainer;
(2) For defamation. (n)
Article 1148. The limitations of action mentioned in articles 1140 to 1142, and 1144 to 1147 are without
prejudice to those specified in other parts of this Code, in the Code of Commerce, and in special laws. (n)
Article 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within
five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n)
Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains
otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. (1969)
Article 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the enforcement of obligations to
pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or of the interest. (1970a)

252 | P a g e -
Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment
commences from the time the judgment became final. (1971)
Article 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs from the day the persons who
should render the same cease in their functions.
The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting runs from the date when said result was
recognized by agreement of the interested parties. (1972)
Article 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing his right is
not reckoned against him. (n)
Article 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.
2 Solis v CA, 176 SCRA 678
Facts: Plaintiffs Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim alleged that they are co-owners of a parcel of
residential land situated at Barrio Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, with an area of 1,073 square meters
more or less; that this parcel of land was inherited from their parents, Simeon Solis and Petronila
Bauzon; that in 1939, they allowed defendants Jose Solis and his wife Florencia Dioquino to construct a
house on the eastern portion of plaintiffs' parcel of land (consisting of 536 square meters) with the
understanding that they (defendants) should vacate the premises as soon as their financial conditions
would permit them. In 1965, plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the premises but the latter
refused.
The answer (pp. 8-10, Record on Appeal) of defendants raised as affirmative defense the fact of their
ownership of the property in question having acquired the same by way of donacion proper nuptias from
spouses Tomas Solis and Hermenegilda Jimenez, way back in 1931. They also alleged that since 1931,
they were in possession of said property openly, continuously and adversely, to the exclusion of all
others, and in the concept of owners and that since 1931 they have paid the taxes due on the property.
On November 21, 1968, plaintiffs filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction (pp. 11 -12, Record on Appeal) praying that the defendants or their agents be enjoined from
commencing and continuing the construction of a residential house on the land in question. The
motion was granted in an order dated December 11, 1968.
Issues: 1. The Court of Appeals was not justified in concluding that the possession by private
respondents over the disputed property was adverse and in the concept of owner, because such
possession was merely tolerated by the petitioners.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in recognizing the validity and effect of the donation proper nuptias as
sufficient to create or establish the just title of private respondents, as donees in said donation,
although the alleged donor or grantor Tomas Solis, had no right or title whatsoever over the property
in question.
3. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that petitioner's cause of action had prescribed, overlooked the
importance of determining when such cause of action accrued.

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Held: This contention of petitioners is not meritorious. Suffice it to state that even a void donation may
be the basis of claim of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription. It is the essence of the
statute of limitations that, whether the party had a right to the possession or not, if he entered under
the claim of such right and remained in possession for the period (ten years) named in the statute of
limitations, the right of action of the plaintiff who had the better title is barred by that adverse
possession. The right given by the statute of limitations does not depend upon, and has no necessary
connection, (with) the validity of the claim under which the possession is held. The "just title" required
for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y valid"-or such title which by itself is
sufficient to transfer ownership Without necessity of letting the prescriptive period elapse but
only"titulo colorador" — such title where, although there was a mode of transferring ownership, still
something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner (See Doliendo vs. Biamesa, 7 Phil. 132).
The donacion was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino took possession
of the land in 1933 by virtue of the donacion. It was the Code of Civil Procedure which was then in
force. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to be
the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced shall vest in every actual possessor of such
land a full complete title. In Ongsiaco vs. Dallo (27 SCRA 161) the Supreme Court said: 'Under the Code
of Civil Procedure formerly in force,good or bad faith was immaterial for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
Adverse possession in either character ripened into ownership after the lapse of ten years (Miraflor vs.
CA, L-40151-52, April 8, 1986, 142 SCRA 18, 29).
Finally, petitioners assail respondent appellate court's holding that their cause of action had
prescribed, overlooking the importance of determining when such cause of action accrued. In its
findings of fact, the appellate court said that the record shows that Tomas Solis (private respondent's
predecessor) was already in possession of the eastern portion in question before 1927 (t.s.n., June 25,
1969, pp. 41, 42, 47; p. 2, CA decision). However, no evidence was presented to show that Tomas Solis'
possession thereof was adverse, exclusive or in the concept of an owner. Thus, the appellate court
concluded that private respondents possession have been actual, adverse, continuous, open, public,
notorious, peaceful and uninterrupted only in 1933, when they took possession of the property by
virtue of the donacion proper nuptias. The respondent court, therefore, found and w e agree that it was in
1933 when petitioner's cause of action accrued.
Even if we were to admit, as contended by petitioners, that their cause of action accrued only in 1941
(p. 3 of Reply; p. 148, Rollo), the first time that private respondents can be considered as having
repudiated petitioners' ownership of the premises by paying the tax on the property in the name of
respondent Jose Solis, the same conclusion would be obtained. The lapse of more than twenty (20)
years of adverse possession by private respondents is sufficient to confer ownership on them of the
disputed portion under the Old Civil Code which requires only ten (10) years of adverse possession.
3 Republic v Rizalvo, GR 172011, March 7, 2011
FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union,
acting as a land registration court, an application for theregistration of a parcel of land, located in
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Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged thathe is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land,
that he obtained title over theland by virtue of a Deed of Transfer 5dated December 31, 1962, and that
he is currentlyin possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others,
TaxDeclaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxesbeginning in
1952 up to the time of filing of the application.On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed an Opposition. TheMTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered
its Decision,approving respondent’s application. The Republic of the Philippines through the OSGfiled
a Notice of Appeal. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgatedthe assailed
Decision, affirming the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has complied with all therequirements
showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, hasbecome private property by virtue
of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time required by law.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficientlyestablish first,
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second,
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest havebeen in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of thesame; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The
certification and report dated July17, 2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that
the entire land areain question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such since
January21, 1987. Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession.
The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficienttestimonial and
documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interestwere in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of theland in question.However, the third
requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be inopen, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subjectproperty since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been
satisfied. Respondent onlymanaged to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mother’s
ownershipand possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of AbsoluteSale
dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. Hepresented Tax Declaration for
the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and realproperty tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even
assuming that the 1948 Tax Declarationin the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts
could be taken in thiscase as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation
andpossession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law isopen,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under abonafide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and
report isenough to signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or thedevelopment of
the national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registrationbecause the land was certified as
alienable and disposable in 1987, while theapplication for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a
mere thirteen (13) yearsafter and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on
prescription.

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(a) Distinctions between Acquisitive and Extinctive Prescription Rule 9, Sec. 1 (1997)
RULE 9 - Effect of Failure to Plead - Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
4 Sunga v De Guzman, June 19, 1979
FACTS:
- 5 of the 9 legitimate heirs of the spouses Juan de Guzman and Lucia sold the property in
question, a fishpond of 5,590 sq. m situated in the barrio of Sebitanan municipality of Sexmoa
province of Pampanga, to Feliciano Sibug, a widower, for and in consideration of P700.00, as
shown in the said deed of sales, on July 1, 1947.
- The referred deed of sale is not notarized nor registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
The records also disclosed that according to the declaration of real estate the said property was
still registered in the name of the father of the aforesaid plaintiffs appellees up to October 5,
1962. The records further disclosed that the De Guzman couple died in 1935 and 1937,
respectively, hence by operation of law, the nine (9) children succeeded in the ownership of the
property in question.
- Demands were made by plaintiffs-appellees for the delivery of their respective shares from the
defendants-appellants since 1955, but the latter refused to comply with their Lawful (sic)
demands. From the execution of the deed of sale, defendants-appellants were in physical
possession of the fishpond in question, hence an action was instituted against the defendants on
February 5,1962.
- Only three (3) co-heirs filed the complaint namely Benito, Emilia and Fe all surnamed De
Guzman, which represents 3/9 of the property in question which cannot be considered as sold to
the defendants-appellants by any stretch of the imagination. To claim now that the whole
property in question was sold to the said defendants-appellants is absurd.
- RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and this was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PERIOD TO FILE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED AND
THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE ALREADY ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THROUGH ACQUISITIVE
AND EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION.
HELD:
No. The petitioners’ claim of prescription is based in the fact that they have been in possession
of the whole pond since 1948. And while the respondents knew of the possession of petitioners
commencing since 1948 they had no knowledge of the sale that had taken place. e. In that state of their
knowledge as to the extent and nature of petitioners-appellant's possession, said possession cannot be
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said to be adverse and open as to give rise to title by prescription in favor of petitioners-appellants.
A fishpond is not as physically or actually occupied or held in possession as a parcel of land, in

that the signs of possession in the latter are more visible, and the extent of its exercise or enjoyment,
more manifest and easily determined. Hence, the adverse nature of the possession of parcel of land is
more overt as to satisfy also the other element of proscription that the possession must be open and
public. In the case of a fishpond, owned in common, one or some of whose co-owners sell their
undivided share to another, the only way the whole fishpond, including the shares of the other co-
owners may be said to have been held in adverse possession by the vendee, as against the co-owners
who did not sell is if he harvests all the fish in the fishpond, leaving nothing for the other co-owners
who did not sell their share. This is not as easily ascertained as in the exercise of possession over a
piece of land, which is relatively quite easy to show that the possession is to the exclusion of the other
co-owners by the extent of the possession, as by actual occupation or the land is for occupancy, or the
extent of the enjoyment of the produce of said land, as when it is for cultivation or raising of products
sustained by the soil. When one harvests from a fishpond, of which he is only a part-owner, it must be
assumed that his harvest is only to the extent he is rightfully entitled to, until the contrary is positively
shown, which was not done in the present case.
The fact that the tax declaration over the land has remained up to the present in the name of the
original owners, the deceased parents of respondents-appellees. The possession of petitioners-
appellants, was, therefore, not completely adverse or open, nor was it truly in the concept of an owner,
which are indispensable elements for prescription to become legally effective as a means of acquiring
real property.
The court added that the lower courts were correct in saying that the promise of petitioners to pay for
the share of respondents interrupts the possession as a source of prescriptive rights
Any express or implied acknowledgment which the possessor makes with regard to the
dominant rights of the true owner, interrupts the possession held for prescriptive
purposes and defeats the operation of the law granting such rights.
ART.1155. The prescription of action is interrupted when they are filed before the Court,
when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor,
As may easily be discerned, the cited provision has no relevance to possession as an element of
prescription, referring as it does to "prescription of action", an entirely different matter from the
"interruption of possession" for acquisitive prescriptive purposes, as held in the case of San Carlos vs.
Municipality of Cebu, supra.
As to the allegation on non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the court held that even by virtue of
express provisions of law, representative suits that need not be joined by an parties in the same status
or condition, and linked together with a common interest, are permissible. Thus anyone of the co-
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owners may bring an action for ejectment (Article 487, Civil Code), while prescription obtained by a
co-proprietor or a co-owner shall benefit the others (Article 111 Civil Code). Moreover, non-joinder of
parties, is not a ground to dismiss an action.
JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED.
5 Overseas Bank v Geraldez, December 28, 1979
The Overseas Bank of Manila appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 from the orders of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dated January 4 and February 9, 1977, dismissing, on the ground of
prescription, its complaint against Teodosio Valenton and Andres A. Juan for the recovery of the sum
of one hundred fifty thousand pesos plus twelve percent interest per annum from February 17, 1966
and ten percent of the amount due as attorney's fees (Civil Case No. 105037).
The allegations in the complaint dated October 15, 1976, which were admitted hypothetically by
Valenton and Juan, are that on February 16, 1966 they obtained from the bank a credit accommodation
of P150,000, which was secured by a chattel mortgage, and that written extrajudicial demands dated
February 9, March 1 and 27, 1968, November 13 and December 8, 1975 and February 7 and August 27,
1976 were made upon the debtors but they refused to pay on the ground that their obligation was
assumed by a third party. The bank alleged that the supposed assumption of obligation was made
without its consent.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court reasoned out that, because the bank's cause of action
accrued on February 16, 1966 (the date of the manager's check for P150,000 issued by the plaintiff bank
to the Republic Bank) and as the complaint was filed on October 22, 1976 or more than ten years from
the accrual of the cause of action, the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.
As to the interruption of the ten-year period by the written extrajudicial demands, the trial court held
that a demand letter tolls the prescriptive period only for the period of time indicated in the letter
within which payment should be made and prescription commences to run again after the expiration
of that period and no payment is made.
The trial court observed that, because in the demand letters no period of payment was indicated, that
would mean that payment should be made within one day and, therefore, the six demand letters
interrupted the prescriptive period for six days only. (The trial court noted that the seventh demand
letter dated August 27, 1976 was sent when the ten-year prescriptive period had allegedly expired.)
The lower court ruled that the action, which should have been filed within ten years expiring on
February 15, 1976, was extended for six days only or up to February 21, 1976, and consequently,
according to its ratiocination, the action was filed out of time on October 22, 1976.
The issue is as to the effect of the bank's demand letters on the prescriptive period or whether the
action had already prescribed.
We hold that the lower court erred in holding that each of the demand letters suspended the
prescriptive period for one day only. The interruption of the prescriptive period by written
extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the
demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling
of the prescriptive period.
An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the tune the right of action
258 | P a g e -
accrues (Art. 1144[1], Civil Code). "The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before
the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor" (Art. 11 55, lbid, applied in Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs.
City of Manila, 117 Phil. 985, 993; Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, L20086, July 10, 1967, 20
SCRA 645, 648; Harden vs, Harden, L-22174, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 706, 711).
Interruption of the prescription of actions by means of a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor is
a rule of civil law origin. Article 1973 of the old Civil Code, from which article 1155 was taken,
provides that "la prescripcion de las acciones se interrumpe por su ejercicio ante los Tribunales, por
reclamacion extrajudicial del acreedor y por cualquier acto de reconocimiento de la deuda por el
deudor". Article 1155 specifies that the extrajudicial demand and the acknowledgment should be in
writing.
A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the
prescriptive period. Giorgi says: La interrupcion difiere de la suspension porque borra el tiempo
transcurrido anteriormente y obliga a la prescripcion a comenzar de nuevo" (9 Teoria de las Obligaciones, 2nd
Ed., p. 222). "La interrupcion ... quita toda eficacia al tiempo pasado y abre camino a un computo totalmente
nuevo, que parte del ultimo momento del acto interruptivo, precisamente, como si en aquel momento y no antes
hubiese nacido el credito" (8 Giorgi, Ibid, pp. 390-2).
The same view is entertained by Manresa who, in speaking of interruption of prescription by means of
a judicial action, says: La interrupcion de la prescripcion extintiva se produce eficazmente desde luego
con la presentacion o interposicion de la demanda o con cualquier otro acto en que sea ejercitada la
accion que hubiera de ser prescrita en otro caso, y en su virtud habra de empezar a contarse de nuevo el
termino cuando cesen los efectos de dicho ejercicio, ya por abandono o desistimiento voluntario del actor, ya
por caducidad de la instancia, ya por sentencia recaida en el juicio, sin que pueda acumularse en ningun
caso el tiempo anterior a la interrupcion al que transcurriere despues de ella". (12 Codigo Civil, 5th Ed., p. 955.
See 32 Codigo Civil, Quintus Mucius Scaevola Vol. II, p. 991 re "El comienzo de un nuevo plazo".)
Under article 1973. it was held that if the action for the collection of a sum of money accrued on August
31, 1897 and there were written extrajudicial demands by the creditor in 1906, 1907 and 1910, the
fifteen-year period for enforcing that kind of personal action had not elapsed when the action was filed
on duly 18, 1913 (Marella vs. Agoncillo, 44 Phil. 844, 854-5).
That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483,
488, where it ruled that the interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial demand
means that "the full period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the
suspension". "When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand the full time for the prescription must be
reckoned from the cessation of the interruption" (Spring vs. Barr, 120 So. 256 cited in 54 C.J.S. 293, note 27).
That rule was followed in Nator and Talon vs. CIR, 114 Phil. 661, Sagucio vs. Bulos, 115 Phil. 786 and
Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974, 981.
In the aforecited case of Spring vs. Barr which was decided under the Civil Code of Louisiana, the one-
year prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of an action in July, 1923. The action was
terminated on March 2, 1926 after the plaintiff was non-suited. On June 10, 1926, the plaintiff renewed
the action. It was held that the first case interrupted the one-year period and after its termination, the
one-year period started to run again from March 2. The second suit, filed on June 10, 1926, was filed on
time.
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In the Florendo case, a judgment for support against the husband and in favor of the wife was rendered
by this Court on March 4, 1935 (Organo vs. Florendo, 61 Phil. 1028, unpublished). In 1943, in an action
for divorce filed by the husband against the wife, the latter filed a counterclaim for the payment of the
unpaid installments of support decreed in the 1935 judgment. Those installments dated as far back as
February 1, 1932, having been fixed in an earlier judgment dated September 8, 1909.
It was held that each monthly installment prescribed in ten years but the prescriptive period was
interrupted by the filing of the action which culminated in the 1935 judgment already mentioned. The
ten- year period commenced to run anew from March 4, 1935 when the said judgment was rendered
on 1943, when the counterclaim for support was filed in the divorce suit, the said ten-year period had
not yet completely run out. Hence, the counterclaim for support was not barred by prescription.
Interruption of the prescriptive period as meaning renewal of the original term seems to be the basis of
the ruling in Ramos vs. Condez, L-22072, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1146, 1151. In that case the cause of
action accrued on June 25, 1952. There was a written acknowledgment by the vendors on November
10, 1956 of the validity of the deed of sale.
It was held that the vendees' action against the vendors on the basis of the said deed of sale, which
action was filed on May 22, 1963, had not prescribed because the ten-year prescriptive period was
interrupted on November 10, 1956. (See Mina vs. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 590, 593; Herrera vs.
Auditor General, 102 Phil. 875; Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Solano, 104 Phil. 1050 and Talens vs.
M. Chuakay & Co., 104 Phil. 1047 as to renewal of obligation by means of written acknowledgment.)
In National Marketing Corporation vs. Marquez, L-25553, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 722, it appears that
Gabino Marquez executed on June 24, 1950 a promissory note wherein he bound himself to pay to the
Namarco P12,000 in installments within the one-year period starting on June 24, 1951 and ending on
June 25, 1952. After making partial payments on July 7, 1951 and February 23, 1952, Marquez
defaulted.
His total obligation, including interest, as of October 31, 1964, amounted to P19,990.91. Written
demands for the payment of the obligation were made upon Marquez and his surety on March 22,
1956, February 16, 1963, June 10, September 18 and October 13, 1964. Marquez did not make any
further payment.
The Namarco sued Marquez and his surety on December 16, 1964. They contended that the action had
prescribed because the ten-year period for suing on the note expired on June 25, 1962. That contention
was not sustained. It was held that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the written demands,
copies of which were furnished the surety.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the lower court's order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. It
is directed to conduct further proceedings in the case. Costs against private respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
6 Ledesma v CA, 224 SCRA 174
Topic: Distinctions between Acquisitive and Extinctive Prescription
Facts:
Respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed a case in the CFI of Rizal against petitioner to
enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement executed by them but which petitioner had failed to
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comply with.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was denied and judgment was rendered in
favor of private respondent by the court a quo ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
P168,00.00 with interest thereon of 12% per annum.
Issue: WON the second action filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed.
Held:
Petitioner’s contention: In case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and
continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period available for the filing of another
action. This postulation of petitioner, if we are to adopt it, would result in an absurdity wherein Article
1155 would be interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the prescriptive period is interrupted in case of
an extrajudicial demand and a written acknowledgment of a debt, but it is merely tolled where an
action is filed in court. (Interrupted vs. Tolled)
Article 1155 of the Civil. Code provides that the prescription of an action, involving in the present case
the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the
Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor,
and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last two instances have
already been decided by this Court, the rationale wherein should necessarily apply to the first.
Interruption of the prescriptive period by extrajudicial demand as pronounced in Overseas Bank of

Manila: The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the
said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of
interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period.
Interruption of the prescriptive period by acknowledgment as pronounced by Philippine National

Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission: Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the
"prescription of actions is interrupted" inter alia, "when there is any written acknowledgment of the
debt by the debtor." This simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by such a
written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already
elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered inefficacious.
There are two school(s) of thought as to the legal effect of the cessation of the interruption by an
intervening action upon the period of prescription. There is the view expressed and perhaps, not
without reasons, that the full period of prescription should start to run anew, reckoned from the date
of the cessation of the interruption. The contrary view is, that the cessation of the interruption merely
tolls the running of the remaining period of prescription, deducting from the full period thereof the
time that has already elapsed prior to the filing of the intervening action. Nevertheless, all discussion
on this point is academic; considered in the light of either view, We find that the second action is not
barred.
We are convinced and so hold that the correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are

261 | P a g e -
reflected in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila and
Philippine National Railways Company. Petitioner's submission would result in a bifurcated
interpretation of Article 1155, aside from the irrational conclusion that a judicial action itself cannot
produce the same result on the prescriptive period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an
acknowledgment of the debt.
7 Tanyag v Gabriel, April 11, 2012
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada,
Municipality of Taguig (now part of Pasig City, Metro Manila). The first parcel ("Lot 1") with an area of
686 square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos.
1603 and 6425 issued for the years 1949 and 1966, while the second parcel ("Lot 2") consisting of 147
square meters was originally declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos. 6418 and
9676 issued for the years 1966 and 1967.4 For several years, these lands lined with bamboo plants
remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her
inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument ("Affidavit of Sale") whereby she sold the
said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit,
when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who
was Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of
petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964.6 Petitioners then took
possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax.
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under
Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property
and declared the same for tax purposes.
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured TD No. 120-014-01013 in his name over
Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters. Said tax declaration supposedly
cancelled TD No. 6425 over Lot 1.
TC – Dismissed the complaint; That petitioners failed to establish ownership over the property and
that they failed to prove that respondents acquired the property through fraud and deceit.
CA – Affirmed TC; MR denied (The CA never addressed the issue on acquisitive prescription)
ISSUE: WON petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription
HELD: Yes. The CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners have not acquired any right over the
subject property simply because they failed to establish Benita Gabriel’s title over said property. The
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appellate court ignored petitioners’ evidence of possession that complies with the legal requirements
of acquiring ownership by prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of
time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful
and uninterrupted.39 Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine.40 It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.41
On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners’ adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance of TD No. 1145 in the name of
Araceli Tanyag, which tax declaration cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel.42 It is settled
that tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for
which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may
become the basis of a claim for ownership.43 Petitioners’ caretaker, Juana Quinones, has since lived in a
nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended a piggery on the land. Aside from paying taxes due on the
property, petitioners also exercised other acts of ownership such as selling the 468-square meter
portion to Sta. Barbara who had constructed thereon a nine-door apartment building.
It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the property by securing a tax
declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel albeit over a bigger area than that originally declared. In 1998,
they finally obtained an original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763 square meters which
included Lot 1. Did these acts of respondents effectively interrupt the possession of petitioners for
purposes of prescription?
We answer in the negative.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon44 this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil
Code45held that civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and

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not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. Thus:
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the
possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to
when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to
wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the
complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the
complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil
interruption.1âwphi1 For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial
summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by
petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt
respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the
conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of
Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there
remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely
a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action
was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was
received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling,
the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil
interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt
respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962
continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim. (Emphasis supplied.)
From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the latter have been in
continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the
property for the period and in the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot
be defeated by respondents’ acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining
a Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.
This notwithstanding, we uphold petitioners’ right as owner only with respect to Lot 1 consisting of
686 square meters. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale
from the original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan. Respondents asserted that the 147 square
meters covered by the tax declarations of Dinguinbayan being claimed by petitioners is not the same
lot included in OCT No. 1035.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of
the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the
identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.46 In this
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case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that
the same may be compared with the technical description contained in OCT No. 1035, which would
have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square meters was erroneously included in respondents’
title. The testimony of Agueda Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said witness merely
stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his mother. On his
part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the
consolidation of the two parcels. However, no such plan was presented in court.
1 Mercado v Espenocilla, February 1, 2012
Facts: Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, (570 sq. m.) at Sorsogon. After he died,
his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided it equally among
themselves. Later, Dionisia died (no descendants) and Macario took possession of Dionisia’s share. In
an affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1948, Macario claimed that Dionisia had
donated her share to him in May 1945.
August 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty and Saida sold 225 sq. m. to his son Roger, husband of
respondent Belen and father of respondent Ferdinand. March 1985, Roger Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to
Caridad Atienza. (So in Lot No. 552: Belen Espinocilla= 109 sq. m., Caridad Atienza = 120 sq. m.,
Caroline Yu = 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacion’s son = 132 sq. m).
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.58 sq. m. which he bought from
Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was. He claims it must be
returned to him. He avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. having inherited 142.5 sq.
m. from his mother Salvacion (Doroteo= 114sq m + Dionisia 28.5 sq m) and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his
aunt Aspren. He occupies only 132 sq. m., he claims that respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq.
m.
Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of acquisitive
prescription and that there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of encroachment.
RTC:
1. Petitioner entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC computed that Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and Macario each
inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia.
2. Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return 39 sq. m. to petitioner who
occupies only 132 sq. m.13
3. Macario’s affidavit is void (no public document of donation)
4. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire said shares by prescription.
5. Partially declared the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale by Macario, Betty and Saida to Roger as it
affects the portion or the share belonging to Salvacion
CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground that extraordinary
acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents since petitioner’s complaint was filed
only on July 13, 2000.
Issue: The core issue to be resolved is whether petitioner’s action to recover the subject portion is
barred by prescription.
Petitioner concludes that if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of
equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party.

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Held: We affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioner’s complaint on the ground of prescription.
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, is
concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In extraordinary prescription,
ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.
Respondents’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was
established. Macario occupied Dionisia’s share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia donated it to
him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We also agree with the CA that Macario’s possession of
Dionisia’s share was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied
portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of his
son Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macario’s possession because said sale of 225 sq. m. was an
act of ownership. Roger also exercised an act of ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza.
It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer petitioner’s complaint, that
respondents’ peaceful possession of the remaining portion was interrupted. By then, however,
extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found
Macario’s 1948 affidavit void is of no moment. Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with
Macario’s title or good faith.
Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents’ possession with his assertion that
Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share created a constructive trust. Prescription may
supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Moreover, the CA correctly
dismissed petitioner’s complaint as an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action accrues( extinctive prescription), where
rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. Petitioner’s action for recovery of possession having
been filed 55 years after Macario occupied Dionisia’s share, it is also barred by extinctive prescription.
The CA while condemning Macario’s fraudulent act of depriving his three sisters of their shares in
Dionisia’s share, equally emphasized the fact that Macario’s sisters wasted their opportunity to
question his acts.
(b) Distinctions between Extinctive Prescription and Laches

2 Miguel v Catalino, November 29, 1968
Facts: On January 22, 1962, appellants Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina Miguel, and appellant Grace
Ventura brought suit in the Court below against Florendo Catalino for the recovery of a land. Plaintiffs
claimed to be the children and heirs of the original registered owner, and averred that defendant,
without their knowledge or consent, had unlawfully taken possession of the land, gathered its produce
and unlawfully excluded plaintiffs therefrom. Defendant answered pleading ownership and adverse
possession for 30 years, and counterclaimed for attorney's fees. After trial the Court dismissed the
complaint, declared defendant to be the rightful owner, and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a
transfer certificate in lieu of the original. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court, assailing the trial

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Court's findings of fact and law.
As found by the trial Court, the land in dispute is situated in the Barrio of San Pascual, Municipality of
Tuba, Benguet, Mountain Province and contains an area of 39,446 square meters, more or less. It is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 31, which was issued on 28 December 1927 in the name of
Bacaquio (or Bakakew), a widower. No encumbrance or sale has ever been annotated in the certificate
of title. The plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura is the only child of Bacaquio by his first wife, Debsay,
and the other plaintiffs-appellants, Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina, all surnamed "Miguel", are his
children by his third wife, Cosamang. He begot no issue with his second wife, Dobaney. The three
successive wives have all died.
Bacaquio, who died in 1943, acquired the land when his second wife died and sold it to Catalino
Agyapao, father of the defendant Florendo Catalino, for P300.00 in 1928. Of the purchase price P100.00
was paid and receipted for when the land was surveyed, but the receipt was lost; the balance was paid
after the certificate of title was issued. No formal deed of sale was executed, but since the sale in 1928,
or for more than 30 years, vendee Catalino Agyapao and his son, defendant-appellee Florendo
Catalino, had been in possession of the land, in the concept of owner, paying the taxes thereon and
introducing improvements.
On 1 February 1949, Grace Ventura, by herself alone, "sold" (as per her Transferor's Affidavit, Exhibit
"6") anew the same land for P300.00 to defendant Florendo Catalino.
In 1961, Catalino Agyapao in turn sold the land to his son, the defendant Florendo Catalino.
Issue: Is the sale valid?
In their first assignment, appellants assail the admission in evidence over the objection of the appellant
of Exhibit "3". This exhibit is a decision in favor of the defendant-appellee against herein plaintiff-
appellant Grace Ventura, by the council of Barrio of San Pascual, Tuba, Benguet, in its Administrative
Case No. 4, for the settlement of ownership and possession of the land. The decision is ultra
vires because barrio councils, which are not courts, have no judicial powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
Constitution; see Sec. 12, Rep. Act 2370, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter). Therefore, as
contended by appellants, the exhibit is not admissible in a judicial proceeding as evidence for
ascertaining the truth respecting the fact of ownership and possession (Sec. 1, Rule 128, Rules of
Court).
Appellants are likewise correct in claiming that the sale of the land in 1928 by Bacaquio to Catalino
Agyapao, defendant's father, is null and void ab initio, for lack of executive approval (Mangayao et al.
vs. Lasud, et al., L-19252, 29 May 1964). However, it is not the provisions of the Public Land Act
(particularly Section 118 of Act 2874 and Section 120 of Commonwealth Act 141) that nullify the
transaction, for the reason that there is no finding, and the contending parties have not shown, that the
land titled in the name of Bacaquio was acquired from the public domain (Palad vs. Saito, 55 Phil. 831).
The laws applicable to the said sale are: Section 145(b) of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and
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Sulu, providing that no conveyance or encumbrance of real property shall be made in that department
by any non-christian inhabitant of the same, unless, among other requirements, the deed shall bear
indorsed upon it the approval of the provincial governor or his representative duly authorized in
writing for the purpose; Section 146 of the same Code, declaring that every contract or agreement
made in violation of Section 145 "shall be null and void"; and Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913,
extending the application of the above provisions to Mountain Province and Nueva Vizcaya.
Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained, in law, the owner of the land until his
death in 1943, when his title passed on, by the law on succession, to his heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants.
However, notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the
opinion that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must be sustained. For
despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor
Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from
1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased, also
remained inactive, without taking any step to reivindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the
present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellants' proposition that no prescription lies
against their father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962)
justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a
result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the Court below correctly so
held. Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly
induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making
improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the
possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.
3 Lola v CA, 145 SCRA 439
This petition for review on certiorari asks us to set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals which
reversed its original decision and ruled that the land in dispute, Lot No. 5517 belongs to the private
respondent as evidenced by the latter's original certificate of title over the said property.
In a complaint for recovery of real property and damages filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Leyte, private respondent Dolores S. Zabala alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of land
situated in Sto. Niño Street, Tacloban City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10782,
and more particularly described as follows:
Lot No. 5517 of the Cadastral Survey of Tacloban, with improvements situated in the municipality of
Tacloban Bounded on the NE by Lot No. 4885; on the SE by Lots Nos. 5516 and 4884; on the SW by Lot
No. 5519; and on the NW by Calle Sto. Niño containing 164 square meters, more or less.
that by virtue of "Escritura de Venta Absolute" executed on June 29, 1936, the petitioners, Fr. Pablo B.
Lola and his sister Maxima B. Lola, bought from her Lot No. 5516 containing 474 square meters and
adjoining Lot 5517 to the East, which the petitioners immediately occupied upon consummation of the

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sale; that well aware of such alienation covering only Lot No. 5516, the petitioners, with deliberate bad
faith, also occupied Lot No. 5517 fronting Sto. Niño Street by constructing a balcony and part of their
main residential house thereon, depriving the respondent of the use and employment of rentals; that
the petitioners with full knowledge that they bought only Lot No. 5516 from the respondent
maliciously caused her to sign an affidavit of transfer of real property thereby unlawfully effecting the
transfer of Tax Declaration No. 16187 which covered another parcel of land in the name of respondent
to the petitioners alleging therein an occupation of "About four years ago" before said transfer, when in
truth and in fact the sale took place barely one year six months and twenty-nine days earlier and that
inspite of demands made by her, the petitioners have refused and still refuse to vacate lot No. 5517.
In their answer, the petitioners denied specifically most of the allegations of the complaint and averred
that when the respondent offered to petitioner Fr. Pablo B. Lola in writing the sale of the residential lot
located at Sto. Niño Street, Tacloban City, she never mentioned any lot or lots; that when Lola asked
for the particular description of the subject of the sale, respondent attached in her letter a sketch of the
land being offered to him for sale; that from the sketch he understood the offer to include any lot or
lots embodied in the sketch (which included Lot No. 5517); that he, therefore, accepted the offer and
sent the money to the respondent through his notary public who ratified and acknowledged the
document of sale; that when the document of sale was made and executed, only the respondent was
present; that if the latter did not knowingly include Lot No. 5517 when it should have been included,
she should be compelled to execute the proper deed of conveyance in favor of the petitioners; that
more than thirty (30) years have elapsed since the document of sale was executed and petitioner Pablo
B. Lola has been in possession thereof, as well as the land described in the respondent's complaint,
which formed part of the latter's offer, peacefully, publicly, adversely, and in the concept of owner and
that the respondent should be estopped from asserting any right or rights after she had slept on them
for thirty (30) years.
After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the
respondents' complaint. The decision is based on the following findings of facts:
On the witness stand, plaintiff Dolores Santillan Zabala declared that she owned Lots 5516 and 5517
along Santo Niño Street of this City; that through a deed of sale executed on June 29, 1936, Exhibit "A"
she sold only Lot No. 5516 which is in the interior and this did not include Lot No. 5517 which adjoins
Santo Niño Street; that Lot No. 5517 is covered by O.C.T. No. 1078 issued in her name by the Register
of Deed of Leyte on April 9, 1934, Exhibit "B"; that Lot No. 5516 has an area of 474 square meters while
Lot No. 5517 has an area of only 164 square meters; that after the execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit
"A", defendant Fr. Lola took possession of Lot No. 5516 while she (plaintiff) stopped living in Santo
Nino Street, Tacloban City, and transferred to Cebu City; that Lot No. 5517 was left to the care of her
brother; that her brother notified her that a house was constructed on Lot No. 5517 by defendant Fr.
Lola; that, because of this information, she came to Tacloban City in 1958 and she discovered that
defendant Fr. Lola was occupying Lot No. 5517; that she saw said defendant regarding the matter but
the latter merely said: "You will not build a house, never mind, because I will have to pay you for the
rental," that she did not agree to said proposition, and instead, said, "I will have to stay here in
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Tacloban;" that she thereafter went back to Cebu and, because she was very busy with her business in
Cebu, she did not anymore bother about her lot in Tacloban City; that in 1966, she came again to
Tacloban, but she was not able to see defendant Fr. Lola as there was nobody in his house and she did
not know where he was transferred; that she went back to Cebu and came again to Tacloban in 1968 to
see her lot and that she could no longer insist on getting back Lot No. 5517 from defendants so she
decided to file the present action.
On the other hand, defendant Fr. Lola testified that in 1936 while he was the parish priest of Balangiga,
Samar (now Eastern Samar), he requested Atty. Joaquin Hacbang, his lawyer and cousin, to look for
him a residential lot in this city; that Atty. Hacbang wired back to him that there was an offer of
plaintiff for the sale of her lot along Santo Niño Street of this city; that he received two letters from
plaintiff offering the sale of a lot along Santo Niño, the first being dated May 20, 1936 and the second
one dated July 8, 1936 (Exhibits " 1 ", " 1-A", "4" and "4-A" English translations, Exhibits " 1-B " and "4-
B"); that attached to the first letter was the sketch, Exhibit "1-A", showing that the land offered for sale
was along Santo Niño Street on the North, that upon receiving these letters, he sent by telegraphic
transfer to Atty. Hacbang the amount of P600.00 for the purchase of the land; that it was only after
plaintiff had filed the present case that he discovered that the parcel of land of plaintiff along Santo
Nino Street as described in the sketch sent to him by her, Exhibit "1-A", involves two lots, Nos. 5516
and 5517; that as offered to him by plaintiff in her letters, he was of the impression that there was only
one lot of the plaintiff along Santo Niño Street; that after the execution by plaintiff of the deed of sale in
1936, Exhibit "A", he introduced improvements therein by starting to construct a house in May, 1938
and this was completed in December of the same year; that the balcony of the house as well as a
portion of the main house itself is constructed on lot 5517; and that since after the execution of the deed
of sale in 1936 until the filing of the present complaint plaintiff had never disturbed him in his
possession of the parcel of land in question along Santo Niño Street of this City.
It would seem from the pleadings and the evidence submitted by the parties that the principal issue
involved in this case is whether or not Lot No. 5517 was deemed to have been sold by plaintiff to
defendant Fr. Lola when the former executed on June 29, 1936, the deed of sale in favor of the latter,
Exhibit "A".
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, it would appear to the Court that whether she herself or somebody else in her stead
had written the letters, the fact remains that plaintiff sent to defendant Fr. Lola the letter dated May 20,
1936, offering to sell the parcel of land located at 17 Sto. Niño Street, this city, Exhibits "4" and "4-A"
(English translation, Exhibit "4--B") and this was followed up by another letter, Exhibit "1" (English
translation, Exhibit "I-B") which was accompanied by a sketch indicating that the land offered for sale
was along Santo Niño Street of this City, Exhibit " 1-A ".
This is the observation of the Court from an examination of the letters which are wanting of any
indication of having been falsified by defendant or probably made by them for self-serving reasons.
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And now there seems to be no clear explanation from either side why the deed of sale executed by the
plaintiff on July 29, 1936, Exhibit "A", mentions only Lot 5516. However, considering that the sketch,
Exhibit "l-A", had earlier been sent by the plaintiff to defendant Fr. Lola, it would seem safe to
conclude that both plaintiff and defendant Fr. Lola were uniformly under the impression that what
was being sold by her to the latter was her lot which was directly adjoining Santo Niño Street.
The Court considers as a belated afterthought plaintiff's protestation that what she really intended to
sell to defendant Fr. Lola was only the interior portion of her land for this is belied not only by the
sketch she sent to said defendant, Exhibit "l-A", but also by her subsequent inaction regarding Lot No.
5517 after the execution of the deed of sale, despite the fact that defendant Fr. Lola had constructed a
house extending up to said lot along Santo Niño Street of this City. Precisely the court fails to see any
reason why defendant Fr. Lola would ha e been satisfied to acquire only the interior portion of the
plaintiff's property and not that one along Santo Niño Street.
It is significant to note that on cross-examination, plaintiff's brother Ramon Santillan admitted that at
the time of the sale, defendant Fr. Lola did not ask for a right of way to Santo Niño Street. This is an
indication that said vendee understood an the time that what he was offered for sale and what he had
purchased was plaintiff's Street. On the other hand, the Court is of the opinion that the preponderance
of evidence indicates that, contrary to her claim that she tried to approach defendant Fr. Lola in 1958
and 1966 and complained about the encroachment of her land by said defendant, plaintiff did not do
anything at all regarding the lot in question until she filed the present action last year.
As a matter of fact, from January 28, 1938, or almost two years after the execution of the deed of sale
Exhibit "A," plaintiff executed a transferor's affidavit of the parcel of land in question in favor of
defendant Fr. Lola as covered by tax declaration No. 16187, Exhibit "2", and from an examination
thereof, it is clear that the land involved was declared in plaintiff's name and is the one located in
Santo Niño Street of this city as it is bounded on the West by said street. This, in the mind of the Court,
was tantamount to a signification by plaintiff that what she had sold to defendant Fr. Lola was her
land along Santo Niño Street.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Zabala appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court initially affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the further modification that the respondent was ordered to execute the
necessary deed of conveyance covering Lot No. 5517 in favor of petitioner Fr. Pablo B, Lola. The
appellate court ruled that while it is true that the land in dispute is still registered in he name of the
respondent and title thereto may not be acquired by the petitioners against the former as registered
owner, the equitable defense of laches, in lieu of prescription, should be applied in their case.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
The appellate court reversed itself and held the respondent to be the absolute owner of Lot No. 5517,
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covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10782. It ordered the petitioners to vacate the disputed
premises and demolish whatever improvements may have encroached on it. The reversal was based
on the following conclusions: (1) There was no encumbrance on the title of the disputed lot; (2) The
deed of absolute sale, "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" should be the sole repository of the terms and
conditions of the agreement between petitioners and respondent with the sketch relied upon by the
petitioner being merely evidence of "an offer to sell " (3) The deed was prepared by Atty. Hacbang, the
lawyer of petitioners; (4) It is improbable for the petitioners not to have examined the deed of sale; and
(5) The Transferor's affidavit contains inaccurate statements.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
The petitioners maintain that the appellate court should have considered as evidence of the sale, the
fact that the said sale was perfected by a written offer, and the written offer which was accepted by
petitioner Fr. Lola never mentioned any lot or lots; and the fact that the respondent sent another letter
with a sketch map showing the subject matter of the sale to be only one single lot abutting Sto. Niño
Street, Tacloban City. Furthermore, the petitioners allege that the true intention on the parties to the
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta" can be seen not only from the aforementioned exhibits but also from the
contemporaneous acts of the respondent after the sale. Finally, the petitioners invoke the doctrine of
laches because of the unexplained delay, inaction, and neglect on the part of the respondent to assert
her claim over the disputed lot for over thirty (30) years.
We agree with the petitioners and affirm the findings of the trial court as well as the initial decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The reasons relied upon by the appellate court in completely reversing its previous decision are based
on the strict application of the parol evidence rule and sole reliance on what is written on the "
Escritura de Venta Absoluta. " A closer look at the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
deed of sale, however, gives a better understanding of what actually transpired between the parties
and what was their real intention when they entered into the contract of sale. We are constrained to
apply the exception to, rather than the general rule to parol evidence following the case of Premiere
Insurance & Sure y Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court (141 SCRA 423, 434) where we ruled:
While it is a general rule that parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose of varying the terms of a
contract, when an issue is squarely presented that a contract does not express the true intention of the
parties, courts will, when a proper foundation is laid therefore, hear evidence for the purpose of
ascertaining the true intention of the parties. Once the intent is clear, then it shall prevail over what on
its face the document appears to be. (Labasan v. Lacuesta, 86 SCRA 16, 22). The court does not reform
the instrument. It remains as it was written. However, the court receives evidence to find out how the
parties really bound themselves. The second exception to the parol evidence rule enables the court to
ascertain the intent of the parties.
In the present case, the petitioners specifically raise the issue that the subject of the deed of sale which
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was finally drafted on the basis of the title which respondent presented to petitioners did not embody
the whole lot which the parties previously agreed upon on the basis of the written offer and acceptance
by the parties, but only a portion thereof. The petitioner's contention is substantiated by the two letters
of the respondent to petitioner Fr. Lola which clearly show that what the respondent offered
comprised not only Lot No. 5516 but Lot No. 5517 as well, the latter being the exterior portion of the
whole land and which lot abuts Sto. Niño Street.
Aside from the respondent's two letters the authenticity of which she did not even try to impugn, the
circumstances after the sale also clearly indicate that the respondent sold the whole parcel of land,
unmindful at that time of the fact that the lot was covered by two titles. Again, in the case of Sy v.
Court of Appeals (131 SCRA 116, 124), we ruled:
It is a basic and fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms thereof are clear
and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the
stipulations shall control but when the words appear contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former. (Labasan v. Lacuesta, supra). In order to judge the intention of
the parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Likewise in the case of Philippine National Railways v. CIR of Albay, Br. I, (83 SCRA 569, 576) we
ruled:
On the other hand, if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the
complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to
prove the true agreement of the parties (Enriquez v. Ramos, 116 Phil. 525, 531; Philippine Sugar E. D.
Co. v. Philippines, 62 L. Ed. 1177, 247 U.S. 385; Heirs of De la Rama v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., 54
Phil. 580, 588; Land Settlement and Dev. Corp. v. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 117 Phil. 761, 765).
We apply the above rulings to the case at bar, As stated earlier, aside from the letters which embody
the true intention of the parties, the records also show that after the consummation of the sale, the
respondent executed a transferor's affidavit which included the lot in dispute. More important, the
respondent moved to Cebu City, leaving the petitioners in continuous, open, adverse, and peaceful
occupation of the disputed lot for thirty-two (32) years. In all of these 32 years, the petitioners paid the
taxes on the entire property.
In the case of Samson v. Court of Appeals (141 SCRA 194, 205), we ruled:
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land by the
respondents and their parents before them for more than thirty years qualify them to register title to
the said subject parcels of land. We ruled in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, (131 SCRA 533)
that:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
273 | P a g e -
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property.
The trial court also correctly found that the respondent's allegation that she confronted or tried to
confront petitioner Fr. Lola in 1958 and 11966 is unfounded and unsubstantiated. To our mind, even
assuming that the respondent really found that there was an encroachment on her lot only in 1958, it is
highly improbable that she would let eight years pass before she would try to confront petitioner again
in 1966 and two more years before she actually files an action for recovery of possession. Hence, the
Court is led to the inevitable conclusion that what the respondent offered to sell and what the
petitioners accepted are Lot Nos. 1156 and 1157.
We also agree with the petitioners that laches effectively bars the respondent from recovering the lot in
dispute.
Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners because, admittedly, the title to
Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of the respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to
it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to the respondent's failure to assert her claims and
ownership for thirty two (32) years.
There are precedents for this ruling. In the following cases, we upheld the equitable defense of laches
and ruled that the long inaction and delay of the title holder in asserting his right over the disputed lot
bars him from recovering the same.
Miguel v. Catalino (26 SCRA 234, 238, 239) states:
Appellants are likewise correct in claiming that the sale of the land in 1928 by Bacaquio to Catalino
Agyapao, defendant's father, is null and void ab initio, for lack of executive approval (Mangayao, et al,
v, Lasud, et all., L-19252, 29 May 1964). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained, in law, the owner of the land until his
death in 1943, when his title passed on, by the law on succession. to his heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants.
Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the opinion that the
judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must be sustained. For despite the
invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered
the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the
seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive, without
taking any step to reinvindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in
court. Even granting appellants' proposition that no prescription lies against their father's recorded
274 | P a g e -
title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in
setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-
appellants must be considered barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with
favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time,
effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long
years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land
values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense...
Pabalete v. Echarri, Jr. (37 SCRA 518, 521, 522) states:
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find, however, that
while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that is, the
equitable defense of laches. We hold that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in
derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable
defense of laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession for 37 years, the original
owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant
has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction and neglect been converted into a stale
demand. (Quoting Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277).
xxx xxx xxx
This defense is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title,
but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect he should
be barred from asserting this claim at all because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and
unjust to the defendant...
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE is ENTERED ordering the respondent to execute the
necessary deed of conveyance covering Lot No. 5517 in favor of the petitioners. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case is made PERMANENT.
(c ) Special Cases
4 Espiritu v CFI, October 31, 1972
Facts: Sometime in 1948 the defendants verbally sold to her the two parcels of land in question for
P3,000.00 Pesos and, in consequence, delivery thereof together with the corresponding transfer
certificates of title (TCT) was made to her, but no deed of sale was executed at the time because
private respondents promised they would do so as soon as the titles which were then in the name of
their predecessor in interest were transferred to their names, and that despite demands made by her
for the execution of such deed, said respondents, "without justifiable cause therefor adamantly failed
275 | P a g e -
and refused — to comply with (such) just and valid demand." In their answer, defendants denied that
the transaction was a sale and alleged that it was merely a contract of antichresis whereby petitioner
had loaned to them P1, 500.00, for which she demanded the delivery of the lands in question and the
titles thereto as security, with the right to collect or receive the income therefrom pending the payment
of the loan. And by way of affirmative defenses, respondents interposed (1) unenforceability by action
of the alleged sale, under the statute of frauds, and (2) prescription of petitioner's action, the same
having allegedly accrued in 1948. Subsequently, respondents reiterated their said affirmative defense
of prescription in a formal motion to dismiss and as no opposition thereto was filed by petitioner, on
July 31, 1967, respondent court issued the impugned order of dismissal reading as follows:
Submitted for resolution is a motion to dismiss filed counsel for the defendants to which no
opposition has been filed despite the fact that the plaintiff was furnished with a copy thereof.
Finding the said motion to dismiss to be well-taken for the reasons stated therein, this Court grants
the same and the complaint, dated October 16, 1964, is hereby dismissed with costs against the
plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed the complaint of October 20, 1964
Issue: Whether petitioner’s right to demand the execution of the TCTs already prescribed.
Held/Ruling: The right to demand the execution of the document required under Article 1358 1is not
imprescriptible.
The nature of petitioner’s action may be said to be one founded on an oral contract, which, to be sure,
cannot be considered among those rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds, for the simple
reason that it has already been, from petitioner’s own point of view, almost fully consummated by the
delivery of the lands and the corresponding titles to her. X X X. The petitioner’s action, based as it is
upon oral contract, prescribes in 6 years according to Artcle 1145 of the Civil Code. Assuming
otherwise, the only other possibility is that petitioner’s case comes under Article 1149 and the action
prescribes in 5 years. In either case, since the cause of action of petitioner accrued in 1948 and the
present suit was instituted in 1964 or sixteen years later, and none interrupting circumstances
enumerated in Article 1155 has been shown to have intervened, it is unquestionable that petitioner’s
action filed in the court below has already prescribed.
5 Solidarios v Alampay, January 28, 1975
In this review on pure questions of law of respondent court's granting of the motion to dismiss
petitioners' action for reformation of instrument, the Court reverses and remands the case for trial and
adjudication on the merits. The Civil Code provides that where, as alleged in the complaint, two
1
ART. 1357. If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in the following article, the contracting parties
may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon the
contract. (1279a)
276 | P a g e - P L M C o l l e g e o f L a w B a t c h 2 0 1 4
parties agree upon the mortgage of real property but the instrument states that the property is sold
absolutely or with a right of repurchase, an action for reformation of the instrument is proper. The
prescriptive period must be determined on the basis of the allegations of the complaint for reformation
of instrument and not on the counter-allegations of the motion to dismiss (which must hypothetically
admit the factual allegations of the complaint) that the transaction was actually a true sale (which is a
matter of defense), of an action for annulment of which would prescribe in the lesser period of four
years. The existence of a bona fide mortgage in favor of a third party clearly constitutes no impediment
to petitioners' action for reformation and recovery of title.
On November 29, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed a complaint against private respondent in the court of
first instance of Negros Occidental presided by respondent judge for reformation of instrument and
praying that the deed of absolute sale of the parcel of land in Bacolod City executed by them on
December 24, 1964 in favor of private respondent which did not embody their true agreement be
reformed and declared a contract of mortgage and that their property be returned to them upon their
payment of the loan consideration of P16,500.00 and that they be awarded damages, attorneys' fees
and costs.
In their complaint, petitioners allege that "on December 24, 1964 the plaintiffs and the defendant Ong
entered into an agreement whereby they agreed that the plaintiffs will borrow from the defendant the
sum of P16,500.00 on the security of the parcel of land above mentioned;" "that the deed of sale does
not embody the true agreement of the parties which was to constitute a mortgage over Lot No. 270-A,
Bacolod Cadastre above mentioned to secure payment of the loan of P16,500.00;" "that plaintiffs
acceded to the condition required by the defendant Ong (to execute in his favor a deed of sale) for the
reason that they reposed great confidence in said defendant, being a good family friend and because
they were in dire need of money "that simultaneous to the execution of the deed of sale, Annex A, the
defendant Ong executed in favor of the plaintiff an option (for six months) to purchase the ... parcel of
land for the same sum of P16,500.00;" that since the purported sale up to now, petitioners "continue to
occupy part of the premises without paying rentals to the defendant; moreover, plaintiffs collect up to
the present time all the rentals due from the other occupants of the premises;" that the "sum of
P16,500.00 ... is grossly inadequate for purpose of definite sale ...;" that the "plaintiffs had on several
occasions offered to the defendant Ong to pay the sum of P16,500.00 representing the loan ...;" that the
plaintiffs are "willing and ready to pay defendant the loan of P16,500.00 plus lawful interest if due;"
that "due to the defendant Ong's unjust refusal to execute the proper document of mortgage and to
accept plaintiff's payment of their loan to him they suffered damages." 1
Respondent filed his answer with counterclaim and raised the defense of prescription in his answer.
Respondent court after pre-trial directed respondent to raise the issue of prescription squarely in a
motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed their opposition to the dismissal motion and after hearing,
respondent court issued its order of June 10, 1974 granting the motion to dismiss and dismissing
petitioners' case.
No evidence on the sole issue of prescription was received by respondent court at the hearing of the
dismissal motion. It merely relied on the allegations of the complaint and the pleadings and granted
dismissal on two grounds, to wit,
1. The proper remedy of petitioners on the basis of the complaint is annulment of the sale on the
ground of "vitiated consent" which action has prescribed within the statutory four-year period citing
277 | P a g e -
Article 1391, Civil Code;2 and
2. The existence of a mortgage for P100,000.00 over the lot executed by respondent in favor of Jose del
Castillo3 who is a mortgagee in good faith presents a legal impediment to petitioners' action for
reformation of instrument and recovery of the property free from all liens and encumbrances.
Reconsideration was peremptorily denied in respondent court's order of August 5, 1974. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law. The Court per its resolution of
January 13, 1975 in view of the simple issues involved resolved to consider the case as a special civil
action and respondent's motion to dismiss as his answer to the petition in order to expeditiously
dispose of the legal questions presented without the need and expense of parties' briefs.
The petition has merit and calls for the setting aside of the dismissal order.
1. Respondent court manifestly erred in holding that petitioners' action prescribed four years after the
execution of the questioned deed of sale on the premise of its unsupported prejudgment in its
dismissal order (without trial and evidence) that "the ultimate agreement of the parties (was) for the
definite sale and conveyance (of the property)", 4 and that petitioners' action "would involve, not the
reformation of said document of sale into a mortgage as they so contend, but inherently the annulment
itself of the deed of sale and only because of an alleged vitiated consent of the plaintiffs in acceding to
the conditions required by the defendant." 5
Respondent court instead of disregarding, should have adhered to the established rule that in motions
to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint are deemed to be hypothetically admitted. Here, the
complaint for reformation of instrument clearly alleged that the deed of sale did not express the true
agreement of the parties and should be reformed into the mortgage that it actually was and prayed
that petitioners be allowed to redeem the property by repaying the loan of P16,500.00 (the true value of
the property being much more, as evidenced by the mortgage loan for P100,000.00 which respondent
in turn secured on it). Such allegations are binding for purposes of the dismissal motion and therefore
the applicable prescription period for such actions based upon a written contract and for reformation
thereof as provided by law is ten (10 years as provided in Article 1144, Civil Code. 6
Such right to reformation is expressly recognized in Article 1365 of the Civil Code which provides that
"If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property but the instrument
states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right to repurchase, reformation of the instrument
is proper."
Petitioners' action for reformation and recovery of title was brought on November 29, 1972 less than
eight years after execution of the questioned deed on December 24, 1964 and had therefore not
prescribed.
Respondent's counter-theory that the questioned contract was in truth and reality a bona fide sale is
clearly a matter of defense, which was yet to be established at the trial and could not be availed of at
the pre-trial stage to dismiss the case as if it were already a proven fact, contrary to the very allegations
of fact of the complaint which petitioners must be given an opportunity and their day in court to
establish.
2. Respondent court's other ground for dismissal, to wit, that the existing P100.00-mortgage of the
property in favor of Jose del Castillo (whom the parties have conceded to be a mortgagee in good faith)
constitutes an impediment to petitioners' action as an innocent party's "undisputed rights ... would be
impaired and prejudiced" is clear error.
278 | P a g e -
It is obvious that the mortgagee's rights over the property are recognized but that would in no way
defeat petitioners' action for reformation and recovery of title to the property. If petitioners prevail,
they simply would recover the title to the property, subject to the mortgage thereon in favor of del
Castillo or as prayed for by them, respondent may be duly sentenced "to deliver title to the plaintiffs
free from any encumbrances including the mortgage to defendant del Castillo" 7 which merely means
that respondent would in such case be obliged and sentenced to discharge del Castillo's mortgage
credit (which mortgage loan he obtained after all for his own exclusive benefit).
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the dismissal order of June 10, 1974 and
remanding the case to respondent court for trial and adjudication on the merits. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
6 Jalandoni v PNB, October 9, 1981
Topic: Distinctions between Extinctive Prescription and Laches
Facts:
On March 31, 1959 the CFI of Manila rendered a judgment ordering Eduardo Jalandoni to pay the
Philippine National Bank. That judgment became final and executory. Within five years from the entry
of judgment in that case, or on March 9, 1964, the sheriff of Silay City, pursuant to an alias writ of
execution, levied upon Lot with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3202 in the name of Eduardo
Jalandoni.
No effort was made by the bank up to this time to have that land sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment against Jalandoni. On April 22, 1974, or more than ten years after the levy was made,
Jalandoni filed with the CFI, a petition for the cancellation of the levy on the ground of prescription.
Jalandoni filed in the same court an action to quiet title or for the cancellation of the notice of embargo
on the ground that, although more than ten years had elapsed from the time the levy was made, no
execution sale had been held.
TC: Dismissed.
CA: Affirmed.
Jalandoni’s Contention: In support of their contention that the levy cannot be enforced after the
expiration in 1969 of the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment, rely on the rule laid down in
Ansaldo vs. Fidelity and Surety Cocase, that "properties levied upon by execution must be sold in
public auction within the period of ten years during which the judgment can be enforced by action"
The reason for that rule is that an execution is enforced by levy and sale, not by levy alone.
Court and Bank’s Contention: The execution sale can be made beyond the ten-year period for
enforcing the judgment as long as the levy was effected within five years from the entry of judgment as
in the instant case.
They rely on the dictum that while section 6 of Rule 39 "limits the time within which a writ of

279 | P a g e -
execution may be issued to enforce a judgment, it does not prescribe a period when the sale at public
auction by the sheriff shall take place after the issuance of the writ of execution and a valid levy made
pursuant thereto"
Issue: May the judgment debtor's land, which was levied upon within five years from the entry of
judgment, be sold at an execution sale after the expiration of the ten-year period for enforcing the
judgment?
Held:
No. We hold that the trial court erred in not applying the ruling in the Ansaldo case which is on all
fours with this case.
The employees of the bank were negligent. They did not require the sheriff to sell Jalandoni's land at
public auction. The bank is bound by its employees' negligence. This case should teach the responsible
officers of the bank to be more vigilant in exercising its rights and in supervising its employees. The
law helps the diligent and vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
For laches and neglect on the part of those, who, under the law are entitled to require of others the
fulfillment of their obligations, the statute of limitations has been enacted, which provides that such
rights prescribe after a certain period of time, in order that it may serve alike as a punishment for those
who do not know how to look after their own interests, and as a source of reassurance to those who
may have rested in the belief that their creditors had waived their rights, and also to insure economic
stability and the certainty of rights.
We find that the "notice of embargo" annotated in 1964 on Jalandoni's title is no longer enforceable.
Thus the court granted the action to quiet title on the ground the contract, instrument or other
obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription.
7 Republic v CFI, January 27, 1983 (FULL TEXT)
In 1943 defendant Dolores Infants obtained loans from the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., payable at its office in
Bacolod City in the total amount of P683.10 with interest at the rate of six percent per annum,
compounded quarterly.
On September 15, 1961, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Villadolid, Negros Occidental, to collect from the defendant the said amount of P683.10. The
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. The Justice of the Peace of
Villadolid, after hearing, dismissed the case on the ground that the action had prescribed. The plaintiff
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and, on October 28, 1963, the case was
dismissed on the ground that plaintiff's action had already prescribed.
Plaintiff appealed directly to this Court contending that the lower court erred (1) in holding that this
action had prescribed, and (2) in dismissing the complaint.

280 | P a g e -
In the case of Republic of Philippines vs. Grijaldo 15 SCRA 681, We ruled that " ... pursuant to the
Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and Executive Order No. 9095 of the United States; and
under Vesting Order No. P-4, dated January 21, 1946, the properties of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., an
entity which was declared to be under the jurisdiction of the enemy country (Japan), were vested in the
United States Government. Pursuant, further, to the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and Transfer
Agreements dated July 20, 1954 and June 15, 1957, between the United States Government and the
Republic of the Philippines, the assets of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. were transferred to and vested in the
Republic of the Philippines. The successive transfer of the rights over the loans in question from the
Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. to the United States Government and from the United States Government to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines, made the Republic of the Philippines the successor of
the rights, title and interest in said loans, thereby creating a privity of contract between the appellee
and the appellant. . . . As successor in interest in, and transferee of, the property rights of the United
States of America over the loans in question, the Republic of the Philippines had thereby become a
privy to the origin,- 1 contracts of loan between the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. and the appellant. It follows,
therefore, that the Republic of the Philippines has a legal right to bring the present action against the
appellant Jose Grijaldo "
In the same aforecited case, the borrower contended that the action had prescribed, pointing out that
the loan became due on June 1, 1944 and that the complaint was filed on January 17, 1961, or after
more than 16 years had elapsed far beyond the period of ten years when an action based on a written
contract should be brought to court.
The Court did not find merit in the above cited argument and further ruled that:
Firstly, it should be considered that the complaint in the present case was brought by the
Republic of the Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of its sovereign
functions, to protect the interests of the State over a public property. Under paragraph 4
of Article 1108 of the Civil Code prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not
run against the State. This Court has held that the statute of limitations does not run
against the right of action of the Government of the Philippines (Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, etc., 35 Phil. 738-751). Secondly, the running of
the period of prescription of the action to collect the loan from the appellant was
interrupted by the moratorium laws (Executive Orders No. 25, dated November 18, 1944;
Executive Order No. 32, dated March 10, 1945; and Republic Act No. 342, approved on
July 26, 1948).
In the case at bar, the loans which had no maturity dates were contracted in 1943, or during the period
of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Ordinarily, the counting of the prescriptive period
should be reckoned from the date the debt became due and demandable. However, the moratorium
decrees supervene suspending the enforcement of payments of all debts and other monetary
obligations contracted during the war, although in the case of Royal L. Rutter vs. Placido J. Esteban, 93
Phil. 68, the moratorium laws (Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and Republic Act No. 349) were
declared unconstitutional. (Republic vs. Herida G.R. No. L-34486, December 27, 1982). Nevertheless,
281 | P a g e -
said laws were in effect from the time of their respective promulgations until May 18, 1953. As a
consequence, before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the running of the
prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year period within which to institute the
action against herein appellee began the day after the moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional
or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953. It was on September 27, 1954 when plaintiff (appellant) made extra-
judicial written demand on defendant (appellee). As the loans in question did not have any maturity
dates and, therefore, payable on demand, prescription could have accrued, if at all, only on September
27, 1954 when petitioner made the extra-judicial demand. Plaintiff's cause of action will therefore
prescribe only on September 27, 1964. And, since the complaint in this case was filed on September 15,
1961, which is within the 10-year period, the action has not yet prescribed.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of the lower court, dated October 28, 1963, dismissing the complaint is
hereby SET ASIDE and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings. With costs
against the appellee.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions: TEEHANKEE, J., concurring : I concur on the ground that the action had not
prescribed, having been filed on September 15, 1961 within the 10-year prescriptive period, counted
from the lifting of the moratorium on May 19, 1953. I do not subscribe to the applicability here of the
principle that prescription does not run against the State this was a purely commercial loan that passed
to our government's ownership as empty property, subject to the laws of prescription.
8. Succession
C. Modes of Extinguishing Ownership

282 | P a g e -

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PROPERTY

I. Classification of property, NCC 414

A. Immovable or real, 415

B. Movable, 416, 417

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Lopez tried to secure a modification of the decision, but was denied.

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2 Associated Insurance v Iya, 103 SCRA

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WON the house can be considered as personal property.

3 Tumalad v Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143

Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property:

Topic: Movable Property

II. Character of Ownership, NCC 419-425

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1 MIAA v City of Pasay, April 2, 2009, G.R. No. 163072

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the

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Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

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3 Republic v Vega, GR 177790, January 17, 2011 (FULL TEXT)

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B. Patrimonial property of the State

Topic: Patrimonial property of the State

Held: We answer in the negative.

C. Private ownership, NCC 421

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Zamboanga vs Zamboanga 1968 case

The motion for reconsideration is vigorously opposed by plaintiff-appellee Province of

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2 Casimiro v Mateo, GR 175845, July 27, 2011

III. Essential Form

VI. Aptitude for repeated use, NCC 418

VII. Susceptibility to Division

VIII. Existence in Time

3 Arriola v Arriola, GR 177703, January 28, 2008

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4 Lunod v Meneses, G.R. No. 4223, August 19, 1908

Article 552 of the Civil code provides:

Article 563 of the said code reads also:

Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, without respondents' knowledge and consent, constructed

o Must be based on a legal taking

6 Aneco Realty v Landex, 560 SCRA 182

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7 Padilla v Velasco, et al, GR No. 169956, January 19, 2009

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The Ruling of the Court

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RTC: DISMISSED plaintiff’s complaint.

CA: REVERSED lower court’s decision.

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Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

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Ruling of the Court of Appeals30

Petitioners immediately filed this petition for review.

Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration: