Leslie Ui vs. Atty.

Iris Bonifacio

A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000

Facts of the case:

Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on
grounds of immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with
Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. According to petitioner,
Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This
led Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail.
According however to respondent, she is a victim in the situation. When respondent
met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with children to an
estranged Chinese woman who is already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the two
got married inHawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent
knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further
claims that she and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to
allow them to gradually accept the situation. Respondent however presented a
misrepresented copy of her marriage contract.

Issue:

Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law?

Held:

NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath
and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to
the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession.

Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
character. A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude”. A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.

Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondent’s suspicion that something
was amiss in her relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions.
Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains
that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was
a valid marriage, cannot be considered as an immoral. For immorality connotes conduct
that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and to opinion of good and
respectable member of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral, that is it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.

A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his
true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The
title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up
to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in
the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to
1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of
the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for
1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was
based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of
World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of
the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are
only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can
practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will
not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF
BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the
2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the
face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is
not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows
that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with
the OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised
him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their
former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and
terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of
do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition
to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact,
the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that
these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court
to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper
and shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll
of Attorneys.

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership
of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further
orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition
seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven
to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee,
Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and for
disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Melendrez.

FACTS:

MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him
the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.

i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people.

ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.

Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the
Bar.

MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.

1. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge
has moral ascendancy over them, considered the three cases that arose from
a single incident as “closed and terminated.”

i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk.

Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:

1. Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending.

2. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose

the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:

PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the

Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic (Meling did not pass the bar).

Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a

false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar.”

He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed
as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters.

i. Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.

1. Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational

qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so

far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

2. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant
to aver that he or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable
by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or
indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her.”

1. Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His
deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
Zoreta v. Simpliciano

A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004.

FACTS:

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of Contract
and Damages against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001
due to the latter’s failure to honor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where
respondent Atty. Henerson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter’s counsel. In said cases,
respondent who was not a dully commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications
issued by the CLerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of
notarization, as evidenced by presented documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the
Rules of Court.

RULING:

Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s
oath similarly proscribes. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct, “Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). The
lawyer violates, likewise, Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Radjaie v. Alovera

A.C. No. 4748. Aug. 4, 2000. 337 SCRA 244

PER CURIAM

FACTS:

Atty. Alovera, former RTC Judge, faces disbarment for having penned a Decision long
after his retirement from the Judiciary, which ultimately divested complainant of her
property. The gist of the anomalies committed by the respondent judge are: (1) The case
was not tried. What transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside his chambers where
only the lawyer of the plaintiffs and a court stenographer from another court were present.
No Judge or court personnel were present as there was actual Court session in open court
going on at that time;

The records of the case were with Judge Alovera and remained with him even after his
retirement. He did not return the record to the Court Clerk in Charge of Civil Cases; (3)
The record of the case turned up on the table of the Court Clerk together with the “Offer
of Exhibits” of the lawyer of the plaintiffs and the “Order”, after the retirement of Judge
Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the exhibits were not properly filed and
do not bear markings of having been received by the court; (4) The “decision” of Judge
Alovera was filed with the court by Judge Alovera himself and because he was no longer
a judge his submission was refused.

HELD:

Disbarred. Respondent has thus sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally
unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. The
evidence against respondent were all quite telling on how the latter acted in a grossly
reprehensible manner in having the questioned decision come to fore, leading ultimately
to its execution divesting the complainant of her property. Respondent gravely abused his
relationship with his former staff, pompously flaunting his erstwhile standing as a judge.
He disregarded his primary duty as an officer of the court, who is sworn to assist the courts
and not to impede or pervert the administration of justice to all and sundry. In so doing,
he made a mockery of the judiciary and eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers.
Quingwa vs. Puno

[AC. No. 389 February 28, 1967]

FACTS:

Complainant Flora Quingwa filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint charging
respondent Atty. Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. Complainant and respondent were engaged to be married. One time, the
respondent invited the complainant to watch a movie, but later they went to a hotel to
perform the sexual act with a promise and assurance of marriage. Complainant begged
respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: ‘anyway I have
promised to marry you’. Complainant submitted to respondent’s plea for sexual
intercourse because of respondent’s promise of marriage and not because of a desire for
sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred.

HELD:

YES. Respondent’s name was ordered to be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

[T]he respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with
the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:

… The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education.
He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the
profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

[A] “grossly immoral conduct” is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment.
(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Quingwa vs. Puno

[A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967]

FACTS:

Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar,
with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been
a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon
Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted
to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage
and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth
certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he
asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special
defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or
suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD:

YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance
of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When
his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his
answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall
under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule
that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be
taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The
inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with
the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either
moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only
the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his

name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
ROYONG vs. OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963

FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the
bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation
and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and
respondent seems to be consensual sex.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor
General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately
alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral
character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit
relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law,
praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the
respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the
adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one
who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the
statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.

As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is
required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known.

Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that
people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a
person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered
then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
People vs. Tuanda
[A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990]

FACTS:
Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation of B.P.
22 with a fine and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant Herminia Marquez. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court and imposed upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in addition, the
suspension from the practice of law until further orders from the Supreme Court. The
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals noted
respondent’s Notice of Appeal and advised her “to address her Notice of Appeal to the
Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum.” In the said motion, responded stated:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court’s penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant’s
action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been
motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the
intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.

HELD:
NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied. [T]he crimes of which respondent was
convicted [also] import deceit and violation of her attorney’s oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to “obey the laws of the
land.” Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted
of such offense.
PEOPLE v. TUANDA

FACTS:

Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court
of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several
pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984,
instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks.
These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency
of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to
settle her obligation.

Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of
violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice
of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing
to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a
penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law.
Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A.
Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD:

NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide as follows:
3. Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics
supplied)

1. Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
— The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a
serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The
effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.
Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws
of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from
this Court.
MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO
ARANETA
A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts:

Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts
to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account
against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The
Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.
On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of
Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects
of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document.

Issue:

Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against
a closed account.

Held:

The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral
turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless
checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the practice of law,
or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case,
however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa
thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which
he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a
similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are
constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment
is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,
“the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only
has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it
to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.”
Atty. Damaso Flores vs Judge Bernardo Abesamis

FACTS:

In 1986, Flores was accused of breaching the [compromise] agreement and so

eventually a writ of execution was issued against Flores ordering the latter to
surrender the cockpit to Ligon because of the said breach. Flores appealed and
the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court nullified the writ of execution
[because it was later determined that Flores did not breach the compromise
agreement].

On April 5, 1988, the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to order the restoration of
the cockpit to Flores. Judge Abesamis of the trial court however only received the
mittimus on April 13, 1988 and then the next 2 days, he received subsequent pleadings
from Flores and Ligon. Considering this, Judge Abesamis was only able to issue an order
favorable Flores on April 20, 1988. But Ligon was able to secure a TRO from the Court of
Appeal enjoining Judge Abesamis from restoring the cockpit to Flores on the ground of
intervening events because apparently, Ligon was able to buy the property from Flores’s
lessors. This was opposed by Flores until it reached the Supreme Court where the
Supreme Court noted that such fact [of the supervening event] should be addressed by
the trial court and not the SC.

From May 1989 to June 1989, Flores filed criminal and administrative cases against
Judge Abesamis, accusing him of partiality, evident bad faith, and gross negligence, as
well as of serious misconduct, inefficiency and ignorance of the law, in deliberately
delaying action on his motions to obtain possession of the cockpit. The cases were
dismissed for lack of merit.

In November 1989, Judge Abesamis issued a writ of execution ordering the restoration of
the cockpit to him but this was again opposed by Ligon on the ground of the supervening
event which should be discussed by the trial court. Judge Abesamis ruled in favor of
Ligon. It was ruled by the trial court that Ligon’s lawful acquisition of title to the cockpit
and Flores’ continuing failure to pay his debt of about P1.8 million to the former were
supervening events warranting Ligon’s retention of the cockpit and precluding its
restoration to Flores. This ruling was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court

In 1993, Flores, however, again filed complaints against Abesamis for serious misconduct
etc but they were again dismissed for lack of merit.

In 1995, Flores once more filed in the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Judge
Abesamis, he accused Judge Abesamis of transgressing the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act “for alleged bias and prejudice in granting a party’s motion which caused
undue injury to complainant.”

The case was again dismissed. The Assistant Ombudsman however ordered Flores to
explain why he should not be cited for he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for willful
disregard of the judgments and orders of the Ombudsman and those of the Court of
Appeals; abuse of the processes of the courts; and forum-shopping.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Flores is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:

Yes. Flores knew that Judge Abesamis cannot restore the cockpit to him because of the
TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. He also knew that that the specific Orders of Judge
Abesamis upon which his criminal complaint was grounded had already been sustained
by higher courts, and consequently, his complaint was completely devoid of merit. Flores
actually resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a
substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law
from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him
“undue injury.” This is impermissible.

Flores thus abused the processes of the court. He resorted to the administrative procedure
for disciplining Judges prescribed by law, and even to criminal prosecution,
notwithstanding that determination of the correctness of the orders of Judge Abesamis.
It would appear that improper motives underlay the filing of his complaints: either to vent
his wrath against someone, anyone, because of his frustrations in his attempts to regain
possession of the cockpit, or to so intimidate the respondent Judges as to make them more
malleable in their subsequent actuations with respect to his future motions.

Finally, his initiation of the complaint was forum shopping of the most blatant sort, a clear
attempt to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and definitively resolved
by this Court, affirming action on those same issues by the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court. Flores is thus guilty of contempt; he was ordered to pay a fine by the
SC.
In Re: Felipe Del Rosario
52 Phil 399

FACTS:

Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took
it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in
which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the
1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar.

HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario,
together with one Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some
documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The
two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded
guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however
recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

HELD:

Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the
certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del
Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination.

But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?

No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands
it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive
one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Nunez v Ricafort

382 SCRA 381

Facts:

An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her

attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on
the ground of grave misconduct.

Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of
land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as
commission. Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots, but despite Soledad’s repeated
demands, he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file an
action for a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon City.

The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as
principal obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the
action.

An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the
required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that
only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800
unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks but was
dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed.

Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
before the MTC, Quezon City.

In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated
checks in favor of Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already
been encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking
Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified
that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.

The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the
favorable action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure
to do so compelled Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground that
his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment
“smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law
dean.”

The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment
against him. It recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings
with complainant” and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay
the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with
complainant.

Held:

YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.

diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such
confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal
profession.
His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money
judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His
failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer
of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even
had the temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his
three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet,
not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such
failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the
comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to
willful disobedience to its lawful orders.

Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility stating that:

Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.

The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to pay
Soledad P13,800.
Soriano v. Dizon

A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.

FACTS:

While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven
by herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped
to make a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent
fired and shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the respondent
so the latter pushed him out and sped off.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

RULING:

Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.
PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial
woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and
ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with
the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation
as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor
General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen
and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied
Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion
to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment
as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent

Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.”

HELD

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and
later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the
issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the
matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The
Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter”
and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution
and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as
the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has
the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the
Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that
the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that
the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly
as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims
of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court
litigator protecting the interest of government.Petition assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is denied.

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer,

having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his
retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.”

Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle
to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters
in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically
applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the
interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his
accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.
OMAR P. ALI vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG

A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005

FACTS:

This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having
been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of
Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the
administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent
with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.

It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial
inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent, absolved respondent of all the
charges brought against him. The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then
SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity
in the custody of documents, but held guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent
issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-accused. As a result
of this finding, former President FVR issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion
reached by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned said AO before this Court through a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the Office of the

President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office and
insisted that respondents violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent
Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service
Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against
him (herein respondent), but was dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order.

Respondent MR was denied with finality.

On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that
respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney
and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent
maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the
name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence support his
stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on
applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the
applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to
his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their
favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was
a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who
required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. The IBP
commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order relative to the transfer of venue of
this case and penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi
City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the
President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in
considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. The IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, which pertained solely to the
period of suspension from the practice of law from a five-year suspension to a two-year
suspension to be proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that time, the matter had already
been endorsed to this Court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he
was in the employ of the government.

RULING:

We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does
not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In
fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as
a member of the bar on such grounds.

Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official,
he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his
oath a member of the legal profession.

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public office
he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived
use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal
of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for
the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings
of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.

As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A.

Rayos: A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out
by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.
Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao Bayot

74 Phil 579

FACTS:

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage
licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage
arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is
confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot
for Malpractice.

Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the
same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD:

Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be published is a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again
emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for
leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad,
the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the
amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil.
Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is
that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did
not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual
membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from
the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his
property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP
annual membership.

RULING:

The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory
measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the
Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one
remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his
petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is denied.
In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of
Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

FACTS:

1. DIAO was admitted to the Bar.

1. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application
for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.

2. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the
roll of attorneys

i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

2. Never attended Quisumbing College

3. Never obtained a diploma.

2. DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third
year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma

1. Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as
the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

2. No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is

clearly meritorious:

i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.

ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949
1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College,
in his school records.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not
completing pre-law requirements? NO.

HELD:

STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN

HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.

1. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.

1. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his
law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts
degree.

2. He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).

ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations

iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked.

2. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-

law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.
TOLOSA vs. CARGO

A.M. No. 2385 | March 8, 1989

Facts:

Complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint seeking the
disbarment of respondent District Citizens’ Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant’s) wife Priscilla
M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that his wife left his
conjugal home and went to live with respondent.

Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a “Comment and/or Answer”
denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant’s
wife had been seeing him but that she had done so in the course of seeking advice from
respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of
affiant [complainant] against her), much as complainant’s mother-in-law had also
frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do
about the” continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical
injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former.

Complainant filed a Reply to respondent’s “Comment and/or Answer” and made a

number of further allegations, to wit:

(a) That complainant’s wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;

(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant’s wife last
May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday;

(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had
refused to do so;

(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living
although she had no means of livelihood; and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife’s house rent.

Respondent filed a Rejoinder denying the further allegations of complainant, and stating
that he (respondent) had merely given complainant’s wife the amount of P35.00 by way
of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.

The Solicitor General found that complainant’s charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found
that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:

Respondent’s failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant’s suspicion and/or

jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.

Priscilla’s being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend
and former client of respondent.

Respondent’s failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his
differences with complainant.

Respondent’s failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant

and Priscilla’s brothers

Respondent’s interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU
Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent should be suspended

Held:

NO. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed
been cohabiting with complainant’s wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For
this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to
comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members
of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards.
Atty. Rosalie Dallong- Galicinao v. Atty. Virgil R. Castro

Adm. Case No. 6396 | 25 October 2005

Facts:

Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private
practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to
inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the
MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case.

Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true
copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted, “You mean
to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy?” Complainant replied that respondent
may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents. Respondent then replied that
complainant should’ve notified him. Complainant explained that it is not her duty to
notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left
the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office and shouted, “Ukinnam
nga babai!” (“Vulva of your mother, you woman!”)

Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearing of the case
in view of the respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.

Issue:

Did the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility given his actions
towards the complainant?

Held:

Yes, the Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he
will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the
MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record respondent had no right to impose
his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act of
encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.

His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar incentives to the clerk of court was not only
ill- mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the
complainant’s subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.

The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the
latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from
his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do
even if they repent afterwards.

The respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)

PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.
ISIDRA VDA. DE VICTORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS

467 SCRA 78 (2005)

Every lawyer pledges to act with “candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

FACTS:

The Supreme Court granted petitioner Mario Victoria (Victoria) an extended period
to file the petition, conditioned, however, on the timeliness of the filing of the Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of
remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the
period sought to be extended. Where a motion for extension of time is filed beyond the
period of appeal, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to
extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from the will have become final and
executory.

In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period to
appeal had in fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of Victoria’s motion
for extension of time on April 10, 2001. The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was
received by counsel for Victoria’s agent on June 5, 2000. Hence, Victoria had only until
June 20, 2000 within which to file an appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration.

In the same Decision, the Court noted that Victoria, with the aid of his counsel, Atty.
Abdul Basar (Atty. Basar), made misleading statements in his Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari and in his subsequent Petition respecting
the timeliness of his appeal and the status of the Resolutions of the CA.

Consequently, the SC ordered Victoria and Atty. Basar, to show cause, within 10 days from
receipt of the Decision, why they should not be held in contempt of court and
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUES:

Whether or not Atty. Basar can be held liable in contempt of court and for misconduct

HELD:

As part of his or her oath, every lawyer pledges to act with ―candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.‖ Thus, a lawyer is honor bound to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in his relations with his
client, the opposing part and his counsel, and the court before which he pleads his client’s
cause.

Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility obligates lawyers to ―observe the rules
of procedure and not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. It is,
therefore, lamentable that Atty. Basar, by misrepresenting the timeliness of an appeal
from a final and executor Resolution of the Court of Appeals, chose to disregard the
fundamental tenets of the legal profession. In fact, from his explanation, he was well
aware that the reglementary period for appeal from the Decision of the RTC had already
lapsed, but he nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for review on certiorari.
In Re: Vicente Almacen

FACTS:

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said
civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party
of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion.
Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his
appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional.
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of
title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members
of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made
to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted
to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his
lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that
he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen
was however unapologetic.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the
Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties.
The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there
is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms
as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory.
It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts
and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always
been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have
known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the
time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court.
He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was
suspended indefinitely.
In Re: Almacen,

31 SCRA 562

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title”
to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled
by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong words as
against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” . The
petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in
the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of
jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed
thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move.
He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain
the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:

YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty.
Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are
so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn the sinners
but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this
particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in
analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and
suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further
orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the practice
of law.
Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez

FACTS:

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan
who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to
investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the
petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily
restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations
against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that
he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a
manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the
Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be
given due course”.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then
ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the
newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is
entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the
Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not
embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements
necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such
statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court,
the entire system of administration of justice in the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms,
is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning
of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor
who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic.
The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a
private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona
fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members
of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.
Montecillo and del Mar vs Francisco Gica et al

FACTS:

Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented
Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even
able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the
adjudged moral damages.

Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made
a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA
justices “knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered
through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.

The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the
court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then
ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.

Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the
President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the
CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices
of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason
of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices.
Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.

The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as
well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the
ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the
judges who voted against him.

The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should
not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even
stating that had he not been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be
fruitless” he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.

Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

HELD:

Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As
an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice.

It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when
on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In
short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance
of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.

Samar Mining Company vs Francisco Arnado

FACTS:

In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was
awarded compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he incurred while
working for Samar Mining. The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer
duly appointed by Francisco Arnado, a regional administrator of the Department of
Labor. In 1961, Samar Mining’s lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an action for
certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no authority or jurisdiction over said
case because he was a “mere labor lawyer” who had no authority to render the award being
complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.

Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v.
Villanueva (L-15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional
administrators of the labor department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling,
Arcinas still filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appeal has merit.

HELD:

No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in
the hope of “draining the resources of the poorer party” “and of compelling it to submit
out of sheer exhaustion.” The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty
of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the
same. The Supreme Court ordered Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the
litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.
Blandina Hilado vs Jose Gutierrez David

FACTS:

In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled
against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented
by a certain Atty. Ohnick.

In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and
he thenafter entered his appearance in court.

In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty.
Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.

Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that
no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s
story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado
returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when
Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a
certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left,
leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter
where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had
Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava
said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.

Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which
was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify
Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the
said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD:

Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s
consent.

As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not

necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.

Further:

An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer

or counselor-when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s
pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.

Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not
matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client
relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations
against the client.

Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was
only signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the
real author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a
member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or
his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco
filed his entry of appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of
time is not a waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified,
based on previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe.
Professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional
employment.
WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES

A.C. No. 5280 : March 30, 2004

FACTS:

Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for
the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the
circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent
prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial
Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office
demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent
left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was
shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint
contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was
the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that
he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another
lawyer to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him
and complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between the two
of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the
facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from
public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

HELD:

No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to
his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the
issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly,
there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The
preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal
transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by

respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally
owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa
against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would
constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we
can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a
misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would
be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or
proprietary interests.

PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

STA. MARIA vs. TUASON

FACTS:

This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta.
Maria.

Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon
and Chincuanco in a collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory
note of P50,000.00. Defendant Hidalgo in this case was declared in default and was
ordered to pay. By virtue of a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff of Pampanga was
able to obtain the amount of P22,930.64.

Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following
manner : P10,000 attorney’s fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he
claimed to have advanced during the prosecution and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto
Chincuanco, his uncle.

Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff,
respondent failed to comply and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General who made the findings and
recommendation that: respondent Tuason was not in connivance with his uncle
Chincuanco in depriving petitioner of his lawful share in the liquidation of partnership
assets, however, the collection of P10,000 as attorney’s fees after the case was terminated
after one brief hearing is unreasonable. There was also no evidence presented to show
that Tuason actually spent P1,648 for the expenses.

The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would
otherwise deserve, respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a
warning that a more severe penalty be imposed for the repetition of the same of similar
acts.
ISSUE :

Whether respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.

RULING:

The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that
of his clients constitutes a breach of the lawyer’s oath, to say the least. Call it professional
indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to
the health growth of the legal profession. Respondent is hereby admonished that a
repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic action.
Jose Alcala vs Honesto De Vera

FACTS:

Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.

On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.

On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera
failed to inform Alcala about the adverse decision.

On July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That was the
only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And because of Atty. De Vera’s failure to
inform him of the adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can appeal his case
had already lapsed.

As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera in order to
collect damages as he averred that he sustained damages due to Atty. De Vera’s
negligence. The court however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to damages.

Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure to update his
client of the status of the case.

HELD:

No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss
in his duties as counsel for Alcala because he failed to update him of the status of the case,
however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any damage by reason of such negligence.
But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will
only serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty of
simple negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De Vera’s failure
to notify his clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or
devotion to the client’s interest expected of Atty. De Vera under the lawyer’s oath.

In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client to
collect damages from the negligent lawyer.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
ARTEZUELA vs. MADERAZO
A.C. NO. 4354 APRIL 22, 2002

Facts:
Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his dutiesĺher lawyer in a
damage suit and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to
her, when her case was scheduled for pre-trial conference, respondent asked for its
postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant’s
persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case
moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant’s consent.

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests.
While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s Answer to the Amended
Complaint. The said document was even printed in respondent’s office. Complainant
further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading
the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.

Issue:

Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held:

Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03 of Canon

15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need

not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold
himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse
party’s conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most
obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had
a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and
conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-
record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward,
with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct on 3 grounds: First,

for representing interests which conflict with those of his former client, herein
complainant. Second, for taking advantage of the information and knowledge that be
obtained from complainant. And, third, for not notifying the complainant of the dismissal
of his counterclaim and should be disbarred by reason thereof.
DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C.
MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money
against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were
not successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the
status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail.
The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come
with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait
for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk
of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news
that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk
of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has
been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that
the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification
did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for
the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to
reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in
the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue:

Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio
Law Office was for the filing fees of the Reg will complaint. With complainant’s deposit of
the filing fees for the Reg will complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the Reg will complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the
money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds.”
Blanza v. Arcangel

A.C. No. 492. September 5, 1967

FACTS:

Atty. Agustin Arcangel, respondent, volunteered to help Olegaria Blanza and Maria
Passion, complainants, in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths
of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the
pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently,
they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims
and refused to surrender the papers when asked by the complainants six years later.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance.

RULING:

No. The Court found the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of
disciplinary action against respondent. But the Court cannot but counsel against his
actuations as a member of the Bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the
community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a
man of the law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model
citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case,
he volunteers his professional services.
OPERAL vs. ABARIA

Facts:

This administrative proceeding was started by Pedro Oparel, Sr., who identified himself
as a pauper in his complaint filed with this Court on August 27, 1970 against respondent
Dominador Abaria, a member of the Philippine Bar. The charge was that respondent,
whose services were retained to assist complainant recover damages from his employer
for injuries suffered, acted dishonestly. Apparently, a settlement was reached,
complainant having been made to sign a receipt in the sum of P500.00 for his claim, out
of which was deducted P55.00 as attorney's fees, when the truth, according to the
complaint, was that respondent did receive the much larger amount of P5,000.00. He
accounted for the alleged sum of P5,000.00 by stating that P3,500 was spent by the
employer for plaintiff's operation and medical bills, another P1,000.00 given to
complainant's family during his confinement in the hospital, and then the P500.00
received in cash by way of additional settlement. He prayed that the complaint be
dismissed. However, when investigated, Operal admitted that the administrative charge
arose out of a misunderstanding between him and respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent can be held liable.

Held:

No. While it would appear that under the circumstances no case lies against respondent
Dominador Abaria, it is not amiss to impress on members of the Bar that the utmost care
be taken to minimize occasions for any misunderstanding between them and their clients.
The relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the latter being
adequately and fully informed of the mode and manner in which their interest is
defended. They should not be left in the dark. They are entitled to the fullest disclosure of
why certain steps are taken and why certain matters are either included or excluded from
the documents they are made to sign. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain
unimpaired. x x x the same zeal.
In Re: Felipe Del Rosario

FACTS:

Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took
it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in
which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the
1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar.

HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario,
together with one Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some
documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The
two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded
guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however
recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

HELD:

Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the
certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del
Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination.

But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?

No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands
it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive
one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Toledo vs. Abalos

[A.C. No. 5141. September 29, 1999]

FACTS:

This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back. Atty. Erlinda Abalos
obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from date, plus
interest of 5% per month. Respondent executed a Promissory Note to guarantee the payment of
said obligation. Respondent failed to pay her obligation despite repeated demands of the
complainant. Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which
referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline. Although, the respondent received an
order from the Commission, she did not do anything about it. The Commission passed a
resolution recommending the suspension from the practice of law of respondent for a period of
six months “for her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her
despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not IBP has jurisdiction to suspend Atty. Abalos.

HELD:

YES. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity. The recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six
months to be grossly disproportionate to the act complained of , i.e., her failure to appear before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. IBP does not ignore the fact that by virtue of
one’s membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus submits himself to the disciplinary authority of
the organization. It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the
Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard
of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution.
Emerenciana Reyes vs Felipe Wong

FACTS:

Reyes and Wong were classmates in the college of law at MLQ University in 1960. Wong
and Reyes became sweethearts. Later on, Wong requested Reyes to fill out an application
for a marriage license which the latter did. Later on still, Wong requested Reyes to sign a
marriage contract, and the marriage contract made it also appear that their solemnizing
officer was a Supreme Court justice. Apparently, Reyes believed that she’s already married
to Wong by virtue of those papers she was made to sign. So she gave in to Wong’s
request to have sexual intercourse in hotels. Reyes became pregnant twice and she gave
birth to two daughters.

Eventually, Wong became a lawyer while Reyes was still in the college of law. Wong’s
engagements as a lawyer kept the couple apart. But later on, Reyes found out that Wong
got married somewhere. This also led to her discovery that her marriage with Wong was
not registered. She now comes before the Supreme Court asking for Wong’s disbarment
on the ground of grave immorality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Wong should be disbarred.

HELD:

No. The acts imputed against him may constitute immorality for surely, cohabitation is
immoral for lack of marriage. But the same is not sufficient to disbar him for in order for
such result to take place, the act complained of must not merely be immoral; it must be
“grossly immoral” — “it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree”. And the same must be established
by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. In the case at bar, it’s highly impossible
that Reyes actually believed that she’s married to Wong. She’s a law student and as early
as the first year of law studies, the essential requisites of marriage is discussed. She could
have not believed that there was a valid marriage considering that no celebration actually
took place plus other infirmities in the alleged “marriage”. Further, the Supreme Court
said:

Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, is neither so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action against the man as a member of the Bar.
Florence Teves Macarrubo vs Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo

FACTS:

In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a
lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with
Esparza was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against
Macarrubo. Teves alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with
Esparza was void; that Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her and
then Macarrubo subsequently married another woman named Josephine Constantino
whom he subsequently abandoned. Teves presented as evidence documents proving
Macarubbo’s marriages as well as photos of him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was
initially declared in default for failing to appear multiple times but was subsequently given
the opportunity to defend himself. In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only
coerced to marry Teves in order to save her face because at that time she was already
pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He
presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Teves; that the marriage
was void for being a sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case serves as res
judicata on the disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He
also avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to
similar circumstances.

The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in
supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is
void, recommended a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for
grave misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is subsisting
shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently declared
void.
HELD:

Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is still
undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the second
marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman while
his first marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense that
both second and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to
be coerced. One incident of a “shotgun marriage” is believable, but two such in succession
would tax one’s credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show a blatant disregard to the institution
of marriage and family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the
basic social institution of marriage.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community. Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis
cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer
in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course. In this case, the
annulment of Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work to remove such second
marriage as a ground for disbarment.
In Re: Edillon

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

FACTS:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the

Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD:

The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to
further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.