DOCTRINE:
MHC The winning bidde r. or the eventual "strategic partner." is to provide
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
February 3, 1997 G.R. No. 122156. 267 SCRA 408. BELLOSILLO, J.:
Nature of the Case: Special Civil action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and M
andamus.
FACTS
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i. e., in the gra nt of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and pa
trimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 5 1% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporat ion
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain t
hat the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for
its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Const
itution
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) , pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
under Procl amation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
management expertise and/o r an international marketing, reservation system,
and financial support to stren
gthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel, In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation. a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of t he
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of s hares at P44.00 per share. or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partne r and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respon dent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tend ered by Renong Berhad 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos ( P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the
Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x 5which respondent GSIS
refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded th e tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad.
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995
the Court issued a tempora ry restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self -
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect; (2) Assuming Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is selfexecuting,
whether th e controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation; (3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence,
mandated to implement S ection 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
'petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a f
oreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Co
rporation; (5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the
shares to Re nong Berhad, a foreign corporation.
RULING
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the
guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundati on and
general framework of the law and government.5 As a rule, its provisions a re
deemed selfexecuting and can be enforced without further legislative action.6
Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate la
ws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is selfexecuting i s a
hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamenta l law
oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made t o
find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itse lf as
a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enf orcement.
The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of th e provision
in question. Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as
selfexecuting, r ather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement.10
The reason i s not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing,
the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be
easily ign ored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is
the unyieldi ng rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights
but co ngressional inaction should not suffocate them.
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on
arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investiga
tion, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-incrimination. It is
recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate co
nstitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the
protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional pr
ovisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without ju st
compensation. Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional
provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its
language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy
shall be carried into ef fect.19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in
Article II of our Const itution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies"
should generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State.20
We have also rule d that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social Justice and
Human Rights," and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts,
Culture and Sports''can not be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their
enforcement is addresse d to the discretion of Congress though they provide the
framework for legislatio n23 to effectuate their policy content.
Guided by this map of settled Jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section
10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is selfexecuting or not. It reads: "Sec. 10.
The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning a
gency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippin es
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encou
rage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State
shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and prioriti es."
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in
the country25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent26 of whose
capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws
that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent
Filipinoowned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders
the entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and
priv ileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph
also dir ects the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national
goals a nd well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, th ere
is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting.foreign owne
rship in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the format
ion and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the
provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right b y
means of legislation. Parenthetically. this paragraph was plucked from Section 3,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.27 The provision in the 1973 Constituti on
affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez,28 where
we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of
investments.29 By reenacting the 1973 provision. the first paragraph of Sectio n
10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in
favor of Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed t
o the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branch
es of our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the nationa l
economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdic
tion" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot
be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy
of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privi leges
covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not sugge st
that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to
refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is
unconditional and it is now.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Decl
aration of Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that ''[T]he State
shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.'' It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy i n our
fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila H
otel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The
records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners
entertaine d the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner
Nolledo, "patrimony " refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritag e of our race.By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within
the cover age of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to
qualified F ilipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The
unique val ue of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with
a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As
chronicled by Be th Day Romulo,31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a
first-class hotel b uilt by the American Insular Government for Americans living in,
or passing thro ugh, Manila while travelling to the Orient. Indigenous materials
and Filipino cr aftsmanship were utilized in its construction. For sometime, it was
exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official
guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries.
Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period.
When the Jap anese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and
lodging for the hi ghest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the
Intramuros that t he Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of
Manila. After the war , the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike.
Presidents and king s, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous
international film and sports c elebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the
situs of international conv entions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the
venue of historic meetin gs, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel
has reaped and conti nues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from
international hotel and trave l award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of
Filipino talent and ingenuity . These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot
be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure
pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national
patrimony. Republic Act No. 486, 'The Cultural Properties Preservation and
Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural
property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural
property." 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 3 74 in 1974, the
law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not
equate cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase
"patrimony of the nation."
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the
respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-own
ed and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly
contributions of government employees and the government.33 The funds are
held i n trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently.34
They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefit
s of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the
GSIS.3 5 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and
other ventur es for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended that the
GSIS' inves tment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture,
hence, an ac t beyond the contemplation of Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII
of the Cons titution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It i s
essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original c
harter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civi l
Service Commission37and the Commission on Audit.38 As a state-owned and
contr olled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the
Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the pe
ople. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevat ed
as a constitutional command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified Fi
lipinos" and their "preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their
contents. This is as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down fle xible
policies and principles which can be bent to meet today's manifest needs a nd
tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity c an
grow as a living constitution.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three
resolutions which aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180
members (First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second
Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional
Convention without forfeiting their seats (Third Resolution).
Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on
June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval
the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Congress in the First and
Third Resolutions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in
representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing
Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation,
assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and
Third Resolutions.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.
2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines
violate the spirit of the Constitution – NO.
RATIO:
1. RA 4913 is constitutional.
The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the
amendments are sufficient under the Constitution. The Constitution does not
forbid the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under
certain conditions.
2. The submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do
not violate the spirit of the Constitution.
People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned
among the provinces of the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are
interested to know the full details may enlighten themselves by reading copies of
the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the matter of Third
Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long
as the electorate knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to
the Convention.
NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA 4913 were
unconstitutional but they did not reach specific number of votes to invalidate
these congressional acts under the 1935 Constitution, which is two-thirds of the
Supreme Court.
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, (G)
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
 December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative.
 Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman,
issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the
signature form, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense and setting the case for hearing
on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
 December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by
the COMELEC.
 December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for
prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law.
 December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition and issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Petition, and private
respondents conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution.
 January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the
petition. They argue therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law
implementing the power of people initiative to propose amendments to
the constitution.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD:
 No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements
in subordinate legislation.
 First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section
2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent
as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative
on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
 Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three
systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must
submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does
not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution.
 Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation
of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important
than the initiative on national and local laws.
Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution
under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before”
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of
the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines by Resolutions No. 2 and 4 on
March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969, respectively.
On November 10, 1970, the delegates were elected. The Convention has its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Three months later, the Constitutional
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1. Constitutional Convention OR
No. 1 lowered the voting age to 18 years old and made women qualified to vote.
President Diosdado Macapagal sent letter to Comelec calling upon it to
implement the resolution. A day later, Comelec resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite. Constitutional Convention
then passed a series of resolutions to continue with the plebiscite. Plebiscite was
scheduled on November 8, 1971, which is the same day for the elections of other
government officials.
Petitioner assailed COMELEC’s resolution and the holding of the plebscite,
arguing that:
 the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by Constitution, a power
lodged exclusively in Congress.
 the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people
for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments.
(Sec. 1, Art. XV – partly stated above)
The COMELEC argued that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down
the details of the plebiscite is within the authority of the Constitutional
Convention and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments
either individually or jointly.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Constitutional Convention is governed by the Constitution.
2. Whether the plebiscite initiated by the Constitutional Convention, and to
be held by the COMELEC is constitutional
RATIO:
1. The Constitutional Convention is governed by the Constitution.
As a creature of the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention is governed by
the same Constitution that created it. This Convention has not been called by the
people, that is, revolutionary convention). Consequently, it is not completely
without restrain and omnipotent all wise. Therefore, it is subject to the constraints
imposed upon it by the Constitution.
2. The plebiscite initiated by the Constitutional Convention, and to be
held by the Comelec, is not constitutional.
The plebiscite is against Sec. 1, Article of the 1935 Constitution, which provides
that:
“SECTION 1. … Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” (emphasis
supplied)
The phrase “an election” refers to a singular election. The rationale of which is
that, to allow the people to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of the
provision, they need to examine the amendments proposed by the Constitutional
Convention in harmony with the others, as well as the rest of the Constitution.
Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in
separate opinions, 1 filed separate opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a
majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators
and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators
were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of
Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their
election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit
in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the
same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for
their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that
resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for
prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution,
designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was
their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths
vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote
in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the
enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the
Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the
Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of
the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters
fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the
scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions
of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively
binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in
a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There
is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to
its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of
expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then
into that of ratification.
MICHAEL F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 484 SCRA 529
(2006)
A Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy
of Congressional Candidate Anna Liza C. Cabochan was filed by
a registered voter of Quezon City before the Commission on Elections National
Capital Region (COMELEC NCR), alleging that Cabochan’s certificate suffered
from a serious and material defect as it was notarized by a Notary Public whose
commission had already expired. Consequently, Cabochan withdrew her
certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr. filed his in substitution of
Cabochan. Herein petitioner Michael F. Planas (Planas), also a candidate for the
same position, filed before the Quezon City Board of Canvassers a Petition for the
Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor of Defensor who appeared to be
leading the congressional race, citing the memorandum- recommendation of the
NCR Acting Director directing that the certificate of Cabochan be denied due
course and that the substitution of Defensorfor Cabochan be
accordingly declared invalid. Defensor was proclaimed as the winning candidate
for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City. On March 11, 2005,
the COMELEC En Banc issued the challenged Resolution ruling that the
COMELEC is already ousted with jurisdiction over the case thus, the same is
already under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); and that the certificate of candidacy of Cabonchan is valid, and the
subsequent substitution by Defensor is legal. Hence, the present petition of
Planas.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by virtue of
Defensor’s proclamation and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives.
HELD:
The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests
COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without
exception. As held in Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., the usual remedy of any
party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an electionprotest. But that is so
only on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation. Where the
proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the
basic issues.
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who garnered the
highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time remained qualified.
Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal. Following Mutuc then, as at the time
of Defensor‘s proclamation the denial of his COC due course was not yet final, his
proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and
assumed his duties as representative, the COMELEC had been
effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case.
JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, respondents.
Facts:
 The Plebiscite Case
1. On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed
Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of
said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
2. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by
Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant
to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said
Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971
Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on
June 1, 1971.
3. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972,
the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law.
4. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day,
November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued
Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the
plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.
5. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and
the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents
from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner,
until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia,
that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law
because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of
guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the
ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the
voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose,
are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and
“there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time
to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
6. On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081,
for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution.
7. On December 23, the President announced the postponement
of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until
January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued,
directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January
15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order
No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of
December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on
the proposed Constitution.”
8. Because of these events relative to the postponement of the
aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for
the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for
neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite
would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to
meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the
main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the
President does not have the legislative authority to call a
plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal
postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after
consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and
the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more
imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
9. “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case
G.R. No.
 L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said
case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than
January 15, 1973.”
10. The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the
Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three
(3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and
“manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16,
1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before
noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a
“supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and
inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a
restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent
Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local
Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the
Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary
Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating
Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies,
subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons
who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and
announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum
results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have
met during the period comprised between January 10 and
January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1
of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
11. On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a
resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-
35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4
P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for
hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was
being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the
Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said
 that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of
Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of
Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the
President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall
and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948
inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going
on and the public there present that the President had,
according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice,
signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
 The Ratification Case
1. On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court
decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit
against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any
of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the
present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a
Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a
class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters
similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
2. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground that
the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution;
and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not
a free election, hence null and void.
3. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a
justiciable question.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with
or without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in force.
Rulings:
1. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.
1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force
depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has
been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935
Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an
amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the
provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.
2. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been
ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the
US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
2. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of
the court.
1. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to
vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of
suffrage.
2. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the
proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held
in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in
that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid
votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or
segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings
in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
 3. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term
“votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising
hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but
natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American
regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its
major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared
and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting,
with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial
inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election
returns.
4. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted
under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that,
such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without
the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with
the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly
followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking
the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted
said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of
the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to
insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s
will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is
null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified
the revised Constitution
3. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
1. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already
accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
2. Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the
people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their
acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under
Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that
the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that
independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must
be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view
of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of
the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial
law.”
3. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge
and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal
and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement
that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of
opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have
no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether
the people have accepted the Constitution.”
4. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and
offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102,
connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
2. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own
acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a
party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by
members of Congress do not constitute congressional
recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in
session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The
compliance by the people with the orders of martial law
government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that
the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and
their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees
and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had
salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a
ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102.
The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the
people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of
conformity or acquiescence.
3. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill”
rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document
certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps,
and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses.
Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President
declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed
Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution
denies the executive department of the Government.
4. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in
said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there
 being more than prima facie showing that the proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has
been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said
proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the
1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land,
without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or
rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935
Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in
force at the time of such plebiscite.
5. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the
new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
2. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance
thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando
and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the
third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people
have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court,
voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not
in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO C. SANIDAD VS HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. NO. L-44640
OCTOBER 12, 1976
FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976
through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to
resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).
On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to
specify the questions that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16.
The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue, and
the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the
existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
national referendum in October 16.
Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
asserting that the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution
during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly
under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to
restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the incumbent President
cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution
and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973.
The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for
deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need
not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would
amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage
to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that
the issue raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court.
The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the
constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).
HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question,
while only 3 maintained it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.
The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a
political one. This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the
power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly in the period of transition.
After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the president undertook the proposal of amendments through
Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a
contestable issue.
the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system,
is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of
the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because
'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At
any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."

SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting
proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions
(Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the
constitutions in proposing amendments:
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments
as well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution
supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when
it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be
proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is
concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as
follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg.
22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day
period provided by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and
how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue
of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to

amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court
held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to