EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W.
DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-
Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer & Meer and Juan T . David for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine
C . Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D.Quiason and Solicitor C . Padua for respondents.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C .J p:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondent-Prosecutors — several judges 2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Judges — issued, on different
dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers, 5 directed to any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used
as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court
— because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to
be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondent-Prosecutors, their agents and or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned, or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that,
in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ opreliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards
the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b)
those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right
to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
 ". . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
theother defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could
they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the
rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken . . ." (A. Guckenheimer & Bros.
Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d, 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondent-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners
herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not; and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that,
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference
to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under
the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
 Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion
that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory
that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an
illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies
as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that
is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed". 18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land." 19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions of the same Federal
Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy
free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the
only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We
held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State court.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words',
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, 'without
that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's
high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' At the time that the Court held in Wolf
that the Amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the
exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that
proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not
susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always
been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it
was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case.
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its
most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been
forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoinment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.' . . .
"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be
secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no
longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to
like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforceable itself, chooses to suspend
 its enjoinment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."
(Emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to
the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority
usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that
the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning,
power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No.
1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control,
for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has been advanced, not in their
petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29,
1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be a readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions and motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners, to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are
null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied,
as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 41490-92 October 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTORIANO DAMASO alias ROGELIO DAMASO, REYNALDO O.
CALPO and JUANITO FAVIE, JR., accused, VICTORIANO DAMASO alias ROGELIO DAMASO and JUANITO FAVIE,
JR., defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Rodolfo D. Mapile for defendants-appellants.

DECISION

BIDIN, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision ** of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV, at Pasig, Rizal, dated June
16, 1975, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6934-36, all entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff vs. Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio
Damaso, Reynaldo Oliveros Calpo and Juanito P. Favie, Jr., accused," the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court Finds:
"(a) In Criminal Case No. 6934, Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso, Reynaldo Oliveros Calpo, and
Juanito Favie, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery, and there
being one generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle and one mitigating circumstance of
vindication of grave offenses, all of the accused are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment); to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Roberto Villalino y Gilber the sum of
P12,000.00 as indemnity; P20,000.00 as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs;
"(b) In Criminal Case No. 6935, Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso, Reynaldo Oliveros Calpo and
Juanito Favie, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery, and there
being one generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle and one mitigating circumstance of
vindication of grave offense, all of the accused are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment); to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Alfredo Antiporda, Jr. the sum of
P12,000.00 as indemnity; P20,000.00 as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs;

"(c) In Criminal Case No. 6936, Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso, Reynaldo Oliveros Calpo and
Juanito Favie, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder qualified by treachery,
and there being one generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle and one mitigating
circumstance of vindication of grave offenses, all the accused are each sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally Edmundo
Relova the sum of P158.00 as actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED." Rollo, pp. 36-37; Records, pp. 462-463)
Three separate criminal informations, all dated December 7, 1972, were filed against the same accused on December 13,
1972 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliseo C. de Guzman, and docketed thereat as
Criminal Cases Nos. 6934, 6935 and 6936.
The information in Criminal Case No. 6934 accused Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso, Reynaldo Oliveros Calpo and
Juanito P. Favie, Jr. of murder for the fatal gunshot wounds inflicted upon Roberto Villalino y Gilber committed as follows:

"That on or about the 21st day of September 1972, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously armed with guns shoot one Roberto
Villalino y Gilber, as a result thereof Roberto Villalino y Gilber sustained mortal gunshot wounds on the vital
parts of his body which directly caused his death." (Records of Criminal Case No. 6934, p. 1)
Similarly, for the mortal gunshot wounds sustained by Alfredo M. Antiporda, Jr., the Information in Criminal Case No. 6935
accused Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso, Reynaldo Oliveros Calpo, and Juanito P. Favie, Jr. of murder committed
as follows:
"That on or about the 21st day of September 1972, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
 confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, armed with guns shoot one Alfredo
Antiporda, as a result thereof Alfredo Antiporda sustained mortal gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his
body which directly caused his death." (Records of Criminal Case No. 6935, p. 1).

And for the near fatal gunshot wounds suffered by Edmundo Relova y Agra, the Information in Criminal Case No. 6936
accused Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso, Reynaldo Oliveros Calpo and Juanito P. Favie, Jr. of the crime of
frustrated murder committed as follows:
"That on or about 21st day of September, 1972, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another armed with guns, with evident premeditation,
treachery and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and shoot one
Edmundo Relova y Agra who as a result thereof sustained injuries on the vital parts of his body which
would ordinarily cause his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason independent of his will,
that is due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Edmundo Relova y Agra which
prevented his death." (Records of Criminal Case No. 6936, p. 1).

Upon motion of the prosecution, the three criminal cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Hon. Judge Buenaventura
J. Guerrero of the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXIV. Upon arraignment, the three accused entered their individual pleas of not guilty
to each of the aforequoted information.
A careful perusal of the voluminous records of the three cases on appeal before this Court and the accompanying evidence
on record supports the following basic antecedent facts found by the trial court in favor of the prosecution's version, to wit:
"At about 8:00 p.m. on September 20, 1972 (the eve of the declaration of Martial Law) Victoriano Damaso
alias Rogelio Damaso arrived at 'Aling Meding's Carinderia' located at 135 Aurora Boulevard, San Juan,
Rizal, and ordered beer. Two (2) hours later, while Victoriano Damaso, a security guard of the Rizal
Security and Protective Agency, then under suspension because of an illegal possession of firearms case
against him, was still drinking beer, his co-security guards in the persons of Juanito Favie, Jr. and Reynaldo
Calpo, and one Perlito Serrano arrived and joined him. The three ordered beer. At about midnight, as the
four were enjoying their drinks, a group consisting of Alfredo Antiporda, Jr., Roberto Villalino, Edmundo
Relova, Artemio Lao (sometimes referred to in the evidence as Artemio Santos) and Danilo Santos arrived
in two cars and seated themselves at the counter where the Damaso group was drinking. The Antiporda
group also ordered beer. As the two groups were thus drinking beer, Victoriano Damaso poured beer on
Roberto Villalino. When he repeated this, Roberto Villalino stood up and slapped Victoriano Damaso. At
this moment, Perlito Serrano ran from the scene to call for a policeman. Before Roberto Villalino and
Victoriano Damaso could lunge at each other, Aling Meding, the proprietress of the carinderia, and Alfredo
Antiporda, Jr., intervened and pacified the two. After making Roberto Villalino y Gilber and Victoriano
Damaso shake hands, Aling Meding hailed a taxicab for the Damaso group whom she requested to go
home. As soon as the Damaso group stood up, Victoriano Damaso remarked: 'Pare, hintay kayo, babalik
kami.'

"With Victoriano Damaso, Reynaldo O. Calpo and Juanito Favie, Jr. gone on board a taxicab, a policeman
arrived and inquired what the trouble was about. This policeman was summoned by Perlito Serrano.
Changing his position by facing the policeman along Aurora Boulevard, Edmundo Relova and his group
advised him that the incident was just a misunderstanding and that it was already settled. The policeman
left the scene.
"Meanwhile, on board the taxicab, Damaso, Calpo and Favie, hurt by the humiliation and insult they
received because of the slapping incident, discussed the manner of killing the persons with whom they
quarrelled. Upon instruction of Reynaldo Calpo, the taxicab proceeded to Unimart at Greenhills. Reaching
said place, the three accused disembarked. Claiming that because of the incident elsewhere in Greenhills,
the three tried to borrow the carbine of Charles Miane. At first, Charles Miane refused but since there is a
standing instruction of Captain Algose of the Rizal Security and Protective Agency that in case of an
emergency a security guard may lend his firearm to another security guard, he finally agreed. Charles
Miane made Reynaldo Calpo and Juanito Favie, Jr. sign the logbook. Thereupon, although the three tried
to get the firearm simultaneously from Charles Miane, the latter handed it to Reynaldo Calpo. Riding in the
same taxicab, the three returned to 'Aling Meding's Carinderia.'
"Upon approaching 'Aling Meding's Carinderia' and travelling along Aurora Boulevard towards Quezon City,
Reynaldo Calpo ordered the taxi driver to slow down. At about fifteen (15) meters from the Antiporda group
who were still at the counter of 'Aling Meding's Carinderia', the taxicab stopped. Thereupon, Calpo aimed
his carbine towards the Antiporda group and commenced firing. Shooting at this position, Calpo continued
to press the trigger as the taxicab started to speed away towards the direction of Quezon City. Calpo's
bullets found their marks on Roberto Villalino who died instantaneously, Alfredo Antiporda, Jr. and
Edmundo Relova.
"With Alfredo Antiporda, Jr. on board his Datsun car, Edmundo Relova, although wounded, drove towards
St. Luke's Hospital. At the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Broadway Street, Quezon City. Edmundo Relova
flagged down a passing Quezon City Police Patrol car which hailed them to St. Luke's Hospital.
"At about that time, Pat. Danilo Pumareja and Pat. Augusto Cruz of the San Juan Police Department were
taking snack at N. Domingo. They were notified of the shooting. On board their patrol vehicle, they rushed
to the scene of the shooting at about 2:00 a.m. Upon arriving thereat, at about 2:00 a.m., they met Pat.
Angeles who advised them that some of the victims were brought to St. Luke's Hospital. Since Pat. Angeles
of the same Police Department was there to investigate Artemio Lao and Danilo Santos, Pat. Pumareja left
for St. Luke's Hospital to interview the other victims. At St. Luke's Hospital, Alfredo Antiporda, Jr. was dead
on arrival. Edmundo Relova was given emergency treatment and at about 3:30 a.m. Dr. Alfredo C.
Valderama performed an emergency operation on his gunshot wound.
"At the scene of the shooting, pictures were taken of the carinderia (Exh. I); Roberto Villalino as he slumped
dead on the counter (Exh. I-1); the cartridges near the manhole (Exh. I-2); the bullet-riddled Datsun car
(Exhs. I-3 to I-5). That dawn, the investigation continued at the San Juan Police Headquarters wherein
Danilo Santos and Artemio Santos y Lao gave their individual statements (Exhs. A and L). In the course of
their interrogation, when shown a picture of police characters in the policy gallery, Artemio Santos pointed
to a picture of Rogelio Damaso (Exh. K) as one in the group who shot them that evening. Perlito Serrano
being the person who had earlier sought police assistance in connection with the trouble at 'Aling Meding's
Carinderia' was also interviewed. He identified Reynaldo Calpo and Juanito Favie, Jr. as his companions
that evening. At about 11:00 p.m. on September 22, 1972, Zeny Navela's statement (Exh. D) was also
taken by Patrolman Danilo Pumareja. On the basis of the statements given by Danilo Santos, Artemio
Santos y Lao and Zeny Navela as well as interviews made at the scene of the crime, Pat. Danilo Pumareja
drafted his official report on the incident (Exhs. G to G-7) including a sketch thereto (Exh. H).

"In the meantime, the three accused returned to the post of Charles Miane and handed back his carbine,
tearing the page of the logbook where they had earlier signed their names. At Ortigas Avenue, they
disembarked from the taxicab to which Victoriano Damaso paid the fare, and walked to the headquarters of
the Rizal Security and Protective Agency. Meeting the guards constituting the third shift, Reynaldo Calpo
and Rogelio Damaso related to them that they had killed somebody. Reynaldo Calpo also advised Captain
Delfin Casia, then acting as Desk Officer that evening, that they killed somebody. In reply, Delfin Casia said
'Bahala na kayo diyan.' The three accused went home to the boarding house of Reynaldo Calpo and
Juanito Favie, Jr. at J.P. Rizal, San Juan, Rizal, where they spent the night.
"At about 8:00 a.m. the following morning, while at 'Aling Meding's Carinderia', Zeny Navela, one of the
waitresses at the said carinderia on the night of the incident, saw Rogelio Damaso and beckoned him.
Asked if he had anything to do with the shooting that night, Damaso replied to Zeny, 'Huwag ka lang
maingay, dahil sa gumanti lang kami at wala kaming kasalanan." Zeny advised Victoriano Damaso to go
into hiding as there is a shoot to kill order and the police authorities were looking for him. That same
morning, because of information received that one of the assailants had just visited the scene of the crime
that morning, the parents of Edmundo Relova transferred him from St. Luke's Hospital to V. Luna Hospital
where he was confined up to October 15, 1972. At St. Luke's Hospital he paid the sum of P158.58 (Exh. R).
"The cadavers of Roberto Villalino y Gilber and Alfredo Antiporda, Jr. where autopsied by Ricardo G.
Ibarola, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. In the case of Roberto Villalino y
Gilber the cause of his death was certified to as 'Shock secondary to gunshot wound of the face' (Exh. Y).
As regards Alfredo Antiporda, Jr., the cause of his death was 'hemorrhage, acute, massive, secondary to
gunshot wound of the abdomen' (Exh. AA).
"On November 27, 1972, Victoriano Damaso was arrested at Barrio Bascaran, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
From the PC Headquarters at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya said accused was brought to Camp Crame
arriving in the evening of November 28, 1972. He was referred to Investigator Master Sergeant Felicito
Ricardo who took down his written statement in question and answer form (Exh. M). The following day,
Victoriano H. Damaso swore to his statement before Lt. Cecilio R. Penilia of the Philippine Constabulary,
after investigator Felicito Ricardo had left the two alone in accordance with the policy of the office. On
November 29, 1972, the statement (Exh. Q) of Delfin Casia was reduced to writing before Agent Calayog of
the Philippine Constabulary.
"Two days later, or on December 1st, Reynaldo Calpo was also arrested at his home at Sta. Maria, Laguna.
The following day, December 2, 1972, Calpo likewise executed a written statement consisting of four pages
(Exh. N). On the same day, Charles Miane also gave his written statement before the same investigator
(Exh. P). At Orense, Narvacan, Ilocos Sur at about 2:00 p.m. that day, Juanito Favie, Jr. was similarly
 arrested by Philippine Constabulary soldiers. After having been brought to Camp Crame, on December 4,
1972 he gave his statement to Master Sgt. Felicito Ricardo. consisting of four pages (Exh. O)." Records of
Criminal Case No. 6934, pp. 432-438; Trial Court Decision, Rollo, pp. 6-12).
The prosecution presented before the trial court twelve (12) witnesses, namely: Danilo Santos, who was among the five
companions of the Antiporda group who sat and drank at Aling Meding's Carinderia immediately before that fateful
incident; Zeny Navela, a waitress at Aling Meding's Carinderia, who sat between the Antiporda group and the Damaso group
and saw the encounter and the aftermath thereof moments thereafter; Danilo Pumareja, a policeman of San Juan, Rizal
Police Department who responded to the reported shooting incident; Artemio Lao Santos, the assistant manager of Sky-Liner
Taxicab and a companion of the Antiporda group who were drinking at Aling Meding's Carinderia and who witnessed the
incident between the deceased Roberto Villalino and accused Victoriano Damaso as well as the fatal shooting of his
companions thereafter; Felicito Ricardo, a master sergeant of the Philippine Constabulary who investigated Victoriano
Damaso and took the latter's extrajudicial statement; Charles Miane, a security guard of Rizal Security and Protective Agency
who loaned his carbine service rifle to accused Calpo and his companions sometime past midnight of September 21,
1972; Delfin Casia, the Recruitment and Training Officer of Rizal Security and Protective Agency who was very familiar with
accused Victoriano Damaso and his two other co-accused and who saw them at about 1:00 a.m. of September 21, 1972 at
their headquarters and overheard accused Calpo talking about the victims he had killed with the two co-accused; Alfredo
Antiporda, Sr., the father of the deceased Alfredo Antiporda, Jr.;Edmundo Relova, a member of the Antiporda group who was
himself seriously wounded in the bloody shooting incident; Juanita Gilver, mother of the deceased Roberto Villalino, who was
with the Antiporda group; Alfredo Balderama, a physician at St. Luke's Hospital where the injured victims were rushed
immediately after the shooting; Ricardo Ibarola, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, who performed
post-mortem examination over the cadavers of the victims: Roberto Villalino and Alfredo Antiporda, Jr.; and fifty (50) exhibits.
On the other hand, the version of the defense sought to be established by the testimonies of the three (3) accused and by two
(2) exhibits, consist of disclaimers from any criminal involvement or liability.
On the witness stand, accused Reynaldo Calpo admitted that he was at the carinderia, the scene of the crime, at around
10:00. p.m. of September 20, 1972, drinking beer with his companions Juanito Favie, Jr., Perlito Serrano and Victoriano
Damaso, but in defense, he sought to establish the fact that he was unaware of what transpired that fateful night because
after drinking beer for a couple of hours, he was overcome by drowsiness and he slept at a corner of the store where he was
later awakened by the owner when the latter told him and his companions Victoriano Damaso and Juanito Favie, Jr. to go
home without being informed of the reason therefor. Nonetheless, they boarded a taxicab and passed the night at the
residence of Maximo Salomon at J.P. Rizal Street, San Juan, Rizal. At about 8:00 a.m. of the following day, he and Favie
went to the offices of Rizal Security and Protective Agency to get their salaries. Thereafter, he went home to his parents at
Sta. Maria, Laguna where he stayed until December 1, 1972 when he returned to Manila where he was arrested and brought
to Camp Crame for questioning at which place he executed a sworn statement (Exhibit N) admitting, among others, that he
shot the victims but only to scare them and in the process, he provided the details of the incident which jibe with the
prosecution's version and the antecedent facts established by the trial court. He claimed, however, that he signed the
statement under threats of a firing squad because he was being dubbed as a member of the New People's Army and that he
had signed the said statement without reading it due to fear, coercion and duress.

On the other hand, the other two accused Juanito P. Favie, Jr. and Victoriano Damaso while testifying on substantially the
same facts, categorically pointed out that it was Calpo who fired the fatal shots that ended the lives of the two victims and
nearly killed another. Like Calpo, they admitted being in the said carinderia in the evening of September 20, 1972 drinking
beer and added that later, the Antiporda group arrived and one of them approached Damaso, held his testicles and boxed him
and then slapped Favie, Jr. Such strange turn of events were explained by the Antiporda group as retaliation for Calpo's
provocation in dousing beer on one of their members. Both Favie and Damaso vehemently denied, however, that they were in
conspiracy with Calpo. On the contrary, they maintained that they have already settled their differences with the other group,
and shook hands with them after they were pacified by the carinderia owner, and before they left, they were surprised when
their taxicab which was supposed to be headed for the offices of their employer's firm, went directly to the Unimart, Greenhills
where Calpo borrowed a carbine and proceeded back to the carinderia against their protest, with the assurance of Calpo that
he will only scare the Antiporda group. The rest transpired as already narrated. Favie went to his hometown at Ilocos Sur
where he was arrested on December 2, 1972 and brought to Camp Crame for questioning. He executed a sworn statement
(Exhibit O) admitting, among others, that when they left the carinderia that fateful evening, they agreed to get a gun (carbine)
from the Security Guard Charles Miane, in Unimart, returned to the carinderia and shot the victims to avenge themselves. He
also stated that after the shooting, they were reassigned to San Pablo City by their Chief Security in order to hide them.
For his part, Damaso stated that he went back to the carinderia to find out what happened and upon learning from one Zeny
Navela, that the men they quarrelled with were already dead and that he was a wanted man with a "shoot to kill order" issued
against him, he proceeded to Bascaran, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya where he was arrested on November 27, 1972. He was
likewise investigated at Camp Crame where he executed his sworn extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M) admitting, among
others, that all three of them proceeded to Unimart, Greenhills to borrow a carbine; that it was Calpo who alighted and got the
carbine and then they all returned to thecarinderia and with Calpo as the triggerman, shot the victims who were still at
the carinderia drinking beer. Thereafter, they went back to Greenhills and returned the fatal weapon and then proceeded to
their boarding house.
As regards his written extrajudicial statement, Favie, Jr. avers that it did not reflect correctly all the answers given by him as
the investigation was first jotted down in handwriting and was later on handed to another to be typewritten. Throughout the
investigation, he was not assisted by his lawyer.
Accused Damaso asserts that his extrajudicial confession was already prepared when he signed it on November 29, 1972,
after having been intimidated, coerced and even tortured. He claimed further that his investigators told him to cooperate and
that they would be nice to him and he reacted by telling them the truth regarding the circumstances of the case but when
asked where Calpo got the gun and he answered that he did not know, they allegedly brought him inside the C-2 room where
he was tortured and when he could no longer bear the maltreatment, he gave the name of Alfonso Rana who was already
dead.
The trial court gave more credence to the evidence of the prosecution and convicted the accused as aforestated.
Only Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso and Juanito P. Favie, Jr. appealed. Accused Reynaldo Calpo chose not to
appeal.
On March 1, 1976, the Brief for the Defendants-Appellants was filed. On August 28, 1976, the Brief for the Appellee was filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General. On November 27, 1978, accused Juanito P. Favie, Jr. filed a motion withdrawing his
appeal herein, which was granted by this Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 1978. Entry of judgment with respect to
Favie, Jr.'s conviction was made immediately thereafter. Hence, only accused Victoriano Damaso alias Rogelio Damaso's
appeal remains to be resolved.
The following assignment of errors were raised by counsel for the accused-appellant in his brief, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANTS
WERE OBTAINED BY FORCE AND INTIMIDATION AND IN NOT HOLDING THEM INADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS CONSPIRED WITH REYNALDO
CALPO IN THE KILLING OF ALFREDO ANTIPORDA AND ROBERTO GILBER AND IN THE ASSAULT
OF, WITH INTENT TO KILL, EDMUNDO RELOVA.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FLIGHT OF THE APPELLANTS WAS AN
INDICATION OF THEIR GUILT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANTS MUST, IF AT ALL, ON THE BASIS
OF THE EVIDENCE IT CONSIDERED IN CONVICTING THEM BE HELD CULPABLE AS ACCOMPLICES
NOT AS PRINCIPALS.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING IN ITS DECISION THE NON-REBUTTAL OF THE
VERSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS BY THE PROSECUTION.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RETURN OF DAMASO TO THE SCENE OF
THE CRIME A FEW HOURS AFTER THE INCIDENT AS AN INDICATION OF HIS LACK OF
COMPLICITY.

VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING APPELLANTS AS MERELY CONSPIRATORS TO SCARE
THE ANTIPORDA GROUP.

The main issue in this case is whether or not there is conspiracy among the three accused in the commission of the crime to
render the accused-appellant liable for the offenses charged even if he did not perform the act of shooting the victims himself.
I
As earlier stated, both accused Damaso and Favie contend that it was Reynaldo Calpo and no other, who fired the fatal shots.
Said contention was given credence by the trial court. Moreover, Calpo did not appeal while Favie withdrew his appeal.
Consequently, the issue narrows down to the participation of accused-appellant Damaso in the commission of the crimes
charged. He insists that his extrajudicial statement as well as those of his co-accused were allegedly obtained by force and
intimidation and therefore, inadmissible in evidence, to prove that there was conspiracy among them. Accordingly, his counsel
argued that said statements cannot be used to implicate Damaso in this case.
Counsel for appellant Victoriano Damaso and accused Juanito Favie, Jr., who (Favie, Jr.) later withdrew his appeal, contends
that bereft of the extrajudicial confessions of the appellants, there is nothing left to prop up the judgment of conviction. Among
the matters specified and pointed out as proofs of involuntariness of appellant's extrajudicial statements, are: (1) the
remonstrance of Damaso over the inaccuracy and even the incompleteness of the statement (Exhibit M) taken from him and
prepared by the investigator Sgt. Ricardo; (2) the implication of the need to mention the name "Alfredo Rana" as the person
who loaned his automatic carbine to accused Reynaldo Calpo despite knowledge that said Alfredo Rana was already dead;
and (3) the fact that he failed to file charges against his tormentors because Martial Law had just been proclaimed and it was
highly improbable for such action to prosper, or to secure a medical certificate to show the physical harm inflicted upon him by
the investigators because his sister, who could have been his medium for ventilating his grievances, was denied the privilege
of visiting him at the Camp Crame Stockade (Brief for the Accused-Appellants, pp. 4-10).
A close scrutiny of Damaso's statement (Exhibit M) and the findings of the trial court would inevitably show that he had
narrated certain details that only he could have supplied without force and coercion. Against the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses pointing to him as the triggerman during the shooting incident, Damaso told his interrogators that it was
Reynaldo Calpo who shot the victims, then narrated in rich detail his own version of the fleeting events before and after the
shooting aside from other facts which his investigators could not have been interested to know and which could have been
known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability thereon (People v. Torrefranca, 151 SCRA 143 [1987]; People v.
de los Santos, 150 SCRA 311 [1987]; People v. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207 [1984]; People v. Jimenez, 105 SCRA 721 [1981]).

Sgt. Felicito Ricardo, the PC investigator of Damaso, testified that Damaso gave his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit M) freely
and voluntarily, the truth of the matter being that after he had signed Exhibit M, he subscribed and swore to the said statement
before Lt. Cecilio Penilla in the absence of Sgt. Ricardo, who left Damaso alone with Lt. Penilla during the ratification of said
document. (Hearing of March 6, 1974, TSN, p. 315).
Consequently, in the absence of proof that Sgt. Ricardo extracted Damaso's extrajudicial statement by force and intimidation,
the same should be considered to have been freely and voluntarily given, as Sgt. Ricardo has in his favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his duty. Moreover, said investigator did not know the accused before the investigation and
there is no cogent reason shown that Sgt. Ricardo had any motive to incriminate Damaso to a serious crime. (Decision,
Criminal Cases Nos. 6934-36; Rollo, p. 30).
The claim of appellant Damaso that he was constrained to use the name of "Alfredo Rana" as the source of the fatal weapon
because of force and duress, is untenable. Such fact alone is irrelevant and cannot support his claim of force and intimidation.
It is more reasonable to believe the findings of the trial court that at the time that Damaso was being investigated, he did not
know the name of security guard Charles Miane, from whom the carbine was borrowed because Damaso met the latter for the
first time only when that fatal gun was borrowed from him. Furthermore, Damaso was the first to be apprehended and
investigated, so much so, that during his investigation he could not have yet learned from his co-accused who were then still
at large that the name of the security guard from whom they borrowed the gun is Charles Miane.
Equally incredible is appellant Damaso's claim that he could not have filed charges against his alleged tormentors as Martial
Law was then newly imposed throughout the country, and that his unnamed sister was denied the privilege of visiting him at
the stockade. The former argument is a legal non sequitur and at most, based on surmise or conjecture. The latter argument
could have been better off with the presentation of his supposed sister as his witness to corroborate his claim, but for reason
only known to him, he chose to suppress such testimony as evidence and instead risked the adverse inference and legal
presumption, "that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" (Section 5[e], Rule 131, Rules of
Court; Enriquez, et al. v. Manuel, et al., 76 Phil. 558; Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42). And even his claim, that had his
sister visited him in his confinement, Damaso could have aired his grievances to her, is at most far-fetched, and an
afterthought as a last ditch effort to buttress his allegations of force and intimidation in executing his extrajudicial statement.
Be that as it may, Damaso and Favie admitted in their separate extrajudicial confessions (Exhibits M and O) that with
Reynaldo Calpo, they plotted the killing of the persons they quarrelled with; but nowhere in the records did Favie state that his
extrajudicial confession was tainted with force and/or coercion. Even on the witness stand, he did not insinuate that he was
ever subjected to violence or intimidation before he gave his statement to Sgt. Ricardo, although he claims that some of the
answers given to the questions propounded were not his.

But, like Damaso's confession, Favie's confession is likewise replete with details he alone could supply and therefore,
deserving of credence (People v. Pingol, 33 SCRA 73 [1976]). It is no less important that he withdrew his appeal, thereby
giving rise to the implication that he could not support his allegations.
In addition, bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not
sufficient in view of the standing rule enunciated in the cases of People v. Mada-I Santalani (93 SCRA 317 [1979]; People v.
Balane (123 SCRA 614 [1983]; and People v. Villanueva (128 SCRA 488 [1984]), "that where the defendants did not present
evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered
their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these were considered by this Court as factors indicating
voluntariness."
Under the same circumstances, subject confessions, although made without the presence of counsel, cannot be stricken out
of the records as inadmissible, the same having been executed before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and even earlier
than the 1973 Constitution.

In view of the foregoing considerations, it is evident that the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, more particularly of
appellant Damaso herein, have been freely and voluntarily given, despite protestations to the contrary.
II
Nonetheless, appellant finds fault with the trial court's conclusion that conspiracy does in fact exists which implicates all the
accused as principals by common design.

It is well-settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively
(People v. Laguardia, 148 SCRA 133 [1987]; People v. Petenia, 143 SCRA 361 [1986]; People v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330
[1982]; People v. Sy, 113 SCRA 207 [1982], People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223 [1982]; People v. Managa, 118 SCRA 466
[1982]; People v. Dayag, 98 SCRA 235 [1980]). While it is desirable that the conspiracy be proved by direct evidence, like an
express understanding among the plotters affirming their commitment and defining their respective roles, it may nevertheless
be established at times by circumstantial evidence (People v. Petil, 149 SCRA 92 [1987], Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 151
SCRA 425 [1987]; People v. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178 [1987]; People v. Viray, 147 SCRA 146 [1987]). Conspiracy is
established by evidence of unity of purpose at the time of the commission of the offense and unity in its execution (People v.
Bravante, 150 SCRA 569 [1987]; People v. Rosas, 149 SCRA 464 [1987]). And as conspirators, the accused is equally
responsible for the acts of the co-conspirators (People v. Jusep, 151 SCRA 248 [1987];People v. Tamba, 147 SCRA 427
[1987]).
In the case at bar, it will be noted that aside from the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the following attendant
circumstances and/or contemporaneous acts which occurred in uninterrupted sequence, were undisputedly established by the
trial court from the mass of evidence, to wit:
(1) A slapping incident preceded the shooting, wherein the deceased Gilber slapped the face of appellant Damaso; (2) Before
the two groups could engage in a physical clash, they were pacified by the carinderia owner who later flagged a taxicab for
the three accused; (3) The three boarded the taxicab leaving with Damaso's parting words, "Pare hintay kayo, babalik kami";
(4) They then proceeded to Unimart Greenhills, arriving at the post of Charles Miane where all of them disembarked and
persuaded Miane to lend them his carbine; (5) Miane testified that in borrowing the gun, all of them (accused) signed the
logbook and when Miane was in the act of handing the carbine, the three accused were grabbing it from him; (6) After having
received the gun, they again boarded the same taxicab and returned to thecarinderia; (7) Upon arrival, gunshots were fired
from the taxicab with the three accused on board, hitting the victims as earlier narrated; (8) After having fired at the victims,
the three went back to Charles Miane, returned the weapon and then proceeded to the headquarters of the Rizal Security and
Protective Agency where they narrated the incident (Decision: Criminal Cases Nos. 6934-36; Rollo, p. 27).
As correctly observed by the trial court, the foregoing "attendant circumstances" occurring in uninterrupted sequence attest to
the concurrence of wills of the three accused and the unity of their purpose and action (Ibid.; Rollo, p. 28).
III
The trial court was convinced that the flight of the three accused was unquestionably indicative of their guilty conscience.
Among others, accused Damaso's claim that he went into hiding as he was informed by Zeny Navela that there was a shoot-
to-kill order issued against him by the authorities, was not established by the testimony of Zeny Navela herself despite grilling
cross-examination (Hearing of November 14, 1973; TSN, pp. 192-214).

Despite appellant's counsel's protestations that Damaso cannot be expected to expose himself to an invitation of the military
authorities during those first few days of Martial Law (Appellants' Brief, p. 19), the trial court did not fail to notice that there was
no immediate necessity for Damaso to flee to the province upon learning that Calpo's gunshots had killed the victims. Instead,
he should have stayed and cooperated with the authorities in apprehending the culprits. As correctly held by the trial court,
appellant's flight only underscored his role in the criminal act. Still further, the actuations of appellant are not consistent with
the actuations of a person afraid of Martial Law but of one with a guilty conscience.
Thus, as consistently held by this Court, flight is an indication of a guilty mind (People v. Ornozo, 151 SCRA 495
[1987]; People v. Astor, 149 SCRA 325 [1987]; People v. Narjos, 149 SCRA 99 [1987]). In fact, not even the readily contrived
reason of fear of Martial Law averred by counsel for the appellant can overturn such a widely-accepted aphorism.
It has been established beyond dispute that conspiracy exists among the three accused, both by circumstantial and direct
evidence. In the same manner, the guilt of appellants' co-accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Under the
circumstances, Damaso need not have fired any of the shots that killed Antiporda and Gilber and wounded Relova, to be
liable for the felonies committed by his co-accused (People v. Lucman, 97 Phil. 575 [1955]) because as conspirators, the
accused is equally responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators (People v. Jusep, supra; People v. Tamba, supra). All those
who participated in the conspiracy are liable (People v. Archis, 144 SCRA 684 [1986]).
V
Counsel for the accused harped on the fact that the claims of Damaso and Favie, Jr. were not rebutted by any of the
prosecution witnesses. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is no need for such rebuttal since the versions of
the accused were discredited by the trial court for being against human nature and experience. For, evidence to be believed,
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must also be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (Borquilla v. Court of Appeals, 147
SCRA 9-10 [1987]; People v. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292 [1987]). Moreover, it has been held that the Court should give more
credence to the testimony of witnesses for the prosecution which is positive in nature than the negative evidence of the
defendant and his witnesses (People vs. Labis, G.R. No. L-33087, November 15, 1987).
VI
Counsel for the defense capitalizes on the fact that the appellant Damaso returned sometime in the morning of September 21,
1972 at Aling Meding's Store and asked Zeny Navela if there was any casualty from the shooting incident as an indication of
his lack of complicity or participation in the commission of the crimes charged. But the records also show that upon learning
that some members of the Antiporda group were fatally wounded, Damaso lost no time in leaving and proceeding to Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya where he stayed until his arrest on November 27, 1972. Again, as above discussed, had he been innocent,
the urge would have been not to hide but to help in the apprehension of the triggerman whom he knew all the while.
Consequently, it is more reasonable to believe that Damaso returned, to ascertain the extent of the casualty and/or injuries
inflicted by them upon their hapless victims the night before and after acquiring knowledge of the magnitude of their
culpability, opted to flee until he was apprehended.

VII
While counsel for appellant admits hypothetically that appellants agreed to go back to the carinderia only to scare the victims
with the use of firearm, but not to kill them, he insists that conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are not punishable
except only in cases where the law specifically provides a penalty therefor (CitingArticle 8, Revised Penal Code). He further
stated, as conspiracy to scare a person with the use of firearm is not a felony, the act of killing is merely the liability of Calpo.
This defense does not deserve consideration.
Appellant's contention that there was no plan to kill the victims, but only to scare them, is belied by the kind of weapon used;
the accuracy of the shots directed against the victims; and the gravity of their wounds. And even granting that such claim was
true, it will not relieve appellant of criminal responsibility as co-conspirator. If the intention was merely to scare the victims, the
accused could have fired in the air. Having done the contrary, appellant cannot claim that he did not commit an unlawful act.
Indeed, it is an established rule that an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of the law and
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom (U.S. v. Sornito, 4 Phil. 357 [1905]; U.S. v. Navarro, 7 Phil.
715 [1907]; U.S. v. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218 [1915]; People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631 [1974]).

At this juncture, the oft-repeated aphorism that the appellate courts will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court
especially as to credibility of witnesses (People v. Martinez, 144 SCRA 303 [1986]; People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 265
[1984]; People v. Adones, 144 SCRA 364 [1986]; People v. Patag, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]), deserves reiteration. More
specifically, findings of the lower court on the existence of a conspiracy should not be disturbed, not only because they are
logical, but also because they are based on evidence appearing in the record (People v. Arhis, 144 SCRA 687 [1986]). In fact,
even defense counsel's assertion that justice in this case was inconsistent when the trial court credited appellant's testimony
that it was Calpo who fired the fatal shots but discredited his testimony as regards other facts (Appellant's Brief, p. 12), cannot
overturn this legal truism, because it is equally well established that a testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts
and disbelieved as to other facts (People v. Pacada, Jr., 142 SCRA 427 [1986]; People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 [1985]),
depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case.
Thus, where appellant's extrajudicial confessions and testimonies categorically point to each other's actual participation in the
conspiracy and in the execution of the crime, they are admissible in evidence (People v. Petenia, 143 SCRA 362 [1986]).
More importantly, independent of the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, their guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
In resume there appears to be no reason to disturb the finding of conviction by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court appealed from is hereby Affirmed in toto, with the modification that for the death
of Roberto Villalino y Gilber and Alfredo Antiporda, Jr., the amount of their respective indemnities is increased to P50,000.00
each pursuant to the recent Court rulings on the matter.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. J.:

Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller.[1]

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent Antonia Melodia
Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a true Servant, thereby assailing the 30 September 1993 decision[2]and 2 December 1993
Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the
reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private respondent[4] and denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[5]

The facts are as follows:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.

On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum[6] from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co
warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters accounts because the same was a prohibited
practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum[7] to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of
medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the companys control of purchases and,
besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.

As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was due to negligence,
since fellow employee Irene Soliven obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that
she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept. Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of
Soliven.[8]

In a memorandum[9] dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the
rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents.

On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving
Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:

A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266
representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that
the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total
of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification was
made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc.
Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of
Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to
Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989....

The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the
overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check
amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she
opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her talagang ganyan, bukas. It appears that the amount
in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.[10]

Forthwith, in her memorandum[11] dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of
the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation,[12] and she was granted a 48-hour
extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7
March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.[13]

In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be
able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaas invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an
envelope addressed to Catolico.[14]
 In a letter[15] to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as
it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Cos secretary, Irene Soliven.

On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum[16] notifying Catolico of her
termination; thus:

We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990 respectively
regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut
the evidences [sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch, you
actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous price
of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the amount of P640.00 actually represents the refund of over
price of said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.

Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company. Accordingly, you are
hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.

On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and illegal suspension.[17]

In his decision[18] of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against
petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to prove what [they] alleged as
complainants dishonesty, and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and
due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the
best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half months pay for every
year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension representing 30 days
work. Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows:

30 days Preventive Suspension P 2,000.00

Backwages 26,858.50

1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21

Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15

TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in
finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.

In its decision[19] of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioners evidence
consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter
opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of
Article III of the Constitution.[20] It concluded:

With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants, respondents case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal
basis for complainants dismissal.

The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by
deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards
in the amount of P35,401.86.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari, which is
anchored on the following grounds:

I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts.

II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.

III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
 As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving commissions from YSP, or
probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also
maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolicos receipt of YSPs check, aggravated by her
propensity to violate company rules, constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was
given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.

Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti,[21] the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's decision, as
it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact; and (b)
the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private respondent does not warrant the application of the
constitutional provisions. It observed that Catolico was given several opportunities to explain her side of the check
controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation satisfy the requirements of just
cause and due process. The OSG was also convinced that Catolicos dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolicos
admission of the existence of the check, as well as her lame excuse that it was a Christmas gift from YSP, constituted
substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners argument that there was no violation of the right of
privacy of communication in this case,[22] adding that petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one
of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest.

In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC contends that
petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays
that we dismiss this petition.

In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners evidence is too flimsy to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was
given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting
gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced
medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and
communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.

Catolico likewise disputes petitioners claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never received a check
were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a check from YSP, she meant that she did not
receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered
from the audit report is that there was apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount
in collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.

Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS because, being
merely a pharmacist, she did not handle confidential information or sensitive properties. She was doing the task of a
saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low.

A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the instant
petition must fail.

Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the
charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself,
and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires.[23] Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that
management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation.[24]

In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in
the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisors memorandum spoke of evidences [sic] in
[WATEROUS] possession, which were not, however, submitted.What the evidences [sic] other than the sales invoice and the
check were, only the Supervisor knew.

Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.[25] Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
 It is evident from the Supervisors memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous
transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. Control
Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolicos inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit:[26]

4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the [company]
procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a
jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;

5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed
overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an
overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to
me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.

It clearly appears then that Catolicos dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed
an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries
no probative value.[27]

Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through the formers
memorandum[28] of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832, the said check
was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners.

Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an overcharge. The
purchase order dated 16 August 1989[29] stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated
5 October 1989[30] priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to the
different packaging used in each purchase order.

Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended by Director-
MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R.
Co. The purchase orders were silent as to Catolicos participation in the purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to
petitioners, they or their officers should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for
their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by
petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that
she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders
indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much
less benefit from, what Valdez called an under the table deal with YSP.

Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employees
dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment;[31] and
even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers
arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.[32] Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which
class of employees the term trust and confidence is restricted.[33]

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the
doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti[34] that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities.

Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolicos reinstatement would not be to the best interest of
the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one
months salary for every year of service.[35] In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-
half months salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award
of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-
93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and
against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143944 July 11, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-
appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06,
in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 2 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. cDAITS
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus: cEaSHC

"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the
corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659." 3

During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed
from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when
its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security
force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. 4 The suspect was
identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to
cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security
agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the
cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported
the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. 5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie
Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the
seized items — the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag 6 and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline
substance. 7 When asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican
"Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan City. 8 The accused and the seized items were later
turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano
Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters, 9 while the packs of white crystalline substance were
sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later
confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. 10

The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo,
Manila where he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to
bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan
port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage
or "maleta"containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi. 11 He
stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m. of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his
baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he
met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he
recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily
went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went
back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase. He left the
small "maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When
requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed
was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white
crystalline substance inside which they suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked
him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF. 12

On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 "WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of
such preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to
the National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED." 13

Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.

II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED
EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." 14

On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of
his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti 15 is not applicable in this
case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 16 Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to
the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government
or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, 18 "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State." 19 The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 20

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was
only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel
security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed
and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of
enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite
suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained "shabu." He submits that without knowledge or intent to possess
the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged. 21

We are not persuaded.

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22 The first two
elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
 As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa, 23 this Court has ruled that to warrant conviction, the
possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the
possession or control of such articles. 24 It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession. 25 Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi. 26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous,
was not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 27 Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in
law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be
inspected. 28 Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only
to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents
consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, 29 but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not
his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches. 30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. 31 To overcome this presumption, it
is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican
"Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the
trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of
the imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling
sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing,
flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he
does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim
of the accused." 32

Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the
accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court
that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542,
convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant. IaHCAD
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THECHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vino, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and
Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION

ESCOLIN, J p:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the
validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive
Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate
General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or
successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q-022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled "People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et
al." 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General
in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until
final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles . . . " 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic. LexLib
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having
previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the
validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued
them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and
urgency of the constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum"
offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice
Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to
suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it . . . "
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said
search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983
or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
"Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the
Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.

"The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their
case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven
 [11] years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to
release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse.
"Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal
Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronel, asking the return at
least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V.
Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
"After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court." [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise
them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the
presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the
charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the
seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q-022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. 6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves
conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the
execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only
one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] which states:

"Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the
crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at
19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City."
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because
the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to
have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched
were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the
search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The
fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously, this is the same
place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has
been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to
be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that
the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit. And it has also been said that the executing
officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against
Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media
Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to
wit:
"Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

 [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2,
one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the
person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and
it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article
415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet
the needs ofthe said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this
legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed.
This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant. prcd

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla,
Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez
and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides: LLphil

"SEC. 3. . . . and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at
bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement
in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended . . . " 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave
error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that
the premises above-mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for
subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, . . . after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the
test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
 "1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in
the printing of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the 'WE FORUM' newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and
purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement
and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE FORUM' and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking 'Bagong Silang.'"
In Standford v. State of Texas, 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas,
and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In
like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held
too general, and that portion of a search warrant - which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in a
question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Standford case, the U.S. Supreme Court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord
between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search
where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to
such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or
publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We
Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. Thus state of being
is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. LLjur
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered
under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any
person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities . . . in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful,
however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos himself
denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
"The President denied a request filed by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM
newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendaña."
"On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a
detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
"Cendaña said that because of the denial, the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the
owners, subject to the discretion of the court." 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign
Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President
Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM" case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

"2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close the
paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses." 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7,
1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C .J ., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ ., concur.
Aquino, J ., took no part.
||| (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, [December 26, 1984], 218 PHIL 754-773)
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE CITY, AND OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR., respondents.

DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed
through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the
investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade
I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from
COMELEC as required by law.
Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City: (1) to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to handle the
prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and (3) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as
the case may be. The directive to conduct the preliminary investigation was pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752
dated January 14, 1986. The resolution, in turn, is based on the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections (Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election Code which implements the
constitutional provision. The Resolution provides, among others: LLjur

xxx xxx xxx

"Further, Regional Election Directors and Provincial Election Supervisors are hereby authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations of election offenses committed in their respective jurisdictions, file the
corresponding complaints and/or informations in court whenever warranted, and to prosecute the same
pursuant to Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code." (Rollo, p. 15).
After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26,
1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code
against the OIC-Mayor.
In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. It
also fixed the bail at five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September
30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the
written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of
the latter." (at p. 23, Rollo, emphasis supplied)
In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Atty. Lituanas fifteen (15) days from receipt to file another
information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. LLjur
Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an order dated December 8, 1988, the trial court quashed the
information. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent trial court justifies its stand on the ground that the COMELEC through its Provincial Election Supervisor lacks
jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause in an election offense which it seeks to prosecute in court because:
"While under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code approved on December 3, 1985 duly authorized
legal officers of the Commission on Elections have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses and to prosecute the same, it is doubtful whether said authority under the auspices
of the 1973 Constitution, still subsists under the 1987 Constitution which has deleted in its Section 2, Article
III, the phrase 'and such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law' in the equivalent section
and article of the 1973 Constitution." (Rollo, p. 24).
The petition is impressed with merit.
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that "xx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge xx." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution).
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the
Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if
any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to
make hisdetermination. llcd

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore, whether or not be should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the
function of the Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [1989]):

"Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct
preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon. 47 Phil.
443, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984)
which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point this out in Salta
v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that
the conduct of a preliminary investigation is 'not a judicial function xx (but) part of the prosecution's job, a
function of the executive,' (2) that wherever 'there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary
investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them,' and the fact
'that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.'.

"The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988,
(The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore
that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the
officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
"This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a
preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power — indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a
power — has been and remains vested in every judge by the provision in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the
1973 and the present (1987) Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court rule or statute to revoke. The distinction
must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to
ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains
the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause
justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than
conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order
arrest, recognize that function to be judicial in nature."

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of
a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's
job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature
and is lodged with the judge. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning
to the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding election offenses. LLjur
Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
xxx xxx xxx
 (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
votes, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or
omission constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. (Emphasis supplied).

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of
election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election
offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is
exclusive with COMELEC.
"The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not
without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC
is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration
of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified
citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by
public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceived
neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office as
contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the
COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Section 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of
1978.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear
intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance,
irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is
the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an
election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing
power over the conduct of elections." (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files
an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by
the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40,
November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the
Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation.

It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President issued Executive
Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:

"Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding
section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any
complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the
Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the
information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it
quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. As indicated above what the respondent trial court should
have done was to enforce its September 30, 1988 order, to wit:
"Pursuant to Circular No. 12 of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court dated June 30, 1987 and
considering that after a personal examination of the evidence submitted by the investigating Provincial
Election Supervisor III Negros Oriental (Designated Legal Officer), there is reasonable ground for this Court
to rely on the certification of said Provincial Election Supervisor III in the information that a probable cause
exists, let a warrant issue for the arrest of the accused fixing the bail at FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor III."
The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted. llcd
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Orders dated October 3, 1988, November 22, 1988 and
December 8, 1988 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court's Order dated September 30, 1988 is
REINSTATED. The respondent court is ordered to proceed hearing the case with deliberate speed until its termination.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOILI, and GODOFREDO L.

MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA AND PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional
Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT
AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F.
GUERRERO, AND JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at
Manila, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V . Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. No. 82827 and 83979.]

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review
by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's
finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by
the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16,
1988. With these developments, petitioner's contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available
under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceeding
Closed", in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance
of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character or
the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to
appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, the
Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to
maintain status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution
dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

||| (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 82827, 83979 (Resolution), [November 14, 1988], 249 PHIL 394-406)
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22196 June 30, 1967

ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. MARTINIANO VIVO, in his
capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant.

Engracio Fabre Law Office for petitioners-appellants.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, and Solicitor A. M. Amores for respondent-appellant.

DECISION
SANCHEZ, J p:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in the Philippines on
November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first
marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai. With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in
Hongkong on September 11, 1957.
Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted entry into the Philippines under a temporary
visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.
On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union
on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.
To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last
extension expired on September 10, 1962.
In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan
Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure to do so, he will issue a
warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.
Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban Morano) and
Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to
cancel petitioner's Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing warrants of arrest
pending resolution of this case. 1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the parties, the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment, viz:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU WAH,
who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate
of Registration and other immigration papers upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring the
preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent admission, prohibiting the respondent, his
representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;
(b) Dismissing this petition with respect to petitioner FU YAN FUN, and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from
arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;
(c) Authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by herein petitioners CHAN SAU
WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of P4,000.00; and
(d) Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare Sec. 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 unconstitutional
Without pronouncement as to costs."
Petitioners and respondent Commissioner both appealed.
We will deal with the claims of both appellants in their proper sequence.
1. The Solicitor General's brief assails the trial court's declaration that Chan Sau Wah is a citizen of the
Philippines. The court a quo took the position that "Chan Sau Wah became, by virtue of, and upon, her marriage to
Esteban Morano, a natural-born Filipino, a Filipino citizen." 2
Placed to the fore is paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 [Revised Naturalization Act], which
reads:
'Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
To apply this provision, two requisites must concur: (a) a valid marriage of an alien woman to a citizen of the
Philippines; and (b) the alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized.
We may concede that the first requisite has been properly met. The validity of the marriage is presumed.
But can the same be said of the second requisite? This question by all means is not new. In a series of cases,
this court has declared that the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino
citizen. She must satisfactorily show that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by
the Naturalization Law. 3 Ly Giok Ha alias Wy Giok Ha, et al. vs. Emilio Galang, L-21332, March 18, 1966, clearly writes
down the philosophy behind the rule in the following expressive language, viz:
"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and if
 all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might
well he that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For
example, section 4 disqualified only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude',
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a
competent court, would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a
person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship
'must be of good moral character'.
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by
certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk', and thus disbelieve in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long
as she is not 'opposed to organized government', nor affiliated to groups 'upholding or teaching doctrines
opposing all organized governments', nor 'defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas'. Et sic de caeteris."
Upon the principle of selective citizenship, we cannot afford to depart from the wise precept affirmed and
reaffirmed in the cases heretofore noted.
In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all
the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law.
Because of all these, we are left under no doubt that petitioner Chan Sau Wah did not become a Filipino citizen.

2. Squarely put in issue by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940,
which reads:
"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commission of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which
he was admitted as a nonimmigrant."
Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3),
Article III [Bill of Right] of the Constitution, to wit:
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of
such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a
final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the
exercise of judicial power 4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or
administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal
order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
The following from American Jurisprudence, 5 is illuminating:
"It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an alien
who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This
is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after A fair though
summary hearing, are made conclusive."
xxx xxx xxx
"The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime;
nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may constitute a crime
under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it
does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of congress is purely accidental, and,
though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate
and independent."
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid
requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. 6
The view, we, here express funds support in the discussions during the constitutional convention. The convention
recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty, other than by order of a
competent court. 7
Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on the "accepted
maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions." 8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that
there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that
temporary visitors who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by
the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they were admitted as non-
immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a), subsection (7) C.A. 613, as amended)" 9
And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was challenged
as unconstitutional because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our
Constitution", this Court declared —
"This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is
subject to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in
case of breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond
has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to
enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth
Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State." 10
It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is not constitutionally proscribed.
3. A sequel to the question just discussed is the second error set forth in the government's brief. The Solicitor
General balks at the lower court's ruling that petitioner Chan Sau Wah is entitled to permanent residence in the
Philippines without first complying with the requirements of Sections 9 and 13 of the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended
by Republic Act 503.
We first go to the law, viz:
"SEC. 9 [last paragraph]
An alien who is admitted as a nonimmigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To
obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the
officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act."
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 13. Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted into the Philippines
immigrants, termed 'quota immigrants' not in excess of fifty (50) of any one nationality or without nationality
for any one calendar year, except that the following immigrants, termed 'nonquota immigrants, may be
admitted without regard to such numerical limitations.
The corresponding Philippine Consular representative abroad shall investigate and certify the
eligibility of a quota immigrant previous to his admission into the Philippines. Qualified and desirable aliens
who are in the Philippines under temporary stay may be admitted within the quota, subject to the provision
of the last paragraph of section 9 of this Act.
(a) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty- one years of age of a Philippine
citizen, if accompanying or following to join such citizen:
(b) A child of alien parents born during the temporary visit abroad of the mother, the mother having
been previously lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence, if the child is accompanying
or coming to join a parent and applies for admission within five years from the date of its birth;"
Concededly, Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant.
Under Section 15 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the
provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country; second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo
examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of the Immigration Act.
This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor
cannot change his or her status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9
of the Immigration Act. 11
The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry, married in Manila a native-
born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort
to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left
two of her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.
Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from
writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso facto make her
a permanent resident in this country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed us. We
cannot insulate her from the State's power of deportation.
Really, it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a
mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of
our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a
Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is
impermissible.
Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing
from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses. 12
 The ruling of the trial court on this score should be reversed.
4. It is petitioner's turn to point as error the dismissal of the petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to
petitioner Fu Yan Fun. Petitioner's line of thought is this: Fu Yan Fun follows the citizenship of his mother. They cite
Section 15, paragraph 3, Commonwealth Act 473, which says that:
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen. . . ."
Petitioner's position is based on the assumption that Chan Sau Wah, the mother, is a Filipino citizen. We have
held that she is not. At best, Fu Yan Fun is a step-son of Esteban Morano, husband of Chan Sau Wah. A step-son is not a
foreign-born child of the step-father. The word child, we are certain, means legitimate child, not a step- child. We are not
wanting in precedents. Thus, when the Constitution provides that "[t]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines"
are citizens thereof, 13 the fundamental charter intends "those" to apply to legitimate children. 14In another case, the term
"minor children" or "minor child" in Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law refers only to legitimate children of
Filipino citizens. This Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, there said: 15
"It is claimed that the phrases 'minor children' and 'minor child', used in these provisions, include
adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is, for all intents and
purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word 'children' or 'child' is used in statutes, it is generally
understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its spirit indicate
clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides that 'those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines', and 'those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines' who shall elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are citizens of the Philippines Article IV, Section 1,
subdivisions [3] and (4]), our fundamental law clearly refers tolegitimate children (Chiongbian vs. De Leon,
46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952)."
At any rate, Fu Yan Fun entered the Philippines as a temporary visitor. The status of a temporary visitor cannot
be converted into that of a permanent resident, as we have heretofore held, without first complying with Section 9 of
the Immigration Law.
5. Petitioners finally aver that the lower court erred in authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond
filed by petitioners Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun in the amount of P4,000.00.
Here is petitioner's posture. They enjoyed their stay in the Philippines upon a bond. Now they come to court and
say that as the prescribed form of this bond was not expressly approved by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act 613, which reads —
"Sec. 3. . . . He [Commissioner of Immigration] shall, subject to the approval of the Department
Head, such rules and regulations and prescribe such forms of bond, reports, and other papers, and shall
issue from time to time such instruction, not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best calculated to carry
out the provisions of the immigration laws . . ." that bond is void.
Reasons there are which prevent us from giving our imprimatur to this argument.
The provision requiring official approval of a bond is merely directory. "Irregularity or entire failure in this respect
does not affect the validity of the bond." 16 The reason for the rule is found in 9 C.J., p. 26 (footnote), which reads:
"(a) Reason for rule. — 'Statutes requiring bonds to be approved by certain officials are not for the
purpose of protecting the obligors in the bond, but are aimed to protect the public, to insure their solvency,
and to create evidence of an unimpeachable character of the fact of their execution. When they are
executed for a legal purpose, before a proper tribunal, and are in fact accepted and approved by the officer
or body, whose duty it was to approve them, it could serve no useful purpose of the law to hold them
invalid, to release all the obligation thereon, and to defeat every purpose of its execution, simply because
the fact of approval was not indorsed precisely as had been directed by the Legislature.' American Book
Co., vs. Wells, 83 SW 622, 627, 26 Kyl 1159." (emphasis supplied)
And another. This bond was accepted by the government. It has been there. The form of the bond here used is of
long continued usage. If the government did not question the form of the bond at all, then we must assume that it counted
with the Secretary's approval. For the presumption is that official duty has been legally performed.
Surely enough, equitable considerations will stop petitioners from pleading invalidity of the bond. They offered
that bond to enable them to enter and stay in this country. They enjoyed benefits therefrom. They cannot, "in law and
good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits" of that bond, and then jettison the same. They are "precluded from
attacking the validity" of such bond. 17
Actually, to petitioners the bond was good while they sought entry into the Philippines; they offered it as security
for the undertaking that they "will actually depart from the Philippines" when their term of stay expires. Now that the bond
is being confiscated because they overstayed, they make an about-face and say that such bond is null and void. They
shall not profit from this inconsistent position. Their bond should be confiscated.
Conformably to the foregoing, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows:
(1) The portion thereof which reads:
"(a) Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU
WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien
Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring
the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the respondent, his representatives or
subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;"
is hereby reversed; and, in consequence —
 The petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioner Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied; and the
judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and
other immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, are all hereby set aside;
and
(2) In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs.

HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

The facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay

ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa

iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?

S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha

ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the
petitioner the following telegram:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT
6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE
FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the
CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same
code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito
Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed
them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team
chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:

Gentlemen:

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal
properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was
contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November
3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of
the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without
her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and
constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for
shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal
action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a
criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.1

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are alreadyfait
accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest
involved.

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely
raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise
this power:

xxx xxx xxx

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September,
1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the
mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date
of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search
warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the
phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search
warrants. 4

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and
on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for
purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his
office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably,
as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to
make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential
Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos.
1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative
powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised
recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of
any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the
campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or
non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies,
establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and
seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the
search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal
recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of
workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed
by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order
to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the
Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11

xxx xxx xxx

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40
Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace
and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens
whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law,
deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute
and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the
nature of a general warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the
CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that you have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same
code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/
recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM"
newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda,
more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like
manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between
the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such
historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication
that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and
Seizure Order No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 50720 March 26, 1984
SORIANO MATA, petitioner, vs.
HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES
and REYNALDO MAYOTE, respondents.

Valeriano R. Ocubillo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION
DE CASTRO, J p:
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged
failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the application for
search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before
the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach
the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein
petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered,
took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be
found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the
City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the
records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. prcd
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and
invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on
March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court
made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records. 2 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been
denied, he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be
invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on
the matter.
We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of
Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. cdll
The judge's insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner's claim that at the
particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after
he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at
the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk
of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy
of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This
doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the
applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial
proceeding which will be open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no
"deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man, woman and child,
and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She claims that in order to abate the
proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done
usually and publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement
verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a
witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is
the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial
officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions
propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of
the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that
the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even
be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but
one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing. LexLib

The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might
be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection
and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." 6

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory
provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. 7 No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro vs. Pabalan, 9 it
was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is
prohibited.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the motion to annul the search warrant
as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being
declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the things seized under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao"
tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao" numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc
City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ ., concur.
Aquino and Escolin, JJ ., concur in the result.
Abad Santos, J ., took no part.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 45358 January 29, 1937

NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY
BOARD, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Adolfo N. Feliciano for respondent Anti-Usury Board.
No appearance for other respondent.

DECISION
IMPERIAL, J p:

The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering
the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents and
papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date,
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays
that all the articles in question be returned to him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of
Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender,
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret
service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to
the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable
person. Upon the affidavit in question the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the
petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and
documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on
the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years
1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four check stubs, two
memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two
bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of
correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers, many
documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks
of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The search for and seizure of said articles were made with the
opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant,
the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other
agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be
declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order directing
Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within twenty-four hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving
him a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On June
10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of
said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30)
days for the necessary investigation. The attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that,
notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles
seized by them and praying that a search warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his
custody and deposit them in the clerk's office, and that the officials of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt o
court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited
some documents and papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory duly verified by oath
of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit presented in support thereof, or
to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and prayed that said agent be directed to file the documents in
question immediately. On the 25th of said month the court issued an order requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to
file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an
inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for the petitioner filed another
petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date together with the
proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing
the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the court issued an order
holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with
and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and
must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any, within the
unextendible period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the
inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the
Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained
for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of
the opposition of the attorney for the petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury
Board to specify the time needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be
retained, granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the assistant chief of the Anti-
Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten (10) days to comply with the order of September 25th and that
the clerk of court be ordered to return to him all the documents and papers together with the inventory thereof. The court,
in an order of October 2d of said year, granted him the additional period of ten (10) days and ordered the clerk of court to
send him a copy of the inventory. On October 10th, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed sixty
(60) days to examine the documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5,
10, 16, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 , 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of
sixty (60) days. In an order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of sixty (60) days to investigate said
nineteen (19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the respondents, that these nineteen (19)
documents continue in the possession of the court, the rest having been returned to said petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a
judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring
it before the court (section 95, General Orders, No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In
re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commn. vs. Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Boyd vs. U.
S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Carroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government
(People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and
privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor
of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs.
Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it
is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs.
St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So.,
613).

III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the
affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which
were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information
secured from a person whom he considered reliable. To the question "What are your reasons for applying for this search
warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be
reliable that there are being kept in said premises, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by him
in connection with his activities as a money- lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in
attesting the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent stated that he found them to be correct and
true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant
shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not only probable
cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported
by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation
by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes
defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate
sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir.
Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphrey vs. State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac., 378; Atwood
vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20
Fed., 621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 839; U. S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S. vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The
true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused (State vs. Roosevelt County
20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State vs. Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guaranties
afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders,
No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general
language. All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S., 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881; U. S. vs. Vatune,
292 Fed., 497; Agnello vs. U. S., 70 Law. ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S., 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231;
Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was
subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared illegal and cancelled is
that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the
search warrant cannot be issued unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be
presented necessarily by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice
must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to
the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness.
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders, No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of
the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both
in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts
was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit
of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge
is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of
one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant
issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the
facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search warrant and the
cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes
that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavit that the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavit insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it
illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was issued illegally is
the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the
basis for determining whether probable cause exists and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular
description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must
be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292
Fed., 463; U. S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605; People vs. Mayen, 188
Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 415); but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue
(People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn,supra). The only description of the articles given in the affidavit
presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in
violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description
of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the
law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
 VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant was obtained
illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by
it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. At the hearing of the
incidents of the case raised before the court, it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to
enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence
against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means
of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession
they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal , 42
Phil., 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs.
U. S., 116 U. S., 616; Carroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in
question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or
proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law, which it is attempted to institute against him, we hold that the search
warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search
warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in
proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or
proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied
the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred not to the search warrant and the
incidents thereof but to the institution of criminal proceedings for violation of the Anti- Usury Law. The waiver would have
been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles
in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in
writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because he can
appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition. Section 222 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion, however, that an appeal from said orders would not in this case be a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy for the petitioner because a long time would have to elapse before he recovers possession
of the documents and before the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo vs.
Llorente, 6 Phil., 426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14
Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:
1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and seizure, should be
given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full
force;
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of the
ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the individual, they should be strictly construed;
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based
solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts necessary to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation
of the Anti- Usury Law;
4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the
articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made
at night;
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or complainant
in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the
facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine
whether probable cause exists;
6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is necessary,
but where, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;
7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or settlement
attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure; and
8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an effective, speedy
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the petition for mandamus filed by him lies.
For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of the
respondent court authorizing the retention of the books and documents, are declared illegal and are set aside, and it is
ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the immediate return to the petitioner of
the nineteen (19) documents designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 140546-47 January 20, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose Mencio Molintas for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by the
operatives of the NBI and the PNP NARCOM at the premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge
quantities of marijuana. The City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged appellant with illegal possession of marijuana, which later
on resulted to the filing of two separate informations which were docketed to Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R. In
Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of marijuana from appellant's rented premises
was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence against appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted
of the charge. However, the trial court found that the evidence for the prosecution was more than ample to prove appellant's
guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R and duly convicted him of illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
According to the Court, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-
called reopening of the case to complete the testimony of the prosecution witness. Appellant was never deprived of his day in
court. Appellant was given every opportunity to support his case or to refute the prosecution's evidence after the prosecution
rested its case. The physical evidence in this case corroborated what the prosecution's witness testified to. Hence, the
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that appellant was guilty of the crime charged. The penalty, however; was
reduced to reclusion perpetua as neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance was present in the instant case.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:

For automatic review is the consolidated judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 6,
dated September 17, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, involving violations of Section 8, Article II, of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. 2 Since appellant was acquitted in the second case, we focus on the first case, where appellant has
been found guilty and sentenced to death and fined one million pesos.
The decretal portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. 15800-R, the Court finds the accused Modesto Tee guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana of about 591.81 kilos in violation of Section 8, Article
II of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the Information, seized by virtue of a
search warrant and sentences him to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of 1 million pesos
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 591.81 kilos of marijuana contained in 26 boxes and one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to U-27) are
ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.

2. In Crim. Case No. 15822-R, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
accused Modesto Tee beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of the charge of illegal possession
of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Art. 2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged
in the Information since the marijuana confiscated have to be excluded in evidence as a product of
unreasonable search and seizure.
The 336.93 kilos of marijuana contained in 13 sacks and four boxes (Exh. B to S and their
component parts) although excluded in evidence as the product(s) of unreasonable search and seizure, are
nevertheless ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law
considering that they are prohibited articles.
The City Jail Warden is, therefore, directed to release the accused Modesto Tee in connection with
Crim. Case No. 15822-R unless held on other charges.
COST(S) DE OFICIO.
SO ORDERED. 3
 Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by
operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM)
at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the
NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion,
however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 15800-R, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias "Estoy Tee," with illegal
possession of marijuana, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:

1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. One hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms; and
3. Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (boxes)
and a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms,
all having a grand total weight of 928.74 kilograms, a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to
possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On August 7, 1998, the prosecution moved to "amend" the foregoing charge sheet "considering that subject
marijuana were seized in two (2) different places." 5

As a result, the information in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was amended to read as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
- Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (26) boxes and a
yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

A separate amended information docketed as Criminal Case No. 15822-R was likewise filed, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and

2. hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried flowering
tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms;

a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

On September 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to quash the search warrant and ordered appellant's
arraignment.
When arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, appellant refused to enter a plea. The trial court
entered a plea of not guilty for him. 8 Trial on the merits then ensued.

The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:
 Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto Tee are well acquainted
with each other, since Abratique's wife is the sister of Tee's sister-in-law. 9
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him a place for the storage of smuggled
cigarettes. 10 Abratique brought appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a house for rent in Bakakeng, Baguio
City. After negotiating the terms and conditions, Ballesteros agreed to rent out his place to appellant. Appellant then brought
several boxes of purported "blue seal" cigarettes to the leased premises.
Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes stored in his place were not "blue seal" cigarettes but
marijuana. Fearful of being involved, Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both later prevailed upon appellant to remove them from
the premises. 11

Appellant then hired Abratique's taxi and transported the boxes of cannabis from the Ballesteros place to appellant's
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. 12
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext of buying and
transporting strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant directed Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet,
where appellant proceeded to load several sacks of marijuana in Abratique's taxi. He then asked Abratique to find him a place
where he could store the contraband. 13

Abratique brought appellant to his grandmother's house at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., QM Subdivision, Baguio City, which
was being managed by Abratique's aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Nazarea agreed to rent a room to appellant. Abratique and
appellant unloaded and stored there the sacks of marijuana brought from Sablan. 14Abratique was aware that they were
transporting marijuana as some of the articles in the sacks became exposed in the process of loading. 15

Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of the goods stored in the rented room. She confided
to her daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their predicament. As Alice Fianza's brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI
agent, Alice and Abratique phoned him and disclosed what had transpired. 16

On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by information that appellant would retrieve the sacks of prohibited drugs that
day, Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at No. 27, Dr. Cariño St. While the NBI agents were
conducting their surveillance, they noticed that several PNP NARCOM personnel were also watching the place. 17 The NBI
then learned that the PNP NARCOM had received a tip from one of their informers regarding the presence of a huge amount
of drugs in that place. The NBI and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.

As the day wore on and appellant did not show up, the NBI agents became apprehensive that the whole operation
could be jeopardized. They sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau to enter the room rented by appellant. She acceded
and allowed them entry. The NBI team then searched the rented premises and found four (4) boxes and thirteen (13) sacks of
marijuana, totaling 336.93 kilograms. 18

Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied for a search warrant from
RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence. 19 Judge Reyes ordered the NBI agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty.
Delilah Muñoz, so the proceedings could be properly recorded. After Atty. Muñoz arrived, Judge Reyes questioned Lising and
Abratique. Thereafter, the judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search appellant's residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green
Valley, Baguio City, for marijuana. 20

The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow, proceeded to appellant's residence where they
served the warrant upon appellant himself. 21The search was witnessed by appellant, members of his
family, barangay officials, and members of the media. 22 Photographs were taken during the actual search. 23The law
enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of dried marijuana 24 in the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellant's
residence. 25 The total weight of the haul was 591.81 kilograms. 26 Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of
marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist Maria Carina Madrigal
conducted the tests. Detailed microscopic and chromatographic examinations of the items taken from appellant's rented room
at No. 27, Dr. Cariño St., as well as those from his residence at Green Valley, showed these to be marijuana. 27

In his defense, appellant contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally obtained, being the
products of an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. Appellant insisted that the search warrant was too general and the
process by which said warrant was acquired did not satisfy the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. Moreover, Abratique's testimony, which was heavily relied upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was hearsay.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the 336.93 kilograms of
marijuana was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence against appellant. Appellant was
accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court found that the prosecution's evidence was more than ample to
prove appellant's guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R and as earlier stated, duly convicted him of illegal possession of
marijuana and sentenced him to death.
 Hence, this automatic review.
Before us, appellant submits that the trial court erred in:
1. . . . UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF
COMPLIANCE OF (sic) SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED AND IT
BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;

2. . . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING

ABRATIQUE TO TESTIFY AGAINST APPELLANT;
3. . . . GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ABRATIQUE;
4. . . .NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH
DESPITE THE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE FIRST CASE. 28

We find that the pertinent issues for resolution concern the following: (1) the validity of the search conducted at the
appellant's residence; (2) the alleged prejudice caused by the reopening of the case and absences of the prosecution witness,
on appellant's right to speedy trial; (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to sustain a finding of guilt with moral
certainty; and (4) the propriety of the penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for and seize "an
undetermined amount of marijuana," was too general and hence, void for vagueness. He insists that Abratique could already
estimate the amount of marijuana supposed to be found at appellant's residence since Abratique helped to transport the
same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is issued if a judge finds
probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that he believes the place contains a specific
amount of it. The OSG points out that, as the trial court observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine the exact amount
of prohibited drugs that a person has on himself.

Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined amount of marijuana" as used in the search warrant fails to satisfy
the requirement of Article III, Section 2 29 of the Constitution that the things to be seized must be particularly described.
Appellant's contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify
the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; 30 and (2) leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. 31 What the Constitution
seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police
officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an
offense.32 However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, 33 particularly, where by the nature
of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would
mean that no warrant could issue. 34

Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as to create a general
warrant. 35 Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and records
pertaining to" the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional. 36 A search
warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin" has been held sufficiently particular. 37

Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to
satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is property of
a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be
found, said article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such
character, the place, and the circumstances. 38 Thus, this Court has held that the description "illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of
paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized. 39

The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, "undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian
hemp," in our view, has satisfied the Constitution's requirements on particularity of description. The description therein is: (1)
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the peace
officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 40 Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the
objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the
Bill of Rights.
 Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could be guilty of violation of
Republic Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement as said statute lists a number of offenses with
respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he contends, said warrant is a general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his possession and control
marijuana or Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98), 41 and we find that it is captioned "For Violation of R.A.
6425, as amended." 42 It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that "there is probable cause to believe that a case for
violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659
has been and is being committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto.
Tomas, Baguio City by having in his possession and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or INDIAN
HEMP in violation of the aforementioned law."43 In an earlier case, we held that though the specific section of the Dangerous
Drugs Law is not pinpointed, "there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for
the finding of probable cause." 44 Appellant's averment is, therefore, baseless. Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears
clearly issued for one offense, namely, illegal possession of marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to exhaustively examine the
applicant and his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate should not have swallowed all of Abratique's statements
— hook, line, and sinker. He points out that since Abratique consented to assist in the transport of the marijuana, the
examining judge should have elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for squealing on appellant.
Appellant further points out that the evidence of the NBI operative who applied for the warrant is merely hearsay and should
not have been given credit at all by Judge Reyes.

Again, the lack of factual basis for appellant's contention is apparent. The OSG points out that Abratique personally
assisted appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the latter's house and to appellant's rented room at No. 27 Dr.
Cariño St., Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates personal knowledge on Abratique's part. Law enforcers cannot themselves
be eyewitnesses to every crime; they are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge. In this case, witness
Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the NBI did not rely on hearsay information in applying for a
search warrant but on personal knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution 45 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure 46 require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath or
affirmation. The personal examination must not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive. 47 In
the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin A.
Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes of the proceedings were taken
by Atty. Delilah Muñoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In
the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made
of "notes" at "pages 7–11." 48 We have thoroughly perused the records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere find
said "notes." The depositions of Lising and Abratique were not attached to Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the
Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that the purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the
examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause. 49 The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity
that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily
fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony was presented. 50 In the testimony of witness
Abratique, Judge Reyes required Abratique to confirm the contents of his affidavit; 51 there were instances when Judge
Reyes questioned him extensively. 52 It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,53 absent a
showing to the contrary. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court,54 as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. 55 Substantial basis means
that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No. 415 (7-98) in his motion to
quash before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching
questions of the applicant and his witness. Belatedly, however, he now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said
witness. 56 But it is settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and objections then available, existent
or known, should be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they are
deemed waived. 57
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lising's knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in appellant's house was indeed
hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal knowledge about said drugs and their particular location.
Abratique's statements to the NBI and to Judge Reyes contained credible and reliable details. As the NBI's witness, Abratique
was a person on whose statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellant's activities with respect to
the seized drugs was substantial. In relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not depending on casual rumor
circulating in the underworld, but on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.
 In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held
liable for damages caused. 58
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate the place to be searched.
The OSG points out that the address stated in the warrant is as specific as can be. The NBI even submitted a detailed sketch
of the premises prepared by Abratique, thus ensuring that there would be no mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended 59 and distinguish it from other places in the community. 60 A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search warrant. Appellant fails,
however, to point to any evidentiary matter in the record to support his contention. Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellant's
mother, testified on the search conducted but she said nothing that indicated the use of force on the part of the NBI operatives
who conducted the search and seizure. 61 What the record discloses is that the warrant was served on appellant, 62 who was
given time to read it, 63 and the search was witnessed by the barangay officials, police operatives, members of the media,
and appellant's kith and kin. 64 No breakage or other damage to the place searched is shown. No injuries sustained by
appellant, or any witness, appears on record. The execution of the warrant, in our view, has been orderly and peaceably
performed. EHIcaT
2. On The Alleged Violation of Appellant's Substantive Rights
Appellant insists that the prosecution's unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness Abratique unduly delayed the
resolution of his case. He points out that a total of eight (8) scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or willful
refusal of Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists that said lapse on the prosecution's part violated Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98. 65 Appellant now alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to delaying the case to cause him
untold miseries.

For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a great length of time as to
amount to a violation of appellant's right to a speedy trial. A trial is always subject to reasonable delays or postponements, but
absent any showing that these delays are capricious and oppressive, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable
opportunity to prosecute the criminal action.
On record, the trial court found that prosecution witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to appear in no less than eighteen
(18) hearings, namely those set for February 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24; March 9, 15, 22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16, and 19, all
in 1999. 66 No less than four (4) warrants of arrest were issued against him to compel him to testify. 67 The NBI agent who
supposedly had him in custody was found guilty of contempt of court for failing to produce Abratique at said hearings and
sanctioned. 68 The prosecution had to write the NBI Regional Director in Baguio City and NBI Director in Manila regarding the
failure of the Bureau's agents to bring Abratique to court. 69 Nothing on record discloses the reason for Abratique's aforecited
absences. On the scheduled hearing of June 7, 1999, he was again absent thus causing the trial court to again order his
arrest for the fifth time. 70 He also failed to show up at the hearing of June 8, 1999. 71

Appellant now stresses that the failure of Abratique to appear and testify on twenty (20) hearing dates violated
appellant's constitutional 72 and statutory right to a speedy trial.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free
from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. 73 In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held
that "where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding
inmandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom."

The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated involves
the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and
the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the
accused. 74
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty
(180) days. 75 However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. 76The right to a speedy trial is deemed
violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; 77 or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; 78 or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 79
 In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing days, there
is no showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratique's absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and
deny him his rights. On record, after Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution
went to the extent of praying that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The prosecution
likewise tried to get the NBI to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureau's custody, but to no avail. Eventually, the trial
court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already offered. 80
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay of less than two
months has been found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of time. 81

Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the inability of the prosecution to produce
its witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure
that the latter would testify when required. 82 Appellant could have moved to have Abratique found in contempt and duly
sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in the day for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.

No persuasive reason supports appellant's claim that his constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. One must
take into account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other causes of delay. But in the absence of a showing
that delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an
accused. 83

Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited partiality, when it allowed the
reopening of the case after the prosecution had failed to present Abratique on several occasions and had been directed to
rest its case. Appellant stresses that the lower court's order to reopen the case to receive Abratique's further testimony is an
indication that the trial court favored the prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.
On appellee's behalf, the Solicitor General points out that the trial court's order was in the interest of substantial
justice and hence, cannot be termed as an abuse of discretion. The OSG points out that the prosecution had not formally
rested its case and had yet to present its formal offer of evidence, hence, the submission of additional testimony by the same
witness cannot be prejudicial to the accused, it being but the mere continuation of an uncompleted testimony. Furthermore,
appellant did not properly oppose the prosecution's motion to reopen the case.
At the time Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure were
in effect. There was no specific provision at that time governing motions to reopen. 84 Nonetheless, long and established
usage has led to the recognition and acceptance of a motion to reopen. In view of the absence of a specific procedural rule,
the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen was the paramount interests of justice. As a rule, the matter of
reopening of a case for reception of further evidence after either prosecution or defense has rested its case is within the
discretion of the trial court. 85 However, a concession to a reopening must not prejudice the accused or deny him the
opportunity to introduce counter evidence. 86

Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A motion to reopen may
properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence, but before
judgment. 87 In the instant case, the records show that on April 19, 1999, the prosecution was directed to close its evidence
and given 15 days to make its formal offer of evidence. 88 This order apparently arose from the manifestation of the
prosecution on April 16, 1999 that should they fail to produce witness Abratique on the next scheduled hearing the
prosecution would rest its case. 89 On April 19, 1999, which was the next scheduled hearing after April 16, 1999, Abratique
was absent notwithstanding notices, orders, and warrants of arrest. However, on April 27, 1999, or before the prosecution had
formally offered its evidence, Abratique was brought to the trial court by the NBI. In its order of said date, the trial court
pointed out that the prosecution could move to "reopen" the case for the taking of Abratique's testimony. 90 On May 7, 1999,
the prosecution so moved, stressing that it had not yet formally offered its evidence and that the substantial rights of the
accused would not be prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition to the
motion. The trial court granted the motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as the prosecution had not
formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratique's testimony was not for the purpose of presenting additional
evidence, but more properly for the completion of his unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs.Base, 91 we held that a trial court is not
in error, if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision,
by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge's mind with reference to particular
facts involved in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to complete his testimony, which is
what happened in this case. It is but proper that the judge's mind be satisfied on any and all questions presented during the
trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.

Appellant's claim that the trial court's concession to "reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him is not well taken. We
note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecution's evidence
point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in
court is the touchstone of the right to due process in criminal justice. 92 Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order to complete the testimony of a
prosecution witness.
 3. On the Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
In bidding for acquittal, appellant assails the credibility of Abratique as a witness. Appellant insists that Abratique's
testimony is profuse with lies, contrary to human nature, hence incredible. According to appellant, Abratique was evasive from
the outset with respect to certain questions of the trial court. He adds that it appeared the court entertained in particular the
suspicion that witness Abratique had conspired with appellant in committing the crime charged. Appellant questions
Abratique's motive in informing the NBI about his activities related to the marijuana taking, transfer, and warehousing.
The OSG contends that Abratique's testimony, taken as a whole, is credible. It points out that Abratique testified in a
straightforward manner as to his knowledge of the huge cache of prohibited drugs stashed by appellant in two different
places. His testimony, said the OSG, when fused with the physical evidence consisting of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana
found by law enforcers at appellant's residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of appellant.
It is the bounden duty of the courts to test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no innocent person is made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties meted out for drug offenses. 93 Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of
Abratique, we find no cogent reason to disbelieve him. From his account, Abratique might appear aware treading the thin line
between innocence and feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story tending to be self-exculpatory. However, his whole
testimony could not be discredited. The established rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved
in other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. But it is
accepted, as a matter of common sense, that if certain parts of a witness' testimony are found true, his testimony cannot be
disregarded entirely. 94

Abratique testified in open court that appellant rented the taxicab he was driving, and he helped appellant transport
huge amounts of marijuana to appellant's rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., Baguio City and to appellant's residence at
Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. He also declared on the witness stand that out of fear of being
involved, he decided to divulge his knowledge of appellant's possession of large caches of marijuana to the NBI. When the
places referred to by Abratique were searched by the authorities, marijuana in staggering quantities was found and seized by
the law enforcers. Stated plainly, the physical evidence in this case corroborated Abratique's testimony on material points.

Appellant imputes questionable motives to Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He demands that Abratique should
likewise be prosecuted. However, by no means is the possible guilt of Abratique a tenable defense for appellant. Nor would
Abratique's prosecution mean appellant's absolution.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1)
that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 95

We find the foregoing elements proven in Criminal Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable doubt.
In said case, the testimony of Abratique and the recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from appellant's residence
served to prove appellant's possession of a prohibited drug. Tests conducted by the NBI forensic chemist proved the seized
articles to be marijuana. These articles were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant and hence, fully admissible in
evidence.
In People v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies generally to all
persons and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by any person, and no person is authorized to sell such drugs. Said
doctrine is equally applicable with respect to possession of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes the
possession of prohibited drugs, applies equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to possess said
articles, without authority of law.
Anent the third element, we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge
of the accused or that animus possidendiexisted together with the possession or control of said articles. 96 Nonetheless, this
dictum must be read in consonance with our ruling that possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.97 In effect, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi 98 in this situation.

Appellant Modesto Tee opted not to testify in his defense. Instead, he presented his mother as his lone witness, who
testified on matters totally irrelevant to his case. We can only conclude that, failing to discharge the burden of the evidence on
the possession of prohibited drug, appellant's guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was established beyond reasonable doubt.
4. On The Proper Penalty
Under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) 99 shall be imposed if the
quantity of marijuana involved in a conviction for possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more. 100
 In the present case, the quantity of marijuana involved has been shown by the prosecution to be far in excess of 750
grams, as stressed by the trial court:
The volume is rather staggering. It is almost one whole house or one whole room. In fact, when
they were first brought to the court, it took hours to load them on the truck and hours also to unload them
prompting the court to direct that the boxes and sack of marijuana be instead kept at the NBI office in
Baguio. And the identification of said marijuana during the trial was made in the NBI premises itself by the
witnesses since it was physically cumbersome and inconvenient to keep bringing them to the court during
every trial. 101

In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana bales involved, but also
"the acts of accused of hiding them in different places . . . and transferring them from place to place and making them appear
as boxes of cigarettes to avoid and evade apprehension and detection." They showed his being a big supplier, said the trial
court, [whose] criminal perversity and craft that "deserve the supreme penalty of death." 102

We are unable to agree, however, with the penalty imposed by the trial court. The legislature never intended that
where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of death shall
automatically be imposed. 103 The statute prescribes two indivisible penalties:reclusion perpetua and death. Hence, the
penalty to be imposed must conform with Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death penalty law,
Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. 105 The rules in Article 63 apply although the
prohibited drugs involved are in excess of the quantities provided for in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425. 106 Thus,
finding neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the present case, appellant's possession of 591.81 kilograms of
marijuana in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital punishment but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The trial court imposed a fine on appellant in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of illegal drugs.
This being within the limits allowed by the law, the amount of the fine must be sustained. All these sanctions might not remedy
all the havoc wrought by prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of our society, especially the youth. 107 But these penalties
should warn peddlers of prohibited drugs that they cannot ply their trade in our streets with impunity.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 15800-R,
convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias "ESTOY" TEE of violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine
of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to pay the costs of
suit.IEHTaA
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL

PANGANDAMAN, PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN, MANGORAMAS PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB P.
PANGORANGAN KILATUN PANGANDAMAN, MARIO PANGANDAMAN, MACABIDAR PANGANDAMAN, PUYAT P.
ROMAMPAT, SANTORANI P. DIMAPENGEN, NASSER P. DIMAPENGEN and DIAMA OPAO petitioners,
vs.
DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE OF POONABAYABAO, TAMPARAN AND MASIU,
LANAO DEL SUR and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The petitioners ask this Court:

1) to annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge Dimaporo T. Casar of the Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu,
Lanao del Sur, in Criminal Case No. 1748 entitled People vs. Hadji Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman et al.;

2) to prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said Criminal Case No. 1748; and

3) to compel the Judge to forward the entire record of Criminal Case No. 1748 to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur for
proper disposition. 1

Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for their arrest was issued by the respondent Judge without a
proper preliminary investigation. 2 The Solicitor General agrees and recommends that their petition be granted and the
warrant of arrest voided. 3

On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two
others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear. According to one version, armed men had attacked a residence in
Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties. 4 Another version has it that a group that was on its
way to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed.5

On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint
with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident. 6The letter adverted
to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides — none of whom was, however,
identified — and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st
indorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be filed
relative .. (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken
cognizance of said cases." 7

No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a
criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No.
1748. 8 On that same day, the respondent Judge "examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under
oath thru .. (his) closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter's
answers. 9 Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest" against the
fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does." 10

An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar (joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti),
seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's
initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been
propounded. 11 The respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis;" 12 hence the present petition.

While they concede the authority of the respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary investigation of the offenses involved,
which are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, the petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the Judge in the case at
bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court ; 13 and that that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the
issuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest. 14 It is further contended that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which
"Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only, ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible for
respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations were of
varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day;" 15 and that there was undue
haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied "mainly on the supporting affidavits which were
obviously prepared already when presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator." 16

The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges "... in total
disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken cognizance of the matter twelve
(12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation of the same; 17 and that issuance of a warrant of arrest
against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly
describe the persons or things to be seized.18

There can be no debate about the proposition that in conducting a pre investigation of any crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Courts, a judge of an inferior court (other than in Metro-Manila or the chartered cities, where no authority to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested in such officials) must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. And although not specifically so declared, the procedure mandated by the Rule actually
consists of two phases or stages.

The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents
offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with
the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the
case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with
the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the complainant's evidence and an
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and
propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase
concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial,
which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action.

The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint or information is filed in the Regional Trial Court.
Failure to do so will result in a denial of due process. 19

Here, no information has as yet been filed with the Regional Trial Court. There is no pretense that the preliminary
investigation has been completed, insofar as the respondent Judge is concerned, and that he does not intend to undertake
the second phase. In this situation, it cannot be said that he has failed to observe the prescribed procedure. What has
happened is simply that after receiving the complaint and examining the complainant's witnesses, and having come to
believe, on the basis thereof, that the offenses charged had been committed, the respondent Judge issued the warrant now
complained of against the fourteen (14) respondents (now petitioners) named and Identified by the witnesses as the
perpetrators of the killings and injuries, as well as against 50 "John Does."

The real question, therefore, is whether or not the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without
completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation. Stated otherwise, is completion of the procedure laid
down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest
may be issued. What the Rule 20 provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court may be filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before
a warrant of arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly
authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the second phase of the investigation
if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-

xxx xxx xxx

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers,
that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a warrant of arrest. 21
This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the investigation was expressly denominated
"preliminary examination" to distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper. Thus, the former
Section 6 of Rule 112 provided:

SEC. 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary e petition conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

In Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 22 this Court found occasion to dwell in some detail on the process of preliminary investigation and,
incidentally, to affirm the power of a justice of the peace or municipal judge conducting a preliminary investigation to order the
arrest of the accused after the first stage (preliminary examination), saying:

Appellant should bear in mind that a preliminary investigation such as was conducted by the Justice of the Peace has for its
purpose only the determination of whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the
accused guilty thereof, and if so, the issuance of a warrant of arrest. And it should not be forgotten that a preliminary
investigation has two stages: First, a preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the
accused; and, second, the reading to the accused after his arrest of the complaint or information filed against him, and his
being informed of the substance of the evidence against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor, if he
so desires. Probable cause, in regard to the first stage of preliminary investigation, depends on the discretion of the judge or
magistrate empowered to issue the warrant of arrest. It suffices that facts are presented to him to convince him, not that a
person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause to believe that such person committed the crime charged.
The proceeding is generally ex parte unless the defendant desires to be present and while under the old Rules the Justice of
the Peace or investigating officer must take the testimony of the complainant and the latter's witnesses under oath, only the
testimony of the complainant shall be in writing and only an abstract of the testimony of the other is required. Regarding
preliminary investigation, it has thus been ruled that 'the occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. ... 23

The rule on arrest after preliminary examination has, of course, been modified somewhat since the occurrence of the facts
upon which Mayuga was decided, but not to abrogate the authority of the investigating judge to order such arrest, and only to
prescribe the requirement that before he may do so, he must examine the witnesses to the complaint, the examination to be
under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. This modification was introduced by
Republic Act 3838, approved June 22, 1963, amending Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and the "searching questions
and answers" requirement is incorporated in the present Section 6 of Rule 112 already quoted.

The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the
completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation .

Also without appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that there was scarcely time to determine probable cause against
sixty-four persons (the fourteen petitioners and fifty "Does") within a matter of hours on a Saturday when municipal trial courts
are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. That argument founders upon the respondent Judge's positive affirmations that he
had personally and closely examined under oath the three witnesses to the complaint 24 and that he had issued the warrant
of arrest "believing that the offense thus filed had been committed." 25 Nothing in the record before this Court belies or
discredits those affirmations which have, besides, the benefit of the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. 26 The contention that the witnesses to the complaint had merely sworn before the respondent Judge to
statements prepared beforehand and submitted by a military investigator 27 must, in view of the foregoing considerations and
for lack of any support in the record, be dismissed as mere speculation.

The same argument also unwarrantedly assumes that the respondent Judge limited the proceedings on preliminary
examination to the usual Saturday office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., in addition to not making any persuasive showing
that such proceedings could not have been completed within that time-frame. For all that appears, said respondent could
have put off the 1:00 p.m. adjournment until he had finished interrogating the witnesses to his satisfaction. And there is really
nothing unusual in completing within a three-hour period the questioning of three witnesses in a preliminary examination to
determine the existence of probable cause.

The record which, lacking proof to the contrary, must be accepted as an accurate chronicle of the questioned proceedings,
shows prima facie that the respondent Judge had personally examined the witnesses to the complaint, and a consideration of
the latter's sworn answers to his questions satisfies this Court that the finding of probable cause against the petitioners was
neither arbitrary nor unfounded.
The three witnesses to the complaint, Misandoning Monasprang, a student, Lawandato Ripors, an engineering graduate, and
Sanny Monib a farmer gave mutually corroborative accounts of the incident. Under separate questioning, they declared that
they were members of a party that was passing by Pantao on its way to Lalabuan from Talaguian, all in Masiu, Lanao del Sur,
at about 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1985, when they were ambushed and fired upon by an armed group which included the
petitioners and about fifty other unidentified persons; that five of the party had been killed and two (the witnesses Lawandato
Ripors and Sanny Monib) wounded; that even after they had killed their victims, the ambushers had continued to fire at the
dead bodies; that the witnesses managed to escape their attackers and return to Talaguian, where they informed their
relatives about what had happened, and thence went to the municipal hall in Masiu to report to the authorities; that the dead
victims were recovered only late in the afternoon of that day because the authorities could not "penetrate" the area and the
ambushers refused to release the bodies; and that the ambush was an offshoot of a grudge between the families of the
ambushers and those of the victims. 28

The witnesses named and Identified the dead victims as Cadar Monasprang, Macacrao Guiling Macrang Hadji Alawi, Alicman
Ripors and Malabato Diator. All of them also Identified by name each of the fourteen petitioners as members of the ambush
group. The respondent Judge can hardly be faulted for finding enough cause to hold the petitioners named in the statements
of three eyewitnesses to killings perpetrated in broad daylight.

In Luna vs. Plaza, 29 this Court ruled that the term "searching questions and answers" means —

...only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant
of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial," such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime
and the perpetuator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as:
the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the subject, his
age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities
to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics,
etc. The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions, therefore must to a great degree
depend upon the Judge making the investigation. ...

Upon this authority, and considering what has already been stated above, this Court is not prepared to question the propriety
of the respondent Judge's finding of probable cause or substitute its judgment for his in the matter of what questions to put to
the witnesses during the preliminary examination.

Upon the facts and the law, therefore, the warrant of arrest in question validly issued against the petitioners, such issuance
having been ordered after proceedings, to which no irregularity has been shown to attach, in which the respondent Judge
found sufficient cause to commit the petitioners to answer for the crime complained of.

Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint
could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and
once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." 30 Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that
warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, 31the warrant must, as regards its
unidentified subjects, be voided.

The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may have announced his intention of investigating the incident himself did not, in the view of
the Court, legally inhibit the respondent Judge from conducting his own inquiry into the matter if, as is made to appear here, it
was regularly brought before him and no formal complaint was filed before the Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated that in
those circumstances he leave the investigation to the Fiscal and simply endorse to the latter the complaint filed with him; duty
did not, and if he nonetheless chose to conduct his own investigation, nothing in the rules states or implies that he could not
do so.

Be that as it may, since the action and final resolution of the respondent Judge after completing the second stage of the
preliminary investigation are subject to review by the Provincial Fiscal, practical considerations of expediency and the
avoidance of duplication of work dictate that the latter official be permitted to take over the investigation even in its present
stage.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said
warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "John Does." The respondent Judge is directed to forward to
the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of
his court for further appropriate action. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 133254-55 April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City,
finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case
No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug,
without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law
to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under
his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the
Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics
Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field
operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias,
Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams
of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken
by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by
Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the
residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house,
apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the
house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box
also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in
newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City,
along with the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.[13] The white crystalline substance with a
total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other
850 grams, were found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law,
Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard
a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms,
climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of
him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen conducted a
search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned
goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took
him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen
ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables.[19]
 After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced
to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and
condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances
over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING
THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered
from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the
admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third,
the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its
issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and
his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his
possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises above-described and
forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt
with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for
drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be
searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented
showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends,
however, that the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug
paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did
not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you were assigned
into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
 A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City,
sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established contract with ROBERT
SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
(P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu) were being
kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken
by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and reported the progress of
my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards,
our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which
yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-
95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu,
he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per
gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does
not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search
warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus,
in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It
was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned
merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from
the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and
seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . . In so holding
we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We
recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet
the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure
would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be
tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the
items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other
items not supported by the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellants house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the
search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use
of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A.
No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that There is probable cause to believe that
Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and
control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to
be made of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A. 6425, without specifying what
provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section
3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles
and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In
short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu,
the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to
the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any particular
provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a
codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related
as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was
necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, the trial court took note of the fact
that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched,
to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and
11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as a house without
a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be
searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellants house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo
Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant
lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is
undeniably appellants house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through
their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.[33] For example, a search warrant authorized a search of
Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3
on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the
apartment was occupied by the accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass.[34] In this case, the location of
accused-appellants house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the
place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants residence, Search Warrant No. 160
was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the plain view of
the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior
justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this
case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable
to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been
executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has
been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to accused-
appellants lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the
one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the
person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous
with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellants person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from
the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is
similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the
said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its
contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and
found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM
agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened
it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their plain
view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating
nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of
accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents
wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner
these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a
warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in effecting the
raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving
notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors
and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested
persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The
occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party
knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the
house. These circumstances justified the searching partys forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension
thatthe execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City,
finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the
confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty
of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Fidencio S. Raz for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, under an
Information which reads:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of
Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
acting as a pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to another and/or
distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law have in
his possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried marijuana
leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea
bag of dried marijuana leaves to a customer. (Rollo, p. 9)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. Trial
ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug under
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his sentence
with the period for which he has undergone preventive imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this judgment. All
the items of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared forfeited in favor of the State. (Rollo, p. 41)

From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this appeal, assigning the following as errors
allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA
BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME WERE
TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT IN
THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO GUILTY OF THE SALE OF
PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND SENTENCING
HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P 20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 1)

The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:

On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi,
Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).

As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie
Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter,
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer,
 Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to
a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and
reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about
6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante,
was transacting with appellant. (pp. 18-19, Ibid)

At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at
Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team
caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon
seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp. 6-8,
TSN, June 19, 1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison
Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at
the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart
inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to
"E-4") were all found positive of marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)

As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

We rule in the affirmative.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest
warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March
21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

This contention is without merit.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered
lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])

The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the activities of the accused
who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.

Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go
inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was
being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.

Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana
stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had
just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.

The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it
stated:
 When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take place and while positioned at
a street comer, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty
meters away from them (the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter handed a
wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while
Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their testimonies were based on their
actual and personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been
within hearing distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed tones, but they were
certainly near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution
witnesses are all law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence
of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing People v. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)

The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's
activities even prior to the former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three days before the
incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined
the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that because of this
friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However,
because of reliable information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday, he was constrained to report the
matter to the Station Commander.

On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from
the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that
probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, et al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21,
1991):

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country.
The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of
which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time
of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

As the Solicitor General has pointed out:

There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without
warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter
is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant
who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143
SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R.
No. 87783, August 6, 1990)

The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that the evidence obtained
therefrom is inadmissible.

As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.

Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for testifying could be merely to
escape prosecution.
We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:

The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have been the reason of (sic) his
willingness to testify in court against the accused. But this does not necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from
his lips. As explained by Lt. Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers are usually their customers,
especially if as in this case, there is no other direct evidence of the selling except the testimony of the buyer. We
accept this observation as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users are, and should be employed by law
enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who are the real felons in our society. We have observed
the demeanor of the witness in court, and found him to be straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his
declarations, so that we are satisfied as to his intention and disposition to tell the truth (Rollo, p. 40)

Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged.
that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies
(People v. Umali, et al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Dorado,
30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970]).

Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public officers Fulgencio and Seraspi.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive than to accomplish their
mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the presumption being that police officers perform their duties
regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v.
Castiller, supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986]).

The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that the items seized were all positive
for marijuana.

In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's defense is alibi which is unavailing considering
that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana.

Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and cousin distributing handbills for his
Auntie's candidacy. The fact, however, remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he was present in the vicinity as
established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to meet Macabante on the street.

It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the appellant as the seller of the
prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])

Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged. The
trial court's decision must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.