Republic of the Philippines Commitment Order.
— The person named and described above is
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44 September 13, 1945
LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.
J.A. Wolfson for respondents.
HILADO, J.:
Alleging in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated August 30, 1945,
that they have been and are being "confined, restrained and deprived" of their
liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza,
Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante, pray that the officers therein
named, to wit, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S.
Army, "or whoever acts in her place or stead," be directed to appear before this
Court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why petitioners
should not forthwith be set at liberty.
Respondent Lt. Col., Bradford, having been served with this Court's order to
show cause dated August 31, 1945, made return thereto dated September 5,
1945, to which are attached as parts thereof certain commitment orders marked
Schedules A, A-1 and A-2, the first and last emanating from the Headquarters of
the Sixth Army, 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second
from that of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, 493rd Counter
Intelligence Corps Detachment.
Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, WAC, having been served with this
Court's order to show cause dated September 7, 1945, made return thereto dated
on the same day, incorporating therein by reference Schedules A, A-1 and A-2
of her co-respondents' return above mentioned.
It appears from these returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, that by
virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on
December 29, 1944, petitioner Lily Raquiza was on March 13, 1945, arrested by
the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the U.S. Sixth Army, and
detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385 (Schedule A), wherein she
was charged as follows:
deemed a risk to the security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth
above. The commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or
comparable installation in which this person may be confined is
authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by
competent military authority.
In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge
against petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."
As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, it appears that by virtue of the aforesaid
proclamation she, on February 25, 1945, was arrested by the same 306th
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and detained under Security
Commitment Order No. 286 (Schedule A-2) wherein the Commitment Order is
in exactly the same terms as in Schedule A. The specific complaint or charge
against petitioner Tee Han Kee in Schedule A-2 is "Active collaboration with
the enemy."
With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, it appears that by virtue of the
same proclamation she, on April 10, 1945, was arrested by the 493rd Counter
Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United States Army Forces in the Far East,
and detained under Commitment of that date (Schedule A-1), wherein she was
charged with "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Her previous association
with the enemy constitutes a present security risk to the United States Armed
Forces.
The said proclamation reads:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
PROCLAMATION
PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN
UPON THE APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHO VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID,
COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.
WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the
Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the
enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
 WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be enemy in
violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army,
United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area,
hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such
persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for
the duration of the war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine
Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.
Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this
twenty-ninth day of December, 1944.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army
United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
Of course, the power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to
issue the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned. It has not been
questioned in this case. Where opinions are divided as to its interpretation and
effects.
General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it to be his
purpose, among other things, to hold in restraint the persons referred to, when
apprehended, "for the duration of the war; whereafter, I shall release them to the
Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." He
premised his proclamation upon two grave reasons, to wit, (1) that evidence was
before him "that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid,
comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the
Government of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;"
and (2) that "military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any
opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our
military operations."
In the very nature of things, the Commander in Chief of the Army of liberation
at the time of issuing that proclamation had to act upon the evidence then before
him. The exigencies of the mighty military operations that he had then but
recently begun for the destruction or defeat of the powerful enemy who was at
that time occupying the Islands, did not permit of any other procedure. And to
deny him the exclusive power and competency to determine the strength and
sufficiency of such evidence would have been destructive of that military
efficieny with which, in the interest of all the citizens of the Philippines
themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners, the operations for their
liberation had to be conducted. And once having apprehended the persons to
whom the proclamation referred, the same exigencies required that the said
Commander in Chief be invested with the exclusive power and authority to
decide when he should deliver them to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his proclamation
wherein the Commander in Chief declared his purpose to hold such persons in
restraint "for the duration of the war"? We are of opinion that it has not.
In the case of United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this Court said:
From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not end
officially until the President proclaimed it an end, July 4, 1902. It is
necessary to refer to a public act of the Executive Department to fix the
date of the closing of the war. (Freeborn vs. The Protector, 79 U.S.,
700.)
If it be alleged that, notwithstanding the insurrection, there were no
actual hostilities in Nueva Ecija at the times above mentioned, the
answer is that the condition of hostility remained impressed on the
whole island until it was removed by the proclamation of the President.
...
War, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the time of,
some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to
proclaim it. It is the province of the political department, and not of the
judicial department, of government to determine when war is at an end.
. . . (67 C.J., 429, sec. 195.)
And even if the war had terminated, we are of opinion that under the aforesaid
proclamation the petitioners, who are held in restraint thereunder, would
continue legally under custody of the proper military authorities of General of
the Army MacArthur's or his successors' command, for a reasonable time after
termination of the war.
If General of the Army MacArthur had, in express terms, declared in his
aforesaid proclamation that after termination of the war he will release the
persons therein named to the Philippine Government within a reasonable time,
we think that he could have done so within his legitimate powers as Commander
in Chief of the United States Army; and not only this, but that for obvious
reasons he should be the best and, therefore, the only judge of how long or how
short that time should be under the circumstances. And in order to give his
proclamation a reasonable construction, we are of opinion that this should be
implied from the context. Otherwise, we would be giving to this solemn
document the irrational interpretation that said Commander in Chief thereby
announced a purpose which would be physically impossible for him to carry out;
namely, to make delivery to the Philippine Government immediately upon
termination of the war of persons under restraint whose number he could not
then foresee but which he could reasonably expect to be more or less
considerable, with their respective charges and pertinent evidence, papers, and
the like. It was not a matter of delivering a certain quantity or amount of
personal property but human beings who although under custody, had to be
properly housed, maintained and otherwise treated as becoming the "dignity of
the human person," which is one of the cardinal principles of democracy for
which the United Nations have fought in this war.
The fact that, as this Court can take judicial notice of, delivery of certain persons
under custody of the United States Army pursuant to the said proclamation has
already begun does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already
terminated, which it clearly has not. Such delivery is undoubtedly within the
power of the proper military authorities to make even before the termination of
the war. The existence of the military necessity to which General of the Army
MacArthur refers in his proclamation, as well as its continuance, is a question
exclusively for the military authorities to determine, as regards each and every
person under detention. For obvious reasons, the civil courts should not here
interfere, and it is to be presumed that in the judgment of said military
authorities that necessity no longer requires the detention by them of the persons
whom they have already delivered to the Philippine Government.
In the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S., 509), the Supreme Court of the
United States, among other things, said:
It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its
government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and the criminal
jurisdiction of the place. The sovereign is understood, said this court in
the celebrated case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 139, to cede a portion
of his territorial jurisdiction when he allows the troops of a foreign
prince to pass through his dominions: "In such case, without any
express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this
right of passage has been granted, it would certainly be considered as
violating his faith. By exercising it, the purpose for which the free
passage was granted would be defeated, and a portion of the military
force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from those
national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be
withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose
safety might greatly depend on retaining the exclusive command and
disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies
a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and
permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those
punishments which the government of this army may require."
(Emphasis ours.)
In the case of the United States Army of liberation, not only has the
Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States Government agreed,
that it come and be stationed in the Philippines, but it is here for the very
realization of the overruling and vehement desire and dream of the Filipino to be
freed from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and to see this was brought to a
victorious end. If a foreign army permitted to be stationed in a friendly country,
"by permission of its government or sovereign," is exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the place, with much more reason should the Army of
the United States which is not only permitted by the Commonwealth
Government to be stationed here but has come to the islands and stayed in them
for the express purpose of liberating them, and further prosecuting the war to a
successful conclusion, be exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of this
place, at least for the time covered by said agreement of the two Governments.
By analogy, an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the
United States Army before such period expires, would be considered as a
violation of this country's faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep
and uphold. By exercising it, paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the purpose
for which the stationing of the army in the islands was requested or agreed upon
may be hampered or prejudiced, and a portion of said military force would be
withdrawn from the control of the sovereign to whom they belong. And, again,
by analogy, the agreement, for the stationing of the United States Army or a part
of its forces in the Philippines implies as a waiver of all jurisdiction over their
troops during the time covered by such agreement, and permits the allied general
or commander in chief to retain that exclusive control and discipline which the
government of his army may require.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Schooner Exchange (7 Cranch, 139),
gave the reasons underlying the doctrine of mutual waiver of jurisdiction
between nations in the following paragraphs:
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by
intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good
offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns
have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain
peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction
within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.
xxx xxx xxx
 This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this Whether the doctrine here laid down would be applicable to cases arising in time
common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and interchange of peace, we do not decide.
of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in
which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of In conclusion, we hold that the petition should be dismissed. No special
that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
be the attribute of every nation.
Moran, C. J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya and Pablo, JJ., concur.
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the present petitioners, while under the
custody of the United States military forces, may be considered as prisoners of
war. In volume II, Hydee International Law, page 345, section 676, we read:

. . . It should be borne in mind that an army in the field, in the course of

any operation in any locality . . . may also avail itself, of the right to
make civilians prisoners of war.
The author cites from the Rules of Land Warfare which contain an enumeration
of civilians who may be made prisoners of war. This enumeration includes:
(c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to the
hostile army or its government, such as the higher civil officials,
diplomatic agents, couriers, guides, etc. . . . (Emphasis ours.)
We think that the petitioners would prima facie come within this classification
under the charges of "Espionage activity for Japanese," "Active collaboration
with the Japanese," and "Active collaboration with the enemy."
Separate Opinions
OZAETA, J., dissenting:
We dissent from the majority opinion which sanctions the long-continued
deprivation of the petitioners of their sacred liberty without due process of law.
The petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee, and Emma Link Infante,
were arrested by an agent of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the United
States Army on March 13, 1945, February 25, 1945, and April 10, 1945,
respectively, and have since then been confined in the custody of the
respondents. The returns filed by the respondents herein simply say that the
petitioners were arrested and being detained by virtue of the proclamation issued
by General MacArthur on December 29, 1944, which reads as follows:

We are not unmindful of the fact that the detention of the petitioners may have
subjected them to hardships, but this situation is one of those born of all wars
where hardships of all description are visited upon even the most innocent
people. At any rate, we do not think that the petitioners are totally without
remedy. We think they may have recourse to the proper military authorities by
making due representation to them.
These military authorities, we can safely presume, will not deny to the
petitioners any remedy which may be available under the military laws and
under the prevailing circumstances. The United States army forces which have
come to the Philippines for the express purpose of liberating the Filipinos and to
restore them the blessings of liberty under a democratic government, just as fast
as the military situation would permit, would not be — we can justly assume —
the very ones to take from them any of those liberties without legal reason or
justification. But the present state of the world is such that military exigencies or
military necessity may, under certain circumstances, still require some limitation
on the restoration or enjoyment of those liberties. The present case is, in our
opinion, one such situation.
WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the
Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the
enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be removed
from any opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or
the success of our military operations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army
United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area,
hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such
persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for
the duration of the war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine
Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.
 Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this
twenty-ninth day of December, 1944. (41 Off Gaz., 148, 149.)
Attached to the returns as Schedules A, A-1, and A-2 are copies of confidential
security commitment orders which shows: as to the petitioner Lily Raquiza,
"Complaint: Espionage activity for Japanese;" as to the petitioner Emma Link
Infante, "Remarks: Active collaboration with the Japanese;" and as to the
petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, "Complaint: Active collaboration with the
enemy."
Up to this date the petitioners have not been informed of the nature of the
accusation against them, no complaint or information charging them with any
specific offense has been filed against them in any court or tribunal, and they
have never been given a summary hearing. They have not been turned over to
the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases, and no
allegation or intimation is made in the returns as to whether and when the
respondents will release the petitioners to the Philippine Government.
The petitioners now invoke from this Court the writ of habeas corpus to recover
the precious liberty of which they have long been and are still being deprived.
The important question before us is whether this Court has jurisdiction or legal
power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they
have been and are being subjected. Six members of the Court voted for the
negative and three for the affirmative.
Our affirmative and dissenting vote is based on the following considerations:
The guaranty of due process of law found in the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, which declares "that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," is incorporated
in section 1, Article III of the Constitution of the Philippines, which we have
solemnly sworn to support and defend.
"The essential elements of due process of law are notice and an opportunity to
be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case
before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause. One of the most famous and
perhaps the most often quoted definition of due process of law is that of Daniel
Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College Case, in which he declared
that by due process of law is meant 'a law which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.' Somewhat
similar is the statement that it is a rule as old as the law that no one shall be
personally bound until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an
opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks
all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and
oppression and can never be upheld where justice is fairly administered." (12
Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. 573.)
The right to due process of law is more than a prerogative. It is an immanent and
inalienable right of every man, woman, and child living under a government of
laws. It cannot be dispensed with or brushed aside either in time of war or in
time of space. In time of war martial law may be declared. But even under
martial law appropriate tribunals such as courts-martial are set up to hear and
decide the case before anybody can be punished.
General MacArthur's proclamation of December 29, 1944, says that "evidence is
before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid,
comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the
governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;"
that "military necessity requires that such persons be removed from an
opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our
military operations;" and that it was his purpose "to remove such persons, when
apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the
Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter,
I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their
respective cases."
If that proclamation was meant to be a sentence pronounced by General
MacArthur against certain specific persons who, when apprehended, were to be
held in restraint for the duration of the war, such sentence did not constitute, or
was totally devoid of, due process of law because those persons had not been
heard before they were condemned; the evidence before him, whatever it was,
must have been taken at the back and without the knowledge of said persons,
everyone of whom, under the Bill of Rights, to the protection of which every
person living under the American flag is entitled, had "the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf." Such sentence, moreover, is void on its face because the persons
condemned were not named therein, so that anybody whom the agents of the
Army might apprehend could be held thereunder for the duration of the war; and
even if the persons condemned had been named, the proclamation could not be
upheld because, in so far as it purports to pronounce judgment of treason on
"certain citizens" who have not been tried in the courts, it partakes of the nature
of a bill of attainder which is likewise prescribed by the Bill of Rights. If that
proclamation was promulgated and intended as a military law or order whereby
those who had committed treason might be apprehended and held in restraint for
the duration of the war, then the persons affected should have been accused and
tried by a military tribunal before they were consigned to imprisonment for the
duration of the war. Otherwise, how could it have been legally and justly
determined that the accused fell within the purview of the proclamation — that
they had voluntarily given aid, comfort, and sustenance to the enemy? In either
case there was failure of the indispensable requisites of due process of law.
We take for granted the military necessity that gave rise to General MacArthur's
proclamation — the Court is not competent to inquire into it. But we understand
that military necessity to an army of liberation like that of General MacArthur
was not intended to override law and justice as regards the lives and liberties of
the citizens of the country being liberated; and law and justice required that no
accused be condemned without hearing. Even the most notorious war criminals
of Germany and Japan who are publicly known to have committed horrible,
inhuman atrocities during the war have to be accused before and tried by duly
consisted tribunals before punishment can be meted out to them.
To be held in restraint for the duration of the war was in itself a punishment. It
may, parenthetically, be observed here that the petitioners and thousands of
other Filipino citizens held in restraint for the duration of the war by virtue of
the proclamation in question have suffered that punishment with fortitude and
abnegation. While the war was in progress they refrained from questioning the
legality of the drastic military measure taken by General MacArthur in order not
to place any obstacle to his titanic task of driving the enemy out of their country.
The Filipino people's gratitude to General MacArthur for their liberation from
the clutches of their Japanese oppressors was so great that they did not mind the
hardship suffered by them in connection with his prosecution of the war — even
the restraint of the liberties of thousands of them for the duration of the war.
But now that the enemy has surrendered and the war is over, no one can blame
the petitioners for knocking at the portals of justice and demanding their
inalienable right not to be further deprived of their liberty without due process of
law. The majority opinion turns a deaf ear to their pathetic supplication on the
supposition that the war is not yet over, for the final treaty of peace between the
belligerents has not yet been signed and the Congress of the United States has
not yet proclaimed the termination of the war, and that therefore the military
necessity to hold the petitioners in restraint still subsists, for which reason the
Court has no jurisdiction to order the respondents to discharge them from
custody. We cannot yield to such supine attitude. It disregards "fundamental
human rights" and "the dignity and worth of the human person" for which this
global war has been fought and won. (See Charter of United Nations.)
We have shown that with or without war the petitioners are entitled to due
process of law, and that without due process of law their confinement by the
respondents is illegal. Section 1 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that
"the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. . . ." Section 2 of the
same Rule provides that "writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, . . . in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. . . ."
It is true that section 529 of Act No. 190, as amended by Acts Nos. 272 and 421,
provided, among other things, that it shall be a conclusive answer to a writ
of habeas corpus against a military officer or soldier, and sufficient excuse for
not producing the prisoner in all other organized provinces than those therein
named, if the commanding general or any general officer in command of the
department or district shall certify that the prisoner is held by him as a prisoner
of war. But when section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure was reenacted as
section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, that provision was omitted and
therefore impliedly abrogated.
The only exceptions, then, to the application of the writ of habeas corpus are
those now found in section 4 of Rule 102, namely: (1) if the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order; (2) the case of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines or in any part of the United States, and who ought to be
delivered up to the executive power of the United States, or of any State or
territory thereof; and (3) the case of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment. The case of the petitioners herein does not fall under any of
these exceptions.
The majority are of the opinion that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
respondents as members of the United States Army. We do not share that
opinion. General MacArthur himself, on the occasion of the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government on February 27, 1945, addressed to the President
of the Philippines the following eloquent words:
. . . God has indeed blessed our arms! The girded and unleashed power
of America supported by our Allies turned the tide of battle in the
Pacific and resulted in an unbroken series of crushing defeats upon the
enemy culminating in the redemption of your soil and the liberation of
your people. My country has kept the faith!
These soldiers have come here as an army of free men, dedicated, with
your people, to the cause of human liberty and committed to the task of
destroying those evil forces that have sought to suppress it by brutality
of the sword. An army of free men that has brought your people once
again under democracy's banner, to rededicate their churches, long
desecrated, to the glory of God and public worship; to reopen their
schools to liberal education; to till the soil and reap its harvest without
fear of confiscation; to reestablish their industries that they may again
 enjoy the profit from the sweat of their own toil, and to restore the
sanctity and happiness of their homes unafraid of violent intrusion.
Thus to millions of your now liberated people comes the opportunity to
pledge themselves — their hearts, their minds, and their hands — to the
task of building a new and stronger nation — a nation consecrated in
the blood nobly shed that this day might be — a nation dedicated to
making imperishable those sacred liberties for which we have fought
and many have died.
On behalf of my Government I now solemnly declare, Mr. President,
the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to
the Commonwealth whose seat is here reestablished as provided by
law.
Your country thus is again at liberty to pursue its destiny to an honored
position in the family of free nations. Your capital city, cruelly
punished though it be, has regained its rightful place — Citadel of
democracy in the East. (41 Off. Gaz., 86, 87.)
Thus General MacArthur himself, as Commander in Chief of the United States,
Army in this area and as the representative of the Government of the United
states, declared the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution
restored of the Commonwealth. This Court functions under by virtue of the
Constitution. As the highest court of the land it is the bulwark of civil rights and
individual liberties. It is its inescapable duty to apply the law no matter on whom
it falls. It would be an astonishing manifestation of judicial timidity for the
Court to hesitate to subject any person or class of persons to its mandate in a
proper case for fear of lack of physical power to enforce it.
It is the undying glory of our democratic form of government implanted here in
America herself, that no man living under it is above the law. General McArthur
himself as the peerless defender of democracy, would be the first to recognize
this fundamental principle, and his "army of free men, dedicated, with your
people, to the cause of human liberty," cannot but graciously obey the law as
interpreted by the courts. We know of no law which places members of the army
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters affecting civil
rights. In the instant case, the fact that in due time the respondents filed their
returns to the order of this Court to show cause is a positive acknowledgment by
them of the Court's jurisdiction over their persons.
The majority are not satisfied with the spontaneous recognition by the
respondents themselves of the Court's jurisdiction over their persons. To justify
their stand the majority opinion cites and applies the rule of the international law
mentioned in the case of Coleman vs. Tennesse (97 U.S., 509; 24 Law ed.,
1118), to the effect that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly
country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. The case cited has
no applicability whatsoever to the case at bar. It appears in that case that
Coleman, while a regular soldier in the military service of the United States,
committed the crime of murder on March 7 1865, in the State of Tennesse and
was convicted by a general court-martial regularly convened for his trial at
Knoxville, Tennesse, and sentenced to death by hanging. Pending the execution
of that sentence Coleman was indicted in the Criminal Court for the District of
Knox Country, Tennesse, on the 2d of October, 1874, for the same murder.
Under that indictment he was tried and convicted and sentenced to death, and on
appeal to the Supreme Court of the State the judgment was affirmed. Pending
the appeal to the State Supreme Court, the defendant was brought before the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennesse on habeas
corpus, upon a petition stating that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty
and imprisoned by the sheriff of Knox County, upon the charge of murder, for
which he had been indicted, tried, and convicted by the general court-martial.
The question brought before the Supreme Court of the United States was
whether the Criminal Court of the State of Tennessee had jurisdiction to try the
case.
The Supreme Court of the United States declared that the judgment and
conviction in the Criminal Court should have been set aside and the indictment
quashed for want of jurisdiction. It held that the State of Tennessee, at the time
the crime was committed therein, was an enemy territory under the military
occupation of the United States and that the military tribunals had exclusive
jurisdiction to try and punish offenses of every grade committed by persons in
the military in the military service. The court said that "officers and soldiers of
the armies of the Union were not subject during the war to the laws of the
enemy, or amenable to his tribunals for offenses committed by them. They were
answerable only to their own government, and only by its laws, as enforced by
its armies, could they be punished." The court then mentioned the rule of
international law quoted in the majority opinion and argued as follows: "If an
army marching through a friendly country would thus be exempt from its civil
and criminal jurisdiction, a fortiori would an army invading an enemy's country
be exempt?" Thus it is clear that the rule of international law above mentioned
formed no part of the holding of the court in the said case.
Neither can such rule of international law of itself be applicable to the relation
between the Philippines and the United States, for the reason that the former is
still under the sovereignty of the latter. The United States Army is not foreign to
the Philippines. It is here not by permission or invitation of the Philippine
Government but by right of sovereignty of the United States over the
Philippines. It has the same right to be here as it has to be in Hawaii or
California. The United States has the same obligation to defend and protect the
Philippines, as it has to defend and protect Hawaii or California, from foreign
invasion. The citizens of the Philippines owe the same allegiance to the United
States of America as the citizens of any territory or the State of the Union.
If instead of the Philippines California had been invaded by Japan, and General
MacArthur had issued the same proclamation in question against certain citizens
of that State, we do not doubt, from our knowledge of the American people and
their tradition and jurisprudence, that any of such citizens apprehended and
confined by virtue of said proclamation without due process of law would have
been set at liberty by any competent court there through the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. If, as seems to us indisputable, a citizen of the Philippines is
entitled to the protection of the same Bill of Rights, particularly as regards due
process of law, as any citizen of the United States, one would be at a loss to
understand why under the same facts and circumstances the latter would be
entitled to his liberty and the former not.
Our Habeas corpus Law is of American origin. It is substantially the same law
that reigns in very State of the Union. If it can be successfully invoked from the
courts there under a given set of facts, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked from the courts here under the same circumstances. The Philippine
courts are vested with the same power and jurisdiction to grant the writ as the
American courts.
The case at bar is not like the Coleman case wherein a member of the United
States army of occupation was indicted by the enemy state for a crime
committed against a citizen of the latter after he had been tried and convicted by
a proper court-martial. This is a case wherein nationals of the United States
living under the protection of the army of the United States are being deprived
of their liberty by members of that Army without due process of law, and
wherein no conflict of jurisdiction between the military court and the civil court
is involved. In fact, no military court is claiming jurisdiction over the persons of
the petitioners. And yet while sympathizing with the petitioner this court, by the
majority opinion, declares itself impotent to grant them any relief, and suggests
that "they may have recourse to the proper military authorities by making due
representations to them" — the very same military authorities who have long
been and are depriving them of their liberty without due process of law. That is
tantamount to throwing a meritorious case out of court on the ground that the
plaintiff may seek his remedy from the defendant himself by making due
representations to him. One might wonder what the court is good for.
Another reason given to support the judgment is that while under the custody of
the United States military forces the petitioners may be considered as prisoners
of war, citing Hydee on International Law to the effect that an army in the field
in the course of any operation in any locality, may also avail itself of the right to
make civilians prisoners of war, such for example as of "persons whose services
are of a particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, such as
higher civil officials, diplomatic agents, couriers, guides, etc." We do not dispute
that rule of international law; but again, we think it has no application to the case
before us. That rule evidently refers to civilians of the enemy country of whom
the hostile army operating in that country may make prisoners of war. The
Philippines is not an enemy of the United States, whose army came here to
liberate this country and not to conquer or invade it. Under the rule cited, as we
understand it, the United States Army could not make prisoners of war of
Japanese civilians. It could not make prisoners of war of Filipinos any more than
it could make them of Americans. Of course, if the petitioners were Japanese
subjects who were held as prisoners of war by the United States Army, no one in
his right mind would contend that this court should entertain a petition
for habeas corpus from them. But that is clearly not the case, and with all due
respect we think the citation of the rule to support the majority opinion is out of
place here.
In the case of Payomo vs. Floyd (42 Phil., 788), it appears that one Calixto
Mendigorin, a civilian resident of Subic, Zambales, was arrested by a naval
officer and arraigned and sentenced by the naval reservation police judge for
violation of the laws and regulations which prohibited the cutting of timber on
the naval reservation without a permit from the proper officer. Upon petition
for habeas corpus originally filed in this court by Juliana Payomo in behalf of
Mendigorin, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Street, held that the
Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippines Islands have
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the writ of habeas corpus to set at liberty a
civilian person who is alleged to have been detained by the naval authorities of
the United States; that in this respect said courts have the same authority as the
Federal courts in the United States; and that the naval authorities of the United
States have no authority to establish a tribunal in the Olongapo Reservation with
jurisdiction to try and sentence civilian persons for offenses committed on said
reservation in violation of the penal laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature.
The prisoner was ordered released.
The refusal of this court now to exercise similar jurisdiction over the
respondents herein because they are members of the United States Army
constitutes, in our opinion, a reversal of or a retrogression from the sound and
the liberal doctrine laid down by this same court in that case.
We think it is idle to discuss whether the war has terminated as a matter of law
or has ended as a matter of fact. In his proclamation of December 29,1944,
General MacArthur announced that after the war he would release the prisoners
to the Philippine Government, and the fact that the CIC has partially turned over
said prisoners to the Philippine Government shows that they themselves
recognized that the war has ended within the purview of said proclamation.
The war having ended as a matter of fact with the unconditional surrender of
Japan formalized on September 2, 1945, the petitioners, who have been deprived
of their liberty without due process of law since they were arrested five or six
months ago, are peremptorily entitled now to that due process. Due process will
not commence for them until and unless they are turned over by the CIC to the
Commonwealth Government. Respondents not having intimated in their returns
whether and when they will release the petitioners to the Philippine
Government, the court has no alternative but to order their immediate discharge.
Paras, J., concurs.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The petitioners complain that they are being illegally detained and pray that they
be set at liberty without delay.
They allege that they had been taken from their respective residence in the City
of Manila by certain individuals posing themselves as agents of the Counter
Intelligence Corps (CIC), Lily Raquiza on March 13, 1945; Haydee Tee Han
Kee on February 25, 1945; and Emma Link Infante on April 10, 1945; and since
then had been restrained and deprived of their liberty in the Correctional
Institution for Women in Mandaluyong.
They allege also that no formal complaint or accusation for any specific, offense
had been filed against them, nor any judicial writ or order for their commitment
has at any time been issued so far, and that they did not commit, either
individually or collectively, any offense for which they may be arrested or
deprived of their liberty without any formal charge or judicial warrant, and that,
according to reliable information, they are being unlawfully detained by a
temporary warden named Captain Inez L. Twidle, by order and at the behest of
one Lieutenant Colonel L.J. Bradford of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and
that, there being no martial law in the Philippines and the civil government
having been formally delivered to the authorities of the Commonwealth and the
Constitution of the Commonwealth being in full operations, the confinement of
the petitioners is illegal..
Respondent, Lieutenant Colonel L. J. Bradford, of the United States Army,
alleges in his return that he is attached on duty in the Counter Intelligence Corps
(CIC) of the United States Army; that petitioners were detained by virtue of the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur on December 29, 1944, and were
immediately turned over to the Provost Marshall at Bilibid Prison on the dates
specified in Schedules A, A-1 and A-2, attached to the writ, and since then
respondent had nothing to do with petitioners, and has absolutely no connection
with the correctional institution for women.
Respondent alleges further that he is not acquainted and has no official
connection with Captain Inez L. Twidle; that Captain Twindle is in no manner
connected with the Counter Intelligence Corps and at the date of petition,
August 30, 1945, with the correctional Institution for Women.
In Schedule A it appears that petitioner Lily Raquiza was arrested on March 13,
1945, by Lieutenant Colonel L. J. Bradford, accused of espionage activities for
Japanese and under commitment order worded as follows:
The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the security
of the United States Forces for the reasons set forth above. The
Commanding Officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable
installation in which this person may be confined is authorized and
directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military
authority.
In the same schedule that said petitioner was delivered to Bilibid Prison on
March 13, 1945.
In Schedule A-1 it appears that Emma Link Infante has been delivered to the
Provost Marshall in Bilibid Prison on April 10, •1945, pursuant to the authority
of the proclamation issued by the Commander in Chief, GHQ, Southwest Pacific
Area, dated 29, December, 1944, accused of active collaboration with the
Japanese and because her previous association with the enemy constitutes
security risk to the United States Armed Forces.
In Schedule A-2 it appears that petitioner Haydee Tee Han kee has been arrested
on February 25, 1945, for active collaboration with the enemy under a
commitment order identical to what appears in Schedule A and was delivered on
the same day to the Provost Marshall in Bilibid Prison.
There is absolutely no mention in the return of any formal complaint or charge
filed against any of the petitioners nor of any legal proceedings regarding the
offenses imputed to them as mentioned in Schedules A, A-1 and A-2, nor of any
judicial order or writ issued by competent authority for the detention or
commitment of petitioners.
Attorney for petitioners filed a reply alleging that, no denial having been made
of the essential allegations of the petition, to the effect that petitioners had been
deprived of their liberty, following the doctrine set in the case
Villavicencio vs. Lukban (39 Phil., 778), the Supreme Court should the grant
writ of the habeas corpus and order Lieutenant Colonel L. J. Bradford and
Captain Caroline De Eason or whoever actually is in command of the Women's
Detention Centre in Welfareville to appear before this Court and produce the
bodies of petitioners and explain then and there why they should not be set at
liberty immediately.
Lest we forget it is timely to remember that at the hearing of this case it was
denounced by counsel that one of the petitioners, since her custodian received
that order of the Supreme Court to show cause why petition should not be
granted, has been subjected to harsh maltreatment, confined into a solitary cell,
and deprived of the opportunity of the verifying the truth of the denunciation by
hearing the testimony of the petitioners, because the writ of habeas corpus was
not issued as we have twice proposed.
The nature and gravity of the charge against, the petitioners, we hope, will not
induce us to consider with prejudice their case. Whatever our feelings are
against the enemy and those who helped him as spies or collaborators, and no
matter how sincere and strong those feelings might be, it is our inescapable duty
not allow them to sway our judgment and reasoning. Our position imposes upon
us the responsibility of applying the law above all considerations, and it is one of
the great elemental principles of law that all accused are presumed innocent
until, after due legal process, they are finally found guilty beyond guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Perhaps it is worthy of note that the United States Army, instead of following
the ordinary military course with regard to spies and collaborators, and of
subjecting them to summary trial and immediate execution, had chosen merely
to keep the petitioners restrained of liberty, abstaining completely from trying
them by court-martial, and proposing to deliver them to the Commonwealth
Government. That the might mean that evidence of guilt of the petitioners is not
strong enough to justify a drastic action, and that if they are guilty, they belong
to the harmless type, and, therefore, will not endanger the safety of military
personnels and installations nor jeopardize public order.
As a matter of fact, it was authoritatively stated at the hearing of this case that
many other persons placed in identical situation as the petitioners are being
turned over to the Government of the Commonwealth.
Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, in her return, states that petitioners are
detained in the Women's Correctional Institution, of which she is in charge, by
virtue of the proclamation issued by General MacArthur on December 29, 1944,
and the commitments Schedules A, A-1 and A-2.
The proclamation of General MacArthur relied upon by the respondent, it seems,
is in conformity with the statement made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
upon signing S.J. Resolutions Nos. 93 and 94, on June 29 1944, the first of them
laying down a policy for the granting of independence and for the acquisition of
base adequate to provide for the mutual protection of the United States and the
Philippines. President Roosevelt said:
. . . The measure makes it possible to proclaimed independence as soon
as practicable after constitutional process and normal functions of
government have been restored in the Philippines.
It is contemplated that as soon as conditions warrant, civil government
will be set up under constitutional officers. It will be their duty
forthwith to take emergency measures to alleviate the physical and
economic hardship of the Philippine people, and to prepare the
Commonwealth to received and exercise the independence which we
have promised them. The latter includes two tasks of great importance:
Those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from
the authority and influence over the political and economic life of the
country, and the democratic from of government guaranteed in the
constitution of the Philippines must be restored for the benefit of the
people of the Islands. (41 Off., Gaz., No. 1, p. 85.)
The proclamation of General MacArthur, issued in the filed on the 29th of
December, 1944, is as follows:
Whereas evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines
voluntarily have given; comfort and sustenance to the enemy in
violation of allegiance due to Governments of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
Whereas military necessity requires that such persons be removed from
any opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or the
success of our military operations;
Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur General of the Army, United
States Army, as Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, hereby
do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such persons,
when apprehended, from any position of political and economic
influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the
duration of the war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine
Government for its judgment upon their respective cases, (41 Off. Gaz.,
No. 2, pp. 148, 149.)
It may appear at first blush that the persons whose liberty is restrained under the
Proclamation, which shall hereafter be referred to as the December
proclamation, may be considered as military prisoners.
But they are not. They are political prisoners. As a matter of fact, if we delve
into the history of the December proclamation, we will find out that the same
has been issued to accommodate the Commonwealth Government and to relieve
it from a difficult position under the circumstances, at the time it began to
function in Leyte, immediately after the landing of the Armed Forces of
Liberation, when many political prisoners were intending to seek habeas
corpus relief and the Commonwealth Government handicapped by lack of the
facilities, was not in a position to cope with the extraordinary situation
confronting it.
Of course, General MacArthur had the technical right to issue the December
proclamation, under the extraordinary powers wielded by a military commander
in chief during war operation, but let us analyze carefully the text of the
document and we will see that the persons included under it, although they may
also be considered as military prisoners as indicated in the second "Whereas" are
in fact civil prisoners, accused of offense of political character, not emenable to
military justice but to the ordinary administration of the justice in civil courts.
It is true that in the second "Whereas" military necessity is invoked for the
removal of affected persons from any opportunity to threaten the security of the
military forces, but in the dispositive part of the December proclamation, which
is the controlling part, it is catergorically stated that it is THE PURPOSE of
General MacArthur "to removed such persons, when apprehended, from any
position of political and economic influence in the Philippines," and just "to hold
them in restraint," NOT TO PROSECUTE, NOR TO TRY, NOR TO PUNISH,
"for the duration of the war."
Finally, General MacArthur says: "Whereafter I shall release them to the
Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respectives cases." That is
saying in other way that their cases belong to the civil jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth ordinary tribunals, and not the court-martial or other military
tribunal's jurisdiction.
Taking into consideration the December proclamation in conjunction with
President Roosevelt's declaration, the conclusion is inevitable that said
document is, in fact, a political proclamation, not military.
If the petitioners are political prisoners subject to the civil jurisdiction of
ordinary courts of justice if they are to be prosecuted at all, the army has no
jurisdiction, nor power, nor authority, from all legal standpoints, to continue
holding them in restraint. They are entitled, as a matter of fundamental right, to
be immediately released, any allegation as to whether the war was ended or not,
notwithstanding, as the Supreme Court of the United States of America, the
highest tribunal under the American flag, has stated that the constitutional
guaranties of personal liberty are a shield for the protection "OF ALL
CLASSES, AT ALL TIMES, AND UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES."
The constitutional guaranties of personal liberty are a shield, for the
protection of all classes, at all times, and under all circumstances; and
the writ of habeas corpus issues to inquire into the legality of the
detention of an accused. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2.)
It is alleged that petitioners are being held as a measure of military necessity and
that the army Commander in Chief, and not an outsider, including the members
of this Supreme Court, is the competent judge as to the existence of military
necessity.
Certainly, the army Commander in Chief is supposed to be the most competent
judge as to whether military necessity requires or not the detention of
petitioners, and ordinarily this Court should accept his judgment as conclusive.
But in this case there is nothing to show that General MacAthur, as the
Commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces, is of the opinion that
military necessity requires the detention of petitioners. The only opinion that we
have in the record is the one expressed by respondent Bradford AT THE TIME
OF THE APPREHENSION of petitioners. In his return dated September 5,
1945, said respondent stated that petitioners "were temporarily detained" by
virtue of the December proclamation, and nothing is said whether military
necessity still requires their further detention. In fact said respondent washes his
hands when he alleges that immediately after the apprehension of petitioners, he
ceased to have nothing to do with said persons, while respondent Captain
Caroline De Eason, in cotinuing to restrain the liberty of petitioners, is invoking
the authority of the commitment orders of Lt. Col. Bradford, the other
respondent. So it seems that the two respondents are mutually throwing
responsibility to each other's shoulders.
Under the circumstances, we are entitled to opine that no competent or
authoritative statement is on record to the effect that petitioners must remain
under restraint as a matter of military necessity. Many other persons placed in
the same situation are being released to the Commonwealth Government.
It is easy to understand the absence of such statement if we take into
consideration that the state of war has ceased to exist.
The contention that, notwithstanding the historical facts leading to the
conclusion that war has ended, we cannot declare that the war has terminated
unless and until a treaty of peace has been formally signed, like the Treaty of
Paris which ended the Spanish-American war, or a formal declaration of the
United States Congress to the effect that peace has been restored, as it was done
two years after the termination of hostilities in the First World War, is untenable.
Shall the members of this Supreme Court be blind enough to maintain the
existence of a state of war between the Allied Nations and Japan after Japanese
Foreign Minister Mamoru Sigemitsu has signed on V-J Day, September 2, 1945,
the document of unconditional surrender of Japan, by accepting completely the
July 26, 1945, Potsdam declaration?
The following indubitable historical facts are matters of judicial notice, and they
are officially recorded in the Official Gazette:
1. On August 10,1945, the Japanese Government declared its readiness to accept
the Potsdam allied joint declaration "with the understanding that the said
declaration does not compromise any demands which prejudices the
prerogatives of his Majesty as a sovereign ruler."
2. On August 11, 1945, the Allies answered that from the moment of surrender
"the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government shall be subject to
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers."
3. On august 14, 1945, the Japanese Government accepted the Allied counter-
proposal. The Japanese reply was considered by President Truman as "a full
acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the unconditional
surrender of Japan."
According, on September 2, 1945, the document of formal surrender was signed
by the Japanese representatives at Tokyo Bay, aboard the battleship Missouri,
Admiral Halsey's flagship, in the presence of General MacAthur, as Supreme
Allied Commander, of representative of individual allied nations.
One day after, General Yamashita, the biggest Japanese military figure in the
last war, the Conqueror of Singapore and called as the "Tiger of Malaya," signed
the surrender of all his forces in the Philippines.
We do not believe it right to maintain the existence of war when, as a matter of
fact, war is over. The immediate and main objective of a warring motion is
victory. Once attained, war ceases to exist. War cannot exist without two
contending parties. It is a strungle between two opposing nations or combination
of states. No fight can exist if there is only one fighter. In the last war, which
ended on September 2, 1945, there were two opposing parties, the Allied
Nations on the hand, and on the other, Japan. And Japan laid down arms, refused
to continue to fight, surrendered completely. If it is maintained that there is still
war, among whom is it being fought? Certainly, it is not between the United
Nations and Japan, because Japan is not willing to put up any fight anymore. It
is preposterous to think that the Allied Nations shall engage in a shadow war.
Therefore, the formality of a treaty of peace or a resolution of the Congress of
the United States, declaring the war is over, is absolutely unnecessary. At most,
it is a mere technicality that cannot add anything to the stark reality which is
facing us. With or without congressional declaration, the Supreme Court cannot
close its eyes to the reality of the termination of war which is confronting us
with the same tangibility of a fist blow.
Suppose the Congress of United States of America does not make any formal
declaration about the end of war within two or three years, as it seems improper
for the Allied Powers to sign any peace treaty with vanquished Japan subject to
the authority of the Allied Supreme Commander, shall the Supreme Court of the
Philippines declare that war is going on, that war continues to exist that far? To
do that we must lose all sense of truth.
We hope nobody will suppose that we will have to endure the Japanese self-
delusion of not accepting the existence of a state of war between Japan and
China in what they used to call a mere incident, although for years since the
Marco Polo bridge action took place in 1937, thousands of soldiers and millions
of Chinese innocent, civilians had died during protracted military hostilities in
wide areas of China, ending only with the unconditional surrender of Japan at
the Tokyo Bay.
In considering the case of the petitioners, we believe that instead of the
December proclamation, we must take into consideration what we shall call
hereafter the October proclamation, issued by General Douglas MacArthur on
October 23, 1944.
It is declared therein that the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines is the "sole and only Government having legal and fundamental
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control," which is the case of the place wherein the petitioners are being
held in restraint; that the "laws now existing in the statute books" and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto "are in full force and effect and legally
binding," including the Constitution which guarantees that "no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law" (sec. 1 Article III) and the laws
affording the relief of habeas corpus to all who are illegally detained.
It is further announced by General Douglas MacArthur in the October
proclamation that it is his purpose to restore and extend to the people of the
Philippines "the sacred right of the government by constitutional process."
It is not logical to entertain the idea that, with the issuance of the December
proclamation, General MacArthur had the least idea of jeopardizing the personal
liberty of any citizen of the Philippines, which is one of the fundamental human
rights guaranteed by our Constitution and laws.
On the morning of February 27, 1945, upon turning over to President Osmeña
the full powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government at a
ceremony held at Malacañang Palace, General MacArthur declared in a stirring
speech that his soldiers have come here as an army of free men, dedicated, with
our people, "to the cause of human liberty," and that with our liberation, millions
of our people will have the opportunity to pledge themselves to the task of
building a new and stronger nation "dedicated to making imperishable those
sacred liberties for which many have fought and died."
These words are in line with the United Nations' joint declaration made on
January 1, 1942, to the effect that complete victory over the enemies "is
essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to
preserved human rights and justice."
It is again General MacArthur who, in the speech delivered at a special session
of our Congress on July 9, 1945, said:
Since the beginning of the time men have crusaded for freedom and for
equality. It was this passion for liberty which inspired the architects of
my own government to proclaim so immutably and so beautifully that
"all men are created equal" and "that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights — that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness." On such rights rest our basic concept of
human freedom, in defense of which we have fought and still continue
to fight on the battle fields of the world. These rights are the very
antithesis to the totalitarian doctrine which seeks to regiment the people
and control the human will as the price for presumed efficiency in
government.
And as a final declaration, binding to all United Nations, including the United
States of America and the Philippines, it is stated in the Charter adopted in the
Conference on June 26, 1945, that it is one of the main purposes of the
organization to promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion." (Sec. 3, Article I, Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations.)
It is interesting to note that counsel for respondent is invoking section 4 of Rule
102 and Act No. 190, as amended by Acts Nos. 272 and 421, to maintain that
this Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
We cannot help declaring that they very legal provisions invoked precisely show
that petitioners are entitled to the relief sought in the petition.
The pertinent provision of Act No. 190, as amended, were enacted specifically
that relief by habeas corpus cannot be afforded to military prisoners.
We shown already that petitioner are not military prisoners.
The provisions of Act No. 190, as amended, were enacted specifically for
special extraordinary situations, and said provisions are no longer in effect, as
procedural provisions on habeas corpus are incorporated in the present judicial
rules, wherein said provisions are ommited. When the Supreme Court adopted
the rules, by ommitting said provisions, it intended clearly to repeal them, and
with good reason, because they are incompatible with democratic principles and
with the provisions of our Constitution.
It has been argued with energy by those oppose our issuing the order for the
release of the petitioners, that if we decide to issue it, the United State Army
might refuse to set them at liberty, with the result that the order of release will
become a mere scrap of paper and the supreme court of the Philippines will be
placed in the unenviable position of utter ridicule. We have to answer in the
most definite way that we cannot agree with such •a narrow point of view.
As Greece was the cradle of democracy in the West, so the Philippines is the
cradle of democracy in the East. If the first occidental democracy was born in
Greece centuries before the Christian Era, at the end of the last century the
Philippines gave birth to the first democracy in the Orient, the abode of more
than one-half of all humanity. That first oriental democracy was born with the
drafting of the Malolos Constitution in the most difficult and trying
circumstances, under conditions less appropriate for a healthy and vigorous
growth, when our country was enduring the hardships of an uphill bloody
struggle for national independence. But America, the greatest occidental
democracy, came to offer us a helping hand as a second mother. With solicitude
she nursed the small child. She reared and cared for her with the self-sacrificing
earnestness of maternal love. The child has grown into a brown girl, full of the
joy of life. The girl learned from the American teacher the full meaning of
constitutional guaranties, of civil liberties, of fundamental human rights. She
studied at heart the accomplishments of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln. She
followed the teaching of Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison. She saw how law is
really above all men, and how a humble police officer in the discharge of his
official duties, arrested President Grant, and how the Chief Magistrate of that
great nation, the United States of America, submitted to the arrest. That girl has
grown into full maturity, the personification of beauty, bewitching, the
sweetheart of one billion lovers, the greatest pride of America in the continent of
Asia, on the shores of the vast Pacific.
Now, who shall dare to lay hands on her? Who shall dare to destroy that most
beautiful masterpiece of the greatest American democratice virtues? Who shall
have heart to straggle the neck of Philippine democracy, the beloved daughter of
American democracy? Certainly, not the United States Army, nor the heroic and
glorious Army of Liberation not the gallant warriors who fought thousands of
battles to return to rescue Philippine democracy from the Japanese monsters,
with the same romantic courage of a knight of old in the rescue of the beloved
princess in captivation. No, certainly not. the American Army shall never allow
itself to stand indicted before the bar of the whole world as the cold-blooded
murdered of the liberated little daughter of American democracy.
But suppose the most unexpected should happen, that there might be members
of the United States Armed Forces who will be blind to ignore the order of this
Supreme court, to make a mockery of the administration of justice, shall that
unthinkable hypothesis deter us from doing our duty? Our answer is simple. No.
no one and nothing whole world, neither the all-powerful army which humbled
Germany and forced the surrender of the "invincible" Japanese Army, nor
weapons more dreadful than the atomic bomb, nor the menace of an imminent
catastrophe, shall be powerful enough to make us flinch from complying with
our plain duty as justices of the Supreme court. We must do our duty as justices
of the supreme Court. We must do our consequences. Law and justice might
suffer setbacks, endure eclipses, but at the end they shall reign with all the
splendors of real majesty.
Justice Cooley, one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers,
said:
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six
centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and
rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations,
until Coke could in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna
Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the
extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of
rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion
of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the
life and soul of the whole instrument, it so easy as is claimed here. (In
the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
Referring to this opinion of Justice Cooley our Supreme Court said:
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative
by other courts. (Rivers vs. Citchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193;
Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young
[1892], 50 Fed., 526.) (Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil., 791-793.)
We have the almost one-fourth-century-old legal doctrine laid down by this
Supreme Court to the effect that this tribunal and the courts of first instance of
the Philippines have jurisdiction to set free, through habeas corpusproceedings,
a civilian who has been illegally arrested or is unduly being detained by military
or naval authorities of the United States. (Payomo vs. Floyd [Feb. 17, 1922], 42
Phil., 788.)
We agree that, while war is going on, ordinary civil laws shall remain silent, in
order not to impede the effectiveness of war operations. It is legal maxim that
laws are silent amidst arms. Silent leges inter arma. But when the din of war is
over, when the clang of arms has ceased, civil laws are restored with full
effectiveness, and it is the function of tribunals to interpret and apply them. If
they fail to apply them in a proper case submitted to them, they will be recreant
to their judicial duties, and are liable to be marked with a stigma they cannot be
proud of. Legem terrae amittentes perpetaum infamiae notam inde merito
incurrunt. Those who do not preserve the law of the land, thence justly incur the
ineffaceable brand of infamy.
It is evident that petitioners are being deprived of their personal liberty without
due process of law.
More than three years under the arbitrary rule of the Japanese kempei might
have habituated us to view with some leniency the illegal deprivation of
individual freedom. The gestapo procedures of apprehending indiscriminately
our citizens at any time of the day, mostly after midnight, employed by the
ruthless Japanese military police, were a daily occurrence, and it might have
deadened our sense of personal freedom, and might make us insensible to the
injustice being done to petitioners, to their moral sufferings in their involuntary
imprisonment, and, therefore, might have closed our eyes to a situation that
requires immediate relief, and our ears to the anguishing clamors of the victims
of the injustice. But the fact that immediately after we assumed jurisdiction in
this case, and respondents have been required to show cause why relief should
not be granted to petitioners, one of them has been subjected to maltreatment, to
an inquisitorial procedure hardly justifiable to be used against a Japanese
prisoner, must arouse us to the full realization that here there is a case which
needs prompt relief, if the final victory won by the United Nations at Tokyo Bay
on September 2, 1945, must have a substantial meaning.
With the facts confronting us in this case, we cannot remain indifferent. They
present a question that affects us in the deepest recesses of our being. It is a
human freedom which is at stake. It is one of the fundamental rights which have
existed since mankind began to live in this world, much before the Code of
Hammurabi has been written, anterior and superior to any constitutional
guarantees, and recognized before the organization of society and of any
government, because they have their roots in human nature. We cannot remain
unmoved when we see how such natural right is disregarded, and violated by
official representatives of a democratic government.
If we allow freely such flagrant trampling of the personal freedom of three of
our citizens, we shall shake the faith of one hundred million fellow malayans in
the effectiveness of democratic processes, and one billion orientals shall cease to
look here for the MacArthur's Citadel of Democracy. If the facts presented to us
shall happen to reach such public forums as our Congress and the American
Congress, they will not fail to arouse waves of protest and indignation. This is
the first case submitted to the new Supreme Court of the Philippines, as
reconstituted since our liberation, wherein our power is invoked for the
protection of personal liberty, flagrantly violated. Shall we shrink from doing
our plain duty?
If we refuse to grant the redress sought by petitioners, we are afraid we are
sanctioning and perpetuating the same procedure which made Fort Santiago a
veritable house of horrors, which branded with eternal infamy the Axis
concentration camps, Buchenwald, Dachau, Maidanak predicated on the
supremacy of the torture among the functions of government, in which case the
only peace possible is the peace of death. And then, what was the use of
requiring our boys to fight, to shed their blood, to die in the battle fields of
Bataan? What was the purpose of fighting in the whole world to crush Germany
and Japan, if we are to follow their procedures? What meaning will the gospel of
fundamental freedoms preached by Roosevelt have?
We will not conclude without challenging the applicability of the quotation in
the majority opinion of what has been said by the Supreme Court of the United
States of America in the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S., 509),
recognizing the privilege of extraterritoriality in a foreign army, permitted to
march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it.
The American Army of Liberation is not a "foreign army." It represents the
same sovereignty of the United States of America under which the Philippines is
placed. That army is waving the same American flag that waves in the
government offices of the Commonwealth. From our point of view, we must
consider it as a domestic army. Is it not the continuation of the Fil-American
Army which fought in Bataan and Corregidor? Did not the American boys and
our boys mix their blood in the same holocaust, in the same battles? Are not the
dead American soldiers resting in the same graves with the dead Filipino
soldiers in an eternal embrace of brotherhood, sanctified by the noblest ideals?
There is no analogy between that of a foreign army which is granted free
passage in a friendly country and that of the American Army in the Philippines,
which has belonged here since the American flag began to fly in this country,
had to return to vindicate the honor of the American sovereignty, wantonly
insulted in the treacherous attack of Pearl Habor, and shall remain, even after the
formal proclamation of our national independence, to protect that independence,
as has been solemnly pledged by President Roosevelt, and to maintain vigilance
in the first line of defense of the United States of America.
With regards to the privilege of extraterritoriality granted to a foreign army,
permitted to march through a friendly country, it must be understood as limited
to the internal matters of said army. That is, it is exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the place as far as it does not affect the substantial rights
of the nationals of the friendly country where it is stationed. Those substantial
rights, specially if guaranteed in the Constitution, in proper cases, shall always
merit the protection of the courts of the territory. That official duty of the courts
shall be more imperative if we take into consideration the stress given in the
Charter of the United Nations upon the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
We cannot accept the position of those who maintain that our civil courts should
not exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army, the very army of a
country which recognizes no one as being above the law, no matter how high his
position is or how powerful he is, a country wherein a humble police officer, in
the performance of his official duty, may legally arrest the Chief Magistrate of
the nation. Such position is subersive of the fundamental tenets of democracy.
We cannot accept it in the same way that we cannot accept military dictatorship
or any other kind of dictatorship. Under the American Constitution or the
Philippine Constitution, the army is always placed under the authority of civil
government, functioning through its legislative, executive and judicial branches.
The supreme commander of the army is the President, a civil officer elected by
the people. The army has to obey the laws. The jurisdiction of the courts is
granted by the Constitution and by the laws. We cannot accept a theory that
might revive or reproduce the military tyranny of Himmler or of the Japanese
Kempei. With all our admiration for the gallant American Army, with all our
deep gratitude for the freedom it has restored to us, we cannot recognize in it
any power that is above the law of our land. All tyranny is hateful, even if it be
exercised by our own parents, the very persons to whom we owe our lives and
all opportunities and happiness. We must do all we can to show our recognition,
respect, and gratitude to the American Army, but we should never renounce the
supremacy of the law. If we should falter in our national duty of upholding law,
we will be unworthy of the efforts and sacrifices undergone by the American
Army to liberate our country. And we can uphold the law by applying it in the
proper case and, if its application requires the exercise of jurisdiction over the
American troops, nothing shall make us hesitate to exercise that jurisdiction. It is
the only way of keeping alive the public faith in the effectiveness of the courts
as the bulwark of the rights of the people.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that an order should be issued by this Court
without delay for the immediate release of petitioners.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by
virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner
is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After
the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court viaa petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from
the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination
that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu
propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a
right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in
what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires
for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity
clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy
the following privileges and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed
by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives
the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that
the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if
petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution
should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be
accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so
desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra
vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 4 It appears that even the
government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic
agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional
or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions.5 As already mentioned above, the commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted,
suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.6 Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by
law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.8 Besides the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the
court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled,
render it defective.9 he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court
of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. against him.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court
of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur. petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of
the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that
even under the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred
exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a

consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is
accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not
exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country
where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's
International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is
Republic of the Philippines one of jurisdiction.
SUPREME COURT
Manila 1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it
EN BANC necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision
relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the
Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a
fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner, On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into full
vs. force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent. only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative,
executive and judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner. bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.)
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent. This court owes its own existence to the great instrument, and derives
all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction,
ABAD SANTOS, J.: this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this
of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. constitutional provision.
He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the 2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred
upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors,
 other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does
not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely
provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate
jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of
this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises
whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was
exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived
from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warrantoin the cases and in the manner
prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the
controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law."
Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It
results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the
Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such
cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in
the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have
"original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the
Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such
grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original
jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union.
(U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months'
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act
No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought
against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to
the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the
laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2,
of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of
the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless
inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed
by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of
First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in
force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the
conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution
over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an
exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are
not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative
and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to amend alter,
modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U.
S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction to try the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must
be denied. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court
over the petitioner in the instant case is concurrent and not exclusive. The
strictly legal reason is set forth in the preceding illuminating opinion. The other
reasons are (a) historical and based on what I consider is the (b) theory upon
which the grant of legislative authority under our Constitution is predicated.
(a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, has been taken from the
Constitution of the United States, considerable light would be gained by an
examination of the history and interpretation thereof in the United States.
The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15,
1787) gave the Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court
under the plan, authority to hear and determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier
resort . . . all cases touching the rights of ambassadors . . . ." This clause,
however, was not approved. On July 18, the Convention of 1787 voted an
extraordinarily broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court extending "to cases
arising under laws passed by the general legislature, and to such other questions
as involve the national peace and harmony." This general proposition was
considerably narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May 29 which, however, did
not mention anything about ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
But the Committee of Detail, through Rutledge, reported on August 6 as
follows: "Article XI, Section 3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
. . . In . . . cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, . . .
this jurisdiction shall be original . . . ."On September 12, the Committee on Style
reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2. The judicial power
shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls . . . In (all) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." This provision
was approved in the convention with hardly any amendment or debate and is
now found in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United
States. (The Constitution and the Courts, Article on "Growth of the
Constitution", by William M. Meigs, New York, 1924, vol. 1, pp. 228, 229. See
also Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale University Press,
1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-
537.)
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. Two years
after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act
(Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat., c. 20, 687) was approved by the first
Congress creating the United States District and Circuit Courts which were nisi
prius courts, or courts of first instance which dealt with different items of
litigation. The district courts are now the only federal courts of first instance, the
circuit courts having been abolished by the Act of March 3, 1911, otherwise
known as the Judicial Code. The Judiciary Act of 1787 invested the district
courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all suits
against consuls or vice-consuls and the Supreme Court of the United States with
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or vice-
consul shall be a party. By the passage of the Act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat.,
470, c. 137), the clause giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction was
repealed and, since then state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts over civil or criminal proceedings against a consul or vice-consul.
At the present time, the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction "of suits or
proceedings against ambassadors or other or other public ministers, or their
domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have consistently with the
law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits brought
by ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul is
a party." (Act of March 8, 1911, 36 Stat., 1156, reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of
September 24, 1789; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 341; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code,
4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 233.) The district courts now have original
jurisdiction of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls." (Act of March 3, 1911,
36 Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, subsec. 18; Hopkins' Federal Judicial
Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 24, par. 18.)
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed
by the Congress of the United States. It has remained essentially unchanged for
more than 145 years. It was prepared chiefly by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut
(1 Ann. Cong., 18, April 7, 1789) one of the ablest jurists in the Constitutional
Convention, who was later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States (1796-1800). It is interesting to note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of
the members of the House of the first Congress had been among the 55 delegates
who actually attended the Convention that adopted the federal Constitution
(Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court [Boston, 1935], p.
99). When, therefore, the first Congress approved the Judiciary Act of 1789
vesting in the Supreme Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in
which a consul or a vice-consul shall be a party, express legislative
interpretation as to the meaning of the word "original" as not being exclusive
was definitely made and this interpretation has never been repudiated. As stated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ames vs. Kansas ([1884], 111 U.
S., 449; 4 S. Ct., 437; 28 Law. ed., 482):
In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the
Constitution by Congress, at the very moment of the organization of the
government, and of the significant fact that, from 1789 until now, no
court of the United States has ever in its actual adjudications
determined to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not within the
power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States
jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the
Constitution with original jurisdiction. It rests with the legislative
department of the government to say to what extent such grants shall be
made, and it may safely be assumed that nothing will ever be done to
encroach upon the high privileges of those for whose protection the
constitutional provision was intended. At any rate, we are unwilling to
say that the power to make the grant does not exist.
Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means
"exclusive" and as observed by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana
([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69), the question has given rise
to some differences of opinion among the earlier members of the Supreme Court
of the United States. (See, for instance, dissenting opinion of Iredell, J., in U.
S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388.) Reliance was had on more
or less general expressions made by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of
Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was said:
"If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the
constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the
distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance."
But Chief Justice Marshall who penned the decision in this case in 1803 had
occasion later, in 1821, to explain the meaning and extent of the
pronouncements made in the Marbury case. He said:
In the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172;
2 Law. ed., 60), the single question before the court, so far as that case
can be applied to this, was, whether the legislature could give this court
original jurisdiction in a case in which the Constitution had clearly not
given it, and in which no doubt respecting the construction of the article
could possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think very
properly, that the legislature could not give original jurisdiction in such
a case. But, in the reasoning of the court in support of this decision,
some expressions are used which go far beyond it. The counsel for
Marbury had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in
the apportionment of the judicial power; and it is against this argument
that the reasoning of the court is directed. They say that, if such had
been the intention of the article, "it would certainly have been useless
to proceed farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals in
which it should be vested." The court says, that such a construction
would render the clause, dividing the jurisdiction of the court into
original and appellate, totally useless; that "affirmative words are often,
in their operation, negative of other objects than those which are
affirmed; and, in this case (in the case of Marbury vs. Madison), a
negative or exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no
operation at all." "It cannot be presumed," adds the court, "that any
clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and,
therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require
it." The whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon the idea that the
affirmative words of the clause giving one sort of jurisdiction, must
imply a negative of any other sort of jurisdiction, because otherwise the
words would be totally inoperative, and this reasoning is advanced in a
case to which it was strictly applicable. If in that case original
jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause under consideration
would have been entirely useless. Having such cases only in its view,
the court lays down a principle which is generally correct, in terms
much broader than the decision, and not only much broader than the
reasoning with which that decision is supported, but in some instances
contradictory to its principle. The reasoning sustains the negative
operation of the words in that case, because otherwise the clause would
have no meaning whatever, and because such operation was necessary
to give effect to the intention of the article. The effort now made is, to
apply the conclusion to which the court was conducted by that
reasoning in the particular case, to one in which the words have their
full operation when understood affirmatively, and in which the
negative, or exclusive sense, is to be so used as to defeat some of the
great objects of the article. To this construction the court cannot give its
assent. The general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison
must be understood with the limitations which are given to them in this
opinion; limitations which in no degree affect the decision in that case,
or the tenor of its reasoning. (Cohens vs. Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat.,
264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)
What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that
Congress could not extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly
mentioned in the Constitution, the rule of construction being that affirmative
words of the Constitution declaring in what cases the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction must be construed negatively as to all other cases. (See Ex
parte Vallandigham [1864], 1 Wall., 243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589;
Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1 Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law. ed., 97; U.
S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass., 1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.) That was all.
It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion in the
case of Davis vs. Packard (11833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684). In this case the
jurisdiction of the state court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign
consul was denied solely on the ground that jurisdiction had been conferred in
such a case upon the district courts of the United States exclusively of the state
courts. Such a ground, says Justice Harlan in Bors vs. Preston ([1884], 111 U. S.,
252; 4 S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probably not have been given had it
been believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
deprived Congress of the power to confer concurrent original jurisdiction in such
cases upon subordinate courts of the Union, concluding that the decision in the
case "may be regarded, as an affirmance of the constitutionality of the Act of
1789, giving original jurisdiction in such cases, also, to District Courts of the
United States." Of the seven justices who concurred in the judgment in the case
of Davis, five participated in the decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United
States ([1824], 9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed., 204), also penned by Chief Justice
Marshall and relied upon as authority together with Marbury vs. Madison, supra.
The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United
States. The question involved in that case was whether the Circuit Court then
existing had jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States to
hear and determine any suit whatever against the consul of a foreign
government. Justice Harlan said:
The Constitution declares that "The judicial power of the United States shall
extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and
consuls;" to controversies between citizens of a state and foreign citizens or
subjects; that "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction;" and that in all
other cases previously mentioned in the same clause "The Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make." The Judiciary Act of 1789
invested the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction, exclusively of
the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls,
except for offenses of a certain character; this court, with "Original, but not
exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits . . . in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a
party;" and the circuit courts with jurisdiction of civil suits in which an alien is a
party. (l Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this act we have an affirmance, by the first
Congress — many of whose members participated in the Convention which
adopted the Constitution and were, therefore, conversant with the purposes of its
framers — of the principle that the original jurisdiction of this court of cases in
which a consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily exclusive, and that
the subordinate courts of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases
affecting such representatives of foreign governments. On a question of
constitutional construction, this fact is entitled to great weight.
In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by Chief Justice
Taney in the earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's
Dec., 1, 10). In that case of Gittings, it was held that neither public policy nor
convenience would justify the Supreme Court in implying that Congress is
prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls to the
inferior judicial tribunals of the United States. Chief Justice Taney said:
If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into
appellate and original, as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude
that tribunal from appellate power in the cases where original
jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the same clause, to imply
words of exclusion as respects other courts whose jurisdiction is not
there limited or prescribed, but left for the future regulation of
Congress? The true rule in this case is, I think, the rule which is
constantly applied to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of
jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of
itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in
question, there is nothing but mere affirmative words of grant, and none
that import a design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other
courts of the United States on the same subject-matter. (See
also U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; United
States vs. Louisiana [1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed.,
69; Ex parte Baiz [1890],135 U. S., 403; 10 S. Ct., 854; 34 Law. ed.,
222, denying writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D. C. N. Y., 1890];
41 Fed., 732; Iasigi vs. Van de Carr [1897], 166 U.S., 391; 17 S. Ct.,
595; 41 Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken [C. C. N. Y., 1857]; 4
Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada [D. C. Mass., 1866]; Fed. Cas., No.
8517; St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf.,
259; State of Texas vs. Lewis [C. C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of
Alabama vs. Wolffe (C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836, 837;
Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed., 146.)
It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay, supra,
the jurisdiction of circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens, no
exception being made as to those who were consuls, was maintained. (See1 U. S.
Stat. at L., c. 20, sec. 11, pp. 78, 79.)
From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2, section 2
of Article III of the Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word
"original" in reference to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of the United States
over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, was never
intended to be exclusive as to prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent
jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls and vice-consuls in other federal courts.
It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 placed cases
affecting the official representatives of foreign powers under the jurisdiction of
Federal Supreme Court to prevent the public peace from being jeopardized.
Since improper treatment of foreign ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls may be a casus belli, it was thought that the federal government, which
is responsible for their treatment under international law, should itself be
provided with the means to meet the demands imposed by international duty.
(Tucker, The Constitution of the United States [1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide,
The Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in mind in
the distinction which international law establishes between ambassadors and
other public ministers, on the one hand, and consuls and other commercial
representatives, on the other, Congress saw it fit to provide in one case a rule
different from the other, although as far as consuls and vice-consuls are
concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, as already observed,
though original is not exclusive. But in the United States, there are two judicial
systems, independent one from the other, while in the Philippines there is but
one judicial system. So that the reason in the United States for excluding certain
courts — the state courts — from taking cognizance of cases against foreign
representatives stationed in the United States does not obtain in the Philippines
where the court of the lowest grade is as much a part of an integrated system as
the highest court.
Let us now turn our own laws as they affect the case of the petitioner.
Undoubtedly Philippine courts are not federal courts and they are not governed
by the Judiciary Acts of the United States. We have a judicial system of our
own, standing outside the sphere of the American federal system and possessing
powers and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of our own
Constitution and laws.
The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our
Constitution and laws which include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the
laws of nations. There are no treaties between the United States and Uruguay
exempting consuls of either country from the operation of local criminal laws.
Under the generally accepted principles of international law, declared by our
Constitution as part of the law of the nation (Art. II sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls and
vice-consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign nations do not
possess the status and can not claim the privilege and immunities accorded to
ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, sec. 249; Kent,
Commentaries, 44; Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews, The
American Constitutional System [1932], 204, 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C.
Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1; Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C.
J., 9 R. C. L., 161.) The only provisions touching the subject to which we may
refer are those found in the Constitution of the Philippines. Let us trace the
history of these provisions.
The report of the committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on September 29,
1934, did not contain any provisions regarding cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls. The draft of the sub-committee of seven of
the Sponsorship Committee, submitted on October 20, 1934, however, contains
the following provision:
Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original
jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the present Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls . . . ." The Special
Committee on the Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates
Vicente J. Francisco and Norberto Romualdez, included in its report the
provisions which now appear in sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Section 2 provides:
The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribed, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other ministers and consuls . . . . And the second sentence
of section 3 provides:
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court
"original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls" is literally the same as that contained in clause 2, section 2 of
Article III of the United States Constitution.
In the course of the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt
was expressed regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to
our Supreme Court. An examination of the records of the proceedings of the
Constitutional convention show that the framers of our Constitution were
familiar with the history of, and the judicial construction placed on, the same
provision of the United States Constitution. In order to end what would have
been a protracted discussion on the subject, a member of the Special Committee
on the Judiciary gave the following information to the members of the
Convention:
. . . Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Articulo 2, el Comite esta
dispuesto a hacer constar que la interpretacion que debe dard a la ultima parte de
dicho articulo es la misma interpretacion que siempre se ha dado a semejante
disposicion en la Constitucion de los Estados Unidos. (January 16,1935.)
Without further discussion, the provision was then and there approved.
It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well-settled
meaning in the United States — the country of its origin. It has there received
definite and hitherto unaltered legislative and judicial interpretation. And the
same meaning was ascribed to it when incorporated in our own Constitution. To
paraphrase Justice Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are
justified in interpreting the provision of the Constitution in the light of the
principles and history with which its framers were familiar. (United
States vs. Wong Kin Ark [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct., 456; 42 Law. ed.,
890, cited with approval in Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin
[1904]; 195 U. S., 100; 49 Law. ed., 114.)
(b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to history or
idolatrous adherence to precedents. In referring to the history of this provision of
our Constitution it is realized that historical discussion while valuable is not
necessarily decisive. Rationally, however, the philosophical reason for the
conclusion announced is not far to seek if certain principles of constitutional
government are borne in mind. The constitution is both a grant of, and a
limitation upon, governmental powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal
restraint of legislative authority, the power is retained by the people and is
exercisable by their representatives in their legislature. The rule is that the
legislature possess plenary power for all purposes of civil government. A
prohibition to exercise legislative power is the exception. (Denio, C. J., in
People vs. Draper, 15 N.Y., 532, 543.) These prohibitions or restrictions are
found either in the language used, or in the purpose held in view as well as the
circumstances which led to the adoption of the particular provision as part of the
fundamental law. (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73 S. W., 811; 108
Am. St. Rep., 929.)
Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their delegates, have
committed legislative power in a most general way to the National Assembly
has plenary legislative power in all matters of legislation except as limited by the
constitution. When, therefore, the constitution vests in the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, without specifying the exclusive character of the grant, the National
Assembly is not deprived of its authority to make that jurisdiction concurrent. It
has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible
reservoir of power behind. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people, and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express
language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions
which, by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
p.139, ante.) What the Constitution prohibits is merely the deprivation of the
Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls and while it must be admitted that original
jurisdiction if made concurrent no longer remains exclusive, it is also true that
jurisdiction does not cease to be original merely because it is concurrent.
It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class of cases
would mean the sharing of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls such that the
Supreme Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the lowest courts in our
judicial hierarchy, the justice of the peace of the courts, in a petty case for the
instance, the violation of a municipal ordinance affecting the parties just
mentioned. However, no serious objection to these result can be seen other that
the misinterpreted unwillingness to share this jurisdiction with a court pertaining
to the lowest category in our judicial organization. Upon the other hand, the
fundamental reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court of the
land is made to take recognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation
of the municipal ordinance simply because of the character of the parties
affected. After alluding to the fact that the position of consul of a foreign
government is sometimes filled by a citizen of the United States (and this also
true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, in Gittings vs. Crawford, supra,
observed:
It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed
our constitution to require that one of our citizens who had a petty
claim of even less than five dollars against another citizen, who had
been clothed by some foreign government with the consular office,
should be compelled to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury
summoned in order to enable him to recover it; nor could it have been
intended, that the time of that court, with all its high duties to perform,
should be taken up with the trial of every petty offense that might be
committed by a consul by any part of the United States; that consul,
too, being often one of our own citizens.
Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is,
that considering the actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different
courts in our jurisdiction, there may be cases where the Supreme Court may not
actually exercise either original — whether exclusive or concurrent — or
appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the grant of original jurisdiction in this
class of cases to the Supreme Court. If, for instance, a criminal case is brought
either in a justice of the peace court or in a Court of First Instance against a
foreign consul and no question of law is involved, it is evident that in case of
conviction, the proceedings will terminate in the Court Appeals and will not
reach the Supreme Court. In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of all
jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant thereto in the
Constitution of original jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls. This is a
situation, however, created not by the Constitution but by existing legislation,
and the remedy is in the hands of the National Assembly. The Constitution
cannot deal with every casus omissus, and in the nature of things, must only deal
with fundamental principles, leaving the detail of administration and execution
to the other branches of the government. It rests with the National Assembly to
determine the inferior courts which shall exercise concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, considering the nature of the offense and irrespective of
the amount of controversy. The National Assembly may as in the United States
(Cooley, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. [1931], sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal
to the Supreme Court in all cases affecting foreign diplomatic and consular
representatives.
Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was
exercisable by our courts. This is more so now that the Independence Law and
Constitution framed and adopted pursuant thereto are in force. The fact that the
National Assembly has not enacted any law determining what courts of the of
the Philippines shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is
of no moment. This can not mean and should not be interpreted to mean that the
original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution is not
concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.
The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case brought against the
petitioner, the writ of prohibition should be denied.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the
judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper
assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the
trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act
No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the
evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel
known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there
engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals
from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said
accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or
about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and
city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa,
six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos,
without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid,
did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and
suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner,
and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means
of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without
being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason
of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some
of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed
about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded,
bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
—
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port
within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels
carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for
the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port
of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with
adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four
hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their
final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding
to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port
within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing
such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading
and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which
they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is
hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by
swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the
thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
 Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who
knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section
one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less
that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United
States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be
instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized
in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state
that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the
offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws
of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which
such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act
No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the
Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the
courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands
on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.)
This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province
into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed
shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon
a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the
Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law. But
the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have
then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the
neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the
ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the
Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the
high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she
came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105;
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and
her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject
through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within
territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters
the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor.
During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as
the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same
conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense,
assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing
one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage
across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within
American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that
jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every
state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According
to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly
power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a
prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly
powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such
waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794,
Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered
opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign
ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he
comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by
Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as
1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch
(U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under
which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as
"containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose
territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the
Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of
exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of
nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the
principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int.
Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go
freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the
laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and
convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that
such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are
essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and
convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and
practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the
court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant
vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See
Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2,
pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p.
63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a
right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law
(Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who
consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local
jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that
— "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of
merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign
state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which
the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant
vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities,
unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty
arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys.
Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory,
Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of
the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be
obviously in convinient and dangerous to society and would subject the
laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if such
individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade,
subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they
remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty.
(U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by
article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and
Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul,
vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and
arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of
the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their
charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the
crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country."
(Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to
disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318;
Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are
affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public
disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another,
committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever,
is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a
prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney
was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the
proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with
the view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876;
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature
as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the
mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of
Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship
while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the
treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made
through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr.
Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and
Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful
consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of your note
and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between
the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained
in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is
contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers,
not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of
the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for
which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of
such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls
is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or abitrators in
such differences as may arise between captains and crews of the
vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain
or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When,
however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the
captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the
 disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent
for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of
the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it
becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty
voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the
local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the
United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such
disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is
supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party
accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined
against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int.
Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew
against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the
country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un to
hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the
country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with
any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master
of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of
the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law,
are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense
charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege
that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is
claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold
with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the
complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the
animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a
reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon
the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their
disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional
element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege
that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully
includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully'
carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the
act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will
consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13
Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in
the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained
of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel — that
the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully'
do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I
think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same
effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours
with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but
his defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system
of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more
secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that
what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it
is only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a
crime or public offense in ordinary and concise language, without repitition. It
need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as
to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the
court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies
with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel
the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so
as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation
of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully,
and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of
the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty
torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of
said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information
does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means.
The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the
fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and
"conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we determine this
point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was
not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the
amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of
the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and
ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports
and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating
commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of
the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of
the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N.
S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is
controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States
of the Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement
of the principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature
and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity
of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war
and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by
conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to
guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its
government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in
express terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to
the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory
by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the
duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern
the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate
thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194
U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such
governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired
territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative,
and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in
accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act thus
became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not been
formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by
the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of
such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the
legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of
legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government
of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local
legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been
exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right
of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously
questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370,
385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within
such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution
into contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many
people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.)
In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited
only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its
power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is
plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the
United States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to
the acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised
Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United
States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect
within all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as
elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized a civil
government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the
Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of
1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the
United States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative
authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above
state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13,
1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control,
disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the
American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within
the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on
August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty
of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the
President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender
of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the
suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the
future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the
United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty
of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the
military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress
took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had
its legal justification, like the purely military government which it gradually
superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he
chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation
includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not
infrequently happens that in a single order of a military commander can
be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the
exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of
action; of judicial power by determination of right; and the executive
power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as
rapidly as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of
civil government was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which
civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the
authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the
military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in
its character" was transferred from the military government to the Commission,
to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the
Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus
conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules
and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs
duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the
Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil
service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and
establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other matters
of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by
rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the
Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of
individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to
be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent
with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the
declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no
person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime;
that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall
forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the
Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901,
provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the
Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in
such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President
of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and
for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901,
the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was
transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the
authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the
President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the
situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of
April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government
which the President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in
operation, and approved the action of the President in organizing the
government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the
legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law,
Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution,
but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals
which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in
creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the
office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved
and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before
and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by
Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206
U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the
Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the
future the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United
States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In the course of time the
legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited
by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting
of two houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The
government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to
govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although
its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of
the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the
Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the
Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the
United States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power
from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the
limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the
President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed
control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will
of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency
which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress,
and when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines
the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a
complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial
departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments.
The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither
Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the
abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the
Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls
legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to
exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the
Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The President
and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are
familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public
interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the
general constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under
it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws,
as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the
national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under
written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as
well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions
it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the
United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that
government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights
under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity of
an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State
court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises
such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution
of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been
granted to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter
subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether
the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied
authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or
State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the
legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been
covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some
provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general
terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to
legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that
Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however,
should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully
informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April
16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by
the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for
purposes of construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded
as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was
unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority.
To relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it
was thought better to grant general legislative power to the new government,
subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the
power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided
"that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul
the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not
suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws
of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands
until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether
the Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section
3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the
States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by
virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may
regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or
indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this
respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has
expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs
of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress,
but its general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to
the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with
its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation
of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress
took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275
after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military
government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power,
whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between
foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How.
(U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by
Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore
satisfied that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full
constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between
foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as
amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of
the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question
which must be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2,
1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of
Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the
provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275.
The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the
evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian
steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six months or
thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the
transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to
and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master
and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said
ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the
directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the
city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court;
and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three
others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said
cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable
precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid
danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle
were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into
the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being
made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to
maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such
transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle
abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of
Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing
partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are
transported, of that in case of storms, which are common in this
community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and
pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle
were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has
testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively
that since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of
the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has
suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The defendant has
testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his
experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the
hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the
animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by the
proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for
instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or
any other protection for them individually can safely and suitably
carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such
 a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if
he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the
wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner
found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and
fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.