Violent Pluralism

Understanding the New Democracies of Latin America

ENR¡OUE DESMONO ARIAS AND OANIEL M. GOLDSTEIN

Reactions to the 2005 election ofEvo Morales as the president ofBolivia were
in many ways indicative of the complex and often contradictory understand-
ings ofdemocracy extant in Latin America today, Many of Morales's support-
ers, in Bolivia and around the wo¡ld, celebrated the election ofBolivia's "first
indigenous president" triumph for the historically disenfranchised, as the
as a

undoing of five centuries of political marginalization and socioeconomic ex-

clusion through theballot box. ln their often tearful inaugural addresses and in
subsequent speeches, Morales and his vice president, Alvaro García Linera,
spoke ofthe need to create a goyernment that would wo¡k against corruption
and the privileging of an elite few and toward a broade¡ social inclusion for
poor and indigenous Bolivians. Advocating for a "strong state" that would
work to transform povert¡ nationalize natu¡al resou¡ces (specifically hydro
ca¡bo¡rs), and combat tra¡rsnational policies of neolibe¡al economics and t}le
war on drugs, García Linera used the language ofmulticultural democracy to
call for a state in which "different peoples, different languages, diffe¡ent colors
are all valued equall¡ pollera [dress typical ofindigenous Bolivian women] is
a

the same as a skirt, a poncho the same as a tie, lighter skin colo¡ the same as
darker skin" (Ios 7i empos zoo6). The prevailing public sentiment, in the news-
papers and on the streets ofBolivia's cities, was one ofprofound optirnism, an
almost unprecedented sense of confidence in the democratic process, and a
cross-class and cross-party willingness to let the new MAs (Movement toward
Socialism) goverlrnent succeed in its6tated goals ofexpanding the rights and
benclils ofdemocratic citizenship to all Bolivians.l
Ii)r othcr obscrvcrs holcling different conceptions of democrac¡ the elec-
tion of Mo¡ales rather represented what one columnist called "the End of
Bolivia." In a bulletin written fo¡ the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Michael
Radu (zoo5), the co-chairman ofthe institute's Center on Te¡¡orism, Counte¡-
terrorism, and Homeland Securiry reflected the opinion ofmany U.S. observ-
ers when he described Bolivia as "a black hole in the heart of South America."
Radu considered Morales's and García Linera's calls for multicultural citizen
ship and the greater inclusion of indigenous peoples in the political and eco-
nomic life of Bolivian society to be "racism," and he described the MAS 53.74
percent sl'¡are of the electo¡al vote (compared with the 28.59 percent of the
nearest rival) as only a "slight majority." Radu also blamed Morales personally
fo¡ the social movements that drove from power the previous "democratically
elected" president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who fled Bolivia following the
state's massacre ofmore than fifty people in the so-called Gas War ofzoo3. "So
much for the Bolivians' thirst for democracy," he quipped. Radu concluded by
calling for a strong U.S. policy response to Morales's "dubious election."
As the divergent reactions to this election indicate, the meaning ofdemoc
racy in Latin Arne ca (and indeed, around the world) is today the subject of
some co¡rtestation. In many ways the label demooocy is itselfof questionable
merit in analyzing the quality ofpolitical democracy-including the existence
ofa rule of law, sociopolitical inclusion, and public fairness and transparency-
in contemporary Lati[ An]erican nations. Indeed, ifone considers violence as
a measure of democ¡atic failure with greater levels of violence indicating a
breakdown of democratic institutions and values-then Latin American de-
mocracies could be considered profoundly rfldemocratic. As recent resea¡ch
has shown, some nations tl'rat have been formally dernocratic for the past
twenty or thirty years nevertheless ofteDtimes fall far short of the de¡nocratic
ideal due to, among other things, high levels of state and interpersonal vio
lence. The Gas War in Bolivia does not mark üe only such instance. In Sáo
Paulo, for example, more people are killed by police every two years than the
military dictatorship killed during its entire twenty-year reign.': Extrajudicial
killings of criminal suspects (lynchings) are becoming endemic in nations like
Meico, Guatemala, and Bolivia (Daniel Goldstein 2oo3, 2oo1: Godoy zoo5).
Likewise, crin.rinal, political, and donrestic violence is widesplead in such
countries as Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.3 And, as is now apparent in
Bolivia, violence between groups deñned along lines of race, social class, re-
gion, and political af6liation remains a potent force in Latin American society,
despile the existeDce ofde¡r.rocratic elections ar.rd the expanding electoral par-
ticipation of formerly excluded populations.
2 ENRIOUE DESMONO ARIAS AND OANIEL M, GOLDSTEIN
A focus on democ¡atization, de¡nocratic consolidation, democratic institu-
tions, and democ¡atic behavio¡ has driven scholarship by Political scientists
studying Latin Ame¡ica for the past twenty-five years. Despite more than a
generation ofinternal and transnational efforts to change, improve, and west-
ernize Latin American political systems, a consensus seenls to have emetged
among scholars that while democracy may exist in nost of the region'.s re-
publics, it is usually far from perfect. In the generation since the retu¡n of
civilian governance, degrees of economic inequality have substantially in
creased, and large segrrents of national populations (especially poor and in-
digenous communities) have continued to suffer significantly frour violence,
including crime, police violence, domestic abuse, and human rights violations.
As a result of this contradiction between the democratic ideal of peace and
equality and the continued reality of insecurity and violence, a whole range of
ad.jectives-includin1 inperfect, illiberal, inconplete, delegatite, a'nd disjunc'
rire-have been proposed to characterize the differences between democracy in
Latin America and the supposedly more ideal forms extant in Westerll Europe
and the United States (see Gledhill zooo). Similarly modified fornls ofcitizen
ship (most influentiall¡ Guillermo O'Donnell's "low intensity citizenship")
have also been proffered in an effo¡t to characterize what are increasingly seen
asdemocracy's "failures" in Latin America (O'Donnell zoo4:42). The extended
debate that has cropped up around these taxonomic questions suSSests that tl'le
democratization/consolidation paradigm that for so long has dliven tlre study
ofpolitics in the region is not providing the necessary descriPtivc or analytical
tools to conceptualize politics and society in Latin America today
For anthropologists and some other social scientist§ concerned with similar
issues in the region, the scholarly focus has not been on electoral Patterns and
the formal structures ofdemocratic governance, but rather on the lived experi-
ence of ordinary citizens within these democratic or democratizing contexts.
Concerned less with state typologies than with everyday realities, these scholars
have nonetheless also adopted the adjectival approach to political analysis,
deploying many of the same terms mentioned above or coining new ones to
critique current political regimes and the inequitable social relations they have
produced. Such critiques have largely focused on the deficiencies and ineq-
uities in tlre quality ofcitizenship and its attendant rights available to different
categories ofcitizens in much ofLatin America. For example, Teresa Caldeira
and l:rmes Holston argue that in thq absence of an effective rule of law that
guar¡nrccs I'ull and equal ptotectiolrs to all, fornrally democratic §tates are
rcvcirk'tl lo l¡cl< ¡¡¡¡ry ol'fhc fundanrcnlal qualitics that ale suPPosed to Peltain
VIOLEN] PLURALISM 3
 [7
'
to such srares. In other words, though political democracies se¡,¡so
] srricro, these social order. The idea of violent pluralism is not intended to sug-
societies in facr remain socially and economically undemocratic (i.e., ,.disjunc_ - "{e-mocralic
'
gest (as some interpretations of the pluralism concept imply) a kind of basic
tive"), with extrerue levels ofsocial and interpersonal violence being the
clear_ equivalency between types of violence in the reglon. Latin American democ-
est indicator ofdemocracy\ incompleteness (Caldeira and
, Holston 1999). As
, racies are not violently plural in the sense that these societies consist of a
I citizens are unable to secure justice through state irstitutions,
they increasingly :i variety ofgroups maintainin8 equal access to power,aDd equal use of violence
employ violence (e.g., vigilantism) as a means ofcreating their
own extralegal to achieve or maintain it, Rather, what th€ nojion ofviolent pluralism offers is l

forms of"security" (Goldstein zoo4, zoo5l. The resulting inequality

in access a way to think about violence in Latin American society as not nerely co¡rcen-
to citizclrs'rights reveals what Ana María Sanjuán calls ,.an institutional
ab_ trated iIr the state or in "deviant" groups and individuals who contravene
'surdity:democraciesinwhichthemajorityofthepopulationlackscitizenship,,
otherwise accepted norms of comportment in a consensual democr¡tic so-
i (Sanluán zooz:89).
ciety. lnstead of viewing violence as üldicative of denrocratic failure, we ca¡,
Despite these critiques, however, political scientists and anthropologists
from a violently plural perspective, u nderstand violence as critical to the foun-
alike do not yct have an alternative framework within which to
begin a new
discussiolr of Latin American politics i¡r the context of proliferating
dation of Latin American democracies, tlre maintenance ofdemocratic states, L.u
violence, and the political behavior of democratic citiz-ens. In cortemporary Latir ' ¿*rl
Thc overwhelming number ofadjectives (many ofthem grappling
to express Ame¡ican society violence enrcrges as-much more than a social aberration: l't *c,1
s¡rlilar sentirrreDts) deployed to conceptualize democracy and citizenship r.i vql
in violence is a mechanisn.r for kceping ir.r p)ace the very institutions and policies
co¡temporary Latin America suggests the need fo¡ a more synthetic Íiame_ --.
that neoliberal democ¡acies have fashioned over t¡c past several decades, as
work, one thatjo¡rs de¡nocratic state functioning more explicitly to
the daily well as an instrument for coping with tlre myriad problems that neolibe¡al
experience of citizens within these democ¡acies, Starting ftom
the pewasive democracies have gene¡ated. Ofcourse, thc recognition ofthese problems does
social violence and apparent state breakdown that affects much
of the hemi_ imply a measure offailure or inadequacy on the pa(t ofthe state iD ter¡rs of its
sphere, in this introductory essay we will lay out the basis for an
alternatiye ability to address the needs ofits citizeus. IJut rather than seeing violence as an
conceptualization of politics in Latin America, one
-that recognizes the plural indicator ofthe distance a state has [allen from thc (inrplicitly Western) demo- ,.'- i ?-r rl
¡r¡ture ofils current governing regimes but. at the same time, does
not confine cratic ideal, violent pluralism allows us to analyzc the role that violence plays irr ,.,,¡,t"4t
discu.sions ofviolence to the fdilure oIrhosc regjnres. Rather. we
will focus on r/ preserving or ihallenging a particular form oflived den.rocrac¡ understanding ¡5/{ "1
the multiple ways in which the politics of violence concretely affects
lived that reality in its own terms rather than as a measure ofmovcment away from a
political cxperience and is fuirdamentally inculcated in the production ¿t
and base line that even occidcntal <iemocracies u,or¡ld have ir ha¡d timc living up to.
maintenance ofthe "democratic transition,', as well as in the operations
of In offering this analysis, the editors ofthis volume (a political scientist and a
denrocratic statcs and civil societies in Latin America. We wllt argue
thut to political anthropologist) attempt to transcend the academic iron curtain tl?-
understand politics in Latin Ame¡ica toda¡ we need to understand
how vio- ically dividing nvo disciplines that, at least in the Latin American context,
lence affects political practice and subjectivit¡ and how it
remains an instru, could profit greatly ftom cross-disciplinary dialogue. Both anthropology and
ment for political rule ard resistatce in conrempora¡y Latin American
democ_ political science offer unique and important insights into political institutions
racies. In _q¡lqr.yords, rather than understanding Latin Ame¡ica,s
endemic and practices in contemporary sociery yet each has its blind spots, areas of
violence as simply_a failure ofdemocratic governance and institutions,
we call analysis that disciplinary commitmcnts to particular methodological or theo-
attentioD to violence as an element integral to the configuration
of those retical approaches have historically obscured. In general terms, much ofpoliti-
institutions, aia necessary coÁponent oftheir maintenancelund u.
an instru_ cal science is typifred by the top-down perspective that reveals the workings of
ment for popular challenges to their legitimacy (Daniel Goldstein 2oo3).
states, institutions, and trans:rational processes at what may be called the
In this sense Latin American democratic society can be conceptualized
as macrolevel of analysis; anthropolo$y, in contrast, typically works from the
"violently plural," with states, social elites, and subalterns
employing violence bottom up, with a concern fol the everyday lived experience ofordinary peo-
,in the quest to establish or contest regimes ofcitizenship, justice, rights, and a plc wilhin lhc contcxt ofthcsc larger statcs, institutions, and processes. Each of
¿ DESM0ND ARTAS AND DAN¡EL M. GOLDSTETN
,ENRI0UE VIOI INT Pt TJRALISM 5
these rpproachcs can oiler v¿rju¿ble insights into thc workings of politits in
oon \\¡estern scttiD!ls. IlLlt as lhis introduction hopcfully dcmorrstr-ates, these
insights can bc signilicaltly strengthened by the kind of collabor¡tiou that
havc u¡dcr L¡l<en here, one that joins the top dorvn and the bottom up
I¡o¡chcs ltl produce a nrore complete pclsllcclive than eithe¡ one alone
1,r-oviclc.
Such collalloration is rnircle ¡Ll thc more rccessary by the subject
engage here. !or violcncc is no1 nlerell ¿n ¿bstl¿ction, the unpleasant
out of irstitutional fajlurcs and deficiencies. Nor is it onLy thc rcflexive .rctio¡s
of the lasliing ou1 at one another oI at the state in frustralion and
oppresse(1,
rage or in sorne romanticalll cr¡nceived "¡esistance." Violencc, as $e suggest
hcrc, is lrcccss¡rily plural and clialecticai it stcms ñom muJtiple sources,
tr¡¡sfbr'¡ns all ihal il louches, antl configures daity lite ancl the rvorkings of
govclrla¡cc in va¡ious w¿),s. Insi€lht ilrto tllcsc plocesses is the goal of thc
intcrtliscipli¡¿r¡y anillysis presctrtccl ür t]ris introduction and in the substartive
cssays tlrat fbllol, it.
t\cti.otr: A BrieJ DaLour through lracl
f)etttocrocy i.rt
On 9 April 20ol, the United Stales i¡vaded lraq. The invasion nas justi6ed, in
part, to bring dcnocr¡cy to tlre Middle East, the region ofthe norld arguably
least alTectecl by the "thircl w¿vcJ' of clem o.ratizatio n.r llerfbrc thc t.1.S.Jed 1^,ar,
lrarl in sornc uays resernbletl Latin America's political past: a th¡orvback to a
troubling tirne whel political leaclcrs rvorc olive drab unitbrrns and dictatorial
rcginrcs svstcnr¿tic¿llyjailed, tortured, aril killccl thcir political opponents. But
the collapse ofthe B¡'athist rcginlc, as is b,v norv u,ell-knowtt, did not hcrald a
s¡rooth transitio¡ to democracy. Alier. the fall of Baghdad, groups of acloles-
cents ¿[d yor]ng mcn ¿rmcd with light combat u,eapons arose to dcfcncl poor
peripherai neighborhoods, climc began to grow dramrticrlll', ancl occu¡ring,
forci:s soon iou¡d thernselves pinned dolvn by an insurgency given to small
scalc but wiclcsprc'acl violelce such as roadside bombings, stlicide att?rcl$, ¿nd
kidrappilgs. Ironicall¡ in its purported quest to cstablish detnocracl', the
L¡ritcd Stalcs appcaretl to have succeetled in turnhg a brutal l)ut stable dic
l¡torstrip into a country mired ir civil r,jolence, a situation rcmark¡bl,v sirlilar
to tll¿rt ol'other cLr¡reDt troublc spots: liairi, ,,\t-ghanistrn, (irlr¡nrl¡ir, I)rrliistrur,
Sierr¡ Leo¡e.
Ail through this tlillicr¡1t ¡criorl, irs thc (irirlitir¡r¡ l'rovi¡r,'rr'rl ,\rrllr.r ili ,rrrrl
thc Ir'.rqi lrirrsitiort¡l (iovtlrrt¡clrl rlolht,l 1,,lrt¡ i r l , r , r , l l,rrrlrl r'r,rrrt
lr i , r ' . r
¿ I NRtOUt Dl 'iMONl) Alt 4,, ANI) nANll I M (;01 l)" ll lN
fornr olplr,rralistic Political iDSlitutions, the Bush acLninistr¡tiott ¿¡ci its allics
ol it
employecl the Jogic ancl lirtrguage ofscho)at ship on delllocr atiz¡l ioll, nrÚch
t'e procluce<l b,v s¡rccialists on Latin AlllcIica, to builcl stt¡rport frrr thcir cllirlts irt
aP Iraq.5 This ulrlolclcci in tlro principal $ays first, ¿rs-lhom¡s Caroth'l's hrrs
argued, the policy rra\'sis t¡1' der¡r¡cr atizatiotr cxplicilly asscrts tllat Polili'¡l
carl
transitiotl to lrlore oPen go\elDlllcllt cilll occrlr undcr vilttlally i1¡l,v struclt¡l¿l'
m¡ttcr $e hjs¡orical, an<l soci¿l concliliotls, thouglt actuirl consolidatjort rr l,v lle glcrtll'
affectccl b,v social conditions (C¡rothcrs zooz:8) " Thus a coutltry rvith ir
historv
rvorking
ofi¡tcrnal violencc (e.g., ,\l'gellitra or tr,1 Sahador), a country lrith tro ex¡"'L'i
qross inconrc
cncc rvith dcmocra(ic 8ovc1[mcrtt (e.!i., l{ussiil), or a cotlnt rv$'ith
inetlualitics (e.g., Ilrazil) could succcsslrtliv hatsitio¡ to tlcrnocr¡o' ill¡oiilic¡l
conclitions nc¡c skilltirlly man¿geLl by loc.rl political e'lites ant[ tirttside powcrs
ancl ifthose samc groups could builc1 the right ty1'c's ofiiemocr¡tic
instilu tiLrrrs
(e.g., see O'Donrlell an.1 Schinitter 1986).7 Seconcl, many of llrc'llttsll ¿tlrlirr
isLration's cl¡irrs aboul thc ir¡Port¿ulce ol cstablistring clelllt)crati' irlstitlrl
ir Lrs I
ancl holcling clectiols reilcctecl tl¡c llelic l-b,v son-re rnorkitru rvittrin the dcmocr¡
tiration fr¡Drc\\,ork th¿t elcctoral Proccsses cati substaDtially resolve co¡flicts
a d ¡llcvi¡te jnterlltl tensio]1s, ancl that countr ics tlansitiorrirlg ol¡t of¡rthori
rulc tend to nlovc to¡l¡tcl denocracv (sec l)i¡moltd l'oo5¡:9 loi l:lr-
(
t¿rrian
othcrs 2()o2:7-ll).s fhis petceplion Icilectcd \{estcrD conllnollsellsc 11(ltiorrs'
untlcrscorccl l)y naillstrc¿nl mc'di¡
jDtelPrctatiolrs, oftlcl¡¡ocmc)is illherentlv
tJanslortrr¡tive powel. As just o¡e erilnlple, in zoo4 the Nltl Yorli Iir¡¡rs colLrnl-
nisL Daviil Btool<s asscrteci cxpJicitlv that the civil n¡r' in F'l S¡lv¡dor cnded
bcc¡usc (rtot when) both sidcs agrcetl to hold clcctions, leriiing hin.r to dccla
re
thc inrportirncc ofholding c)ections in lra'.1 (Brooks zoo'+) "
'fhc lraq War points to a rlumbcr of thc linit¡tions of thc tletlrocl ¡tizirl ion
paracligtn as it is typically appliccl in l,atin Americir' Despitc this ¡»ratligtn's
potent iegitir¡acy ¡s an i¡strltmcllt for rLnclcrstatlcling antl c'r'en fncilit'lting thc
tr¿nsition ot( ofauiltorittfi¿llism, it is ot at ill ccrl¡ill th¡1 this lpproaclr
hirs
proviciecl scholirrs rl'ith the appropriaLe thcoreticirl tools to explairr hon politi
c¿l syste¡rs oPerale in cleveloPi¡g cr¡u¡tl-ics todáy Viewccl Irorn thc 'ont(
xl of
contemporarv Lalin Anrelica, rvllerc virtr¡allI evc¡y coulltrY is govct tlecl [r1 a
fornrally cletrocratic regirllc brit where soci¿l collflicl' crin¡e, alrd oltg"ing
vir¡leDcc h¡vc becone a lvay of lile, thc difilculties eocourttelcd in thc
lraqi
(lcnrocritlic tttrtsitiort hatcll,v corne as a snt¡rt-ise (lololltrja, firt cxatnplc' rle
slrite h¡virrg sonlc ofthc lcgiotr's lo¡giest-strncling <letllocratir: irlstittltil)rr\'
is
nlircrl ir¡ ¡ fi)r l! )'uilr civil w¡r. Pcrtl ¡lso sullcrs fir»rl otlgoillg ploblcnls'lt'itll
r irrsrrrgr'rr, y rrlltl slrr'ttrrirrti ilcs¡'itr'llrr'cxislcl¡Lcol ii¡lnl¡l dcl¡ocr¡tic instittr
VIOI I NT PLUIIAL ISM 7
tions and regular elections, Gove¡nments throughout Central An-rerica today
face threats from rflalas, transnational youth gangs with roots in the deporta-
tion ofyoung immigrants from the United States, whose existence has justified
broad violations of the civil and human rights of poor young men itr tl]ose
countries (e.g., see ar zoo3). Jamaica, Brazil, and Venezuela all suffer from
astonishingly high levels of st¡eet crime. Bolivia, democratic for more than
twentyyears, has one ofthe world's highest rates ofvigilante lyr:chings (Daniel
Goldstein zoo3). Despite the apparent success of democmtic elections in that
country, recent Bolivian history has been marked by state violence against coca
growers, unionists, and political demonstrators, as well as by the more quoti-
dian violence ofpolice corruption and domestic abuse. Indeed, not long after
the election of¿n indigenous, leftist government in 2oo5, Bolivia again experi-
encecl deadly clashes between police and public demonstrators. The transfor-
matjon of p vate security firms (which have arisen in maDy countries to
compensate for the inadequate administration ofolfcial policirrg) into ma6as
and paramilitaries is a phenomenon conce¡ned observers are watching in
countries throughout the region.
Fronr one perspective, criticizing the U.S. government's apparent imple
mentation ofthe democracy paradigm in Iraq may seem unfair to scholars of
democratization. After all, this would not be the first case in which a govern-
ment had optimisticallyinterpreted academic work to justify its political efforts.
Thc main reason why these criticismshave to be taken seriousl¡ though, is thar
while scholarship on democratization is substantially more sophisticated than
the claims made by the Bush administratiol, the structure of rnuch of the
existing literature, especially as it pertains to persistent cdminal and civil vio-
Ience, lends itself to misinterpretation, It is notable that in his January 2oo2
criticism of the "transitions paradigm," Carothers olléred many of the argu-
ments about democratic transitions üat the Bush administratioÍr would even-
tually make in mid-2oo4 about the democratization process in lraq.'o Further,
the Doted democratization scholar Larry Diamond served as an adviso¡ to the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His analysis ofthe failure to build a in l[ilq may not have been "squandered" at all. Given the conditions ofviolence
stable democracy in the years after the U.S. invasion focuses principally on
institutional failings on the paft of the United States, such as not sending
enough troops, a failure to build trust and legitimac¡ improperly timing elec-
tions, and distributing funds around lraq in unproductive ways. His work
provides very limited discussion of the underlying social, political, and cco-
nomic conditions that have given rise-not iust in lraq but in r¡uch ol'the
8 ENRIOUE DESMOND ARIAS AND DANIEL M, GOLDSTEIN
developing world-to the tyPes of guerillas, terrorist§, and militias that today
contribute to the violence and political instability in lraq (Diamond zoo5a:rz-
zr). Diamond deals more extensivelywith the question ofmilitiasin Squandered
yicforyl, abook-length discussion ofhis experiences in Iraq. While c¡ime merits
only three mentions in the book, he is aware ofthe threat militias could pose to
democratic order; hecalls fora heavier deployment oftroops to crush militias at
one point, and supports ademobilization effort at another. He doe§ notseem to
recognize that U.S. autho¡ities would try towith militias to build
engage
something that could act like a democrac¡ but that may, ultimatel¡ be very
different (Diamond zoo5b:zzt). The United States ofcourse refused to act on his
warnings and would, as with Anbar Awakening, engage with rnilitias in efforts
to control otherviolent actorsand to establishorder. What is most tellingabout
I)iamond's experience is how he interPreted events in a memo to his superiors
on the threat militias posed to democracy: "The road to democracy in Postcon-
flict situations is littered with the corpses oftransitions that failed because they
could not establish this most basic condition of a viable state. . . . A common
reason why is the presence ofindependent armed groups who refuse to play by
the democ¡atic rules ofthe game: who use force, fraud, thugger¡ and intimida-
tion to impose their will and corrupt power" (quoted in Diamond zooSb:zz6).
l,atin America toda¡ however, is litte¡ed with what aPPear to be viable states
i¡r va¡ious stages of democratic transitiolr and consolidation that coexist and
cngage with subnational armed actors.It is notclear that states desi¡e to control
these actors. lndeed, as occur¡ed with the United States in Iraq, Sovernments in
the developing world operate in a context where they often strengthen their
political position by working wirft rather than agaínst armed groups. Diamond
sces the U.S. failure in Ira<¡ as stemming principally liom institutional and
lactical errors, mther than recognizing the systemic processeslcomlnon to
dc¡»ocratic transitions in Iraq and in othe¡ countries in which order is con-
structed outside of, or with blatant disregárá io¡, states and state power, and in
Ihc context ofviolence perpetuated by a variety of different actor§, Democracy
in nruch ofthe developing world, any nonauthoritarian system may have been
hcatling in this dircction.
A¡r unc¡itical belief in the transformative power of democracy has limited
¡xrlicyrrrakcrs'ability to forecast the violence inherent in democratic t¡ansi-
I iorrs. Sinrilarly, the inability ofdemgcratization schola¡s to- conceptualize ade-
r¡rrirlcly (hc complcx and ¡'uullistranded relationship between violence and
vror tNI t,t ltRAt tsM 9
politics has left these scholars unable to cornment critically about problems
that have arisen in the so-called democratic transition-in Iraq, Latin America,
and elsewhere.ll How can we conceptualize ongoing violence in these coun-
tries in a way that goes beyond simply blarning imperfect electoral processes
and weak domestic institutions? Inwhat follows we will argue that this involves
necessarily moving beyond the constraints of democratization theor¡ which
sees disorder principally as á failure of instilulions resuJting in a material loss
of rights, to a conception of politics that looks to the complex ways in which
order (and/or disorder) is c¡eated tlrough the interactions of rnultiple violent
acto¡s, both within and without the state, a situation that characterizes many
political regimes in the developing world toda¡
What's the Matter with Democratization?
Most scholars in what might be called the "democratization school" advance a
minimal definition ofdemocracy based on a conception (initiallyput forth by
Robert Dahl) of polyarch¡ According to this theory, democracy exists when
formal institutions operate and when the basic civil, political, and legal rights
necessary for the proper operation ofthose institutions are widely extended to
the population (O'Donnell 1996:34 35). However, in_its exclusive focus o¡
elections, institutions, and rights, this formulation avoids the messy realities of
actually existing political systeurs as they are found in Latin America (and
elsewhere) toda¡ Particularly problematic to these models is the existence of
widespread violence, c¡iminalit¡ and insecurity in nations whose political
systems might otherwise be cha¡acterized as democratic, if not polyarchic.
Indeed, üe obvious lack ofbasic public safety and a of
widespread distribution
rights, among many other problems, brings into question the possibility of
establishing prototypical polyarchies in Latin America."
This discrepancy between the ideal of polyarchy and the decidedly violent
reality of political life on the ground in Latin Ame¡ica has led to unfavo¡able
compariso[s between the tlpes of liberal or social democracy that exist in
Norü America and Western Europe and those found in I¿tin America (Collier
and Levitsky 1997; also see Diamond r996:22; Schedler 1998:92-94; O'Donnell
2001:7-8; Armony and Schamis zoo5). Political scientists' deployment ofvari-
ous negative modifiers to refer to Latin America's political regimes emerges as
part of the effort to differentiate these "shallow" Southe¡n rlemocracics fron't
the apparently "deeper," more successful Nolthem varieties. Such conr¡rirr i-
sons also imply a teleological or evolutionary trajectory, st¡ggcsli¡rg llrirl, w¡ll¡
IO ENRIOUE DESMOND AR¡AS ANO DANIEL M, GOLDSTEIN
external guidance and sufficient attention to improving the functioning of
democratic institutions, progress can be made f¡om the violent, "illiberal"
democracies of"developin¡i nations" toward the polyarchic ideal ofthe devel-
oped North.'3 This focus on institutions is part and parcel of the underlying
assumption of the democratization school that democracy, given the right
management and organizational structure, can evolve anywhere. As a result,
.
writing oÍr politics in Latin America in the major political science journals
principally focuses on such issues as elections to fill presidencies and parlia-
I mentary bodies, the tensions with¡r and among the varying levels of these
institutions, the cent¡alization ordecentializationofpoliticaldecision making,
ancl the struggle among various levels of govcrnm€nt and intergovernmental
organizations (rcos) about budgeting and policy.
. Schola¡s' insistence on viewing contemporary politics through the lens of
the democratic icleal, deviations from it, and efforts to improve existing politi-
cal systems creat€s myopia in üeir perceptions ofongoiDg cdme, violence, and
rights violations among poor and marginal groups in Latin America. When
these issues do cor¡e up, tlrey are rnentioned either in the context ofongoing
or recently concluded civil wars or invoked as evidence demonstrating how
failu¡es ofstate institutions lead to violence.'a Bloodshed and rights violations
are high, it
is claimed, because governments do not have enough mone¡
because they are simply not able to manage the bureaucratic compleúties in
some police agencies to prevent excesses, or because iflterested politicians
eÍrsure that the state fails to have the capacity to maintain order iu some areas
(e.9., sce Hinton zoo6; O'L)onnell 2oo4',42).ts [n this vein O'Donnell writes
that "even in countries where aspirations for democracy have been satisfied by
the inauguration ofdemocratic regimes, the rule oflaw raay be compromised.
Indeed, most contemporary latin American countries, like new democ¡acies
in other parts of the world, are cases where national-level democratic reginles
coexist with undemocratic subnational regimes and severe gaps in the effec-
tive¡ress of basic civil ri6hts" (O'Donnell zoo4:38). Along similar lines, thc
Unitcd Nations Developn'lent Programme's (uNor) zoo5 report on democracy
in l-ati¡r America devotes only 8 of its 288 pages to issues relating to thc
wiclcsprcacl violence affecting the region, lodging its discussion ofthese issues
Iirm)y within the logic ofstate and democratic failu¡e, The report reads:
'l'hcrc is no doubt that since the end ofmilitaryrule in theSouthern Cone. ..
¡ ncl thc rcsolution oftbc aJmecl conflicts in Central America ... progress has
bccn nr¿dc wilh respect to u¡,ustiñed deprivation of freedol¡l, tortu¡'c ¡nd
vtol tNl I,t l,k^l tsM lt
 politicai assassinations. Nevertheless, the progress achieved is not as great
as failure, the evident ¡esult of states failing to function as per the polyarchic
could have been expected afte¡ the elimination oftotalitarian regimes and
prescription. Violence here emerges as a key element of Latin American de-
the end ofnearly all wars in the region. There is one substantial reservation:
lno(racy itsel[. as the b¿sis on which it w¿s founded and a critical component
the vast majo ty ofthe violations not the consequence ofdeliberate aud
are allowing its maintenance,
planned action by the state, but, rather, of its inability (or sometimes un_
All this should not be taken to mean that we believe it impossible for these
willingness) to enforce the effective n¡le of law and to ensu¡e that it enjoys
a regimes to beconre polyarchies, Such a rigorous claim lies beyond the scope of
monopoly offorce. . . . Another relevant issue concerns citizens, security and
the essays in this volume. The evidence we present here does, howevet suggest
ability to providethis publicgood. A se¡ious defect is that, in many
the State's
that no simple path will lead to lower levels ofviolence in much ofthe region.
democracies in Latin America, the state does not ensure the physical security
Violence is implicated both in the institutional structure ofthe regin.res and in
ofwide secto¡s ofthe population.. . . This poses a challenge to our institu,
the way these regimes are inserted into the international system. Violence
tions, to the governments that are part of the system and to the future of , stems from the structure and activities that support existing social relations
democracy in Latin America." (uu»t zoo5:tz_r3)
aiid fior¡ the way state power is exercised. Changing this will require more
The rest ofthe report contains a little less than a page on illegal actors than minor administratiye fixes and reform programs and will, as shall l¡e
and the
dangers they create for residents ofthe regioÍr,s many republics.r6 discussed in the conclusion to this volume, involve reorienting the relationship
In other words, much of the writing on politics in Latin America today, betwee¡ Latin A¡rerican polities aud both the international system and inter
while both sophisticated and insightfut, is focused on how to get regimes that nal practices ofconflict in those countries.
have fo¡mal but weak democratic institutions to become polyarchic.
Though
they do not say so overtl¡ all these texts implicitly advocate the ..developed,,
Histories and Díscotrrses of Democracy
democracies of Western Europe or North America as the target ofthis
direc_
tional improvement. ln the process, it is assumed, such supposedly illiberal Understanding the complex relationship between violeuce and democracy in
states may be able to drop the negative adiectives that often modi$ Latin America also ¡equires us to adopt a historical perspective, one that allows
their
democ¡acies and citizenship will approach the high-intensity variety found us to comprehend democracy emerging not out of some kind of inevitat¡le
in
places like the United States. evolution of "political man," but as the real product of a particular historical
In many ways, the limitations and problems with this approach are conjuncture unfolding in the context of actual latin American society. Con
evi_
dent.rT As a reading of the uNDp report clearly suggests, simply labeling temporary democracy in Latin Ame¡ica is deeply entwined with neolil¡eral
re_
gimes "democratic" does not mean that they are normatively positive, capitalist relatiorrs of production, emerging out of a history of engagement in
inclu_
sive, effective at guaranteeing rights, or able to accomplish the reforms the region with global forces ofimperialism, socialism, and the cold war.
many
claim are necessary to achieve such conditions. No¡ is there reason to believe, Over the course ofthe nineteenth century Latin A¡nerican states remaiued
after twenty years ofcivil strife and growing criminal violence in much relatively weak, encountering limited interstate tensions, The resulting political
ofthe
hemisphere, that Latin America,s political regimes are on a path to polyarchy_ systems in the region, as Nliguel Angel Centeno has noted, developed militaries
a developmentalist fallacy based on the faulty assumption that the United focused on dealing with internal dissent rather tlan on fighti¡rg intemational
States and other Western nations are, in fact, ideal-type polyarchies, lndeed, wars (Centeno 2oo2). Subnational political elites retained a substantial amount
the political regimes that exist in Latin America, as elsewhere, may have sub_ of powcr vis-¡-vis centr¡l states. The reigning political system could l¡e de
stantial difficulty achieving polyarchy. More important, they nrayalso produce scril¡ed ls a forrrr of exclusionary republicanism, in which a small portion of

s
fairly static degrees of violence and rights abuse, and they may depend on a the poptrlation (generally property owners) retained the voting franchise and
base level of violence to achieve collective political ohjectives. It tl¡e re¡u¡i¡rdc¡ ol'tl¡e populatidn (e.g., the srrrall workirg cJass, women, Afro-
is critical in
this case to understand violence as more than merely the residr¡c ol rlt,n¡ot l,¡tinos, ¡ncl intligcnous pcoplc) rcnraincd largely excludcd fnrm political par-
t.i¡t ic
ticip¿llio¡r irn(l (ot¡rl Prolcctions. lrl lhis environnrc¡r( cnr¡rowcr-cd l¡ntftrwncrs

I2 ENRIOUE OESMOND ARIAS AND DANIEL M GOLDSTEIN vI)t I N I t'l l,trAt t.,M ll

retained a srbstantial number oflegal rights and de facto powe¡ over much
lÉeJópulation, exerci;ing control over politics and violence beyond the con-
I rol oftlrc naLional statc.
These conditions began to change around the tum ofthe twentieth century
as significant immigration from Europe and Asia, as well as a growing indus,
trial sector, empowered segments ofthe u¡l¡an working class, creating condi-
tions for thc emergence ofpolirical movements and parties dernanding greater
inclusion and collective riglrts. Over time most countries in the region, in the
context of substantial political and social conflict, would extend some basic
social guarantees to the working class. These rights were extended both under
democratic regimes, as in Colombia during the Revolución en Marcha, and
unde¡ morc authoritarian regimes, in Mexico under Lázaro Cárdenas and in
as
Brazil during the Estado Novo. As Greg Grandin details, during the period
immediately following the Second World War, most Latin American states had
become democratic, adopting á model of what he terms "democratic social-
ism," which built on efforts at inclusion, ilryjted the political participation of
ihe wo.king class, and advocated a developmentalist vision of the ¡atio¡ral
economy th¿¡t included notions of redistributing elements of national wealth
irom foreign ownership and sone elements ofthe upper classes to parts ofthe
working and middle classes (Grandin zoo4). Despite the many deficiencies of
thése political systems, including a tendency toward repressive forms of state
corporatism, at times allied with fascist idcologies, and the continued exclu-
sion oflargc segments of the population, they offered a promise of empower-
ment to manF groups long excluded from national political engagement, es-
pousing a collectivist ideology that provided the intellectual basis of postwar
democracy (Bethell and Roxborough 1993). With the emergence of the cold
war in the late-r94os and early r95os, these democracies over the next tw!i!
years gradually gave way to military coups and dictatorships that (with the
backing of the United States) c¡acked down on political dissent ancl imple-,-ri,
melted policies that regarded oational developfrent as inherently-antagonistic
democratic go\.ernance. 'fhese states and their security forces relied on
-to
yiolence antl new technologies ofrepression to combat the lingering influence
ofthe postwar democratic period, crushing those elements seen as threatening
to national development and stability (Grandin zoo4).
:.l,.", The establishment of neolihe¡al economics in Latin Ame¡ica during.,the
r97os and espccially the r98os hinged directly on the introduction of ¡r uew
model of democ¡acy in the region, one based on an indiviclt¡¡lisl cot)(el)l o[
l sclfand socicty. Rather tha¡r o¡r ¡ social wclfarc st¡tc thitt worrkl ¡rlov ir[, lirr. I hc
]¿ ENRIOUE DESMONO ARIAS ANO DANIEL M GOLDSTEIN
r Iüt4
'^¿
lü¡vt
of needs of its citizens, neoliberal democracy rvould be based on a limited ánd plt't'
circumsc¡ibed state whose princiBal task was to providc a stable and secure
IeId for t¡ansnatioral investment and individual self-realization.'l'his new
kind ofdcrnocracy. as Grandirr argucs. war constructed explicitly irr opposit ion
to the older midcentury model, made possible in the wake ofcold war violence
and terror, which had long targeted progressive social nlovements fc¡r eliminn-
tion: "The threat of mid-century social movements was that they provided a
venue in which self and solidarity could be imagined as existing i» sustai¡ing
relation to one another through collective politics that looked toward the state
to dispense justice. Latin American democrary as an ideal and a practice was
always more participatory and egalitarian than it wirs procedural and individu-
alistic. In marry countries, CoId War terlor changed tlrat, imposing a more
restrictive model, o¡re tlrat defin€d individualism as economic self-intercst and
aclvanced it through free market policies" (Grandin zoo4:14). Such democratic
conceptions as rights and citizenship were constructed along similar lines,
ones grounded in a notion of üe liLreral citizen whose basic political identity
derived from his or her individual nature and personal relatiLrnship to the
national state, rather than from his or her membership in a pa¡ticular group or
cl¿rss (as in, fo¡ example, more recent conceptions of indigenous rights) (Pos
tcro and Zamosc 2oo4).
l{istoric forr¡rs of political practlce it the region werc thus terupcrcd by
thcii being inculcated through a fran.re ofneoliberal capitalism and econo¡.ric
globalization, whose emphasis on the individual nature of righrs and belong-
ing in some ways runs counter to the collectivist and participatory natu¡e of
clcnrocracy itself. From such a perspective, violence can only be understood as
it l-ailure, an obstacle to individual self-rcaijzatjon, rather tlran as a tool of the
dc¡uocratic state to break dorvn opposition to ¡ts particular forns ¿nd rnun
il-cstations, or as a collective behayior constituent of democracy's vcry fabric.
Alternativel¡ though, democracy can be understood as a product of struggle,
cvcn of violent struggle, air:l conflict as a basic element of what tlcmocratic
ll()vcrDance requires. As Geoff Eley puts it: "Let the¡e be no mistake: democ-
lacy is not 'given' or'granted.' It requires conflict, namel¡ courageous chal-
lcnScs (() authority, risk-taking and reckless exemplary acts, ethical witnessing,
violcnt confrontat¡ons, and ger'reral crises in wlrich the given sociopolitical
ordcr brc¡l<s down, In Europe, democracy did not result Íionl Datulal evolu
li(,n or cconoÍnic prosperity. It tertainly did not emcrge as an incvitable by
prrxluet ol intlividu¡lisnr or the ¡rarket. lt developctl bccause nrlsscs ol-pcoplc
or'1¡irrrizctl collcclivcly lo ciemrncl it" (lllcy zooz, r¡trl. irr ( ilarrrlin :oo,¡:r6).
vr0t INT t)t UltAt ,,M i"
f),
prtrticular
tional political and economic regimes, ¡.lt'¡vc wcitlll¡ inequalit¡ and
Furthermore, asthe many contradictio¡s of contemPorary global capital- regions, rrr
historical forms ofsocia! r.elatitllrs itt spceilic countries, sub¡rational
ism now make clea¡, neolibe¡al democracy is it§elf resPonsible fo¡ much of üe rs As is well knowr'
cities. Viole¡ce, inclecd, rnrty bc physical and st¡uctural
social violence we see in coulttries throughout Latin America. Such violence is been
under neoliberal democracy many Latin American debtol states have
not the simple ¡esult of iristitutional failure but the logical outco¡¡e of neo- lend-
forced to complywith the structural adiustment dictates oftran§Dational
iiberal democracy's unfolding. As many §tudies have made clear, the trickle-
ing agencies, diminishing state investment in and the administration of
na-
down economic promises of neoliberal Promoters have not been realized, reproduc-
tional social and economic life, devolving responsibility for social
instead leading to widening income inequalities and mounting Pove¡ty across
tion to individuals, far¡ilies, and local communities (Harvey zoo5) In
many
the regjon. Such poverty, and the lack of employment and educational o?Por- arld
parts of Latin America crime has risen, police corruptiol) has n]ounted'
tunities associated with ir. ar:e directiy linke,l to thc social violence we describe
judicial services have been unable to Provide security to the maiority of the
in this volume. Economic inequatities, along with a declining public confi-
national population (Ungar zooz). Poverty, fiagmented f¿milies' domestic
dence in the representative nature of many neoliberal states, have also been at Latin Americlos
abuse, fear, insecurity, and the instability ofdaily life for many
the heart of tlre new social mobilizations emerging across the region in the
form apart oflife under the neolibe¡al democracies that have governed these
early- to grid zooos as popular groups and social movements have once again logic rather
societies over the past few decades: üey are part oftheir structural
mobilized to contest the contradictions ofneoliberal democracy, In their insis-
than the resrdt oItheir imperlections.
tence on a more inclusive, even socialist democratic politics and economy, part due to
Violence has become so pervasive in much of Latin Ar¡erica in
iiese groups somctin.res employ violence, as docs the state when it resi§ts their
theparticular ways in which trade liberalization and neoliberal economic
calls fo¡ refolm. The Gas War ofzoo3 in Bolivia offers a clear examPle: In the
systems have interacted with the political environment of postauthoritarian
effort to enforce a neoliberal prescriPtion for natu¡al-re§ource exPortation, led to an increase
Latin America. Growing Pressure to lower t¡ade barriers has
soldiers defending thc democratic state of Sánchez de Lozada li¡ed on and
in drug and arms trafficking in the Americas (Andreas 1999:rz6-35) At
the
killed more ttran ñfty unarmed Prote§ters, leading to the presider.rt's resigna- to
same time for structural reform have led to cuts in state
Pressures
funding
tion and, ultimatel¡ the ascendancy of leftist union leader Morales to the (see Alcantara 2005:1661' 1668)'
both policing and social welfare programs
Bolivian presidency (Koh1 and Farthing z006). In other contexts the problems of military
Both ofthese trends have occu¡red in the coutext of imProvements
of insecurity unleashed by the policies ald practices of neoliberal democracy weap-
technology that have made it very easy to deliver relatively high-powered
have specifically created situations in which violcnce emerges as a logical re- pro-
ons into the hands of civilians.re The United States and other leading
sponse. The Bolivian state's compliance with the U.S. international war on controls
clucers of firearms have been reluctant to adopt §erious international
drugs, for example, has generated circumstance§ of extreme Precariou§ness for
the trade in small arms. All üis has ¡esulted ir the emergence
of conditions
on
rural cultivators, who Íiequently exPerierce thc violence ofpolice and security have faced serious
in which violent nonstate actors have Proliferated and states
forces intent on prosecuting the drug war at the expense ofPoor farm families'
clrallenges in controlling violent nonstate grouPs, or have
demonstrated an
Meanwhile, marginal u¡ban comrrunities lack police protection and so deploy
unwillingness to tr¡ .t.
vigilante violence as a techniqr'¡e of providing security and .iustice to their is all the
The critique ofevolutioni¡t democratization theory offerecl abovc
co¡¡munities, Such violence, it must be ob§erved, cannot be understood as democratizaiion
nrore important given that ethnograPhies of democracy and
relating to democratic failure but, perversel¡ to its success: lynch mobs, like
point to Profound and ongoing struggles within civil societ¡ where the in-
private security firms operating in other context§, are clear marifestations of
§t¿rntiation of democracy is contested and negotiated, and within
the state
the logic of neoliberal democracy, which urges self-help and individual ¡e- reality of
itself, where the language of<lemocracy may be used to paper over
the
sponsibility to local communities corfronting social welfa¡e conditions in
in-name-only democratic states (Nelson 1999)' Research by anthropologists
which the state does not consider itselfobligatcd to intervene (Goldstcin zoo5)' in
in«l what might be called "the úiscourse of democracy" includes the ways
As should be eviclent by nrlw, violelce itl these countrics is citttst tl tlol only
inlcrlli¡liollrll l¡¡trL', tt¡ttlsna- which (hc language of and ideas about democracy circulate within socict¡
by a failtrlc of institL¡tions l)ul ¡lso by pallcrns of
VIOLENT PLURALISM 17
mobilizing resistant political movemeDts and justirying the maintenance of
violent state regimes, demonstrating how democracy transcends state institu-
tions and electoral processes. Thus fulia Paley urges anthropologists to con-
sider "the strategic deployment ofthe term democrac¡ its powet implications,
competition over its meanings, jts manifestations jn institutions aud social
arangements, and üe way attendant discourses circulate within and among
countries" (Paley zooz:475l' see also Gutmann 2ooz; Ong 1999; Verdery 1996).
Despite its potential for broadening scholarly considerations of the demo-
cratic, however, this anthropological work tends to be overlooked by those
who understand politics as properly located only in the domain of political
institutions.
Understanding democracy not merely as a set ofinstitutional arrangements
but as an ideological and discursive jnstrument in political struggle opens
critical doors for the study of democratic society in Latin America. This is
particularly the case for understanding violence in contemporary Latin Ameri
can political regimes. Rather than viewing violerce as simply- an indicator of
democracy's "failure" (as the democratization paradigm does), an anthropo-
logical perspective on democratic discourse reveals the ways in which democ-
racy and violence are intimately entangled in both the establishment ofdemo-
cratic regimes and their ongoing maintenance. Ior example, in his study ofthe
cultural politics of statecraft in Venezuela, Fernando Coronil has noted the
shifts in the meaning ofdemocracyin recent Venezuelan histor¡ These include
the use of the te¡m by the political party Acción Democrática, which came to
power in 1945 through a violent coup that toppled a constitutional government
(Coronil r997). In this case democracy was used to legitimate military rule and
its accompanying authoritarian practices. In spite of Guatemala's transition
from military to civilian rule, the repressive apparatus of the dictatorship
continues to be manifest in the democratic state; as Jennifer Schirmer notes,
"after decades of naked military rule, the Guatemalan military have craíted a
unique Counterinsurge¡rt Constitutional State in which State violence has
been ¡eincarnated as democrary" (Schirmer 1998:258; see also Warren zooo).
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the region military regimes haye actually come to
power through democratic elections, thereby maintaining violent and oppres
sive practices within formal democracies, as Julie Taylor has observed in Ar-
gentina ('lhylor 1993) and as the election ofthe fo¡mer dictator Hugo Banzer in
1997 demonstrated fo¡ Bolivia (Sanabria zooo). Such examples indicate the
complex relationship between democracy aud violence in Latin America: as
the violent Iegacies of authoritarian regimes have been reinscribed ¡s rlcnr,rc-
]8 ENRIOUE DESMOND ARIAS AND DANIEL M, GOLDSTEIN
racies, üeir continued abuse is legitimated by democratic rheto¡ic. It also
suggests, as Paley points out, that democracy cannot be considered a free-
floating signifier detached from reality and inñnitely malleable; ¡athe¡, as the
above examples demonstrate, the democ¡atic djscourse has important institu-
tional referents through which it operates and exerts its force, a point that
anthropologists of democracy and violence have frequently noted (Paley
zooz:477; zoo4) ,
An approach that focuses solely on formal measures of democrac¡ then,
and which regards violence as a deviation from the ideal ofpolyarch¡ is clearly
inadequate to unde¡stand the intricate dialectic between state power and vio-
lence in Latin America, or the complex political, social, and economic circum-
stances that give rise to and maintain political and social vjolence fo¡ that
¡natter (e.g., see Garro r999). If, as we suggest, violence in Latin America today
is an integral component ofboth the state-[ormation process and challenges to
the state, then traditional approaches to both democracy and violence are
limited in what they have to offer to our interpretations oflocal realities. Nor is
it enough simply to require improvements in the quality of citizenship or an
expansion of the rule of law, both worthy causes but nevertheless analytical
dead ends, remaining as they do within the normative framework of democ-
racy and its correlates. The question is not only how the legal system or police
institutions operate or fail to operate but also how violence ard contentious
politics are foundational to the political systems ofcontemporary latin An.rer-
ica. This does not mean that understanding police, courts, or even electiols
and budgeting is unimportant. Rather, it means that these diffe¡ent ins¡iru
tional phenomena must be understood in a much broader political and social
context, one that includes the operation, distribution, and structure of statc
und ¡ronstate violence in tJle region. The regimes that exist in l,atin Americ.r
today may thus represent another t),pe of political formation at variance frolrr
both democracy and authoritarianism, a type whose outlines the followin¡
scction of this iutroductian explores.
Violcnt Plurqlism: Toward qn Alternatite Paradigm
'ltr unde¡stand the relationship between violence and democracy in I-ltin
Anrcrica toda¡ we need to move away from the conceptual ground ofdemoc-
rncy and democratization and the political projects associated with it. Ending
lLttlroritarianis¡n was supposecl to create a pol¡tical outcome in which thc
nrc¡r¡rs ol'violcncc wound u¡r in the ha¡rcls ol ir sl¡lc al)par¡lLrs contlollctl by
vll,t I N I l,t u¡r^t t"M t,
 "the people" th¿t, bI virtuc ol'its
¡ropular nature, \\¡¿s unr{illiug to tolerate llrcir c¿ueers) to groups institutionally further rer¡ovecl (tbough rot always

rvitlespread violerce against thc population. What is significart about politics , r,nrpletely detached) flom thc state, suclr as clrug tralickcrs and guerillas.

in thc rcgion todav is rot th¿rL clernocratic irtstead of ¿uthorit¿rian teginres While nonc ol'these lists are edraustive, they reveal something oftcn ig-
control nalion¿l governmeDts (part, after all, of ¿n altcrn¡rting cyclc rvhosc rrrrrccl in scholars' focus on the oPcratio¡ and failure of delnocriltic inslitu
P
( ,n
,¡ rcccnt histoiy u,e have detailed above), [¡ut t]r¿t tlle political regincs clominat tions: violence per-vadcs much of Latin America, bul the conftgutation and
1r ing I¡rLch olthe regio¡ appear to be unablc to consolid¡tc coirtlol ov!'r subslale ¡,rrlitics of tl.rat violeDce differ substarltially from place to place. Iu the concli
..".
violc|ce. 1hese regimes coexist 'with organizecl, violcnt nolrstatc actors, lLnd ti()ns that exist today in nranl oftllc Western Hemisphere's republics, nrultiplc

i' they stand side by siclc rvith multiplc lbrms oi'substate order th¿t erist sepil-
ratel,v frorn, but iD constart irtcraction with, ttre state-sa¡ctionetl rule oflarv.
Also sig[ificant is thc cha[g¡1g ¡¿rlure oi civil socieq, in l.ati¡r A¡reric¿, u4riclr
ir nran,v countrics must bc urderstot¡tl tt¡ irclutle mLrltiple violent ¡ctors.
Rathcr lhan operatirg, peacefully to expand and cleepen thc riglrts of clcnro
,J"
cl atic citizcns, rlrany orguizations a¡tl groLrps th¿rt collectivcly corstitritc civil
societ\¡ iu the legion today oper¿lte violentl1,, usiug violencc a¡cl its tlrrcat as a
basis fo¡ their orvn collective orgtrnizing. Contrary to expectatious that civil
to llrcvcrlt statc abuses of citizens' rights,
societ,y iDe\.itably acts as a u,atchdog
these civil society groups (rvhich inclucle vigilarrtes, paramiJitaries, ¡nd other
so called justice nraking cntitics, cvcn local btse con¡n¡unilics) ilstead some
timcs firncLion to impose greater r-estrictions on rights (particularly the rights
of crinrinals rltcl the accusetl), often in the namc of c¡ir¡c cc¡ntrol ¡nd thc
mainlcrirnce ofsocial oi-der ((lodoy zooS; Goldstei¡ zool).
lf wc looli compar atirel,v at Latil Amer ica we ca n thus obscn e an im r¡re nsc
diversity of fbrrls of violcnce. Colc»nbia, for cxurmple, iionl a lbrtr-
st¿fl-ers
,vear old guerilla war, paranilitary violcnce, irnd large-scale drug traltcking
(Thouni zoo3; Crandal :ooz). li¿rzil, ii cou¡ltly with very tlilitrent political
ancl crimi¡irl clynanrics, exhibits large-scale urban gang violence, police inr
punit1,, a growirg ¡rroblern rvith vigilantis¡n an(l de¡th sqr¡ads in sc»ne iitrr:,
ancl ¡ural l¿rnd conflict in lvhich wealthy l¿ndo¡v¡ers fend oll lanclless rvorliers
through hired grLns and private militias (see Arias:ooób; Lcc(ls 1996; C¿,"-
2ooi)..Jarnaica, on the othel hand, ficcs gang cr»rllict in cilies and a gto'.ing
problern ofpoliticall,v ancl crimiraJly aligned privale securitv iirnrs (Sires :.ooz;
(;unst r99E). Elscu,herc in Latirl Ar¡erica a myriad ol'other ¿ctors crnplo)'
violence: thcsc rrngc tl'onr state aclors such as the police arrd the Inilitar,v ($,ho
oray or r¡ay not ácL in viol¿rtiolr ofthe larv, or uüo follorv the orders ofsup( rior
olllccrs ¿nd electerl leaders) to nonst¿te or civil society ¿ctors jncJuding plir llc
sccurity linns, l,vnch mobs, antl tleath sqLrads (whosc mcmbcrs ma,v dorrlrlc as
police, soldiers, or 6refrghtcrs at othcr tinrcs ofclay ol cluling othcr ¡rcriotls of
violcnl actors operate u'ithin tlre polity and nraintain diflitent and chargirrg
({)r) ections to state instittttions ancl political Ieade¡s, t'hcther those states are
oIlicirlly democralic, author-it.uian, or othcru,ise. We can teltatively call these
of rclationship violcrrt l¡lur;rlism. LJntlerstanditlg ¡rolitics in Latill
Anrcrica now reqr¡ires us to considcr how dispersed, often amorphous, and
sccnringly apolitical violence is deployed and managed by various actors in the
¡rolitical system. The corlcePt of violent pluralisnr as we describe it here has
nr.rcll in comrno[ with other t¡eoretical aPProaches to violeirce emergi]ls
lalgcly from anthropological analyses of these phenomena, including stch
({)ncepts as Nancy Scheper Hughes's and Philippe Bourgois's (zoo3) "con-
tirrr¡um of violence," Paul larlner's (uoo3) "st¡uctu¡al violence," and Ilené
tiirurd's (1977) "cycles of violence." VioJent plurultsm goes bey.,nd these to
irlcntify particular social locations rvithin Latin American states arld civil so
r ictics in wl¡ich violeuce can be found, ioining it specilically to den.rocrac¡ 1J
l¡'onr wlrich we find it analyticaliy inseparable.
Violent pluralisn also helps us clevelop a ftrtlet conception ofwhat relation-
shi¡rs civii society and violent actors maintajll 1tl one arlother and to different
, l( rrrcnts bureaucrati anr.l thc r-¡ili
of thc statc, inclrrclirtg politichns, police, hrrre¡rcrats.
tilry. 'lhese conoections can be ol¡vious ancl aPparent, such as when Brazilian
¡rolice flaunt their lelationships with death squads; or they may be
more e1u
sivc, as when police take bribes from money launderers or poljticians take
tlnrpaign donations from drug traffickers. Sometimes powerful state actor§
will cn.rploy violence specialists to intimidate political or social opponents. ln
()lhcr cases, violence specialists lrom outside the state will work to buy off
¡rrwcrful elerrculs ofthe political establishment. In yet other cases, such as in
( irkr»bi¡, ¡rilitaly or police units may tlain and arm Donstate actor§ such as
¡rrrranrilitarics to support their political objectives. Finall¡ maty ofthese non-
siirrc groups havc Ielationships with or.re another; they interact, build alliances,
arrd cngagc i|
conllicts witho¡¡t clirect Ieference to tbe state. As discussed
¡l¡ovr', so¡¡rc of lhcsc grottps clearly lit ittto what l'¡¿¡s classicalJy been idcrrilied

20 INI Ot't l)t .iM0NIl A5 ANlr l)ANlll M (i(ll lr,,lll¡l vroLlNt l,t lIrAl l"M :)l
as civil society, though they may operate violently and in opposition to the
democratic or basic human rights ofothers in society.
Having identiñed the actors and relationships that operate in a violendy
plural society, we can begin to ask what effects these arangements ¡rave olr
politics and social relatious. Essential to this effort is developing an under-
standing ofhowviolent actors and the relationships between them affect polit-
ical practice at various levels ofthe polity. For example, the drug-gang domina-
tion of Rio's favelas has had a substantial effect on the practice ofclientelism in
those conrmunities and on how üe leaders of those communities relate to
politicians (Arias zoo6c). Domination by criminal gangs, as occu¡s i¡ Rio, o¡
by guerilla groups, as occurs in parts of Colombia and Peru, can lead to
alte¡native fo¡ms of conflict resolution and modes of legal pluralism (Arias
and Davis Rodrigues 2006). Alternatively, the ongoing presence of uncivil
movements can have a corrosive effect on national-level politics, as trigh
Pa1,ne has argued occurs in Brazil, Argentina, and Nicaragua (Payne zooo).
Funds delivered to politicians through criminals can have direct effects on üe
election of national political figures, as has occur¡ed in Colombia (Bowden
2yni 3o-4oi Chepusiuk zoo3:óo). The growing power of criminal gangs can
fesult in state reactions that lead to nar¡o dura (iron fist) policies that circum
scribe a¡rd transform political and civil rights, as has occurred in Honduras,
where gang members recently were accused of engaging in terrorist activities.
The coutrol of violent nonst¿lte actors by a political party can eve,r result in
riots and the collapse ofa government (Auyero and Moran zoo4).
Anthropological studies of the lived experience of poor and marginalized
people in neoliberal democracies reveal the profound fear and all-encompass-
ing sense of dread that surrourds daily life in such a contert, and the ways in
which tlrjs structural violence translates into more physical forms.20 For exam-
ple, Daniel Goldstein has explored the fea¡ of crime and the mistrust of the
democratic state t}lat leads some urban Bolivians to turn to lynching as an
instrument of c¡ime control in their communities (Goldstein zoo5; see also
Goldstein zoo4).'z' He argues that rather than some kind of primitive holdover
from a violent past, vigilante Iynching actually represents a fully modern re-
sponse to insecurit¡ reflectir¡g the very logic of neoliberal democmcy that
requires individual responsibility for self-preservation, without reliance on the
state." Similarl¡ in her studies ofSáo Par¡Io, Caldeira has shown how violence,
urban segregation, and the emergence ofprivatized security systems negatively
impact the quality of life undcr Brazilian democracy (Caldeira zooo), Urder-
standing thcse different types of outcomes aDd how pcfsis{cnl violent irctors
22 ENRIOUE OESMOND ARIAS ANO OANIEL M. OOLDSTEIN
contribute to them is essential to interpreting how this violence brings into
question existing social norms, contributes to the formation of tlre political
order, and constructs political subjectivities.
These sets of questions about the relationships between violert actors and
the democratic state, and about how these actors and ¡elationships affect polit-
ical practices and outcomes, offer very different insights than approaches that
focus on the supposed failures ofthe ¡ule of law. When scholars write about a
rule of law, they imply a certain set of generally accepted international stan-
dards f¡om which, for a variety of reasons, a given polity may deviate. Irom
such a rule-ofJaw perspectjve the quotidian violence in Latin America repre-
sents neg¿rtive deviations from an international, developmentalist standard.
Rather than understanding the types ofpolitical formations that we confront
in Latin America as somehow reflgcting ¿n absence or failu¡e ofa rulc oflaw'
we need iDstead to look at what orders are prese¡'¡t in and produced by the
(more or less) autonomor¡s violent actors operating inside or outside a given
political system.
The shape ofcitizenship and the role that it plays in Latin America's politi-
cal systems has been a particularly powerÍirl sourcc of contention in debates
about den'¡ocratization between more institutionally oriented scholars arguing
for narrow, rights-based conception and others arguing for a b¡oade¡ vision
a
of what citizenship entails. For this Iatter group citizenship rights include not
just basic civil and political rights but also social rights and rights particular to
group membership.'zr In ¡ecent years much ¡esearch in political science has
explored contestations over citizenship rights and efforts to expand and recon-
ceptualize the notion ofcitizenship in Latin Anrerica. Yet these debates about
citizenship are largely inscribed within a vision ofthe state and the individual
involved in a mutual ¡elationship of rights ancl responsibilities. Citizenship
itselfgains meaning Íiom the idea üat individuals can gain access to rights by
acting within a rule oflaw guaranteed by a democratic state. However, ifstatc
power and the rule of law are openly contested, with powerful armed or
otherwise violent groups establishing contingent legal and political ordels
interspersed and interacting with state based systeurs, the notion of a general
set of reciprocal rights and obligations distributed widely among the popula-
tion bccomes less meaningful. In the environment that exists in Latin America
toda¡ citizcnship remains a useful way of conceptualizing a deEcit of order
oncl ofdiscussing the failures oÍtfie state, but it provides a less useful heuristic
for conccptualizing how l,atin Anrericans, sutrject to the force ofvariotls dif-
k'rcnl or'¡¡arrizccl ol spontirncoLrs violcnt cclors, corrccivc ofthcil politicll sLrll-
vll I N I I't rll^l l"M 7.r
jectivity and their role in localized and more national visions of the polity.rl
Focusil1g on Latin American regimes' failures to protect rights provides a one-
dimensional picture of the problent of violence and the treatment of the
population. Rather, we suggest that the inte¡action of multiple violent actors
has enabled the emergence of new forms ofpolitical orde¡ constitutive ofnew
modes ofpolitical subjectivity and contestation. How has political subjectivity
been reconceptualized in tight of regimes of violent pluralism, and how has
this more broadly alfected how individuals and groups attempt to protect and
provide for themselves?
Answers to these questions become particularly evident in anthropological
work recognizing that democratization does notoccur solelywithin the institu
tions ofthe state but also within and a¡nong groups of people typically consid-
ered part ofcivil society. As discussed ea¡lier in this introduction, the period
the democratic transition in Latin America has also been marked by the emer
gence in many countdes of powerful, organized social movements aimed at
exposing and transforrring the social, political, and economic inequities inher-
ent in neoliberal democrac¡ often employing the very language ofdemocracy
itself to underwrite and legitimize their interventions. ln their struggles these
social movements not only use but also strategically manipulate and rewo¡k the
transoational language of democracy and human rights, adopting nonlocal
concepts for their own ends (Paley zooz). Thus, for example, June Nash has
written ofthe Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, rvho have appropriated democracy
to characterize their own consensus-building practices (Nash zoot; see also
Nugent 1999). Similarl¡ Rob Albro (:oo6) and Nancy Postero (1999) have each
described the role tlrat concepts of democrary, citizenship, and rights have
played in the rhetoric and political practice ofBolivian indigenous lrrovements.
Posterol work on Br¡livian multiculturalism echoes that ofCharles Hale (zooz)
and Kay Warren (zoo2) in Guatemala, who have analyzed the opportunities and
the pedls presenting themselves to cultural-rights movements that deploF the
democratic language of multiculturalisrn in their own struggles. Such strategic
self-positioning can cut both ways, allowing social movement actors to exploit
emerging spaces of protest in the democratic context, while simultaneously
enablingthe stateto contain thei¡ protests in the realm ofwhataredcemcd to be
appropriate and acceptable forms of expression. Clearly violence is also part
and parcel of the engagement between state and civil-society acto¡'s, as the
recent histories of assassination, state repression, street clashes, and open war-
fare in Bolivia, Chiapas, and Guatemala (among othcrs) have shown. This
2¿ ENRIOUE DESMOND ARIAS AND DANIEL M GOLDSTE¡N
Huggests that the struggle for equality and rights within democratic co¡ttexts
may rrot be separable from the violent encounters such struggles errtail.
Ethnographic studies such as these point to the many ways in which vio-
lencc is deeply intertwined with democracy in Latin America, such that the two
rrrust be understood in tandem, rather than as two distinct Points on a single
cvolutionary trajectory or as contradictory elements of an ongoing teleology.
'l'hese studies also point to democracy's basic unevenness, the inequitable
distribution ofcitizenship rights in Latiu American courtries, and the ¡ole that
violence plays in implementing and challenging these inequities. ln trying to
understand the supposed failures of Latin American democracies, anthropo-
logical writing suggests, it is critical to look at democracy "fiom below" to
understand the nature of people's demands, the violent conditions that they
of co¡rfront, and the sometimes violent responses they make to these conditions.
Such a perspective may yield rather surprising insights. For ultimatel¡ and
pcrhaps ironicall¡ what many social movements and inclividual social actors
nray be seeking is nothing sho¡t of the democratic ideal-full inclusion in
national democratic societ¡ with equal access to rights and justice tbr all
citizens. In this sense, what they may be seeking is what Holston has identifred
ns "substantive citizenship": not merely the voting rights that political democ-
racy confers (and which the democratization paradigm takes as its baseline
ntcasurement) but the full range ofsocial and economic rights that true Poly-
rrchy is said to guarantee (Holston 1999).
There are, of course, sites in the region in which police seem to function
cffcctivel¡ where crime is relatively under control even by Northern standards,
rrrd where a normal rule of law appears to operate. O'Donnell has called thesc
¡rlaces "blue areas," and he contrasts them with "gteen" and "btown ateas"
whcre there are progressively g¡eater deficits in central o¡der and in the ef-
fcctive national administration ofjustice (O'Donnell 1993). These areas, how-
cvcr, frt within the broader constraints of the concepts we develop ill this
volume. Some parts of Lat:tr American polities do oPerat€ under conditit>lls
thut some might consider simila¡ to those believed to exist in Europe ancl
North America (e.g., the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, the northern part ol
l](,gotá, and parts of Uptown Kingston). But even ifthis were not the casc, thc
cxistcnce ofthese types ofplaces would not be inconsistent wiü our argument
hcrc. Our nolion ol'vlolent pluralism includes the idea that state security forces
tlo opcratc and will operate as expectedunder some ci¡cut¡stances. This fu¡c-
tion¡r¡B corrstitutcs, howevcr, sinrply another elemeDt ofviolent pluralisn,. In
vtot I N I t,t tJkAL t,,M ,,1)
 some places the state does effectively naintain order, which is critical to the
functioning ofthese political regimes. Emerald dealers, the owners ofweapons
factories, those shipping drugs, and even small gangs trying to get access to
state patronage need certain parts of the political system to operate withiD a
more formal ¡ule of law to maintain working port facilities, have functioning
financial systems to provide loans and guarantee deposits, ancl make sure a
state budget is generated with access to international financing that can su¡.r-
port different types ofpatronage. In other words, even when we see supposed
blue areas of state functioning, they are deeply engaged with other parts ofthe
polity and often operate in ways that support more unorthodox systems of
order in some parts ofcities and the countryside.
Similarl¡ spread across the region are a handful of states that experience
conparatively lower levels of violence and that appear to expedence, over
national terdtory, a functioning syste¡n of sanctioned violence. These coun-
tries include Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, panama (outside of the Darien jungle
where Colombian guerillas operate fieely), and Urugua¡ A discussion ofthese
countries lies beyond the scope of tl.ris project, but we will note that the
relatively lower levels of violence in these places, even those with advanced
neoliberal refornrs, stem from particular local characteristics that have to do
with the social and institutional history of each and the particular ways i¡.t
which these places are inserted into the international economy. lndeed, rrrany
of the factors that we note as contributing to violent pluralism in the cases
discussed here operate in slightly different ways in these countries, Ieading to
Iowe¡'levels ofviolence and different political conditions. For example, Argen-
tina experiences comparatively low violence by global standards but, as the
essays by Iavier Auyero and Ruth Stanleywill demonstrate, these conditions of
relatively low violence operate in the context ofa fornr ofviolert pluralism.
The concept of violent pluralism thus inve¡ts many of the assumptions of
extant writing on politics in LatinAmerica. We are not inte¡ested in whether or
not there are deficits fiom a generally agreed upon standard of rights or
political behavior. Moreover, we do not see ongoing violence in Latin Ame¡ica
as a reflection of anarchy, state breakdown, or the failure
of the rule of law.
Rather, we are concerned with what particular fo¡ms of order are built up in
polities in which multiple persistent violeDt actors operate. Who are these
actors, ho\a, do they interact, afld what types oforders do they build? How do
these interactions create new fo¡ms of order such as netwo¡ks of criminal
governance or legal pluralism? By looking at üe interactions of multiple vio_
lent actors and trying to understand what order they create, we provide a ncw
2ó ENRIOUE DESMOND ARIAS AND DANIEL M, GOLOSTEIN
nrode for studying politics in the region. Similarl¡ we are not concerned with
dcficits of citizenship but, ¡ather, with how citizenship and other forms of
political subiectivity are built among different segments of the population
under plurally violent conditions. Ultirnatel¡ these constitute much richer
questions than üose that can be asked under a paradigm that assumes certain
fixed understandings about institutions, order, yiolence, and rnodes ofpoliti-
cal participation. Latin America does not live in a peryetual deficit ofnotbeing
Europe or North America, and there is no i¡dication that the particular pat-
tcrns of political arrangement that exist in these countries are amenable to
them becoming more like those Northern democracies. Indeed, pluralist polit-
ical practice in Latin America, as we have suggested, may very well depend on a
tolerance for privatized violence and ongoing abuses of large segments of the
population. These are unique forms of political practice, order, and subjec
tivity that need to be studied on their own terms,
Violent Plurulism in Context
It is of course impossible to talk about politics in Latin America without
talking about democracy. [t has been the political proiect of the entire conti-
neDt for the past genemtion: every country, even Cuba, has claimed it as its
form ofgovernment, and it dominates academic and political discourse about
the region. It is not our intention here to say eifher that democracy does not
cxist in Latin America or that we should not study democracy in Latin Anrer-
ica. Rather, the purpose of this introduction has been to attempt to open a
parenthesis in which students ofpolitics can critically consider the state ofthe
political regimes in Latin America without the weight ofthe democ¡atization
project hanging over the analysis. Within this parenthesis we can consider,
counter to conventional political science, the actual co[dition of Latin Amer-
icat potitical regimes amid and in concert with the various forms ofpolitical
nnd social violence that ch,rractedze Latin.American national societies. The
questions aDd modes ofanalysis that we lay out in the previous sections ofthis
introductiol provide tools that can enable scholars to assess Latin American
political society without assuming a priori the political proiect and the lan-
guage ofdemocl acy and democratization.2s
'[ he essays that follow serve to deepen and extend the arguments laid out irr
this introduction. Drawing on dEtailed case studics from a variety ofcountries
throughout thc region (from the Andes and Brazil to Ccntral America, thc
Sor¡lhcrn (irnc to tlre lJispanic Caribbc¿n) lnrl lio¡» ¡ rarrgc of acaclcnric
v r)l I N I l,L UftAt t,,M /7
 tilsciplines iinclrr<1ing anthropolog,r,, histolr,, political scicncc, and sociology),
thev crplorc thc rtrultiplc lol»s in u4rich violelcc nanJfests Jtse)fas part alcl
pattl of conternpor¡ry Latio ¡\¡rcrican clc¡rocracy,. Sorne of the essays pro-
vicle clear anrlcornpcllinr eth nogr aplric ¿nd ltisto¡ical illr¡stratiotrs ofthc theo_
¡ctir:;rl r¡rrtlines ol'this ilttroduction, tvhile others expand tltt tlrese outl¡tes to
contrjbulc thril own clisci¡rlinary or cross-disciplinary irsights.rn
I)rarving oD erirlcnce lront her rcsc¡¡ch ir l\,lexi.o, l)i¿rne Davis,s cont¡it¡u_
lir»r olTe¡s ¿lt iinpot tiint historical fianring firr lhc couccptual rvork proviilccl
br, i¡rrr int¡ocluction. i\s l)avis oLü, the
lloillts itiiti¡l ellthusiilsnt rvith which
polilicians, ci{izcrrs, iurcl ¡carlenric an¿lvsts ofLaril America gleetecl thc s¡rread
rrfpoiiticrl ald cconorr¡ic litre¡¡lization tltroughout thc region in
the r96os atd
rt)9os has no1\, l¡ecn repl¿ccd bv anxiety ¿rncl fe¿r :rs violencc and insecuritl
coDti,üre lo char-actcrize [)ost¿u1l]or-itari¿n sr.rcieties.',Forgel big ideas about
rlcmocracl,¡ ntl ¡hout h(rw, elcctorirl rulcs o1-thc gatDe will lead to improvement
ir pcople's cvcryclay lir,es"- ils l)cvis obserres, ordini¡y citizens today arc
r¡ruah more concerncd \1,ith crcatitig secr¡rity ()n theil.o\\,n ternts, oftel b1,
p¡ssin!lthe s l¿tc ¡n.1 its dentofr¡ti. ilstitutions anrl opting tbl lrorc loc¡lizcdl
\¡ioiL.rr1 lrclrsLu cs of control that scenl to promisc nlore immcdiirte retur¡s. ñ
lhr snme tinle, org¡trizt,d .qroups ofviolent "nafias," ofien performing statelike
flrnctions, ¡ntl olicn u,ith thc collabor¿itic¡n of police and ¡nilitary olllcials,
h¡r,c el]tcl'ged ¡s i)o\¡,cr blokers ill or alongside ol,dcmocratic states. I)avis,s
cssav ¡roviclcs thc vital hislo¡i.:al coDtert Í/ithi¡1 \,r,hich these sund¡y lo¡ms of
\-iolcnl org¿ni7¡tiolt ¡nd practice can bc understc¡od in tl¡c ¡e¿rlitics ofcontcr¡r
¡rrlary democlacv. \\¡hy, Davis ¡sks, h¡s the tr¿nsition to denrocracy not bcen
¿cconlp¿njeLl by ¿ tr¡¡sitiotr dw¿y from the violcnt a¡d coercivc practices of
th. üondcnro.r¡tic past? And ht¡rv has rhis past laid the fi¡und¿tion fo¡ the
l<indsol t,iole¡L dc¡tocracics th¡t \,!.e ol)scrve in l,atin Amc¡ica todav? The
Ansrvers lo these ql¡cstio¡s, itccorcling to l)avis, lic in
¡rast clecisions irbout
ccono¡ric d§.elopment, statc forr¡atjou, and indLlstr.ializ¿rtion i¡t thc region,
reqtriri[g us to p]¡cc contemporarv dcltocracy within the context of this
lo¡lcr tl ¡lectory for it to be unclc¡str¡r¡d.
'l hc histolian l\4¡rv RoLl¿itr in her essay
exanrines the intertu,irled relations
bctrvccn de¡t<¡c¡¡ct,¡r¡d vioiencc in Colonti¡ia, a formally democratic rration
ll¡at nelerlhclc'ss "has spent ¡ [oL insiÉlDi6cant ¡rortion oftltc last fbur t]ec¿rdcs
under statcs of siegi: or- sonre forrn of political cot1stri1int.,, ID coltccrt uith
Lhcnres raisccl corsistently lhror¡ghout this volurDe, Iloldán asks ofColc¡ntbi¿¡
dcmocrac¡, "ls it ¡\rssible thrt viole ce is both collstitntivc oI ancl the rrlucl
¡.lr
of frLnd.Irrel¡t¡llv diflcrcDt uocicrstanclings of What it rlre¡ns lo
(1.
l)lr(li!(,
28 [NRIOUE OTSMOND ARIA5 AND DANIII M GOI I)" II IN
[]()cracy?" Het answer, of cou¡se, is "ves," a response she arr'iles at through a
lrislorjcal ethnography of a grassroots solidariq. nrovemen t organized to seek
nonvjolent alternatives to armed conflict in the Altioguia region of Colombia.
In contrast to Todd LaDdnrarl's macropoLitical perspective (see below), RoJdrin
ofiirs a microanalysis of thc pcrils of practicing democracy in a context ol'
violent plulalism, in which thc constaDt threat or experience ofviolence jeop-
mrlizes local elTorts to livc peacefully and ilefend trasic rights. Interestingly,
llr»rgh, as Roldán obse¡r,es, violence i¡ this case has Dot lecessarily eroded
Lrcal people's confidence in den-rocracy o¡ the clemocratic state; rathe¡, \'io
lcncc he¡e motivates previously unorganjzed citizerls to joü together to create
rlenrocrac¡ even as this action brings local definitio[s of democracy into
L onllict with oflrcial statc or transDational conceptions.
'I he contribution by the althropologist María Clemencia Ramírez irlso
olii'rs ¿ consideration of Colonbia's violent dernocracy-an ¡pt case for a¡a-
lyzing this apparent contradiction in ternrs, gir.cn Colombia's long standing
scll-irnage as ore ofthe oldest democracies itr I-atin America. In some viole¡t
rlcnlocracies the ties Iletween formai sta[e ¡]stitLltions and violeut entities a¡e
ruhtlc and covert; in Colombia, as Ran-rirez clearly dernonstratcs, the relatio[
slril)s betweel official state and violent nonoflicial, iJlegal groups arc tight]y
wr rvcn and multiply configured. Especially in the so-cnlled malginal regions ol-
llr( couDtry, an "alte¡native social o¡de¡" has been established in u,hjch violcn(
¡r(),rst¿te actors (i.c., gucri)las and paramilitaries) have takel control of the
rrSi()ns, ¿ control n.raintained through their various ties r.ith local and state
¡rolitical ofñcials. In this alternatjve older, autagonistic to but at the same tinrc
,rllili¡ted with the democratic state, security has emerged as the domin.rrl
lrr¡'irtli!Ír¡l of democratic rule, a paradigm u,hose hegenrony is guarantced by
llrc lirrccd participation ofall citizens.
l'hc cssays by.favier Auyero and Ruth Stanley both exar¡jlle violc¡ce ¡nrl
,lt rrocracy in Buenos Aires. But ¡r'hereas Stanley's worJ< focuses on the cx1,r'r r
victi,;s, Auyero, like Ramírez, is inte¡ested il its perpctrir
, rtct's of-violence's
l()rs, hc they legal ol ilLegal, ofñcial or unauthorized. Aul.ero focuses o¡ u,h¡l
Irc lclnrs "clanclestine conrlecLioos" between legal and illegal political actor-s, ¡s
wt ll us on thcir c¡itical role in the making ofcollective violence. Auyero's ess¡y
r lhc c¡sc ofthe t oor food liots in Arge¡tina to exanljne the diversc n ays
rst s rrr
wlrielr covcll ¡nd often ulrecognized links betrveen membets ofthc polrtr
lrorrr ¡rrliliciansloirctiviststdperpetratorsoIsfreelviole]rce shapc thccnrcr
¡3 rrtc, rrlrrrilcslitliorrs, ancl diffLrsiorr ol tollct livr' violcncc. I)rrhlrl;s nrorc rr¡i
1,olit ir ,rl , lil( \ rrrrv r )fl( r)linl( s lllc¡¡scllas
rr ilrt lr nl is At¡yc¡is r ccoqn itio¡r llrrrt
vll)t I N I l,t IttA l,,M l,
 perpetrate the violence: beyotd simply tolerating the
use ofyiolence to achieve tltc nrore ethnographic techniques of anthropology to provide üese scholars
political ends, in Buenos Aires (as elsewhere) elites deploy violent
tactics, or acccss to sociopolitical realities at multiple Ievels ofexperience.
call on their allies to do so, in the pursuit ofostensibly democratic
objectives. In many ways Latin America lies at the crossroads of the developed ard
In a simila¡ vein, Stanley's contribution engages the question police
of im- clcvckrping worlds. While it has some things in common institutionally with
pu[ity in Buenos Aires, focusiug on the expedence of the victims
of illegal thc political and economic systems of Western Europe and North Anrerica, in
police violence and their efforts to organize and confront
it. Stanley,s analysis lcrnrs of how political institutions function and how force is deployed in
reveals the complexities and contradictions of a democratic
system in which rociety Latin America has much more in common with Al¡ica, the former
those authorized to use legal violence likewise function as
illegal violent actors, Soviet Republics, and Central Asia. In his broadly synthetic contribution to
calling into focus the poteDtiar consequerces for democ¡atic
stabilitv when thin volume, Landman brings the perspective of comparative politics to his
§tate institutions are unal¡le or unwilling to restrict the use of violence and 0ttalysis ofthe conjuncture between violence and democracy in Latin Ame¡ ic¿,
coercive state power. These essays are particularly interesting
in that they inves nnd ofits inrpact on human rights in the rcgion. Systematizing what are often
tigate üe problem ofviolent pluralism in the context ofwhat
has been seen as a loosely deployed concepts, Landman offers a tFpology that distinguishes use-
Iow-violence country until now. They show that while levels
ofvioleuce may fully between Iegal and illegal forms ofviolerce and between state and nonstate
not be as high here, countries with relatively low levels of conflict
can still 0r cxtrastate perpetrators of violent acts. Such tpologizing, while fbreign to
experience many of the same potitical processes ofviolent pluralism
as coun_ §nthropologists and other more qpically qualitative analysts, serves to clarify
tries with higher rates ofyiolence.
Éx0ctly who are the violent actors in Latin American democracies, and how
The essays by Lilean Bobea and Robe¡t Cay also wrestle
with the question of vlole¡rce identified as legal or "legitimate" coexists with other forms tl,at Iie
impunity and, Iike mary othe¡s in this volume, respond to
our call in thi§ bcyond the pale. Additionall¡ as Landman goes on to demonstrate, this cl¿ssi-
introduction for a scholarship that explores the connections between
violent lic¡ltion enables us to identifo rights-protective regimes, that is, "the degree to
democratic states and the Iived realities of citizens ofthose
states. Bobea and which states have the capacity to respect, protect, and fu16ll rights obligations
Gay both highlight the connections between levels ofabst¡action
often identi (y¡rically associated with derrocracy." This kind of analysis moves us trcyond
6ed as the micro and the macro to unde¡stand daily life within
broade¡ forms lhc tendency to pile ever more ad.jectives in front of democraq., ilsteacl faciii-
ofnational and t¡ansnational organization and practice. Bobea,s contribution, lnting an objective analysis of the extent to which any so-called democracy
for example, begins with an ethnographic descdption of the experiences
of Bcrvcs lo glrarantee t}re basic rights ofits citizens. Landman's anaiysis providcs
poor residents of Santo Domingo and Santiago in üe Dominican
Republic, 0 framework for interpretürg the varieties ofviolent ptactice describecl i¡ cuclt
who live with criminal and state violence on a daiiy basis.
She then moves to a ol'the pleceding essays.
¡nac¡olevel co¡rsideration of the state,s plan for Democratic
Securiry a pro_ As many ofthe essays in this volume suggest, ifwe begin to reorie¡rt how wr.'
posal to "reorganize the public sector and rebuild
society,, in the fight against Blu(ly politics in Latin America, we can also begin to think seriously aborrl llrc
jllegal violerce. The extent
to which security programs open the door to fur-
nco¡:c and dimensions of reforms o¡ more radica.l changes that a¡e ¡rcccssirty l(,
ther violence, albeit of the democratic variety, is an important
consideration ructually achieve somet!ing like polyarch¡ By looking beyond political ir rstit r r

here. Similarl¡ Gay examines local violence in Rio de

laneiro in the context of I ions and taking seriously the idea that some current political regilncs in l,ir I ir r
a transnational political economy of drug traflicking, demonst¡ating
the ex_ Anrcrica nay not be able to move toward wide guarantees ofbasic lights, wc
tensive complicity of police and other authorities in the
very violence and crrrr beginto think about what type of institutional aud noninstitr.¡lio¡rrl
illegality they are supposed to combat. Both of these essays,
like others in this lrlnrcwork may lead to polyarchy. Do countries, for example, need a dilll'rct¡l
volume (those by Auyero and Roldán come partic¡rlarly
to mind), also demon_ oricntatiorr to international trade flows that cont¡ibute so much to thc drugs
strate the need for scholars engaged in the study ofcontemporary
democracies ltn(l rms trildcs to create gdvernments more capable ofprotecting thcir popLr-
to employ a variety ofmethods in their work. The macrohistorical
a¡rtl struc_ l¡rtions? Allcrnativel¡ as we begin to undcrstand morc about the relltionshi¡rs
tural analyses ofhistory, sociology, and political science conrbinc
rrscfirlly wirh llr.ll govcnrnrcnts n¡¿rint¡in wilh othcr lyl)cs ofviolcnl ¡c(ols opcrxling ir¡ ,l

30 ENRIOUE DESMOND ARIAS AND DANIEL M, GOLDSTEIN

vto 1 Nt I Lli^l t"M
 polit),,r'r,e can dcvclop ¿n undelstardinfJ about wllat t]-pes of networl(s of
rclatio¡s bctu,eell lhc state ¿rld othcr r.ioltrt actors succeec{ in tr¿ltsl¡irtill! Nofes

basic prolections to lesidents. Most impot.tanl, if\\,e do not

crilic¡lly osscss the r. This optimism and the political unaÍimity üat seemed to accompany it turned
rlolion thilt thc existilg rcgi¡rcs can Dove in this directiotr tvc call evcr out to be short-lived, as long-standing divisions in Bolivian society reasseted
detelrrine what t)pe r¡fextrainstitutional changes might bc uecessirrv to lnorc themselves over the ne)(1 few years, leading to violent clashes betwee[ groups
eflectivclygu¿Ll'aDtee basic rights to Lati¡1 Antericans. Itr thc conclrlsion E¡ri supporting the MAs government and those backing "traditional" parties from the
clue r\rias ties logrther thc various st¡¡ncls ol argun-rcnt in Iowland regions seeking more autonom)¡ from the central state.
¡l-rc volu¡tc th¡ough
2, For statistics on nurders in Sao Paulo, see Brinl(s 20(]3:6-7.
a cliscussic¡o ofthc oligins ofviolcnt plurirlisnr, and ofsolutions
irncl operation
3. For statistics on violence in Latin Ame¡ica, see Hi[ton 2oo5:77.
to thc challcnges it poses. l hc conclusion oliirs a discussion of fi¡ture resc¡¡cI¡
4. On the third wave, see Huntington 1991.
nccds on thcse issucs in l.atin Amcrica ¿nd the policy úuplications ofthe 5. Indeed, Larry Diamond, one ofthe leading scholars on democratization, §erued
approach lvc oflér. ln the encl the conciusion sccks lrot so ¡tuch to close thc the U.S. governm€nt in Iraq i¡r its efio¡ts to build democratic government there
volunrc ¿s to o1-rcn up space fbr an ongoing discussion ofLhc issr¡es discusscd in and has w tten about the reasons behind that country's very lough transition
the book. process. See Diamond 2oo5al 2oo5b.
"l'his project docs l)ot preten.l 6, On social conditjons in the second pllase ofdemocratic transitions, see Przeworski
to offer a risoroLts proo l-of r.iolent pluralisnt
as the exclusive rnoclel fbr understanding political s\.stents in L¿tir Aneri..l. et al.1996:39 40.

Rather, Lry offering detailecl ex¿nrinations of the
¡rractice ancl politics of vio-
lcnce in a nurnl¡er r)f counlrics in thc region, this v<¡luure oflirs a thcoretic¡l
explor:ition ofthe challenges ficing thc region that should help open ¿ corccp-
trL¿rl space through,,r,l¡ich rve ca¡r r¡nclerstantl in a more nr¡ancecl antl so¡rhisti
c¿tecl rvaythc challelgcs facing these ¡rolities and thei¡ inhabitants. Br.aclopt
ing a rrore criticll approirch trtrvartl our rinderstanding of reeinc change and
of eflbrts to build clerrocracy, bv ¡¡¡1,i¡lg bel,oncl the dcnr oct a tization para
cligm, rve, as Latin Americanists and comparativists, caD molc clleclivcly con-
tribute to solDe of the largcr policy debates that exist today. Silce thc seconc]
Clinto¡ ¿idr¡i¡ isl r¡tion U.S. foreign ¡xrlicy has oflicially becn drilen trl.rlre
"clenroc¡atic pcace" Lhcor1,, w}rich claints that thc u.orld rvill be a safcr plircc
for
the Ll¡ited States iftherc ¿rt'n¡orc de¡nocracies, siDce (leúloc¡¿cics do nol {o to
war rvith etrch other.rT'llD this end botlr the Cliirk)¡r and the Bush ¡¡tlminis¡rii
tions, in very clillerent w;rvs, ollicially rvorkecl tr¡ br¡ild denocracy il t-ar-llung
p¿rts ol-thc worlcl. The clcbacie ol clcmocr.ac,v builcling in Ir.aq ancl the reso
¡ance of that expcrience with ongoing prol.rlerns ol social i,iolence in Lirtin
America highJight an itnpo¡ti1¡rt cont¡ibution that L¿ti¡ Anterici¡ists coukl
have maclc to this dcbate. By taking scriously the idea ofviolent phrralisrr antl
b.v broadetritrg our conceptioll of how to sturly the elective re¡¡iltes
donrinate in l,atin Anterica, \¡,/c can rlot onlv bcgin to cottributc iu n rlore
critic¿l rv¡v to the deL¡atc ¿bout de¡rocracy building btrl also iclcntitl, lirctols
th¡l tcncl to ['¡ti to cr»tditiol'ts oi violcnt pltrralisnr or., ultcrrrrrtirely,
7, On the hope for brlilding clemocracy under di6frcu1t conditions, see O'Donnell
2OO2i8-9.
8. It should be noted, however, üat ¡ecent studies of democratization have focused
more substantially on the gray zone between ¿udlodtarianism and democracy;see
Plattner 2oo5:5-6.
9. An expert on postconflict transitions debunked Blookt analysi§ in a letter to the
editor; see Whitfield :oo.4.
to. The controversial Carothers piece, published in úLe Jourxal of Defiocracy, w¡s
extensively criticized two issues later in the samejouroal by a host ofpractitioners
and scholars.
u. The exception to this statement is Diamond, whose anal)'sis of the failure to
manage an effective transition in Iraq focuses principally on elections, institutiol
building, developing a stroDg plan for the transition, and devolving decision-
makng power to local leaders quickly. See Diamond zoo5a:r3-21. Yet even thesc
are stock answers that offer little in the way ofa program fol responding to ¿umcd
insurgency or ongoing street violence, in Iraq or elsewhere.
tz, This <¡uestion has been addressed most notably by O'Donnell;see O'DoD¡ell 2oor.
r3, NotabJy O'Donneli speciflcally eschews this, instead arguing that democratiTi liol)
!tselfis an unending p¡ocess and that hence the democratization paradigm shotrld
lemaiD the main theoretical basis for understanding democracy in Latin ArDcrie
Sce O'Donnell 1999c. In its own way, this is also a teleological argument; it is jusl tr
thlt pre_ te)eology in which the telos has already arrived,
in United Nations De-
14, A comprehensive example of this approach can be found
vcloplnc¡t Program¡ne 20o5. :l
I0 polv lt. Oú i¡fonnal rules and police violeDce see Brinks zoo3:6-7; and O'Donnell 1993;

¡r'chv. on ¡rolicing ancl violcncc in Argc¡'rtiDa i¡nd llrazil, see Hinton 2005, esP. 9o

r2 I NllloUt t)t ,iMoNo ARtA,. ANfr t)AN|I I M (;Ol fr,,|l tN vtf)t tNtl,t ufrAt t,,M rl
16. An important variant on this approach focuses not on state failures but, rather, on
how state institutionscan be refo¡med to more adequately protect basic righis. For
examples, see Zaverucha 1999; Correa Sutil 1999.

17. On the politics ofthe democratization project, see Paley 2oor:5-7.

18. Structural violence refers to the ways in which a ruling regime or state st¡ucturc
s)'steñatically inhibits people from realizing their full potential th¡ough the ¡r-
stitutionalization of such barriers to human achievement as poverty, sexism, or
racism. For an application in anü¡opology, see Farmer 2oo3.
Political and Economic Origins of Violence
19. On the impact of light combat weapons on viole»ce in Rio de )aneiro, see Dowd-
ney 2oo8. Insecurity in Contemporary Latin America
20. In other co¡rtexts, see Green 1999; Merry 1981; Rotker 2oo2b.
Trajeaories and Future ProsPects
2r. Interesting work from political science on this topic is being donc by Godoy
(zooz).
zz. Anotable anthropological study ofneoliberal democracy in Latin America is Paley
2007,
23. On this debate generall¡ see lelin and Hershberg 1996:z; on a narrow political
vision of rights, see O'Don¡ell and Schmitter 198ó:7-8; for a good analysis ofthe
interplay between civil, political, and social rights in the expansion ofcitizenship very long ago oPtimism flowered about prospects for democracy in Latin
i¡ postauthoritarian Latin America, see Jelin r996i for a wider call for social a¡rd 'l'hc spreacl of political ancl econouric liber¿tization tllrougholrt the
political citiz€nship, see uñDp 2oo5:27-28. and r99os produced a wave of hoPe, seen most visibly in countries like
24. A.lüough for some in I¿tin America, the idea of citizenship remains a potent tool arcl li¡azil. \{ith thcjr ¡uthoritariaD Past §cemingly lcft
for demanding expanded ¡ights in the Deoliberal cra; see Postero 2oo7. ^rgeDtinrl,
and the ¡rlvent oIa reinvigolatcd co]rlPetitive electoral system, citizeus
25. This is extremely impotant in light of recent work on "conditional authoritarian-
,rntl ncwly elected officials faced thcir future with a sense of unlimited Possibil
ism" that looks at howotherwise repressive regimes employ electoral mechanisms
ilics for positive change. But for many, dream§ have steadily climmed as prob-
to achieve political ends without er.tending broad dghts to the population; see
Levitsky and way 2oo2.
r¡f violence, crime, and insecurity emerged with a vengeance, having
(Bailey
26. A particular deEciency of the present volume is its lack ofan essay that specihcally tcrched new heiShts by the mid- and late r99os and continuing today
addresses Cent¡al America. The editors ¡ecognize the limitations that this lacuna roo¡; lrlilhling ancl Tulchiu witb Golding zoo3). As Susana Rotker so astutcly
(zooz)' the
imposes on our analysis. chronicled i¡ Citizens of Fear: tJrban Violence in Latin America
cveryday Latin American experience is now haunted by the specters of
27. On the democratic peace, see Do),le r9E6. fear'

violence, crime, and police impuniry all of which permeate Practically eYery
uspect ofdaily life.
Illected governments seem hamstrunS in their capacities to control lhesc
problcms, let alone reverse them, in large part because tlose charged with
police
kccping order and guaranteeing the rule oflaw on behalfofthe state, the
ancl/or the rr.riJitar¡ are themselves frequently implicated in abusive practices

or crinrinality (l{inton zoo6; Leeds 1996). The result is growing cynicisnr'

social fllgmetrlltion, and a renewed sense of hoPelessness about the future
ancl thc potentiat of compctitil'e political systems to dcal with the cleterioratürg
situaliorr,'l'hc rcPcrcussions fot tlcnlocracy and citizenship are troubling'

l¿ ¡NRtotll I)l .iMoNl) ARtA:, ANI) t)AN I M f;('t t,,,ll r¡l

 Forget big ideas about democracy and about how the electoral rules ofthe
game will lead to improvement in people's everyday lives. Iorget aspirations
that the embrace of libe¡alization will finally bring the ¡esou¡ces and institu-
tions to address problems of economic inequality and political polarization.
/" Instead, growing numbers ofcitizens in Latin America are tu¡niDg their atten-
tion away from formal politics and party-led solutions and looking for their
own answers to the problems of insecurity in everyday life (Oxhorn and
Ducatenzeiler 1998). The upside is that these efforts to ¡einvigorate civil society
can at times lead to mass mobilizations against c¡ime and insecurily. But there
also is a downside. Hopelessness has become so erirlreme that some citizens are
turning to violc¡rce themselves . whether in the form o[ vigil.rrrtir,n, ,""n
"' "
last-gasp measure for achieving some sense ofjustice, or through the embrace
ofa life of crimc, so as to be on the giving rather than on the receivit'rg end ofan
unjust and unequal political economy-to recapture some control over their
daily existencc (Davis zoo6c; Daniel Goldstein zoo3; Moser z.oo4).
impunity are no strangers to the countries ofLatin
To be sure, violence and
America, rvhere an authoritarian past produced political torture, so-called
disappearances, gue¡illa movements, and other fo¡ms of a¡med rebellion in
prior epochs (Bodemaer, Kurtenbach, and Meschkat zoor; Huggins 1998). Yet
contemporary problems of violence, daily conflict, and insecurity.are much
broader and perhaps more insidious and damaging to the quality oflife than
even the violent struggles over authoritarian rule in the past (Huggins,
Haritos-Fatouros, a¡rd Zimba¡do zooz). This is partly so because the violence
in contemporary Latin America appears to be a more "garden-variety" t)?e of
insecurity that permeates the most ¡outine ofdaily activities a¡rd is best seen in
rising homicides, accelerating crime rates (despite a decline i¡ reportage by
victins), u-nprecedented levels of policc corruption and impunity, and an
inability to rnove aror¡nd freely without fear of armed robber¡ violent attack,
or erlort ion (Davis ¿nd Alvarado r999 ), It i5 thcse condition" that push citizens
(and criminals) to take matters into their own hands, either through vigilante
acts (Daniel Goldstein zoo3) or, more commonl¡ by hiring private securiry
guards, thereby fueling the environment of fea¡, exclusion, and insccurity
(Smulowitz zoo3).
One result is that in many parts of Latin America, mafias involved in v¿¡i-
ous fo ns of illegal activities (ranging fionr drugs and guns to knockoff de-
signer proclucts and c»s) are calling the shots (Bailey and Godson zoot; Cross
1998). Well<rrganizetl cad¡es involvcd in illicit activities oicn l¡kc on thc
functionally cquivaleDt role of mini¡lurc stittcs by Dr()n()l)olizirrli tlrc rrrc0rrs ol'
3ó OIANE E. OAVIS
violence and p-I1q]IlC,!-:^oJ:_.f.ion for loyalty and territprial.do-
fn.-e1ch11ge
rrini-on (Lupsha 1996). More often thao r.rot, these illicit activities Per§i§t wirh
lhc tacit support ofthe police and rrilitar¡ who often priotitize the ProtectjoD
of their own institutional sovereignty and/or involvement in these black-
n¡arket activities, rather than the Protection ofcitizens who suffer in the Pre-
(¡rious environ¡nent ofan elusive rule of law. With a wide rarge ofinstitutious
irr¡d actors involved in crime and brutalit¡ and rvith many of the key protaSo-
nists both trrnred and dangerous, most governments, democratic or not, have
lirilcd to keep violence and insecurity at ba¡
*i
So u,lrat accounts for this distressirrg state ofaffairs? My aim in this essay is t !,,t
lo nrrswer this question with a focus on Latin America's developmental history
nd its current political and economic patterns. Three questions guide the
[r[rative: (r) In what ways has the political, social, and economic history of
l.¡rtin An.rerica laid the foundation for contemPorary Patterns ofviolence and
insccurit¡ especially those involving tl.re police and military? (z) Why has
lr.lrrlively successful political transition from autho¡itarian rule to democracy
lol produced a significant b¡eak froru this coercive a¡rd violent Past and a
rtrcngthcning ofthe rule of law? And finatly, (:) what can be done about this
¡l¡rlc of affairs in a democratic and increasingly global context in which the
irl(.rrrational scale of the problem fails to match the local or national scale of
thc ¡v¡ilable solutions?
I nnswer lhese questions with evidence prin.rarily drawn fion.r the Mexica¡
r ¡rric, ¡lthough I proceed under the assumption that the geDeral develoPmental
r ltrtllcngcs facing Mexico in the first half of the tr,ventieth century resembled
llrosc lircctl by other large industrializers in Iátin America. That is, despite the
¡x't ttliurities of Mexican histor¡ the story recounted hcrc has been c¡afted
tr¡
rcllt,r't lirrgcr dynamics relevant to many ofthe large countries on the South
Arrrcricir¡ continent.
l'lre llrst l¡¡lf of this essay examines the history of Political and ecolorriL
rlcvclo¡rrrrcnt ancl how it scr problems ofviolence it motion lt focuses on three,
(lislincl bul interlelated processes: contested state formatíon, the instittltion,l-
l¡rrtiorr ol ¡n authoritarian politicil apparatus and its coercive arms. artl
Itrrlrtstri¡liz¡tion-led urbanization. It argues that the combination of these
llrrcr, rlcvclo¡rnrents led to state-sponsored violence, reflected first in growing
lrvrls o l ¡ro licc a nd rnilitary in.rpunity and the rise of so-called political policing
r¡¡rinsl ('lcn)ics ofthe state, 4od later in a weakened rule of law. These out-
rrrrrcs He¡rcr¡lccl ¡n eltvironn'renl oI violcnce and c¡inc in which the policc
rllrrl rrrilit,rly wclc rout¡¡cly inr¡rlicatcd, a stalc ol ¡11¡its lhal hcl¡:ctl institrr
OI (;1N,, or Vr L ll.lr I ANI N"l( l'llllY l7
 tionalize corruption within the police force, the military and the entire admin- r ,rrr i otrntries f-alling into the revolutionitry .¡tcgor,v. Itvcr so, it shares n conl
istration ofthe justice system. ¡ ¡,,n l,r'ohle rvith r¡a¡t,v of its Southcrn ( i)ne counterparts: a histo¡). of centcr
The second half of the essay examines recent trends of political and eco- r, lilrn lcrlsions over the ¡retca¡rtilisl rr¡trrrc of the natir¡nal cconomv and the
n-omic liberalization and their impact on politics and society in the current ,'llr )r ls to ccntralize power; long-st.rucling l)irttlcs betiveen ¡lgrarian and indus

demoiratic period. it argues that ihri réient ilaÑ;;;ti;;s Éave reinforced-
rather than reversed-qast patterns of impunity and violence in such a way as
to limit g1¡acities of formally democratic mechanismlánd civi] §ociety to
tfuq
counter the situation of growing insecurity. lt focuses on new actors em-
tr¡.rl tlilcs aboul the nature of the st¡te ¡ncl lbc direction t¡f thc ccononty;
¡,, r r.rsivc social uprisings irncl ¡cbcllion oll thc pat't of the natioll's nrost int
¡',,r'r.r ishccl citizens, rvhose cxclusion froD'r lhc govcrning pact fuclcd their
, rrllL r tivc ire; and the entergerrce of¡ pl-olcssio¡¡l nlilitary linked to the porvcr

powered by global trading patterns, on the challenges facing newly democratic
party systems, and on nonstate develop¡¡ents within civil society, all ofwhich
have led to the o-f a large informal sector riddled vjolence and
-growth -with
'illegality, a growin-g private security appáratus, ancl a delegitimizecl state. I
argue that the combination of these changes has been more likely to limit,
rather than facilitate, the d€mocratic state's efforts to stem violence-aid a
deteriorating rule of law.
Overall, my essay not only advances the claim that continuing violence in
newly democratic Latin America is traceable to the path-dependent conse-
quences ofpast political decisions about economic development, state forma-
tion, and industrialization; it also suggests that the current intensification of
long-standing problems ofviolence owes as much to the wholehearted embrace
,{
of libe¡alization, both political and economic, as to the weight of histor¡
however paradoxical this may appear at the outset, Specifically, in the context
of a slow but steady democratic transition that does not necessarily make
clear b¡eak with the institutional structures and practices ofthe past, in which
coercive elen.rents implicated in authoritarian rule have remained in the pic-
ture, and in which new global patterns oftrade support the informal and illegal
economyas much as the formal, violence and the "unrule" oflaw have and
continue to persi§t.
Contested State Formation ond tlrc
Historical Roots ofViolence and lmpunity
For large portions of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, most
llrt, (r'cgionalJv. nationally,
or both). All these conllicts gar,c life to a singlc
trl)()rlilnt t-act about Mexico in ¡rarlicrrlar, ¡¡rl ¡l¡out l.atilt Anteric¡ rnt¡rc
11,,n, r'irllv: onploing strugglcs ovcr tltc Ílaturc, ch¿r¡cter, a¡d clircction ofstatc
(Knight and Pansters 2oo5; Oszlal( r98l).
¡,,,rv, r
Wl¡ile the roots ofcontcstatiou ovct thc stiltc ntay be initially tritce(l to thc
,llrrrrial pcriod, struegles persisted bey<tnd ltrnnal inrlependence and mar-ketl
tlrr. ¡rolitical and economic lantlscapc oI Latin Amcrica even in the l\\,cntictll
,r'nlr¡ry, producin€i a highly conflictive ¡rolitical euvironment i¡ *,hich a:r
,rl¡r¡sivc st¡te apparatus, untr¡nrmelcd cocrcivc power, and violence all llor.
lrlrl. Ir¡ tlre case ofN{crico, the tglo rcvolution ¡nd ils aftcrmath proved a kcv
lll..lori(¡l iuncture, setting these d,r'nantics in nrotio¡. lD ¿rrl cffolt to ad\'aD.e
.rrrl l)rotcct the revolutionary caL¡sc, thc statc u,ielded corrsidcrable coelcir',:
l,o§,.r .¡!t¿iDst real and potcntial enerrjes (l(night rt¡S6). These practices, d.rtins
lo llr('l)ostrevolutionary cr¡, ultimatcly hclpccl institutionalize policc colrup
a Ir¡¡rr ,r¡rrl lhc cocrcive power of an autltoritarian sl¡tc $¡hose pervasivc usc of
t r, lntl disrega¡d for the rt¡lc <.rflaw pclncatccl civil societr. ¿s n ell.
rll rr c
t rrrrrplicirting miltters, dLlrirl!l this e¡rly twelrlicth ccntury period, nrosl
I ,rlirr Ar¡rcrica¡ statcs whether newly lilrntcci i¡ revolution, as in the c¡se of
will lrllriro, ol those metcly struggliug tr¡ holcl onto ¡rower irlso faccd the chLtl
l,'rr¡i s ol r'.rpicl econornic expansion, or bctter s¡id, of fostcri¡tq industri¡liz.r
tr¡,n.'l lris rnc¡ut that in ¡cklition to corlsolidirting st¿1te pou¡er vis á r'is ¡rrliti
,,rl ,rr i,lcological cne¡nies, ú.1)st Latirr Anreric¡n statcs tbund iL esscnti¡l t,,
rr,rr¡,r11( il n()l (()ntlol a n:rscent rvorkittg class ancl/nt ot'ganized agrar'iarr clitr's,
l¡,tl¡ r'l rvlrich rvcrc ¡clativclv rvell mobilized to acl against the rvishes ofintlrrs
lr r,rl I'il.rlisls (sec l:r'cnch r99:). I I.¡l irrg ir strong rrilitiu ,v and ¡rolice lblce u,as
( ir

Latin American countries suffered through continuous conflicts over sov- ,",rr'¡¡ti.¡l lo rurtlcrrrrininq srrch o¡rPosition arrrJ to irchic'r'ing iarger i¡clustr-iirl
ereignt¡ seen initially in struggles for independence from Spain (or Portugal), rI,r'r'Ir¡,rrrtrrt ¡iurs. ]r lhis sensc lhc ('c()lt()nlia clcvclopnrcni aints btrill ol
in civil wars and other similarly weighty regional conflicts, and, in a few cases, ,(llrrrr( (()rr\i)li(1.¡li()Drrin¡slr¡r'cinlirl'ccllt,.,cocrciv.'¡owcr ()l lltcsl¡tc.
in revolution or oüer protracted battlcs lcading to a ma.ior political rupture Irrn,rllr, ,rrrrl ir¡\l .rs irr)1,¡,r1.llrl lirr strc,llilltcrri li (()(rLi\c ilsl)c(ts ()l tlr.
with a colonial or liberal past. Mexico is one ofjust u h¿tnclli¡l ofLatin Amcri- ,rrllr)r rl,ri,rr rt,rlr' (rllrilr' ,rlro i rI sI iI L I t ir r rI,rI I z i II
i i (,r
( ll)lir )l .r rrr I irrrl,rrrrrt) ),

38 DIANE E, DAVIS llli r)lil(, N, r)l vlr)l lNr I ANt) tN,,t ( !t IY rr)
 the ciuaJ chailenges ofconsoliclating statc powcr a ci ex|ancling thc econonty
frequcntly u¡lirlded i¡r thr: contcxt of rapicl urbatization, prcciscll becausc Ilt| t9 t o Mexican Revolution: Setting tlrc (\,cle of Impu ity in Motioi
ccono¡lics of scale and cotlsLultcl- lr¡rkcts conce¡tr'ated rnost itrdust¡i¡l
cle- lrnrrn carly on Mexico's police and militaqi i{,ere drawIr into ongoing tensions
vclopnren t in I lirv citics, kc¡ alro¡rg thcur capital cities that also sc¡veil as seats
rlr(l political battles among and betu,een re\.oh¡tionaries, counterrevolution-
ofpolitical polver fsec I)¡\'is t99g). Ilt this cnviroDment
¡rolice rvcre as signifi ,rr rnd, Iater, opposition groups that sou¡iht to refonn or widen the revoliL-
ics,
ca¡t ¡s the nijljtdr-v in lilfilling thc statc's political, economic, and social
arnls. tir)r).rry state's project. It is understandable that both forces were used to police
thc,ebl crtc¡di,r: tht' coercivc ¡r' ol the st¡te ir)to thc e'erycfuy iife
.f rarge r ( )r¡ nlcr¡evolutionaries, tasks that were lnost intense from r91o-iB and focused
porlions ofthe natio¡'s citizens. This was so ltot o¡lv because lar.ge
cities scrvecl ll¡ lhc capital, Mexico City. This was so lrot oliy because, i¡ an uDstablc
as home to nluch oflhe inclusl ri¡l ivorkilg class ancl
lo thc owllcrs of¡tdLrstri¿ri |cvolutionary envirollrnent, the 1rew]y founded Mexican state was not yct
¡x rst
estaL¡lish¡nc¡ ts 1h¡ t th c poii,:e sough t to protec l (Leal :oo l police
). also beca¡n e wt,ll iustitutionalized due to internal tensiolrs in the revolutionary family ancl
ce¡tr¡l ¿clors l¡cc¡r¡sc the lapidlv urhanizing Ircales ofLatin Antcrica requiretl
lrtr¡trsc the militar-y was not united behind the revolutionary leade|s1.rip
additional li¡.nrs r¡f control irncl regulrtiol relating to thc procluction
lncl (wlrich itself was divided). The situation was also owing to tlre fact that the
consumptiolt of ne1\. gt¡ocls and serviccs, lhc
¡rror.isit»r a¡d l¡anagerre¡t of ¡rrrliciury was dominated by political conservatives and others $,1'lo ren-l¿1ined
trlnsport¡til)n aotl trallic, thr: irspecliorr of-llr¿rkcts, and lhc nrolitoring
of hyr¡rl)¡thetic to the counterrevolutiorary elite and had Lirnited sympathy tbr
thc urtran rrncntplol-erl ancJ inditcnt, t() 11¡l¡c t)Ltt;r iéw necessarv to ¡¡rease tlrt, r'cvolutionary project. Iloth conditions drove the revolutionary leadership
the thec'ls olconl¡tc¡ct', I<eep thc locirl econollr
), gt-olvi¡g, alcl guariutee social to t'rcate new police institutions and polvers th¿rt could be used to th$.afi thc
ortler i¡ a¡ eltviroltlllelll in [,hjch rUful tri¡irants, itrfbrmal-scctor rvo¡kers,
cllolts ofjudges employing their power against revolutioDary loyalists, as rvell
ancl other neu, soci¿l actor.s appcarecl on thc sccne in clrovcs (Bliss zoo¡t piccato
¡rs to l(ccp the over$¡belming power of the military at ba¡r
20orj Mr:¡dc 1997).
ln ¡ddition to founding a new "judicial" police that answcrcd directly to llre
ln Lhis coiDplicatecl cnyiroutllcut of rl1>i,:l urbanization, industri¡lizi1ttot1.
lcr lt r'¡l crecutiye despite retaining local functions, the new political Ieaclership
¡nd statc lorm¿tiou, the powcr ,tf the policc exfandccl by lcaps aDd
lrounils, (irr ¡
reform introduced by Venustiano Carranza and co¡itjoued by Plutarco
olten to the poi¡t of lensiorr lis-ir vis tl¡e ¡tilitat v. \,Vith thc policc becornut¡i
lilirrs OrlJes) also centralized control over preventative police, or "beat" cops,
i¡crcasinglv i¡volvecl i¡r cverycl¡y r¡rb¿n lili, ancl the nrilitarv slruggling
1o keep wlro ¡rlior to this ¡eform wo¡ked majnly al the decenrralized level of the mu
its ¡rivilcgecl position ns the arr of thc st¿le used to root out enc¡rics
ancl rr ir i¡ralities ( zliriclpios), along witlr other ¿rctors mor e closely linked to citizcns
defend thc ¡.rtion¿l itrtcrcst, lcnsions el)tcrged n,ilhin thcse
cocrcive arms of tlriúr lhc state, including justices ()1'the peace (Piccato zoor). To establisli
the sl¡te ¡s ¡,tell as l¡ctlvecn thcnr ¡lcl thc citizcnrv. iloth lhe nrilitary
ancl the ,rrtlrorily oyer the city police, the revolutionary leadership not o¡ly cleale.l a
folice ¿s indivicht¿ls ancl instilution¡llr *,trc cr¡¡,,r.,.]rtr¿r'r.
sir(.tr leervav nr'\\, inslitutiolr and chair-r of command intended to integratc all Local police
aDd ofcr¡tcd rvith very littlc state-irnp(,¡..J di..jplinc lI,cr(ir.r .,,,,5; Ungo,.
ollir cls and.justices ofthe peace into a single ciq^\.ide police force answeling to
:oo:). I'his cst¡i¡lisherl the lbuncl¡tio¡s for abuse ofponer on thc part ofthe
llrL lirlcral erecutjve. Political leaders also kept centralizcd con[rol bv Iinl<ing
statc's ke),coerci\e ¿ppar-atuscs, a lc¡1ac¡,th¡t persisted loDg
trcyonti thc suc tlr is r)cw cit»\,ide police dir'rctly to tbe militar¡ This is evidenced by the use ol'
cessfi¡l ¡chieverle¡t ofthc st¿ttc's urbln. politicll, and econontic
developnten rrrilitrrry pcrsonnei in the uppcr ranks ofthe poiicing apparatus, as well as b1,
tal goitis. Ilow this u¡rfolcle.l in car.l\.t1\,enticth century I_¡tin A¡nerica
can be tlrr r(slrr¡cttrrirg ofpolicc trajning and r-esponsibilities so as to inc¡lcate ¡r(l
cviclcnctcl through I lrrorc focLrse.l Liiscussion ol the Mexicau experienct,
ir the lrrriLl on rnililary valucs and rliscipline.'? These institutional tralsfo¡matit,ns
,lc. r,i,. L,ll,'rr irr tlre tqt,, r..r.r.rr i,rr.
¡rrrt rr lirlerirlly col¡lrolled, n.rilitariJy linked policing apparatus onto Me,\i.o
( it! st,ccts, rvhcrc il mirint¡ined a visible presence in evelyclay u ran Iiii nncl
rv.rs irlrlc lo Iolitic¡lly t¡rrc¡1cD t¡Dd cconc¡Dic¡lly cxto¡t) thc nost hr¡r¡l¡le ol
r itircr¡s.
No¡rc ol llrcsc,.'h:rn1¡ts o,crrrrctl srrrrxrllrly or !villlo(rl 1)|crl co¡rllicl, horv

/,0 ulAN tt D^Vl5

|llt r)! f,tN., fI vtr 1ur I ANlr N"lrLltillY ¿l
 evcr. l'he r¡nk and file of the prer-entative police dicl not like thc miiitar),
ir¡r,olvcncnt in thci¡ acivitics, es¡reciall,v in thc e¿rlr, vcars ofpostre\,olutionJn'
consolidation rvhen they still h¿d pro-Di¿z s,vlrpathizers or ¡1o¡trcvolutionarv
lol-¡lists ¡r.ithin their rarks. l'hcy llso ficclucntly found themselves contp,:ring
rvith thc jLLclicial policc ii» thc power to jn\-estigate ¿ud al rest suspected crii¡i
n¡ls tbr both political ancl renl sccking purposes. More important, ¿rs the
internal ideological conll)Lr.s ol thc rcvolutionalv st¿te shifted, so too rlid the
hvaitics olthc polJce and the nrilitar¡ Th¡t is, even though in thc initial stages
lr4cxico Cily poiicc nral'havc joi¡recl with the revoluLiorl¿ry lcadcrship in the
qoal of lootinir out courlter-rel.ohrtion¡ries, the fbllowing phascs of ¡rolitical
policirg, in uhich the focus shilted to policing other revoltüionarics ancl pa:--
tisrn political oppoücnts, brought conflict and tension tvithin and among the
ir,lexico Citi, police, the nrilitary, .tnd the sti¡tc. L)ver time these tetrsions frrther
reinforccd the violeul ¿nd rutllor ilar iaD chal-actcr ol the state, also leltlilg to
'
!¡c¿tcl policc irupunity rntl ¡ turrt to violeir.e to solvc sociai and political
ploblcms. ln lr'lcrico rnuch ofthis ca¡¡e to ¡ hc¿d in thc immcdiate postrevolu
tionely dccaclc, and then agaln in the r93os r¡nder the ¿clministr¡¡tion ofLiizaro
(li¡rrlc'n¡s. rvhc'n thc (lc¡11ocl¡tic ¡¡d clltss charicter of thc statc cantc ur¡cle¡
qr¡cstion.
As earl,v as r9r5 \\,e see slile e,lbrts to Usc the Mcxico City police to cotrtr-oi
political enenries not corsitlcr'ecl countcn-cvolt¡tionaries t]rrot¡glr coercive.rc-
tions a!li1i¡1st striki¡rg trolley worliers ancl mcr¡t¡crs of ,¡ther tralrsport uuion§.
In l)arl, thc ncw rcvohrtionary govcrnrDent r'vas concernecl to l<ccp the urtran
ccr¡nc¡nry functioninll so ¿s to tircilit¿te urbtrn illd industri¡l dcvclopmcnt in
tlic criticill ,vcars aftcr the revolutio¡, rvhe¡ loreign cipital had flcd and the
. lrrger revolutionrry projcct de¡rcnclccl on juntp stilititrg tlte economy. l,ike
nr¿nv elerrents i¡
the l¡bor nlovcr¡tcnt u,tth com¡runist synpathies, lroLh
r¡rrii»rs h¡d actlLally been qLrite loyal to the revolutionilry ¡rroject, irnd many
rure¡rtrers h¿d fóucht ¿longsicle llre rcvolution¡rics in the stmggle agaiust the
l)i¡z dicl¡tolship. llut they did rlot necess¿uily suppr»t thc fictious in ¡ror'r.er,
rvho rvcrc t()cing il ntore collserv¡ti\¡e line, ancl thus ihc strikjng lvorkers'
clisruptior t¡1 1hc local ccorlomy w¿s corlsidered grounds firr violcrt reprisirl.
'l hc slrtc rcplcssion ofstriking u,orJ<ers not olly planted the ilslitulional sceds
. of police corlplicitl irr rooting ou1 idcological enemies, a t¡¡tlitior¡ that woulcl
p.rsist a¡d be.orne irstitutionalircd ovcr thc ycals. It also gilve police a kev rolc
iDlegulating transit--sonrethiDg llr¡l lvoul(l l¡tcr rctunt to h¡Unt the forcc ds ¡
uholc, ¡s thc poliac aotttr()l o1_tr¡llic l¡ccamc ¡ nrain rour',c of l¡r'ihcrv ¡l¡tl
.()rrrrIli()n iIr Ilrctlctrrrlcs r¡l llri r9;os.t0rl t96rrs.
/,.) l)t^Nt I trAVt.,
Another round of intensive political poiicürg occurred in the period r9z5-
-r.u, this time directed against Labor Party members and other prodemocracv
l)¡rLisans in the Distrito Federal (or) who opposed the ar¡tho¡itarian and
centralizing tendeocies of Calles's revolutionary leadership. In this particular
conflict, a strolrg connection developed between the Mexico Cit¡, police chief
¡ntl Calles around the aims of nonitoring political debate an.rong Labor Party
¡clivists, dor¡inating public infornration, and trleaking up opposition rallies.r
A lhird round of political policing tool< place in tJre early r93os, just before
( lfrdcnas's rise to porver, when police again were uscd against laborers and
(-onrrunist linked worker organizations, well as against canrpesinos. The
as
¡rrlicing ofpolitical opponents was clearly not i¡te¡ded merely to silcnce an
rrrtive civil society. [t also found elective afñnity with the polirical leadership's
.lli)rts to repress revolutionary rivals u,ithin the military and the state itscll Ali
llrcse fbrms of police practice trace their origins to the contested process of
slirlc formation and to the struggle to establish control and ideological con-
lol¡rs notabl¡ in the Mexican case, tl'¡e relatiye power and inclusion ofla-
lrorcrs and peasants as opposed to industrial and agrarian elites.
In combiration, these tensions pitted revolutiorlal'y against revolutionary,
¡rolicc against military, and president against mayor, depending on rvhich coer
t ivc lirrce was most loyally attached to u,hich faction o¡ level ofgovernrrent. In
llr is cr)vironment, mistrust and violence became the modus operandi ofpoliti
L , rl lrr lc, ar-rd the institutiols of policilg bccarne the battleground for porver.
l' t nt u ( :on tesled State Form.tt¡011 to Institutionalízcd
I \tl ir ( )ornqtion, t 9zo-qo
(;ivcn the history ofcontestation over the direction ofthe revolutiolary statc,
it lli(l rrot tal(e long before the police as an institution begar] [o spiral out ol'
, or¡l¡rl. I'his direction had become clear by the r93os, at a time whe¡ ll)(,
lvlt'x ica n governn.rent h(,?ed to turn its full attcntioD to inclust¡ialization. Morc
llrrrr lwo dcc¡des of political policing and corrrpljcity between revolutionlly
lr'.rrI ls and the police in the use ofextralegai nreasures to achieve tireir ideoLr¡1
or st¡ lc consoliclado¡r ainrs h¿d created a corrupt police force increasingly
iL,rl
lr,rrrl lo trrlh_ol
I l)r ¡1)()ts of institLl tionalizccl corruption probably trace to the period tgto
rtl \\rlr.n thc nrilil¡ry, rrrclcr C¡rranza, began usurping Mexico Ciity policrrg
Ir l{ ti( )rs l1) (()ns()litl¡lc llrc rcvoltrl ion¡r y Jcaclcrsh ip's lrowcr ovcr cilizclt l¡tili-
li,r,;rrrri L¡trrl r¡r¡nici|]¡lilics wlro soughl lo nm in ta irr ¡ clcccnlr¡lizctl svstcnt of'
]llt r)titf; N,, lI vt1)t tNr I N,,lrLli Y /,1
polici¡rg. Durjng this period police became directly involved in "garden-
variety" corruption linked to urban regulation and servicing. This entailed
taking bribes fron'¡. vendedores qfibulantes (street vendors) arrd pulque (fer-
mented grain drink) sellers, or negotiating prices in return for ignoring labor
law regulations, market permissions, transport violations, and the like. The
pressure for so-called ¡ent seeking among the police (i.e., corruption and
bribery, or la mordida) caure Iiom a variety ofsources. The police were poorly
paid, in no small part because of the depressed economic envi¡onment in
postrevolutionary Mexico City; Betting a iob was reward enough to keep sal-
aries low. Yet even with low salaries, the police were required to pay for their
own supplies and unifo¡ms, an obligation that pushcd them to find other
sources for ilrcorne. The lack of formal training in police work, and a Iimited
commitÍrent to the communities the olfrcers were policing, also greased the
wheels ofbribery and impunity.
Solne of the petty corruption unfolded among the rank and file, many of
whom were ex-soldie¡s of humble means who got their jobs by petitioning to
revolutionary leaders for police employment as payback for fighting with revo-
lutionary cadres.a But corruption did not just r¡ccur in the rank and file. As
early as r9r8 we see highJevel militaryofficers requesting posting in the Mexico
City police, precisely because ofthe money assumed to be circulating through
this office via corrupt practices. The involvement of higher police olfcials i¡r
corruption helped regularize the practice throughout the entire system, in part
because higher officials (police chiefs, :rilitary generals, and higher-positioned
individuals) expected citizen payoffs to rank-and-file offrce¡s to be channeled
upward. Thcse practices helped establish a clear set of "prices" or rates fo¡
mordidas (tw<t pesos for vetding pulque on Sunda¡ etc.), which in turn helped
¡ormalize citizen expectations that such bribes were the officially sanctioned
price for doing business.
Over time, even after the still frafle state leadership had effectively defeated
its counterrevolutionary opponents, corrupt practices continued, and they
soon beca¡¡e interlaced with üe ascendance of political factions, further en-
trenching them, despite occasional efforts by the rrilitary leadership or gov-
erning officials to clean up the police fo¡ce. This was ¡eflected in the terms of
ofñce for police chiefs: P¡io¡ to 1921 almost all chiefs had left their positious
after less than a year in of6ce (Davis forthcorning). Starting in the mid-192os,
terms for police chiefs begin to extend, with some remaining at the helm for
three to four years,s although the average tenure of Mexico City police chiefs
¡emained crratic. Only around r95o did police chiefs' tcrnrs begin to coincidc
¿¿ OIANE E, OAVIS
s,ilh lhose of nriryrtral untl/or presiclential ad¡linislritlions. Paradoxicalir,',
lr.wever, thc incrcasccl lcrnrs of ildividual poiice chicfis llso rllowed netrvo¡ks
,l toncrption to (-leei)cn and flourish, not Least l¡ec¿use lhc lo¡g-stdr]diDll
r orrr¡licity ol'thc policc nraclc olliceholding ¡ lucrittivc busincss whose geirs
\!( r( sccn ¿1s st4rporting o¡tional ¡cvolutionary ¡rr'ojccts ls ntucl-r as personal
¡r rt lietbooks.
llv the r92os cor.ruptiorl h¿rd rc¿ched such heights that high lcvcl police
¡', r'rrnnel rvere pu blicll, knowu-antl alf¡mcd in internal sccrct police reports
tr¡ bc involvcd i¡ crinrinal activities, including an auto-tlrcti garrg ktrorul as t-J
tlrr l]¡id.r de Autonrobilc G¡is th¿t counted c»r Mexico City's polict'chief.rs a
l,¡rrr.ip¿l i¡lerloct¡lor." lhrgues likc this did not l¡st lorlg ir't tltcil posts, and
rr,)sl wcle recyclcd out of leaclership positiotrs bcciusc ofuncleniablc corrup-
lr(¡n, lhe wrong polilicirl rllcgianccs, or both. li¡l lltcy rilcly clisappeared
, r lir cly. Most jusl fi)u r'rd otller lucriltive positions clsovhclc in the ¡ciminist¡a
tror either in ¡nolher police agency, in thc nrilitlr¡ nnrl/or in othcr higher
l, vtls ol the state (a l'avored posting rtas in customs, rvhich had great reflt
'.rthirrg potential). In l¿¡ct, it is not farletchcd to suggest that L¡tin America's
l.rtlr irrfirrnously high lcvcls ofcorruption nta.v havc origirratcd \\,ith corrupl
,rrlrrri¡ristrators o:iginally rccvclcd out of potice or nilitary posts into othe¡
.r¡ rrr ol the statc.
I tntt l\tl¡Lr,(hrnLlt¡ou Io Il(ttt\tdte¿ Authorit(n-¡onisút, tt)lo .60
(l¡1'ol thc gre¡t ironies ol policc contLption was that it ¿ccelcr¡tcd i¡ iulersc
rr l,rtir rrr to thc revolutionrry Ieaclershi¡r's elforts to cr»rsolirlatc its political holcl
,rr rlrr \l.lte. lhc dyn¡n1ic rci¡rfbrced the stite's autho rit¡ ri.rrr isrn clcspite the
It'\( rrr)lcnt's clli)rts to strcngthc¡ the political systcnr's tlcmoeratic cha¡acter
tltc t94os:tnd t95os. I¡ lVIcxico this shilt corrcsÍronded u'ilh thc i¡tlmin
,lrrr rrrl1
rltr,rti¡,n ()l (lárdc¡¡s, lllc coLllttrv's great populist lc¡clcr ¡ncl liiend of thc
rr.r Iirrrt r l:rss, rvho also w.:nted to spur on thc cconont), lhrough i¡dustrializl
lrorr l\lolir'¡ltrl in p¡rl by rcpressivc policc actio¡ls ¡aainsl ¡rc'usnnts.and Ia-
I'r,r,'r,. who strrrgglcrl firr ¡ nrolc inclusire ¡¡cl dc¡tocr¡tic slatc, as well ¿s I)\,
llrt l.r(I llrll lrr¡li,.r'tr»ruPliolt ¡1c into toLu_isl'D reveltues ilt w¡ys th¡1 ch¡l-
l, rr¡i,,1 lrrs ctorronrir'clrvcIr¡rr¡cnl ainrs,] (irirclenns cirnrc to ollicc with ¡ conr
rlltllr'nl l,) l)úrifi llrc |olirc ¡|P¡r'¡tr¡s in thc c¡pit¡l cily l)oing so, hollcvcr,
r,¡rrrrtrl srr¡r¡,olt lirrrrr ¡llits. I
li rlr.rl,rtlrr'¡rrll lol(r. \tltlttlr('(r)cr(iYCt.r¡r.rtitvor¡rrlitit.rl |()\v.rt(,ri(l ir¡
llrr', t.r.,l. rr.rr llrr'rrrlrt,rrr'. ,\ rrr l tlri ¡, irr l.rl tlrc r,r¡trlrrlr rl¡r. llrrL.t rl. t..rrrlcl¡.¡s s
llll 0Jtjr,tN,, ot vlrt I N( ! ANt) lN,,l ( l,ti|ly /,,,
rcli¡nce on the nrilit¡r)' to deal u,ith policc col-uPtio¡ el-en if cione tbr pro lorve¡-rank ofiice¡s to hold theil superiors accoultable, and they coLrld reiuse
gressir-e, populist purposes-only iurlhcr institutionalizcd the st¡1e's iiulllori, Io [¡e driwn into the circle of corruptiot] ancl impunit¡ Further problems
t¡r'i¡n cb¡r¡cter-, thercbl,undt'rrnirrirg thc lalgcr dcnloct-¿tic ¿itns tlt¿t lt¡cl irose fi-onr thc "effects" of this uovly instated class consciousless. Otganizx-
pusltctl Chrdcnas to sLrpport police reforms in the llrst pl¡cc. It illso rcintro lional connectiorls ar-ound state-wot-kct identities l)etwec[ the rank and {ile
ducecl ¡ ¡rilil¡rv r¡cntalit), into the policiDg appar-¡tLrs, soiilcthinir tltat had in police and the general wo¡king class madc it impossible fbr the police leader
the p¡sl, ¿1s dcscribccl carhcr', planted the seeds of police .orrltptiorr lo bcgitl ship to continue its political policing ofclass enemies or tt¡ further use coerLivc
u,ith. Io his.redil, (larrclc¡lils (li(l l1ot turu to the nri]it¡ry it¡ntcdiatci,v, sccl<ing lirlce against rebellious citizens, esper:ially those jnvolvecl in the lal¡or-r¡ove
instc¡d othcr i¡stitLrtion¿11 reli)ln)s thirL nright cllect changes ft-om uithin tlte ¡rlelt, who had long been on tlte receivi¡s eltcl ofpolice btutaliry. Cárdetr¿rs's
policc firlce. \'et his efii¡rts to liee| the coclcivc ¡nns ofthe st¡tte "cleau" ald refolris thus proved highly contror.elsiaL. 'fhey c¡e¿ted tensious \,vithirl
¡rrllice
undcr his contrc¡l f¡ileti. tlre policc, cs¡recially bet$¡een the rlew ¿uriliary ancl the o1d pr everltalive police,
-l
hc lllst of Cár'c1en¡s's relblt¡s e¡t¿iled an cxpransion of thc cit¡,'s poliet tu ¡nd betrveen sorre elements of tlre police and the military. And although
i¡clude seoriIri\,¿rtc sccurit,v fbrccs that h:rd been opelating prr-allci to thc pre ( l¡irdenas hin¡sellhcld great prestige and considerirbJe porvcr in the militar y, as
!ent¡tiye polic.. l lris infirsion of ¡c¡tst¿te secu rity 1¡rces ill lo thc prrblJc policc ln organizatioo it divided ovcr the changes lte initi¿ted. 0 As a result,
rvas also
r¡¡l<s ¡llor'vecl (}i rcle¡ns to lir ¡i it thc rclativc institrLtio¡al inflrLc¡cc of l hc hishlv ( liilden¿s sooll backcd tlown on his pla[s to extend state worker legislirtion to
corruptcd oflicer corps. -,\t rnilirrurn, hc hopccl to ofiel the citt:s residents ¡ tlrc police, despite their potential to move forrvard his agenda or bt¡th the class
rencwed Police tirlce Dot tied i¡lo old llctrvo¡ks ofcorrLtption r¡cl rvith t repu ,r rrd police corruptiolr fronts.
t¡tioD ofbcing rcspolsive to the citizenr,v. Mosl irrpo tilnt, b].bringiDg pliv.rte 'I'l-re
police did not, howcver, remain unchanged. To conlpensltc fol-tltis
policc irto thc cit,v's public policing sen,ices Ciirclcnas strcngthenccl }lis orrn lit iled reform and to repair the damage inflicted on police-military relations by
ideologicel posilion rvithin thc conflictive r t,yolutir¡¡rarv famill,at large. The llrr state-workcr dcbate, in r939 Cárdenas int¡oducecl a third and final police
¡c\\, Policc olfice¡s, r¡orv callccl Irolici¿ AuxJIil r (auxiliarv poli.c), $/crc kno\ n to ,
rcfirrn.r: its "¡tilitarization." Militarization mealt orgatlizationally subordin.rt
be extrenrel¡- loyal to (iiirclcnas and his political itlc¡ls, ¡r¡d Lhcv wcrc both ing the poJice to tirc militarv once again. In the u'ords ofthen police chieflosé
organizt-rl alcl scll-iclcrttilicd as part of lris lirrger rorking-cl¡ss llrovcnlent. h4unucl Nuirez Amaral, rrilitarizatio was a rteans lor "incor¡rorat[ing] thc
'I hc scconcl m¿jor change r,¡s ¿ reorgarliT¡tjolt ofthc police to reflccl their ,rtlrninistr¿tion of the police fo¡ce u,ithin the aury, so that jt rvill becor¡c
class, crDploymcDt, ¡¡d/or state-lvorl(er slitrs, puttiltg thell in svuc \\,ith ¿ll srrbjcct to ¡rilitar i, lau' and discipline."rr Milit¡rrization unde¡¡ined the r adical
othcrs cnrploycd b)¡ the state. The roo(s ol this shiil traced to a piecc of- ,rirns ofthe state-r'orl<er legislation, l¡ecause it endowed all police ivith the
le¡,islation lionr r93fi thilt tlividcd state workets int(i trvo carcgor ics, r1c lrd-sc and srrnrc jtrriclical status
as militarv personnel (i,r,ho werc neither aiiowed to strike
dt cLtnlitttzu.t llris lcgisfation, also crafteti by (iiirclenirs, helpcd rcinfotcc thc rro¡ lo hold superiors accountable on employment dccisions). It also helped
1\,orliing-cl¡ss cons.it¡usr-rcss ol'thc new ¡rixiliar y police, bringing thcnr iu sl nc: ,rssu¡se lhe fia¡s of the colservatjve fáctions of the nilitar)., u,ho wo¡¡ied
with other wor-king-class lcrrccs who sought to lintif the slale's incltrstri¡rliz.ttron rrlxrul thc i clusion of leftJeaning cadres of privatc sccurity forces ir the
lrojcct. It nreilnt that police coulcl idenlily thcmsclvcs ¡s jr¡st anotirer lbüü of'
¡,olicc. |inall1., milita.izati.»l made it easicl-to coDtrol conl'lict l)ctrleen rl¡e
sl¡lc workcr'. lt proved n very poprLlar n-rovc, ancl ntany ollicels requested lull
l)r.v(rr l¡tivc ¡ od aLrxiliary police forces, r,vh o rvcre struggling ovc'r power, influ-
inclusic¡n ill thc stilte work Iecisl¡tion so as to bcnclit from job stabilit¡,rncl confrol ofcorntption netu,orl<s.
r'rri c, rr ntl t hc
¡c.ess lo soci¡l sccuritt ') H()\,\,e\.el, I)oth rel-olñs rlrct sclious political opp,.si liul llrc l¡rliLc's rrrilit¡r iz¡tion rr1ost h¡n¡tecl thc n¡tion i¡ tllc 1()rr:t tcr¡ll l)\.
tio¡, prirnarily becausc thcy gate the treu,r:rtrl<-ancl-ille Ioli{jc fo\\'crhtl tools , ,t,rlrlrslrrrg Lrr¡rrlilior¡s irl r\.lritlt !rr,rrl(,r'corrupli()lt iln(l nt()rc unconslr¡inc(l
to..xpose the corruIt lriring ¡u(l firing P¡¡ctices rLsed bv cxtant policc cadres.
¡,,,1iti,.r) ¡,o i( ¡ii r)rrlilrl florver irrrrl l¡r'i¡rclc¡sing lhc nrilit¡ri s.o¡tr()l ()\(f
The highcr level olllccrs had glou,n ¡ccustonre(l to tr hierirrclt¡, ol LrnqLrcs ,,,irl L r.rrrrI,,()( i( l\. I irsl, tlris rJor rrr, lilic llrc irrrlLrsiorr ol s.nril)riv,ttr lill\ ll
tir¡nccl ¡rLthori¡v th¡1 ¿llox,ecl the¡n t(r cxtort lowcr r¡nh olllccrs lir Liclib¡tks llr, ¡,,, r,, ,,r,IrIr'rI,r ILIrIIIL I l,rr'l ()l 1r,r1i¡lrc¡lt.tliol l,) llt(. \() lrr.l rtrrrl itrstttlr
lr(.r
¡rrtl Piryofls rollc,rlcd on (lul\'. Ille sl¡1e worl«r ii'rtis.rlrorr, lrrrrcvcr. .rllrrwcri 1r,,1,.t)l li,,li, rrri, rllri, lr rlL rr',rIr,,r,II ,Iir i,l,.,l1,, trr,, rr1rr,li, i.rl,lrill,r, \ t.l t,rl,\ !

¿¿ r)lANt I t)AVl,,
lltl l)|lt(,tN,,r)l vr)r tt.]l l^NttN ltt)| t t/
police. The prolrcm wirs not Inerelv the Prdifcr¡lion of (iistillct cocrcivc lbrces
blrt the coexjstcrcc t¡l- difiérent ¡xrlicc rvho artsweretl to dilferent lcvcls o[
sove¡nmcnt. llaving, so many policc uith the atthority to coclcc cilizerls
uppcd thc antt'and u,iclened thc e)ilerlt ofcouupt pr¡cticcs, iLs e¡ch sepa¡ate
cadrc ol police used its disti¡ct institutiolr¡l v¡ntage pojnt to cilpt rLre a piece of
the rcnt-sceking pie. As citizcrts sullirecl the b¡unt of fhis slr-LlctLr¡e, thev
prcssured the st:1te on refir-ms. r 'lhis it lu¡n sprtrrcd l1-rc fi¡rr¡¿lion oI nerv
lionr Lhe parqv's deliber¿rtions, at least as a formal body rvith scctoral rePreseD
t,rtion. With the military controlling the police bul absent from rePresertativc
l)olitical institutioDs, citizens had almost nou'here to trrrn ¡1 terms of poiice
,r.countabillty during the r95os, r96os, and r97os.
'l he problem was not rrerely th¿t citizens lrad tlo clear democratic or in-
stitr¡tiorlal ¡¡echanisms for cornplaiuing about policc or military abuse and
r orluption. The nrilita zation ofthe police also rei¡forced a centralizing terl-

¡rolice lorces rvho mighl act more efficieutlv c¡r conscic¡tiously, inclucling thc
fororation of a sccrct police cor¡rs to dcal rvith irrlern¿l corruPtioll,'r lurthcr'
fraglnenting thc police irtto tret'local ¡rcl nalionurl agencit-s.r
Fragrlle¡tdtio¡ m¡de it difhcult Lo cooldinate police scl'viccs, as thc rank
and filc rrnsneretl to their olv¡ sublcadetship, rvith etrch cor-nplctnetrtary fot'ce
,lt rrcy in the state, Jinking a unified r.nilitary rvith the Mexico City police in
w.rys rhat irllowecl for greater corrtlption and a more di¡ect coltnectio¡ bc
twccn local ancl national repression ofthe country'§ citizens. Ct¡tnLlined rvith
tlrc llrgn-reotation ofpoiicing ancl the overlaps oflocal ancl natio¡al coercivc
¡rl)l,,rratuses, these Iegacies set the stage for the repressivc political policing and

ther commLlnic¡ting horizontrllv t'ith the Nlexico Cit.-v l.olicc LlePar tlre¡t. ,rlrrrscs of power that matcrialized in thc r96os, leading to the 1968 student
'll1is ¡rr¡ngenrent also luclcd thc rvheels of extortion ancl corr-u¡rtiotr botlt ( risis,the emergence of an active and r¡obilized civil society in the r97os and
wirhin thesc orllirrizalions ¿Dd betwcen thcn arid the Nleico City policc rrltos, and ultimately, struggles 1br the democratizatiolr ofthe Mexican politi
chief.r5 Furthcr complicrtirg ln¿ttels, bcc¡llsc ol lhe historv of aclciitrg not' , ,rl syslem in the r99os.
police serviccs iD rcsfonse to sltJfting po)Jtical clilcn¡rnas or reqr.tisitr:s assuci
¿ted $.ith levolLrtiolary or statc consr¡licl¡tion, police services h¿rd bccr¡r:c
More of the Some?
l)útncrqtizalíoi1: A Bredk vlil:h thc P.'st 01'
organizecl around just ilbout ev(]r,v functio¡al l¡asis ¿r¡rl tcrrilory. 'lltis il1 turll
¡educccl ¿ccor¡lt¡]¡i]ity bctwccll cilizens artl the police. Ancl rvhilc nruch oft]ris 5o rlid the successful democratization of the political systen.r Put an end to the

¡,r olrlcms ofpolice corruption, impunit¡ and violence?

situirlioll oq,ed to the cleclining clcnrocr¿ltic poteDti¡l ofthc Polilical svstem ¿t SadJy, the ans¡r.er is t'to.

lar-ge, it llso owcd to the fi irgnented structulc of policing, in rvhich citizcns lly r..¡94, just u,her.r Mexico City residents obtained the ght to democratica]ly

had little possibilit,v to holc{ irdividual policc ¡ccounl¡ble. There u,as no singlc ( 1.( I ir mayor, the corutry found itself arvash in robberies, kidnappings, car
police authoritv to N,horl citizens could tur¡ 1() úr¿l(e corrplaints ilLrout gcn tlrcf t, cxtortion, and other fo¡ms of violent and nonviolent criure, including
eral servicing in thc city. Likc\,vise the leaders d police suboperations 1\'ere kept r,rl,, ¡ncl homicide, ¡ruch of it concentrated in the caPital citl' (Davis and
p¡rti¡ll,y pro(ected fro¡r¡ the tbmal ch;rnnels of cornplaints managcil bv lhe Alvrrr¡(lo r9g9). Beha'een 1995 atrd 1998 alone, the overall crime ra¡e in Mexictr
Inspccción (iene¡al de Pr¡lici¡ bccause ol their setniautonomous status. t ity nclrly tripJed (Fundación Mexicana para la Salud 1997:16), and much of
Still, perhaps the greatest obstaclc to accour¡tal¡ility was the milit¡r'izat ion ol llrl violcncc was fueled by police participation in criminal gangs and military
thc police. The decision to sut¡olclirt¡te NIexico (iity police to thc milit.rr:1 rr rvolvcnrcnt in dr ug trafEcking. \\4ry?
¡re¿nt that, iDstitutionrlly speaking, the party rvas bvpasst'cl alrnost entirel)., as l'lr¡.:rrsrver l¡as a lot to lo with horv hard it has proven to change institrr
tlas the l)ep¡rtamcnlo del llistrito federal, thc l\,lcxico City mtyor, rvho coul<1 Irr rrrs prrctices on the ground, given the weight ofpolitical histor¡ despitc
rr rrrl

h¡ve servecl as a ndtur¡l point person fo¡ citizcns'corlrPlilints ¿bout Policc tlrr'ir(lveDl o1'fon¡al den¡oc¡atization. For one, the long-standing nature allcl
atruses. 'l'his clici ¡t¡t initially corstitute a najor problcrr-r when the milita ry had rn:,titu li()n¡ liz¡fiou ol'police corruption in Mexico, leading to the police's orvtr

its own [epreselt¡tive ¿rnc] organizirtio¡ tithin the Partido de la I].cvt¡lu, i,¡r
(lnrr) linl<ing its i¡terests a¡cl actit¡Ds to those ofth(] party an(l thc sl¿le. llul
aftcr the successful ca¡lpirign to denrilitarize the Nlexican st¡tc in tl-rc.arl\'- to
ruicl l9.los, a¡cl following thc creatio¡ ofthc Confl:rlcriri ir'»¡ N¡t iorr¡l rlc ( )rltr
niz-¡cioncs lrolrul¡rt's (¡:rr¡¡,) in rg.j-l, th( nrililiu v l,r',,¡rr, ,,,rrr1rlclclt' isol;rtt tl
¡rrrrtlivitics lo htrirss the state's Political enen-ries and operate above the Jau',
lr,rvt r¡rrtle citizc'rrs unde¡standably distrustful of police motives and of Jegal
r r\t itr rliors, giving incentivc tr¡citizens to resolve violations of the larv al Lhc
..tr,r't llltlllrrorrgh cocrcivc l.lriLrery rather than through jrrlidical ¡rroccdures
'l'hcsc irlli¡r¡r¡l
llu,r irrl( (\l lry lhc firrnrrrl syslcnr ol-jLlslice. l)r¡cliccs l'l¡vc nol

/.fl tANI I
f ) 0AVl! ll oftl{ilN,, r)l v r)r rNl I AN{) lN"l i llllllY ¡'l
only kcpt ir s)'stcrr lrfbribery and police corruptioll aflo¿t bui h¡ve ¿lso flleled that iD the past thcy hatl shared. With corlPetitiorl betrvccn thc
jrLclici¡l r,le¡kncss ¡nil unricrmincd the courts ¡nd the rule oflarv ("I{ect,t¡n ¿ an<1 the police for cr¡ntrol over an expauding big-tttc»le)' netlvork ol

policia clcl rr" .1oo3: Iriccato 2oo4). Thus, ever though ¡ dillerent p¿rtl rnil,a-
nou, be in pou,er, nr¿ny citizers conlirrrre lo rely on old pracliccs.
Sillrilarl1,, it is i[rporL¡nt lo Iecogrlizc thiit rcginrc clcntocratization ln
Mexico and elseuüere--rviil not oecessarill, elilni¡ate all prior instilutions and
¡rrrcticcs, police 1el¿rted or otherwise. llvcn alicr tlcmoc¡atic tralsjtiou, lrilltv
lirtc clo,ckrl.cls still fice their ¡eolitre¡¿l political antl eco¡onric lltures witlr
lhc ol<1 coctcjvc nclrvorks int¡ct, espcci¿lly in the rank ancl hle ofthe police and
lhc nrililar y. A11cr vears ol rvc» king u,ithout eff¡ctive illstitution¿l constr¡ints--
¿s p.rt ol ¿ [.largain with thc ciitc to police the natiolt's political and ecor]urui.
c¡remies to glr¡rrinlee state power ¡nd ecor¡r»rTic pr-oqrcss thc cocr-cjvc ar]ns
of the l¿te del-elo¡rnrental st¡te hiNe becomc wcll cl'lsconccd in ¡ nctwolkcrl
worll of impunitl,, corrLrption, a¡tl crir¡e. Ihis is Lhc instilution.ll lcgacy
bequcathcd to nrani countries ofLiltin Alreric¡, ¡nd denrocr-:rc1, has done little
lo rcvcrsc il.
ln Lhc casc o1-l\lcrico City, in p¿rtjcular-, the dellto.ratiziltion of sor-ero¡ nce
.oltstilulcd l)irrl ol lhc problcm ofaccr:lcrating violcncc irD(l ilrsr-cr¡rit,v, not the
st¡luti<)rr to it, lirr precisclY lhr-'sc rcasr»rs- lnclcccl, wjthout the [,¡t-tic]o Rer.illu
cion¡rio lnstituciorlal lFRr) ¿t the helr¡r in lllc capilal, rtrid rith thr plrty
rvcakened b,v electoral tleleal, thc stability oI the crtile systcnr of conrplicity
l¡etr,r,een the police ¿nd the st¡te iv¡s called into question. \\¡it]r thc ¡,nr un¡L¡lc
10 cortlol the st¿tc ¡n(l its budgct, the policc tur¡ed aw¿r,v tú¡nr ll¡e s¡r¡c
inibrnral practiccs ofpatr-onage anti rert seeking that in prior clecades hacl l<ept
the¡n lor'¡l 10 lhc statc. \\ithout gu¡ra[tees froln the st¿rte th¿1t lllc f]-uits o1-
.orrlrpti(,¡r and briirery $,ould c(»tinuc to cycle throu! l the systellt, police
turned torqarcl citizer¡s nncl crimi¡ral gangs 1or sourccs ofincotrte, contrib
utilir, k) rnore impunity uurd violcncc, or liiliug to sto¡r it. f)entocratizatto¡
¡nd gun-relatcd criminal activities, viole¡ce aDd corllrlict accclel-¿te(l'
situation, ecril,v if not ironicallv, replicateti man,v of thc problenls of thc
past.
I Iris is not to say that dernocraLicall)' clected oflicials gale Lrp \\hendenro
r.:lcctions jn Mexico Cit,v blought Cuauhtómoc Ciirclcnas (son of Lilzlro
) ofthe P¡rtich¡ tle l¿ Revoluciiill f)ct¡-roct iitica r'to) iuio the mayor's
(
in r992, citizcns wele drunk wilh denrocracy's Potelltial, and cxPectil
¡bout cleaning uP the police force and rcducing cor-t tlptiolt rose dr¿rrr¡t
r,.rlly. Cárdenas, Iike his father, was comnitted to dclnocracv and reforl¡ to
to the conccrns ol tlle coulltl \is ll-rost vlllnerablc 1'ropulatir»-rs One of'
first objectives was to mount a capable and trr¡stworth)' police force, pnrgcd
.l olrt ancl corrupted elements and replacecl with those loyal to the pno ¡athel
tlri¡r lo the r,ru, Wisel¡ Cárdenas thc insisLed that he would rot bring i¡
jn
nrilit¡ ry to reforn the police, altlrough son.re ofbis most loyal allies rvere the
rrrililary (owing to his father's tegacy), ar.rd his ñrst police chicfwas a retirecl
rrr ilitruy n.ran. This generated considerable skepticism about thc veracity ofhis
,lrrirrr, bursting the bubble ol'euphoria about real cltange it1 a newly demo-
, r ,rli. city. However, the subsequent aPPoinlments of the civilians Alejanchtr
(irrtz Manero (as or police chief) and Samuel del Villar (as attorney general
lor llrc Dp) soon rei¡forced his colnmitment to a nerl' strategy of reform'
\lr)rlly thereafler, Cá¡denas introduced lrew structules lb1 hiring and fornru-
l,rrr(l ¡llcrnative mechanisms for oversiglrt of the police. Thesc changcs in
,lrrrlctl lhe introduction of lie detector tests for nelv and returning poJice
judicial police (those empowcred trr
l)r'rs()rrrel, forced IesiSnation§ among the
l,r irrli crinrinals to coufi), and a new system of tracldng pl'eventative l)oli'c
(tlr cnt¡.§ted with guaral'rteeing social order) by neighborhood Yel, unfirr-
)sc

¿lso ¡re¡ut that the PRr's col]trol oi llre juslicc systcm f.lJtcrctl, furthcr crcatrtr¡, trrr,rtcly, the reform's incffectivcne§s bccame visible aluost immediltcl,v,
¡ r,oid in thc inslitt¡tions irncl practices that upheld tht' rule of law. l'hc rapiilli, ,,rvirr11 irt tto small part to the institutional legacies created by Cárdcnas's
dctcriorating situation lvi1s ¡ot, tiisru|lions irr r-r1d
ho\!,ever, solel), the result of l rt lr, r . r clirrnrs iilil' 1,gars e¡rlicr.
institlrtion¡i nct\\¡orks of control and emergent weaknesscs in the jrLsticc sys lrr\t r.r,n. op¡rositiolt frorn Ieacling policc officials, ollc of whollr \\'rrrl
tcnr. It rvas also the product of tlre cre¡tion ofalter¡rati¡,e pr¿ctices, ioclutling .r ,lLr,(rl! t{) lhc press to vigorously clcfi¡cl thc "rnorirl qurlity'' of thc cit¡'r
"occ¡siorr¡l '
call by the cit,r's Iast lRr-¡i)pointcd ntayor to'irilitarizc" thc city's police forcc, 1,,,lr,, ,lcs¡,itc hJs sur¡rrisir-rg ¡rltblic acknorvledgtlc'¡t c¡f the
Lrsi¡rg the ¿ünv 1o pLuge the .orps ()1-its rrost corrLrpt elemet)ts (L¿)pez Montiel 1,r,,l,lr rrr ol "jrrtiicial policc . . . linkages rvilh In¿tl¿ dc(li.atc(l to thc robb' rl
:,ooo)."'Such uleasures only crealecl nc$ conl'licts within ¡r1d bctwccn th. .r rr,l l rlllirrr,, of .t irlorttobilcs i¡ltl atrlo p:rl ts" (scc " l )eflendcn c¡litl¡tl ¡¡lol 'r I ' l'
l, ¡,,,1r, i,r,os" lq,l,ll. Scc,rl¡tl, l)cilt coPs l)r()tc\lc(l
;rtilillsl lh' 11(\\¡ 1l()\'('l I
lxrlicc altl thc militar,v, which lurthe¡ ILrelecl an envir-r»uucnt r¡f insccrr-i1v ¡s ¡,
thcsc t\Í) fi)rccs stnrgglecl over donrinion rnd the singtrlll conlrol ol illt,q,rl r|r, rr I 1
, , r r II i ( (¡ r r rl |
) I i( ¡ ¡ 1 ¡11..¡',1¡¡¡.1r1'rrillltir,rrr rlrrl llrr'il r(r!i(r's(orllIl(l'l\'\r)'r\

5{) t)tAN L L DAV]s |llt o!t(,tN,,rl v oi r r,¡i t ANI) lN"l ( llllllY r,l
 to actually facilitate criminal offenses, C¡ir¡e rates immediately went through
thc roofas a direct product ofpolice inaction-and perhaps even ofconcerted
action, as some of8cers became blatantly involved in c¡iminal acts as a form of
ret ribution.LT
This situation ofopen rebellion owed not merely to the unparalleled power
ofthe police and ofpolice institutions reinforced by strong connections to the
military. It also occurred because the reform efforts did nqt touch f}re heart of
the problem: the government's ilcapacity to legally indict criminal elements so
as to get to the source of violent disorder and criminaliry A¡d this problem
owed rotjust to the fact that most beat cops refused to cooperate with the state
in iuvestigating drug and other gang-reJated crime, lt also owed to the fact that
thc strong-armed efforts to purily the judicial police had alienated key ele_
n]eDts ir¡ that other stage ofthe administration ofjustice, üe courts. In short,
there was even less cooperation among different crime-fighting elements in the
justice systen after democratization than before. This problem was acknowl_
edged publicly by then police chief Gertz Mane¡o, who lamented a lack of
institutional or legal "coordination which [could] tink [crime] prevention
with investigation" or "articu.late civil, business, and penal codes,,(.Aplica la
SPP plan de emergencia," 1999).
But democratic transition also created a new environment in which politi_
cal competition became so stark that congressional compromises on legisla-
tion ol po)icies enabling police or military reform became well-nigh impossi_
I¡lc, Mcxico's democratization produced a country governed by a National
Congress divicled almost equally betwee[ the three parties rying for national
powc¡ (p¡u, pn», p,rN lPartido Acción Nacionall), with one or the other in
power on the level of the city, the region, and the nation. The absence of
successfi reform, moreove¡ had its impact on civil society. With years passing
and democratic governments failing to make headway on c¡ime because of
past lcgacies, civil society started to take matters into its own hands, although
tratliti<»ral recourses, like citizen p¡otest, hardly n¡attered. In Mexico City a
zoo4 rnobilization of two hundred thousand citizens marching in the name of
public security brought almost no response from then mayo¡ And¡es Manuel
López Obrado¡ for many of the political reasons noted earlier having to do
with his key political bases. The mayort failure to accommodate a highly
mobilized citizenry further alienated them from the state, while also making
thern cynical about the possibility oftrue reform fiom above and diminishing
thcir e¡thusiasm fo¡ standard rortes ofpolitical cJaim-rnaking.
52 OIANE E. DAVIS
li) some extent, this was a vicious ci¡cle: withoLrt citizcns orllat)izcd ¡n(l
for change, elected olicials did not go the extra milc to root oLrt
corruption, continuing instead to let themseh,es be hamstrung by their
p¡rty rivalries afld the sheer magnitude of the organizational rcforn] at
Yet in üe absence ofconcrete gains in police ¡eform or the fight against
citizens became furthe¡ alienated frorn the government, instead
altemative means-ranging Íiom the privatization of policing to
address security problems. By zooz the number of private
firms operating in Mcxico City neared ole tllousand, and thcsc conr
logether employed ¡bot¡t 22,5oo private seculjty liuaIds.rN
(:ilizens ca¡rnot bc faultccl ii» tLrrning to the private sectol lt; solvc prob
llr¡l lhe nc\^/ly dem(xratic gover¡lmu1t proved incapablc oftacl<ling. Yet
dccision to bypass public police in favor ofone's own private security forces
rt dark side, especiallyfor democracy. Such actions not o¡rly ¡et corrupt
offthe hook by decreasing citizen pressure on the state; they also some-
generate more violence a¡rd insecuriry all the while raising troubling
about democracy, equaliry and the rule of law more generally.
a large number of i¡dividuals start bearing arms due to their em-
in private security services, and citizens themselves start to carry
for self-protection, violent "solutions" to questions of public insecurity
the nolm, thereby fueJing the vicious circle ofviolence.re The thct that
police forces frequently co¡'nprise ex-military or ex-police officers fur
lrL lPs ¡ccr¡unt fbr sr»'rre ol tlre transfercnce in impunity ancl thc ttequenl
lighls abuscs rrithin thc lanhs of thc prir.ate police.'. 'l hc rccorrrsr lo
and the emergence ofvigilante attitudes constitute the logical exten-
()l ¡ nlentality to priyatize security and the rule oflaw.
( ), coursc not all citizens resort to such questionable tactics. Mrtny gl¿¡ss
groups take the problems of police corruption and public insecurity to
sceking alternative solutions arld newcommunity practices at thc neigh-
lcvcl. In this serre, citizens are both building on and reinf-orcing thc
practices and advances that have ¡esr¡lted from many years ol'
against authoritarianism. The Mexico Citygovernment has supported
, r tr /, n .,rr r r ify r)rectings ¡t tltc level ol the clclegation, r,ith the goll of brin¡ir rr¡l
lntl ¡rolicc fogethcr in democratic dialogue about how to bcst gLldr-
¡rrrlrlit sccrrrily. llrc rcsults h¡ve been linlited, hou,ever. Citize¡rs rlo ¡rot
,,¡,,,rl' lr,rrrlll, .rl)oul
l¡)li(c .(r'nrIlion rntl inrprr¡ily in tlrcit' nciglt lro llto, rtl
rrll n ll¡,'rr !(r\'\.rr( ¡rolirt rrt rittinll .rrross l1¡c l.rl,le, irnrrctl witlr llrcir
llll r)rir,ll],or vor rrrl I AND lN,,l { rk Y ,,1
not€pads and badges (identifying citizens by face, street, etc.). Therefo¡e, some
degree of police reform must already be in place before grassroots citizen
participation can make a serious djfference,
The power to change endemic poüce corruption and a downward spiraling
situation of insecurity rests partly in civil society's institutional capacity to
transform the system ofpolicing and the ove¡all administ¡ation ofjustice. This
requires, among other things, legislative and poliry actions in which the state
and political parties also emerge as key players. But again, the paradox of de-
nocracy looms large: these kinds ofgoals are dif&cult to realize in a virulently
competitive democratic context in which the lying political parties are unwill-
iDg to cooperate with each other and in which citizens routinely bypass formal
political routes for evoking change. In the meantime, as police remain rela-
tively unaccountable, the sense ofalienation, fear, and defenselessness becomes
a modus operandi for daily life in places Iike Mexico City.
Will a Vibrant Democracy M.ttter in a Globolized World?
The final remaining question is whether a sufficienü strengthened democracy
and relegitimized political system involving cooperation between civil society
and the state could really make a difference in alleviating violence and insecu-
rity. As in earlier historical periods, evidence from Mexico suggests that eco-
nomic dynamics also pose obstacles, especially those that work at the level of
the city and that build on trends towa¡d globalization.
Two factors linked to prior economic development models are key: the
llr,¡l r(irl w¿Iges h¡ve ren¡¿i¡ccl stagllallt atd undcr ¿¡cl un'mPlovlllent h¡\''
l,r.r.rr oI thc ¡isc. l hcsc problertrs iravc Prr)!en parliculirrl),sevcrc
in i\lcxictl (iity,
,r l,r, ,rle h it especially hard by tJrc collirpsc ofthe irrlPolt-sLrbsl
itution irl'lustri¡l
lr.rtiort ntodel.
llre cit)is i¡dust¡ial sector has been nlortally r"'ou¡clcd l'',1 the opcltittg o1'
ilrr' r\oDorrl,v ¿n(l the relociltioll rll-Mcxicr¡ Cily til'tot-ics to the bol(lcr alc¡s
rl,rrcr to nerv nl¡rkct§ fa\'orcd bY the governnlcnt's elil)ort ied nroclel As ¿
r,,,rrll, rttlny previtlusly cnlPloved in thc city's industri¡l sc'tol h¿vc
lool(r'(l
,,1,,r'wlrerc fo incomc. O$,il)g to N4exico's age strttcture, yoLtth urclllPloymcnt
lr.r. ltctt an cspeci:rllv big concern; il signirls a dtmogra¡rhic problt'ttr ihirr
has
lu, l,rl lhc rise oI yot¡th g¡ll8 ¡ctivitics arltl fi¡rthcl colrtl ibutecl to ct'iruiltriil¡
,rrr,l l,ttlrlic insecurit,v.
\irlt¡lilrl)', thc c.otlollric crisis and gbbal prcssttres to libcri'lize thc cconont¡
l,r , uttir!, pul¡lic cxpenclilrtrcs alltl aclvocating lltc privaliz'lliotl olpublic scr'-
r r,, lr¡vc conlribt¡ted to thc problertt. ltl all ecotlomicnlly sclttcczctl
crtvir"rr-
'
Í r,-ll l, sl ¡te downsizi1lg has l atle it dillicuit lirt dctuocr'¡t icallY elcctcd ¡rrthori
ll
rlt \ l ririsc public se.tol-s.IIitl ics, tclnPting police to lirthcr cngtrg,c itl crinre
r1 ll,)l ur]a(»¡motl ro fincl police rvho acl as iir¡nttnell lirr crinlinal gangs ot'
s lr, r r ottl irtel,v extort cr in¡inals fo¡ kickl¡¡cks u'lrcther thc) do or do not at l esl
tlr( rr. l)rcssurcslbl ct¡llusitllt r'r'ith cli¡ri¡r¡ls ilccelerated itl Lhe t99its' es¡re
, r.rlll rvltcrt the f)rug llnftlrccmcrt Á¡1elcv of thc U¡ritccl St¡tes
achieved cotr-
'.r,1,'r,rl,lt sr¡cccss itr ct¡ttillS off dircct supplics l¡etu'eerl
(iolc¡¡bi¡ ¡nc] thc
I r it, rl St¡tcs, thclcl)y in¿(lvcrtcrtly shiftiug much ofthc drr'rg tr'¡(lc into l\lcr-
r, ,, ( /\ ü(lrc¡s rg98 ). Slo$'lv but surelv clrttg Irront'1' beg:ill
t() inEltr¡tc ¡ \''rr iul \

extent of informality in the national economy and the extent of income and ,rl ,rlitrrrics ol thc slate il¡l(l society, inc)uding the military and thc policc
social polarization. And like the problems of corruption, impunit¡ and the il'rrr,yr() .loo.li l'inrentcl :rtloo; (!otrzrilez iluiz, Ltipcz l\rr'lillo V, ¡r\'1 Yiiii('7
un¡ule of law, both trace their roots to past patterns and historical trajectories lr,r t:K.r¡rl.rIr r99t ).rr
of political and economic development. ll,)\\,r'\rr, thc lure ofcnrployment in the illcgal ch ug' (aud gurr) lr¡de i: iLr'r
In prior decades late developers trod a very rocky economic road in which ,rr lrk lv lo crttra¡r citizclls rrs the policc, oivilg lo the sectot'al clratlgcs
l'r'r' i
¡ r,.l rv¡tlr ¡rcolibcr¡l cco¡r\rttic l-cstrucruriug. \{ith ti-wcl
job 1)rosPe'ts ilr tr¡n
formal employment in industry paled in comparison to informal employment
lrl,rr lrrr irrll irrr(l rlllttly rlew ctnploymclll oLrPorltlnities bcyotld thc c<lttcllliorlirl
in small-scale commerce and other petty services, with government employ-
ment generallytaking up the slack. Such secto¡al imbalances have long plagued r,.r, lr 0l those Iititl r¡tf frotlt lilctorit's, ever illo¡-e Mericrtll citizetls 'rtc bcirlg
Mexico, with üe capital city an employment magnet for se¡vice workers in tlr r,,rr rr i¡r to tlrc ittlirtlll¡l scclor. ln 111. historic cclltlal clist¡ict
ol Irlexito ( litv
government and comme¡ce, With the neoliberal turn advancing a downsized ,rlorrr, llrr'rtt¡lltlr,.t tll strccl vcll(l()rs is cslilll¡1cd al iilly lllottsancl' ¡ ltrrrtlbtl'
state, and with the desi¡e for greater global competitiveness driving many llr.rt lr.t\ rrr(¡¡r llrrrtl t ¡
t rI rilt" llrt l'r't x¡r'l¡ tl¡lc of tqqr (lirr¡rrrri
. t tI t
'
t r
¡
'
I
' '
countries to reduce traditional sources ofmanufacturing and agriculture, these ,,,,, ,,,. ). Srrrlr.¡r)l)l(,\l)l(lllr\\'lli,lr lr'rr'lr lrr'r'l*rrl'sisttllit rrttrlt' is tt'¡'
sectoral imbalances haye becor¡e mo¡e extreme. Growing income polarizatiorr r, rllr lrl,, l,rl ill,1i,rl" l'v llr('\l'rlt, Lr'l r'l'r.lrttr.rr"t I I I t I s I ' 'I' lctrL I I i rII I
I '
r

and a failure to recover from more than a decade of rcccssio¡r h¡ve also meant ,1,,¡,r, rlr, rtr,rlr l('r \'rl, ,rr( ¡'r"'lrr"'l 'rr¡l r rl¡ I'I''I'IIIu rIi''II "l
tlr' rlli'it

r r ll r rlr , ¡r vrr) liL | tl , lLril I

54 DIANE E, DAVIS ^lllr
goods trade picks up the slack. As a result, much informal employment is
physically and sectorally situated in an illicit world ofviolence and impuniry
not lust because ofthe illegality ofmany ofthe goods traded but also because
the big-money trade in guns, drugs, and other internationally sold contraband
products generally necessitates its own armed forces for protection. The result
is often the development of clandestine connectiolls between local police,
internationally linked rnafias, andthe informal sector, as well as the isolation
certain territorial areas as locations for these activities (Davis zoo6c).
This illicit network of reciprocities, much of it unfolding on a global scale,
and the territorial concentration of dangerous illegal activities in highly cir-
cumscribed neighborhoods of Mexico City that function as no-man's-lands
outside state control, fu¡ther drive the problems of irrpunit¡ insecurity, and
yiolence. These dangerous areas often sit nestled against old central business
districts where local chambers of commerce face a declining manufacturing
base and are especially desperate to attract high-eDd corporate investors and
linancial seryices. This leads to a clash offorces and development models, and
growing problems of insecurity, that can thwart the developmental aims both
of would-be global cities and of a national investor class desperate for a new
way of generating global capital and visibility. In Mexico tñese clashes have
even spilled into the electoral arena, as pro-liberalizers on the national scale
want to turn the capital city into a global mecca for foreign investors, while
local authorities try to balance these conce¡ns with those ofthe middle classes
who fear declining security conditions and those ofthe urban poor (informally
employed and otherwise) who are caught in between.
The Paradox of Demotatization; or,
Full Circlc from Cárdenas to Cánienas
Many ofthe tensions over insecurity and the future of Mexico City first hit the
public agenda in the rrid-r99os, just wh€n the city and the nation began fully
embracing political and econqmic libe¡alization. In Mexico City most ob-
servers cite 1994 as the year in which criminality and public insecurity burst
out of control, This was the year NAFTA changed several key aspects of the
macroeconomy, directly hurting the more protected industries located in the
capital. The 199os also ma¡ked the decade in which the Mexico City govern-
ment democratized with a series of constitutional changes introduced to em-
power a local consultative body with legislative power (the Asamblea Legis-
5ó DIANE E. OAVIS
l,rtr!.r (¡el l)istrito Fedcral,.er-»r'), fol]orvcd b,v ¿ l'llovc to alio$'the direct
, ll, tion ofthe nriryor lor the first tilllc sitlcc t9z{'1.
S,r fur, little progrcss has becn nr¡,.Ic in llalancing lhcse tcnsiolls l)etween
,l¡ ¡r¡rr r'¡tization lncl iusecuritl'. Nl¡ny streets rellr¡irl dangeloLls, ¡ntl daih'
, \, llr \i()ns from honte to \\'ork can l)e utlsafe, rvith murders and ¡ss¡ssinations
r, l.rtivcly unchcckccl a¡d even thc Mcxico City police fearful olentct ing ccrtlitl
of rr, rlilrlrorhoods. A stcacly inflow of §ireet veDdo]-s ancl othcr utrtlercnl¡rloyetl
,,, r lills rrlost of the cit)"s strcets be)'ond ca¡racit¡', rc¡rto<lucitlg the
\ i( (' workers
,,1,1 informality rncl ir mix of rich and Poor morc ¿rssociatcd with pirst
'tylc
,¡u,,lrs and tratlition¿l third rvorltl citics than rvjth a moder¡' globalizing
rr rr tro¡xrlis. ln othcr worcls, old problcnrs of insecttrily sit
side by sitlc with nov
flrl,,flr rt¡cg¿projccts ¿tncl other tlcw ur[¡¡tt illfl ilst] LlctLlr¡l cleveloPnrcnts fb-
rrr, rrl|ri lry global capitalists i¡rtent oll transfornlitrg the cit,v into vct ¡llotllel
r',,rl,l lt'cognizcd global city. !\t cotrld idertif,v thesc two distinct g|rbal net
r',,rlis.rs lit¡eral ancl illibcral rather 1h¡l lcgal and illegal, becatrsc thc fbrrner
,r, ,lt'fincd as legitimatc in tlre eyes of ccortomic Iibcr¡liz¿tion proPorlcnts'
of
l,rllr,r'ily because they alc constittllcd by a legally acctlrtnt¿blc nctworl¡
, , rr ¡,or.rlc and proptrtv investot's rvho o¡rcr ale iu a global *'orlcl ol regr'rlrttiuns'
¡'ty r.ights, alcl lir¡nr¡l contracl la\r. The laltct are deiinerl ¡s illibcral
1,r,,1,,
illegitinratc partakcrs ol the global ecotlorDl" tir erl
l,¡ r ,r rse the,v arc col)sitlered
tlr,rl llrcy¡reconstitutcdl),vnetworksolillicit(anclolicnsnr;rll-sc¿le) inlcstors
r'lr,,s, global sup¡ly chain ¡evolvcs ¡rotttrcl blilck-trl¿rket, utclcrcover, ¡l'rn'
,l, ..t rt , or viole¡cc Pronc activ ities it1 which the ¡ulc of law re¡lains clusive'
r¡
Nt ilhcr set of forces is peculirr to N'lcliico (see \{bll¿cc and L¡tchcvit loo'r )
11,)tlr .u. prcsclrt in citics ancl n¡tiolls ¡ll ovcr thc tlcvcloping rvol lll, whir:h
, ,,lllinr.s to be clught in the orbit oI global ttrde ilncl capital llt¡rvs, licit 'rnd
rllr, rt. l\rt th.)'¡rc now the kev protagottists in Nle\ic() Ciry It is itrther rr«¡rtll
r,,lll¡li I hxl lhcsc c(»lflicls ¡nd stntg¡1les are usually as llluch about collfrol oYcr
( ,r\ tl¡c) ilrc ill)ollt the dilection, or globirlizalirltl, tlf tlre ecotlollty lir tlr'
!l,,rr
, \t¡rl llr¡l lhesc str'(rg,8lt'i ovcr sPace are linkcd k) ccolonlic livelihlrods 'rrr'l
rIr, ¡,,tt rrIi.rl iirr huge pro6ts, thc stakes arc quite hi8h. )tt precisclv hc''rtr"'
llrr r.¡¡!litl involvcs illit¡c¡al forces who shun thc rulc of lau', it can bc 'ltrit'
\r.l,rl ,rrr(l tliurgcrotts, alrd such llattlcs ale llot eirsil,Y lemecliccl h¡ trlh'rrr
¡,.lrtir s, rlt rrtorralie rl¡ olhenvise. ljrlr all these rc¡sr:ns Mexico lncl its crt¡ritrrl
,1l\ ,,)rrlirrr¡c l() hc Pl¡grrccl b,v violcncc, ¿rltd citizcns l¿tcc ¿ douttrvatcl spirel ol
llr'r Url\', t[spit. Lorr,-crtctl cllirrts ¡rtd high cx|cctirtions- Sincc l't'csiricllt
l,lrl¡ ( ,rLl( r()r) tooli oflitc itr -rrx).1' ll)c ¡Lr¡rbcr t'l ¡rrrrt¡¡l nrr¡ttlcls linli"l t"
t11l r)lilr,rN.' rll vlrrl lN( I ANI) lN.,l lllllllY ')7
thc drug tratle has climbcd \\,ith estint¿rtcs suggesti¡lg a recorcl six thousand
pcrsons killed in 2oo8 (\\¡llitaker zoog:r). Violence has reached such heights
that questio¡rs of whelher Mexico is a "lirilcd state" have enrcrgcd in poiicy
circJes, bringing diplomatic urgency to the problcr.ns of violence th;rt nou,
plague the country.
A studybythe Cato lnstitrte fu¡ther af6r]rs th¿rt "violcnce inN4exico, mostly
related to the tradc in illegal drugs, has r-isen shar¡rly ill lcccnt years and shows
ofbeconring even u,o¡se," in parI bccause Calderon's deplo,vment ofthe
sr'gns
arny has neither cripplccl the organizetl drug tradc lor tudern¡ined the corn-
plicity of"local police forccs, which are Isuggcstcd to be] thoroughiy corrupted
by clrug moncy" (Car¡relter zoog:r). Observers long knorrn lbr their pr.udcnce
in assessing l,atin Arnerica's social and political cr¡ndiLion have rveighed in rvith
equally sombcr tones. Larry Bius, director of the Ct¡r¡ncil on Henrisphcric
Affairs, callecl thc situation in Mcúco "a sickening vcrtigo into chaos ¿r¡d
plunder," r,hile Peter I [akin, president <¡ftire Lrte¡-Arnericirn Dialogr]e, stated
that "the entire population is ver_v sc;rrccl" (llrice zoog:r ). Wlile ¡ot all of this
violcnce is concentrated in the capital, whcre ttre legacies ofpolicc corruptio
inlcractiDg with drug violence ha¡,e their origins, X,{exico Cjty still hosts its
share. In ciuly May zooB, the rcsidents of Mexico City awoke to the c\ ¡s that
gunnren, acting on behalf of drug c¿rtels, had assitssinated Mericris nirtional
chiefofpolice outside his home in the city, the fburth such assrssin¿r1ion in the
course ofa single week, an act that \\.ould i¡ter be ¿ttributed to infilttatir»r ofthc
police services by drug informants (Roig F-r¡nzia 20o8).
Conclusion
In light ofthcse developmeuts, it is hard to be optimistic about a rvar, fbnva¡d
to$,¿trd pe.rcc and security in thc region, despiLc clcar democr:r[ic gains in
Mexico ancl elscwhere.zr Given the political and economic legacy bequcathed
by late industriaiizatio[, lrtan,y
Lati¡ Amcr-ican cities a¡d couttries are in fb¡ a
rough time. Denrocratic iltstitutions and global market practices that seeln to
bring civic engagenrent ard rising standards ofliving in the advarced c¿pitalist
worlcl have not proven pou,erful or resilient cnough to catapt¡lt Mexico oltl its
Latin Amcrican neighbors out of the treacheror-rs strangiehoJd ol tl¡eir de
velopnertal past. To do so woulcl reqnire a c(niplctc brt-¡l< ilith lhc globll
eco¡onric conncctions ¡nd local social or spltial l)r¡(liccs th.lt slrslirin vr(,
lencc. It lvould ¿iso cntail a rethinl<ing oIl)r'ior s ! I r I ) I ( ) s rlrorrt llrc sr rr lc ol
i I I I i r r
I
politicul rnd t-cono¡ric rlccision rtlrkirrq, irs w,,ll ,r...rl,,,rr
II] I)IANI I I)AVI'i
lirrliing prcviously antagonistic acLors in search of comlnon solutions
wlrclher thcv l¡e civil societv acto¡s linked to the statc or infor]nal-sector
.r,lvocirtes linked to high enci invcstors in services or real cstrte develoP¡relt.
'lir ¡ch ieve ¿nI or all r¡1- thesc ends lvill t;rkc a new ty¡re of politics, o¡c that:
It.t! clell jettison old dcrlo.r¡lic stnrctlr-cs, placticcs, ¿nd discourscs. Al
,1\.e mutt stop tltiuking th¡t thc r¡crc eristen.e ofdcntoct-ircv u'ill dl)
nrrrlr kr Lelcls,¡ thc violertce spre¿ding across the.ontinent. L)nlv thcrl c¡rl
, rtrrcns anil poliLicinns bcgin mobilizing to do sonethiDg dillcrcüt-
l)ortions of the research for this essay were supported by grants from the Johu D.
0nd Cadlerine T. MacArthur foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New
York. I thaDk Artu¡o Alvarado, my fellow principal investigator on the first grant,
for comments on the general ideas presented in this essay. AII interpretations aie
n'liDe.
t.'l'hiswasl¡estexemplifiedinthergrTconstitlrtionalreform,craftedbyVenusti¿no
(ilrraDza, that created t$'o distinct police forces existing side by side: the judicial
police (policía judi.cial) and the preíentative police (policia preventlla). The pur-
l)ose ofthis refonn was to take the power of¿rrest out ofthe hands ofbeat cops,
nrirny ofwhorrr traced their positions and lo1'alties to the Porñriato, and to give
llrosc police who wele closer to the exectLtive branch-that is, the judicial police
I l()rc powers ofinvestigation.
¡. A littlc discussed but \r'el] docunented fact is that almost all Mexico City police
r lricls after r9r5, with the exceptioll of a handf, over a spaü ofalmost sixty1¡ears,
wclc highJevel rr,ilitary generals rotating back and forth between the police and
lh( nrilitarf some tal(ing side trips to the congress or other maior posts iD the
¡rcculive branch.
L lt(lro Ahlada sought and received funds from Calles to buy a key Merico City
r l,riLyIi)r the purposes ofgeleratiilg pro Cal1es political propaganda and keeping
r rtlrer' ¡rolitical discourses out ofthe public sphere.
lú,rrr y o I thcse nerv ranl, and-file police c¡me ftom the proviDces, and many from
llrr n()rlh, because they fought with Carranza, Calles, or AIvLrro Obregor. Thus
tlri,y lrlrl littlc allegiance Lo the population they were policing, rvhich translated
rrri(l lcwc| social constraints on cxtortio[. That ]arge number's of redeployed
rrrilitalyvctcrrnsandotherrevolutionaryloyalistsjoinedthepolicejustatthetimc
tiol¡ay governmc[t began iDposing a varicty of urbaü reg
!\,lrtr r I lrc lx)strcvolu
I on lhc Lrsc ol'paper monc¡ price gougir, g, and thc like-to reverse somc
,rtir )lls
oi rlrc rLlh¡n cc,,nonric rnalchy that haLl rccompanied the ¡evolution furthcr
llr, lrolicc i¡ ¡ prinrc position 1or soliciti¡g tttoriiclas.
I'1,r,r'rl
lll rrl!)rt,rr(r ()f
Olr(ilNl, (ll v r)r rNr I ANI) lN',1 (rllllllY '|),
 5. Before the 1940s the tenure ofpolice chiefs tended to be erratic, shifting between
relatively long terms in oflice (three to four years) to extraordinarily short stints
(some Iasting only a few weeks). Only around r9¡o do police chief terms begin to
coincide with mayoral and/or presidential administrations. This tells us some-
thing importart about the volatility and institutional instability of police servic'
ing, which was both the cause and the effect ofinfighting and political instability
wiüiu the revolutionary state and its leadership and correlated with changing
political conditions rnore generall¡
6. A,¡ong the police chiefs involved in this gang was Vale¡te Quintana, a former
private detectivewho was appointedpolice chiefin 19z9 and who, perhaps because
ofhis involvement with criminal gangs, was the liIst and last civilian police chief
for dccacles. In additio¡ to serving as a conduit to large sources of money that
could potentiall¡J:e redistributed among revolutionary leaders, he was knowu to
ilr dirty tricks ¿gainst revolutionary competitors.
have been involved
7. Observen reported that the "inemciency of the police in the capital [meant that]
alrtonobilcs of tol ists in front of the embassy (as well as ca¡s belonging to
nembers of the staff) have repeatedly been b¡oken into," while reports of stolel
items from foreign tourists were rcaching new heights. See Archivo General de Ia
Nación (AcN), Ramo Gobernación, 8r2.ro5h6, letter Íiom Pierre de L. Boal,
Chargé d'Affaires ad inte¡im, to the Honorable Sccretary ofState, washingtor, 17
October 1939. For more on the development of touris¡r as an industr¡ why
Cárdelas supported it, a¡d how he balanced the need to sell Mexican culture with
his administrationt nationalist ethos, see Berger 2006.
8. Trabajodores de base (base workers) were defined in te¡ms oftheir locatioÍ at thc
lowcr end ofthe pay, autoriomy, a¡rd decision-making hierarchy. Tabojadores de
confonm (workers of con6dence) were better paid and made decisions on the )ob
requiriug greater skills and discretion. See Davis 2oo4:298.
9. lcr.r, Ramo Presidentes (Cá¡cleuas); 544.zrr (Empleados PúLrlicos).
ro. For more discussion of the class and nrilitary rcactions to Cár'den¡s's efforts to
rest¡ucture state'\¡orker legislation, see Davis zoo4: chap.5-
11. ,tc;u, Ramo Gol¡e¡nación,8rz.ro5116, letter froú Pierre de L. Boal, Chargé d'Af-
f¿ires ad interim, to the Ho¡orable Secretary of State, Washington, r7 October
1939.
t2- Citizens were quite aware of the problem of growing corruption, as v¡ere party
leaders and the president himself. As early as r959 citizens began organizing them-
selves as advocates for police reform, writi¡g letters to the authorities ¡'¡clucling
the extensive documentation ofpolice corruption and abuscs ofpower. One ofthc
most high-profile o¡ganizations of this so¡t was the Coalición Defensora de los
De¡echos Ciudadanos, located in the Colonia Moctezuna in the Distrito Federal,
which started a massive campaign (r9i9-62) to inform the president and the loc¡l
citizenry about the corruption, extortion, and sickncss of the police at all lcvcls.
Yet tlleir efflrrts hardly made a de11t in the sitLrxtion. Aftcr r959 practically cvcry
óO OIANE E, DAVIS
police chiefwho came to ofñce identified himself as beginning a new (and "final")
cnnrpaign for the "moralüatio[" of the police. But over the years the conditions
worscried, with corruptio¡ growilg out of control and ¡nany of the same policc
chicfs who initiated mor¿lization campaigns later identined as an¡ong the worst
§ulprits. These citizens lamented that "little has bee¡ achieved [in combating
¡:olice couuptionl because the police, given their lack of cultu¡e and troublecl
blckgrourrd, continue believing that they have neither the authority ¡or capacity
lo guarantee citizens the tranquility one might expect from a conscientious and
honorable police." See ¡c¡¡, Galeria de P¡eside[tes (Adolfo tóPez Mateos) vol. 652
cx¡r,542-rlro4.
'fhal is, the secret police (poliia secreta) were initially formed in the rgros to
'lrolice the police." The same logic manifested again in the r93os, with the newly
§rc¡led Dirección de I¡vestigación y Seguridad Politica in the Distrito lrederal, an
orgi¡nizational force for i¡vestigatiDg corrupt police as much as political enemies.
And Iinally, these same aims laybehind the creation ofa new force offederal police
l¡r r946, called the Di¡ección Federal dc Seguridad (o¡s), whc.¡ worked d¡rectly for
lhc president (thereby bypassing the coüuPted Mexico City police deparlmenl)
üld took over the iob of investigating corrupt city police. With city and agency
¡olicc so involved in corruption, the DFs soon became the principal arm ofpoliti-
(nl policing for the entire party state, a functio¡l well rePresented by the role thc
rt,s played years Iater irr investigating and ¿ttacldng §tudent leaders and political
(l¡rside¡rts duriog the 1968 uprisings. As such the formation of the secret Policc,
Ir(l its fr¡gmentátion and expansio¡ over tinre, strengthened thc autlroritarian
clhos within the Mexican state app¿ratus.
rt ln lhc lale r96os a leading Mexico City daily, Excelsior, contained an article thal
liltctl the following combination oflocal and federal police forces a§ active in thc
r¡rpil¡li "l¡r actuality, in addition to the pteventative and rePressive police-both
rurrilirr»rcd Ii.e. beat cops] andjudicial, respectively-'security' forces who work for
llrc fi)llowiDg local arrd federal agencies also exist and operate in the city: lhosc
crrrpkryed by the ministries or agencies of federal securit¡ the federal iudiciary,
nllrcolics! secret service, agricultural resources, military courts, civilian ¡i¡ tbrces,
liLlclll highways, forestry, intcrnal revenue, migration, defense, railroads, the Ba¡l<
ol N,4cxico, industrial police, auxiliary police, banking police, etc. Without cven
Irelu,lin¡l the r.rngc,rf private police." See Raveio, r9ó8.
lly thc carly r96os the system ofkickbacks was in full swing. Interuai documcnls
lc1¡istc|cd in the MiDistry of Natio¡al Defense indicate that going mo¡thly Pay-
nrurts fi (nn thc Policia llancaria Industrial (PeI) leadership to Mexico City's policc
clriel wcrc thought to be 75,ooo pesos monthl¡ with the auxiliary police head
lceciving rz5,ooo pesos mo thly in direct i¡ribes, and the Dr poiice chieftaking
7i,(rx) pcsos f|or¡ thc¡r ¡s wcll. T}ese rno»ies camc in ¡ddilion To tlle 4oo,ooo
|$i()s cxlr¡clc(l lir»I thc ¡rolice lieutcnanls ol-each coDPany un<ier thc policc
rlricl''s iL¡¡istlictio¡r ¡n(l ¡ rcporlcd payrncnt of closc k) 5oo,ooo Pcsos Donthly
llll l)lll(ilN, (ll Vl(rllN( I ANlrlN',1 l ll¡lllY /l
 ftom the head ofthe army's Second, Ninth, and Twenty Seventh Divisions. See the
Secretaria de Defensa Nacional (srorl.l) Archives, personnel 61e on Gral. Luis
Cueto Ramírez, expediente x\|itlr-s43,letter to President Díaz Ordaz fronr
Lazaro Cárdenas, 15 November 1968.
16. This response came partly in reaction to social movements clamoring for the
revitalization of democratic structures a¡d p¡actices in the city, which hoped to
see the fiuits of their labor realized iD legislation passed to fully democratize
Mexico City governance starting in 1997. with crime rates skyrccketing after 1994,
and with popular elections for a democratically elected mayor to be held in two ofDiscussion
years, it seemed evident to Villareal and the pRr leadership that the party that had Participatory De mocracy, and
the most to offer in crime lighting or guaranteeing public security might have the
Lintits of L)issent in Cr¡lt¡ntbía
best shot at winning the city or,ce dernocratic rights were established (González
Ruiz 1998:9o). ROLDAN
r7. The level ofcalculated impunity in th e lirst several week after the introductiol'¡ of the
reforrn was so extreme that Gertz Manero was compelled to publicly acknowledge
that Mexico City\ "4o,ooo member force [wa]s out ofcontrol" (Gregory1999:4).
18. Dataon p¡ivate police drawn ftom interviews and documentation provided by the
Secretaría de Seguridad Pirblica in Mexico City during summer zooz. Arias and Daniel Goldstein suggest in the introduction to the current
19. Iri 2oo2, when statistics we.e 6rst compiled, Mexico City governing ofñcials saw that the time may have conte ¡(to
assess critically the usefulness of the
morethan a fourfold rise (from 6ve to twenty-two) in monthly complaints against
of'democracy' for understanding contcmporary Latin American polit-
private police between May and November ofthat year.
society," given the emergence and proliferation ofnew forms ofviolence i¡ a
20. Statistics fiom the Registration Office suggested that one-thi¡d of the personnel (3o
in which democratic governments are at least a generation old. More
percent) in private security forces came Íiom the military and police ranks. In
perso[al intervievrs with several representatives fiom private security firms, the Arias and Goldstein suggest that yiolence may lrol be-as analysts
numbers were closer to jo percent. Adriana Robles Zapata, Sociedad Meicana de la typically posited "ar iDdic¡tor ol dcmor:¡atic 'liilu¡c' " in the recion, but
Capacitación Plofesional (soMÉscA), inteNiew with the author, 21 Novembe¡ zooz. an "integral part ol contcmpor¿rry L¡tin Arneric¿rn der¡oc¡acies" r¡rcl
zr. Police often become involved ir criminal operations because it will earn them ofa "r'iolent pluralisur" e¡rrerging throughorLt the lrcnisphere.
much greater remuneration than their r¡leasly professional pay. This helps explain ( )rlrmbia offers pcrhaps the mosI cxtrcmc version of vio]cnt plur¿rlisnt in
why foreign consultants uniformly suggest that raising police salaries constitutes Anlerica a many-decades-old democracy marked by selectively high
an essential first step in professionalizing the police and gaining control of im-
ofviolence. Unlike manyof its regional peers, Colombia has rarelyhosted
punil¡. But such policies have not been seriously pursued, partly owing to the fact
dictatorships or authoritarian governments. It is characterized, on the
that macrceconomic policy constraints associatecl wiü üe economic liberaliza-
tion ofthe country have limited public-sector investment capacities.
orrt, hlnd, by regularly elected civilian governments and one of the oldcst anrl

zz. While inte¡national drug trafficking and the sale of illegal drugs in Mexico has [rost stable two-party pohtical systems in the Western Hemisphere.' On thc
existed fo¡ decades, a¡d some say since the r94os (Sadler zooo), it had remained a (fhcr, however, it is also home to l¿ti¡r America's oldest and largest leftist
relativelylow pro6le seclor oIthe national economy until recently (Astorga 2ooo; ¡¡ucrilla insurgency, most powerful paramilitary presence, and greatest produc-
Benítez Manaut 2ooo). tion ofillicit drugs (Palacios and Safford 2ool). Ir recent years the escalation of
23. Although there are grounds for pessimism, I am not suggesting that scholars afld vkrlcncc and the proliferation ofillicitly frnanced armed groups ofthe left, right,
polirymakers have given up hope, or that there are no new ideas available thaf
lnd thc purely criminal prompted dire assess¡r¡ents of Colombia as a "failed"
might lead to more optimism about the futu¡e. Fo¡ a further discussion ofpossible
fll¡rlc or o¡c on the verge of i¡¡]minent collapse. Yet despite selective, intensc
policy options and new political strategies that seek to reve¡se conditions ofurba¡
lrtlinrirl¡1ion, regular clcctions occurred without fail and neu, political movc-
violence, see Davis 20o8, 2009,

ó2 DIANE E, DAVIS