Article 1162.

Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by

the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
(1093a)

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.(n)

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the

immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is

demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or

incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are

likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a

special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
 Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

Barredo v. Garcia and Almario, G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942, 73

Phil. 6076.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla
and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned,
and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered
injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in
the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the
plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was
instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is

proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he
was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several
times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A)
— violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public
Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil
Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only
subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case
xxx

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality

of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they
show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from
criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and
that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude
that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily
and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

Elcano and Elcano v. Hill and Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977,
77 SCRA 987.

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald
Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Issues:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of

Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at
the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor,
living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally
married?

Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code,
which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-
delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new
provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
 civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article

2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura,
an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts
of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction
that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is
literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the
separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c),
Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent
with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal

case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's

emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation

of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or
by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the
child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of
his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is

demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind

the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399,
in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is
that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while
still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill

notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.

Mendoza v. Arrieta, G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA

1138.

On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a three-way

vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,
Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a
private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a
gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven
by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were
filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. The case against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as
Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by
Salazar, in the amount of P1,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion
thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which
happened to be petitioner’s Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-228, was for causing
damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00.

At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner-
driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left
going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound
for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had
jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar’s jeep was
bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner’s version
of the accident was adopted by truck-driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver
Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck
driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn
left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection
by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop
position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montoya
causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left
and hit petitioner’s car, which was coming from the opposite direction.

On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta.
Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion.

The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar

The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.

At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability coexists

with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has
the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on
culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an
action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is
deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended
party. 8

The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion

that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana, as
evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution
of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter’s civil liability
continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination.
Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved
his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was
deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.

Neither would an independent civil action be. Noteworthy is the basis of

the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case,
expounded by the trial Court in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of what has been proven and established during the
trial, Accused Freddie Montoya would be held liable for having bumped
and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo
Salazar.

"Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar
and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya,
this Court believes that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held liable for
the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza’s car." 9

PSBA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992,

205 SCRA 7299.

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of

Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47)
presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-
Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At
the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce
course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community but were elements from
outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school
authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-
President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro
(Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge
them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and
methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the
other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,

alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,

establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine
in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently,
in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed
that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material

facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe
its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation

of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists
in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly,
no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics
or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying
or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within
the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual

relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has
not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even
when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil.
722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,
however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one
arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air
France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if
there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this
Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38
Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than

that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the
whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had
no contract existed between the parties.

Amadora v. CA, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 72910.

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to

the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in
the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma.
These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out,
though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
The victim was only seventeen years old. 1

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence

. 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two
other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against
the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity,
costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees .3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved .4

It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of
the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that
day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules.
Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of
classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports,
term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is
still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot
consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in

pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing
in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the
provisions of Article 2180.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who

must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the
parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The
teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and
the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the
injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be
held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the
school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article
is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its
nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the
head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then
it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.

Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed
by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when

the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held

liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent,
who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of
the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was
already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.

The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice

Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be
unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing
activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is
not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of
due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable
as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.

The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the
head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all
cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of
an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those
rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it
has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed
by its students.

A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would

otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and
presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed
not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility
imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child
because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's support
and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence, besides
being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only
because of the students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill
more las discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held
to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the
child.

And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and
therefore less tractable than the minor — then there should all the more
be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability
as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts
because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the
former's control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in
assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the student.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the

following conclusions:

1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important
is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed,
even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of
the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in
the custody of the school authorities.

2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus
immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does
not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The
mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics
teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's
killer.

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no

showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-
charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was
committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness
in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private
respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through
the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.

4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys

who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence
that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary
action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the
school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it
has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun
that killed the petitioners' son.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos

cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for
none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in
the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents
is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora
that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief
they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.

Araneta v. De Joya, G.R. No. L-25172, May 24, 1974, 57 SCRA 62

Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of
the Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors1 that an employee,
Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in
television. The board, however, failed to act on the proposal.
Nevertheless, in September 1953 the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J.
Antonio Araneta, a company director, inquired about the trip and was
assured by the respondent that Taylor's expenses would be defrayed not
by the company but by other parties. This was thereafter confirmed by
the respondent in a memorandum.

While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor

continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his salaries
appeared in vouchers prepared upon the orders of, and approved by, the
respondent and were included in the semi-monthly payroll checks for the
employees of the corporation. The petitioner signed three of these checks
on November 27, December 15 and December 29, 1953. The others were
signed by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer)
who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed
him letters for delivery in the United States. The Ace Advertising
disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies.

On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court
of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total
sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made without its
knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer,
denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by
the company's board of directors, and that in any event under the by-
laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to authorize the trip
which was for the company's benefit..

A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the respondent against Vicente

Araneta, the petitioner and Ricardo Taylor. The respondent proved that
Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of the firm, signed a check representing the
company's share of the transportation expense of Taylor to the United
States, and that a series of payroll checks from September 15, 1953 to
December 31, 1953, inclusive, which included the salaries of Taylor, was
signed by Vicente Araneta and the petitioner who is a vice-president of
the company. Both Aranetas disowned any personal liability, claiming
that they signed the checks in good faith as they were approved by the
respondent..

On April 13, 1964 the trial court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with
interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment," and
dismissing the 3rd-party complaint.
The basic legal issue is whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict
as held below.

It is our view, and we so hold, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
should be upheld. The petitioner's assertion that he signed the
questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in
particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim.
Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president and director of
the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained passive, throughout the
period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning the unauthorized
disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he
even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary,
demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his
duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The
fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising
is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has
been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission
of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages.2

CHAPTER 2 Nature and Effect of Obligations

Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged to

take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family,
unless the law or the stipulation of the parties requires another standard
of care. (1094a)

Article 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the
time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall acquire no real
right over it until the same has been delivered to him. (1095)

Article 1165. When what is to be delivered is a determinate thing, the

creditor, in addition to the right granted him by article 1170, may compel
the debtor to make the delivery. If the thing is indeterminate or generic,
he may ask that the obligation be complied with at the expense of the
debtor. If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to
two or more persons who do not have the same interest, he shall
be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery.
(1096)

Article 1166. The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of

delivering all its accessions and accessories, even though they may not
have been mentioned. (1097a)

Article 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same

shall be executed at his cost. This same rule shall be observed if he does
it in contravention of the tenor of the obligation. Furthermore, it may be
decreed that
what has been poorly done be undone. (1098)

Article 1168. When the obligation consists in not doing, and the obligor
does what has been forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his
expense. (1099a)

Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay

from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them
the fulfillment of their obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that
delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or

(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it
appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered
or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the
establishment of the contract; or

(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it
beyond his power to perform.

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does

not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is
incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his
obligation, delay by the other begins. (1100a)

Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are

guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101)

Article 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all

obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)

Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance

of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be
regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the

omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed
in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required. (1104a)
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it
is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable. (1105a)

Article 1175. Usurious transactions shall be governed by special laws.

(n)

Article 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor without

reservation with respect to the interest, shall give rise to the presumption
that said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior
installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that such installments
have been paid. (1110a)

Article 1177. The creditors, after having pursued the property in

possession of the debtor to satisfy their claims, may exercise all the
rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the same purpose, save
those which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn the acts
which the debtor may have done to defraud them. (1111)

Article 1178. Subject to the laws, all rights acquired in virtue of an

obligation are transmissible, if there has been no stipulation to the
contrary. (1112)