Sanidad V.

Comelec
G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of
the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related
decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in "barangays"
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD
No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of PD No. 991.

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued PD No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly reveals their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced

Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as PD No. 1031, insofar as it directs the CoE to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Sanidad contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the
new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case?
2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the
Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame
allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:

Issue 1 – Justiciability of the courts

We cannot accept the view of the SolGen, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that
the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the
procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the
judgment of the clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people
themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the
amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether,
therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of
inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments
have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e.,
before the submission to and ratification by the people.

Issue 2 – Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments
to the Constitution?
As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim
National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that
Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in
the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter
recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon
special call by the President. Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the
President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the
bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power
of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The
answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions
of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function
of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the
President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened
and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution.

Issue 3 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the
time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific
date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."