A3. Carlos Superdrug Corp. v.
DSWD 526 A grand jury for the Eastern District of California indicted Grubbs on one
SCRA 130 (2007)
FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003.” Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent
(20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends
that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property.
ISSUE: WON RA 9257 is unconstitutional HELD:
Petition is dismissed.
RATIO: The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs.” It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare.
GSIS v. Montesclaros 434
SCRA 441 (2004)
Nicolas Montesclaros, 72-year old widower, married Milagros Orbiso, then
43 years old. GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement granting a
lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity
thereafter. Nicolas died. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim of survivorship
pension. GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the
surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension
HELD: Yes. We hold that the proviso is unconstitutional because it
violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and
denies equal protection of the law. The proviso in question does not
satisfy these requirements. The object of the prohibition is vague. There
is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
intended (“deathbed marriages”)
D3. United States v. Grubbs 547
U.S. 90 (2006)
FACTS: Jeffrey Grubbs purchased a videotape containing child
pornography from a Website operated by an undercover postal
inspector. Officers from the Postal Inspection Service arranged a
controlled delivery of a package containing the videotape to Grubb’s
residence. A postal inspector submitted an "anticipatory" search warrant
application to a Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of California,
accompanied by an affidavit describing the proposed operation in detail,
explaining that the warrant would be executed only upon the receipt of the
parcel by a person(s) and has been physically taken into the residence
(triggering condition). The warrant was issued. Two days later, an undercover
postal inspector delivered the package. Grubb’s wife signed for it and took
the unopened package inside. The inspectors detained Grubbs as he left
his home a few minutes later, then entered the house and commenced
the search. Roughly 30 minutes into the search, Grubbs was provided
with a copy of the warrant, which included both attachments but not to
supporting affidavit that explained when the warrant would be executed.
Grubbs consented to interrogation by the postal inspectors and admitted
ordering the videotape. He was placed under arrest, and various items were
seized, including the videotape.
count of receiving a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit
conduct. Grubbs moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search
of his residence, arguing as relevant here that the warrant was invalid
because it failed to list the triggering condition. The district court denied the
motion. The court of appeals for the ninth circuit reversed; it held that
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies with full
force to the conditions precedent to an anticipatory search warrant,
because the postal inspectors failed to present the affidavit the warrant
was inoperative, and the search was illegal.
ISSUE: Whether anticipatory search warrants are categorically
unconstitutional
DECISION: No. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
REASON: The Fourth Amendment does not set forth some general
“particularity requirement”, it specifies only two matters that must be
particularly described in the warrant: (1) the place to be search and (2) the
persons or things to be seized. The court defined an anticipatory search
warrant as “a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at
some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be
located at a specified place. The court further held that the probable-
cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be found when the
search is conducted, all warrants are in a sense, anticipatory.
Anticipatory warrants are, therefore, no different in principal from
ordinary warrants. They require a magistrate to determine (1) that it is now
probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive will be on
the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed. It should be
noted, however, that where the anticipatory warrant places a condition
(other than the mere passage of time) upon its execution, the first of these
determinations goes not merely to what will probably be found if the
condition is met. Rather, the probability determination for a conditioned
anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood that the condition will occur,
and thus that a proper object of seizure will be on the described premises.
Two pre- requisites of probability must be satisfied (1) It must be true that if
the triggering condition occurs “there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” (2) there is
probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will occur.
Klyllo v. US
533 US 27, 150 L Ed 2d 94, 121 S Ct 2038 (2001)
Suspicious that marijuana was being grown in petitioner Kyllo`s home in a
triplex, agents used a thermal imaging device to scan the triplex to
determine if the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent with the
high – intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth.
Kyllo was indicated on a federal drug charge of manufacturing marijuana,
he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home
and then entered a conditional guilty plea.
This case presents the question whether the use of a thermal – imaging
device aimed at a private home from a public street detect relative
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a “search” within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interest as well as interests and rights of
individual citizens.
The government uses a devise that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and
is presumptively unreasonable without warrant
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed: the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

D10. Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board 570
SCRA 410 (2008)
Facts: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
The Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a
candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections. He seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486. Pimentel Invokes Sec. 3,
Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks
to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c),(d),(f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative
power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing.
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., seeks in his petition that Sec. 36
(c),(d),(f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal
protection guarantees.
Issues: (1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
And (2) Are paragraphs (c),(d),(f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of
legislative power?
Held: The congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be declared unconstitutional.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.
The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. The right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements. The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the will-being of the
people, particularly the youth and school children who usually end-up as
victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized
and put in motion, random drug testing of students in secondary and
tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate
concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit
not exactly for the same reason. Reasonableness’ is the touchstone of
the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search
at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing
of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling interest. The
employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed
by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if
any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is,
in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has
been upheld.
The reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-
defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
The situation is entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six years
and one day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test
as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. w, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 –
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 - CONSTITUTIONAL but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
494 U.S. 259, 108 Led 2d 222, 110 S Ct 1056 (1990)
Facts: Respondent is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He was believed
by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to be one of the
leaders of a large and violent organization in Mexico that smuggles
narcotics into the United States. He was apprehended by the Mexican
Police and transported him to United States Border Patrol station in
Calexico, California, then arrested by the United States Marshals and
moved him to a correctional center in San Diego, California, pending his
trial. DEA agents, working with Mexican officials, with Director General
of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), authorizing the searches,
searched his Mexican residences in Mexicali and San Felipe and seized
certain documents. The search of his residence uncovered a tally sheet,
which the Government believes reflects the quantities of marijuana
smuggled by the respondent into the United States. District Court
granted respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that
the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches and DEA agents had
failed to justify searching of the premises without a warrant. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court, divided panel, held that American
citizens tried abroad by United States military officials were entitled to
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections – The court concluded that the
Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the Federal
Government, even it operates abroad. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, [1957]). Majority assumed that illegal aliens in the United States have
Fourth Amendment rights. (relying on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 [1984]). Majority recognized that American search warrant would
be no legal validity in Mexico, but it is deemed sufficient that a warrant
would have “substantial constitutional value in this country”, because it
would reflect a magistrate’s determination that there existed probable
cause to search and would define the scope of the search.
Issue: W/N Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by the
United States agents of property that is owned by a non-resident alien
and located in a foreign country.
Ruling: Reversed (Decision of the Court of Appeals) Ratio:
*The Fourth Amendment operates in a different manner that the Fifth
Amendment, because the Fifth Amendment guaranteed the privilege
against self-incrimination, which is a fundamental trial right of criminal
defendants, which the constitutional violation will occur only at trial.
*As suggested by Madison, “the driving force behind the adoption of the
Amendment was widespread hostility among the former Colonists to the
issuance of writs of assistance empowering revenue officers to search
suspected places for smuggled goods and general search warrants
permitting the search of private houses, often to uncover papers that
might be used to convict persons of libel. (Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625 – 626, [1886])
*Purpose for the Amendment was to protect the people of the United
States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never
suggested to be intended to restrain the actions of the Federal
Government against aliens outside of the United States.
*Not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even
where the United States has sovereign power.
*Congress was not required to adopt “a system of laws which shall
include the right of trial by jury and that the Constitution does not without
legislation and its own force, carry such right to territory so situated.
Only “fundamental” constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of
those territories.
Ople v. Torres 293
SCRA 141 (1998)
The instant petition prays for the invalidation of Administrative order no.
308 entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System” on constitutional grounds – usurpation of the power of
congress to legislate and violation of the right to privacy. A.O. no. 308 was
issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos on 12 December 1996, was
published in four newspaper of general circulation on 22 and 23 January
1997.
Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a
law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. A.O. 308 is so
vague. The vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger. There are no vital safeguards the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308
can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN
The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but
the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist.
Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from
constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does
not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. The
petition is granted and A.O. no 308 declared null and void.
Zulueta v. CA 253
SCRA 699 (1996)
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta, wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin,
entered the clinic of her doctor husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, i.e. greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband
Held: No. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding”
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
521 U.S. 844, 138 L Ed 2d 874, 117 S Ct 2329 (1997)
Two provisions of Communications Decency Act of 1996 seek to protect
minors from harmful material on the internet. 223 (a)(1)(b)(ii)
criminalizes the “knowing transmission of “obscene and indecent”
message to any recipient under 18 years of age. Section 223(d)
prohibits the “knowin[g]”. Sending or displaying to person under 18 of any
message “that, in context, depicts, describes, in terms patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs.” A number of plaintiff files suit challenging the
constitutionality of 223(a)(1) and 223(d). Three judge of District court
convened and entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both
challenged provisions. The court’s judgment enjoins the government
from enforcing 223(a)(1)(B)’s prohibitions insofar as they relate to
indecent communications, but reserves the right of the Government to
investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities
prohibited therein. The injunction against 223(3) is unqualified because
that section contains no separate reference to obscenity and child
pornography. Government appealed arguing the DC erred in its ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the two provisions enacted to protect minors from
indecent and patently offensive communications on the internet
constitutional
Decision: Yes there is a violation. The Court upheld the decision of the
District Court.
Rationale: The stature abridges “the freedom of speech” protected by
the First Amendment.
The CDA is a content based regulation on speech.
The CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a
stature regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to
potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to
address to one another.
Where obscenity is involved, we have consistently held that the fact that
protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its
suppression. It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials but
that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech
addressed to adults ( example: since ang gusto ng government para macheck
kung minor ka is magswipe pa ng credit card, etc. E since yung ibang adult
walang credit card, Boom!)
Moreover, the general, undefined terms “indecent” and “patently
offensive” cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious
educational or other value.
Osmena v. Commission on Elections 288
SCRA 447 (1998)
In National Press Club v. Comelec, the court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 11(b) of R.A. no. 6646 which prohibits mass media from selling
or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except the COMELEC. Petitioners, candidates for public office,
seek a re-examination of the validity of aforecited provision, contending
that events after the ruling in National Press Club “have called into question
the validity of the very premises” if that decision.
There is no case or controversy to decide, only an academic discussion to
hold.
Decision: Petition is dismissed.
Petitioners claim that the experience in the last five years since the
decision has shown undesirable effects of the law. However, petitioners do not
complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the law. What
petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the holding of
an academic exercise.
The law’s concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with
ensuring media equality between candidates with “deep pockets” and those
with less resources. There is not total ban on political ads, much less
restriction on the content of the speech. Given money could be of a
disadvantage of a poor candidate, there is a substantial or legitimate
governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the
COMELEC.
Puno, J. Concurring:
The guaranty of freedom of speech should not be used to frustrate
legislative attempts to level the playing field in politics. R.A. 6646 does not
curtail speech as it no more than prevents the abusive wealth by the rich
to frustrate the poor candidate’s access to media. If we allow money to
monopolize the media, the political framework will cease to be a market of
ideas but a market for influence of the rich.
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections 357
SCRA 496 (2001)
Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a non-stock social research
institution which conducts surveys in various fields and thereafter
processes, analyzes, and publicly reports the results thereof, while
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioners bring action for
prohibition from implementing Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006, the Fair Election
Act, which the former claim unconstitutional. Sec. 5.4 provides: “Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen
(15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not
be published seven (7) days before an election. SWS, which wishes to
conduct survey throughout the period of elections and to release to the
media the results as well as publish them directly, and Kamahalan
Publishing, which intends to publish election survey results to the last day
of election survey results to the last day of elections, assail the aforecited
provision as equivalent to prior restraint without any justification.
O’Brien test – used to determine the constitutional validity. A
government regulation is sufficiently justified: [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press. It is invalid because: [1] it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression; [2] it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and [3] the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by other means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections 357
SCRA 496 (2001)
Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a non-stock social research
institution which conducts surveys in various fields and thereafter
processes, analyzes, and publicly reports the results thereof, while
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioners bring action for
prohibition from implementing Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006, the Fair Election
Act, which the former claim unconstitutional. Sec. 5.4 provides: “Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen
(15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not
be published seven (7) days before an election. SWS, which wishes to
conduct survey throughout the period of elections and to release to the
media the results as well as publish them directly, and Kamahalan
Publishing, which intends to publish election survey results to the last day
of election survey results to the last day of elections, assail the aforecited
provision as equivalent to prior restraint without any justification.
O’Brien test – used to determine the constitutional validity. A
government regulation is sufficiently justified: [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press. It is invalid because: [1] it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression; [2] it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and [3] the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by other means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its
dignity would lose their utility if public confidence is destroyed.
The contention that Professor Mangahas was improperly cited for
contempt for acts or utterances not related to a pending action must,
therefore, be rejected. What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report
about the results of the SWS poll – in the words of Judge Asuncion, “that
the people have more confidence with the police that with the judges” – in
light of the fact, of which judicial notice is taken, that said report came out
at a time when there already was widespread publicity adverse to the
judiciary, there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade the
administration of justice. Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for what, at
a minimum, he must have felt duty- bound to do in the circumstances.
No question of prior restraint or violation of the guarantee of free speech
arises here, what he did being, in essence, merely to initiate an inquiry into
the source and basis of the derogatory news report. And he forthwith
abated the proceedings upon receiving an explanation he deemed
satisfactory.
Chavez vs. Gonzales 545
SCRA 441 (2008)
The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004
elections. On June 5, 2005 Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that
the opposition is planning to destabilize the administration by releasing
an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between Pres.
GMA and a high-ranking official of the Comelec (Garcillano) through
wire-tapping. He produced two kinds of tape a complete version and a
“doctored” version. That which instructed the comelec official to
manipulate the election results in the president’s favor. There were also
conversations of President, First gentleman, Garci and the late senator
Barbers.
On the June, 2005 respondent DOJ secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that who had copies of the CD or those who will publish the
contents will be liable under the Anti-wiretapping Act because of the
continuing the offense that had the personal knowledge of the crime that
included Sec. Bunye and Atty. Paguia.
Because of the incident the NTC gives fair warning to radio and
television owners/operators to observe anti-wire-tapping law and
pertinent circulars on program standards. It has been subsequently
established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a
prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and
television companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for
the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said companies.
On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured
the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, “praying for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal
remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the
respondents.” Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the
freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different
kindsand doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if
violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but do not
endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their
violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free
speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one
to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the
violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the
preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international
covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a
careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these
factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test,
the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all
means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State
for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to
prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech
and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils.
For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear
and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the
national security of the State.
This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the
issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice
and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this issue,
we hold that it is not decisive that the press statements made by
respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or
circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly,
respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while
the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act
done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an
“act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order
or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that
should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior
restraints on the right to free speech and press.
There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on
record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a
regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio
and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the
alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute
those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the
KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press
Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this
battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the
sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be
the subject of misinterpretation.
In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and
prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by
respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the
alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other
personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press
F11. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 555
U.S. (2009)
Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant
Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks.
Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten
Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the
monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove."
Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other
things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a
preliminary injunction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court
and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the
park was in fact a "public" forum, not a non-public forum as the district
court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of
the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to
the court, was also not against the public interest.
Does a city's refusal to place a religious organization's monument in a
public park violate that organization's First Amendment free speech rights
when the park already contains a monument from a different religious
group?
No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the
placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government
speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that since Pleasant
Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments were
displayed, the monuments represented an expression of the city's
viewpoints and thus government speech. Although a park is traditional
public forum for speeches and other transitory expressive acts, the
display of a permanent monument in a public park is not a form of
expression to which forum analysis applies.
F12. PHCAP v Duque III 535
SCRA 265 (2007)
Facts: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify A.O No. 2006-0012 entitled, “Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No 51,
Otherwise known as the "Milk Code,”, Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof and for Other Purposes
(RIRR)”. Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is
supposed to implement.
Issue: WON RIRR is valid and constitutional
Held: Only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of A.O. No. 2006-0012 are declared as
beyond the authority of the DOH and are therefore null and void. The rest
of the Code is in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the
Milk Code since it constitutes reasonable regulation of an industry which
affects public health and welfare. Thus, the rest of RIRR do not constitute
illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause
of the Constitution.
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Puno:
Another reason why the absolute ban on advertising and promotion of
breast milk substitutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 2006-
0012 should be struck down:
The advertising and promotion of breast milk substitutes is considered a
commercial speech which is a kind of speech that proposes an
economic transaction. It is a separate category of speech which is not
accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection. Commercial speech must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading if it is to be protected under the First Amendment. The
asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If both of these
requirements are met, it must next be determined whether the state
regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, and whether
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve the interest.
The absolute ban on advertising prescribed under Sections 4 (f) and 11 of the
RIRR is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed
governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young
children. It must be self-evident, for instance that the advertisement of
such products which are strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech.
The laudable concern of the respondent for the promotion of the health of
infants and young children cannot justify the absolute, overarching ban.
F13. Bayan v. Ermita 488
SCRA 226 (2006)
Facts: Petitioners come in three groups and they assail BP 880 “The
Public Assembly Act of 1985” , some of them in toto and others only
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of Calibrated
Preemptive Response (CPR). They also seek to stop violent dispersals of
rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently
announced.
Issues: (1) WON the Calibrated Preemptive Response policy is valid
(2) WON BP 880 is valid and constitutional
Held: The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of the constitutional
protection. Since these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. However, such right is not absolute. Thus,
BP 880 provides restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies. It does not impose an absolute ban on public
assemblies.
(1) The Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down. It serves no valid purpose
if it is also means “maximum tolerance” under BP 880 and is illegal if it
means something else.
(2) BP 880 is valid and constitutional since it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedom. It merely regulates the use of public places as to the
time, place and manner of assemblies. Moreover, “maximum
tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is likewise
valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present
danger" standard.
Estrada v. Escritor 408
SCRA 1 (2003)
FACTS: Compalinant Alejandro Estrada wrote to the presiding judge of
Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soleded Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They
allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. She admitted that
she has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. Quilapio was likewise married
at that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife. But as a member
of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. In fact, the respondent has executed a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness that is recognized as giving the parties
the right to marital relationship even if not recognized by civil authorities.
PRINCIPAL ISSUE: “Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct”.
SUB-ISSUE: “Whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom
should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit
relations for which government employees are held administratively
liable.”
THE COURT’S RULING: The case is REMANDED to the Office of the
Court Administrator.
The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be
given the opportunity: (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to respondent’s religious belief
and practice and (c) that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest
is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.
REASON: The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
Should the Court declare respondent’s conduct as immoral and held her
administratively liable, the Court will be holding that in the realm of public
morality, her conduct is reprehensible or there are state interests
overriding her religious freedom. But in so ruling, the Court does not and
cannot say that her conduct should be made reprehensible in the realm
of her church where it is presently sanctioned and that she is answerable
for her immorality to Jehovah God nor that other religions prohibiting her
conduct are correct.
In any event, even if the court deems sufficient respondent’s evidence on
the sincerity of her religious belief and centrality to her faith, the case at
bar cannot still be decided using the “compelling state interest” test.
The government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s
stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it
comes within the scope of the free exercise protection.
*The benevolent neutrality approach is used in interpreting the religious
clauses in the Philippine Constitution.
*Benevolent Neutrality Approach –looks further than the secular
purposes of government action and examines the effect of these actions
on religious exercise.
*Tests must be applied to draw the line between permissible and
forbidden religious exercise:
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST; IMMEDIATE AND GRAVE DANGER
TEST –involves religious speech as this test is often used in cases of
freedom of expression.
COMPELING STATE INTEREST TEST –is proper where conduct is
involved.
Marcos v. Manglapuz 177
SCRA 668(1989)
FACTS: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into
exile in Hawaii. Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic.
Soon, the Marcos family sought to be allowed to return to the country but
President Aquino barred their return. The Marcos family filed the instant
petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Court to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s
decision to bar their return from the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING: YES. The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. That the President has such power under the
Constitution has been recognized by members of the Legislature. The
request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as
a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied. The petition was dismissed.
DISSENTING OPINION: It is of the dissenters’ belief that Marcos, as a
citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return to and live – and die – in his
own country. The government failed dismally to show that the return of
Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to the national security as it
had alleged.
Air Philippines Corporation v. Pennswell, Inc.
540 SCRA 215 (2007)
FACTS: Air Philippines Corporation (APC) is a domestic corporation
engaged in air transportation services. APC purchased chemical
lubricants from Pennswell, a company that manufactures and sells
industrial chemicals. In the course of events, APC alleged that
Pennswell defrauded it: APC insisted that Pennswell committed to
deliver lubricants of the type belonging to a new line instead of what it had
previously delivered to them, which were apparently lubricants of second-
grade quality not fit for APC's specific use. The second batch of lubricants
demanded for, though, turned out to be of the same type as that of the first
delivery. APC demanded return of its money, but Pennswell ignored the
demand and billed APC instead for its outstanding debts. APC now seeks
to convince the Supreme Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical
composition and ingredients of respondent’s products to conduct a
comparative analysis of its products.
ISSUE: Can chemical components of Pennswell products be accessed
pursuant to right to information under Sec. 7, Art III?
HELD: No. Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private
character of trade secrets, as there is a privilege not to disclose them. The
Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking
transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the
people to information as embodied in the Constitution.
 Antolin vs. Domondon15 G.R. No.
165036; 5 July 2010
Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) Licensure Exam she took in October 1997. Convinced she
deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the Board of Accountancy (Board),
requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was shown her
answer sheets but since these showed only shaded marks, she was unable
to determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she asked the Board
for copies of the questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an
explanation of the grading system (collectively, the Examination Papers). Her
request was denied on two grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the Rules
and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals,
as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No.
332, series of 1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets, and
reconsideration of the result of her examination can be made only on
grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or
malfeasance; and (2) the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets) by Section 20, Article
IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later informed
her that her exam was investigated and no mechanical error was
found in the grading.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner has the constitutional right to have
access to the Examination papers.
Held: Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is
not absolute; it is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further
“subject to such limitations as may be provided by law” (Section 7, Article
III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is
limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987
Constitution). National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are
matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in
particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those The
Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit
access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the
exam. That there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation,
encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams
that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a
limited duration. The PRC had not been given an opportunity to explain
the reasons behind their regulations for keeping the Examination Papers
confidential. The Court deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for
further proceedings.
Manotok Realty Inc v CLT realty development corporation
582 scra 583 (2009)
*from Constitutional Law Updates and Teasers (bar 2010) by Atty
Gorospe
Here the court spoke of “cleansing effect” of the expropriation
proceedings. “The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for
titles acquired by the state by way of expropriation are deemed
cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have attended these titles . . .
. ‘in an in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed
title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing
better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary
conveyance’”
In this particular case, the court noted that “ in annulling the manotok
titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in
September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before
the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have
attended that particular title would have been purged when the
property covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through
Eminent Domain.”
DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES
530 U.S. 428, 152 L Ed 2d 1069, 122 S Ct 2315 (2000)
FACTS: In the wake of the ruling on Miranda v. Arizona, Congress
enacted a law which in essence makes the admissibility of a suspect’s
statements on a custodial interrogation turn solely on whether they were
made voluntarily. Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy
to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a
crime of violence. He moved to suppress a statement he had made to the
FBI, on the ground that he had not received “Miranda warnings” before
being interrogated. The District Court granted his petition, and the
Government took an interlocutory appeal; the Fourth Circuit reversed,
acknowledging that even though Dickerson had not received Miranda
rights, the law was satisfied because his statement was voluntary –
concluding that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and that
Congress could by statute have the final say on the question of
admissibility.
ISSUE: WON the Miranda court announced a constitutional rule or
merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the
absence of congressional direction.
HELD: A little backgrounder: in the past, a suspect's confession had
always been inadmissible if it had been the result of coercion, or
otherwise given involuntarily. This was true in England, and American law
inherited that rule from England.
However, as time went on, the US Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth
Amendment was an independent source of protection for statements
made by criminal defendants in the course of police interrogation.
Custodial police interrogation by its very nature "isolates and pressures the
individual" so that he might eventually be worn down and confess to
crimes he did not commit in order to end the ordeal. In Miranda, the
Court had adopted the now-famous four warnings to protect against this
particular evil.
Congress, in response, enacted §3501. That statute clearly was
designed to overrule Miranda because it expressly focused solely on
voluntariness of the confession as a touchstone for admissibility. As
regards Congress' authority to pass such a law: on the one hand, the
Court's power to craft non-constitutional supervisory rules over the
federal courts exists only in the absence of a specific statute passed by
Congress. But if on the other hand the Miranda rule was constitutional,
Congress could not overrule it, because the Court alone is the final
arbiter of what the Constitution requires. As evidence of the fact that the
Miranda rule was constitutional in nature, the Court pointed out that
many of its subsequent decisions applying and limiting the
requirement arose in decisions from state courts, over which the Court
lacked the power to impose supervisory non-constitutional rules.
Furthermore, although the Court had previously invited legislative
involvement in the effort to devise prophylactic measures for protecting
criminal defendants against overbearing tactics of the police, it had
consistently held that these measures must not take away from the
protections Miranda had afforded.
In conclusion, the Court held that Miranda announced a constitutional rule
that Congress may not supersede legislatively.
PEOPLE V. LAUGA 615
SCRA 548
FACTS: Lagua, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force
and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
have carnal knowledge with aforementioned daughter, a 13 year[s]old
minor against her will. After the deed was done, AAA recounted what
happened with her brother BBB, and then told her grandfather and uncle,
and after which they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting, a
bantay bayan.
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his
underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant
obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA
because he was unable to control himself – said confession being something
which he denied in his testimony. The RTC found him guilty and convicted
him, and upon appeal said conviction was modified by the CA (by rendering
Lagua ineligible for parole and increasing the indemnity and moral
damages to be paid), hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON his alleged confession with a “bantay bayan” is admissible
in evidence.
RULING: NO. This Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay
bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy
Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated
to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned, therefore finding
the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a
counsel, inadmissible in evidence. (This does not change anything either way
as Lagua’s guilt was not deduced solely from said confession but from
confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt… but
that’s another issue.)
Martinez v. Mendoza
FACTS: Petitioners are mother and wife of Michael Martinez, who was
allegedly abducted and taken away by 7 persons last November 19, 2001
at Sun Valley, Paranaque City. Martinez, is being implicated in the killing of
Dorothy Jones, aka Nida Blanca. It appears that on the evening on November
19, 2001, the CIDG presented before the media a certain Philip Medel, Jr who
allegedly executed a statement confessing to his participation in the killing,
naming Michael Martinez as the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren
Strunk, the husband of Nida Blanca and alleged mastermind in the killing.
In a televised interview, Medel narrate that he saw Michael Martinez at the
CDG at Cam Crame where he was being detained. The respondents
vehemently deny any participation or involvement in the alleged
abduction of Martinez and said that the alleged victim was never confined
and detained by them or in their custody at any given time. The CA did not
believe Medel’s narration and said that his credibility was highly suspect
since, he had contradicted himself as to material facts, as the Court opined.
The issue here is whether the court erred in reversing the trail court and
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus.
HEL: The SC held that the petitioner’s anchor for the present case is the
disappearance of Martinez. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best,
merely consequential of his disappearance. The ultimate purpose for the writ
of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is a
remedy intended to determine whether the person under detention is
held under lawful authority. If the respondents are neither detaining nor
restraining the person on whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus has
been filed, then it should be dismissed. Considering that respondents have
persistently denied having Martinez in their custody, and absent any decisive
proof to rebut their denial, the SC is restrained to affirm the CA’s dismissal
of the petition for habeas corpus.
P3. Disini v. Sadiganbayan GR.
No. 180564 June 22 2010
Facts: In 1989 respondent RP, represented by PCGG wanted petitioner
Jesus P. Disini to testify for his government in its case against
Westinghouse and an arbitration case which the latter and others filed
against RP before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration. Petitioner was an executive in the companies of his 2nd
cousin, Herminio T. Disini, from 1971-1984. RP believed that
Westinghouse's contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear
Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminio's companies, had been
attended by anomalies. On Feb 16, 1989, RP and petitioner entered into
an Immunity Agreement wherein the latter undertook to testify for his gov't
and provide its lawyers the necessary documents and information. RP
also guaranteed that it shall not compel Disini to testify in any other
proceeding brought by RP against Herminio. Petitioner complied with the
said agreement however after 18 yrs, or on Feb 27, 2007, upon application
of RP, respondent Sandiganbayan, issued a subpoena duces tecum and
ad testificandum against Disini commanding him to testify and produce
documents before such court on March 6 and 30 2007 in a case filed by RP
against Herminio. Disini filed a motion to quash subpoena invoking his
immunity agreement with the Republic, but respondent Sandiganbayan
ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena, directing him to testify
before it on May 6 and 23, 2007. On July 19, 2007 the PCGG issued a
resolution revoking and nullifying the Immunity Agreement between
petitioner Disini and RP since it prohibited the latter from requiring Disini to
testify against Herminio. On August 16, 2007 respondent
Sandiganbayan denied Disini's motion to quash subpoena,which made the
latter take recourse to this Court.
Issues:
WON the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the
Immunity Agreement between respondent RP and petitioner Disini WON
respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied
petitioner Disini's motion to quash the subpoena addressed to him.
Held: The guarantee given by PCGG covers only immunity from civil or
criminal prosecution and not immunity from providing evidence in court.
The immunity from the need to testify in other ill-gotten wealth cases would
defeat the very purpose of EO 1 which charged the PCGG with the task of
recovering all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos. Moreover, if
he refuses to testify in those other cases, he would face indirect
contempt and would be penalized. His refusal to testify as ordered by the
Sandiganbayan would result in prosecution for criminal contempt.
RP invokes Sec 15 , Art XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides: "The right
of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not
be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel." However, the estoppel
which Disini invokes does not have the effect of denying the state its right
to recover whatever ill-gotten wealth Herminio may have acquired under
the Marcos regime. And although the government cannot be barred by
estoppels, such principle cannot apply to this case since PCGG acted
within its authority when it provided Disini with a guarantee against having
to testify in other cases. Petition is GRANTED and PCGG resolution is
ANNULLED.
People v.Velasco (p. 763) 340
CRA 207
FATS: Alex Vinculado was killed while his twin brother Levi lost
permanently his vision and their uncle was shot. Information for
Homicide and frustrated homicide was filed against Mayor Honorato
Galvez of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and his bodyguard, Godofredo Diaz.
Charges were however, withdrawn and a new one for murder and
frustrated murder was filed against the accused. In addition, the mayor was
charged with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm
outside this residence. The court found them guilty . However, it acquitted
Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. The
acquittal of Mayor Galvez is challenged by the government in this
petition of certiorari. Their position is that the elevating the issue of
criminal culpability to the Supreme court despite acquittal by the trial court
should not be considered as violative of the constitutional right against
double jeopardy.\
HELD: The petition at hand seeks to nullify the decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused goes deeply in the court’s appreciation and
evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of
the questioned decision shows that respondent’s judge considered the
evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the
testimonies relative to the position of the victims visa vis the accused and
the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the
opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation
may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it does not
detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon.
This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of
excess or lack of jurisdiction. Hence, it becomes an improper object and
non reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be
confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
R1. Salvador v. Mapa, Jr
539 SCRA 34 (2007)
President Ramos issued AO13/MO61 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Several loan accounts were referred to
the Committee for investigation, among others is that of Philippine Eagles
Mines, Inc. (PEMI) whose officers were known cronies of then President
Marcos. The Committee then filed a complaint against the respondents
before the Ombudsman for violation of Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The complaint was dismissed due to prescription and if such orders
are to be considered as bases of charging respondents, they become ex case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
post facto laws. Hence, the appeal. absence of a grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Yes. AO 13 and MO 61 are not ex post facto laws.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally
prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum
orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition.
Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and
functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for
determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No.
13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post
facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the
subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules
of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its
interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be
read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should
not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law
where none is indicated.

People V. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

559 SCRA 449 (2008)

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of
San Vicente, Palawan. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of Villapando's
wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando
won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. Maagad
and Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape
charging the two with violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Unlawful

appointments.-Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or
appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications...

There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called upon to

determine whether Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his] designation as
Municipal Administrator, was lacking in legal qualification. Stated
differently, does "legal qualification" contemplate the one (1) year
prohibition on appointment as provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the
Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local Government Code, mandating that
a candidate who lost in any election shall not, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government?

The Court answers in the negative.

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a

position are provided by law and that it may well be that one who
possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of
the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is
no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person
suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the
appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.

There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation. On the

contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of
1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Villapando's contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division's

interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in
order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991.

Although this Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan that once
a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same