POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.

ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. PD 1606, Amended by RA No. 7975 and RA No. 10660

REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS

"SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Effectivity: Take effect upon approval, 10th January 1979

Section 1:
Sandiganbayan – a special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all
the inherent powers of a court of justice.

 Composition - Presiding Justice and eight (8) Associate Justices who shall be appointed
by the President.
 Qualifications:
(1) Natural-born Filipino citizen;
(2) At least 40 years of age; and
(3) For at least 10 years has been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar
as a pre-requisite for a like period

 Mode of Removal: The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed
from office except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 3: Divisions of the Courts; Quorum. The Sandiganbayan shall sit in 7 Divisions of 3 members
each. "Two (2) members shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when
the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary
incapacity of a member or a vacancy therein, the Presiding Justice may designate a member of another
division to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a
special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in
the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto."

Section 5: Proceedings, How Conducted; Decision by Majority Vote. – All three (3) members of a
division shall deliberate on all matters submitted for judgment, decision, final order, or resolution.

"The concurrence of a majority of the members of a division shall be necessary to render a judgment,
decision, or final order, or to resolve interlocutory or incidental motions."

Section 4: Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads:
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.

"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.

"Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not
allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from
the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (P1,000,000.00).

"Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the official holds office.

"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ’27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of
the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020
"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Section 6. Maximum period for termination of cases. As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the
Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuos until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered
within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.

Section 7. Form, finality and enforcement of decisions. All decisions and final orders determining the merits
of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete
findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and
necessary in deciding the case.

"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided
within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.

"Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher is
imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of
Court. In case the penalty imposed is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or
not the accused filed an appeal.

"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by
law.

"Decisions and final orders of other courts, in cases cognizable by said courts under this Act shall be
appealable to the Sandiganbayan within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice to the parties."

Section 8. Transfer of cases. As of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any case cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the accused has been arraigned shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan.

Section 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all
cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases
among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal
operations of the court which shall be inforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court."

Section 10. Authority over internal affairs. The Sandiganbayan shall administer its own internal affairs and
may adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them, the
rotation of justices and other matters relating to its business.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020

2. Nunez v. Sandiganbaya 111 SCRA 433

Petitioner: RUFINO V. NUÑEZ

Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
Petitioner was accused for Estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. He filed a motion to quash on
constitutional grounds which was rejected twice. He now raises the cases to the Supreme Court through
petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the validity of PD 1486, the law creating the Sandiganbayan
as a special court, with jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
other offenses committed by public officers, including GOCCs, in relation to their office. The constitutional
grounds relied upon are (1) Equal Protection; (2) Due Process; and (3) Ex-post facto clauses of the
constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1486 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
PD 1486 is constitutional.

Equal Protection
To assure that general welfare be promoted, a regulatory measure may cut into rights and liberty of the
people, as is the end of law. Those adversely affected may only invoke this if such classification was in the
spirit of hostility and discrimination. Laws operate equally to all persons, under the same circumstances,
privileges and liabilities wise. Equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in
the group equally binding on the rest.

Due Process
The argument of due process also does not hold water – a criminal proceeding complies with this
requirement if a) defendant is informed why is he being proceeded upon and what charge he has to meet,
b) full opportunity to rebut the evidence against him and c) judgement is imposed in accordance with a valid
law. This is presuming that the court has jurisdiction to do so.

Ex-post facto clauses of the constitution

The argument that petitioner’s right to appeal was diminished as the appeals are directly routed to the
Supreme Court is untenable. The aim of the law was to respond to a specific situation, an urgent one,
which is the dishonesty in public service. It does not fall within the 6 cases of ex-post facto law mainly:
(a) Makes an innocent act criminal before the passage of the law and punishes such;
(b) Aggravates a crime than it was committed;
(c) Inflicts greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime than it was committed;
(d) Alters the legal rules of evidence: authorizing conviction with less evidence;
(e) Imposes a penalty or deprives of a right for something which was lawful when previously done; and
(f) Deprives an accused of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled.

If there was any right that was deprived, it should be vital to the life and liberty of the defendant (Thompson
v Utah). In the present case, a 3 judge court is presiding over the case of an accused and a unanimous
vote is required. Even as previously declared that the Supreme Court does not review facts, holding the
same in the negative in view of the Presumption of Innocence, as the Court had already ruled in previous
cases that they have reversed convictions on a showing that this right is violated.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020

4. Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207

Petitioner: MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA

Respondents: HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, VIRGINIA
PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Director, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) , ALAN
FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his capacity as Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas), and JESUS RODRIGO T. TAGAAN

FACTS:
The petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of
asphalt to the city for the period 1998-2001. Sometime in March 1999, news reports about an alleged
anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City came out, through the contract signed by petitioner. This
prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.

The Office of the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against the petitioner and others, as
per recommendation of Allan Francisco S. Garciano.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, but it was denied. Thus, petitioner filed petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the validity of the said order in the Supreme Court (SC). But the SC directed the parties to
maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court. On the same day, petitioner issued a
memorandum informing employees and officials of the Office of the City Mayor that he was assuming the
post of mayor effective immediately. But the respondents claimed that the status quo referred to in the
order should be that where petitioner is already suspended and vice mayor Renato Osmeña is the acting
city mayor.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the status quo order would be referred to the status of the petitioner during his
preventive suspension.
(2) Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to issue such preventive suspension, and to
conduct an investigation over a particular act or omission, and the petitioner, after investigation,
may be held administratively liable.

RULING:
(1) No. The status quo could not be that where petitioner is preventively suspended since the
suspension did not precede the present controversy, it is the controversy. A status quo order is
merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things
which preceded the controversy. It was issued motu proprio on equitable considerations, it is
more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts
as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief, and it does not require the posting of a
bond.
(2) Yes. The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by the
Constitution. R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman the
statutory power to conduct administrative investigations. Petitioner is an elective local official
accused of grave misconduct and dishonesty, which such appears clear from the foregoing
provisions of R.A. 6770.

However, the power to investigation is distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring
public officer. The power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official subject to its
administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770,
“The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020
more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the
Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which
case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.”

Thus, there can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to
prevent that official from using his office to intimidate or influence witnesses or to tamper with
records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against him. However, the Ombudsman
and his deputy cannot he cannot extend the period of suspension beyond that provided by law.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020

5. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636

Petitioner: MIRIAM SANTIAGO

Respondent: SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION

Facts:
The case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation against petitioner Santiago, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. In Oct 1988, Santiago approved the application for legalization of the stay of about
32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith. Two other criminal cases, one for
violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were also filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued
an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand Pesos. Petitioner posted cash bail
without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until June 5, 1991 or until her physical
condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. After a long series of appeals and court battles
between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago from office
who was already a senator by then. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President Maceda to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.

Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating
the Constitution.

Ruling:
Yes. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes
each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own
sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of
either branch.

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts” about it. In issuing the preventive suspension of
Santiago, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as
the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree
the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of
the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and
not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

While the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the information
must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct
thereof. It was sufficient "that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the criminal proceedings against him."

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan on December 6, 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it
appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020

6. Francisco v. House of Representatives et al. Nov. 10, 2003

Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2,
2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House
Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.”

On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:
(1) Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense?
(2) Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
(1) No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six (6)
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition.

(2) Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

(3) Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second
impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ARTICLE XI, XII, XIV JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY