1. Our Lady of Lourdez Hospital vs.

Capanzana
G.R. No. 189218 March 22, 2017

Facts: Regina Capanzana, a 40-year old nurse and clinical instructor was scheduled to give birth through
C-Section. During her labor, she underwent preoperative physical examination by Drs. Ramos and Santos
and was found fit for anesthesia after she responded negatively to questions about tuberculosis, rheumatic
fever and cardiac diseases. She successfully gave birth and was later discharged from the recovery room.

However, the following day, Regina, who was under the watch of her niece Katherine Balad, complained of
headache, a chilly sensation, restlessness and shortness of breath. She asked for oxygen and later became
cyanotic. She was eventually transferred to the Intensive Care Unit, where she was hooked to a mechanical
ventilator. The doctors thereat found that she was suffering from rheumatic heart disease mitral stenosis
with mild pulmonary hypertension, which contributed to pulmonary edema. This development resulted in
cardiopulmonary arrest and, subsequently, brain damage. She was discharged, still in a vegetative state.

Respondent spouses Capanzana filed a complaint for damages against petitioner hospital, along with co-
defendants. They imputed negligence to Drs. Ramos and Santos for the latter's failure to detect the heart
disease of Regina, resulting in failure not only to refer her to a cardiologist for cardiac clearance, but also to
provide the appropriate medical management before, during, and after the operation. They further stated
that the nurses were negligent for not having promptly given oxygen, and that the hospital was equally
negligent for not making available and accessible the oxygen unit on that same hospital floor at the time.

In this regard, both courts found they committed a breach of their duty to respond immediately to the needs
of Regina, considering her precarious situation and her physical manifestations of oxygen deprivation.

Issue: Whether there was negligence on the part of (A) Drs. Santos and Ramos; and (B) Nurses on duty

Ruling: (A) NO. In order to successfully pursue a claim in a medical negligence case, the plaintiff must
prove that a health professional either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health
professional would have or have not done; and that the action or omission caused injury to the patient.
Proceeding from this guideline, the plaintiff must show the following elements by a preponderance of
evidence: duty of the health professional, breach of that duty, injury of the patient, and proximate causation
between the breach and the injury.49 Meanwhile, in fixing a standard by which a court may determine
whether the physician properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimonies
from both plaintiff and defense are resorted to.

In this case, the expert testimony of witness for the respondent Dr. Godfrey Robeniol, a neurosurgeon,
provided that the best time to treat hypoxic encephalopathy is at the time of its occurrence; i.e., when the
patient is experiencing difficulty in breathing and showing signs of cardiac arrest.

(B) YES. For the negligence of its nurses, petitioner is thus liable under Article 2180 in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, an employer like petitioner hospital may be held liable for the
negligence of its employees based on its responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. The liability
of the employer under this provision is "direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon a prior recourse
against the negligent employee or a prior showing of the insolvency of that employee." The employer may
only be relieved of responsibility upon a showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees. The rule is that once negligence of the employee is shown,
the burden is on the employer to overcome the presumption of negligence on the latter's part by proving
observance of the required diligence.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioner was the employer of the nurses who have been found
to be negligent in the performance of their duties. This fact has never been in issue. Hence, petitioner had
the burden of showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection of
the negligent nurses, but also in their supervision.

1. St. Martin Polyclinic Inc. vs. LWV Construction Corp.

Facts: In January 2008, respondent LWV Construction Corporation, which was engaged in the business
of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia referred applicant Jonathan Raguindun to
petitioner St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc., which was authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective
applicants for overseas employment. After undergoing the required examinations, petitioner cleared
Raguindin and found him “fit for employment” as evidenced by a Medical Report.

However, after being deployed and undergoing another medical examination in Saudi Arabia, Raguindin
tested positive for hepatitis C virus (HCV). After a re-examination by the Ministry of Health in Saudi Arabia,
the results remained the same, thereby leading to Raguindin’s repatriation to the Philippines.

This prompted respondent to file a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner for
recklessly issuing a medical report indicating, “fit for employment” to Raguindin. On the other hand,
petitioner denied the liability.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit for
employment" and hence, should be held liable for damages

Ruling: NO. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.

The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to establish
petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test Report. However, these
issuances only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own medical
examination of Raguindin finding him to be positive for HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the
General Care Dispensary, which was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health, was conducted only two (2)
months after petitioner issued its Medical Report. Hence, even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for
HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was
already under the same medical state at the time petitioner was first issued the Medical Report.

In this regard, it was therefore incumbent upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at
the time the Medical Report was issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical
procedures were not carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's
unfitness for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when respondent only proffered evidence
which demonstrate that months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued, Raguindin, who had already
been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for employment".

All told, there being no negligence proven by respondent through credible and admissible evidence,
petitioner cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 2. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service Inc. vs. Phoenix Assurance Company of
New York/McGee and Co. Inc.
MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK/MCGEE & CO., INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 162467 May 8, 2009

TINGA, J.:

Facts: Del Monte Philippines contracted petitioner Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc, a
stevedoring company, to load and stow a shipment of 146,288 cartons of fresh green Bananas and 15,202
cartons of fresh pineapples belonging to Del Monte Produce into the cargo hold of the vessel M/v Mistrau.
The vessel was docked at the port of Davao and goods were to be transported to Incheon, Korea in favor of
consignee Taegu Industries. Del Monte Produce insured the shipment under an “open cargo policy” with
private respondent Phoenix Assurance Company of New York, a non-life insurance company, and private
respondent McGee & Co, the underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix

Upon arrival of M/V Mistrau in Incheon, it was discovered upon discharge that some of the cargo was in
bad condition.

The damage surveyor of Korea, Byeong, surveyed that 16,069 cartons of the banana shipment and 2,185
cartons of the pineapple shipment were so damaged that they no longer had commercial value. Del Monte
Produce filed a claim under the open cargo policy. McGee’s Marine Claims evaluated the claim and
recommended that payment in the amount of $210,266.43 be made. Del Monte issued a subrogation
receipt to Phoenix and Mc’Gee.

Phoenix and McGee instituted an action for damages against Mindanao Terminal.

RTC ruled that the only participation of Mindanao Terminal was to load the cargoes on board the vessel
and signed the foreman’s report unless they were properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand
voyage across the open seas.

It was found that the cargoes were damages on account of a typhoon which M/V Mistrau had encountered
during the voyage.

It was held that Phoenix and McGee had no cause of action against Mindanao Terminal because the latter,
whose services were contracted by Del Monte, a distinct corporation from Del Monte Produce, had no
contract with the assured Del Monte Produce.

CA reversed the RTC’s decision which sustained Phoenix’s and McGee’s argument that the damage in the
cargoes was the result of the improper stowage by Mindanao Terminal. It imposed on Mindanao
Terminal, as the stevedore of the cargo, the duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in loading and
stowing the cargoes.

It further held that even with the absence of a contractual relationship between Mindanao Terminal and
Del Monte Produce, the cause of action of Phoenix and McGee could be based on quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Mindanao Terminal was careless and negligent in the loading and stowage of the cargoes
onboard M/V Mistrau making it liable for damages?; Whether Phoenix and McGee has a cause of action
against Mindanao Terminal under CC 2176 on quasi-delict?

Whether Mindanao Terminal observed the degree of diligence required by law of a stevedoring company?

Ruling: The company filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal states a cause of action.

The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of
the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only
been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service between
Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the
Court’s consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.

In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.

In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of
the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the
cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del
Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should
be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.

Article 1173 of the Civil Code is very clear that if the law or contract does not state the degree of diligence
which is to be observed in the performance of an obligation then that which is expected of a good father of
a family or ordinary diligence shall be required.

Mindanao Terminal, a stevedoring company which was charged with the loading and stowing the cargoes
of Del Monte Produce aboard M/V Mistrau, had acted merely as a labor provider in the case at bar. There
is no specific provision of law that imposes a higher degree of diligence than ordinary diligence for a
stevedoring company or one who is charged only with the loading and stowing of cargoes.

It was neither alleged nor proven by Phoenix and McGee that Mindanao Terminal was bound by
contractual stipulation to observe a higher degree of diligence than that required of a good father of a
family. We therefore conclude that following Article 1173, Mindanao Terminal was required to observe
ordinary diligence only in loading and stowing the cargoes of Del Monte Produce aboard M/V Mistrau.

Mindanao Terminal, as a stevedore, was only charged with the loading and stowing of the cargoes from
the pier to the ship’s cargo hold; it was never the custodian of the shipment of Del Monte Produce.

The loading and stowing of cargoes would not have a far reaching public ramification as that of a common
carrier and a warehouseman; the public is adequately protected by our laws on contract and on quasi-
delict.

The public policy considerations in legally imposing upon a common carrier or a warehouseman a higher
degree of diligence is not present in a stevedoring outfit which mainly provides labor in loading and
stowing of cargoes for its clients.

Phoenix and McGee failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Mindanao Terminal had acted
negligently. 1avvphi1
Phoenix and McGee relied heavily on the deposition of Byeong Yong Ahn and on the survey report of the
damage to the cargoes. Byeong, whose testimony was refreshed by the survey report, found that the cause
of the damage was improper stowage due to the manner the cargoes were arranged

As admitted by Phoenix and McGee in their Comment before us, the latter is merely a stevedoring
company which was tasked by Del Monte to load and stow the shipments of fresh banana and pineapple of
Del Monte Produce aboard the M/V Mistrau.

How and where it should load and stow a shipment in a vessel is wholly dependent on the shipper and the
officers of the vessel.

We are of the opinion that damage occurred aboard the carrying vessel during sea transit, being caused by
ship’s heavy rolling and pitching under boisterous weather while proceeding from 1600 hrs on 7th
October to 0700 hrs on 12th October, 1994 as described in the sea protest.

As it is clear that Mindanao Terminal had duly exercised the required degree of diligence in loading and
stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family, the grant of the petition is
in order.

3. Burgos Jr. vs. Naval

G.R. No. 219468 | June 8, 2016

FACTS: Burgos filed an Information against Spouses Eladio and Arilina Naval and their daughter, Amalia
Navalof the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents.

The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Aggrieved, BURGOS moved for reconsideration,
which was denied. Thus, BURGOS elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 138203.

In a Resolution dated March 5, 2015, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of BURGOS to join the People
in his certiorari petition as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. Unstirred, BURGOS moved for
reconsideration, 26 which was likewise denied. The CA observed that the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) has not consented to the filing of the certiorari petition hence, this petition before the Court.

ISSUE: Whether the authorization of the OSG needed in filing a petition for certiorari in relation to the
criminal aspect of the case?

HELD: In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party
entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the
OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He
may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the
end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.

In this case, records show that BURGOS's petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No. 138203 sought for the
reinstatement of the Information and/or a ruling that the crime has not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the
same was not intended to merely preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the case. Thus, as his certiorari
petition was filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the criminal aspect of the case, it is necessary that the
same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law, is the proper representative of the People,
the real party in interest in the criminal proceedings.

4. Dy vs. People
The Facts
Petitioner proposed to the president of MCCL William Mandy to purchase a property owned by Pantranco,
wherein petitioner represented the company to secure a loan from the International China Bank of
Commerce. As security, MCCI also executed a chattel mortgage over the warehouses owned by MCCL.
Mandy entrusted petitioner with the obligation to manage the payment of the loan.

When the property was about to be foreclosed, MCCI issued checks in varying amounts and in different
dates. Mandy claims that he delivered the checks with the instruction that petitioner used the checks to pay
the loan.7 Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and returned the money to
Mandy.8 ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued to default in its obligation
to pay. Mandy claims that it was only at this point in time that he discovered that not a check was paid to
ICBC.9chanrobleslaw

MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa wherein the RTC Manila rendered a
decision acquitting petitioner.

Petitioner filed an appeal of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision with the CA. In the Assailed Decision,16
the CA found the appeal without merit. It held that the acquittal of petitioner does not necessarily absolve
her of civil liability.

The Issue
Whether petitioner is liable to pay the civil liabilities that arise ex delicto

The Ruling of the Court

No. A civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if mandatorily instituted
with the corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is based on the presence of reasonable
doubt.

However, when the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it
takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money
because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give
something or to render some service.50 In estafa, the accused's failure to account for the property received
amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to comply with his obligation is only a contractual
breach. Thus, any finding that the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn,
means that there is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are consistent with
the concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and the different sources of obligations under our laws.

We apply this doctrine to the facts of this case. Petitioner was acquitted by the RTC Manila because of the
absence of the element of misappropriation or conversion. The RTC Manila, as affirmed by the CA, found
that Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner pursuant to a loan agreement. Clearly, there is no crime of
estafa. There is no proof of the presence of any act or omission constituting criminal fraud. Thus, civil
liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because there is no act or omission punished by law which can serve
as the source of obligation. Any civil liability arising from the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex
contractu. It does not pertain to the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.

Conclusion

The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation arising from a contract of
loan in the same criminal case where she was acquitted on the ground that there was no crime. Any
contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a separate civil action involving the contract of
loan. We clarify that in cases where the accused is acquitted on the ground that there is no crime, the civil
action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely because there is no delict from
which any civil obligation may be sourced. The peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact,
has an obligation arising from a contract. This civil action arising from the contract is not necessarily
extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper court through the proper civil action.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA dated February
25, 2009 is REVERSED. This is however, without prejudice to any civil action which may be filed to claim
civil liability arising from the contract.

SO ORDERED.

5. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.

FACTS: The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric
light system in the city of Manila.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age.

Plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose
of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his
quarters, the boys spent some time wandering around the company's premises.. Here they found some
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.

The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric
light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked
for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was
filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who
when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run
away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in
the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to
the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds

Action to recover damages was filed by David Taylor

Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of David Taylor

ISSUE:Whether or not defendant company should be held liable for the injury of David

HELD: No. The plaintiff, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

The entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission
would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other
fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant

The negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of
the injury received by the plaintiff and the plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff, and therefore the defendant is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

He may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.

The plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he
exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that
the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act
was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act
in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he can not recover.

6. Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V China Joy vs. Asian Terminal Inc.

7. Dianna vs. Batangas Transportation Co.

Facts: Plaintiffs are heirs of Florenio Diana, a former employee of defendant. In June 1945, while Florencio
Diana was riding the truck of defendant, driven by Vivencio Bristol, the truck got into an accident resulting
in the death of Diana and other passengers. Subsequently, Bristol was charged and convicted of multiple
homicide through reckless imprudence, wherein, among others, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased. However, the writ of execution was returned when it was found that Bristol had no visible
leviable property. The present case was started when defendant failed to pay indemnity under its subsidiary
liability.

Consequently, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause in which the same plaintiffs sought to recover from the same
defendant damages resulting from the death of Diana due to negligent act of its driver. This action was
predicated on culpa aquiliana. RTC dismissed the present action filed by heirs of Florenio.
Issue: Whether the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that there was
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause under Rule 8, section 1(d) of the Rules
of Court.

Ruling: NO. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delictos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito
or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. The other differences pointed out
between crimes and culpa aquiliana are:.

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means
of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which 'any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes.

Considering the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve two different remedies, it can
hardly be said that there is identity of reliefs in both actions as to make the present case fall under the
operation of Rule 8, section 1(d) of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is a mistake to say that the present
action should be dismissed because of the pendency of another action between the same parties involving
the same cause. Evidently, both cases involve different causes of action. In fact, when the Court of Appeals
dismissed the action based on culpa aquiliana, this distinction was stressed. It was there said that the
negligent act committed by defendant's employee is not a quasi crime, for such negligence is punishable by
law. What plaintiffs should have done was to institute an action under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
And this is what plaintiffs have done. To deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of
defendant's employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the indemnity to which they are entitled by
law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our duty to prevent.

8. Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario

FACTS:There was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and
a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old
boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.

Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in
favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.

ISSUE:Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly, responsible as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla

HELD:Yes. The Court held that the separate civil action lies with the employer, being primarily and directly
responsible for damages under Article 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. Following a decision by the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain, a quasi-delict is a separate civil legal institution under the Civil Code. It is independent
from the civil liability arising from criminal liability.
Moreover, the court held that Barredo was negligent in hiring his employees and has not exercised a
diligence of a good fatherto prevent damage. Fonatanilla had multiple traffic infractions already before
Barredo hired him – a failure which was attributed to Barredo as an employer. Had Garcia not reserved his
right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable.