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GREAT PACIFIC LIFE EMPLOYEES UNION and Great Pacific Life Assurance 5. The reinstatement of the employees mentioned in #4 shall be conditioned
Corporation entered sometime in 1990 into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon the submission by Alan B. Domingo and Rodel P. de la Rosa . . . . of their
to take effect 1 July 1990 until 30 June 1993. voluntary resignations to the Company upon the signing of this agreement.
On 18 May 1993, or about a month and a half before the expiration of the CBA, the 6. It is agreed and understood that Messrs. Domingo's and de la Rosa's
parties submitted their respective proposals and counter-proposals to serve as bases resignation while being effective thirty (30) days after submission, shall mean that
for their discussions on its projected renewal. The ensuing series of negotiations they need not report to the Company any longer. For the duration of the thirty
however resulted in a deadlock prompting petitioner Great Pacific Life Employees (30) day period, they shall be considered on leave with pay if they still have any
Union (UNION hereon) on 23 September 1993 to file a notice of strike with the outstanding vacation leave credits for 1993 and 1994.
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor.
Despite several conciliatory conferences before the Board, the impasse could not be 7. Messrs. Domingo and de la Rosa, as showing of the Company's magnanimity,
resolved. Thus, on 3 November 1993 petitioner UNION led by its President Isidro shall be extended/given separation pay at the rate of one(1) month basic pay per
Alan B. Domingo and Vice President Rodel P. de la Rosa went on strike. year of service based on the new CBA
rates. 4
On 6 November
(GREPALIFE 1993
hereon) respondent
required Great
all striking Pacific toLife
employees Assurance
explain in writingCorporation
within forty- On 14 February 1994 petitioner UNION in assenting to the offers expressed that —
eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action, including possible dismissal from
employment, should be taken against them for committing illegal acts against the
company in the course of the strike, particularly on 4 and 5 November. They were . . . . Management will make a full and immediate implementation of all the terms
warned that failure to submit their explanations within the prescribed period would be and conditions agreed upon.
construed as waiver of their right to be heard. The company directive was apparently
triggered by some violent incidents that took place while the strike was in progress. On its part, the Union shall forthwith lift the picket lines at the premises of the
Strikers reportedly blocked all points of ingress and egress of the company premises Company. All employees concerned shall terminate the strike and shall return to
in Makati City thus preventing GREPALIFE employees reporting for work from work promptly at the start of working hours on February 16, 1994.
entering their respective offices. These employees and third persons doing business
with the company, including lessees of the GREPALIFE building, were allegedly
This acceptance should not be Interpreted to mean acquiescence by the Union to
forced by the strikers to submit their cars/vehicles, bags and other belongings to any portion of the aforementioned "last and final offer of Management" which
illegal search. 1 may be deemed to be contrary to law or public policy, the said offer being the
sole responsibility of Management. Furthermore, it is understood that should any
Complying with the order, UNION President Alan B. Domingo and some strikers portion of said offer be held invalid, the remainder of said offer which has been
explained that they did not violate any law as they were merely exercising their herein accepted shall not be affected t hereby. 5
constitutional right to strike. Petitioner Rodel P. de la Rosa and the rest of the strikers
however ignored the management directive. On 15 February 1994 the UNION and GREPALIFE executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) before the NCMB which ended their dispute. The MOA provided in
GREPALIFE found the explanation of Domingo totally unsatisfactory and considered its Par 4 (on dismissals) that —
de la Rosa as having waived his right to be heard. Thus on 16 November 1993 both
UNION officers were notified of the termination of their services, effective (a) (Except for Domingo and de la Rosa) employees/members of the Union
immediately, as Senior Benefits Clerk and Senior Data Analyst, respectively. 2 All subject of dismissal notices on account of illegal acts committed in the course of
other strikers whose explanations were found unacceptable or who failed to submit the strike shall be given amnesty by the Company and he reinstated (under) the
written explanations were likewise dismissed. 3 Notwithstanding their dismissal from same terms and conditions prior to their dismissals following the signing of this
employment, Domingo and de la Rosa continued to lead the members of the striking agreement; (b) Messrs. Domingo and de la Rosa hereby reserve their right to
union in their concerted action against management.
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 1
question before the NLRC the validity or legality of their dismissal from strike in voked by GREPALIFE as basis for his dismissal was not adequately
employment . . . . 6 established. He also complains that he was later on forced to resign by management.
On 15 February 1994 Domingo and de la Rosa filed a joint letter of resignation with We hold that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The right to strike,
respondent company but emphasized therein that "(their) resignation is submitted while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. 14 The Labor Code
only because the same is demanded by the Company, and it should not be is emphatic against the use of violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and
understood as a waiver — as none is expressingly or impliedly made — of whatever to this end prohibits the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's
rights (they) may have under existing contracts and labor and social legislation." 7 The premises for lawful purposes. The sanction provided in par. (a) of Art. 262 thereof is
MOA was subsequently incorporated in a new CBA which was signed on 4 March so severe that "any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
1994 but made effective on 1 July 1993 until 30 June 1996. commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status." 15
On 2 June 1994 Domingo and de la Rosa sue GREPALIFE for illegal dismissal, unfair
labor practice and damages. GREPALIFE submitted before the Labor Arbiter several affidavits of its employees
which de la Rosa did not refute. Of these documents, two (2) specifically described
The Labor Arbiter sustained the charge of illegal dismissal. He found that the the incidents that transpired during the strike on 4 and 5 November 1993. Security
evidence of respondent company consisting of affidavits of its employees was self- guard Rodrigo S. Butalid deposed —
serving and inadequate to prove the illegal acts allegedly committed during the strike
by Domingo and de la Rosa. Calling attention to the fifth. Paragraph Of the "last and (3) Since 3 November 1993, I have noticed that the striking employees have
final offer" Of respondent company, he rationalized that if indeed there was justifiable been doing the following: (a) the striking employees are picketing at the entrance
ground to terminate complaints' employment, there would have been no need for the and exit gates. (b) The striking employees would surround every vehicle
company to demand the resignation of the two union officers in exchange for the including vehicles of lessees of the Grepalife Building, that would enter the
reinstatement of all the strikers. He branded this "offer" as nothing more than a Grepalife premises, inspect the same and ask the driver of the vehicle to open
scheme to get rid the complainants, noting the undue haste with which their services the trunk of the vehicle so that the striking employees can see whether there are
were terminated by the respondent company. This, he observed, constituted nothing Grepalife business documents found therein. The vehicle which is being
less than a deprivation of due process of law. Thus, on 25 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter inspected cannot enter the Grepalife premises as the striking employees would
ordered respondent GREPALIFE to reinstate complaints to their former positions place a wooden bench in front of the vehicle. This wooden bench is only
without loss of seniority rights, with one (1) year back wages without qualification or removed to enable the vehicle to enter the Grepalife premises once the signal
deduction computed from 16 November 1993, the date of their dismissal. The other has been given by the striking employees, who stand at the sides and at the back
claims were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 8 of the vehicle, to the other striking employees who stand in front of the vehicle
that the vehicle has already been inspected and cleared. (c) If the striking
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). employees find Grepalife business documents in the vehicle being inspected, the
Respondent NLRC rejected the finding below that Domingo and de la Rosa. were striking employees would prevent the vehicle from entering the Grepalife
illegally dismissed, contending that a just cause for dismissal had been sufficiently premises. (d) The striking employees do not allow Grepalife, employees to enter
established. However, it agreed that respondent company failed to comply strictly with the Grepalife premises. Occasionally however, the striking employees will allow a
the requirements of due process prior to termination. In its decision dated 14 May Grepalife employees to enter the Grepalife office but on the condition that they
1996, it modified the ruling of the Labor Arbiter by directing respondent GREPALIFE will only get their personal belongings. (e) All persons who wish to enter the
to pay complainants their one (1) month salary 9 for non-observance of due process Grepalife premises are frisked and their bags/brief cases inspected. If a person is
prior to their dismissal. Considering that at the final negotiation for the settlement found to carry any Grepalife business document, he is not allowed to enter the
respondent company offered complainants separation pay of one (1) month salary for Grepalife premises. In the alternative, he would be allowed to enter but the
every year of service based on the new CBA rates in exchange for their voluntary Grepalife business document in his possession will be confiscated from him
resignation, the NLRC additionally ordered payment of such amount. 10 before he is allowed to enter.
On 19 June 1996 respondent GREPALIFE's motion for reconsideration was denied. 4. Among those who I have seen to have participated in the foregoing activities
Pending finality thereof, respondent company and Domingo entered into compromise are the following persons: (a) Alan B. Domingo who I know to be the President of
agreement11 which they submitted to the NLRC for approval. On 10 July 1996 the the Union; (b) Rodel P. dela Rosa who I know to be the Vice-President of the
NLRC considered the case against Domingo terminated, 12 and denied on 16 August Union;
1996 de la Rosa's motion for reconsideration. 13
The affidavit of another security guard, Wilson S. Concha was of similar import.
Pleading before us, petitioner de la Rosa raises two (2) issues. He asserts that he
was illegally dismissed because his actual participation in the illegal acts during the
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 2
Petitioner de la Rosa assails the inherent weakness of the sworn statements of these There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts instituting unfair labor practice
security guards. But while it is true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm in essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may be
evidence 16 before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented on the stand, held liable under this provision if his conduct affects in whatever manner the right of
such affidavits by themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. an employee to self-organize. The decision of respondent GREPALIFE to consider
Under Sec. 7, Rule V, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, these the top officers of petitioner UNION as unfit for reinstatement is not essentially
proceedings, save for the constitutional requirements of due process, are not to be discriminatory and constitutive of an unlawful labor practice of employers under the
strictly governed by the technicalities of law and procedural rules. Section 3, par. 2, of above-cited provision. Discriminating in the context of the Code involves either
the same Rule provides that verified position papers are to be accompanied by all encouraging membership in any labor organization or is made on account of the
supporting documents including the affidavits of the parties' respective witnesses in employee's having given or being about to give testimony under the Labor Code.
lieu of direct testimony. It is therefore a clear mandate that the Labor Arbiter may These have not been proved in the case at bar.
employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy before him.
To elucidate further, there can be no discrimination where the employees concerned
Since de la Rosa did not present countervailing evidence, the NLRC correctly are not similarly situated. 19 A union officer has larger and heavier responsibilities
appreciated the affidavits of the two (2) security guards as having adequately than a union member. Union officers are duty bound to respect the law and to exhort
established the charges leveled against de la Rosa thus justifying his dismissal from and guide their members to do the same; their position mandates them to lead by
employment. example. By committing prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice
President of petitioner UNION demonstrated a high degree of imprudence and
We now turn to the claim of de la Rosa that he was forced to resign. It is true that the irresponsibility. Verily this justifies his dismissal from employment. Since the objective
draft Agreement submitted by respondent company before the NCMB expressly of the Labor Code is to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the
proposed that the reinstatement of its dismissed employees should be conditioned on dismissal of undesirable labor leaders should be upheld. 20
the voluntary resignations of Domingo and de la Rosa upon the signing of the
Agreements. It is also true that petitioner UNION was amenable to t his proposition. It bears emphasis that the employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment
But the unalterable facts is that the MOA that was subsequently finalized and according to his own discretion and judgment. This prerogative flaws from the
executed did not carry this conditionally. Paragraph 4 (b) thereof merely expressed a established rule that labor laws do not authorize substitution of judgment of the
reservation by Domingo and de la Rosa of their right to question before the NLRC the employer in the conduct of his business. Recall of workers clearly falls within the
legality. of their dismissal from employment. Obviously they were referring to their ambit of management prerogative. 21 The employer can exercise this prerogative
dismissal on 16 November 1993 due to the illegal acts they allegedly committed in the without fear of liability so long as it is done in good faith for the advancement of his
course of the strike, and not to the voluntary resignation they were supposed to interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
tender to management. employees under special laws or valid agreements. It is valid as long as it is not
performed in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of
Significantly, the joint letter of resignation submitted by Domingo and de la Rosa a malice or spite.
day after the MOA was executed was never acted upon by respondent company. And
rightly so for, having been earlier dismissed ( i.e., on 16 November 1993), these two That respondent company opted to reinstate all the strikers except Domingo and de la
(2) union officers had no more employment to resign from. To be sure, under the Rosa is an option taken in good faith for the just and lawful protection and
MOA their resignations were no longer a condition imposed by respondent company advancement of its interest. Readmitting the union members to the exclusion of
for the eventual reinstatement of the other strikers. This being the case, de la Rosa Domingo and de la Rosa was nothing less than a sound exercise of management
cannot now complain that he was forced to resign. Did he not explicitly acknowledge prerogative, an act of selt-preservation in fact, designed to insure the maintenance of
in his complaint with the Labor Arbiter that his cause of action was the Illegal peace and order in the company premises. 22 The dismissal of de la Rosa who had
termination of his services on 16 November 1993? 17 shown his capacity for unmitigated mischief was intended to avoid a recurrence of the
violence that attended the fateful strike in November.
Petitioner de la Rosa also claims that respondent company unreasonably singled out
the top officers of the UNION, including himself as unfit for reinstatement. Insisting WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of respondent National
that this act constitutes unfair labor practice, he demands entitlement to moral and Labor Relations Commission dated 14 May 1996 (a) finding that petitioner Rodel P.
exemplary damages. de la Rosa was legally dismissed, and, (b) ordering respondent Great Pacific Life
Assurance Corporation to pay petitioner his one (1) month salary or its failure to
We disagree. While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not comply strictly with due process prior to the latter's termination and his one (1) month
every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair labor practice (ULP) as defined and salary per year of service based on the new CBA rates as separation pay, as well as
enumerated under Art. 248 Of the Labor Code. 18 its Resolution dated 16 August 1996 denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The Court required both public and private respondents to file their comment on the The NCMB set a conciliation meeting on 19 July 1991, but as early as 16 July 1991
petition. Private respondent RBS filed its comment on 23 April 1996 and public the Union held a strike vote among its members and submitted the results thereof to
respondent NLRC filed its own comment on 9 December 1996. Petitioners filed a the NCMB on 18 July 1991 which showed that majority of the union members voted
reply to both comments on 4 March 1997. Since the parties have exhaustively argued to go on strike.
their position in their respective pleadings, the Court dispensed with the filing of
memoranda and considered this case submitted for resolution. During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS, through counsel, informed
GMAEU's officers that RBS did not violate any provision in the collective bargaining
The material and relevant facts are as follows: agreement since the issuance of the guidelines was a management prerogative duly
recognized in their agreement. As regards GMAEU's charges of coercion, union
interference and discrimination, RBS argued that these alleged unfair labor practices
RBS had a collective bargaining agreement with GMAEU which took effect on 2 July were neither raised by the union in its 26 June 1991 letter nor during their 3 July and
1989. After the first quarter of 1991, RBS management noted the huge amount of
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 4
10 July 1991 talks. RBS' counsel requested GMAEU's officers to name the persons or d. The union violated the no strike-no lockout clause of the CBA with RES; thus
officers of RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor practices and to state the specific rendering the strike held on 2 August 1991 illegal. As aforementioned, the NLRC
act or acts complained of so that RBS management could adequately refute said affirmed the labor arbiter's decision in a resolution dated 28 November 1994.
allegations or impose appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring officers.
GMAEU's officers, however, ignored both RBS' and the labor conciliator's requests for In their petition, petitioner raised six (6) alleged NLRC errors which ultimately narrow
a bill of particulars. down to one issue —
In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July 1991, RBS reiterated its request to WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
GMAEU's officers to furnish RBS the details of the alleged unfair labor practices WHEN IT UPHELD THE LABOR ARBITER'S DECISION THAT PETITIONERS
committed by RBS' officers. Again, the Union denied RBS' request and refused to STAGED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE ON 2 AUGUST 1991.
hold any further talks with RBS management. On the same day, RBS filed a motion to
dismiss GMAEU's notice of strike and forewarned the Union about the consequences
of an illegal strike. Petitioners argue that any defect in their pro-forma notice of strike was cured when
the NCMB took cognizance of the case and conducted conciliation proceedings on 19
July and 25 July 1991. In addition, upon assumption by the Secretary of Labor of
On 2 August 1991, the union struck. On the same day, RBS filed a complaint for jurisdiction over the dispute and certification of the same for compulsory arbitration, it
illegal strike and unfair labor practice against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers is presumed that the union had complied with the procedural requirements under the
(hereafter, illegal strike case). The case was docketed as NLRC Case 00-08-04531- labor code for a valid notice of strike.
91. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction over the
case, issued a return-to-work order, and certified the case to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration (hereafter, certified case). The case was docketed as NCMB- Anent the alleged unfair labor practice committed by RBS, petitioners assert that this
NCR-050-7-488-91. issue was thoroughly discussed with sufficient particularity in their position papers
filed in the certified case and in the illegal strike case; hence. "their notice of strike
was sufficient in form and in substance."
In the certified case, the labor arbiter found no factual and legal ground to hold RBS
guilty of unfair labor practices against the Union. On appeal (docketed as NLRC-NCR
CC No. 00076-01), the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter's decision in a resolution Petitioners further argue that they believed in good faith that RBS had committed acts
dated 31 July 1992. of unfair labor practice which induced them to proceed with the strike on 2 August
1991. Since it was an unfair labor practice strike, the no-strike clause in the collective
bargaining agreement with RBS does not apply They also showed good faith by their
Meanwhile, the labor arbiter continued to hear the illegal strike case filed by RBS immediate compliance with the return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor
against GMAEU. On 18 February 1994, the labor arbiter rendered judgment declaring upon assuming jurisdiction over the case.
the strike illegal and the union officers who knowingly participated in the illegal strike
to have validly lost their employment status based on the following reasons:
Private respondent RBS refutes these arguments and asserts that the factual findings
of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, being supported by substantial evidence, should
a. "The notice of strike did not specifically charge the company (RBS) of unfair labor be upheld by this Court. This means that petitioners cannot invoke the protective
practices, only pro forma allegations of gross violation of the collective bargaining mantle of the good faith strike doctrine because the alleged issues in the notice of
agreement, employees coercion, union interference, and discrimination." It is strike were never substantiated by the union either before or during the conciliation
"defective as it consisted of vague and general charges which could not be proceedings. The union violated the no strike clause under the collective bargaining
substantiated and which the company could not properly defend itself against." agreement and should be held accountable for their acts by considering them validly
dismissed from their employment with RBS.
b. "The absence of evidence on record that the mandatory cooling-off period and
strike vote under the law were complied which renders the strike staged by the We find no merit in the petition at bar.
respondents illegal per se on technical grounds."
The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB on 12 July 1991 contained
c. "On the merits . . . there are no strikeable grounds as there was no bargaining general allegations that RBS management committed unfair labor practices by its
deadlock between the parties. The alleged gross violation of the collective bargaining gross violation of the economic provisions in their collective bargaining agreement
agreement cannot constitute an unfair labor practice because said charges were and by alleged acts of coercion, union interference and discrimination which
bereft of factual and legal basis." "There being no unfair labor practice, it follows that amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof to
there is no strikeable issue to support the strike conducted by herein respondents (the present substantial evidence to support these allegations.
Union)."
Petitioners plead that their contemporaneous acts, reckoned from their 26 June 1991
letter to RBS up to the actual strike held on 2 August 1991, were justified based on its
honest belief that RBS was committing unfair labor practices. Stated otherwise, "the
presumption of legality (of the strike) prevails even if the allegations of unfair labor
practices are subsequently found out to be untrue." (citing Muster Iron Labor Union v.
NLRC, 219 SCRA 47)
The Court is not unmindful of this rule, but in the case at bar the facts and the
evidence did not establish even at least a rational basis why the union would wield a
strike based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate
during the conciliation proceedings. It is not enough that the union believed that the
employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly
negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief.
The cases before the Court pit labor against management, in which, on not a few 8. On March 12, 1980, private respondent filed an application for clearance to
occasions, it is labor that has cause for complaint. dismiss Cornelio Pangilinan, Leo Tropics, Olimpio Gumin, Reynaldo Dayrit,
Odilon Lising, Edilberto Quiambao; Ernesto Ramirez, Ernesto Galang,
Buenaventura Puno, Arnel Calilung, Romeo Guina, docketed as R03-AB Case
The Solicitor General states the facts as follows: No. 556-80. Subsequently private respondent filed another clearance to dismiss
Jesus Daquigan, Serafin Pawa and Rufo Bugayong, docketed as R03-A-B Case
xxx xxx xxx No. 55780.
1. Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor Congress 9. On April 22,1980, petitioner Ricardo Dormingo who was preventively
(CLLC), a legitimate labor federation duly registered with the Ministry of Labor suspended on April 17, 1980 filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
and Employment (MOLE), while the individual petitioners are former employees latter, docketed as R03-AB Case No. 55880.
of private respondent who were officers and members of the petitioner union.
10. On April 30, 1980, the services of nine (9) more union members, namely:
2. Private respondent is a corporation engaged in packing and crating, general Ernesto Tuason, Israel Vino, Pedro Santos, Juanita Suba, Edilberto Sarmiento,
hauling, warehousing, sea van and freight forwarding, Diosalino Pandan, Antonio Razon, Benjamin Capiz and Jesus Sembrano, were
terminated by private respondent on the ground that its contract with the U.S. Air
3. Sometime in January 1980, the majority of the rank and file employees of Force had expired. The rune employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
respondent firm organized the e.g. Gochangco Workers Union as an affiliate of against private respondents on June 2, 1980. docketed as R03-AB Case No.
the CLLC. On January 23, 1980, the union filed a petition for certification election 663-80.
under R03-LRD (MA) Case No. 178-80. The MOLE Region 111 office set the
hearing for the petition on February 27,1980. 11. On May 9, 1980, private respondent filed with MOLE, Region III, a Notice of
Termination of Contract together with a list of employees affected by the
4. On February 7,1980, the CLLC national president wrote the general manager expiration of the contract, among them, the 39 individual petitioners herein.
of respondent firm informing him of the organization of the union and requesting
for a labor management conference to normalize employer-employee relations 12. All the aforementioned cases were consolidated and assigned to Labor
(Annex "D," Case 486-80). Arbiter Andres Palumbarit.
5. On February 26,1980, the, union sent a written notice to respondent firm 13. After heating, Labor Arbiter Federico S. Bernardo who took over the cases
requesting permission for certain member officers and members of the union to from Arbiter Palumbarit rendered a decision dated July 2, 1982, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
1. To reinstate all the suspended/dismissed employees to their former 21. Ruben Buela 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with full
backwages including cost of emergency living allowance from the date of their 22. Rolando Santos 11,134 00 7,663.00 18,767.00
suspension/dismissal up to the supposed date of actual reinstatement, as
follows:
23. Ricardo Domingo 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
NAME BACK- WAGES ECOLA TOTAL 24. Serafin Pawa 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
1.Cornelio Pangilinan P 11,266.00 P 7,738.00 P 19,004.00 25. Rufo Bugayong 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
2. Leo Tropico 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 26. Ernesto Santos 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
3. Olimpio Gumin 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 27. Ismael Cayanan 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
4. Reynaldo Dayrit 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 28. Marcelo Lagansad 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
5. Buenaventura Puno 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 29. Marcelino Valerio 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00
6. Ernesto Galang 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 30. Ernesto M. Tuazon 10,618.00 7,225.00 18,767.00
7. Ernesto Ramirez 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 31. Israel Vino 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
8. Edilberto Quiambao 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 32. Pedro Santos 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
9 Jesus Daquigan 11,266.00 7,738.00 19,004.00 33. Juanita Suba 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
10. Renato Castaneda 11,134.00 7,633.00 19,004.00 34.Edilberto Sarmiento 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
11. Edilberto Bingcang 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00 35. Diosalino Pendon 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
12. Benedicto Capio 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00 36. Antonio Razon 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
13. Orlando Nacu 11,134.00 7,633.00 18,767.00 37. Benjamin Capiz 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
14. Rodolfo Capitly 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00 38. Jesus Sembrano 10,618.00 7,225.00 17,843.00
15. Arnel Calilung 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00 GRAND TOTAL P 419,636.00 P 706,973.00 P267,337.00
2. To restore transportation privilege as being extended before the filing of the
16. Romeo Gina 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00 instant case; and
17. Orlando Pangilinan 11,134.00 7,663.00 18,767.00 3. If their reinstatement is no longer possible due to closure of the
establishment, in addition to the payment of their full backwages and cost of
WHEREFORE, in the light of foregoing premises, the appealed decision is This is not to say, however, that such an appeal has judgment. The Solicitor General
hereby set aside and another one issued dismissing the above-entitled cases himself urges that we grant that, petition and hence, reverse the respondent
filed by the complainants-appellees for lack of merit and granting the application Commission. But apart from such urgings, the records themselves show that a
for clearance to terminate the services of individual complainants-appellees filed reversal is in order.
by respondent-appellant.
We are convinced that the respondent company is indeed guilty of an unfair labor
15. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the above decision on July 12, practice. It is no coincidence that at the time said respondent issued its suspension
1983 which NLRC denied in a resolution dated December 6,1983. and termination orders, the petitioners were in the midst of a certification election
preliminary to a labor management conference, purportedly, "to normalize employer-
1
employee relations." 5 It was within the legal right of the petitioners to do so, 6 the
16. Hence, this petition. exercise of which was their sole prerogative, 7 and in which management may not as
a rule interfere. 8 In this connection, the respondent company deserves our strongest
xxx xxx xxx condemnation for ignoring the petitioners' request for permission for some time out to
attend to the hearing of their petition before the med-arbiter. It is not only an act of
The petitioners assign three errors in support of their petition: arrogance, but a brazen interference as well with the employees right to self-
organization, contrary to the prohibition of the Labor Code against unfair labor
practices. 9
I. THAT PUBLIC
SERIOUSLY RESPONDENT
COMMITTED GRAVELY
ERRORS IN LAWABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN CONSIDERING AND
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE INTRODUCED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, But as if to add insult to injury, the company suspended the petitioners on the ground
AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC HAS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED ERRORS IN of "abandonment of work" 10on February 27, 1980, the date on which, apparently, the
GIVING DUE COURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT APPEAL FROM THE pre-election conference had been scheduled. (The petitioners sought permission on
DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER FEDERICO S. BERNARDO, ALTHOUGH SAID February 26, 1980 while the suspension order was issued on February 28, 1980.)
APPEAL WAS NOT VALIDLY PERFECTED ON TIME; What unfolds here is a clear effort by management to punish the petitioners for their
union activities.
The records show that petitioners were do so, 6 The ar employees whose 21. Ernesto Santos June 1978 Packer
employment did not terminate with the expiration of private respondent's contract
with the U.S. Air Force. In their position paper in the arbitration proceedings, they 22. Benedicto Capio Oct. 1978 Packer
averred that been employer employed by private respondent for six (6) months or
more before they were terminated as follows: 23. Rufo Bugayong May 1977 Packer
On 27 June 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered his verdict declaring that the closure of in full and complete settlement of NLRC-NCR-CASE NOS. 00-09-03329-87, 00-
SIMEX was a mere subterfuge in order to discourage the formation of the union. The 11-3887-87 and 00-01-00255-88.
respondents, SIMEX and the SANTANDERs, were found guilty of unfair labor
practice and were ordered, jointly and solidarily, to reinstate the 39 workers without I undertake to take charge of obtaining the signatures of the proper officers of the
loss of seniority rights, benefits and privileges, with full backwages from 1 November union to sign the Motion to Dismiss in order to implement the full and final
1987 until such time that these workers are actually reinstated. They were also settlement of said cases between complainant and respondents.
ordered to pay ten per cent (10%) of the total awards as attorney's fees.
I further undertake and warrant that with this payment by the respondents, the
On appeal, the NLRC, in a Decision dated 28 August 1989, set aside the Labor complainant Union and each of their members, hereby RELEASE AND
Arbiter's Decision when it held that the "determination of the wisdom or expediency to DISCHARGE the SIMEX INTERNATIONAL INC., each (sic) Officers, agents and
close a department in a corporation, e.g., the 'lumpia' department in this case, due to representative ( sic) fro any demands, claims and liabilities from any cause
financial reverses, is the sole prerogative of the corporation." It ruled that since whatsoever, arising out of their employment with the said respondents ( sic)
SIMEX had filed a Notice of Closure on 9 October 1987 and had complied with the corporation.
requirements of the applicable rules and regulations when it posted in their main gate
the aforesaid Notice, its failure to accept the workers of UFW did not constitute unfair
labor practice considering that SIMEX had already closed the "lumpia" department. UFW maintains, however, that the settlement did not materialize because of its
Hence, SIMEX was merely ordered to pay the workers affected a separation pay objections as shown by the fact that it had not filed a Motion to Dismiss and Quitclaim
equivalent to one (1) month's salary for every year of service rendered. in this case.
Petitioner UFW has thus elevated its cause before us in this Petition for Certiorari, The issues for determination then are: 1) whether or not a compromise had been
seeking the reversal of the NLRC Decision, for having been rendered with grave reached by the parties; and 2) whether or not there was a valid closure of SIMEX that
abuse of discretion, and the reinstatement instead of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter entitled it to terminate the employment of its thirty-nine (39) employees. A plea is also
and its affirmance in toto. made that the individual private respondents SANTANDERs be dropped from the suit
since they only acted within the scope of their authority.
The public and private respondents in this case were required to file their respective
Comments. Since the Solicitor General adopted a position contrary to that of the We incline to the view that no valid compromise agreement was arrived at in this
NLRC, the Court required the latter to file its own Comment, which it has done. case.
After the Comments, Reply, Rejoinders and the parties' respective Memoranda were The alleged settlement involved three (3) cases, one of which charges alleged
submitted, private respondents SIMEX and the SANTANDERs filed a Manifestation, violation of labor standards. Compromise agreements involving labor standards cases
dated 10 December 1990 (p. 212, Rollo), signed by Atty. Julio F. Andres, Jr., stating must be reduced to writing and signed in the presence of the Regional Director or his
that after they had manifested to the Court on 9 December 1990 that they were duly authorized representative (Atilano v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 82488, 28 February
adopting their Memorandum, they discovered that an "Acknowledgment Receipt and 1990, 182 SCRA 886). Section 8, Rule II of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor
Undertaking," dated 9 June 1989, had already been signed between private Standards Cases in the Regional Offices provides:
respondent George SANTANDER and petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Modesto S.
Mendoza, whereby this case as well as two (2) others had already been settled and Sec. 8. Compromise Agreement. — Should the party arrive at an agreement as
compromised. Thereby, this controversy has become moot and academic. Said to the whole or part of the dispute, said agreement shall be reduced [to] writing
Undertaking reads: and signed by the parties in the presence of the regional director or his duly
authorized representative.
I, MODESTO S. MENDOZA, . . ., have today RECEIVED FROM SIMEX
INTERNATIONAL, INC., through its Vice-President, MR. GEORGE The questioned "Acknowledgment Receipt and Undertaking" did not comply with this
SANTANDER, the following amounts: requisite. It was not, therefore, duly executed.
xxx xxx xxx In the case at bar, SIMEX alleged that it suffered export rejections amounting to
$78,959.54 for 1985, $1,654.00 for 1986 and $28,414.11 for 1987, respectively. It
(3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to alleged that these export rejections resulted in huge financial losses to the company
appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to (Rollo, p. 96) so much so that remedial measures were instituted as suppliers
abandon a prescription already acquired. (Emphasis ours). hesitated to given the company their usual credit terms ( ibid, p. 97).
No evidence was adduced that would show that the aforementioned counsel for UFW The audited financial statement of SIMEX, however, clearly depicted that for 1985
was authorized to enter into a compromise. Correspondingly, he cannot release and and 1986, the company actually derived retained earnings of P35,593.21 and P73,
discharge SIMEX and the SANTANDERs from their obligation. A perusal of the 241.25, respectively. The private respondents never refuted this fact. Instead, they
"Acknowledgment Receipt and Undertaking" reveals that no representative of UFW merely insisted that these export rejections resulted in heavy losses for the company.
signed the alleged settlement. These export rejections may have, indeed, contributed to a reduction of SIMEX's
earnings. The company, however, was not suffering from business losses, as
claimed, at the time of application for closure.
The fact that said counsel undertook to obtain the signatures of the proper officers of
UFW shows that his action was still subject to ratification by the union members. This Indeed, there is no question that an employer may reduce its work force to prevent
confirmation was never secured as shown by the fact that no motion for the dismissal
of the case at bar had been filed by UFW or on its behalf "in order to implement the losses. However, these losses must be serious, actual and real (Lopez Sugar
full and final settlement of said case," unlike in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-00255-88 Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, G.R. No. 75000-01, 30 August 1990, 189
where such a Motion had been filed. In an Affidavit, dated 6 May 1991 (p. 258, Rollo), SCRA 179). Otherwise, this "ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by
Atty. Mendoza also declared that respondent George Santander had stopped the scheming employers who might be merely feigning business losses or reverses in
payment of the three (3) postdated checks, which statement has not been refuted by their business ventures in order to ease out employees (Garcia v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-
private respondents. 67825, 4 September 1987, 153 SCRA 639).
We now shift to the issue bearing on the legality of the closure of SIMEX. Article 283 In this regard, then, SIMEX failed to prove its claim. What were submitted as
(then Article 284) of the Labor Code provides: evidence were mere receipts of export rejections, nothing more. SIMEX never
adduced evidence that would reflect the extent of losses suffered as a result of the
export rejections, which failure is fatal to its cause.
Art. 283. Closure of the establishment and reduction of personnel. — The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses The Notice of Closure filed by SIMEX had indicated that it will have a permanent
or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking shutdown and/or total closure of all its units of operation. This was not so. Workers
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this belonging to the Marketing and Export Divisions were never laid off. A SEC
Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Certification, dated 4 February 1988, shows that SIMEX never applied for dissolution.
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of The Labor Arbiter also found as a fact that SIMEX continued to export its products,
termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the including "eggroll wrap," long after its target date of closure.
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least
his one (1) month pay or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, In explaining this discrepancy, SIMEX merely alleged that not all its operations were
whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closed. Even on this score alone, therefore, private respondents' position must be
closures or cessation of operations of establishment and undertaking not due to rejected.
serious business losses or financial losses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every These factors strongly give more credence to the Solicitor General and UFW's
contention that the alleged closure of business of SIMEX was "but a subterfuge to
The SANTANDERs' prayer that they be dropped from this case must also be rejected.
They should have adopted that recourse during the earlier stages. Moreover, UFW
has adequately shown that the individual private respondents were not only officers of
the company but its major stockholders as well (see Carmelcraft Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 90634-35, 6 June 1990, 186 SCRA 393).
Lastly, if SIMEX has not yet recovered the balance of the compromise money given to
then counsel for petitioner, its recourse is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case
against the latter. After all, in said counsel's Affidavit, he has stated that he is ready to
return the balance of what he had received after payment of the amount due in
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-00255-88.
SO ORDERED.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the Building at Plaza Moraga.
latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal
Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was
receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the
manager of the Companies, and was li kewise made chairman of the negotiating panel respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to
for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions. each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts
which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October
1, 1957. 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were 2. Take your meals within the office.
conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the
issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a
notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation 3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at
conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the the office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so
that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of
were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958. the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts.
These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, coercion" against two others.
1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on
May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them
personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to
picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike
line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.
between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-
loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to
succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The
offered by some picketers. screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.
However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being
evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically
Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies
the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members
First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed
cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific
restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU;
driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
the Companies' building. Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as
individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety: of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787,
while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have
been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the
convinced of our decision. Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their
right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free
positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if
with or without you. they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in
and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until the strike.
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees
against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech
employees after the strike; provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The
same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free
officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of
investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or
undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB
vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with
full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the
their usual employment. strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay
for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families,
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-
constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is
said letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by registered equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to
special delivery mail at that — without being coursed through the Unions which were striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the
representing the employees in the collective bargaining. employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the
consequences of returning to work would be.
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING... The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused
from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent
deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to
dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the
cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads: second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket
lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly
exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.
filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958,
citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other is sue
than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.) So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by
the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an
illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of
filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the
clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p.
tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197,
meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of Oct. 31, 1958.)
some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in
responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn.,
Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from
circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the
proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent
the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon
dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work.
respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees — having been involved in
Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike — were hostile to the strikers.
ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the
reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and
employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in
there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p.
June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43
employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)
they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.
Law, p. 378)
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 22
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the
necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference,
to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form
855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.) and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of ... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in
law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no
reinstatement. discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable
to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a
not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the
854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.) employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the
employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-
striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those
strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and
reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order. members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their
actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual
and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the
whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work — upon the invitation
union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, of the respondents — they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and
the Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to
because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)
president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the
strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that
picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and [A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is
customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge
discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R.
happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving
picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v.
explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Bri ck Co., 99 F2d
charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It 99.)
may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights
between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the
Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements.
practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to
reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding [W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike
Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the
former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out
Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if
testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the
C, Decision, p. 27) — another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement
practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to believe that employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or
Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of the
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 23
comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as
the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the
replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . ( Id., p. 422 and cases cited.) right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki
Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the
backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of
strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not
period of the strike, even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of
they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do
refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable
for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent
Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the
12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the
also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter
likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .
the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of I ndustrial Relations, supra).
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2,
1958, which the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether
readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer
fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be
readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can able erase
not to put up
or aneutralize
valid defense
the in a criminal right
employer's prosecution for the
to impose same acts,
discipline on does
said
thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to
backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the
Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline
which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was based
Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of
incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct
employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication
Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis
employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever supplied)
they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages
to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the
that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of underscored portions of the above citation read however as follows:
the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]).
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary
dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals
may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of
by serving the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's
compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the
law, e.g., dismissal for union activities. employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the
lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away
terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice,
advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on
from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine
employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless of the whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out
whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 24
measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their
exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which
neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this
employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al.
impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish
charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if
interest. not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their
proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar
"suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities
exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain
on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark,
reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved
the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that
it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no
improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is
may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby,
(Emphasis ours) admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated A ugust 17,
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to
by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's reinstate the similar
comparatively dismissed members
positions, of the petitioning
with backwages from JuneUnions
2, 1958touptheir
to theformer or
dates of
decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted
paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined
sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in
the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the
immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt
against the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to
believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate
attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled
with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine
that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may
escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima
facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to
copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the
underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is
substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's
decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges
against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees,
should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless
an activity inimical to the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions
and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy
the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision rendered Sometime in November, 1962, the PTGWO urged its member-unions to stage a
by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations on January 21, 1974 adjudging the nationwide strike. Thus, respondent Cruz campaigned among the members of RUWU
petitioner corporation guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering the reinstatement of to join the strike.
and payment of backwages to respondent Antonio Cruz.
On November 28, 1962 at around 11:00 p.m., within the company premises,
The antecedent facts as found by the industrial court are as follows: respondent Cruz approached three co-employees who are supervisors of the
company, namely, Camaguin, Dayadante and Gaspar. These persons contended that
respondent Cruz, who was under the influence of liquor, uttered the following remarks
Respondent Antonio Cruz was employed by petitioner corporation in 1957 as an to them: "Ikaw, Ikaw, Ikaw-mga hayop kayo. Bibigyan ko kayo ng isang linggong
electrician. Sometime in December, 1961, he was elected president of the Royal taning sa buhay ninyo ipapapatay ko kayo." They also claim that respondent Cruz
Undergarment Workers Union (RUWU for brevity), a legitimate labor organization had challenged another co-employee. Respondent and his witnesses denied this
which became affiliated with the Philippine Transport and General Workers charge and claimed that what the respondent actually said to the three employees
Organization (PTGWO for brevity). was: "Ikaw, Ikaw, Ikaw pare, alam kong matitigas kayo rito sa compania, kayat ako'y
nakikiusap, kung maaari pag-natuloy ang nationwide strike bukas, makiisa kayo at
On December 14, 1961, the RUWU-PTGWO, represented by the National Secretary gamitin ang tigas ninyo." Immediately thereafter, the three employees went to the
of PTGWO and respondent Cruz as RUWU President, sent proposals to petitioner personnel officer of petitioner corporation. On November 29, 1962, they executed an
corporation for the purpose of collective bargaining. affidavit regarding the incident.
On the following day, December 15, 1961, petitioner corporation, thru its personnel The following day, on November 30, 1962, the general manager of petitioner
manager, terminated the services of respondent Cruz allegedly on the basis of the corporation placed respondent Cruz on preventive suspension effective December 3,
latter's "record and after careful analysis and deliberation." Respondent's wife, 1962 for threatening "the lives of four (4) employees" and for having 'been reported
Felicidad Cruz, who was also an employee of petitioner, was likewise terminated. under the influence of liquor," both acts being "contrary to rules and regulations."
Thus, RUWU called a strike sometime during the first week of January, 1962.
Upon the request of respondent Cruz and PTGWO, the petitioner corporation
On January 10, 1962, RUWU-PTGWO and petitioner corporation entered into a conducted a conference which was in the nature of an investigation of the incident.
Return-to-Work Agreement thru the conciliation efforts of the Department of Labor.
The agreement contained the following provision: On December 13, 1962, petitioner corporation dismissed respondent Cruz for being
under the influence of liquor on November 28, 1962 and for having threatened the
xxx xxx xxx lives of four of his co-employees.
Regarding the two (2) employees, Mr. Antonio Cruz and Mrs. Cruz, the union Respondent Cruz filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against petitioner
entrusts the settlement of its complaint for decision to the Management, which corporation with the Court of Industrial Relations. On January 21, 1974, the
shall be reinstatement for both employees when the Royal Undergarment respondent industrial court, while affirming the findings of the healing examiner,
Workers Union- PTGWO shall have been chosen as the collective bargaining rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads as follows:
agent for the workers at the consent election to be held in the company
premises; WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby declared guilty of unfair labor practice and
is ordered to cease and desist from further committing the same. Respondent is
.... (pp. 39-40, Rollo) further directed to reinstate complainant Antonio Cruz to his former or equivalent
position without loss of seniority and other privileges and to pay him backwages
The records do not disclose the results of the consent election. Subsequently including all benefits attached to his position, from the date he was dismissed up
to November 17, 1969.
however, respondent Cruz and his wife were both re-employed and reinstated by
petitioner corporation, thereby indicating the victory of RUWU-PTGWO in the consent
election. SO ORDERED. (pp. 43-44, Rollo)
II RESPONDENT CIR LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION Then, in the space of eleven months, complainant once again was dismissed
OF FACT IN NOT HOLDING IN ITS DECISION THAT THE DISMISSAL OF from respondents' employ, e.g. in December of the same year he was reinstated.
RESPONDENT CRUZ WAS FOR CAUSE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE Respondents based its dismissal of complainant on the ground that he was
TERMINATION PAY LAW AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH MANAGEMENT obviously under the influence of liquor and he threatened the lives of four co-
PREROGATIVE. employees. The evidence of being obviously under the influence of liquor' is
based on the supposed observation of the three witnesses whose lives were
allegedly threatened, coming as it is from a biased source. None of these
III ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR witnesses have ever supplied, much less hinted on the motivation why
LABOR PRACTICE, RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN AWARDING complainant threatened their lives. On the contrary, they claimed that they were
RESPONDENT CRUZ FULL BACKWAGES WITHOUT DEDUCTING on friendly terms with the complainant with no previous background of
THEREFROM THE INCOME HE EARNED DURING SAID PERIOD. (pp. 9- misunderstanding between them. None of them ever filed criminal charges
10, Rollo) against the complainant for the supposed threat on their lives indicating that
whatever has transpired is not as serious as pictured by the respondent. The
Anent the fi rst and second assigned erro rs, petitioner submits that the records of the incident was simply blown into such proportion so as to provide a supposed valid
case, particularly the testimonies of respondent Cruz himself and his witnesses, show cause for complainant's dismissal. In the light of the initial attitude of respondent
that petitioner corporation did not interfere with or prevent the union activities of its earlier discussed, the inducing cause directly contributing to complainant's
employees;that
company; that
thethe former has
dismissal even allowed
of respondent Cruzorwas
abetted active unionism
not impelled within
by reason the
of union dismissal is the
misconduct. (pp.respondent's
42-43, Rolloantipathy
) to complainant's union activity and not his
participation of respondent Cruz but solely by his infraction of company rules and
regulations, specifically, serious threats against the lives of three co-employees, We accord respect to the findings of the industrial court. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
challenging another to a fight and intoxication while on duty, all of which clearly 875, known as the The Industrial Peace Act, as amended, provides that employees
amounted to a dismissal for cause under the Termination Pay Law, Rep. Act No. shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations
1052, as amended. of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives
of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
On the other hand, the Court of Industrial Relations found from the surrounding collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Hence, it shall be unfair labor
circumstances of the case, a valid and sufficient basis for the charge of unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to tenure of employment or any
practice against petitioner company. Said the respondent court: term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization (Section 4 (a) (4), R.A. No. 875).
There is no question as to the union activities of the complainant. Starting from
the time he was elected president of the RUWU, he had engaged himself actively We have perused the record and found that the totality of evidence as found by
in union affairs. He had in behalf of others pursued assiduously the employee respondent court supports the conclusion that respondent Cruz has been unjustly
relationships of the membership. And on a higher plane, he urged the members dismissed by reason of his union activities. The charge by petitioner against
to join the nation-wide strike being planned by the PTGWO. respondent Cruz for being under the influence of liquor on a certain date and for
having threatened the lives of his co-employees is too flimsy to merit serious
On the part of respondent there appears to be an attitude of antipathy towards consideration. We have on record the undisputed facts that private respondent, as
the complainant. Going back to the time, when the RUWU sent collective president of RUWU, was known for his aggressive and militant union activities; that
bargaining proposals represented then by the complainant, the latter and his wife he and his wife had been previously dismissed on the ground of active participation in
were dismissed one day after the same was received by respondent company. union affairs; that they were reemployed only pursuant to the express terms of the
The record does not show the specific reasons or bases for this action except the Return-to-Work Agreement executed by petitioner corporation and RUWU when the
general proposition that this (complainant's) record was supposedly carefully latter won in the consent election; that respondent Cruz was dismissed again for the
analyzed. And yet, why include his wife in the dismissal? In the Return-to-Work second time in the course of his campaign among RUWU members to join the
Agreement of January, 1962 which followed, a peculiar and strange arrangement nationwide strike of PTGWO in which RUWU is a member union.
was made. The reinstatement of complainant and his wife was made to depend
Further, factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive in the
absence of a showing that the same have no support in the evidence on record. This
Court will not review said court's factual findings as long as the same are supported
by evidence. This is so because the industrial court is governed by the rule of
substantial evidence rather than by the rule of preponderance of evidence as in
ordinary civil cases (Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19000, July 31, 1963,
8 SCRA 654; Industrial Commercial Agricultural Workers Organization v. Bautista, L-
15639, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 907).
Anent the third assigned error, it is the judicial trend to fix a reasonable period for the
payment of backwages to avoid protracted delay in post judgment hearings to prove
earnings of the worker elsewhere during the period that he had not been reinstated to
his employment. In consonance with the rulings in many cases, and in view of the
circumstances and equity of the instant case, respondent Cruz should be reinstated
and granted backwages corresponding to a period of three (3) years from the time he
was dismissed on December 13, 1962, without deduction for his earnings elsewhere
during his lay-off and without qualification of his backwages as thus fixed, that is,
unqualified by any wage increases (Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-26136, October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 27; L.R. Aguinaldo & Co., Inc. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-31909, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 309; Davao Free
Workers Front v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-29356, October 27, 1975, 67 SCRA
418).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated January 21, 1974 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
petitioner is directed to reinstate respondent Antonio Cruz without loss of seniority
rights and with backwages for three (3) years from the time of dismissal, without
deduction and qualification. If reinstatement is no longer possible, respondent Antonio
Cruz should be awarded separation pay of one (1) month for every year of service.
With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2
And, indeed, even without such motivation, the closure cannot be justified because
The rest of the disposition stand. the claimed losses are obviously not serious. In this situation, the employees are
entitled to separation pay at the rate of one-half month for every year of service under
We do not find that the above decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. On Art. 283 of the Labor Code.
the contrary, it is comformable to the pertinent laws and the facts clearly established
at the hearing. The contention of the petitioners that the employees are estopped from claiming the
alleged unpaid wages and other compensation must also be rejected. This claim is
The reason invoked by the petitioner company to justify the cessation of its operations based on the waivers supposedly made by the complainants on the understanding
is hardly credible; in fact, it is preposterous when viewed in the light of the other that "the management will implement prospectively all benefits under existing labor
relevent circumstances. Its justification is that it sustained losses in the amount of P standard laws." The petitioners argue that this assurance provided the consideration
1,603.88 as of December 31, 1986 .3 There is no report, however, of its operations that made the quitclaims executed by the employees valid. They add that the waivers
during the period after that date, that is, during the succeeding seven and a half were made voluntarily and contend that the contract should be respected as the law
months before it decided to close its business. Significantly, the company is between the parties.
capitalized at P 3 million .4 Considering such a substantial investment, we hardly think
that a loss of the paltry sum of less than P 2,000.00 could be considered serious Even if voluntarily executed, agreements are invalid if they are contrary to public
enough to call for the closure of the company. policy. This is elementary. The protection of labor is one of the policies laid down by
That the employee has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in a waiver;
the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation
than what a worker is entitled to recover. A deed of release or quitclaim cannot
bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled. 8
We find also untenable the contention of Carmen Yulo that she is not liable for the
acts of the petitioner company, assuming it had acted illegally, because the
Carmelcraft Corporation is a distinct and separate entity with a legal personality of its
own. Yulo claims she is only an agent of the company carrying out the decisions of its
board of directors. We do not agree. Our finding is that she is in fact and legal effect
the corporation, being not only its president and general manager but also its
owner. 10
Moreover, and this is a no less important consideration, she is raising this issue only
at this tardy hour, when she should have invoked this argument earlier, when the
case was being heard before the labor arbiter and later m the NLRC. It is too late now
to shunt these responsibilities to the company after she herself had been found liable.
All told, the conduct of the petitioners toward the employees has been less than
commendable. Indeed, it is reprehensible. First, the company inveigled them to waive
their claims to compensation due them on the promise that future benefits would be
paid (and to make matters worse, there is no showing that they were indeed paid).
Second, it refused to recognize the respondent union, suggesting to the employees
that they join another union acceptable to management. Third, it threatened the
employees with the closure of the company and then actually did so when the
employees insisted on their demands. All these acts reflect on the bona fides of the
petitioners and unmistakably indicate their ill will toward the employees.
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the respondents guilty of unfair labor practices On January 6, 1960, management sent to the employees of the Company letters of
as charged, orders them to cease and desist from such acts, and to reinstate termination of employment of the following tenor:
complainants Alejandro Ceniza, Lorenzo Solon, Lucas Atienza, Hospicio Castillo,
Eulogio Gernale, Petronio Bustamante, Catalina Aranas and Maria Cabatingan to This is to notify you that on July 31, 1961 you will be separated from the service
their former positions under the same terms and conditions of employment with of this Company. Consequently August 1, 1961 you will no longer be in the
back wages from the time they were illegally dismissed until they are actually employ of this Company.
reinstated by employing them either in the Photo Materials Company, Inc., or
Medel Office Materials and Paper Company, Inc. Due to poor business, the stockholders desire to dissolve this Corporation or to
Upon the filing of a charge for unfair labor practice with the Court of Industrial discontinue doing business on or about July 31, 1961.
Relations by herein respondents against petitioners H. Aronson & Co., Inc. — Then on February 13, 1961 Aronson's srcinal Articles of Incorporation were amended
hereinafter referred to as Aronson or the Company — and/or Photo Materials & Paper so that, instead of its corporate existence expiring on May 27, 1970, it was made to
Co., and/or Photo Materials Company, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as Photo expire nine (9) years earlier, or more specifically, on July 31, 1961. On March 9,
Materials — and Medel Office Materials and Paper Co., Inc. — also referred to 1961, or less than a month after such amendment had been accomplished, Medel
hereinafter as Medel — a preliminary investigation was had and thereafter the was incorporated with a capital stock of P100,000.00, and on July 17 of the same
corresponding charge was filed against them under the provisions of Section 4 (a), year, another new corporation, Photo Materials was also incorporated with an
sub-sections (1), (2), and (4) of Republic Act No. 875. After hearing, the parties authorized capital stock of P400,000.00.
charged were found guilty. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied
subsequently by the court en banc, they took the present appeal.
The total authorized capital stock of the two new corporations amounting to
P500,000.00 was exactly the same authorized capital stock of Aronson. Moreover,
The following facts have been established: Aronson, srcinally known as Moody Photo Materials was organized to engage in the business of importing and exporting,
Aronson & Co., Inc., was incorporated in 1920, with an authorized capital stock of buying and selling goods, specifically photographic equipment and supplies, cameras,
P5000,000.00 and a corporate life of 50 years expiring on May 27, 1970. Its corporate graphic art films, greeting cards, and to maintain a photo processing laboratory and a
purpose was to engage, as it actually engaged, in the business of buying, importing photo finishing and photographic studio, while the other new corporation, Medel, was
and selling of goods, wares and merchandise, wholesale and retail, including photo organized to engage in the business of buying and selling wares and merchandise of
materials and supplies, writing paper, school books, stationery and stationery all kinds, such as paper and other office materials. It will thus be seen that the two
supplies. In the course of time it became an Aronson family controlled corporation. new corporations were organized to engage in exactly the same business in which
Aronson had been engaged; in other words, to take over the latter's business.
In 1958 its President and General Manager was Francis Aronson, and its Assistant
Manager was Donato Medel. That year thirteen of its twenty-five employees became On July 15, 1961, all the employees of Aronson who were members of the
members of the respondent Associated Labor Union, among them being the respondent Union were required to stop working in spite of the fact that, according to
individual respondents Alejandro Ceniza, Lorenzo Solon, Lucas Atienza, Hospicio the notice of termination of employment served on them, their services were to be
Castillo, Eulogio Gernale, Petronio Bustamante, Catalina Aranas and Maria terminated on the 31st of that month. On the other hand, the employees of the
Cabatingan. In the month of September of that year, because of the dismissal of Company who were not members of the respondent Union were allowed to continue
Eugenia Solon, a union member, her co-employees who were union members working up to that date, and thereafter they continued working because they were
Sometime in 1977, PAL, a local air carrier, entered into a service agreement with In its Decision affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter, Respondent Commission held
STELLAR, a domestic corporation engaged, among others, in the business of job petitioner, as an indirect employer, jointly and severally liable with STELLAR for
contracting janitorial services (PAL and STELLAR's Agreement, Annex "1" of separation pay. First, the individual private respondent's work, although not directly
PAL's Position Paper, Annex "F", id.). related to the business of petitioner, was necessary and desirable for the
maintenance of the petitioner's premises and airplanes. Second, the individual private
respondents were retained for thirteen long years, despite the fact that the contract,
Pursuant to their service agreement, which was impliedly renewed year after
year, STELLAR hired workers to perform janitorial and maintenance services for which petitioner had entered into STELLAR in 1977, was only for one year.
PAL. Among those employed were [Complainants] Manuel Parenas, Daniel
Gaco, Rodolfo Siaron, Alfredo C. Montilla, Romulo S. Castro, Elsa C. Castro, On reconsideration, the NLRC modified its earlier Decision by absolving STELLAR of
Marcelo Paragas, Romulo Parane, Rafael Sanchez, Inocencio [Alcantara], liability, thereby making PAL solely responsible for the award decreed by the labor
Reynaldo Paraiso, Roberto Geronimo, Nomer E. Pescante, Benedicto Santos, arbiter. It held that, first, petitioner was the employer of the individual private
Alberto Tomas, Bonifacio Bayeta, Jr., Danilo Rodriguez, Carleto dela Cruz, respondents, for it engaged in labor-only contracting with STELLAR. This was shown
Rafael Bequio, Eduardo Sitjar, Ruben Tanseco, Teodoro K. Discaya, Ernesto by the failure of petitioner to refute the factual finding that it continued to employ the
Evardone, Arnulfo Lavilla, Glecerio Elabarin, Marcelino Caneda, Epifanio Galibo, individual private respondents after the expiration of the service contract on
Benjamin Gandelaria, Lino B. Dahohoy, Avelino Mullet, Jimmy M. Cordero, December 31, 1990. Second, the individual private respondents' admission in their
Ivanhoe Magino, Felix B. Catindoy, Ruben Daluz, Abenir Yara, Santiago Co[r]tez, Complaint that they were employees of STELLAR was not conclusive, as the
Jr., Armando P. Lucido, Alberto Montilla, Renerio Capon, Leonardo Barrozo, existence of an employer-employee relation was a question of law that could not be
Ireneo Frondozo, Dionesio Banares, Marcelo Marzon, Alfredo Sta. Maria, the subject of stipulation. Respondent Commission concluded that their dismissal was
Bernardo Mamaril, Carlos Delloro, Aldon dela Torre and Florentino Pestido, who without just and valid cause. Because they were no longer seeking reinstatement,
were assigned at PAL's various premises under the supervision of STELLAR's petitioner was liable for separation pay.
supervisors/foremen and timekeepers. The workers were also furnished by
STELLAR with janitorial supplies, such as vacuum cleaner and polisher (Please Hence, this petition. 7 When required by the Court to comment on behalf of
see Manuel Parenas' Contract of Employment with STELLAR, Annex "1" of Respondent Commission, the solicitor general manifested his disagreement with the
Annex "E", id.; STELLAR's Position Paper, pp. 2-5, supra; TSN, May 20, 1993, assailed Decision and Resolution. Thus, Respondent Commission, in compliance with
pp. 15-16 and 19-20). the February 5, 1997 Resolution of this Court , 8 filed its own Comment.
On December 31, 1990, the service agreement between PAL and STELLAR The Iss ues
expired. PAL then called for [the] bidding of its janitorial requirements. This
notwithstanding, STELLAR exerted efforts to maintain its janitorial contract with In its Memorandum,9 petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to Respondent
PAL which, in the meantime, allowed Manuel Parenas and others to work at the Commission in this wise: 10
PAL's premises (STELLAR's Position Paper, pp. 2-5, supra, and Memorandum of
Appeal, Annex "H", pp. 3-4, id.; Carlos Callanga's Affidavit, p. 2, pp. 156-160
(a) [I]n holding that the janitorial service agreement with STELLAR was a labor-
only arrangement;
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 35
(b) [I]n holding that PAL continued with the services of the individual respondents (2) The workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities
after November 16, 1991, when the janitorial agreement with STELLAR expired; which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer
and in which workers are habitually employed. 11
(c) [I]n holding PAL liable for payment of separation pay to the individual On the other hand, permissible job contracting requires the following conditions:
respondents.
(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the
The petition raises two main issues. First, whether the individual private respondents contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his
are regular employees of PAL. Second, whether petitioner is liable to them for own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or
separation pay. The resolution of the first issue involves a determination of (1) principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to
whether petitioner was a labor-only contractor; and (2) whether the individual private the results thereof; and
respondents became regular employees of PAL because they were allowed to
continue working for petitioner after the expiration of the service contract. (2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, [machinery], work premises, and other materials which are necessary
The Court's R uling in the conduct of his business. 12
The petition is meritorious. Applying the foregoing provisions to the present case, the Court finds no basis for
holding that PAL engaged in labor-only contracting. The true nature of the individual
Firs t Is sue: No E mployer-Empl oyee Rela tion private respondents' employment is evident from the service agreement between
B etween Complainants and P etitioner petitioner and STELLAR, which we reproduce hereunder:
J anitori al S ervi ce Ag reement Is 1. The CONTRACTOR [STELLAR] undertakes to provide the following cleaning
Not Labor-Only Conta cting and janitorial maintenance services.
Prohibited labor-only contracting is defined in Article 106 of the Labor Code as Daily Routine:
follows:
(a) Dusting and/or damp-wiping of other vertical and horizontal surfaces that
Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. — . . . require daily attention;
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an (c) Polishing and spot-scrubbing of [illegible];
employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers
recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly (d) Dusting, damp-wiping and polishing of [furniture], counters, . . . and other
related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or office fixtures;
intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall
be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were (e) Emptying and cleaning of ash trays;
directly employed by him.
(f) Cleaning and disinfecting of toilets and washrooms;
This definition covers any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer,
where such person: (g) Cleaning of inside windows, glasses, surfaces, [partitions], etc.;
(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, (h) On-the-job supervision.
equipment, [machinery], work premises and other materials; and
(3) The equipment, materials and supplies to be used by the CONTRACTOR in 10. This agreement shall be for a period of one (1) year from May 1, 1977 to April
connection with its aforesaid undertakings shall be of high quality and shall not 30, 1978 and [illegible].
cause any damage to OWNER's premises and properties or cause any injury or
annoyance to the persons working or present in the premises. The OWNER shall
place at the disposal of the CONTRACTOR a suitable storage space with lock The foregoing agreement clearly indicates that an employee-employer relation
and key for the safe-keeping of the cleaning equipment and materials which the . existed between the individual private respondents and STELLAR, not PAL. The
. . CONTRACTOR shall use in connection with its undertakings in . . . provisions of the agreement demonstrate that STELLAR possessed these earmarks
Agreement. of an employer: (1) the power of selection and engagement of employees (Stipulation
Nos. 1, 4, 7 and 8), (2) the payment of wages (Stipulation Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8), (3) the
power of dismissal, and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct (Stipulation
4. The CONTRACTOR warrants that the persons it shall employ to perform the No. 8). 13
work subject to this Agreement shall be honest, reliable, carefully screened,
trained, cooperative, and in possession of health certificates and police
clearances; they will be neat, presentable in appearance, attired in identifying Aside from these stipulations in the service agreement, other pieces of evidence
uniforms and provided with identification cards. The uniforms and identification supportrespondents.
private the conclusion that STELLAR,
A contract not PAL,14 was
of employment the between
existed employerSTELLAR
of the individual
and the
cards shall be at the expense of the CONTRACTOR.
individual private respondents, proving that it was said corporation which hired them.
It was also STELLAR which dismissed them, as evidenced by Complainant Parenas'
5. In consideration of the services to be rendered by the CONTRACTOR, the termination letter, which was signed by Carlos P. Callanga, vice president for
OWNER shall pay to the CONTRACTOR the sum of PESOS: THREE operations and comptroller of
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY (P3,840.00) per month in Philippine STELLAR. 15 Likewise, they worked under STELLAR's own supervisors, Rodel
Currency, payable in two equal payments on the 15th and end of each month Pagsulingan, Napoleon Parungao and Renato Topacio. 16 STELLAR even had its
without necessity of demand. In the event that the minimum wage rate shall be own collective bargaining agreement with its employees, including the individual
increased by the operation of law, there shall be a corresponding automatic private respondents. 17 Moreover, PAL had no power of control and dismissal over
increase in the consideration of the contract price to be paid by the OWNER to them.
the CONTRACTOR in consideration of the latter's services.
In fact, STELLAR claims that it falls under the definition of an independent job
6. In case the OWNER shall require the CONTRACTOR to perform the work contractor. Thus, it alleges that it has sufficient capital in the form of tools and
provided under paragraph 1 hereof in excess of eight hours on: (1) any regular equipment, like vacuum cleaners and polishers, and substantial capitalization as
working day, the OWNER shall pay the CONTRACTOR an additional amount to proven by its financial statements. 18 Further, STELLAR has clients other than
be computed in the following manner: petitioner, like San Miguel Corporation, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, Eveready,
Benguet Management Corporation and Japan Airlines. 19
xxx xxx xxx
All these circumstances establish that STELLAR undertook said contract on its
7. It is agreed that no authority has been conferred upon the CONTRACTOR by account, under its own responsibility, according to its own manner and method, and
the OWNER to hire any person on behalf of the latter and that each person free from the control and direction of the petitioner. Where the control of the principal
employed or hired by the CONTRACTOR in carrying out its part of this is limited only to the result of the work, independent job contracting exists. 20 The
Agreement shall be paid by the CONTRACTOR, and that no such person janitorial service agreement between petitioner and STELLAR i s definitely a case of
employed or hired shall be deemed [an] employee or agent of the OWNER. permissible job contracting.
In trying to support this finding, the individual respondents presented, on the other . . . What actually happened was that PAL and STELLAR impliedly renewed, as
hand, an entirely different theory — that petitioner, by allowing them to continue they had previously done before, their service agreement until PAL's janitorial
working after the expiration of the service agreement, because their successor — requirements were bidded to other job contractors. This explains why the
employer. In their Memorandum, 24 they argue: individual private respondents remained working at PAL's premises even after
December 31, 1990.
. . . [T]he records and evidence show that the janitorial service contract between
PAL and Stellar expired on December 31, 1990, and not on November 16, 1991 From the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that petitioner was engaged in
[as stated in the October 31, 1990 letter of the petitioner]. permissible job contracting and that the individual private respondents, for the entire
duration of their employ, were employees not of petitioner but of STELLAR. In
xxx xxx xxx legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between the principal
and the job contractor's employees. The principal is responsible to the job contractor's
As a consequence of petitioner's letter and upon knowledge of the termination of employees only for the proper payment of wages. 29 But in labor-only contracting, an
[the] janitorial service contract, respondent Stellar formally notified each of the employer-employee relation is created by law between the principal and the labor-
[complainants] that their individual employment contract likewise be terminated only contractor's employees, such that the former is responsible to such employees,
effective November 16, 1991. Furthermore, it has been expressly and uniformly as if he or she had directly employed them. 30 Besides, the Court has already taken
stated in each of [complainants'] employment contract that their services would judicial notice of the general practice adopted in several government and private
last upon the termination of the janitorial service contract between PAL and institutions of securing janitorial services on an independent contractor basis. 31
Stellar which was of course supposedly on December 31, 1990. By working up to
the time of the final termination which is November 16, 1991, from December 31, S econd Is s ue :
1990, private respondents became direct employees of PAL. S TE LL A R I s L iable for Separation P ay
xxx xxx xxx Short of expressly admitting to be the employer of the individual private respondents,
STELLAR avers that the former were project employees, whose employment was
coterminous with the service agreement, 32 as evidenced by the following stipulations
33
in their contract:
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 38
1. The EMPLOYER hereby contracts the services of the EMPLOYEE to work
as Janitor-CPD at the project of the EMPLOYER with PAL.
2. It is expressly agreed and understood that the work of the EMPLOYEE shall
last only during and shall in no case extend beyond the period fixed for the
duration of the contract between the EMPLOYER and PAL covering the project
to which the EMPLOYEE is assigned as specified in the second "WHEREAS"
hereof. Upon the expiration of said contract the employment of the said
employee is deemed automatically terminated without further notice.
In order to avoid liability for separation pay, STELLAR argues that it terminated the
services of the individual private respondents for a just and valid cause: the
completion of a specific project. Thus, they are not entitled to separation pay.
The Court is not convinced. The position of STELLAR that individual private
respondents were its project employees is totally unfounded. A regular employee is
distinguished from a project employee by the fact that the latter is employed to carry
out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at
the time the employees were engaged. 34 A "project" has reference to a particular job
or undertaking that may or may not be within the regular or usual business of the
employer. 35 In either case, the project must be distinct, separate and identifiable from
the main business of the employer, and its duration must be determined or
determinable.
In the case at bar, despite the protestations of STELLAR, the service agreement was
not a project because its duration was not determined or determinable. While the
service agreement may have had a specific term, STELLAR disregarded it,
repeatedly renewed the service agreement, and continued hiring the individual private
respondents for thirteen consecutive years. Had STELLAR won the bidding, the
alleged "project" would have never ended. In any event, the aforesaid stipulations in
the employment contract are not included in Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code
as valid causes for the dismissal of employees.
Again, we must emphasize that the main business of STELLAR is the supply of
manpower to perform janitorial services for its clients, and the individual private
respondents were janitors engaged to perform activities that were necessary and
desirable to STELLAR's enterprise. 36 In this case, we hold that the individual private
respondents were STELLAR's regular employees, and there was no valid cause for
their dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
The record shows that the September 3, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 2. Union Busting – violation of CBA’s Article IV, Section 2;9
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was received by them on September
13, 1999. On September 27, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for 30-day extension of 3. Union Busting – disregarding the uni on’s request to deduct penalties from its
time to file petition which this Court granted. 4 On October 28, 1999, petitioners filed members who were absent and without justifiable reasons during union
the present petition for certiorari.5 Doubtless, petitioners could not have availed of meetings; and
such petition as a mere substitute for lost appeal , 6 hence, this Court treats it as one
for review under Rule 45.
4. Contracting Workout – the management is contracting out services and
functions being performed by Union members . 10
Indeed, Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was amended by
the July 21, 1998 Resolution of this Court En Bancby adding to it as second
paragraph the above-quoted amendment. The Notice of Strike was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-520-97.
The same Section was, however, subsequently amended by this Court’s En Banc Subsequently or on December 17, 1997, a majority of the members of the Union filed
Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000 providing a December 15, 1997 petition for audi t11 of union funds before the Office of the
for a 60-day period to file petition under Rule 65 from denial of a motion for National Capital Region Director of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
reconsideration or new trial. As thus further amended, Section 4 of Rule 65 now against the officers of the Union.
reads:
On March 11, 1998, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR directed the Union officers
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed.– The petition shall be filed not later than to call a general membership meeting to, among other things, render an accounting of
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
Also on March 11, 1998, then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano certified the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:
Notice of Strike for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which the latter assigned to Labor Arbiter Cristeta D. Tamayo. 1. That the Union’stwo notices of strike docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-
The Labor Arbiter set the dispute for hearing/conference on July 3, 1998, July 17, 520-97 and NCMB-NCR-NS-07-277-98 were, to the extent as they concern
1998, and August 11, 1998. No settlement was reached by the parties, however . 13 the issues herein resolved, without merit;
On July 28, 1998, the University moved for the consolidation with the ULP charge 2. That as a consequence, the University is absolved from the charges of
(NCMB-NCR-NS-12-520-97) the Interpleader14 it filed against the Union and some of Unfair Labor Practicecontained in said notices of strike;
its members, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-02036-98 and pending before
Labor Arbiter Felipe T. Garduque II, and the Complaint the Union filed for
underpayment of wages arising from the change in the manner of computation of 3. The loss of employment status of all the individual respondents in
salary of employees and non-payment of Sunday pay, docketed as NLRC NCR Case NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-08-06897-98; and
No. 00-02-01422-98 and pending before Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin T. Reyes,
both of which involve the same parties .15 4. That there is no diminution of workers’ benefits in NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-02-01422-98, because apart from the Union’s failure to prove it, the
Before the NLRC could act on the University’s motion for consolidation, DOLE University, based on existing laws, is correct in using 314 days as divisor in
Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, by Orde r16 of August 5, 1998, certified for computing the daily wage of its daily paid employees.
compulsory arbitration to the NLRC a second Notice of Strike filed by the Union on
July 16, 1998, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-07-277-98, charging the University with SO ORDERED.20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the following:
The NLRC found that what triggered the strike was the Union’s suspicion that the
a. Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), Art. V – withholding of petition for audit of union funds was initiated by the University. The NLRC, citing an
union and death benefits; Order of March 11, 1998 issued by the DOLE Regional Director, found the therein
petitioners to have initiated, out of their own volition, the filing of the petition. It thus
b. Violation of CBA, Art. VI – non-granting of ten (10%) percent salary increase to concluded that there was no factual basis to hold the University guilty of interference
some union members; in union activities.21
c. Illegal/unauthorized deductions in the payroll; On the allegation of union busting, the NLRC ruled that the refusal of the University to
deduct penalties from the salaries of members of the Union who failed to attend
meetings was based on Article IV, Section 222 of the CBA vis-á-vis Section 123 of the
d. Union interference – circulating letters against the union; and same Article which requires as condition for a valid checkoff prior submission to the
management of individual checkoff authorizations, a requirement which was not met
e. Non-implementation of the retirement plan as approved by the BIR .17 by the Union.24 Besides, the NLRC held, the law mandates that the Union should not
be "arbitrary, excessive or oppressive" in imposing a fine .25
A strike was in fact staged on August 5, 1998.
On the claim that the University had been contracting out work, the NLRC held that
By the same Order of August 5, 1998, the DOLE Secretary directed the strikers to the same was never raised during the conciliation meetings at the NCMB level . 26
return to work within twenty-four (24) hours. The order was served upon the Union on
August 6, 1998, and the foll owing day, August 7, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., the Union Respecting the second Notice of Strike, the NLRC found that only the charges of
lifted its strike.18 violation of the CBA for withholding union dues and death benefits, and the non-
implementation of the retirement plan, as approved by the BIR, were left for resolution
The strike staged by the Union on August 5-7, 1998 prompted the University to file on as the Union dropped the other issues raised therein after the NCMB hearings on July
August 24, 1998 a petition to declare the same illegal, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case 21, 1998 and July 28, 1998 .27
No. 00-08-06897-98 , which was also consolidated with the other cases.
On the charge of non-implementation of the retirement plan by the University, the On the NLRC’s declaration of loss of employment status of the strikers, the pertinent
NLRC found that the same was baseless and it was in fact not ventilated before the provision of Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:
NCMB.28
Article 264. x x x x… Any unionofficer who knowingly participates in an illegal
In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-02036-98, the NLRC ruled that the University may not strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
be held guilty of ULP for refusal to heed the demand of the Union that salaries of its the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
members be deducted for their failure to attend union meetings: firstly, because the employment status… (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Union itself failed to meet the requirements provided for in Sections 1 and 2, Article IV
of the CBA; and secondly, an interpleader had been filed by the University for the Under the immediately quoted provision, an ordinary striking worker may not be
parties to litigate their claims before the NLRC . 29 The NLRC also ruled that the declared to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike.
resolution calling for such deduction was not valid as it was not even signed by the There must be proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts
majority of Union officers and circulated to the members . 30 during the strike. While the University adduced photograph s36 showing strikers
picketing outside the university premises, it failed to identify who they were. It thus
In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-06897- 98 (the University’s petition to declare the failed to meet the "substantiality of evidence test "37 applicable in dismissal cases.
strike staged by the Union on August 5-7, 1998 illegal), the NLRC granted the petition
and declared the loss of employment status of all thestrikers for knowingly defying the Petitioner-union membersmust thus be reinstated to their former
Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary dated August 5, 1998, said Order position, without backwages. If reinstatement is no longer possible, they should
having been served upon the union on August 6, 1998 but it was only on August 7, receive separation pay of One (1) Month for every year of service in accordance with
1998, at about 3:00 p.m., that the strike was lifted . 31 38
existing jurisprudence.
In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01422-98, the NLRC ruled that the University was With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere participation in
correct in using 314 days as divisor, instead of 365 days, in computing the "equivalent the illegal strike warrants their dismissal.
daily rate"32 of pay of a worker.
As for petitioners’ claim of substantial diminution of their salary on account of the
The Union et al. (hereafter petitioners) filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC divisor used by the University in its computation – 314 days, instead of 365 days, this
decision which was denied by Resolution 33 of January 20, 1999. Hence, they elevated Court finds nothing wrong therewith. Sundays being un-worked and considered
the decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari which was, as stated unpaid rest days, while regular holidays as well as special holidays considered as
early on, dismissed. paid days,39 the factor used by the University merely complies with the basic rule in
this jurisdiction of "no work, no pay." The right to be paid for un-worked days is
In the present petition, petitioners insist that the University violated the CBA by generally limited to the ten legal holidays in a year . 40
withholding union dues and death benefits. The University counters that on the
request of Union members in light of their gripes against the Union and its officers, it WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Resolution of April 13, 1999 and Resolution of
did withhold said dues and benefits which they deposited with the DOLE where the September 3, 1999 are SET ASIDE.
parties could settle the issues among themselves.
34,
The NLRC Decision of October 12, 1998 and Resolution of January 20, 1999
The then prevailing Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book V Rule XVIII are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONthat the dismissal of petitioner-union
provided that members MONICO CALMA, CONSTANCIO BAYHONAN, BERNARDO SABLE,
NESTOR BRINOSA, NANJI MACARAMPAT, EDUARDO FLORAGUE and DIONY S.
Section 1. Right of union to collect dues. – The right of the incumbent bargaining LUMANTA is SET ASIDE, and they are thus ordered REINSTATED WITHOUT
representative to check off and to collect dues resulting therefrom shall not be BACKWAGES. If their reinstatement is no longer possible, however, they should be
affected by the pendency of a representation case or an intra-union given SEPARATION PAY at t he rate of One (1) Month pay for every year of service.
dispute.35 (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.
To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross violation of
the CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 42
Yellow- Dog Contract Contracting out - no need to consult union consult first
Contracting Out of Work All benefits - existing terms and conditions all terms
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,petitioner, vs. Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union
LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS (Union for brevity) filed a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of
ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondent. the said Decision. A separate intervention was likewise made by the supervisor's
union (FLAMES2) of petitioner corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest
in the outcome of the case. 3 The Court required the "proper parties" to file a comment
In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as
to the three motions for reconsideration but the Solicitor-General asked that he be
follows:
excused from filing the comment because the "petition filed in the instant case was
granted" by the Court. 4 Consequently, petitioner filed its own consolidated comment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent An "Appeal Seeking Immediate Reconsideration" was also filed by the alleged newly
Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside elected president of the Union. 5 Other subsequent pleadings were filed by the parties
to the extent set forth above. The parties are directed to execute a Collective and intervenors.
Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained in the
unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor's orders of August 19, 1996 and
The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been passed upon
December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund
by the Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new arguments were presented for
issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and
consideration of the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein,
determination of the legal personality of the MERALCO retirement fund. 1
particularly those involving the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective
The modifications of the public respondent's resolutions include the following: Bargaining Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the
January 27, 1999 decision Secretary's resolution Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the
consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The
Wages - P1,900.00 for 1995-96 P2,200.00 Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the
prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government
X'mas bonus - modified to one month 2 months agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of
petitioner's employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable
Retirees - remanded to the Secretary granted of meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies
to support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and
Loan to coops - denied granted conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of
Evidence provides:
GHSIP, HMP and
Housing loans - granted up to P60,000.00 granted
Commercial lists and the like . — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
Signing bonus - denied granted persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or
other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any
Union leave - 40 days (typo error) 30 days relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
High voltage/pole - not apply to those who are members of a team therein.
not exposed to the risk
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be
Collectors - no need for cash bond, no
admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
need to reduce quota and MAPL
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held
CBU - exclude confidential employees include in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account
and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries
Union security - maintenance of membership closed shop no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it
On the allegation concerning the grant of loan to a cooperative, there is no merit in SO ORDERED.
the union's claim that it is no different from housing loans granted by the employer.
The award of loans for housing is justified because it pertains to a basic necessity of
life. It is part of a privilege recognized by the employer and allowed by law. In
contrast, providing seed money for the establishment of the employee's cooperative is
a matter in which the employer has no business interest or legal obligation. Courts
should not be utilized as a tool to compel any person to grant loans to another nor to
force parties to undertake an obligation without justification. On the contrary, it is the
government that has the obligation to render financial assistance to cooperatives and
the Cooperative Code does not make it an obligation of the employer or any private
individual.22
Anent the 40-day union leave, the Court finds that the same is a typographical error.
In order to avoid any confusion, it is herein declared that the union leave is only thirty
(30) days as granted by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed in the Decision of this
Court.
The deep-rooted differences between the parties that led to the subsequent strike
were made clear in the presidential certification. As set forth in the opening paragraph The tentative character of such proposed dissolution was made evident by the fact
of the decision now on appeal: "Before this Court for resolution is the labor dispute however that on August 26, 1966, a collective bargaining contract was executed
between the petitioner Shell Oil Workers' Union, Union for brevity, and the respondent between the Union and the Shell Company effective from the first of the month of that
Shell Company of the Philippines Limited, Company for short, which was certified to year to December 31, 1969. It contained the usual grievance procedure and no strike
this Court on June 27, 1967 by the Office of the President of the Republic of the clauses.6 More relevant to the case before this Court, however, was the inclusion of
Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. Said the category of the security guards in such collective bargaining contract. This was
dispute ... 'was a result of the transfer by the Company of the eighteen (18) security stressed in the brief for the petitioner where specific mention is made of the
guards to its other department and the consequent hiring of a private security agency agreement covering rank and file personnel regularly employed by the Company,
to undertake the work of said security guards.' "1 included in which is the work area covered by the Pandacan Installation . 7 There was
likewise specific reference to such positions in the wage schedule for hourly-rated
categories appearing in an appendix thereof .8 Mention was expressly made in
The respective contentions of the parties were then taken up. Petitioner "filed the another appendix of the regular remuneration as well as premium pay and night
petition on July 7, 1967 alleging, among others, that the eighteen (18) security guards compensation.9 Nonetheless, Shell Company was bent on doing away with the
affected are part of the bargaining unit and covered by the existing collective security guard section, to be replaced by an outside security agency. That was
bargaining contract, and as such, their transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal communicated to the Union in a panel to panel meeting on May 3, 1967. A counter-
being done in violation of the existing contract. It, therefore, prayed that said security offer on the part of the Union to reduce the working days per week of the guards from
guards be reinstated with full back wages from the time of their dismissal up to the six to five was rejected by Shell Company on the ground of its being unusual and
time of their actual reinstatement." 2 Then came a summary of the stand Of Shell impracticable. Two days later, there was a meeting of the Union where a majority of
Company: "For hours hereafter, respondent Company filed its Answer [to] the the members made clear that should there be such a replacement of the company
material allegations in the Union's petition and adverted that the issues in this case guards by a private security agency, there would be a strike. It was noted in the
are: (1) whether or not the Company commits unfair labor practice in contracting out decision that when the strike vote was taken, of 243 members, 226 were for the
its security service to an independent professional security agency and assigning the approval of a motion to that effect. 10 On the afternoon of May 24, 1967, a notice of
18 guards to other sections of the Company; (2) whether or not the dismissal of the reassignment effective at 8:00 o'clock the next morning was handed to the guards
18 security guards are justified; and (3) whether or not (the strike called by the Union affected. At 10:00 o'clock that evening, there was a meeting by the Union attended by
on May 25, 1967 is legal. As special and affirmative defenses, the Company ten officers and a majority of the members wherein it was agreed viva voce that if
maintained that in contracting out the security service and redeploying the 18 security there would be an implementation of the circular dissolving the security section to be
guards affected, it was merely performing its legitimate prerogative to adopt the most replaced by guards from an outside agency, the Union would go on strike
a labor
to organization,
encourage and thus
unionization. To in effect
the frustrate
extent, the policy
however, of the
that the Industrial
serious acts ofPeace Act
violence with
of theanagreement
increase inreached,
pay andthe
withterms
a transfer bonus.
of which For be
should what is involved
binding of bothis parties.
the integrity
One
occurring in the course of the strike could be made the basis for holding responsible a of them may be released, but only with the consent of the other. The right to object
leader or a member of the Union guilty of their commission, what was decided by belongs to the latter, and if exercised, must be respected. Such a state of affairs
respondent Court should not be disturbed. should continue during the existence of the contract. Only thus may there be
compliance with and fulfillment of the covenants in a valid subsisting agreement.
1. It is the contention of Shell Company, sustained by respondent Court, that the
dissolution of the security guard section to be replaced by an outside agency is a What renders the stand of Shell Company even more vulnerable is the fact that as set
management prerogative. The Union argues otherwise, relying on the assurance of forth in its brief and as found by respondent Court as far back as 1964, it had already
the continued existence of a security guard section at least during the lifetime of the been studying the matter of dissolving the security guard section and contracting out
collective bargaining agreement. The second, third and fourth assignment of errors, such service to an outside agency. Apparently, it had reached a decision to that effect
while they could have been more felicitously worded, did attack the conclusion for implementation the next year. In July 1966, there was a joint consultation between
reached by respondent Court as contrary to and in violation of the existing contract. It it and the Union on the matter. Nonetheless on August 26, 1966, a collective
is to be admitted that the stand of Shell Company as to the scope of management bargaining contract was entered into which, as indicated above, did assure the
prerogative is not devoid of plausibility if it were not bound by what was stipulated. continued existence of the security guard section. The Shell Company did not have to
The growth of industrial democracy fostered by the institution of collective bargaining agree to such a stipulation. Or it could have reserved the right to effect a dissolution
with the workers entitled to be represented by a union of their choice, has no doubt and reassign the guards. It did not do so. Instead, when it decided to take such a step
contracted the sphere of what appertains solely to the employer. It would be going too resulting in the strike, it would rely primarily on provisions in the collective bargaining
far to assert, however, that a decision on each and every aspect of the productive contract couched in general terms, merely declaratory of certain management
process must be reached jointly by an agreement between labor and management. prerogatives. Considering the circumstances of record, there can be no justification
Essentially, the freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still then for Shell Company's insistence on pushing through its project of such dissolution
has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail. In much the same way that without thereby incurring a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they consider to be an
unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly object to 3. The Shell Company, in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an
management equally being jealous of its prerogatives. existing collective bargaining contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice.
Such a doctrine first found expression in Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial
More specifically, it cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining Relations, 16 the opinion of the Court being penned by Justice Castro. There was a
economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the reiteration of such a view in Security Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 47
Trust Company. 17 Thus: "It being expressly provided in the industrial Peace Act that pending award or decision by the court of such dispute. It follows that, as in the
[an] unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its refusal 'to present case, the employees or laborers may strike before being ordered not to do so
bargain collectively with the employer' and this Court having decided in the Republic and before an industrial dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations,
Savings Bank case that collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an subject to the power of the latter, after hearing when public interest so requires or
agreement, being a continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, to order them
the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective bargaining to return, with the consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work, when so
agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes ordered, the court may authorize the employer to accept other employees or
an unfair labor practice." 18 laborers." 25 Former Chief Justice Paras, in a case not too long before enactment of
the Industrial Peace Act, had occasion to repeat such a view. Thus: "As a matter of
4. Accordingly, the unfair labor practice strike called by the Union did have the fact, a strike may not be staged only when, during the pendency of an industrial
impress of validity. Rightly labor is justified in making use of such a weapon in its dispute, the Court of industrial Relations has issued the proper injunction against the
arsenal to counteract what is clearly outlawed by the Industrial Peace Act. That would laborers (section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended). Capital need not,
be one way to assure that the objectives of unionization and collective bargaining however, be apprehensive about the recurrence of strikes in view of the system of
would not be thwarted. It could, of course, file an unfair labor practice case before the compulsory arbitration by the Court of Industrial Relations." 26
Court of Industrial Relations. It is not precluded, however, from relying on its own
resources to frustrate such an effort on the part of employer. So we have consistently A strike then, in the apt phrase of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, is "an institutionalized factor
held — and for the soundest of reasons. 19 of democratic growth." 27 This is to foster industrial democracy. Implicit in such a
concept is the recognization that concerning the ends which labor considers worth
There is this categorial pronouncement from the present Chief Justice: "Again, the while, its wishes are ordinarily entitled to respect. Necessarily so, the choice as to
legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision when such an objective may be attained by striking li kewise belongs to it. There is the
appealed from — which is supported by substantial evidence — to the effect that the rejection of the concept that an outside authority, even if governmental, should make
strike had triggered by the Company's failure to abide by the terms and conditions of the decisions for it as to ends which are desirable and how they may be achieved.
its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, by the discrimination, resorted to The assumption is that labor can be trusted to determine for itself when the right to
by the company, with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and the dismissal of strike may be availed
management. of inthat
It is true order to attain
there is a arequirement,
successful fruition
in the inAct
their disputes
that before with
the
employees due to union activities, as well as the refusal of the company to bargain
collectively in good faith." 20 As a matter of fact, this Court has gone even further. It is employees may do so, they must file with the Conciliation Service of the Department
not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. 28 Such a requisite however, as has been
employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the repeatedly declared by this Court, does not have to be complied with in case of unfair
inducing factor for staging a strike. So it was clearly stated by the present Chief labor practice strike, which certainly is entitled to greater judicial protection if the
Justice while still an Associate Justice of this Court: "As a consequence, we hold that Industrial Peace Act is to be rendered meaningful. What has been said thus far would
the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in demonstrate the unwarranted deviation of the decision now on appeal from what is
believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that indicated by the law and authoritative decisions.
petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from
notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal 6. Respondent Court was likewise impelled to consider the strike illegal because of
and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents the violence that attended it. What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of
herein." 21 cessation of work in order that a union's economic demands may be granted or that
an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice. That the law recognizes
5. It would thus appear that the decision now on appeal did not reflect sufficient as a right. There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such an
awareness of authoritative pronouncements coming from this Court. What is worse, objective. For implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the maintenance of
certain portions thereof yield the impression that an attitude decidedly unsympathetic peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character may be placed beyond
to labors resort to strike is evident. Such should not be the case. The right to self- the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is
organization so sedulously guarded by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To
right "to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and to avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a
the mutual aid or protection." 22 From and after June 17, 1953 then, there cannot be case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called
the least doubt that a strike as form of concerted activity has the stamp of legitimacy. for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and
As a matter of law, even under the regime of compulsary arbitration under the Court widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be
of Industrial Relations Act, 23 a strike was by no means a forbidden weapon. Such is reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends it becomes illegal because
the thought embodied in the opinion of Justice Laurel in Rex Taxicab Company v. of the means employed.
Court of Industrial Relations. 24 Thus: "In other words, the employee, tenant or laborer
is inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by Respondent Court must have unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the
the Court of Industrial Relations and after a dispute has been submitted thereto and Shell Company to the effect that the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 48
and violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16, illusory. The plain and unqualified constitutional command of protection to labor
1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact that even on the following should not be lost sight of. 33 The State is thus under obligation to lend its aid and its
day, with police officials stationed at the strike-bound area, molotov bombs did succor to the efforts of its labor elements to improve their economic condition. It is
explode and the streets were obstructed with wooden planks containing protruding now generally accepted that unionization is a means to such an end. It should be
nails. Moreover, in the branches of the Shell Company in Iloilo City as well as in encouraged. Thereby, labor's strength, what there is of it, becomes solidified. It can
Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have been inflicted on bargain as a collectivity. Management then will not always have the upper hand nor
management personnel. Respondent Court in the appealed decision did penalize with be in a position to ignore its just demands. That, at any rate, is the policy behind the
loss of employment the ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to be lost Industrial Peace Act. The judiciary and administrative agencies in consrtruing it must
sight of that before the certification on June 27, 1967, one month had elapsed during ever be conscious of its implications. Only thus may there be fidelity to what is
which the Union was on strike. Except on those few days specified then, the Shell ordained by the fundamental law. For if it were otherwise, instead of protection, there
Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other than would be neglect or disregard. That is ito negate the fundamental principle that the
peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it Constitution is the supreme law.
thereby became illegal. This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by
labor to attain its objectives. It is only to show awareness that is labor conflicts, the WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Industrial Relations of August 5,
tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness could break 1967 is reversed, the finding of illegality of the strike declared by the Shell Oil
out in sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the Workers' Union on May 25, 1967 not being in accordance with law. Accordingly, the
balance, the ban the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that could dismissal by the Shell Company on May 27, 1967 of the eighteen security
provoke a strike and its requirement that it be conducted peaceably, it would be, to guards, 34 with the exception of Ernesto Crisostomo, who was found guilty of
repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to stamp the strike with committing a serious act of violence is set aside and they are declared reinstated.
illegality. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of The continuance of their status such is, however, dependent on whether or not a
violence that call for loss of employee status. security guard section is provided for in the collective bargaining contract entered into
after the expiration of the contract that expired on December 31, 1969. The loss of
Such an approach is reflected in our recent decisions. As was realistically observed employee status of the officers of the Union, 35 decreed by respondent Court in its
by the
the presentofChief
passion Justice,participants
the direct it is usuallyinattended by dispute,
the labor "the excitement, the heat
at the peak and
thereof decision,
of whom is didlikewise
commitset aside, acts
serious except
of as to Gregorio
violence. The Bacsa and Conrado
termination Pena, both
of the employment
...." 29 Barely four months ago, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales, Antonio Labrador and
Association v. Insular life Assurance Co., Ltd., 30 there is the recognition by this Court, Sesinando Romero, who committed acts of violence not serious in character, is also
speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently set aside, but while allowed to be reinstated, they are not entitled to back pay.
explosive." 31 It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of Ricardo Pagsibigan and Daniel Barraquel, along with the aforesaid Gregorio Baesa,
illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party. Conrado Peña and Ernesto Crisostomo, were legally penalized with dismissal
because of the serious acts of violence committed by them in the course of the strike.
7. In the light of the foregoing, there being a valid unfair labor practice strike, the loss The rest of the employees laid off should be reinstated with back pay to be counted
of employment decreed by respondent Court on all the Union officers cannot stand. from the date they were separated by virtue of the appealed decision, from which
The premise on which such penalty was decreed was the illegality of the strike. We should be deducted whatever earnings may have been received by such employees
rule differently. Hence, its imposition is unwarranted. It is to be made clear, however, during such period. The case is hereby remanded to respondent Court for the
that because of the commission of specific serious acts of violence, the Union's implementation of this decision. In ascertaining the back wages to which the security
President, Gregorio Bacsa, as well as its Assistant Auditor, Conrado Peña, did incur guards are entitled, it must likewise be ascertained whether or not the security guard
such a section is continued after December 31, 1969. W ithout costs.
penalty. 32
On this point, it may be observed further that even if there was a mistake in good faith
by the Union that an unfair labor practice was committed by the Shell Company when
such was not the case, still the wholesale termination of employee status of all the
officers of the Union, decreed by respondent Court, hardly commends itself for
approval. Such a drastic blow to a labor organization, leaving it leaderless, has
serious repercussions. The immediate effect is to weaken the Union. New leaders
may of course emerge. It would not be unlikely, under the circumstances, that they
would be less than vigorous in the prosecution of labor's claims. They may be prove
to fall victims to counsels of timidity and apprehension. At the forefront of their
consciousness must be an awareness that a mistaken move could well mean their
A service agreement between BPI and BOMC was initially implemented in BPI’s a) Contracting out services/functions performed by union members that interfered
Metro Manila branches. In this agreement, BOMC undertook to provide services such with, restrained and/or coerced the employees in the exercise of their right to
as check clearing, delivery of bank statements, fund transfers, card production, self-organization;
operations accounting and control, and cash servicing, conformably with BSP Circular
No. 1388. Not a single BPI employee was displaced and those performing the b) Violation of duty to bargain; and
functions, which were transferred to BOMC, were given other assignments.
c) Union busting.9
The Manila chapter of BPI Employees Union (BPIEU-Metro ManilaFUBU) then filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP). The Labor Arbiter (LA) decided the case in BPI then filed a petition f or assumption of jurisdiction/certification with the Secretary of
favor of the union. The decision was, however, reversed on appeal by the NLRC. the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), who subsequently issued an
BPIEU-Metro Manila-FUBU filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which denied it, order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The DOLE
holding that BPI transferred the employees in the affected departments in the pursuit Secretary directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that might
of its legitimate business. The employees were neither demoted nor were their exacerbate the situation.
salaries, benefits and other privileges diminished .6
On October 27, 2000, a hearing was conducted. Thereafter, the parties were required
On January 1, 1996, the service agreement was likewise implemented in Davao City. to submit their respective position papers. On November 29, 2000, the Union filed its
Later, a merger between BPI and Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) took Urgent Omnibus Motion to Cease and Desist with a prayer that BPI-Davao and/or Mr.
effect on April 10, 2000 with BPI as the surviving corporation. Thereafter, BPI’s Claro M. Reyes and Mr. Cecil Conanan be held in contempt for the following alleged
cashiering function and FEBTC’s cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions acts of BPI:
were handled by BOMC. Consequently, twelve (12) former FEBTC employees were
transferred to BOMC to complete the latter’s service complement.
1. The Bank created a Task Force Committee on November 20, 2000 composed
of six (6) former FEBTC employees to handle the Cashiering, Distributing,
BPI Davao’s rank and file collective bargaining agent, BPI Employees Union-Davao Clearing, Tellering and Accounting functions of the former FEBTC branches but
City-FUBU (Union), objected to the transfer of the functions and the twelve (12) the "task force" conducts its business at the office of the BOMC using the latter’s
personnel to BOMC contending that the functions rightfully belonged to the BPI equipment and facilities.
employees and that the Union was deprived of membership of former FEBTC
ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. – x x It is to be emphasized that contracting out of services is not illegal perse. 1âwphi1 It is
x Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the
are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with
resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of the exercise of judgment by an employer .32 In this case, bad faith cannot be attributed
this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant to BPI because its actions were authorized by CBP Circular No. 1388, Series of
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. 199333 issued by the Monetary Board of the then Central Bank of the Philippines (now
[Emphases supplied] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas). The circular covered amendments in Book I of the
In the case
banking, the atLabor
bench, the and
Code Unionits submits that while
implementing rulesthe Centralthe
regulate Bank regulates
employment In one case, the Court held that it is management prerogative to farm out any of its
relationship. To this, the Court agrees. The fact that banks are of a specialized activities, regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in nature . 44 What is
industry must, however, be taken into account. The competence in determining which of primordial importance is that the service agreement does not violate the
banking functions may or may not be outsourced lies with the BSP. This does not employee's right to security of tenure and payment of benefits to which he is entitled
mean that banks can simply outsource banking functions allowed by the BSP through under the law. Furthermore, the outsourcing must not squarely fall under labor-only
its circulars, without giving regard to the guidelines set forth under D.O. No. 10 issued contracting where the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places
by the DOLE. workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal or if any of the following
elements are present:
While D.O. No. 10, Series of 1997, enumerates the permissible contracting or
subcontracting activities, it is to be observed that, particularly in Sec. 6(d) invoked by i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment
the Union, the provision is general in character – "x x x Works or services not directly which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees
related or not integral to the main business or operation of the principal… x x x." This recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing
does not limit or prohibit the appropriate government agency, such as the BSP, to activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
issue rules, regulations or circulars to further and specifically determine the
permissible services to be contracted out. CBP Circular No. 1388 38enumerated
functions which are ancillary to the business of banks, hence, allowed to be ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of
outsourced. Thus, sanctioned by said circular, BPI outsourced the cashiering (i.e., the work of the contractual employee. 45
cash-delivery and deposit pick-up) and accounting requirements of its Davao City
branches.39 The Union even described the extent of BPI’s actual and intended WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
contracting out to BOMC as follows:
SO ORDERED.
"As an initiatory move, the functions of the Cashiering Unit of the Processing Center
of BPI, handled by its regular rank and fil e employees who are members of the Union,
xxx [were] transferred to BOMC with the Accounting Department as next in line. The
Distributing, Clearing and Bookkeeping functions of the Processing Center of the
former FEBTC were likewise contracted out to BOMC." 40
G.R. No. L-32853 September 25, 1981 1. As set forth in the B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. decision: "There is novelty in the
specific question raised, as to whether or not a certification election may be stayed at
the instance of the employer, pending the determination of an unfair labor practice
JUAN S. BARRERA, (doing business under the firm and trade name,
case filed by it against certain employees affiliated with respondent-unions. That is a
MACHINERY AND STEEL PRODUCTS ENGINEERING MASPE petitioner, vs. THE
matter of which this Court has not had an opportunity to speak on previously. What is
HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Philippine Associated
settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of
Workers Union (PAWO) and MASPE WORKERS' UNION, respondents.
Industrial Relations, decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to
the participation in a certification election of a company dominated union, as a result
It was the absence of any definite ruling at the time this petition was filed on the of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed,
question of whether or not a pending certification election proceeding may be the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before such
dismissed or held in abeyance, there being such a motion on the part of the employer voting could take place." 4
Juan S. Barrera, doing business under the firm and trade name of Machinery and
Steel Products Engineering MASPE alleging an unfair labor practice against one of
2. This is the more relevant excerpt: "The unique situation before us, however, is
the contending parties, private respondent MASPE Workers Union, the other being
exactly the reverse. It is management that would have an unfair labor practice case
private respondent Philippine Associated Workers Union, that led this Court to give it
filed by it for illegal strike engaged in by some of its employees concluded, before it
due course. The unfair labor practice imputed to such labor union consisted of failure
would agree to the holding of a certification election. That is the stand of petitioner. It
to bargain collectively, aggravated by an illegal strike. Respondent Court of Industrial
does not carry conviction. The reason that justifies the postponement of a certification
Relations denied such a motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds therein alleged
election pending an inquiry, as to the bona fides of a labor union, precisely calls for a
"appear not to be indubitable A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, this
different conclusion. If under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to
petition was filed.
have its way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away the strength of an
organization bent on a more zealous defense of labor's prerogatives. The difficulties
Subsequently, to be precise, in 1973, in the case of B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. and obstacles that must be then hurdled would not be lost on the rest of the
vs. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union- personnel who had not as yet made up their minds one way or the other. This is not
NATU. 1 such a question was given an answer by this Court, one adverse to the claim to say that management is to be precluded from filing an unfair labor practice case. It
of petitioner. This petition, therefore, must be dismissed. is merely to stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend itself as a means,
whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor
The case for petitioner was put most vigorously in the exhaustive and scholarly brief group as to the organization that will represent it. It is not only the loss of time
of its counsel, Manuel M. Crudo To quote from its pertinent portion: "On September involved, in itself not likely to enhance the prospect of respondent-unions, but also the
22, 1970 the petitioner Barrera filed a motion to dismiss or hold case in abeyance, in fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that management has many
CIR Case No. 2759-MC. In said motion, we called attention to the admission of weapons in its arsenal to bring the full force of its undeniable power against those of
MASPE Workers Union as intervenor in the case. We stated that the intervenor union, its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid reason then for
its officers and members had committed various acts of unfair labor practice and were the postponement sought. This is one instance that calls for the application of the
on illegal strike punctuated by force, violence and intimidation. We called attention to maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret. Moreover, is there not in the posture taken by
our formal charge of unfair labor practice against the intervenor union. We called petitioner a contravention of what is expressly set forth in the Industrial Peace Act,
attention to the fact that in the charge of unfair labor practice among the reliefs prayed which speaks of the labor organizations 'designated or selected for the purpose of
for were to declare respondents therein collectively and individually guilty of unfair collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
labor practice; to declare the strike, and other concerted actions resorted to in bargaining unit [be the exclusive] representative of all the employees in such unit for
pursuance of said unfair labor practice illegal to declare the MASPE Workers Union the purpose of collective bargaining.' The law clearly contemplates all the employees,
as consequently having lost all rights and privileges accorded by law to a legitimate not only some of them. As much as possible then, there is to be no unwarranted
labor union; and to declare all individual respondents therein and others as having reduction in the number of those taking part in a certification election, even under the
lost their employment status by virtue of the illegality of the strike staged by them. We guise that in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of those who are
then pointed out that unless the case for unfair labor practice against MASPE employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor
Workers Union, its officers and members is decided the status of that union and its practice case." 5
members who are respondents would be uncertain (i.e., in relation to the requested
certification election and the outcome thereof). * * * Unfortunately, the respondent 3. Even on the assumption that the vigorous condenmation of the strike and the
Honorable Court of Industrial Relations denied our motion to dismiss or hold case in picketing were attended by violence, it does not automatically follow that thereby the
abeyance. * * * ." 2It remains only to be added that subsequently the Court of strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election for
Industrial Relations en bancdenied a motion for reconsideration, failing "to find having automatically lost their jobs. So it was made clear in another B.F. Goodrich
sufficient justification to alter or to modify the aforesaid Order." 3 6
decision: What was set forth in the facts as found by respondent Judge Salvador
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 54
would indicate that it was during the picketing, certainly not peaceful, that the imputed
acts of violence did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that there were injuries on
both sides because management did not, understandably, play a passive role
confronted as it was with the unruly disruptive tactics of labor. This is not, by any
means, to condone activities of such character, irrespective of the parties responsible.
It is merely to explain what cannot be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in question
call for an automatic finding of illegality? Again, the order issued on February 4, 1972
appeared to be oblivious of a 1971 decision of this Court, Shell Oil Workers' Union v.
Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. There it was clearly held: 'A strike otherwise
valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken,
however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it
with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the
recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and
not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of
force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately
resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if
justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed.' It must be
pointed out likewise that the facts as there found would seem to indicate a greater
degree of violence. Thus: 'Respondent Court must have been unduly impressed by
the evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that the strike was marred
by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the
mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact
that even on the following day, with police officials stationed at the strike bound area,
molotov bombs did explode and the streets were obstructed witlh wooden planks
containing protruding nails. Moreover, in the branches of the Shell Company in Iloilo
City as well as in Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have
been inflicted on management personnel. Respondent Court in the appealed decision
did penalize with loss of employment the ten individuals responsible for such acts.
Nor is it to be lost sight of that before the certification on June 27, 1967, one month
had elapsed during which the Union was on strike. Except on those few days
specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a
manner other than peaceful Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to
consider that it thereby became illegal.' Then, mention was made of a decision in
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees' Association vs. Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. [where] there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice
Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently explosive." It is thus clear that not every
form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of
employment by the guilty party. " 7
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed and the appealed order affirmed. No costs.
While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU, on September 5, 1978, filed a Petition for We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the conduct of the certification
Certification Election (R4-LRD-M-9432-78) (the Certification Case, for short) among election, and eventually gave the Petition due course.
the rank and file workers of CENTEX, alleging that: 1) there has been no certification
election during the 12 months period prior to the filing of the petition; 2) the petition is The issues raised are: (1) is the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating
supported by signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of the rank and file union in the certification election proceedings as company-dominated a prejudicial
workers of CENTEX; 3) the collective bargaining agreement between CENTEX and question to the conduct of the election? (2) Does the decision in the Deadlock Case
petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978; 4) the petition is filed within the 60-day- directing the parties to execute a CBA have the effect of barring the certification
freedom-period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA, and 6) there is no election? (3) Does respondent Director have the discretion to call for a certification
legal impediment to the filing of the petition. 2 election even if the 30% consent requirement is lacking?
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 56
and Workers Association v. Court of Industrial Relations (104 Phil. 10 [1958]), thus:
The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which must be `We agree with the CIR on the reasons given in its order that only a formal charge of
answered in the affirmative. Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a certification election, the
charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the
proceedings for a certification election 10 , the reason being that the votes of the workers belong, an election among the workers and employees of the company
members of the dominated union would not be free. 11 The ULP Case herein was would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees
filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented from the standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the members of the
on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to respondent public company dominated union, the vote of the said members in the election would not be
official by virtue of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the free. It is equally true, however, that the opposition to the holding of a certification
Certification Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case was instituted in election due to a charge of company domination can only be filed and maintained by
bad faith to forestall the Certification Case. The following ruling is thus squarely in the labor organization which made the charge of company domination, because it is
point: the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification election, the
reason being that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other
"There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith or filed members controlled and domina ted by the Company,’ (Ibid., 15). It is easily
purposely to forestall the certification election. So, no reason existed for the Industrial understandable why it should be thus. There would be an impairment of the integrity
Court to depart from its established practice of suspending the election proceeding. of the collective bargaining process if a company-dominated union were allowed to
And this seems to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the reason being, in participate in a certification election. The timid, the timorous, and the faint-hearted in
the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, `if there is a union dominated by the company, the ranks of labor could easily be tempted to cast their votes in favor of the choice of
to which some of the workers belong, an election among workers and employees of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the exclusive
the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and representative of labor at the conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory
employees because the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be scheme. It takes two to bargain. There would be instead a unilateral imposition by the
free.’ (Manila Paper Mills Employees v. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10) employer. There is need therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization that
aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative is company-dominated before
"And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company the certification election."
domination is a prejudicial question that until decided, shall suspend or bar
proceedings for certification election. (Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union v. Court of With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for by reason of a
Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126) prejudicial question, the necessity of passing upon the remaining issues is obviated.
virtual law library
"Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case No. 255-ULP, the Workers
Union should be ordered dissolved as a company dominated union, any election held WHEREFORE, the Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued by public respondent
in the meantime would be a waste of energy and money to all parties concerned." 12 affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter, dated January 23, 1979, calling for a
certification election is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary
The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court shall continue to be in force and
amplified as follows: effect until the status is cleared of respondent Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (July Convention) in Case No. R4-LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled "In the Matter of
"What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union v. Certification Election Among Rank and File Workers of Central Textile Mills, Inc.,
Court of Industrial Relations (101 Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner, United CMC Textile Workers
organization objecting to the participation in a certification election of a company- Union, Intervenor."
dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice case
against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in No costs.
such a proceeding before such voting could take place. In the language of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: `As correctly pointed out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting SO ORDERED.
opinion on the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, a complaint for unfair
labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for
certification election when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions
participating in the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the company or
employer. The reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection of an
employer-dominated or company union as the employees’ bargaining representative,
and when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the unfair labor
practice case, the union selected would be decertified and the whole election
proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128). The next year, the
same jurist had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Employees
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 57
G.R. No. 135547 January 23, 2002 Philippine Airlines in the active payroll as of September 15, 1998. Should any
share-owning employee leave PAL, he/she has the option to keep the shares or
GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS R. sells (sic) his/her shares to his/her union or other employees currently employed
ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI by PAL.
ALDEA, Petitioners, vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman
of the PAL Inter-Agency Task Force created under Administrative Order No. 16; 2. The aggregate shares of stock transferred to PAL employees will allow them
HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and three (3) members to (sic) the PAL Board of Directors. We, thus, become
Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY SO UY, partners in the boardroom and together, we shall address and find solutions to
ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J. BAUTISTA, and the wide range of problems besetting PAL.
ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, Respondents.
3. In order for PAL to attain (a) degree of normalcy while we are tackling its
In this special civil action for certiorariand prohibition, petitioners charge public problems, we would request for a suspension of the Collective Bargaining
respondents with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years.3
for acts taken in regard to the enforcement of the agreement dated September 27,
1998, between Philippine Airlines (PAL) and its union, the PAL Employees On September 10, 1998, the Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tan’s offer
Association (PALEA). and requested the Task Force’s assistance in implementing the same. Union
members, however, rejected Tan’s offer. Under intense pressure from PALEA
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: members, the union’s directors subsequently resolved to reject Tan’s offer.
On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the On September 17, 1998, PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its
Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week strike, causing serious losses to the operations effective September 23, 1998, preparatory to liquidating its assets and
financially beleaguered flag carrier. As a result, PAL’s financial situation went from paying off its creditors. The airline claimed that given its labor problems, rehabilitation
bad to worse.
downsized Faced
its labor forcewith bankruptcy,
by more PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and
than one-third. was no longer feasible, and hence, the airline had no alternative but to close shop.
On September 18, 1998, PALEA sought the intervention of the Office of the President
On July 22, 1998, PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures in immediately convening the parties, the PAL management, PALEA, ALPAP, and
adopted by the airline, which affected 1,899 union members. The strike ended four FASAP, including the SEC under the direction of the Inter-Agency Task Force, to
days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PAL’s prevent the imminent closure of PAL. 4
work force and the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees.
On September 19, 1998, PALEA informed the Department of Labor and Employment
On August 28, 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order (DOLE) that it had no objection to a referendum on the Tan’s offer. 2,799 out of 6,738
No. 16 creating an Inter-Agency Task Force (Task Force) to address the problems of PALEA members cast their votes in the referendum under DOLE supervision held on
the ailing flag carrier. The Task Force was composed of the Departments of Finance, September 21- 22, 1998. Of the votes cast, 1,055 voted in favor of Tan’s offer while
Labor and Employment, Foreign Affairs, Transportation and Communication, and 1,371 rejected it.
Tourism, together with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Public
respondent Edgardo Espiritu, then the Secretary of Finance, was designated On September 23, 1998, PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination to
chairman of the Task Force. It was "empowered to summon all parties concerned for its employees.
conciliation, mediation (for) the purpose of arriving at a total and complete solution of
the problem."1Conciliation meetings were then held between PAL management and
the three unions representing the airline’s employees, 2 with the Task Force as Two days later, the PALEA board wrote President Estrada anew, seeking his
mediator. intervention. PALEA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and similar actions and
a waiver of some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA . 5 Tan, however,
rejected this counter-offer.
On September 4, 1998, PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by
private respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL, of a pl an
to transfer shares of stock to its employees. The pertinent portion of said plan reads: On September 27, 1998, the PALEA board again wrote the President proposing the
following terms and conditions, subject to ratification by the general membership:
1. From the issued shares of stock within the group of Mr. Lucio Tan’s holdings,
the ownership of 60,000 fully paid shares of stock of Philippine Airlines with a par 1. Each PAL employee shall be granted 60,000 shares of stock with a par value
value of PH₱5.00/share will be transferred in favor of each employee of of ₱5.00, from Mr. Lucio Tan’s shareholdings, with three (3) seats in the PAL
5. PAL shall grant the benefits under the 26 July 1998 Memorandum of
Agreement forged by and between PAL and PALEA, to those employees who Respondents, in turn, argue that the public respondents merely served as conciliators
may opt to retire or be separated from the company. or mediators, consistent with the mandate of A.O. No. 16 and merely supervised the
conduct of the October 3, 1998 referendum during which the PALEA members ratified
the agreement. Thus, public respondents did not perform any judicial and quasi-
6. PALEA members who have been retrenched but have not received separation judicial act pertaining to jurisdiction. Furthermore, respondents pray for the dismissal
benefits shall be granted priority in the hiring/rehiring of employees. of the petition for violating the "hierarchy of courts" doctrine enunciated in People v.
Cuaresma7 and Enrile v. Salazar.8
7. In the absence of applicable Company rule or regulation, the provisions of the
Labor Code shall apply .6 Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1)
Among the signatories to the letter were herein petitioners Rivera, Ramiso, and the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or
Aranas, as officers and/or members of the PALEA Board of Directors. PAL quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
management accepted the PALEA proposal and the necessary referendum was excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
scheduled. jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.9 For writs of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the
On October 2, 1998, 5,324 PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-supervised impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person,
referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the PAL-PALEA whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions;" and (2) there is no
agreement, while 34% rejected it. plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. "10
On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed domestic operations. On the same date, seven The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person
officers and members of PALEA filed this instant petition to annul the September 27, exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It is not the act of public
1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA on the following grounds: respondents Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma as functionaries of the Task Force. Neither is there a judgment, order, or
resolution of either public respondents involved. Instead, what exists is a contract
a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified-bargaining agent of the
regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company;
The aforesaid provisions, taken together, clearly show the intent of the parties to
maintain "union security" during the period of the suspension of the CBA. Its objective
is to assure the continued existence of PALEA during the said period. We are unable
to declare the objective of union security an unfair labor practice. It is State policy to
promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even
playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and
separately for
stipulations bargain
"unionwith theandemployer.
shop" For as
"closed shop" thismeans
reason, the law has
of encouraging allowed
workers to
join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and
interests vis-à-vis the employer .24
Petitioners’ contention that the agreement installs PALEA as a virtual company union
is also untenable. 1âwphi1 Under Article 248 (d) of the Labor Code, a company union
exists when the employer acts "[t]o initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of
financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters." The case records are
bare of any showing of such acts by PAL.
We also do not agree that the agreement violates the five-year representation limit
mandated by Article 253-A. Under said article, the representation limit for the
exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and
effect. In the instant case, the parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put in
abeyance the limit on the representation period.
In sum, we are of the view that the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27,
1998, is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract. Under the principle of inviolability
of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution ,25 the contract must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion shown, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA NG ALAK (NAFLU),petitioner, vs. 7. Cobarrubias, Corazon 33. Hermogeno, Esther
HAMILTON DISTILLERY COMPANY, CO BON BENG, MARIANO ANG ENG and
HAMILTON WORKERS' UNION, respondents. 8. Castranero, Filimena 34. Javier, Mercedes
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dismissing the 9. Cenon, Marina 35. Lacsamana, Nenita
complaint herein for unfair labor practice.
10. Dumlao, Cristina 36. Manreza, Avelina
Respondent Hamilton Distillery Company or Hamilton Wine Manufacturing Co.,
11. Cruz, Elena de la 37. Masiglat, Norma
hereinafter referred to as the Company, is a commercial establishment engaged in
the manufacture of wine in the Philippines, whereas respondents Co Bon Beng and
12. Esquivel, Plavia 38. Montealegre, Angelina
Mariano Ang Eng are the superintendent or cashier and the manager respectively
thereof.
13. Evangelista, Rosanna 39. Yumul, Laura
On September 24, 1957, two (2) labors unions, composed of employees and laborers 14. Francisco, Rosita 40. Reyes, Elnora
of the Company, were registered with the Department of Labor, namely, petitioner
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa ng Alak (NAFLU), hereinafter referred to as the 15. Flores, Dorotea 41. Sarmiento, Purita
NAFLU, and respondent Hamilton Workers' Union, hereinafter referred to as the
Workers' Union. Thereupon, the latter and the Company entered into a collective 16. Germeno, Caridad 42. Santos, Crisanta
bargaining agreement, incorporated into a private instrument purporting to have been
executed on September 24, 1957. Moreover, the Company issued a notice bearing 17. Pique, Remedios 43. Perez, Cresencia
the sameUnion
Workers' date,thirty
addressed towithin
(30) days all ofwhich
its employees, givingor non-members
to join the same, of the
else, be dismissed. 18. Vigo, Leda 44. Martin, Jorge
There is evidence to the effect that, upon learning that the NAFLU was being 19. Avinante, Simplicio 45. Martin, Severino
organized, or on September 23, 1957, Co Bon Beng sent for Francisco Dumlao, and
inquired whether it was true that he had organized said labor and was its president; 20. Brion, Felix 46. Mariano, Anicito
that upon receipt of an affirmative answer, Co Bon Beng urged Dumlao to dissolve
the NAFLU, for otherwise he would be dismissed; that when Dumlao answered that 21. Bayano, Ramon 47. Mendoza, Roman
he could not follow this advice, Co Bon Beng bade him to look for another job; that on
September 24, 1957, Co Bon Beng refused to admit him to work upon the ground that 22. Cruz, Jose de la 48. Montevirgin, Manuel
he was unwilling to dissolve the NAFLU; that, subsequently, some members thereof
resigned therefrom and joined the Workers' Union, because otherwise they would be 23. Diaz, Angel 49. Opinaldo, Fernando
dismissed by the Company; that beginning from September 30, 1957, those who
remained affiliated to the NAFLU were allowed to work only two (2) days a week; and 24. Dumalo, Francisco 50. Santos, Vicente
that on October 28, 1957 the following members of the NAFLU, who had not joined
the Workers' Union were dismissed by the Company, namely: 25. Gindoy, Luis, Jr. 51. Reyes, Felicisimo
giving its employees who were not members of the Workers' Union thirty (30) days to September
Workers' 24, intended
Union but before
byOctober 24, 1957.
said clause, At anythe
to authorize rate, if the Company
dismissal of personsand the
already
join the same, or else be dismissed — bear the same date. Likewise, noteworthy is
the circumstance that, aside from being a Chinese, Valentin Kaw, the president of the in the service of said Company on or before September 24, 1957, but belonging to
Workers' Union, was the time-keeper of the Company, who, as such, had supervisory another labor organization, and who failed to quit from the latter and join the Workers'
authority over its employees and laborers, and could, therefore, exercise substantial Union on or before October 24, 1957, then such stipulation would be null and void
pressure upon them to induce, if not compel, them to join the Workers' Union, and (Findlay Millar Timber Co. vs. PLASLU L-18217 and L-18222 [September 29, 1962].
that the treasurer thereof was his brother Benito Kaw, another Chinese. Considering As held in Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co., Inc vs. CIR (supra):
further that said agreement was contained in a private document, and that the NAFLU
was, also, registered as a duly organized labor union, on the date aforementioned, we The closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4, subsec. a(4) of the Industrial
find it difficult to avoid the feeling that the Workers' Union was, if not company Peace Act above quoted should however, apply only to persons to be hired or to
dominated, at least organized under the patronage of the Company, and that the employees who are not yet members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to
same was in such a hurry to bargain with the Workers' Union, in order to beat the those already in the service who are members of another union. To hold otherwise,
NAFLU and prevent it from taking appropriate action prior, thereto, that the i.e., that the employees in a company who are members of a minority union may be
agreement was made in a private instrument, thus suggesting that it must have been compelled to disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or contracting union,
made late at night. Otherwise the agreement would have been executed before a would render nugatory the right of all employees to self organization and to form, join
notary public for the corresponding acknowledgment. or assist labor organizations of their own choosing, a right guaranteed by the
Industrial Peace Act (sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 875) as well as by the Constitution (Art. III,
Indeed, the record shows that, despite several defections from the NAFLU, prior to sec. 1[6]).
the expiration of the period given by the Company to non-members of the Workers'
Union, the Company had to dismiss 52 members of the NAFLU, apart from its WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall
president, for failure to join the Workers' Union within said period. Considering that be entered ordering the Company to cease and desist from further unfair labor
the Company had altogether around 100 employees only, it is clear that a petition for practices, to pay the members of the NAFLU who had been discriminated against the
certification election, if filed by the NAFLU prior to the execution of the collective difference between the compensation actually paid to them and that which they would
bargaining agreement between the Workers' Union and the Company, would have, in have received had there been no discrimination, and to reinstate the employees
all probability, barred effectively said agreement. Independently of the foregoing, the named above, with back wages from the time of their dismissal until their actual
provisions thereof do not legalize the dismissal of members of the NAFLU. The lower reinstatement, with all of the rights and privileges appertaining thereto, as well as to
court held otherwise, relying upon the "closed shop" clause of said agreement pay the costs. It is so ordered.
reading:
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 63
Unlawful Discrimination the corporation argued, in a move to reconsider, that the payment had been made
only to prewar male employees who were working for the company at the time the
gratuity was given — which was not exactly the situation of the aforesaid eleven
G.R. No. L-5206 April 29, 1953
female employees.
In the settlement of industrial disputes it is proper and convenient for the court to
insist, in exercising its ample powers, that capital shall make no discrimination
between male and female laborers. But discrimination only exists when one is denied
privileges given to the other under identical or similar conditions. Material conditions
of course. And the condition as to actual employment required by the company is
undoubtedly material, the purpose of gratuity being obviously to induce the company's
workers to render better service in return for such generosity, or simply to improve the
finances and morale of its helpers with consequent beneficial effects upon the
corporate business operations. In the instant controversy, the conditions were
different: the male beneficiaries were employees; whereas these female claimants
were not.
WHEREFORE having previously ruled that the claim for backpay has no legal
foundation, and being shown no resultant unfairness, this Court is constrained
presently to disapprove the order directing payment to the herein named workers,
finding no justification for it, either in law or in equity. Needless to say, Courts are not
permitted to render judgments solely upon the basis of sympathies and inclinations.
Neither are they authorized, in the guise of affording protection to labor, to distribute
charities at the expense of natural or judicial persons, because our constitutional
government assures the latter against deprivation of their property except in
accordance with the statutes of supplementary equitable principles.
In the meantime, talks were underway for early negotiation by the parties of the CBA The petition is impressed with merit.
which was due to expire on April 30, 1988. The negotiation thus begun earlier than
the freedom period. On November 11, 1987 petitioner wrote respondent union Under the CBA between the parties that was in force and effect from May 1, 1985 to
advising the latter that they were prepared to consider including the employees April 30,1988 it was agreed that the "bargaining unit" covered by the CBA "consists of
covered by the CBA in the profit sharing scheme beginning the year 1987 provided all regular or permanent employees, below the rank of assistant supervisor , 3 Also
that the ongoing negotiations were concluded prior to December 1987. However, the expressly excluded from the term "appropriate bargaining unit" are all regular rank
collective bargaining negotiations reached a deadlock on the issue of the scope of the and file employees in the office of the president, vice-president, and the other offices
bargaining unit. Conciliation efforts to settle the di spute on 29 March 1988 were made of the company — personnel office, security office, corporate affairs office, accounting
but no settlement was reached. and treasurer department .4
On March 30, 1988, petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit not only to It is to this class of employees who were excluded in the "bargaining unit" and who do
managers and supervisors but also to all other rank and file employees not covered not derive benefits from the CBA that the profit sharing privilege was extended by
by the CBA. This caused the respondent union to file a notice of strike alleging that petitioner.
petitioner was guilty of unfair labor practice because the union members were
discriminated against in the grant of the profit sharing benefits. Consequently, There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the situation of the
management refused to proceed with the CBA negotiations unless the last notice of union employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees. 5 Indeed,
strike was first resolved. The union agreed to postpone discussions on the profit discrimination per se is not unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the
sharing demand until a new CBA was concluded. After a series of conciliation employees concerned are not similarly situated.
conferences, the parties agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary arbitration.
After the parties submitted their position papers, a rejoinder and reply, on March
20,1989 the voluntary arbitrator issued an award ordering petitioner to likewise extend Respondent union can not claim that there is grave abuse of discretion by the
the benefits of the 1987 profit sharing scheme to the members of respondent petitioner in extending the benefits of profit sharing to the non-union employees as
union.1 Hence, this petition wherein petitioner alleged the following grounds in support they are two (2) groups not similarly situated. These non-union employees are not
thereof — covered by the CBA. They do not derive and enjoy the benefits under the CBA.
I THE HONORABLE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE The contention of the respondent union that the grant to the non-union employees of
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN the profit sharing benefits was made at a time when there was a deadlock in the CBA
HE ORDERED THE EXTENSION OF PROFIT SHARING BENEFITS TO THOSE negotiation so that apparently the motive thereby was to discourage such non-union
EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE CBA DESPITE PATENT LACK OF FACTUAL employees from joining the union is not borne by the record. Petitioner denies this
AND LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR IN THAT- accusation and instead points out that inspite of this benefit extended to them, some
non-union workers actually joined the respondent union thereafter.
The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to regulate, according to its
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. This flows from the established
rule that labor law does not authorize the of the employer in the conduct of its
business.6 such management prerogative may be availed of without fear of any
liability so long as it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers'
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees
under special laws or valid agreement and are not exercised in a malicious, harsh,
oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite . 7
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the
"bargaining unit" falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to
have been done in good faith and without ulterior motive. More so when as in this
case there is a clause in the CBA where the employees are classified into those who
are members of the union and those who are not. In the case of the union members,
they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA contract which
constitute the law between the contracting parties .8 Both the employer and the union
members are bound by such agreement.
However, the court serves notice that it will not hesitate to strike down any act of the
employer that tends to be discriminatory against union members. It is only because of
the peculiar circumstances of this case showing there is no such intention that this
court ruled otherwise.
SO ORDERED.
4] Likewise not considered by the NLRC as a valid ground for strike was the failure of Petitioners seek reversal of the above-cited NLRC findings and conclusions on the
respondent company to provide space for a union office as stipulated under Art. XV, following grounds:
Section 1 of the CBA. The NLRC attributed such failure to the complacency exhibited
by petitioner union in not taking up the matter again with respondent company after A. THE ASSAILED DECISION WHOLLY DISREGARDED VIOLATIONS BY THE
petitioner union rejected the set of rules drawn up by respondent company with COMPANY OF ART. 284 OF THE LABOR CODE AS WELL AS THE STIPULATED
respect to the use of the office in accordance with the CBA provision that the use of PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMISSALS IN THE PARTIES' COLLECTIVE
such office would be subject to any rules and regulations to be agreed upon by both BARGAINING AGREEMENT;
union and company. 20
B. THE NLRC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
5] Anent the recall by respondent company of the cars assigned to the field AFFIRMED THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE FOURTEEN [14] EMPLOYEES ON
representatives, the NLRC found no violation of the CBA nor any unfair labor practice JULY 26, 1984 WAS NOT A PROPER GROUND FOR A STRIKE DESPITE
to have been committed by respondent company by reason thereof. Referring to Art. CONFERMENT BY LAW OF REGULAR STATUS TO THEIR EMPLOYMENT;
XIV, Sec. 2 of the CBA which granted to the assignee of a car to be disposed of the
first priority to purchase the car at fifty [50] percent of the appraised market value, the C. THE NLRC GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE QUADRUPLING OF THE
NLRC found no indication that the cars were to be disposed of and therefore the CBA UNION PRESIDENT'S AREA SALES QUOTA WAS NOT AN ACT OF
provision invoked by petitioner union had not come into operation. This being the DISCRIMINATION AND HENCE NOT A VALID GROUND FOR STRIKE; and,
case, such recall could not be a ground for a strike. 21
D. THE COMMISSION ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, UNREASONABLY AND WITHOUT
6] The dismissal of 31 employees of respondent company's Pharmaceutical Division, LEGAL BASIS WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CLOSURE OF THE
the additional ground cited in the second notice of strike, was found by the NLRC to PHARMACEUTICAL DIVISION AND THE SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER OF ITS
have been dictated by the change in the marketing strategy of Berna and Pharmaton DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS TO ANOTHER COMPANY IS NOT AN UNFAIR
products and not for the purpose of union-busting. Respondent NLRC gave credence LABOR PRACTICE.
to respondent company's claim that as early as October 1983, its operations had
been seriously affected by the suspension of trade and foreign credit facilities, which
situation grew worse in early 1984 when its suppliers of Berna and Pharmaton Grounds A and B cited by petitioners are interrelated and will be discuss jointly.
products insisted on a cash L/C basis or full guarantee by the mother company. As
respondent company could not comply with these requirements, it decided to
In the same manner that We found the dismissal of the 31 employees of the It is an open secret, that most of the Supreme Court Justices belong to the upper
Pharmaceutical Division in itself not to be constitutive of an unfair labor practice, so privileged class and some of them belonged at one time or another, to law firms
must the dismissal of the 14 rank-and-file employees be characterized. In the first that serve the interests of giant transnational corporations as corporate counsels
instance it is not disputed that these employees were hired by respondent company and retainers and this ruling merely confirmed the perceived apparent pro-
thru a placement agency. In the absence of any evidence that the placement agency multinational, pro-capital anti-labor, anti-union and anti-strike posture of
did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment personalities in the Supreme Court. 36
machineries, work premises, among others, We cannot conclude that the
arrangement between respondent company and said placement agency was "Labor-
only" contracting as to make respondent company the direct employer of these 14 and on the fact that at the time the picket was staged, the case was still sub judice.
33
employees.be In
employees the second
deemed regularplace, even of
employees if such conclusion
respondent is reached
company, and the not
their dismissal 14 Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163, is but one of the numerous authorities enunciating
having been shown in the least manner to be connected with union affiliation or the principle that "the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, with
activities cannot be considered an unfair labor practice, and therefore, not a valid caution, deliberation and with due regard to the provisions of the law and the
ground for a strike. constitutional rights of the individual." On this basis, We clear the alleged contemptors
of the charge against them.
We agree with petitioners that respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
concluding that the increase in the area sales quota of union president Leones was To our mind, the statements complained of are mere expressions of opinion intended
not an act of discrimination. The NLRC found the increase in the area sales quota not so much to bring the Court in disrepute as to advance the cause of labor. It must
justified by the change in the sales organization. It, however, overlooked a very be noted that the picket was staged only eight [8] months after the EDSA Revolution
important and crucial factor: that unlike the other field representatives whose quotas which saw the ouster of the past dispensation and the restoration of the basic rights
were increased by an average of 98%, that of the union president and vice-president to the people. Freedom of speech, much repressed during the previous regime, had
were increase 400% and 300%, respectively. No valid explanation was advanced by only begun to take wings again. Taken against this background, We understand the
respondent company for such marked difference. Considered in the light of the anti- overzealousness demonstrated by the KMU and Nick Elman in exercising their
union attitude exhibited by respondent company in transferring union president freedom of speech and expression and are inclined to give more weight to said
Leones from the main office in Manila to Cebu when the union was still being constitutional rights than to the Court's inherent power to preserve its dignity to which
organized, and which act was found by the NLRC as constituting unfair labor practice the power to punish for contempt appertains.
and union-busting in connection with the application for clearance to terminate
Leones filed by respondent company, 34 the uneven application of its marketing plan Although the picket was staged when the motion for leave to file a final and last
by respondent company is patently an act of discrimination, considered as an unfair motion for reconsideration was still pending action by the Court, the KMU and Nick
labor practice under Art. 249[e] of the Labor Code. Elman, not being parties to the case, were unaware of such fact. They believed the
case to have been finally disposed of in view of the final denial of the first motion for
It has previously been indicated that an employer may treat freely with an reconsideration. On the other hand, there is no sufficient proof that petitioner union
employee and is not obliged to support his actions with a reason or purpose. had participated in the picket nor in the preparation of the circular under
However, where the attendant circumstances, the history of employer's past consideration.
conduct and like considerations, coupled with an intimate connection between
the employer's action and the union affiliations or activities of the particular
The contempt charge against petitioner union, KMU and Nick Elman is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
In its Resolution promulgated on December 27, 1985, the Third Division of the On account of these reasons, the Solicitor General sought the dismissal of the instant
respondent Commission affirmed the Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 2 The Petition for lack of merit.
Commission pointed out that the Company had failed to satisfactorily explain why all
of the employees it had retrenched were officers and members of the NAFLU. The
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant,
Petition devoid of merit.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, We are inclined to believe that the
Company had indeed been discriminatory in selecting the employees who were to be
retrenched. All of the retrenched employees are officers and members of the NAFLU.
The record of the case is bereft of any satisfactory explanation from the Company
regarding this situation. As such, the action taken by the firm becomes highly suspect.
It leads Us to conclude that the firm had been discriminating against membership in
the NAFLU, an act which amounts to interference in the employees' exercise of their
right of self-organization. Under Article 249 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, such
interference is considered an act of unfair labor Practice on the part of the Company,
to wit —
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self- organization.;
The respondent Commission and the Executive Labor Arbiter took these
considerations into account in resolving the dispute- This being so, it cannot be said
that the respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
loss of jurisdiction, in finding BASECO guilty of having committed an act of unfair
labor practice despite the valid retrenchment. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari prayed
for by the petitioner cannot issue.
WEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of meat. The restraining order of June 22, 1987 is hereby
dissolved. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
the lower court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of petitioner
b. That subsequent to the filing of the said charge, or on about November 29,
herein. This conclusion is untenable.
1958 and also on or about December 11, 1958, the respondent herein, by its
manager Chua Yiong, summoned and advised union president Lazaro Peralta
that if Francisco San Jose will not withdraw his charge against the company Although subdivision (5) of paragraph (a) of said Section 4 would seem to refer only
(Case No. 1857-ULP), the company will also dismiss his brother Apolonio San to the discharge of the one who preferred charges against the company as
Jose, to which the union president replied that that should not be the attitude of constituting unfair labor practice, the aforementioned subdivision (5) should be
the company because Apolonio has nothing to do with his brother's case. construed in line with the spirit and purpose of said Section 4 and of the legislation of
which forms part — namely, to assure absolute freedom of the employees and
laborers to establish labor organizations and unions, as well as to prefer charges
c. That on or about January 24, 1959, respondent, by its officers and agents, did
before the proper organs of the Government for violation of our labor laws. Now, then,
dismiss Apolonio San Jose without just and valid cause and in gross violation of
if the dismissal of an employee due to the filing by him of said charges would be and
the operative collective bargaining agreement between the complainant union
is an undue restraint upon said freedom, the dismissal of his brother owing to the
and respondent corporation.
non-withdrawal of the charges of the former, would be and constitute as much a
restraint upon the same freedom. In fact, it may be a greater and more effective
The allegations in said sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the complaint were restraint thereto. Indeed, a complainant may be willing to risk the hazards of a
substantiated by the oral testimony of complainant's witnesses, but the Court possible and even probable retaliatory action by the employer in the form of a
finds that such allegations do not constitute unfair labor practice acts on the part dismissal or another discriminatory act against him personally, considering that
of respondent. In sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the Court finds no interference, nobody is perfect, that everybody commits mistakes and that there is always a
coercion and restraint against the employees in the exercise of their guaranteed possibility that the employer may find in the records of any employee, particularly if he
rights to self-organization and discrimination against complainant Apolonio San has long been in the service, some act or omission constituting a fault or negligence
Jose in regard to hire or tenure of his employment. In short, the complainants' which may be an excuse for such dismissal or discrimination. Yet, such complainant
charge is that if Francisco San Jose would not withdraw his unfair labor practice may not withstand the pressure that would result if his brother or another member of
charge against respondent company, the manager of the latter would dismiss his immediate family were threatened with such action unless the charges in question
Apolonio San Jose, the brother of Francisco. In fact, said manager dismissed were withdrawn.
employment
as noteffective
well. A more only of the union
mode member himselfofbut
of discouragement of members
union affiliation of his hardly
could family
be found than the knowledge that such activities put not merely the union
member's employment but that of those closely related to him in jeopardy. The
direct cause of Mrs. Barmer's discharge was the fact that her husband had been
discharged, but the indirect and antecedent cause was discrimination against
union members in regard to hire and tenure of employment with intent to
discourage membership in the Union." So also the Board has held that the
discharge of discriminatingly discharged employees' wives for the reason that the
employer did not desire the employees to continue to live in the employer's
houses, which they would do so long as their wives remained employed, is itself
a discriminating discharge in violation of the Act. (Mexis Textile Mills, 11 NLRB
1167 [1939], enforced 110 F2d 565 [CCA 5, 1940].) In Mansfield Mills, Inc. (3
NLRB 901 [1937] ), the respondent alleged that the wife of an employee who had
been discharged allegedly in violation of the Act was herself discharged in
consequence of a company rule requiring the dismissal of all members of the
family when the head of the family is discharged. The Board said: "Assuming this
as the reason for Mrs. Sutton's discharge, we would necessarily find that she was
the victim of discrimination in violation of the Act, if we determined that Sutton
was discharged as the result of his union affiliation."
In the usual case, it is the wife who is the sufferer because of the husband's
union affiliation. In I. Youlin and Company (22 NLRB No. 65 [1940]),the husband
was discharged for failure to secure his wife's resignation from the union this was
held violative of Section 8(3) of the Act.
In addition to violating Section 4(a) (5) of Republic Act No. 875, the discharge of
Apolonio San Jose is, therefore, an unfair labor practice under subdivision (4) of said
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 76
G.R. No. L-17739 December 24, 1964 We have examined the records carefully, and we find that the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations is supported by substantial evidence. We are quoting hereunder
ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JOSE BALDO, SANGILO-ITOGON pertinent portions of the decision of the lower court which embody its factual findings:
WORKERS UNION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
From the evidence of record, the following facts are clear. Baldo started working
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial as miner in the respondent company sometime in 1954. He worked continuously
Relations in Case No. 50-ULP-PANG. finding the petitioner guilty of unfair labor therein until February 4, 1958 when he was given a "30-day notice of termination
practices and ordering it to reinstate respondent Jose Baldo to his former work with of employment" to the effect that his services will not be needed by the
back wages. respondent company after March 5, 1958 (Exh. "4"). Baldo refused to
acknowledge receipt of said notice when Mowry, mine's superintendent of the
company, asked him to sign the same. It appears that Baldo was on 15 days
In a complaint dated November 18, 1958, an Acting Prosecutor of the Court of vacation leave with pay immediately prior to his being served his separation
Industrial Relations charged the herein petitioner-employer, Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., notice (Exh. "C").
and Claude Fertig its General Superintendent, with having committed unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 4(a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Republic Act
No. 875. The complaint substantially alleged that A. Manaois and Jose Baldo, The complainant's evidence tended to prove that Baldo was dismissed by the
employees of herein petitioner, were dismissed by said petitioner on June 9, 1957 company because of his membership in the complainant Sangilo-Itogon Workers
and March 5, 1958, respectively, because of their membership with the herein Union, a legitimate labor organization; and, for having testified for the said union
respondent Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union and for having testified against the in Case No. 3-MC-PANG a certification proceeding involving the employees of
petitioner in a certification election case involving the employees of the petitioner the respondent company. Baldo failed to obtain a reinstatement therein.
(Case No. 3-MC-PANG). The complaint prayed that an order be issued against the
herein petitioner to cease and desist from the labor practices complained of and that xxx xxx xxx
the complaining employees, A. Manaois and Jose Baldo be reinstated to their former
positions in the mining company without loss of employee benefits and with back
wages from the date of their respective dismissal until the date of their actual It is undeniable
April that
7, 1958, was Baldo's to
favorable testimony in Case No.
the complainant 3-MC-PANG
Sangilo-Itogon of this Court
Workers' Unionon
of
reinstatement. which he was a member and in some way adverse to the interests of the
company. The testimonies of complainant's witnesses are clear that during the
The petitioner herein (respondent below), in its answer to the complaint, admitted the hearing of the certification case in Itogon, Gelladoga, plant engineer and former
fact of the dismissal of the two complaining employees, but alleged that the labor relations officer of the respondent company, asked Baldo not to testify
complaining employees were dismissed for just and lawful causes, namely, therein are the promise that he will be reinstated. Admittedly, the case of Baldo's
"inefficiency, utter disregard and violation of safety rules and regulations established separation from the respondent company which was pending consideration at
and enforced by the respondent for the protection of the lives of the employees and that time with the grievance committee of the union and management was
properties of the respondent company, utter disregard of the company property and immediately "dropped" after Baldo testified in the certification case "because he
poor attendance records." (Baldo) brought his case to a rival union of the Itogon Labor Union." It becomes
obvious that Baldo's case was not considered further by the grievance committee
After hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, on October 5, 1960, rendered a because of his testimony against the company in the certification proceeding. An
decision, finding that the charge of unfair labor practice as far as it concerned the examination of the alleged offense imputed on Baldo previous to his dismissal
complaining employee A. Manaois was not proved and that the dismissal of said and which are relied upon by the respondent company (Exhibits "1", "2" and "3")
employee was just and legal; but as far as the other complaining employee Jose shows that they were not so serious as to warrant his immediate and permanent
Baldo was concerned, the charge of unfair labor practice was proved and that the dismissal. Under the circumstances it is safe to conclude that Gelladoga who is a
dismissal of said employee was unjust and illegal. The Court of Industrial Relations, Supervisor within the meaning of the Act, really promised to reinstate Baldo to his
therefore, ordered the reinstatement of Jose Baldo to his former work with back former work in the company should he desist from testifying in that certification
wages from April 7, 1958, when he was promised re-instatement, up to the day of his case mentioned above.
actual re-employment.
Considering everything, we are convinced that because of Baldo's refusal to
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision with the Court of accede to the demand of his employer not to testify in the certification proceeding
Industrial Relations en banc, but said Court, on October 27, 1960, denied the petition mentioned above, his Case was "dropped" by the grievance committee of the
for reconsideration. The petitioner has appealed from the decision, and from the order union and management, and consequently, he failed to be reinstated in the
denying the motion for reconsideration, of the Court of Industrial Relations affecting company.
only the case of Jose Baldo. No appeal has been filed regarding the case of A.
Manaois.
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 77
The petitioner, in this appeal, maintains that it was the Itogon Labor Union that When an employer commits unfair labor practices he should be made to shoulder all
dropped the case of Baldo regarding the 30-day notice of separation because Baldo the consequences of his unfair acts. The matter of granting back wages or backpay to
brought his case to a rival union of the Itogon Labor Union, so that the petitioner an employee that is reinstated is discretionary with the Court of Industrial Relations
should not be charged with unfair labor practice. This contention of the petitioner has (Section 5 [c], Republic Act No. 875). This question had already been settled in a line
no merit. of decisions rendered by this Court (United Employees Welfare Ass'n. vs. Isaac Peral
Bowling Alleys, G. R. No. 10327, Sept. 30, 1958; Union of Philippine Education Co.
The evidence shows that Baldo had joined the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, the Employees vs. Philippine Education Co., 91 Phil. 93, 95). We are satisfied that under
rival union of the Itogon Labor Union that had a collective bargaining contract with the the circumstances as shown by the records of the present case the Court of Industrial
petitioner, and that Baldo's membership in the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union was Relations had not abused the exercise of its discretion when it ordered the grant of
known to the management of the herein petitioner; that at the time that Baldo was back wages to respondent Baldo from the date he was promised reinstatement to the
given the 30-day notice of separation from the service there was pending before the day of his actual reinstatement.
Court of Industrial Relations a certification election case which involved the
employees of the petitioner, and the certification case was precisely brought about WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
upon petition by the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union; that when Baldo was given said petitioner.
notice of separation from the service he brought his case to the grievance committee
of the Itogon Labor Union and the management of the petitioner — said committee
being composed of representatives of the Itogon Labor Union and the management of
the petitioner — with a view to securing his reinstatement; that the grievance
committee withheld action on the case of Baldo; that the case of Baldo was pending
before the grievance committee when he was asked by Mansueto Gelladoga plant
engineer and former labor relations officer of the petitioner (he was also former Vice-
President of the Itogon Labor Union), not to testify in the hearing of the certification
election case so that be would be reinstated to his job; that in spite of Gelladoga's
request
and Baldo
Baldo's testified at
testimony wastheadverse
healing to
of the
the certification election
petitioner; and case Baldo
that after on April
had7,1958,
thus
testified his case was dropped by the grievance committee, and he was never
reinstated. Considering that Baldo's case was pending before the grievance
committee when he was asked by Gelladoga not to testify, and soon after he had
testified adversely to the petitioner his case was dropped by the grievance committee,
the conclusion is inescapable that the management of the petitioner herein had much
to do with the dropping of Baldo's case, and because of the dropping of that case the
petitioner never reinstated Baldo to his work. This conclusion is bolstered further by
the fact that the petitioner herein had opposed the petition for certification election.
The lower court found that Baldo had not committed any serious offense as would
warrant his immediate and permanent dismissal. On the other hand, the evidence
shows that when Baldo was given that notice of separation from the service he had
already joined the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union. There is evidence too that Claude
Fertig, the General Superintendent of the petitioner, was at that time acting as adviser
of the Itogon Labor Union, the rival Union of the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union.
We agree with the finding of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioner had
committed unfair labor practices as contemplated in sub-paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of
sub-section (a) of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 875 (Henares & Sons vs. National
Labor Union, G. R. No. L-17535, December 28, 1961; National Fastener Corporation
of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations, etc. G.R. No. L-15834, January 20,
1961).
The petitioner, in this appeal, also contends that the Court of Industrial Relations had
gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the reinstatement of Jose Baldo with
back wages. The petitioner points out that it should not be made to pay back wages
during the time that this case had been pending. This contention is also without merit.
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 78
Violation of the Duty to Bargain Collectively 6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of
the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike;
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred
to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the 7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
petitioner Union. appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate
police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO
well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the
order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September issues posed by the case at bar.
28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated
September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well
as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections (1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. ) human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person. " 2
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22,
1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under (2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion
petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience
within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for with general principles."3
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed,
invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights
the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.). them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts . One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
65-73, rec.). elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being
of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests,
not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise. " 5
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion
for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein (3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.). included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the
ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen . 6 And as Justice Douglas
October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one
appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected . 7
Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision,
resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) (4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.). but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and
to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate
not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
The
a superiority
mere of these
reasonable freedoms
or rational overbetween
relation property the
rights is underscored
means employed by
by the
the fact
law that
and survival, utilizing
untrammelled only the
enjoyment weapons
of their afforded
basic human them
rights. Thebypretension
the Constitution — the
of their employer
its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation
rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the
Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the
our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. —
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of
of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17 peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights
has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon —
II at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the
all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the
and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is
"a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 81
wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the
of petition. 19 refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to
join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined
Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as
to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection";
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
slender ground. restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section
Three."
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers
freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection
strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on
that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.). respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore
stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate
in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and
regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal
to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter
effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an
Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further
generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come
action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act
issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance
much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The of their interests. 24
more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally.
Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed
days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the
the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
(pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike
part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised
dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the against the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that
as it is unconstitutional. could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work
on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
III especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day
salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages stagingexigent
when of oneand
demonstration. It is a continuing
expedient whenever immunity
there are to be
errors to be rectified,
invoked and exercised
abuses to be
it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The
IV battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and
well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and services. 28-a
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of VI
the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its
"the State shall afford protection to l abor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Rela tions order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the
as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations legislative delegation. 29
is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest
by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self- The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2)
moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed was a Sunday.
therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed
mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by t he Constitution. Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late
defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does
V the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A their grievances.
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer
or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness
of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each xxx xxx xxx
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one. The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us. right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp.
vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for
cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773,
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected. April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S.
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we 177 [1941])...
in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
xxx xxx xxx
The case at bar is worse.
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial
conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is
sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in
company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and
implement selfishness, if not greed. integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against
the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a the company nor any of its officers.
patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when t hey wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in (2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes from the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their
Act . ..) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly separation from the service.
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if
in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayanto protest the 7. Lolita delos Angeles Board Member
accelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein
petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting 8. Marissa Villoria Board Member
respondents to file on October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal
for failure to comply with procedural requirements. 4 9. Marita Antonio Board Member
On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations . 5 Petitioners, claiming 10. Lolita Lindio Board Member
that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that
the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that 11. Eliza Caranlia Board Member
violence would erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities,
respondents’ workers were prevented from reporting for work.
12. Liza Sua Board Member
FIFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU)
3. Barnice Borcelo Secretary II. . . ERR[ED] IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ERRED IN
IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER . . .
4. Nerlie Yagin Treasurer DISMISSING PETITIONERS FROM WORK DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
5. Evelyn Santillan Auditor
III. . . ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF
6. Leony Serdoncilo Director HOLDING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWED THAT
RESPONDENTS WERE THE ONES WHO WERE GUILTY OF AN ILLEGAL
7. Trinidad Cuga Director LOCKOUT.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling of
Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayanwere considered merely as an exercise
the Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no strike to speak of as no labor or
industrial dispute existed between the parties .10 It accordingly ordered respondents to of their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the
reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not
full backwages from the date of their termination. 11 absolute.17 For the protection of other significant state interests such as the "right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth"18 enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered, otherwise,
On respond ents’ petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 28, oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor
2002, reversed that of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. would be sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers’ joining
demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an opportunity to make the
In finding for respondents, the appellate court discredited petitioners’ claim of having necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the
been illegally locked out, given their failure to even file a letter of protest or complaint business, and ignore the novel "principle of shared responsibility between workers
with the management, 12 and their failure to comply with the legal requirements of a and employers"19 aimed at fostering industrial peace.
valid strike.13
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that
The appellate court further noted that while petitioners claimed that they filed a notice they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990,
of strike on October 31, 1990, no copy thereof was ever produced before the Labor their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.
Arbiter.14
Petitioners, nonetheless, assert that when they returned to work the day following
Hence, the instant petition which faults the appellate court to have: the welga ng bayanon October 24, 1990, they were refused entry by the
If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with the
management or a complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor Arbiter
observed, "[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of their contention for
normally a locked-out union will immediately bring management before the bar of
justice."20
Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with
legal formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free
ingress to and egress from the company premises, they violated Article 264(e) of the
Labor Code which provides that "[n]o person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct
the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares."
Even the NLRC, which ordered their reinstatement, took note of p etitioners’ act of
"physically blocking and preventing the entry of complainant’s customers, supplies
and even other employees who were not on strike. " 21
In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal
formalities but also by the means by which it is carried out.
Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts of
knowingly participating in an illegal strike, conformably with the third paragraph of
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which provides:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike maybe declared t o have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.
4. To assure investors and creditors of industrial peace, PALEA agrees, subject On October 4, 2007, PAL officially exited receivership; thus, our ruling in Philippine
to the ratification by the general membership, (to) the suspension of the PAL- Air Lines v. Kurangking23 no longer applies.
PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years, provided the following safeguards are
in place: On June 22, 1998, FASAP filed a Complain t 24 against PAL and Patria T.
Chiong25 (Chiong) for unfair labor practice, illegal retrenchment with claims for
a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified bargaining reinstatement and payment of salaries, allowances and backwages of affected
agent of the regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company; FASAP members, actual, moral and exemplary damages with a prayer to enjoin the
retrenchment program then being implemented. Instead of a position paper,
b. The ‘union shop/maintenance of membership’ provision under the PAL- respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Consolidation with NCMB Case No. NS
PALEA CBA shall be respected. 12-514-97 pending with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment and/or Suspension and Referral of Claims to the interim rehabilitation
proceedings (motion to dismiss).26
c. No salary deduction, with full medical benefits.
On July 6, 1998, FASAP filed its Comment to respondents’ motion to dismiss. On July
5. PAL shall grant the benefits under the 26 July 1998 Memorandum of 23, 1998, the Labor Arbiter issued an Orde r 27 denying respondents’ motion to
Agreement forged by and between PAL and PALEA, to those employees who dismiss; granting a writ of preliminary injunction against PAL’s implementation of its
may opt to retire or be separated from the company. retrenchment program with respect to FASAP members; setting aside the respective
notices of retrenchment addressed to the cabin crew; directing respondents to restore
6. PALEA members who have been retrenched but have not received separation the said retrenched cabin crew to their positions and PAL’s payroll until final
benefits shall be granted priority in the hiring/rehiring of employees. determination of the case; and directing respondents to file their position paper.
7. In the absence of applicable Company rule or regulation, the provisions of the Respondents appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Labor Code shall apply .15 The NLRC directed the lifting of the writ of injunction and to vacate the directive
setting aside the notices of retrenchment and reinstating the dismissed cabin crew to
In a referendum conducted on October 2, 1998, PAL employees ratified the above their respective positions and in the PAL payroll .28
proposal. On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed domestic operations and, soon after,
international flights as well. 16 FASAP filed its Position Paper29 on September 28, 1999. On November 8, 1999,
respondents filed their Position Pape r30 with counterclaims against FASAP, to which
Meanwhile, in November 1998, or five months after the June 15, 1998 mass dismissal FASAP filed its Reply.31 Thereafter, the parties were directed to file their respective
of its cabin crew personnel, PAL began recalling to service those it had previously Memoranda.32
retrenched. Thus, in November 199 817 and up to March 1999,18 several of those
retrenched were called back to service. To date, PAL claims to have recalled 820 of Meanwhile, instead of being dismissed in accordance with the Kurangking case, the
the retrenched cabin crew personnel . 19 FASAP, however, claims that only 80 were FASAP case (NLRC-NCR Case No. 06-05100-98) was consolidated with the
recalled as of January 2001 .20 following cases:
In December 1998, PAL submitted a "stand-alone" rehabilitation plan to the SEC by 1. Ramon and Marian Joy Camahort v. PAL, et al. (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-
which it undertook a recovery on its own while keeping its options open for the entry 05854-98);
of a strategic partner in the future. Accordingly, it submitted an amended rehabilitation
plan to the SEC with a proposed revised business and financial restructuring plan, 2. Erlinda Arevalo and Chonas Santos v. PAL, et al. (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-
which required the infusion of US$200 million in new equity into the airline. 07-09793-98); and
On May 17, 1999, the SEC approved the proposed "Amended and Restated 3. Victor Lanza v. PAL, et al. (NLRC-NCR Case No.00-04-04254-99).
Rehabilitation Plan" of PAL and appointed a permanent rehabilitation receiver for the
latter.21
4. Ten (10%) per cent of the total monetary award as and by way of attorney’s FIRST, the record shows that PAL failed or neglected to adopt less drastic cost-
fees. cutting measures before resorting to retrenchment. No less than the Supreme Court
held that resort to less drastic cost-cutting measures is an indispensable requirement
SO ORDERED.34 for a valid retrenchment x x x.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC. Meanwhile, FASAP moved for the SECOND, PAL arbitrarily and capriciously singled out the year 1997 as a reference in
implementation of the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Despite its alleged assessment of employee efficiency. With this, it totally disregarded the
respondents’ opposition, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution with respect to employee’s performance during the years prior to 1997. This resulted in the
the reinstatement directive in his decision. Respondents moved to quash the writ, but unreasonable and unfair retrenchment or demotion of several flight pursers and
the Labor Arbiter denied the same. Again, respondents took issue with the NLRC. attendants who showed impeccable service records during the years prior to 1997.
Meanwhile, on May 31, 2004, the NLRC issued its Decisio n 35 in the appeal with THIRD, seniority was totally disregarded in the selection of employees to be
respect to the Labor Arbiter’s July 21, 2000 decision. The dispositive portion thereof retrenched, which is a clear and willful violation of the CBA.
reads:
FOURTH, PAL maliciously represented in the proceedings below that it could only
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 21, 2000 is hereby SET operate on a fleet of fourteen (14) planes in order to justify the retrenchment scheme.
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the consolidated cases for lack of merit. Yet, the evidence on record revealed that PAL operated a fleet of twenty two (22)
planes. In fact, after having illegally retrenched the unfortunate flight attendants and
pursers, PAL rehired those who were capriciously dismissed and even hired from the
With respect to complainant Ms. Begonia Blanco, her demotion is hereby declared outside just to fulfill their manning requirements.
illegal and respondent PAL is ordered to pay her salary differential covering the
period from the time she was downgraded in July 1998 up to the time she resigned in
October 1999. FIFTH, PAL did not use any fair and reasonable criteria in effecting retrenchment. If
there really was any, the same was applied arbitrarily, if not discriminatorily.
Respondent PAL is likewise ordered to pay the separation benefits to those
complainants who have not received their separation pay and to pay the balance to FINALLY, and perhaps the worst transgression of FASAP’s rights, PAL used
those who have received partial separation pay. retrenchment to veil its union-busting motives and struck at the heart of FASAP when
it retrenched seven (7) of its twelve (12) officers and demoted three (3)
others.37 (Emphasis supplied)
The Order of the Labor Arbiter dated April 6, 2000 is also SET ASIDE and the Writ of
Execution dated November 13, 2000 is hereby quashed.
These issues boil down to the question of whether PAL’s retrenchment scheme was
justified.
Under the Labor Code, retrenchment or reduction of employees is authorized as (3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent
follows: to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher;
ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of employees’ right to security of tenure; and,
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status,
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in workers.45
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be In view of the facts and the issues raised, the resolution of the instant petition hinges
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of on a determination of the existence of the first, fourth and the fifth elements set forth
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered above, as well as compliance therewith by PAL, taking to mind that the burden of
one (1) whole year. proof in retrenchment cases lies with the employer in showing valid cause for
dismissal;46that legitimate business reasons exist to justify retrenchment. 47
The law recognizes the right of every business entity to reduce its work force if the
same is made necessary by compelling economic factors which would endanger its FIRST ELEMENT: That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent
existence or stability.40 Where appropriate and where conditions are in accord with business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial,
law and jurisprudence, the Court has authorized valid reductions in the work force to serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived
forestall business losses, the hemorrhaging of capital, or even to recognize an objectively and in good faith by the employer.
obvious reduction in the volume of business which has rendered certain employees
redundant.41 The employ er’s prerogative to layoff employees is subject to certain limitations. In
Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers , 48 we held that:
Nevertheless, while it is true that the exercise of this right is a prerogative of
management, there must be faithful compliance with substantive and procedural Firstly, the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in
requirements of the law and jurisprudence, for retrenchment strikes at the very heart extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly
of the worker’s employment, the lifeblood upon which he and his family owe their shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character, the bona fide nature of
survival. Retrenchment is only a measure of last resort, when other less drastic the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question. Secondly, the substantial
means have been tried and found to be inadequate .42 loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be
perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words,
The burden clearly falls upon the employer to prove economic or business losses with be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic
sufficient supporting evidence. Its failure to prove these reverses or losses recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or
necessarily means that the employee’s dismissal was not justified. 43 Any claim of otherwise laid-off. Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must,
actual or potential business losses must satisfy certain established standards, all of thirdly, be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses.
which must concur, before any reduction of personnel becomes legal . 44 These are: The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to
forestall losses, i.e., cut other costs than labor costs. An employer who, for instance,
(1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business lays off substantial numbers of workers while continuing to dispense fat executive
losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, bonuses and perquisites or so-called "golden parachutes," can scarcely claim to be
retrenching in good faith to avoid losses. To impart operational meaning to the
Neither could PAL claim to suffer from imminent or resultant losses had it not FOURTH ELEMENT: That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench
implemented the retrenchment scheme in 1998. It could not have proved that employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or
retrenchment was necessary to prevent further losses, because immediately circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure.
thereafter – or in February 1999 78 – PAL was on the road to recovery; this is the
airline’s bare admission in its Comment to the instant petition. 79 During that period, it Concededly, retrenchment to prevent losses is an authorized cause for terminating
was recalling to duty cabin crew it had previously retrenched. In March 2000, PAL employment and the decision whether to resort to such move or not is a management
declared a net income of P44.2 million. In March 2001, it reported a profit of P419 prerogative. However, the right of an employer to dismiss an employee differs from
million. In March 2003, it again registered a net income of P295 million . 80 All these and should not be confused with the manner in which such right is exercised. It must
facts are anathema to a finding of financial difficulties. not be oppressive and abusive since it affects one's person and property . 85
Finally, what further belied PAL’s allegation that it was suffering from substantial In Indino v. National Labor Relations Commission, 86 the Court held that it is almost an
actual and imminent losses was the fact that in December 1998, PAL submitted a inflexible rule that employers who contemplate terminating the services of their
"stand-alone" rehabilitation plan to the SEC, and on June 4, 1999, or less than a year workers cannot be so arbitrary and ruthless as to find flimsy excuses for their
after the retrenchment, the amount of US$200 million was invested directly into PAL decisions. This must be so considering that the dismissal of an employee from work
by way of additional capital infusion for its operations . 81 These facts betray PAL ’s involves not only the loss of his position but more important, his means of livelihood.
claim that it was in dire financial straits. By submitting a "stand-alone" rehabilitation Applying this caveat, it is therefore incumbent for the employer, before putting into
plan, PAL acknowledged that it could undertake recovery on its own and that it effect any retrenchment process on its work force, to show by convincing evidence
possessed enough resources to weather the financial storm, if any. that it was being wrecked by serious financial problems. Simply declaring its state of
insolvency or its impending doom will not be sufficient. To do so would render the
Thus said, it was grave error for the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of security of tenure of workers and employees illusory. Any employer desirous of
Appeals, to have simply assumed that PAL was in grievous fi nancial state, without ridding itself of its employees could then easily do so without need to adduce proof in
requiring the latter to substantiate such claim. It bears stressing that in retrenchment support of its action. We can not countenance this. Security of tenure is a right
cases, the presentation of proof of financial difficulties through the required guaranteed to employees and workers by the Constitution and should not be denied
documents, preferably audited financial statements prepared by independent on the basis of mere speculation.
auditors, may not summarily be done away with.
On the requirement that the prerogative to retrench must be exercised in good faith,
That FASAP admitted and took for granted the existence of PAL’s financial woes we have ruled that the hiring of new employees and subsequent rehiring of
"retrenched" employees constitute bad faith ;87 that the failure of the employer to
cannot excuse the latter from proving to the Court’s satisfaction that indeed it was
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 96
resort to other less drastic measures than retrenchment seriously belies its claim that In the implementation of its retrenchment scheme, PAL evaluated the cabin crew
retrenchment was done in good faith to avoid losses ; 88 and that the demonstrated personnel’s performance during the year preceding the retrenchment (1997), based
arbitrariness in the selection of which of its employees to retrench is further proof of on the following set of criteria or rating variables found in the Performance Evaluation
the illegality of the employer’s retrenchment program, not to mention its bad faith. 89 Form of the cabin crew personnel’s Grooming and Appearance Handbook:
When PAL implemented Plan 22, instead of Plan 14, which was what it had srcinally A. INFLIGHT PROFICIENCY EVALUATION – 30%
made known to its employees, it could not be said that it acted in a manner
compatible with good faith. It offered no satisfactory explanation why it abandoned B. JOB PERFORMANCE – 35%
Plan 14; instead, it justified its actions of subsequently recalling to duty retrenched
employees by making it appear that it was a show of good faith; that it was due to its
good corporate nature that the decision to consider recalling employees was made. · Special Award – +5
The truth, however, is that it was unfair for PAL to have made such a move; it was
capricious and arbitrary, considering that several thousand employees who had long · Commendations – +2
been working for PAL had lost their jobs, only to be recalled but assigned to lower
positions (i.e., demoted), and, worse, some as new hires, without due regard for their · Appreciation – +1
long years of service with the airline.
In sum, we find that PAL had implemented its retrenchment program in an arbitrary · Perfect Attendance – +2
manner and with evident bad faith, which prejudiced the tenurial rights of the cabin
crew personnel. · Missed Assignment – -30
Moreover, the management’s September 4, 1998 offer to transfer PAL shares of · Sick Leaves in excess of allotment and other leaves in excess of allotment – -
stock in the name of its employees in exchange for the latter’s commitment to 20
suspend all existing CBAs for 10 years; the closure of its operations when the offer
was rejected; and the resumption of its business after the employees relented; all
· Tardiness – -10 93
indicate that PAL had not acted in earnest in regard to relations with its employees at
the time.
The appellate court held that there was no need for PAL to consult with FASAP
regarding standards or criteria that the airline would utilize in the implementation of
FIFTH ELEMENT: That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining
the retrenchment program; and that the criteria actually used which was unilaterally
who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as
formulated by PAL using its Performance Evaluation Form in its Grooming and
status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
Appearance Handbook was reasonable and fair. Indeed, P AL was not obligated to
workers.
consult FASAP regarding the standards it would use in evaluating the performance of
the each cabin crew. However, we do not agree with the findings of the appellate
In selecting employees to be dismissed, fair and reasonable criteria must be used, court that the criteria utilized by PAL in the actual retrenchment were reasonable and
such as but not limited to: (a) less preferred status (e.g., temporary employee), (b) fair.
efficiency and (c) seniority.90
This Court has repeatedly enjoined employers to adopt and observe fair and
In Villena v. National Labor Relations Commission, 91 the Court considered seniority reasonable standards to effect retrenchment. This is of paramount importance
an important aspect for the validity of a retrenchment program. In Philippine because an employer’s retrenchment program could be easily justified considering
Tuberculosis Society, Inc. v. National Labor Union ,92 the Court held that the the subjective nature of this requirement. The adoption and implementation of unfair
implementation of a retrenchment scheme without taking seniority into account and unreasonable criteria could not easily be detected especially in the retrenchment
rendered the retrenchment invalid, even as against factors such as dependability, of large numbers of employees, and in this aspect, abuse is a very distinct and real
adaptability, trainability, job performance, discipline, and attitude towards work. possibility. This is where labor tribunals should exercise more diligence; this aspect is
Moreover, in assessing the overall performance of each cabin crew personnel, PAL As to PAL’s recall and rehire process (of retrenched cabin crew employees), the
only considered the year 1997. This makes the evaluation of each cabin attendant’s same is likewise defective. Considering the illegality of the retrenchment, it follows
efficiency rating capricious and prejudicial to PAL employees covered by it. By that the subsequent recall and rehire process is likewise invalid and without effect.
discarding the cabin crew personnel’s previous years of service and taking into
consideration only one year’s worth of job performance for evaluation, PAL virtually A corporate officer is not personally liable for the money claims of discharged
did away with the concept of seniority, loyalty and past efficiency, and treated all corporate employees unless he acted with evident malice and bad faith in terminating
cabin attendants as if they were on equal footing, with no one more senior than the their employment.97 We do not see how respondent Patria Chiong may be held
other. personally liable together with PAL, it appearing that she was merely acting in
accordance with what her duties required under the circumstances. Being an
In sum, PAL’s retrenchment program is illegal because it was based on wrongful Assistant Vice President for Cabin Services of PAL, she takes direct orders from
premise (Plan 14, which in reality turned out to be Plan 22, resulting in retrenchment superiors, or those who are charged with the formulation of the policies to be
of more cabin attendants than was necessary) and in a set of criteria or rating implemented.
variables that is unfair and unreasonable when implemented. It failed to take into
account each cabin attendant’s respective service record, thereby disregarding With respect to moral damages, we have time and again held that as a general rule, a
seniority and loyalty in the evaluation of overall employee performance. corporation cannot suffer nor be entitled to moral damages. A corporation, being an
artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no
Anent the claim of unfair labor practices committed against petitioner, we find the emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental
same to be without basis. Article 261 of the Labor Code provides that violations of a anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system
CBA, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life – all of which cannot be suffered
labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the parties’ CBA. Moreover, by an artificial, juridical person. 98 The Labor Arbiter’s award of moral damages was
"gross violations of CBA" under the same Article referred to flagrant and/or malicious therefore improper.
refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement, which is not the
issue in the instant case. 1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87956 dated August 23, 2006, which affirmed the
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 98
Decision of the NLRC setting aside the Labor Arbiter’s findings of illegal retrenchment
and its Resolution of May 29, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered:
2. ORDERING Philippine Air Lines, Inc. to reinstate the cabin crew personnel
who were covered by the retrenchment and demotion scheme of June 15, 1998
made effective on July 15, 1998, without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, and to pay them full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
monetary benefits computed from the time of their separation up to the time of
their actual reinstatement, provided that with respect to those who had received
their respective separation pay, the amounts of payments shall be deducted from
their backwages. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible because the
positions previously held no longer exist, respondent Corporation shall pay
backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to one (1) month
pay for every year of service;
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. and CAM Transportation Co. are separate We find no merit in this appeal of petitioners herein, the lower court found that
entities engaged in business as common carriers, but under joint management, which complainants were dismissed before said Exhibit 5 was received by petitioners
had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the MD-CAM Local 3 herein. Said dismissal could not have been made, therefore, in pursuance either of
(PTGWO), a labor union composed of employees of said entities, to which prior to the request contained in said communication or of the closed shop provision of the
October 27, 1958, complainants Bienvenido de Guzman, Cecilio Cajoles and aforementioned collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the lower court found and
Bernardita Oracion were rendering services, the first two as drivers and the last as this amply supported by the evidence or record — that complainants' suspension by
conductress. On October 23, 1958, complainants secured the signatures of their co- the President of the Union, and their subsequent expulsion by its Board of Directors,
employees to a petition to the Department of Labor for an auditing of the mutual aid were due to the charges preferred by said complainants against the officers of the
fund of said Union, collected by its president, Felipe de Guzman. As the auditing Union, which led to the discovery of an alleged shortage in its Mutual Aid Fund, and
requested took place, said Department found on October 27, 1958, that there was a the preference of the case to the City Fiscal of Quezon City. Thus the Union was
shortage of over P22,000.00 in the aforementioned mutual aid fund. The matter was, guilty of unfair labor practice under subdivision (b) (2) of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
accordingly, referred to the City Fiscal of Quezon City for appropriate action. On the 875. Necessarily, this was, also, the reason why complainants were dismissed by the
same date, complainants were suspended as members of the Union by order of said petitioners herein — since there is no other possible cause for said dismissal, in the
Felipe de Guzman, and several days later, or on November 9, 1958, they were light of circumstances adverted to above — thereby committing an unfair labor
expelled from the Union by its Board of Directors. Complainants were, likewise, practice under subdivision (a) (5) of said Section 4.
dismissed by the petitioners, although the parties do not agree on the date on which
this took place. Hence, complainants brought their case to the Court of Industrial
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the finding that
Relations, an Acting Prosecutor of which subsequently filed a complaint charging the
complainants were dismissed by petitioners beforethe latter had receive the
petitioners, as well as the President, the Vice-President and the members of the
aforementioned Exhibit 5, the record abundantly shows that complainants were not
Board of Directors of the Union, with unfair labor practice.
allowed by agents of petitioners herein to enter its premises or work for the petitioners
since November 9, 1958 despite the fact that said communication was not written and
In their answer, petitioners denied the commission of unfair labor practice on their sent until November 10, 1958.
part and alleged that complainants' dismissal was due: 1) to their absence from work
for four (4) consecutive days, in violation of their collective bargaining contract; and 2)
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the backwages of the three (3)
to a communication of the Union to the petitioners urging the same to dismiss the
complainants shall begin from November 9, 1958, which is the date of their dismissal
complainants pursuant to a closed shop stipulation in said contract, in view of their
by the petitioners, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, in all other respects,
expulsion from the Union. The answer filed by the officers of the latter was
with costs against the petitioners.
substantially of the same tenor.
Unexpectedly and without filing a notice of strike, complainant LAKAS declared 1. That complainant is a legitimate labor organization, with its affiliates, namely:
another strike against the respondent Marcelo Companies on November 7, 1967, Marcelo Free Workers Union, United Nail Workers Union, and Marcelo United
resulting in the complete paralyzation of the business of said respondents. Because Employees Unions, whose members listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of this
of this second strike, conciliation conferences were again set by the Conciliation complaint are considered employees of respondent within the meaning of the
Service Division of the Department of Labor on November 8, November 23, and Act;
December 4, 1967. On the last aforementioned date, however, neither complainant
LAKAS nor the local unions appeared. 2. ...
Instead, on December 13, 1967, Prudencio Jalandoni of complainant LAKAS, in xxx xxx xxx
behalf of the striking unions, coursed a letter (Exhibit "B") to Jose P. Marcelo of
management advising that, "on Monday, December 18, 1967, at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, all your striking workers and employees will return to work under the same xxx xxx xxx
terms and conditions of employment before the strike." The letter was attested to by
Cornelio Dizon for MFWU, Jose Roque for UNWU and Augusto Carreon for MUEWA. 3. That individual complaints listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of this complaint
On December 15,1967, the Bureau of Labor Relations was informed by the are members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association,
complainant LAKAS who requested for the Bureau's representative to witness the Marcelo Free Workers Union, and United Nail Workers Union, respectively; that
return of the strikers to their jobs. the members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Union are workers
of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation; that the members of the
Marcelo Free Workers Union compose the workers of the Marcelo Rubber and
7. That on September 14, 1967, however, Jose P. Marcelo, and Jose A. Delfin, (b) Ordering respondents to comply with the Return-to-Work agreement dated
president and vice-president of the respondents, respectively, on one hand and September 14, 1967, and to admit back to work the workers listed in annexes
the presidents of the three local unions above-mentioned and the national "A", "B " and "C" hereof, with back wages, without loss of seniority rights and
president of complainant union on the other, entered into a Return-to-Work privileges thereof;
Agreement. providing among others, as follows:
(c) Ordering respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant union; and
4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck without
discrimination or harassment consistent with an orderly operation of its (d) Granting complainant and its complaining members thereof such other
various plants provided it is understood that management has not waived affirmative reliefs and remedies equitable and proper, in order to effectuate the
and shall continue to exercise freely its rights and prerogatives to punish, policies of the Industrial Peace Act.
discipline and dismiss its employees in accordance with law and existing
rules and regulations and that cases filed in Court will be allowed to take On March 16, 1968, after an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, the
their normal course. respondents filed their Answer denying the material allegations of the Complaint and
alleging as affirmative defenses,
8. That, contrary to the above Return-to-Work agreement, and in violation
thereof, respondents refused to admit the members of the three striking local I. That the Collective Bargaining Agreement between respondent Marcelo Steel
unions; that in admitting union members back to work, they were screened in Corporation and the United Nail Workers Union expired on March 15, 1967; The
spite of their long employment with respondent, but respondents gave preference Collective Bargaining Agreement between the United Rubber Workers Union
to the casual employees; (which eventually became the Marcelo Free Workers Union) and the respondent
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., expired on June 5, 1967; the
9. That, because of the refusal of the respondents to accept some union Collective Bargaining Agreement between Marcelo Camelback Tire and Foam
members, in violation of the above-mentioned Return-to-Work agreement and Union and the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation expired on June 5, 1967;
refusal of respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant, the latter,
together with the members of the three local unions above-mentioned, again II. That on May 23, 1967, one Mr. Prudencio Jalandoni of complainant addressed
staged a strike on November 7, 1967; a communication to Mr. Jose P. Marcelo of respondents informing him of the
VIII. That on November 28, 1967, respondent obtained an injunction from the 3. That to set the records of this Honorable Court straight, the undersigned
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, against the illegal officers and members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association
picketing of the local unions; in the first week of December, 1967, the striking respectfully manliest that the aforesaid organization has no complaint
workers began returning to work; on December 13, 1967, a letter was received whatsoever against any of the Marcelo Enterprises;
from complainant advising respondents that its striking workers were calling off,
lifting the picket line and returning to work, that from the first week of December, 4. ...
1967, respondents invited the striking workers desiring to return to work to fill out
an information sheet stating therein their readiness to work and the exact dates
they were available so that proper scheduling could be done; a number of 5. ..., the Complaint filed by the Petitioner in the above-entitled case in behalf of
workers showed no interest in reporting to work; management posted in the the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association is without authority from
Checkpoint, Bulletin Boards, and the gates notices calling all workers to return to the latter and therefore the officers and/or representatives of the petitioning labor
work but a number of workers obviously were not interested in returning organization should be cited for Contempt of Court;
anymore;
2. That on January 15, 1968, all the Officers and members of the United Nail 3. That precisely because of the acceptance back to work of these alleged
Workers Union disaffiliated from the herein Petitioning labor organization for the officers and members of the union-movants, and the refusal of respondents to
reason that Petitioning labor organization could not serve the best interest of the accept back to work all the individual complainants in this case mentioned in
Officers and members of the United Nail Workers Union and as such is a Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the instant complaint, inspite of the offer to return to
stumbling block to a harmonious labor- management relations within all the work by the complainants herein made to the respondents without any conditions
Marcelo enterprises; ... at the time of the strike, as per complainants' letter of December 13, 1967 (Exh.
"B", for the complainants), which fact precisely gave rise to the filing of this case.
3. That the filing of the above-entitled case by the herein Petitioning labor xxx xxx xxx
organization was made over and above the objections of the officers and
members of the United Nail Workers Union;
On January 31, 1969, after the submission of their respective Memoranda on the
4. That in view of all the foregoing, the Officers and members of the United Nail motions asking for the dismissal and withdrawal of the complaint, the Court of
Workers Union do hereby disauthorize the Petitioner of the above-entitled case Industrial Relations issued an Order deferring the resolution of the Motions until after
(Re:: Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan) from further representing the United the trial on the merits. To this Order, two separate Motions for Reconsideration were
Nail Workers Union in the above-entitled case; filed by the respondent companies and the movant-unions, which motions were,
however, denied by the court en banc by its Resolution dated March 5, 1969.
5. That in view further of the fact that the filing of the above-entitled case was
made over and above the objections of the Officers and members of the United After the tri al on the merits of t he case, and after submission by the parties of their
Nail Workers Union, the latter therefore manifest their intention to cease and respective memoranda, the respondent court rendered on July 20, 1973 the Decision
desist as they hereby ceased and desisted from further prosecuting the above- subject of these petitions. On the motions for dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint
entitled case in the interest of a harmonius labor-management relation within the as prayed for by MUEWA, UNWU and MFWU, the respondent court denied the same
Marcelo Enterprises; on the ground that the instant case was filed by the Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan for and in behalf of the individual employees concerned and not for the
movants who were not authorized by said individual complainants to ask for the
xxx xxx xxx dismissal. On the merits of the case, while the Decision contained opinions to the
effect that the respondent Marcelo Companies were not remiss in their obligation to
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion signed by the Officers and members of the bargain, and that the September 4, 1967 strike as well as the November 7, 1967
MFWU, headed by its president, Benjamin Mañaol, dated October 28, 1968 and filed strike, were economic strikes, and were, therefore, illegal because of lack of the
November 6, 1968, stated the same allegations as the Manifestation and Motion filed required notices of strike before the strikes were declared in both instances, the
by the UNWU quoted above, except that the disaffiliation of the MFWU from LAKAS Decision, nevertheless, on the opinion that the "procedure of scheduling adopted by
was made effective January 25, 1968. The Resolutions of Disaffiliation of both MFWU the respondents was in effect a screening of those who were to be readmitted,"
and UNWU were attached to these Manifestations. declared respondent Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in
discriminating against the employees named in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" by refusing
to admit them back to work other strikers were admitted back to work after the strike
of November 7, 1967. The dispositive portion of the appealed Decision states, to wit,
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 106
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondents should be, as they are I. The findings of the trial court excluding some of the employees from the
hereby, declared guilty of unfair labor practice only for the discrimination on aforementioned Decision as well as from the benefits resulting therefrom is not in
terms or conditions of employment as hereinbefore discussed in connection with accordance with law and the facts.
the return of the strikers complainants back to work after the second strike, and,
therefore, ordered to pay the individual complainants appearing in Annexes "A", II. The findings of the trial court declaring the strikes of September 4 and
"B" and "C" of the Complaint, except Arlington Glodeviza, Jesus Lim, Wilfredo November 7, 1967 as illegal for being an economic strike is not in accordance
Jarquio, Leonardo Sakdalan, Jose Roque, Alfredo Cabel, and those still working, with law and the facts adduced in this case.
were dismissed for cause, whose contracts expired or who had resigned as
above indicated, their back wages from December l8, 1967but only up to June
29, 1970when this case was submitted for decision, without reinstatement, III. The Honorable trial court in ordering the reduction of the back wages, without
minus their earnings elsewhere for the same period. reinstatement, appears to have departed from the substantial evidence rule and
established jurisprudence.
As to those who di ed without having been re-employed, the back wages shall be
from December 18, 1967 up to the date of their demise, as indicated in the body By Resolution of January 24, 1974, the Court en banc denied the two (2) Motions for
of this Decision, but not beyond June 20, 1970, likewise less their earnings Reconsideration filed by both the respondent Marcelo Companies and the individual
elsewhere. complainants. On February 19, 1974 and on February 20, 1974, both parties filed
their respective Notices of A ppeals. Hence, these petitions.
The Chief Auditing Examiner of this Court, or his duly authorized representative,
is hereby directed to proceed to the premises of respondent companies to In L-38258, the petition filed by complainant Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan
examine their books, payrolls, vouchers and other pertinent papers or documents (LAKAS), the following were assigned as reversible errors, to wit,
as may be necessary to compute the back wages due the individual complainant
in line with this Decision, and to submit his Report thereon not later than twenty I. The respondent court erred in finding the strikes of September 4 and
(20) days after completion of such examination for further disposition of the November 7, 1967 to be economic strikes and declaring the said strikes illegal for
Court. non-compliance with the procedural requirement of Section 14(d) of Republic Act
875, although its illegality was condoned or waived because of the Return-to-
SO ORDERED. Work agreement on the first strike, and the discriminatory rehiring of the striking
employees after the second strike.
On August 9, 1973, counsel for respondent Marcelo Companies filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Decision assigning as errors, to wit, II. The respondent court erred in denying reinstatement to the striking
complainants in Case No. 4951-ULP, and limiting the computation of their
backwages from December 18, 1967 to June 29, 1970 only, despite its findings
I. The trial court erred in not finding that complainant Lakas ng Manggagawang of unfair labor practice against private respondents herein as a consequence of
Makabayan (Lakas) has no authority to file and/or to prosecute the Complaint the discriminatory rehiring of the striking employees after the November 7, 1967
against respondents in representation of the local unions and/or individual strike.
complainants and/or members of local unions in their individual capacities and in
not dismissing the complaint on that ground upon motions of the local unions
concerned and/or their members. III. The respondent court erred in excluding the other individual complainants,
except those who are still working, those who resigned on or before December
18, 1967, and those whose employment contract expired, and denying to these
II. The trial court erred in finding that respondent discriminated against individual individual complainants the benefits resulting therefrom.
complainants who were not readmitted to work after the November 7, 1967 strike
while others were able to return to their former employment and in holding that
the procedure adopted by respondents was in effect a screening of those who On the other hand, in L-38260 which is the petition filed by respondents Marcelo
were readmitted and in finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practice by Enterprises, Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber & Latex
reason thereof. " Products, Marcelo Steel Corporation, Marcelo Chemical & Pigment Corporation, and
Polaris Marketing Corporation, the following is the alleged assignment of errors, to
wit,
On August 14, 1973, the individual complainants who had earlier disauthorized the
counsel of record, Atty. Benjamin Pineda, from further representing them and from
amicably settling their claims, on their own behalf filed their arguments in support of I. Respondent court erred in not finding that respondent Lakas ng
their Motion for Reconsideration, through a newly retained counsel, Atty. Pablo B. Manggagawang Makabayan (LAKAS) had no authority to file and/or to prosecute
Castillon. Assigned as errors are, to wit, the complaint against the petitioners herein in representation of the local unions
and/or individual complainants and/or members of local unions in their individual
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 107
capacities and in not dismissing the complaint in Case No. 4951-ULP of The present controversy is a three-sided conflict, although focus has been greatly
respondent court on that ground upon motions of the local unions concerned placed upon an alleged labor dispute between complainant LAKAS and the
and/or their officers and members. respondent Marcelo Companies. It would bear emphasizing, however, that what had
been patently disregarded by the respondent industrial court and the parties alike, is
II. Respondent court erred in finding that petitioners herein discriminated against the fact that LAKAS had never been the bargaining representative of any and an of
individual complainants in Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent court who were not the local unions then existing in the respondent Marcelo Companies.
readmitted to work after the November 7, 1967 strike, while others were able to
return to their former employment and in holding that the procedure adopted by Contrary to the pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the respondent Marcelo
petitioners herein was in effect a screening of those who were readmitted and in Companies did not ignore the demand for collective bargaining contained in its letter
finding petitioners herein guilty of unfair labor practice by reasons thereof. of June 20, 1967. Neither did the companies refuse to bargain at all. What it did was
to apprise LAKAS of the existing conflicting demands for recognition as the
III. Respondent court erred in rendering judgment ordering petitioners herein to bargaining representative in the appropriate units involved, and suggested the
pay individual complainants in Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent court settlement of the issue by means of the filing of a petition for certification election
backwages from December 18, 1967, to June 29, 1970, minus their earnings before the Court of Industrial Relations. This was not only the legally approved
elsewhere, except those who have resigned, those who have been dismissed for procedure but was dictated by the fact that there was indeed a legitimate
cause, those whose contracts have expired and those who are already working. representation issue. PSSLU, with whom the existing CBAs were entered into, was
demanding of respondent companies to collectively bargain with it; so was Paulino
Lazaro of MUEWA, J.C. Espinas & Associates for MACATIFU and the MFWU, and
IV. Respondent court erred in holding that petitioners herein have waived their the complainant LAKAS for MULU which we understand is the aggrupation of
right to declare the strikes of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967, illegal. MACATIFU, MFWU and UNWU. On top of all of these, Jose Roque of UNWU
disauthorized the PSSLU from representing his union; and similarly, Augusta Carreon
From the aforecited assignments of errors respectively made in both petitions before of MACATIFU itself informed management as late as July 11, 1967 or after the
Us, We find that there are only two basic issues posed for Our resolution, viz: (1) demand of LAKAS that no group representing his Union "is not authorized and should
whether or in
sustained, not the of
view complaint filedfact
the alleged by LAKAS against the
that its authority Marcelo
to file Companies
and prosecute thecan be
same not be entertained. "
has been squarely raised in issue at the first instance before the respondent court; Indeed, what We said in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs.
and (2) whether or not the Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice, for The Bureau of Labor Relations,69 SCRA 132, applies as well to this case.
which they should be made liable for backwages and be obliged to reinstate the
employees appearing in Annexes "A", "B", and "C " of the complaint, taking into
consideration the prayer of LAKAS anent the correct payment of said backwages and ..., in a situation like this where the issue of legitimate representation in dispute is
the non-exclusion of some employees from the benefits arising from the appealed viewed for not only by one legitimate labor organization but two or more, there is
Decision. every equitable ground warranting the holding of a certification election. In this
way, the issue as to who is really the true bargaining representative of all the
employees may be firmly settled by the simple expedient of an election.
The first issue poses a procedural question which We shall dwell on after a resolution
of the second issue, this latter issue being of greater significance to the correct
determination of the rights- of all parties concerned as it treats of the merits of the The above-cited case gives the reason for the need of determining once and for all
present petitions. the true choice of membership as to who should be their bargaining representative,
which is that, "(E)xperience teaches us, one of the root causes of labor or industrial
disputes is the problem arising from a questionable bargaining representative
Hence, anent the second issue of whether or not the complaint for unfair labor entering into CBA concerning terms and conditions of employment. "
practice can be sustained, this Court rules in favor of the respondent Marcelo
Companies and consequently, the appealed Decision is reversed. This reversal is
inevitable after this Court has pored through the voluminuous records of the case as Respecting the issue of representation and the right of the employer to demand
well as after applying the established jurisprudence and the law on the matters raised. reasonable proof of majority representation on the part of the supposed or putative
We are not unmindful of the plight of the employees in this case but We consider it bargaining agent, the commentaries in Rothenberg on Labor Relations, pp. 42943 1,
oppressive to grant their petition in G.R. No. L38258 for not only is there no evidence are forceful and persuasive, thus:
which shows that the respondent Marcelo Companies were seeking for an opportunity
to discharge these employees for union activities, or to discriminate against them It is essential to the right of a putative bargaining agent to represent the
because of such activities, but there is affirmative evidence to establish the contrary employees that it be the delegate of a majority of the employees and, conversely,
conclusion. an employer is under duty to bargain collectively only when the bargaining agent
is representative of the majority of the employees. A natural consequence of
these principles is that the employer has the right to demand of the asserted
LABOR LAW 2- SESSION 2 CASES Page 108
bargaining agent proof of its representation of its employees. Having the right to to work except four (4) who opted not to report for work because of the administrative
demonstration of this fact, it is not an 'unfair labor practice' for an employer to investigation conducted in connection with the acts of violence perpetrated during the
refuse to negotiate until the asserted bargaining agent has presented reasonable said strike.
proof of majority representation. It is necessary however, that such demand be
made in good faith and not merely as a pretext or device for delay or evasion. It is also evident from the records that the charge of bargaining in bad faith imputed to
The employer's right is however to reasonable proof. ... the respondent companies, is hardly credible. In fact, such charge is valid as only
against the complainant LAKAS. The parties had a total of five (5) conferences for
... Although an employer has the undoubted right to bargain with a bargaining purposes of collective bargaining. It is worth considering that the first strike of
agent whose authority has been established, without the requirement that the September 4, 1967 was staged less than a week after the fourth CBA conference and
bargaining agent be officially certified by the National Labor Relations Board as without any benefit of any previous strike notice. In this connection, it must be stated
such, if the informally presented evidence leaves a real doubt as to the issue, the that the notice of strike filed on June 13, 1967 could not have been the strike notice
employer has a right to demand a certification and to refuse to negotiate until for the first strike because it was already withdrawn on July 14, 1967. Thus, from
such official certification is presented." these stated facts can be seen that the first strike was held while the parties were in
the process of negotiating. Nor can it be sustained that the respondent Marcelo
The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated indusputably show that a Companies bargained in bad faith since there were proposals offered by them, but
legitimate representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo Companies. In the the complainant LAKAS stood pat on its position that all of their economic demands
face of these facts and in conformity with the existing jurisprudence. should be met and that all of these demands should be granted in all of the
respondent Marcelo Companies. The companies' refusal to accede to the demands of
LAKAS appears to be justified since there is no showing that these companies were
We hold that there existed no duty to bargain collectively with The complainant in the same state of financial and economic affairs. There is reason to believe that the
LAKAS on the part of said companies. And proceeding from this basis, it follows that first strike was staged only for the purpose of compelling the respondent Marcelo
all acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the Notice of strike on Companies to accede to the inflexible demands of the complainant LAKAS. The
June 13, 1967 (although later withdrawn) and the 'two strikes of September 4, 1967 records further establish that after the resumption of normal operations following the
and November 7, 1967 were calculated , designed and intended to compel the
respondent Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding that it first strike andLAKAS
complainant the consequent Return-to-Work
and the management of Agreement, the striking
the respondent Marcelounions led by
Companies
was an uncertified union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber resumed their bargaining negotiations. And that on October 13, 1967, complainant
Corporation, to bargain with it despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro vas LAKAS sent the final drafts of the collective bargaining proposals for MFWU and
already certified as the sole bargaining agent in said respondent company. These UNWU. The second strike of November 7, 1967 was then staged immediately after
concerted activities executed and carried into effect at the instigation and motivation which strike, as before, was again lacking of a strike notice. All of these facts show
of LAKAS ire all illegal and violative of the employer's basic right to bargain that it was complainant LAKAS, and not the respondent Marcelo Companies, which
collectively only with the representative supported by the majority of its employees in refused to negotiate in the pending collective bargaining process. AR that the facts
each of the bargaining units. This Court is not unaware of the present predicament of show is that the bargaining position of complainant LAKAS was inflexible and that it
the employees involved but much as We sympathize with those who have been was in line with this uncompromising attitude that the strikes were declared,
misled and so lost their jobs through hasty, ill-advised and precipitate moves, We rule significantly after notice that management did not or could not meet all of their 17-
that the facts neither substantiate nor support the finding that the respondent Marcelo points demand.
Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice.
Respondent court, upholding the contention of petitioner LAKAS that after the second
There are also other facts which this Court cannot ignore. the complaint of LAKAS strike, the respondent Marcelo Companies, despite the strikers' unconditional offer to
charge that after their first strike of September 4, 1967, management and the striking return to work, refused to readmit them without "screening" which LAKAS insists to be
employees entered into a Return-to-Work Agreement but that it was violated by the "discriminatory hiring of the striking employees, " declared that although the two
respondent companies who "refused to admit the members of the three striking local strikes were illegal, being economic strikes held in violation of the strike notice
unions ... and gave reference to the casual employees." (No. 8, Complaint). It is also requirement, nevertheless held the Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair labor practice
alleged that the strike of November 7, 1967 was staged "because of the refusal of the in discriminating against the complaining employees by refusing to readmit them
respondents to accept some union members ... and refusal of respondents to bargain while other strikers were admitted back to work. We do not agree.
in good faith with complainant" (No. 9, Complaint). We find however, that in making
these charges, complainant LAKAS lacked candor, truth and fidelity towards the
courts. It is the settled jurisprudence that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer not to
reinstate, or refuse re-employment of members of union who abandon their strike and
make unconditional offer to return to work. 1 As indeed Exhibit "B" presents an
It is a fact found by the respondent court, and as revealed by he records of the case, unconditional offer of the striking employees to return to work under the same terms
that the respondent Marcelo Companies did not violate the terms of the Return-to- and conditions of employment before the strike, the question then confronting Us is
Work Agreement negotiated after the first strike. All of the strikers were admitted back
It is true that upon their return, the strikers were required to fill up a form (Exhibit "49") In Pagkakaisang Itinataguyod ng mga Manggagawa sa Ang Tibay (PIMA), Eliseo
wherein they were to indicate the date of their availability for work. But We are more Samson, et al., vs. Ang Tibay, Inc., et al., L-22273, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 45, We
impressed and are persuaded to accept as true the contention of the respondent held that the exaction, by the employer, from the strikers returning to work, of a
Marcelo Companies that the aforestated requirement was only for purposes of proper promise not to destroy company property and not to commit acts of reprisal against
scheduling of the start of work for each returning striker. It must be noted that as a union members who did not participate in the strike, cannot be considered an unfair
consequence of the two strikes which were both attended by widespread acts of labor practice because it was not intended to discourage union membership. It was
violence and vandalism, the businesses of the respondent companies were an act of a self- preservation designed to insure peace and order in the employer's
completely paralyzed. It would hardly be justiciable to demand of the respondent premises. It was also held therein that what the Industrial Peace Act regards as an
companies to readmit all the returning workers in one big force or as each demanded unfair labor practice is the discrimination committed by the employer in regard to
readmission. There were machines that were not in operating condition because of tenure of employment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union
long disuse during the strikes. Some of the machines needed more than one worker membership.
to operate them so that in the absence of the needed team of workers, the start of
work by one without his teammates would necessarily be useless, and the company In the light of the above ruling and taking the facts and circumstances of the case
would be paying for his time spent doing no work. Finally, We take judicial cognizance before Us in relation to the requirement by the respondent companies in the filling up
of the fact that companies whose businesses were completely paralyzed by major of Exhibit "49", We hold and rule that the requirement was an act of self-preservation,
strikes cannot resume operations at once and in the same state or force as before the designed to effect cost-savings as well as to insure peace and order within their
strikes. premises. Accordingly, the petition in G. R. No. L-38258 should be dismissed, it
having failed to prove, substantiate and justify the unfair labor practice charges
But what strikes Us most in lending credence to respondents' allegation that Exhibit against the respondent Marcelo Companies.
"49" was not meant to screen the strikers, is the fact that an of the returning strikers
who filled up the form were scheduled for work and consequently started with their Now to the procedural question posed in the first issue brought about by the
jobs. It is only those strikers who refused or failed to fill-up the required form, like the respondent court's denial of the motions to withdraw the complaint respectively filed
herein complaining employees, who were not scheduled for work and consequently by MUEWA, UNWU and MFWU. In their petition (G.R. L-38260) the respondent
have not been re- employed by the respondent Marcelo Companies. Even if there Marcelo Companies maintain that the respondent court erred in not dismissing the
was a sincere belief on their part that the requirement of Exhibit "49" was a ruse at complaint even as it knew fully well that the very authority of LAKAS to represent the
"screening" them, this fear would have been dispelled upon notice of the fact that labor unions who had precisely disaffiliated from the LAKAS, was open to serious
each and all of their co-strikers who rued up the required form were in fact scheduled question and was being ventilated before it. On the other hand, the respondent court
for work and started to work. The stoppage of their work was not, therefore, the direct rationalized the denial of the aforestated motions to withdraw by holding that the
consequence of the respondent companies' complained act, Hence, their economic complaint was filed by LAKAS on behalf of the individual employees whose names
loss should not be shifted to the employer. 2 were attached to the complaint and hence, that the local unions who were not so
authorized by these individual employees, cannot withdraw the said complaint. The
It was never the state policy nor Our judicial pronouncement that the employees' right lower court's opinion is erroneous.
to self-organization and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and
protection, are absolute or be upheld under an circumstances. Thus, in the case Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring any action for and in behalf of the employees who were
of Royal Interocean Lines, et al. vs. CIR, 3 We cited these authorities giving adequate members of MUEWA because, as intimated earlier in this Decision, the said local
panoply to the rights of employer, to wit: union was never an affiliate of LAKAS. What appears clearly from the records is that it
was Augusto Carreon and his followers who joined LAKAS, but then Augusto Carreon
The protection of workers' right to self-organization in no way interfere with was not the recognized president of MUEWA and neither he nor his followers can
employer's freedom to enforce such rules and orders as are necessary to proper claim any legitimate representation of MUEWA. Apparently, it is this split faction of
conduct of his businesses, so long as employer's supervision is not for the MUEWA, headed by Augusta Carreon, who is being sought to be represented by
Nor will the lower court's opinion be availing with respect to the complaining SO ORDERED.
employees belonging to UNWU and MFWU. Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS,
that when it filed the charge on December 26, 1967, the officers of the movant unions
were not yet then the officers thereof, nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU Feather-Bedding
separated from and disaffiliated with 'LAKAS to again exercise its rights as
independent local unions, registered before as such, they are no longer affiliates of Asking for or Accepting Negotiation or Attorney’s fees
LAKAS, as what transpired here. Naturally, there would no longer be any reason or
occasion for LAKAS to continue representing them. Notable is the fact that the Violation of a CBA
members purportedly represented by LAKAS constitute the mere minority of the
movant unions, as may be inferred from the allegations of the movant unions as well
as the counter-allegations of LAKAS filed below. As such, they cannot prevail or
dictate upon the will of the greater majority of the unions to which they still belong, it
appearing that they never disaffiliated from their unions; or stated in another way,
they are bound by the action of the greater majority. 4
In NARIC Workers' Union vs. CIR, 5 We ruled that, "(a) labor union would go beyond
the limits of its legitimate purposes if it is given the unrestrained liberty to prosecute
any case even for employees who are not members of any union at all. A suit brought
by another in representation of a real party in interest is defective." Under the
uncontroverted facts obtaining herein, the aforestated ruling is applicable, the only
difference being that, here, a labor federation seeks to represent members of a
registered local union never affiliated with it and members of registered local unions
which, in the course of the proceedings before the industrial court, disaffiliated from it.
This is not to say that the complaining employees were without any venue for redress.
Under the aforestated considerations, the respondent court should have directed the
amendment of the complaint by dropping LAKAS as the complainant and allowing the
suit to be further prosecuted in the individual names of those who had grievances. A
class suit under Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court is authorized and should
suffice for the purpose.