MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and Children born after the one hundred
ren born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the
MARIA DUEÑAS, plaintiffs, vs. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant. G.R. No. L-2474
May 30, 1951
FACTS: Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery
of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal
was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor
of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938 up to
1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered the land in question.
Lower Court: favored the plaintiffs
(a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to
inherit the land in question;
(b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and
(c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court
upon the plea that only question of law are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her
son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor
on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the couple is
deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then
the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed
him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined hinges on the legitimacy
of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned. The
determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed
between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period of conception of the child up to
the date of his birth in connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal.
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of
tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his
house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became
worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped
with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943.
Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as
husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife,
who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a
boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
Issue: Under these facts, can the child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Ruling: Yes.
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the
child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943,
that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been
born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was physically
impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of
tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed
sufficient to overcome this presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include
(1) absence during the initial period of conception,
(2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and
(3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through
corrupt violation of prison regulations.
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942
and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show
that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the
marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the
wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already
suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly
move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience
shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage
because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the
reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably
dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An
Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence
to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable,
nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under
the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123,
of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying
the Civil Code. Said section provides:
 The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty
days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three
hundred days following its dissolution.

We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had
access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other
presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this
presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof.
The fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery cannot also overcome this
presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).

In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err
in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueñas.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious.
Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old
at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by
the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the
legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation
of the said certificate.
Facts: Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only surviving child
of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26,
1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was
delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and
without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a
housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the
child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old,
and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature . . .; that
petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora
Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth
certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit:
a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not;
b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not
the informant;
c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is
GUINTO, her mother being single;
d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child;
The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's
birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically
and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because:
a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years old;
b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born;
c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of
Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate
of cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice
and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent
Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent
local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
RTC: issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing
thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause
of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal
capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally
that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the
Family Code." The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera
and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff
Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood.
Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate of
Baptism, . . . Student's Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant
petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition
is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.
CA: held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the
biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to
show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was
already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in
1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the
advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications. Moreover,
petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature
therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other
signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which
stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was
not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation
wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this
case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being void
ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the mother.
Hence, this appeal
Issues:
1) w/n respondent has the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal under
CA-Yes
2) W/N The special proceeding on appeal is improper and is barred by [the] statute of
limitation (prescription); - NO
3) W/N the Honorable Court of Appeals, utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public
record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent.-
NO
Ruling:
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 1718 of
the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or,
in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject
to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present
action.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is
one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit."9 The interest of respondent in the civil
status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed
against the former. 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by
respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close
reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns
the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child
was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn
petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no
blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of
the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles
provide:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it
is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been
his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived insemination, the written authorization
or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused
to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the
heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to
claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a]
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late
Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code
which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought
within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in
the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of
birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to
the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive
period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio. 1
Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's
testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of
regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the
totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption.
First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was
not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals
observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures in
other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is
not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy,
such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate
itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during
that time.1awphil Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already
54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it
was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age
necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena

Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter
was not hers nor her husband Eugenio's.

Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has
presented no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really
Hermogena's child; Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother
would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.

All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the
appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA
BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, Respondents. G.R. No. 105625
January 24, 1994
Facts: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982 and Vicente foll November 13, 1989.
He died intestate. The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez
Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted before the RTC letters of
administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged,
inter alia, viz.:
1.
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants
or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite
claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly
establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel
2.
Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled
extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and
that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
therefore not a legal heir; .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole
heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The
parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate
of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others:
(1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
(2) Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);
(3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS
of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
(4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter.
On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence,
that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel,
then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted
obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio,
elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically declared that
petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically
procreate.
RTC: decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for
letters and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole
heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
CA: declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by
nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a
legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles
166 and 170 of the Family Code.
Issues:
W/N Court of Appeals committed error of law and misapprehension of facts when it
failed to apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code in this case and in adopting and upholding private respondent's theory
that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child;
W/N Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave more weight to the
testimonial evidence of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and
demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than the
documentary and testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
RULING:
1. No. Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and
171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These
articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of
the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the
husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth
of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the
birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband except in the instance provided in the
second paragraph of Article 164;
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
 Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within
one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth
as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two
years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth
of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child
or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding Article only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing
his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted
therefrom;
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child
by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been
his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused
to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the
heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Article 170 of
the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to
claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction
of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
2) NO. Appellate court that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of
the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively
dissected the evidence of the parties as follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is utterly
insufficient to establish her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses,
while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said
couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late Vicente O.
Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his wife's
legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own
true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she
was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling,
Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years
and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or still could not bear
a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-
known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who
treated his sister for a number of years.
There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez,
Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy
and the youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through law school, and
whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest
daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that
Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might
grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl
and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child.
Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court
in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge of the lower
court had to be held at her residence in Parañaque, MM. Considering, her advanced
age and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez
Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her
Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can
be expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness.
There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin
C. Asendido) who testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost
everyday especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they
never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that
it is also true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel
Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's)
residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that
she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa
in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised
and asked the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me that the child was
brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it"
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her
delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the
fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a
baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were
her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when
appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true
mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing
as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who
wads already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother
of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have
been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's
obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late
age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How
come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly
born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or
even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent
times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to
simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty.
Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if not the
expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting
himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he
had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come
around doing so either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But
definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of
an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of
the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente
O. Benitez and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and
sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the
extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased
ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or ascendants?" Dr.
Chipongian, placed on a witness stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-
in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he signed the
same only because the latter told him to do so. But why would Atty. Benitez make such
a statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really his and his
wife's daughter and descendant and, therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As
for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document without
understanding completely the meaning of the words "descendant and ascendant". This
we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone
to the United States.
Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the foster-
daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's
collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the daughter
and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the
latter, before her death, would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my child or only daughter
will inherit what is legally my own property, in case I die without a will,and in the same
handwritten note, she even implored her husband - that any inheritance due him from
my property - when he die - to make our own daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not
mean what he legally owns or his inherited property. I leave him to decide for himself
regarding those.
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel
to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be
their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and
supplicate her husband to give appellee although without any legal papers her
properties when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the properties
that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their
daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even
testified that her brother Vicente gave the date December 8 as Marissa's birthday in
her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's)
mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of
Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified,
that Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they
gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. The
weight of these findings was not negated by documentary evidence presented by the
petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly
showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28,
1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410
of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary
evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the
content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence, the most
telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel
Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that
"(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without
descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was
petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed
petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner v. EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondents. G.R. No.
200169, January 28, 2015
Facts: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died, intestate and
without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their
estate are two parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of
Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles).
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City (for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat to RTC, the
Complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus
he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he
executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of
Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC
a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,
which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent
presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus
prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to surrender to
him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir
of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out
of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of
the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death
of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had
no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping
by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent
prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as
their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following documents, among others:
His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2, Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit “C” and submarkings), wherein
it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit “F”), which indicated that Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar is his mother;
Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957
(Exhibit “G”), a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar
during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and
indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;
Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated October 29, 1954
(Exhibit “L”), indicating that petitioner is his son;
Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit “M”), where it is declared
that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit “O”) addressed to a BMMC supervisor
introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to the
effect that the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were “all destroyed by
nature,” hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued
as requested (Exhibit “Q”).
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar
(Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister of
Alfredo Aguilar.
Abendan-Aguilar confirmed petitioner’s identity, and she testified that petitioner is the
son of the Aguilar spouses and that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the
latter in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal home built on one of the subject properties.
On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the sister of Alfredo
Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one son – herein petitioner – who was born
at BMMC; that after the death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim
ownership of the subject properties because they recognized petitioner as the Aguilar
spouses’ sole child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted,
imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole, petitioner
continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject
properties, and continues to live there with his family.
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher; that
she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to
petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under
medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital and
funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar
executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to
her husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that she did not steal the subject titles, but that
the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned sale
of the subject properties did not push through because when petitioner’s opinion thereto
was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to the agreed price.
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera),
74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were married on June 22, 1933 in
Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not
know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain “Rodolfo” whose
nickname was “Mait”; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that
Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano.
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar
(Exhibit “2”) announcing among others that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that
she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
RTC: Dismissed plaintiff’s complaint:
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting to the
fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever
presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming
his biological relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S.
Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she
expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue and that she is
the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never
a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and
Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action
to be considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction
and damages prayed for.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis.
CA: affirming the trial court’s August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing thus:
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the deceased
spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. The Elementary School
Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of filiation.
“Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute evidence
of filiation.”
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be considered as evidence of filiation. As stated by
the Supreme Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:
“A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so
are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has
been paid and the amount thereof.”
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the parents of
the former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove filiation. The
Highest Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of
bride is not competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a
public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”)
and the Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit “L”), allegedly tend
to establish that plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known as Rodolfo Siasat
Aguilar and he has been bearing the surname of his alleged parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Use of a family surname certainly
does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar
are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish and prove the
filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is a
public instrument and the latter bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not
constitute clear and convincing evidence to show filiation based on open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious matter
that must be resolved according to the requirements of the law.
All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to hurdle the “high standard of proof”
required for the success of an action to establish one’s legitimate filiation when relying
upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses Aguilar,
thereby negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this
Court cannot grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and
unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither had he shown permanent and urgent
necessity for the issuance of the writ.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article
172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration
under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as the latter’s son; this recognition
should be accorded more weight than the presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172
itself declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation without need of court
action. He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument such
as the SSS Form E-1 is the “highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature
of a complete act of recognition bestowed upon” him as the son of the late Alfredo
Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot
collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already
prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code;23 and that having
proved his filiation, mandatory injunction should issue, and an award of damages is in
order.
Issues: W/N Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in] not taking into
consideration petitioner’s Exhibit “G” (SSS E-1 acknowledged and notarized before a
notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son) as
public document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the [Family] Code in the
establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
Ruling: Yes.
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, has held that –
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending
to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations
is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of
their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being
their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence
of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded
that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo
Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner
correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement
for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the
Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.”
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the
records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were
destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence –
particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) – to prove filiation. It was
erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same
being an express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent
in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate
or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount consideration” in
resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.” Too, “(t)he
State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development.”
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy of
his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod
City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through
the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have
sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the Certification dated January 27, 1996
issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit “Q”) contained just such an advice for
petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in Manila
to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in the
country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.
As to petitioner’s argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy
and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his
legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
the Court has held before that –
Article 26331 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove
that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one
impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner
is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses,
then he is as well heir to the latter’s estate. Respondent is then left with no right to
inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s estate, since succession pertains, in
the first place, to the descending direct line.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO ALCORIZA, PEDRO
ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO,
SHIRLY ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO,
NICETAS VENTULA, AND NILA ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO,
Petitioners, v. ANACLETO ALCORAN AND ELENETTE SUNJACO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163362, July 08, 2015
Facts: Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their marriage
produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan
but their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had an
extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran
on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. In 1972,
Anacleto married Elenette Sonjaco.
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died m 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960,
and Joaquina in 1981.
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan.
Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all
surnamed Arado.
Nemesio had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza;
(2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria;
and (6) Felicisima.
During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following
heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse,
Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse,
Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed
in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette. Named as
unwilling co-plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, along with
Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima.
There were 10 properties subject of the action. The parties later stipulated that the first
eight of the subject properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the last two
had been the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939, his
properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the period of the
old Civil Code, where the spouse could not inherit but only a share of the usufruct,
which was extinguished upon the death of the usufructuary;" that when Nicolas died in
1954 without issue, half of his properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia, and the
other half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her
siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and
Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which affair Anacleto was born,
but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son of Nicolas; that Nicolas did not
recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was
not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to
the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that
the will was void for not having been executed according to the formalities of the law,
and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that the supposed testator
did not acknowledge the will, which was not submitted for probate; that they were the
rightful heirs to the properties; that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the
return of the properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the defendants from further violating their
rights in the properties; and that the defendants should be ordered to reconvey the
properties, and to pay; P20,000.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In their answer, the defendants (respondents herein) countered that Anacleto was
expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact evidenced by the certificate
of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had the right to inherit the properties from
Nicolas; that because Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas died, the
administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother, Joaquina; that
Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's
possession of the properties was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living
with her since his birth; that such possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and
continued until Joaquina's death in 1981; that Anacleto then took over the possession
of the properties to the exclusion of all others; that granting for the sake of argument
that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were already lost through
laches, estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the
properties, and his ownership and possession should not be disturbed.
RTC: rendered dismissing the complaint.
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged
illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of Anacleto of the Register of
Births of the Municipality of Bacong, which proved that Nicolas had himself caused the
registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof and indicating that he
was the father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared under the
column "Remarks" in the register of births, which was the space provided for the name
of the informant; that because the plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the entry
in the register of births, the entry became conclusive with respect to the facts contained
therein; that Anacleto's claim of recognition was bolstered by his baptismal certificate,
in which was indicated that his parents were Nicolas Alcoran and Francisca Sarita; that
also presented was a picture taken during the wake of Nicolas showing the young
Anacleto being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas' wife, Florencia; that in addition,
the school records of Anacleto showed that Joaquina stood as his guardian during his
grade school years; that when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina who gave consent
to his marriage because he was then still a minor; and that Joaquina executed her will
in 1978, bequeathing the subject properties to Anacleto, but the will was yet to be
probated.
As the case was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that
Articles 172,173 and 175 of the Family Code allowed Anacleto to establish his filiation
during his lifetime through the record of his birth appearing in the civil register. It further
ruled that because there were no legitimate children of Nicolas who contested
Anacleto's right to inherit, the rule on the separation of the legitimate from the
illegitimate family was rendered irrelevant; and that, accordingly, Anacleto was entitled
to possess the subject properties upon having established that he was the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. Consequently, it also dismissed the
defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient basis.
CA: affirming the judgment of the RTC
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It agreed that the Register of Births of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas was the father of
Anacleto, and that the former had supplied the information on the latter's birth. It
declared that the plaintiffs did not rebut the filiation of Anacleto by contrary evidence;
that the baptismal certificate of Anacleto and the picture taken during the wake of
Nicolas further showed that Anacleto had been acknowledged by Nicolas; that based
on the Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, the law applicable at the time of
the filing of the case, Anacleto's filiation was established by the record of his birth
appearing in the civil register; and that Anacleto possessed rights in the subject
properties.
Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced that after Raymundo
died in 1939, his wife, Joaquina, and his son, Nicolas, inherited his properties; that
when Nicolas died in 1954, he was survived by Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his
legitimate wife), and Anacleto (his illegitimate son); that Joaquina was entitled to one-
half of Nicolas' estate, and the remaining half should be divided between Florencia and
Anacleto; that in 1960, when Florencia died without issue, the share she had inherited
from Nicolas was inherited by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; and that when
Joaquina died in 1981, she was survived by her sibling Alejandra; her nieces Jesusa,
Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima; her nephews Pedro and Teodorico; and her
illegitimate grandson, Anacleto.
The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from asserting their rights in the
properties by estoppel by laches; that Joaquina had executed her last will and
testament on April 19, 1978, whereby she bequeathed her properties to Anacleto; that
the properties were thus transmitted to Anacleto upon her death in 1981; that the
plaintiffs filed their complairtt in the RTC only on January 14, 1992; that it would be
unjust to award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on their rights for
a long time; and that the plaintiffs could probably pursue their claim in the appropriate
intestate or testate proceedings.
The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas' illegitimate son;
that inasmuch as Anacleto was born to Francisca during the subsistence of Nicolas'
marriage to Florencia, Anacleto could only be the spurious child of Nicolas; that there
was no law for the acknowledgment of a spurious child; that even if Anacleto would be
given the benefit of the doubt and be considered a natural child. Article 278 of the Civil
Code states that "[r]ecognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing;" that the appearance of the father's
name in the certificate of birth alone, without his actual intervention, was insufficient to
prove paternity; that the mere certificate by the civil registrar that the father himself
registered the child, without the father's signature, was not proof of the father's
voluntary acknowledgment; that the baptismal certificate was insufficient proof of
paternity; and that if there was ground for Anacleto's recognition, the period to claim
recognition already prescribed.
The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina bequeathed the subject
properties to him by last will and testament. They assail the validity and due execution
of the will, which was not submitted for probate; that the joint affidavit allegedly
executed in favor of Anacleto by Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, with
Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima Arado, whereby they ceded their rights in the subject
properties in favor of Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity of the affidavit
was doubtful because it was purportedly inconsistent with Anacleto's stance that he
had inherited the properties in his own right.
In tum, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas recognized Anacleto
as his illegitimate child because Nicolas had himself caused the registration of
Anacleto's birth; that the petitioners' allegation of prescription lacked basis inasmuch
as Anacleto was not seeking compulsory recognition; and that Anacleto had already
been voluntarily recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son.
Issue: (A) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran- Yes
(B) Whether or not he is entitled to the properties in litigation-Yes
Ruling:
The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by preponderance of
evidence pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs.
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the provisions
of the Family Code should apply because the petitioners' complaint was filed, litigated
and decided by the RTC during the effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Family
Code, the classification of children is limited to either legitimate or illegitimate.
Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code, to wit:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article I72, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established m accordance with Articles 172
and 173 of the Family Code, which state:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
laws.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
 The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly
acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto
appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental
showed that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The
showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column "Remarks" in
Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the
column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the space
provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering
that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth
certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was
fully warranted.
Anacleto's baptismal certificate was of no consequence in determining his filiation. We
have already held in Cabatania v. Court of Appeals that "while a baptismal certificate
may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal certificates were "per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence, we attach no probative value to
the baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture depicting the young
Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas
(was also undeserved. At best, the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who
had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto. Cautioning against the admission in
evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed out in Solinap v. Locsin, Jr.
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a
picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in
claiming the estate of the deceased.
The school records of Anacleto which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of
Anacleto in his grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and
Elenette which indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did
not have the evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent
recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for, as we stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado,38
the recognition "must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by any
brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary
declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the
paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence
notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond
question in view of the showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged
Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS TOPIC (NOT IMPORTANT)
How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the respective rights of
the parties in relation to the specific properties subject of the complaint?
To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had
previously belonged to Raymundo, while the remaining two had been the paraphernal
properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was the governing
law on succession. Under Article 807 thereof, Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving
spouse and the legitimate son of Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired legal
title to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In accordance with Article 834 thereof,
Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire estate of Raymundo, while Joaquina was
entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to the one third portion available for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in effect.
Under Article 1000 thereof, the heirs entitled to inherit from Nicolas's estate were
Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his
acknowledged illegitimate son). Said heirs became co-owners of the properties
comprising the entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance with
Article 1078 of the Civil Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the
first eight of the subject properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto
became a co-owner of said properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.
Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro indiviso co-owner of, the
properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in 1981, her
hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her share in the
estate of Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate
descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse, Article 1003 of the Civil Code
mandated that her collateral relatives should inherit her entire estate.
Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law from inheriting
from the estate of Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by
right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina. Under Article 992 of
the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or
relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, the right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly,
Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will
and testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento). Article 838 of the Civil Code
dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v.
Arcangel48 that in order that a will may take effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory."
It appears that such will remained ineffective considering that the records are silent as
to whether it had ever been presented for probate, and had been allowed by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged this fact in their complaint, and the
respondents did not controvert the allegation. In the absence of proof showing that the
supposed will of Joaquina had been duly approved by the competent court, we hold
that it had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain the CA's ruling to the effect
that Joaquina had bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will, and that the properties
had been transmitted to him upon her death.

As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the ones
entitled to inherit from her estate.

Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not establish that
the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been respectively settled with
finality through the appropriate testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due
course. Unless there was a proper and valid partition of the assets of the respective
estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether extrajudicially or judicially, their
heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions of their estates,
because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:

x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership

over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot
dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes
the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion
which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains
undivided.

Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina
had been previously partitioned, the Court concludes and holds that none of the parties
herein can lay claim over any of the disputed specific properties. The petitioners cannot
contend, therefore, that they were the rightful owners of the properties of the late
Joaquina to the exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the dismissal of the petitioners'
complaint for recovery of such properties.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 28, 2003 by
the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
ROMEO F. ARA and WILLIAM A. GARCIA, petitioners, vs. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO
and HENRY ROSSI, respondents.
G.R. No. 187273. February 15, 2017.*
LEONEN, J.:
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and
supported by the evidence required under the Family Code.
FACTS: Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and
Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara , who
died on November 18, 2002.
Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro was born to Josefa and her then husband,
Vicente Salgado, who died during World War II. At some point toward the end of the
war, Josefa met and lived with an American soldier by the name of Darwin Gray. Romeo
F. Ara was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia, and
from this relationship, gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia and William A. Garcia.
Josefa and Alfredo married on January 24, 1952. After Alfredo passed away, Josefa
met an Italian missionary named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi.
Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa.
Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro
Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950; and petitioner
Ara is recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his
Certificate of Live Birth.
Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi verbally sought partition
of the properties left by the deceased Josefa, which were in the possession of
respondent Pizarro. The properties are enumerated as follows:
1. Lot and other improvements located at Poblacion, Valencia City, Bukidnon with an
area of 1,268sq. ms. in the name of Josefa Salgado covered by Katibayan ng Original
na Titulo No. T-30333;
2. Tamaraw FX; and
3. RCBC Bank Passbook in the amount of P108,000.00 bank deposit.
Respondent Pizarro refused to partition these properties. Thus, plaintiffs a quo referred
the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation and amicable settlement.
The parties were unable to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, the Office of the
Barangay Captain issued a Certification to File
Action dated April 3, 2003.
Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint dated April 9, 2003 for judicial partition of properties
left by the deceased Josefa, before the
RTC- Malaybalay City. In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her
knowledge, she was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa. She denied that any
of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings, for lack of knowledge or information to form a
belief on that matter. Further, the late Josefa left other properties mostly in the
possession of plaintiffs a quo, which were omitted in the properties to be partitioned by
the trial court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim.
Fely filed her Pretrial Brief containing a proposed stipulation that the Additional
Properties also form part of the estate of Josefa. Amenable to this proposal, plaintiffs a
quo moved that the Additional Properties be included in the partition, in a Motion to
Include in the Partition the Proposed Stipulation.
At the pretrial, Ara, Garcia, and Ramon claimed a property of respondent Rossi as part
of the estate of Josefa. This property was not alleged nor claimed in the original
complaint. This compelled respondent Rossi to engage the services of separate
counsel, as the claim of his property constituted a conflict of interest among the plaintiffs
a quo.
In a Pretrial Order issued by the Trial Court on October 1, 2003, the following facts
were admitted:
4. All the abovementioned fathers of the children in this case, Mr. Vicente Salgado, Mr.
Darwin Grey [sic] and Henry Rosi (sic), are all deceased. Josefa Ara Salgado is also
deceased having died on November 18, 2002.
5. The properties mentioned in Paragraph 9 of the counterclaim mentioned in the
Answer filed by the defendant thru counsel are also admitted by both counsels to be
part of the properties subject of this partition case.
6. The Katibayan Ng Orihinal na Titulo attached xxx are all admitted as the subject
properties.
7. Some properties involved maybe covered by the land reform program of the
government and the parties have agreed that only the remainder thereof or the
proceeds of compensation shall be partitioned among them. All these properties shall
be properly determined during the inventory to be finally submitted to the Court for
approval.
8. All the foregoing properties were acquired after the death of Vicente Salgado and
presumably all the exclusive properties of Josefa Ara Salgado.
TC Decision:
1. Awarding the Baguio property to Henry Rossi, to be deducted from his share;
2. Awarding the Valencia property covered by OCT No. T-30333; Tamaraw FX and the
RCBC Bank Deposit Passbook to defendant Fely S. Pizarro, to be deducted from her
share; and
3. With respect to the other properties that may not be covered by the foregoing, the
same are declared under the co-ownership of all the plaintiffs and defendant and in
equal shares.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision and held that only respondents Pizarro
and Rossi, as well as plaintiff a quo Ramon, were the children of the late Josefa, entitled
to shares in Josefa’s estate.
In omitting petitioners from the enumeration of Josefa’s descendants, the CA reversed
the finding of the Trial Court. The CA held that the TC erred in allowing petitioners to
prove their status as illegitimate sons of Josefa after her death:
In holding that appellants William A. Garcia and Romeo F. Ara are the
illegitimate sons of Josefa Ara, the court a quo ratiocinated:
Without anymore discussing the validity of their respective birth and
baptismal certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold that all the
plaintiffs are indeed the children of the said deceased Josefa Ara for
having possessed and enjoyed the status of recognized illegitimate
 children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of the Family
Code which provides:
“Illegitimate children may establish their filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.”
in relation to the second paragraph No. (1) of Article 172 of the same
code (sic), which provides:
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, legitimate
filiation shall be proven by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.”
All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and supported by
their mother Josefa Ara, including their education, since their
respective birth and were all united and lived as one family even up
to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara. Their mother
had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her life
directly, continuously, spontaneously and without concealment.
Petitioners argue that the CA erroneously applied Article 285 of the Civil Code, which
requires that an action for the recognition of natural children be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, subject to certain exceptions. Petitioners assert that
during Josefa’s lifetime, Josefa acknowledged all of them as her children directly,
continuously, spontaneously, and without concealment.
Petitioners claim that the CA did not apply the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code, which states that filiation may be established even without the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or an admission of filiation in a public or handwritten
document.
Further, petitioners aver that the CA erred in its asymmetric application of the rule on
establishing filiation. Thus, the CA erred in finding that respondent Pizarro was a
daughter of Josefa Ara and Vicente Salgado, asserting there was no basis for the same.
Petitioners claim that, in her Formal Offer of Exhibits, respondent Pizarro offered as
evidence only a Certificate of Marriage of Salgado and Josefa to support her filiation to
Josefa.
On respondent Rossi, petitioners claim that there is no direct evidence to prove his
filiation to Josefa, except for his Baptismal
Certificate, which was testified to only by respondent Rossi.
ISSUE: WON petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa through their open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children, found in the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
RULING: NO.
RATIONALE: On establishing the filiation of illegitimate children, the Family Code
provides:
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code provide:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a,
266a, 267a)
Article 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
Thus, a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a putative
parent must do so via a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation.
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their illegitimate filiation
to their putative parent, Josefa, after her death as provided under Articles 172
and 175 of the Family Code.
To recall, petitioners submitted the following to establish their filiation:
(1) Garcia’s Baptismal Certificate listing Josefa as his mother, showing that the baptism
was conducted on June 1, 1958, and
that Garcia was born on June 23, 1951;
(2) Garcia’s Certificate of Marriage, listing Josefa as his mother;
(3) A picture of Garcia’s wedding, with Josefa and other relatives;
(4) Certificate of Marriage showing that Alfredo and Josefa were married on January
24, 1952;
(5) Garcia’s Certificate of Live Birth from Paniqui, Tarlac, issued on October 23, 2003,
under Registry No. 2003-1447, which is a late registration of his birth, showing he was
born on June 23, 1951 to Alfredo and Josefa;
(6) A group picture of all the parties in the instant case;
(7) In the Comment of Rossi to the Formal Offer of Exhibits of Pizarro, Rossi stated:
1. That William Garcia and Romeo Flores Ara are half brothers of Dr. Henry
Rossi their mother being Josefa Ara, who did not register them as her children
for fear of losing her pension from the U.S. Veterans Office.
(8) Ara testified that he was a son of the late Josefa and Gray, and that his record of
birth was registered at camp Murphy, Quezon City; and
(9) Nelly Alipio, first degree cousin of Josefa, testified that Ara was a son of Josefa and
Gray.

None of the foregoing constitutes evidence under the first paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code.
Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that petitioner Garcia’s Certificate
of Live Birth obtained in 2003 through a late registration of his birth is a record of birth
appearing in the civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code.
True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. To overthrow the
presumption of truth contained in a birth certificate, a high degree of proof is needed.
However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent us from
according it the same weight as any other birth certificate.
There is a reason why birth certificates are accorded such high evidentiary value. Act
No. 3753, or An Act to Establish a Civil
Register, provides:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of Births.—The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar
not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such other data may be required
in the regulation to be issued.
In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the local
civil registrar the place, date and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly
by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it
shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who
refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such
father could be identified.
Any foetus having human features which dies after twenty-four hours of existence
completely disengaged from the maternal womb shall be entered in the proper registers
as having been born and having died.
Further, Rule 21 of NSO Administrative Order No. 1-93, or the IRR of Act No. 3753,
provides that a person’s birth be registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar General
by one of the following individuals:
Rule 21. Persons Responsible to Report the Event.—
(1) When the birth occurred in a hospital or clinic or in a similar institution, the
administrator thereof shall be responsible in causing the registration of such birth.
However, it shall be the attendant at birth who shall certify the facts of birth.
(2) When the birth did not occur in a hospital or clinic or in a similar institution, the
physician, nurse, midwife, “hilot,” or anybody who attended to the delivery of the child
shall be responsible both in certifying the facts of birth and causing the registration of
such birth.
(3) In default of the hospital/clinic administrator or attendant at birth, either or both
parents of the child shall cause the registration of the birth.
(4) When the birth occurs aboard a vehicle, vessel or airplane while in transit,
registration of said birth shall be a joint responsibility of the driver, captain or pilot and
the parents, as the case may be.
Further, the birth must be registered within 30 days from the time of birth. Thus,
generally, the rules require that facts of the report be certified by an attendant at birth,
within 30 days from birth. The attendant is not only an eyewitness to the event, but also
presumably would have no reason to lie on the matter. The immediacy of the reporting,
combined with the participation of disinterested attendants at birth, or of both parents,
tend to ensure that the report is a factual reporting of birth. In other words, the
circumstances in which registration is made obviate the possibility that registration is
caused by ulterior motives. The law provides in the case of illegitimate children that the
birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
by the mother if the father refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely named
as parents.
NSO Administrative Order No. 1-93 also contemplates that reports of birth may be
made beyond the 30-day period:
Rule 25. Delayed Registration of Birth.—(1) The requirements are:
a) if the person is less than eighteen (18) years old, the following shall be
required:
i) four (4) copies of the Certificate of Live Birth duly accomplished and signed
by the proper parties;
ii) accomplished Affidavit for Delayed Registration at the back of the Certificate
of Live Birth by the father, mother or guardian, declaring therein, among other
things, the following:
> name of child;
> date and place of birth;
> name of the father if the child is illegitimate and has been acknowledged by
him;
> if legitimate, the date and place of marriage of parents; and
> reason for not registering the birth within thirty (30) days after the date of
birth.
In case the party seeking late registration of the birth of an illegitimate child is
not the mother, the party shall, in addition to the foregoing facts, declare in a
sworn statement the present whereabouts of the mother.
iii) any two of the following documentary evidences which may show the name
of the child, date and place of birth, and name
of mother (and name of father, if the child has been acknowledged);
> baptismal certificate;
> school records (nursery, kindergarten, or preparatory);
> income tax return of parent/s;
> insurance policy;
> medical records; and
> others, such as barangay captain’s certification.
iv) affidavit of two disinterested persons who might have witnessed or known
the birth of the child. (46:1aa)
 b) If the person is eighteen (18) years old or above, he shall apply for late
registration of his birth and the requirements shall be:
i) all the requirements for a child who is less than eighteen (18) years old; and
ii) Certificate of Marriage, if married. (46:1ba)
(2) Delayed registration of birth, like ordinary registration made at the time of
birth, shall be filed at the Office of the Civil Registrar of the place where the
birth occurred. (46:3)
(3) Upon receipt of the application for delayed registration of birth, the civil
registrar shall examine the Certificate of Live Birth presented whether it has
been completely and correctly filled up and all requirements complied with.
(47a)
(4) In the delayed registration of the birth of an alien, travel documents
showing the origin and nationality of the parents shall be presented in addition
to the requirements mentioned in Rule 25(1). (49:2a)
Thus, petitioners submitted in evidence a delayed registration of birth of Garcia,
pursuant to this rule. Petitioners point out that a hearing on the delayed registration was
held at the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. No one appeared
to oppose the delayed registration, despite a notice of hearing posted at the Office of
the Civil Registrar.
It is analogous to cases where a putative father’s name is written on a certificate of live
birth of an illegitimate child, without any showing that the putative father participated in
preparing the certificate.
Roces vs Civil Registrar: Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make
or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and
the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the
latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.
Berciles vs GSIS: Under our jurisprudence, if the alleged father did not intervene in the
birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and
void. Such registration would not be evidence of paternity. The mere certificate by the
registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment
on his part. A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in a public instrument. A
birth certificate, to evidence acknowledgment, must, under Section 5 of Act 3753, bear
the signature under oath of the acknowledging parent or parents.
A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the putative parent, is
tenuous proof of filiation.
Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia’s delayed registration of birth the same
evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, filiation
may still be established after the death of a putative parent through an admission of
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent
concerned. However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of filiation.
An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which
may be used in evidence against him.
The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa and
petitioners’ relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother.
They do not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to
Josefa, much less ones pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although
petitioner Garcia’s Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate
of Live Birth obtained via late registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they
do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of Josefa. Josefa did
not participate in making any of them. The same may be said of the testimonies
presented. Although Josefa may have been in the photographs, the photographs
do not show any filiation. By definition, none of the evidence presented
constitutes an admission of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.
Josefa passed away in 2002. After her death, petitioners could no longer be
allowed to introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to
Josefa. The only evidence allowed under the law would be a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private signed, handwritten instruction by
Josefa.
An alleged parent is the best person to affirm or deny a putative descendant’s
filiation. Absent a record of birth appearing in a civil register or a final judgment,
an express admission of filiation in a public document, or a handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, a deceased person will have no
opportunity to contest a claim of filiation.
In truth, it is the mother and in some cases, the father, who witnesses the actual
birth of their children. Descendants normally
only come to know of their parents through nurture and family lore. When they
are born, they do not have the consciousness required to be able to claim
personal knowledge of their parents. It thus makes sense for the parents to be
present when evidence under the second paragraph of Article 172 is presented.
The limitation that an action to prove filiation as an illegitimate child be brought within
the lifetime of an alleged parent acknowledges that there may be other persons whose
rights should be protected from spurious claims. This includes other children, legitimate
and illegitimate, whose statuses are supported by strong evidence of a categorical
nature.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The August 1, 2008
Decision and the March 16, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 00729 are AFFIRMED.
NARCISO SALAS, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, respondent.
G.R. No. 180284. September 11, 2013.*
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas in the RTC-Cabanatuan City.
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who
was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed
her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower.
Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses
in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take
the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the
mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide
due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Petitioner filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He
described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out
of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country,
respondent spent time riding on petitioner’s jeepney which was then being utilized by
a female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a
senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said police
officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges against
respondent’s brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that
time respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she
was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo;
he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to
shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery
and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared
to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted
for decision based on respondent’s evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his “kumadre”
Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no more
companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned that petitioner
owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision (petitioner offered
her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already
knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy.
He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and marry her.
She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child
will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her
money for her child. When she became pregnant with petitioner’s child, it was only then
she learned that he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner
opposed it because he wanted to have another child.
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed
with a housemaid; he also provided for
all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good
Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at
the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife.
She filled out the form for the child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information
supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove
her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is
his “look-alike,” and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo,
the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the
baby’s birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her
daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about his having sired an
illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent
money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing
her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of relatives
and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought
to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan
City Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only
petitioner’s wife who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory words
against respondent.
Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of
apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his
presence during and after delivery of respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted
suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill,
her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife at the
headquarters.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent (P2,000 monthly support). CA dismissed petitioner’s
appeal.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent
satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and
consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondent’s prayer
for support. The appellate court thus held:
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth
in the civil registry which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He
cannot claim open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child.
It had been established by plaintiff’s evidence, however, that during her
pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a
rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for. Narciso provided her with a household
help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month. He also provided her a monthly food
allowance of P1,500.00. Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the
latter was in labor, “walking” her around and massaging her belly. Narciso
brought home Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelle’s
discharge from the hospital. People living in the same apartment units were
witnesses to Narciso’s delight to father a son at his age which was his “look
alike”. It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him
Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace
Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted
 on record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or documentary, to
repudiate plaintiff’s evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA
150), the Supreme Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is
an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision provides
that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child x x “3) when
the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father”.
ISSUE: WON it was proven by evidence that petitioner is the father of respondent’s
child in the case at bar
RULING: NO.
RATIONALE: Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit “A- 1”) of Christian Paulo
Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by
him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said
document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote
therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father
did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating
petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their
rented apartment unit. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the
alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.
Exhibits “E” and “F” showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit
thus have scant evidentiary value. The
Statement of Account (Exhibit “C”) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent herself was indicated as the
payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses
in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent
showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not
sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by
petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of
said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article
172 (2) vis-à -vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence
of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed
by the parent concerned.
Petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals is misplaced. In the said
case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the
father of private respondent’s daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein
considered the totality of evidence which established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner was indeed the father of private respondent’s daughter. On the other hand,
in Ilano v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the appellate court’s finding that private
respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner was
overwhelming, particularly the latter’s public acknowledgment of his amorous
relationship with private respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own child
through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient
proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous
possession of status of an illegitimate
child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish
his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s
evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of
Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with details,
do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial”
presented in Ilano.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not
competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create
an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.

Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner’s counsel informing this
Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive,
it is not barred under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code. We have also held that the
death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by
one claiming to be his illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of parties provided in
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64379 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE
S. SALGADO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
No. L-49162. July 28, 1987.*
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: Appeal by certiorari from the decision** of the CA which dismissed petitioner's
action for recognition and support against private respondent, and from the respondent
Court's resolution denying petitioner's MR of said decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her
mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V.
Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which
was in due course conducted by the NBI upon order of the trial court. The result of the
blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been
the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff's
(herein petitioner's) second motion
for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the
child of Jao, thus entitling her to his
monthly support.
Jao appealed to the CA, questioning the trial court's failure to appreciate the result of
the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests
should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The CA upheld Jao's contentions and reversed the trial court's decision. In its decision,
the CA held:
"From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that JAO
was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by
Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long
thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived
together as husband and wife. x x x
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied ARLENE
to the Marian General Hospital for medical checkup and her confinement was
with JAO's consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the salaries of the
maids, and other household expenses. x x x
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16, 1968, after
completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must have conceived
JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967. Thus, one issue to be resolved
in this appeal is whether on or about that time, J AO and ARLENE had sexual
intercourse and were already living with one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the third or
fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after
several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Longbeach,
Merville, Parañaque, Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started to
live with her at her dwelling after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise
to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin,
Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967 because the
day following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie
Litonjua went to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He
remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968,
because that was a week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started
cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the paternity of
JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests
conducted by the NBI and which resulted in the negative finding that in a union with
ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of
JANICE.
ISSUE: WON the evidence is sufficient to prove paternity and filiation between Jao and
Janice in the case at bar
RULING: NO.
RATIONALE: We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in
a position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood
grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court x x x where the blood grouping tests
of the NBI were admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico
who conducted the test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico
approved the findings and report. x x x In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188,
the Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping
test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood
grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950's.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
"Paternity—Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the
mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the
man is not the father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man
is the father of a particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he
is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the
limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive
presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed
manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in
which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn
on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
"The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity
as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child. But the Uniform
Act recognizes that the tests may have some probative value to establish paternity
where the blood type and the combination in the child is shown to be rare, in which
case the judge is given discretion to let it in" (I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-
194).

"In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion is now in accord in
accepting the f act that there is a causative relation between the trait of the progenitor
and the trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood composition of a child may
be some evidence as to the child's paternity. But thus far this trait (in the present
state of scientific discovery as generally accepted) can be used only negatively
i.e. to evidence that a particular man F is not the father of a particular child C."
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood test, JANICE
claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in cases where they tended
to establish paternity; and that there has been no case where the blood test was
invoked to establish non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have probative
value only when the result is a possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This
contention is fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would
be recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test itself
for if the result were negative, the test is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. x
x x As an admitted test, it is admissible in subsequent similar proceedings whether the
result be in the negative or in the affirmative. x x x"
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner's contention
that JAO's actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to recognition.
Said the respondent appellate court:
"On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his
own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the latter's
certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather than
recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE, the
attention given to her during her pregnancy and the financial assistance
extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test.
These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn
JANICE as his own as the possession of such status cannot be founded
on conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier
said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter's birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of
Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which
provides: "When the child is in continuous possession of status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter."
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said
article which states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father."
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived from
November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first sexual
intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week
after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE
must have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one
another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started only after
December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during
this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be had
under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of conception,
ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin
Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE
is not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of
plaintiff's cause by ARLENE 's manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and
candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have been
overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by her acts, whether she was
lying or not.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to affirm paternity
was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, an action for declaration of filiation,
support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert's report of the blood tests stated
that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of
the child." From this statement, the defendant contended that the child must have been
the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot
give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his
opinion that he is a 'possible father.' This possibility, coupled with the other facts and
circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant
Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more
definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in
cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There
is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive
as to nonpaternity, although inconclusive as to paternity—that is, the fact that the blood
type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not
conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the
child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove
non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin the
positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that
proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final
on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo evidence of non-paternity consisting of
the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father
had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation. The Court said that the
competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject
such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated,
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result was to deny progress.
This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph, a filiation proceeding where an
uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence,
excluding paternity, was held conclusive. Legislation expressly recognizing the use of
blood tests is also in force in several states. Tolentino, affirms this rule on blood tests
as proof of non-paternity, thus—
"Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two
persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are
of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus,
when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they
cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood
test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity."

Moreover,
"The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception of
the child. This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of
the period of conception of the child.

Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the supposed father belong
to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition."

Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant
case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and
the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without
merit. The NBI's forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has
had extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood tests were conducted
six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN
Test and the ABO System, under witness and supervision.

Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper
subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood
test, she, represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove
or disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the
result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and
conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No
evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result
of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.

In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted,
which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the
issue of recognition raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, ,the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS
(sic) S. ILANO, represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 104376. February 23, 1994.*
NOCON, J.:
FACTS: Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. llano while she was working as
secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner as one of the clients of Atty. Virata. On
several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less than a year’s time,
she
resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco
distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they
renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods.
Later, he courted her for more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and
with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They
stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch
office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to her three
or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office. He also
took care of the marketing and paid rentals, light and water bills. Unable to speak the
local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena.
Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and
they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay
City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium.
The death certificate was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at
Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merciditas S. llano was born on December 30,
1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merciditas de los Santos
llano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia
submitted receipt issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there
from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name Mrs. Leoncia llano.
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merciditas was sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or thru
Merciditas herself; and sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532, the signature appearing thereon having been identified
by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks which he issues at
home and saw him sign the checks. Both petitioner and his daughter admitted that the
check and signature are those of the former.
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed
concern as the father of Merciditas. When Merciditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as
her parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merciditas because
he signed them at their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merciditas
started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her
Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies,
toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and
even cuddle her to sleep.
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia
his picture with the following dedication: “To Nene, with best regards, Temiong.”
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and
petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she
started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after
five o’clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia
was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information.
Inasmuch as it was already past seven o’clock in the evening, the nurse promised to
return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give
the birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following
morning.
Prior to the birth of Merciditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with
petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. At times, she used
to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money
as support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot come which
she in turn gave to her aunt. They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then at Sta. Cruz, Manila
in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them
up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.
Petitioner’s defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia
and Merciditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite column
of the death certificate of a female child surnamed llano, although in column thereof
opposite father’s name the typewritten name, Artemio G.llano, appears. He also denied
the following: all the notes alleged to have been received from him by Elynia for delivery
to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merciditas’ Report Card; and being the source
of a photo of himself with a handwritten dedication. He admitted that Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 including the signature is his. He was sick on December
30, 1963 and was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. He does not understand why this
case was filed against him.
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased
it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia
lived together and shared the same bed. They later transferred to San Juan St., Pasay
City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped visiting her in March or April, 1963 because
he planned to get married with another which he eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by
Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Nilda llano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she been
brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite, On December 30, 1963, her father was at
their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was advised to have a
complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She denied that
her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December 30, 1963; that he fetched a
certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because he was at their
home at that time, and that her father lived with a certain woman in 1963 up to June,
1971 because all this time he was living with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and
reporting to the office everyday and when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business,
her mother or brother goes with him.
Victoria J. llano, petitioner’s wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about
petitioner’s sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It
could not be true that her husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3) times
a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her husband never slept out of
their house and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of the
Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a year because
they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
TC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed TC. MR was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial
court, therefore, there was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to
Merciditas. It would have been only from the date of the judgment of the trial court that
support should have commenced, if so granted. Under the law in force when the
complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot
maintain an action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may
constitute a voluntary recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such
as signing under the caption “parent” in the report card, is not sufficient. Merciditas has
never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family;
nor brought around town by him, treated as his child, introduced to other people as his
child, led people to believe that she was part of his family.
ISSUE: WON the evidence adduced is sufficient to establish paternity and filiation in
the case at bar
RULING: YES.
RATIONALE: Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified
into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of
lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article
269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were
those born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each
other on account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting
marriage to another at the time Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In
this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than
natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction
are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code.
The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were born
with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages
facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. However, before Article 287 can be
availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or by court
action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like
a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights
spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgement
by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because
he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had
been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. The relevant law on the matter
is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child
as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father.”
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to recognize
the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged
to recognize Merciditas as his spurious child. This provision should be read in
conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:
“ART. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate)
children x x x is permitted under the circumstances specified in articles 283
and 284.”
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise our
finding, that private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and the
paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the
highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently
weak denials of petitioner:
“Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff’s mother and defendant
carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant
is the father of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her mother and
defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took
into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the
apartment where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified
that he took care of all the bills and that he shared the same bed with plaintiff’s
mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was
rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee
and godson of the defendant with a monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere
subaltern of the latter, and only frequented the place upon instruction of the
defendant to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an apartment at
the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by and of which Artemio
was the General Manager and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the
absence of Artemio whose residence and main office was in Cavite. There,
for the first time, Leoncia met Melencio. The apartment in Guagua was rented
in the name of Melencio. As Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect,
Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon Melencio for whatever
Leoncia needs. Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and
services needed in the apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to
Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for liquidations of cash
advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or Leoncia herself, gives
to Melencio (Exh. A, A-1 to 14).
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three or four times a
week and sleeps there. Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00
a month. Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute
between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio transferred
Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City where they were known as husband
and wife. In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was fetched
by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. Even as Artemio and Leoncia
lived and transferred to several places heretofore mentioned, Melencio
continued to be a trusted man Friday of Artemio who would deliver notes (Exh.
“F”, “F-1” and “F-3”) and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference,
among the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from defendant were
the following:
‘Exh. “F-1”
‘Dear Ne,
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa
paa at ngayon ay masakit pa.
‘Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si
Miling na lamang and utusan mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.
Sgn.’
‘Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati.
Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.
‘Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako.
‘Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.
Sgn.’
Exh. “F-2”
‘Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.
Sgn.’
Exh. “F-3”
‘Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako diyan
(11:30 am) Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na, Sigurado yon.
Sgn.’
Exh. “F-4”
‘Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng mataas ang
dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa oficena.’
‘Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong
makarating dian sa Jueves.
Sgn.’
“The address ‘Ne’ in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose
nickname is ‘Nene’ but which Artemio shortens to ‘Ne’. Miling is the nickname
of Melencio. The ‘Gracing” mentioned in Exh. ‘F-1’ refer to Gracia delos
Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with Artemio when Leoncia was
removed from the hospital during the birth of Merciditas.’. These tiny bits of
evidence when pieced together ineluctably gives lie to defendant’s
diversionary pretense that it was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the
mother lived with during her period of conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia
being in the apartment and sharing together the same bedroom and the same
bed hardly inspires belief.
x x x x x x x x x.
Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship
between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a man Friday although
appellant (sic) would not trust him to the hilt and unwittingly required him to
submit to Leoncia an accounting of his expenditures for cash advances given
to him by Leoncia, Artemio or Guagua Telephone System which would not
have been the case, if it were true that there was an intimate relationship
between him and plaintiff’s mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio
foisted on the court a quo the impression that he was the lover and paramour
of Leoncia but since there was really no such relationship, he could not state
the place in San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long
they stayed there belying his pretence (sic) of an intimate relationship with
plaintiff’s mother.”
Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then
applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidence as sufficient to establish that
plaintiff was in continuous possession of status of a child in view of the denial by
appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the support
was really given to plaintiff’s mother. The belated denial of paternity after the action
has been filed against the putative father is not the denial that would destroy the
paternity of the child which had already been recognized by defendant by various
positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff’s father. A recognition once
validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would
be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence
of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be
revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself.
To be sure, to establish ‘the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child,’ it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
‘Continuous’ does not, however, mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues (De
Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the
father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others,
spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the
relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas at the Manila
Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination
accompanied by Artemio. After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in
a car owned and driven by Artemio himself. Merceditas bore the surname of ‘Ilano’
since birth without any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas
had her discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her ‘Daddy’; the fact
that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas , take her for a ride
or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas and does all what a
father should do for his child—bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he
can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas are positive
evidence that Merceditas is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such.
Special attention is called to Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for
a ‘frog test’ to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio,
thru Elynia, or thru Merceditas herself and sometimes in the form of a check as the
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 and the signature appearing therein
which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her
checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check.
Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of Artemio.
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has
shown concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade 1 at the St.
Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas for the fourth
and fifth grading period(s) as the parent of Merceditas. Those signatures of Artemio
where both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because Artemio signed at their
residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas and of Elynia.
x x x. x x x x x x x x x.
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong”.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of
the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry
in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s daughter. This particular entry
was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiff’s mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long
beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who
claims to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the
latter’s signatures and handwriting.”
Granting ex gratia argumenti that private respondent’s evidence is not sufficient proof
of continuous possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next
paragraph (4) of Article 283:
“x x x plaintiff’s testimonial and documentary evidence x x x (is) too
replete with details that are coherent, logical and natural which cannot
be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive and malicious mind
of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to possess.
x x x the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the
father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all
the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. “Any other evidence or proof that the
defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the first
three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph
permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious
child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent
court took into account the following:
“The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be
paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family
Code of the Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on
December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years old at the time and was already of school
age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while
defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She attained the age of majority on
December 30, 1984 (Article 234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in arrears
for a period of twelve (12) years four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is hereby
fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years; and considering the declining
value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of
P1,000.00 a month for the next three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding
three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and
fourteen (14) days until she attained the age of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under
Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under
the given facts and circumstances that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered.”
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was arrived at
arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years after
the decision of the trial court was rendered
does not deserve any consideration because it appears that it is being raised for the
first time in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE
DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent. [G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992]
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS
The PRIVATE RESPONDENT EMILIE, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian
of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim
for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:
4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was
born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had been sired, showered with
exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being
his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of
the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are
hereunder reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for
me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake and for the
child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let
me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all what I am and
what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .
. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole
world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless
entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are
his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo,
Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant
complaint is filed;
9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity
of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is
urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support
from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
EMILIE prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to
render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad
in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
PETITIONER MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION
TRIAL COURT: Denied MTD
CA: Affirmed lower court’s denial of the motion
Hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
PETITIONER contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private
respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint
states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor child,
either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be
established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in
the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of
such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then
there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the
complaint should be dismissed.
ISSUE: What are the correct interpretation and application of the following:
1. Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an
illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will;
2. Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and
3. Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the
action for recognition of a natural child
In short: What law shall apply, Article 175, par 2 of FC or Article 285 of NCC?
RULING: ARTICLE 285 of NCC
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, where we held that
1. an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter;
2. it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being
no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father.
3. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action
for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint,
but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that
the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance,
from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel
recognition.
Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to
claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
There is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases. . .
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well 2. if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the
settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court
been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division and special laws: Action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in parent.
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
. . . In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition
with the Civil Code or other laws."
suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to It becomes essential to determine whether the right of the minor child to
such proceedings. file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.
II. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right
of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
PETITIONER argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The
recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that
fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner the right to file it and
since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument
to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force
signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family
at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be
enactment of a new law.
brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar,
considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question
has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may
affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them
• Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate
case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be
proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed
given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter
by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially
provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created,
where vested rights may be prejudiced.
hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant
PRIVATE RESPONDENT insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and,
case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with
be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.
the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides: provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause
of action has not yet prescribed.
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority;

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law:
1. if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an
admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument: Action may be brought during the lifetime of
the child.
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents. [G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994]
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed for support
against the private respondent before RTC-QC. The complaint was dismissed on
December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano, who found that "(t)here is nothing in
the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent)
to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that
there was no sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation.
PETITIONERS On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench, another action for
recognition and support against the private respondent before another branch of
the RTC-QC
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and
JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met CARLITO [who used to spend his week-ends
regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor] in 1983, at
the Meralco Compound tennis courts
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they
started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting which
resulted to the birth of the two petitioners. She further claimed that she did not know
that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were
married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that
the marriage license which they used was spurious.
PETITIONERS presented the following documentary evidence:
1. Their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father;
2. the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is
respondent Carlito;
3. photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and
4. pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria,3 Dr. Milagros
Villanueva,4 Ruby Chua Cu,5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez.
The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times,
introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the
other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of
petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, CARLITO denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He
averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro.
This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of
respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism.
The Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the
Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent
Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated he never saw
Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private
respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both
petitioners as their father after he was sued for support.
RTC: ruled in favor of petitioners. It concludes and so holds that the minor petitioners
re entitled to the relief's prayed for in the complaint.
CA: Set aside the RTC decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied
upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the (private respondent's) paternity
and filiation of (petitioners)."
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in setting aside the ruling of the RTC-QC?
RULING: No
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE
FILIATION:
1. we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence
of the private respondent in the baptism of Claro. These photographs are far
from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained
by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of
petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
2. the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering
affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. Said
evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much less would prove violation of
complaint's person and honor.
3. the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his
father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent
participated in its preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et
al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the
baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the record the
decedent had no intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a
voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical
records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115
and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical
record is simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by
reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence,
like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the
declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or
of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that
while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
4. the certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as
their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity.
Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the
respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the father or the child born outside
 wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made
by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which
he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority
to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child,
when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child.
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that “a birth certificate
not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent
evidence of paternity.”

AS TO THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is

a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should render
unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro's
baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father
Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out
can remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of Violeta
Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient
to prove the paternity of the petitioners.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent
court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO
REGODOS, respondents. [G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004] CORONA, J.:
FACTS
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by
Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
FLORENCIA testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that
after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros
Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It
was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought
her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after
their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San
Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her
home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a
house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt’s house in
Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.
On the other hand, CAMELO testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at
home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her
husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This
displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend
New Year’s Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for
San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that
she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the
night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt
something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant
with the child of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to
petitioner’s house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner’s wife
was in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioner’s wife noticed that her
stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told
petitioner’s wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she was
again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.
In sum, refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already
pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking
in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2,
1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
TRIAL COURT: gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband
was alive. Deciding in her favor, it held:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this
case, based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never
be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-
minor’s mother, Florencia Regodos.
CA: affirmed the RTC
ISSUE: W/N it was sufficiently proved that the petitioner is the father of the Florencia’s
son
RULING: NO
The trial court’s finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private
respondent was based on the testimony of the child’s mother and "the personal
appearance of the child."
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation.6 An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.7
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
I. AS TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Private respondent presented: copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority
to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child’s paternity.
Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates
are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.1
Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of
voluntary recognition.

II. AS TO THE TESTIMONY OF FLORENCIA

Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of
Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed
the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree.
The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice
as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and set
aside. Private respondent’s petition for recognition and support is dismissed. SO
ORDERED.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992] CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit
from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right,
asserting it for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
FACTS
ELENO and RAFAELA Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.
ELENO died on November 10, 1952, and RAFAELA on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who
had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on
March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson (later referred to as Isabel's children), who claim to be
their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
- The action was resisted by Isabel's children, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Isabel's children filed their own complaint for the accounting and
partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children.
• The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit,
that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit
Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
TRIAL COURT: Both cases were decided in favor Isabel's children on the basis of
practically the same evidence.
CA: MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from
the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all
other respects.
Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Should the finding of Doribel’s legitimacy be upheld? yes
RULING:
PETITIONERS: Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had
already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on
March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot
adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction."
• Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita
Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her
natural mother.
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to
annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel
already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this
argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts
as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained.
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code.
It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such
evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is
of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts.
Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi
v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of
the present proceedings for that purpose.
Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code does not have this purely evidential
character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that:
1. Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and
2. Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children,
are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages.
 An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring
properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and
as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which
the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living
or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children
who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter
by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased
father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,
quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom
the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do
not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children
and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only
Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents'
intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children
of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND
LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,respondents. [G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002] DE
LEON, JR., J.:
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filed before the RTC of Pasig an action for compulsory recognition as "the
illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein respondents,
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina
Liyao.
• The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was
in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William
Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime."3
FACTS
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of
Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely: Enrique and
Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and
Manila.
This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti
Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment,
Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She
failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land
located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East
Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital.
1. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with
her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy).
2. All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the
account of William Liyao.
3. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to
secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate.
4. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited
therein.
5. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son
and had their pictures taken together.6
6. During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyao’s legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio
7. Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually
accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other
important meetings
8. During the occasion of William Liyao’s last birthday on November 22, 1975
held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged
Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and
said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son.
9. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the
latter’s direct and overt acts.
10. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material
needs. However, after William Liyao’s death, it was Corazon who provided
sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills.
William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper
clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last
moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G.
Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. During William Liyao’s
birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was
carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal
marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."10 He then talked about
his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it "engrande"
and "make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring.” Unfortunately, this did not
happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975.
A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From
William.” Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mother’s birthday
where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one
another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage
has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband.
However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita
had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited
Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she had, in numerous occasions, seen Mr. Liyao from
1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon
City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that
Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house,
play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and
together with Atty. Brillantes’ wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among
themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the
salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria
knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never
had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and
Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from
the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Mr. Liyao was very
supportive and fond of Enrique’s half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures
showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enrique’s
testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that
the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents were not separated legally or in
fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal
separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village
and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for conferences
with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at home because of
his personal hygiene and habits.
Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the
company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda’s father, Corazon went to
Linda’s office for the return of the former’s alleged investments with the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added
that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out
documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and
taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the
office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not
recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown
three (3) large suit cases full of men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and
pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never
been separated. Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior
to his death.Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was
paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) representing her
investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her
family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William
Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the
position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed
by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by
Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by
Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed
at the latter’s office.
Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, said that he
usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00
o’clock in the morning. At past 7:00 o’clock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or
Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew
Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in
the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes
go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage
as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale,
represented himself as car dealer.
RTC: declared William Jr. as illegitimate son of the deceased William Liyao, thus
ordering the defendants to recognize and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as
a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all successional rights as
such.
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao,
Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited
with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased
by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of
petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly
and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and
even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
CA reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy
rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is
thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband
and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article
255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some
witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were
still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each
other’s company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased
William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are
not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that
the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates
and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals
stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard
to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William
Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyao’s signature and name
do not appear thereon.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a
number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.
Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation:
ISSUE - May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate
of his supposed father, William Liyao?
RULING: We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate.
The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and
the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of
the New Civil Code24 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
 Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the 2. If the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown: the child cannot elect the paternity
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.31
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia
the child.
with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the
This physical impossibility may be caused: legitimacy of the latter?
1) By the impotence of the husband; We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child.
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible; There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed
away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through
PETITIONER insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled
ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in:
late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with
1. direct action
Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation,"25 executed and signed by 2. brought for that purpose,
Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that
3. by the proper parties and
Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.26
4. within the period limited by law.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs
under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.27
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband,
or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as
guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear
mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs,
could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The
child himself cannot choose his own filiation.
RULE
1. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the
child: the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child
of his mother’s alleged paramour.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors,
represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as
proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS
PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents. G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.
Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on
the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01
July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being
one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead
be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the appellate court upheld the decision
of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the action instituted was made to compel the recognition of
petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon. It was contended,
in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the
question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an
independent suit or proceeding.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special
proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assailed such decision and maintained that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are considered illegitimate children of Juan
Dizon based on the notarized acknowledgment of the decedent?
RULING: No.
The presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate becomes conclusive in
the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable,
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor
in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be
an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private document. Signed by the
acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate
children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored
the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to
declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the
entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy
by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested
in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN "JHONNY"
LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP, the successors of the late LOURDES C.
LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate
estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR. petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN,
JR., respondent. G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
FACTS: Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan
"Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin,
Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of
Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be
appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among
others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that
during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include
undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion
of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose
Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and
(c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
The heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not
a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole
heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin
and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a
natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered
its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was
followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin
Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial
relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and,
therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate, respondent
submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") 3 of his Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar
of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C.
Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by
his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent
presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and
identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original
of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") 4 showing him and his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The
photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized
as family members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", 5 indicating
that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that
the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as
anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth
was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447
(Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand,
Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This
scenario dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as
witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert.
RTC: ruled in favor of the respondent Juan Locsin and appointed him as the
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.
CA: rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial court
ISSUE: Whether or not the filiation of the respondent was sufficiently proven by the
Exhibit D presented?
RULING: No.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records
of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly
forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars.
Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the
country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To
locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to
be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would
have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil
Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously
easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than
those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's
birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's
knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil
Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing
records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary
from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to
the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational
manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a
December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe
the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested
for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."The answer is a "maybe", a
mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form
dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2)
years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General
in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no
irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to
be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the
1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely
pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon
copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein
are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the
contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars,
such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The
space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page
of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling
for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer
except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." There is no
explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely
pasted with the volume.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar
General, thus a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil
Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept
by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General
is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a
spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same
Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and
the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28,
1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar16 that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
. . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of
wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by
him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he
could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to
make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed
only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child." (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs.
Court of Appeals where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged
father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code
and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However,
birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from
which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the
authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of
Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D"
entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in
the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan
C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the
estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C.
Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED
DISMISSED.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.
THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent. G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
FACTS: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a year
later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991,
Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10,
1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo
also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon
City. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She,
however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at
all.
The trial court annulled their marriage for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to
be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as
that portion of the decision which granted to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation rights’.
She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s
surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following
the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname.
RTC: Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma.
Theresa’s motion.
CA: The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the
mother’s surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a
separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to
effect the correction in the civil registry.
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the
appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she
could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
REVERSAL BY CA: It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not
the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. The child
Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the
illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between [Ma. Theresa] and
[Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she]
is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over
the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not
only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art.
146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the married
couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not the child – Jose Gerardo – is the illegitimate child of the
petitioner?
RULING: No.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy.
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167
of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing
in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in
a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born
to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband
or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly
during the period of conception.To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article
166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of
physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer to the petition for annulment
of marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there
was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding
on her.
Gerardo’s argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate
son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by
the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion
by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there
occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived
with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. Telling is the
fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy,
their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the
impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that
she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also
promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of
the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of
filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when
the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought
to be established.
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is
also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the
purpose of the law.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between
the very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox
was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should
end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that
an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of
incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which
has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code
on surnames. The matter of changing Jose Gerardo’s name and effecting the
corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should
be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to
each other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them,
Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January
10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could
not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary
cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted
by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. 47 Between the
certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the
quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA
DIAMANTE, respondents. G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and
registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served
as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an
urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked
Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,
under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find
them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and
told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days,
only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained
to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas
for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse
would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem
even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and
together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding
their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her
son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was
pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already
named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order
to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses,
namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified
that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic
in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. 2 The second
witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that
Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca
causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin
further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.3
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts
that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She said the birth of John Thomas
was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar
of Manila on August 4, 1989.
RTC: the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could
not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. 5 The trial
court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.
Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person who is the natural child of petitioners.
CA: reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence
adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the
minor.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person and is the son of petitioners?
RULING: Yes.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing
son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips,
she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the
Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed,
she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period
of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court.
No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was
sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas
Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria
Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas
Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed
by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the
alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must
be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. 16 Significantly, the
birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally
married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt
the other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were
both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage. 18 Needless to stress, the trial court's
conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the
physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical
records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child. The writ
of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
third person of his own free will.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test19 for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. 20 Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to
resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
Costs against the private respondent.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR
MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents. G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Respondents alleged that Arnel impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to
their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated
requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills
Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door
hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed
with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002,
Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one
other secret lover. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel
terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring
potential customers to the car aircon repair shop" where she worked. In May 2000,
Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in
June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel
refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last intimacy was sometime in
1998."8 Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnel’s wife and family. On January 19, 2001,
Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that
he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe
and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but
without bumping or hitting any part of her body." Finally, Arnel claimed that the
signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the
acknowledgment of Martin’s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously
reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth
year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules
of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants.
CA: affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition
2. Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support
without violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
1. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated
an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in
accordance with jurisprudence. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support
depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result
in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are.
To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
2. Petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of
proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These
contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief
historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
(maraming jurisprudence na cited in this case, kindly refer na lang sa full text, pinili ko
na lang yung mga ilalagay dito to make it shorter)
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee21 where the appellant was convicted of
murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that
"while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as
the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test
result(emphasis supplied)."
In 2001, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
 conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis
is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother,
the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in
Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo24 where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained
clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of
DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile."
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,27 we affirmed the conviction of
the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test
results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the
reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and
shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth
of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the
prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over
which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case
at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the
admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen
recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel
"Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood
sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-
incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution.
We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part
of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken
from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30 We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests
for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine from one’s mouth 32 and the
tracing of one’s foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v.
Cañizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action
for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice
being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather
invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and
its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres,36 where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification
system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, 37 and
the infringement of privacy of communication38 where the constitutional right to privacy
has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds
no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy
here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a
criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit
to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who
does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as
much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore
take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means
of determining paternity.

DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded
its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found
widespread general acceptance. Several cases decided by various State Supreme
Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and
evidence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in
some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme
Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already
acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The
Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family
Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to
order DNA tests.

In Greco v. Coleman, the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality
of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it
was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing
that such support agreements were necessary:

As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has
increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support
agreement…(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to
99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the
disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate
child's access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA paternity
testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in
1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'").
Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the
possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular
male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present
parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than
at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no more than credibility
contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining child support
depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's biological
father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only
sexually involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of
entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the
mother would be unable meet her burden of proof.

Epilogue

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF
ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN
WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG. [GR No. 159966. March 30, 2005]
FACTS: This is a petition filed by the minor Julian Lin Carulasan Wang as represented
by his mother Anna Lisa Wang for the change of name and/or correction/cancellation
of entry in the Civil Registry. Petitioner in this case sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang.
The herein petition was brought about by the Family Wang’s plan to stay in Singapore,
where the petitioner will study together with his sister, Wang Mei. It was averred that in
Singapore, the middle name or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a
person’s name. In view of the same, they anticipated that having Carulasan in his name
will cause discrimination against the petitioner for the ff. reasons:
1. This might raise question as to the filiation of the petitioner with his sister
Wang Mei who do not use ‘Carulasan’ in her name; and
2. ‘Carulasan’ sounds funny in Mandarin Language as Mandarin do not
have the letter ‘r’ and instead ‘r’ is pronounced as ‘l’.
RTC denied the petition. It held that, the reasons given by the petitioner did not fall
within the grounds recognized by the law. The change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. The Court recognizes that the State has interests in the name
of persons, thus, it cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should
now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition under
Rule 45.
Petitioner contends that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the
name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. It is again pointed out
that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and
integration in the Singaporean community.
Petitioner theorizes that it is ‘best interest’ citing the cases of Oshita v. Republic and
Calderon v. Republic. Petitioner also argued citing Alfon v. Republic, that although Art.
174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the
father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one
family name, even the family name of the mother.
The Court required the OSG to comment and in its comment, OSG posits that RTC’s
decision is correct. It argued that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right
cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. There is also no
showing that it is in the best interest of petitioner, as convenience is not sufficient to
support this petition. Moreover, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei
Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even
assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not
been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean
law.
ISSUE: W/N Dropping of Middle Name of a Minor Child in the case be allowable under
Art. 174 of the Family Code?
HELD: Yes. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's surname.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name
of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
The instant case was held not analogous to the cases aforecited by the petitioner.
First, the court observed that in the cases of Oshita and Alfon, the petitioners therein
were already of age when they have filed their petitions and were considered to have
exercised their discretion and judgement, fully knowing the effects of their decision to
change their name. Also the reason for the grant of the petition in the said two cases
was the presence of reasonable or compelling grounds.
Second, in Calderon, the Court granted the petition filed by the mother on behalf of the
minor. But the Court therein gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the
minor petitioner.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which
his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name
be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
NOTE if asked by Dean:
a. In Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time
against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein
petitioner's election of Philippine citizenship.
b. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known
since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not
used her registered name in her school records and voter's registration records;
thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and
LORETA P. MIGUEL [G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004.]
FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus against
respondents to obtain the custody of his minor child, Michael Kevin Pineda.
In the said petition he alleged that:
1. The minor is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta;
2. The minor was born in Japan on September 17, 1996;
3. He brought him to the Philippines on November 4, 1998 so that he could
take care of him and send him to school;
4. It is his parents who is helping him in raising the minor as Loreta was
already married to a Japanese National and is presently residing in
Japan;
5. Maricel and Francisca went to his house and was allowed to take the child
to SM Department Store with a condition that they will return him in the
afternoon but they never did; and
6. He tried to looked for his son from the respondents, but all his efforts were
futile;
In their comment, Loreta denied all the allegations. She prayed that he
custody of her minor child be given to her and invoked Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the
Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. She averred that:
1. It is her who brought the child to the Philippines;
2. The child was entrusted to the petitioner’s parents since both of them are
working in Japan;
3. That they are already separated when the child was brought in the
Philippines;
4. The petitioner was deported for committing a violation of the Japanese
Laws and since then he was unemployed;
5. She is married to a Japanese National only to secure her stay in Japan;
6. Her stay in Japan is temporary as she is returning to the country every
now and then which is every 6 months; and
A writ of Habeas Corpus was issued. Subsequently however, the CA awarded
the custody of the minor to his mother, applying Art 213 paragraph 2 of the Family
Code, until he reaches ten years of age, and after which, the child is allowed
to choose which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their
minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she
leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays there. He wants joint custody
over the minor.
ISSUE: W/N a father who acknowledge his illegitimate son be awarded the custody of
the said minor child?
HELD:
No. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Previously, under the Civil Code, illegitimate children were classified into : (1)
Natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous,
adulterous or illicit. A natural child is one born outside a lawful wedlock of parents who,
at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other. On the other hand, a spurious child is one born of parents who, at the time
of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age
of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both
acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it
was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate
children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided
jointly in the father and the mother.
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children
— legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born
before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36
has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or
born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child,
as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son.
As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him
resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father's recognition of
him.
GRACE M. GRANDE, vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO. [G.R. No. 206248.February 18,
2014.]
FACTS:
Grande and Antonio had lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio
was married to someone else. During their relationship, Grande bore Andre Lewis (on
February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The said children were
not acknowledged by Antonio in their record of birth. When the relationship ended,
Grande went to US with their children. This prompted Antonio to file Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court appending a notarized Deed
of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC decided that it’s the best interest of the children if the sole parental
authority and physical custody is with Antonio. The court a quo rendered amongst that
the Antonio be entered as the father in the certificate of Live Births and that their
surname be changed from Grande to Antonio.
This moved Grande to file a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Petitioner then raised it on appeal before the CA which ruled that
notwithstanding the father's recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived
of her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons. Since
respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that
adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the
minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
However, the CA held that the legal consequence of the recognition made
by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction
with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by
the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that Article 176 of the Family Code — as amended
by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language — may not
be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname
without the consent of their mother.
ISSUE: W/N The court a quo may order the illegitimate children to use their father’s
surname?
HELD
No. Art. 176 of FC as amended by RA 9225 states that, “Illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father…”
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal
meaning free from any interpretation. Respondent's position that the court can order
the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
In case asked by Dean: An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the
mandatory use of the father's surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate
children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255, which
states:
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register
of Births.
xxx xxx xxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth
or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of
Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname)
pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act.
NOTE:
The Court rendered this IRR as void.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father's surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE.
[G.R. No. 157043. February 2, 2007.]
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the respondent for the change of the name of his
ward from Giovanni N. Gallamasco to Giovanni Nadores filed on 1998.
It was alleged that Giovanni was born on July 9, 1982 before effectivity of
Family Code. He is an illegitimate child, born between Corazon P. Nadores and
Diosdado Gallamaso without the benefit of marriage. The petition was filed on the
ground that his continued use of his father’s name might complicate his status as
natural child when his mother petition him to join her in the United States.
Having found respondent's petition sufficient in form and substance, the
trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week
for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered. The trial court also directed that the
local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent
a copy of the petition and order.
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of
court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The
OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court
granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
From this, the Republic filed an appeal on the ground that the court a quo
erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.
Hence, this petition.
The Republic contends that CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision
which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties. Petitioner cites Republic v. Labrador and claims that the purported parents and
all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child's change of name should
have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
ISSUE: W/N the Court did not err in allowing the change of surname? or W/N the
change of surname is correctly filed under Rule 103?
HELD:
Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni's petition.
When Giovanni was born in 1982, the Civil Code, under Art 366 thereof states
that, “A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname
of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ
the surname of the recognizing parent.”
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother's
surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of
Giovanni's putative father to actually recognize him.
Moreover, Art. 176 of the Family Code, which repealed Art 366 of Civil Code,
states that, “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. . . .”
Furthermore, as held In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, an
illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given
name and his mother' surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of
the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such.
Giovanni in this case availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the
procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni's petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has
always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that
he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
mother's intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not
stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name
should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on
account of its own failure to participate therein.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.
With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered
bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG
by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and
CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS.
[GR. No. 105619. Dec. 12, 1995]
FACTS:
The petitioner is the legitimate child of the late Dr. Antonio de Santos and the
late Sofia Bona who were married on February 7, 1941. However, the two separated in
fact when Dr. Santos met herein private respondent Conchita Talag. Dr. Santos, has
then secured a divorce decree from Nevada Court in 1949. Knowing that the said
decree is not recognized in our jurisdiction, in 1951 Dr. Santos and Conchita went to
Japan to get married. Their union bore 11 children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in
Guatemala. Less than a month later, Dr. Santos and Conchita contracted marriage in
Tagaytay celebrated under our laws. On 1981, Dr. Santos died intestate.
Conchita, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration on her
name. On the petition she alleged that the deceased Dr. Santos left her, their children
and petitioner as heirs.
Petitioner then has decided to intervene. On her motion, she argued that the
private respondent’s children are illegitimate. This was challenged by Conchita despite
her admission during hearing that all her children were born before Sofia Bona’s death.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of the respondent’s account of
administration, the Court a quo passed upon the petitioner’s motion. The Court
declared private respondent’s children legitimated and instituted them along with the
petitioner as heirs of the late Dr. Santos.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that only natural children can be legitimized, thus, the Trial
Court erred in legitimizing her half-blood siblings.
ISSUE: W/N the natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
HELD:
No. Under Art 269 of the Civil Code, “Only natural children can be legitimized.
Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural."
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry
each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general
heading of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children,"
Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals
principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of said
marriages on their offspring.
Under Art 89, it creates another category of illegitimate children, those who
are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning," but
because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as
"acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights
and obligations as such kind of children.
In this case, the marriage under question is considered "void from the
beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still
subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered
natural children proper for, at the time of their conception, their parents were
disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting
marriage.
Thus, the term ‘natural children by legal fiction’ was coined in order to identify
such children.
Under the Civil Code, there exists hierarchy of children classified on the basis
of their rights:
1. Legitimate children and legitimated children are those entitled to use
the surname of the father, receive support, as well as to a legitime
consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents and to other
successional rights, such as the right of representation and whose rights
cannot be renounced
2. Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children
by legal fiction are those who shall use the surname of the father,
entitled to receive support from the parent recognizing them, who
also cannot be deprived of their legitime equivalent to one-half of that
pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the
recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the
latter's estate.
3. Recognized Illegitimate Children, other natural, or spurious are those
who are under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally,
take the latter’s' surname. The only support which they are entitled
to is from the recognizing parent, and their legitime, also to be taken
from the free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child.
4. Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights
above mentioned.
It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged
natural children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal fiction.
This conclusion is arrived at through a syllogism. However, the same should
not be applied to those matters which deal with social sciences where human
relationships are central to a study whose main concern is not to leave out
anything of significance.
 Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,
available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural
children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children,
it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have
the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when
the legally existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first
wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.

Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be

legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged
natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children
by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is
involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like
the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary
share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be
placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of
her share.

If the respondent’s assertion be allowed, the hierarchy of children so

painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding gradation of their rights may
conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children by legal fiction who are
incontestably illegitimate children to the level of natural children proper, whose
filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a
valid marriage.