JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A.
DE JESUS minors, sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as
proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS
PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents. G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.
Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on
the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01
July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the appellate court upheld the
decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the action instituted was made to compel the recognition
of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon. It was
contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise
ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in
an independent suit or proceeding.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special
proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
Petitioners assailed such decision and maintained that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are considered illegitimate children of Juan
Dizon based on the notarized acknowledgment of the decedent?
RULING: No.
The presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate becomes conclusive in
the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the
Family Code the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable,
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan
G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, 14 can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor
in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be
an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private document. Signed by the
acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate
children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally
ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly
opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de
Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, 15 one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so
born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN "JHONNY"
LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP, the successors of the late LOURDES C.
LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate
estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR. petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN,
JR., respondent. G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
FACTS: Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan
"Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E.
Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for
Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he
be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin;
(b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include
undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion
of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose
Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and
(c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
The heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not
a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole
heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin
and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as
a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also
entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This
was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester
Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no
filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and,
therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate, respondent
submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") 3 of his Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk
Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is
Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as
evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and
authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine
copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
She produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where
the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")4 showing him and his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body.
The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit
"8",5 indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C.
Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on
October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958
revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already
used before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was
falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert.
RTC: ruled in favor of the respondent Juan Locsin and appointed him as the
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.
CA: rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial court
ISSUE: Whether or not the filiation of the respondent was sufficiently proven by the
Exhibit D presented?
RULING: No.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records
of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly
forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars.
Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the
country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To
locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to
be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would
have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil
Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously
easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than
those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's
birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's
knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil
Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the
existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary
from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant
to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and
rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a
December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe
the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested
for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."The answer is a "maybe", a
mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form
dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2)
years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General
in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no
irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to
be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the
1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely
pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon
copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries
therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten.
Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important
particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and
business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On
the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but
the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not
filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no
answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." There
is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was
merely pasted with the volume.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil
Registrar General, thus a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to
the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy
being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil
Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the
suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled
them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the
same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's
father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on
November 28, 1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar16 that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the
child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not
filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or
circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate
child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an
illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is
incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs.
Court of Appeals where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the
alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of
paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code
and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However,
birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from
which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt,
the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of
Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit
"D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded
in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan
C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the
estate of the deceased.

Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C.
Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED
DISMISSED.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.
THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent. G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
FACTS: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a
year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Gerardo
and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December
19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on
December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola
Heights, Quezon City. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty
years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never
lived with Mario at all.
The trial court annulled their marriage for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo
to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY
as that portion of the decision which granted to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation
rights’. She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor
of the putative father of an illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose
Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden
name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname.
RTC: Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma.
Theresa’s motion.
CA: The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court. The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the
mother’s surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a
separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to
effect the correction in the civil registry.
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the
appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she
could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
REVERSAL BY CA: It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not
the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. The child
Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the
illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between [Ma. Theresa] and
[Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently,
[she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial
rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon
the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his
illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an
illegitimate relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not the child – Jose Gerardo – is the illegitimate child of the
petitioner?
RULING: No.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy.
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167
of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing
in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in
a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo
born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception.To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of
physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer to the petition for annulment
of marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that
there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was
binding on her.
Gerardo’s argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate
son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by
the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion
by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that
there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she
never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material
to Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital
intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus,
the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that
she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also
promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.
Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the
filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of
filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or
when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is
sought to be established.
certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the
quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is
also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the
purpose of the law.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble
between the very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The
paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness
should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is
that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of
incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy
which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames. The matter of changing Jose Gerardo’s name and effecting the
corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should
be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to
each other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them,
Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January
10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could
not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary
cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted
by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. 47 Between the
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA
DIAMANTE, respondents. G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and
registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served
as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for
an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the
child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find
them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and
told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days,
only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved
by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse
would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem
even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled
and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her
son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was
pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already
named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in
order to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness,
Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April
27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her
clinical records.2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the
late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter
was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part
against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his
child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not
blessed with children.3
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts
that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She said the birth of John Thomas
was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil
registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
RTC: the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could
not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. 5 The
trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.
Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person who is the natural child of petitioners.
CA: reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate
court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the
evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the
mother of the minor.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person and is the son of petitioners?
RULING: Yes.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing
son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips,
she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the
Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed,
she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a
period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented
in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever
submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas,
was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John
Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife,
Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though
Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no
offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after
the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must
be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. 16 Significantly, the
birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally
married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even
private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry puts
to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida
were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and
head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent
and material evidence to establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's
conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the
physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical
records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son
of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child. The
writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
third person of his own free will.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test 19 for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage.20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. 21 Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it
was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained
in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. 22 Though
it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to
all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the

Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR
MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN
FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents. G.R. No. 162571 June 15,
2005
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Respondents alleged that Arnel impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November
10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth
to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical
Hospital in Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel
as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused
Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills
Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door
hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On
March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one
other secret lover. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel
terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring
potential customers to the car aircon repair shop" where she worked. In May 2000,
Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return
in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her.
Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last intimacy was
sometime in 1998."8 Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnel’s wife and family. On
January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking
lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could
not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative
but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body." Finally, Arnel
claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in
the acknowledgment of Martin’s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously
reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth
year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants.
CA: affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for
recognition
2. Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support
without violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
1. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated
an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in
accordance with jurisprudence. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will
only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in
both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate
to these proceedings.
2. Petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of
proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means
for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief
historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called
for.
(maraming jurisprudence na cited in this case, kindly refer na lang sa full text, pinili ko
na lang yung mga ilalagay dito to make it shorter)
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee21 where the appellant was convicted of
murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that
"while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as
the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test
result(emphasis supplied)."
In 2001, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test
as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in
Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo24 where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained
clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of
DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected
to various chemical processes to establish their profile."
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,27 we affirmed the conviction of
the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA
test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the
reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and
shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the
wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds
of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the
case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since
it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the
admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from
semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction
of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right
against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken
from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30 We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests
for women accused of adultery, 31 expulsion of morphine from one’s mouth 32 and the
tracing of one’s foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v.
Cañizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action
for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her
orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure,
rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA
testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres,36 where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification
system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, 37 and
the infringement of privacy of communication38 where the constitutional right to
privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as
already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights
elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way
being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can
be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case,
petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered
to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded
its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly
found widespread general acceptance. Several cases decided by various State
Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of
procedure and evidence.
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father
was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove
to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man--the putative father.
Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving
paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of
proof.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as
much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore
take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means
of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in
some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme
Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already
acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The
Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family
Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to
order DNA tests.

In Greco v. Coleman, the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality
of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it
was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing
that such support agreements were necessary:

As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has
increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support
agreement…(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to
99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the
disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of
modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported
results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a
decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males
from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively
pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement
between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far
more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were
often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity