15 Miguel V Sandiganbayan PDF

11/18/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 675
G.R. No. 172035. July 4, 2012.*
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Information; Section 6, Rule 110 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia,
that the information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute
the offense charged.—In deference to the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the
offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts
or omissions and its attendant circumstances “must be stated in
ordinary and concise language” and “in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.”
Same; Same; Same; The test of the information’s sufficiency is
whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged.—The test of the information’s
sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms
and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the
accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular,
whether an information validly charges an offense depends on
whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or
information shall establish the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.
Same; Suspension; The suspension requires a prior hearing to
determine “the validity of the information” filed against him,
“taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a
suspen-
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan
sion of an elective public official even before his conviction.”—

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is
mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine
“the validity of the information” filed against him, “taking into
account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension
of an elective public official even before his conviction.” The
accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the
information before a suspension order may be issued includes the
right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding
leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii)
propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged
do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions
on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Pre-Suspension Hearing; While a pre-suspension
hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the
regularity of the proceedings against him, no hard and fast rule
exists in regulating its conduct.—While a pre-suspension hearing
is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the
regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise
emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its
conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind,
the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of
the validity of a suspension order.
Same; Right to be Heard; It is well settled that “to be heard”
does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings.—Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a
due process requirement, when an accused public official is given
an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses
against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an
accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing
was conducted. It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only
mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019); Suspension; Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere
preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety

(90)
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
days, the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the

information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-
vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured
alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing.—
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure
whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days, the
adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the
information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-
vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured
alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An
opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious
it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and
sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and
the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ferrer and Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule
651 filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the
January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions2 of the
Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the
petitioner’s suspension from public office and (ii) denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the suspension
order.
_______________
1 RULES OF COURT.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, and concurred in
by Associate Justices Efren N. dela Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez, Sr.
563
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 563

The Antecedent Facts

On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido
and other local officials3 of Koronadal City, South Cotabato
filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao (Ombudsman)4 charging the petitioner, among
others,5 with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in
connection with the consultancy services for the
architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the
construction supervision and management of the proposed
Koronadal City public market (project).6
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the
petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit.
On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the
petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.7 In its July 29, 1999
resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against
the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of
R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4
of the Revised Penal Code.8
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the
corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.9 The
information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
reads:
_______________
3 The Sangguniang Bayan members-complainants are as follows: Rose
Dideles, Rene Jumilla, Pablito Subere and Edwin Abris; Rollo, p. 5.
4 Id., at p. 83.
5 Gaspar E. Nepomuceno, Jesus G. Casus, Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr.,
Bonifacio M. Madarcos, and Vinci Nicholas R. Villaseñor; id., at p. 103.
6 Id., at pp. 110-113.
7 Id., at pp. 124-125.
8 Id., at pp. 5 and 83.
9 The case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 25819 (id., at p. 103). The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a
Motion to drop Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Bonifacio M.
564

“That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his capacity as
former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as

such while in the performance of his official functions,
committing the offense in relation to his office, taking
advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating
with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and
advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to participate in
the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed
Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction
Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public
Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a
newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other
consultants from participating in said prequalification.”10
(Emphases and underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-

accused,11 the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On
August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed
suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave
the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-
affidavit with the OSP.12
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the
petitioner asked13 the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day
extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before
the expiry of the
_______________
Madarcos, Jesus G. Casus and Vinci Nicholas R. Villaseñor from the
Information (id., at pp. 106 and 108). The falsification case was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 25820 (id., at p. 103).
10 Id., at p. 117.
11 On March 3, 2000 and June 5, 2000, Bonifacio M. Madarcos and
Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., respectively, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation;
id., at pp. 103-104.
12 Id., at p. 104.
13 Dated August 30, 2000; ibid.
565
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 565

extension requested, the petitioner asked14 the OSP for

an additional thirty-day period to file his counter-affidavit.
Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the

petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension
period.15
Despite the extension period asked and given, the
petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting
Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner
had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence
(April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.16
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the
Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the
petitioner and of the other accused private individuals.17
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and
granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On
February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation—this, despite the OSP’s earlier termination
of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure
to submit his counter-affidavit.18 The petitioner did not
question the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he
pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.19
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend
[the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the
petitioner filed his “Vigorous Opposition” based on the
“obvious and fatal defect of the [i]nformation” in failing to
allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages was done
_______________
14 Dated September 28, 2000; id., at p. 105.
15 Dated October 29, 2000; ibid.
16 Id., at p. 106.
17 Ibid.
18 Id., at p. 27.
19 Id., at p. 6.
566

through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

inexcusable negligence.20
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated
the assailed resolution21 suspending the petitioner
pendente lite—
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s

Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court hereby orders the
suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City Mayor,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from any other public
position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a period of
ninety (90) days only.”22
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for

reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a
pre-suspension hearing.23 The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion,24 prompting him to file this certiorari petition to
challenge the validity of his suspension order.
The Petition
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely

abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the
failure of the information to allege that the giving of
unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was
made through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.” He alleges that the phrases
“evident bad faith” and “manifest partiality” actually refers
not to him, but to his co-accused,25 rendering the
information fatally defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the
issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v.
Hon.
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20 Id., at pp. 6-7.
21 Id., at pp. 21-24.
22 Id., at p. 24.
23 Id., at p. 13.
24 Id., at pp. 26-28.
25 Id., at p. 67.
567
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 567

Mariano, etc., et al.,26 he claims that “[n]owhere in the

records of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution
requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of
hearing why he should not be ordered suspended.”27 For
the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing
can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an

actual hearing to settle the “defect” in the information.
The OSP’s Comment
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information

since all the elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of
R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate
facts. These elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of
Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time material to
the acts complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith when he invited only his co-accused
private individuals to participate in the
prequalification of consultants for the project instead
of publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation;
and
3. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation to his
office, gave unwarranted benefits and advantages to
his co-accused.28
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead
the Court on the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase
“acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality”
when the petitioner quoted the “relevant” portions of the
information in his petition.
_______________
26 148-B Phil. 178; 40 SCRA 187 (1971).
27 Rollo, pp. 13-14.
28 Rollo, p. 45.
568

Citing Juan v. People,29 the OSP argues that while no

actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted, the events
preceding the issuance of the suspension order already
satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension
hearing—i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the
information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to
preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by
the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation
with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner
was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the

petitioner already moved to quash the information,
although unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have
waived his right to submit countervailing evidence in the
reinvestigation by the OSP.30
Issues
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:

1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner
with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is
valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-
suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension
order against the petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave

abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed
resolutions.
_______________
29 379 Phil. 125; 322 SCRA 125 (2000).
30 Citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151; 253 SCRA 773
(1996).
569
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 569

The information for violation

of R.A. No. 3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to
be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him,31 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules)32 requires, inter alia, that the
information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules
requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances “must be stated in ordinary and concise
language” and “in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being
charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.”33
_______________
31 Constitution, Article III, Section 14(2).

32 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information.
33 Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads:
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding
to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment.
570

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the

crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused
is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular,
whether an information validly charges an offense depends
on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or
information shall establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of
the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense.34
In arguing against the validity of the information, the
petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a “person of
common understanding” in appreciating the import of the
phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality.” A reading of the information clearly reveals
that the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality” was merely a continuation of the prior allegation
of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused
private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us

believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in
the information35 when, in his reaction to the OSP’s
comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply
the clarity of the phrase’s position, in relation with the
other averments in the information. Given the supposed
ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase
“acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,” the
remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a
bill of particulars and not for the
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34 Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009,
581 SCRA 431.
35 See Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144823, December 8,
2003, 417 SCRA 242.
571
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 571

quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the

elements of the offense charged.36
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
“Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any public

officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.”
While the suspension of a public officer under this

provision is mandatory,37 the suspension requires a prior
hearing to determine “the validity of the information”38
filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far
reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public
official even before his conviction.”39 The accused public
official’s right to challenge the validity of the information
before a suspension order may be issued includes the right
to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding
leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii)
propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts

charged do not constitute a viola-
_______________
36 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 116, Section 9; and
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004, 435 SCRA
371, 388-389.
37 Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337,
345.
38 Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al., supra note 26, at pp. 183-
184; and People v. Albano, Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511,
517.
39 Ibid.
572

tion of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the

Revised Penal Code.40
In Luciano v. Mariano41 that the petitioner relied upon,
the Court required, “by way of broad guidelines for the
lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension,”
that—
“(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court

should issue an order with proper notice requiring the
accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why
he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the
cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of
suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash
the information or challenges the validity thereof, such
show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear
the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of
the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary
case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-
suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused
should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him,
e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or
of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would

warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of
the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on
any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause

order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension
in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano
_______________
40 People v. Albano, supra note 38, at pp. 518-519; and Socrates v.
Sandiganbayan, supra note 30, at pp. 179; p. 779.
41 Supra note 26, at pp. 192-193; p. 202.
573
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 573

considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show

cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension of the
accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the
prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension
hearing is to determine the validity of the information so
that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the
accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the
case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity.
That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the
information by way of a motion to quash.42
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for
the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity of the information or the regularity of the
proceedings against him,43 Luciano likewise emphasizes
that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.44
With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the
absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative
of the validity of a suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Court considered the
opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to
suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the
need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing.
The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,46
where the Court ruled:
_______________
42 Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008,
570 SCRA 622, 632.
43 Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March 27, 1998, 288
SCRA 328, 339.
44 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, 356
SCRA 636, 645; and Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004,
supra note 37, at pp. 345-346.
45 G.R. No. 161640, December 9, 2005, 513 Phil. 400; 477 SCRA 286
(2005).
46 Supra note 29, at p. 140; p. 138.
574

“In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing

held to determine the validity of the Informations that had been
filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings
filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this
procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral
hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the
parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.”
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process

requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses
against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019,
then an accused would have no reason to complain that no
actual hearing was conducted.47 It is well settled that “to be
heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has
been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.48
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous
Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from
the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the
suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply
to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.49
Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s
continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-
suspension hearing—based on the same alleged “defect in
the information,”50 which we have found wanting—has
legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s
position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal

interpreta-
_______________
47 Flores v. Layosa, supra note 37, at pp. 345-346.
48 Tan v. Atty. Balon, Jr., A.C. No. 6483, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA
645, 655-656.
49 Rollo, p. 109.
50 Id., at p. 95.
575
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 575

tion in favor of the accused public official and a strict

construction against the State.51 The suspension required
under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed
as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the
accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
his suspension.52
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019 is a mere preventive measure53 that arises from the
legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a
finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused.54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere
preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed
ninety (90) days,55 the adequacy of the opportunity to
contest the validity of the information and of the
proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of
the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by
the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An
opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however
unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated
by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process
right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the
suspension required by law.
_______________
51 Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547
SCRA 658, 666-668.
52 Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-61776 to No. L-61861, March 23,

1984, 128 SCRA 383.
53 Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 50, at pp. 666-667; and
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 43, at p. 336.
54 Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994, 235
SCRA 103, 108.
55 Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903, May 15, 1989, 173
SCRA 409, 419.
576

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019

reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that
a public office is a public trust.56 In light of the
constitutional principle underlying the imposition of
preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a
valid information and the nature of this suspension, the
petitioner’s demand for a trial-type hearing in the present
case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than
promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ.,

concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The suspension from office of an elective

official, whether as a preventive measure or as a penalty,
will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of
the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office. (Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals [12th Division], 586
SCRA 799 [2009]).
An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is deemed sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. (People vs. Teodoro, 607 SCRA 307 [2009])
——o0o——
_______________
56 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1; Berona v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 142456, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 303.
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11/18/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 675

G.R. No. 172035. July 4, 2012.*

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, petitioner, vs. THE

Criminal Procedure; Information; Section 6, Rule 110 of the

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 561

Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan

sion of an elective public official even before his conviction.”—

preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan

days, the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 563

The Antecedent Facts

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent

former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as

On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 565

extension requested, the petitioner asked14 the OSP for

Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s

On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 567

Mariano, etc., et al.,26 he claims that “[n]owhere in the

can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an

The OSP’s Comment

The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Citing Juan v. People,29 the OSP argues that while no

Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the

There are only two issues presented for our resolution:

The Court’s Ruling

We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 569

The information for violation

31 Constitution, Article III, Section 14(2).

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the

Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 571

quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the

“Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any public

While the suspension of a public officer under this

propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the

“(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court

of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 573

considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show

574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process

3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 575

tion in favor of the accused public official and a strict

52 Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-61776 to No. L-61861, March 23,

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED