Y 6

INTRODUCTION
CRIMINAL LAW
Definition
Criminal law is that branch or division of public law which
defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for their
punishment.
Crime is defined as an act committed or omitted in violation
of public law forbidding or commanding it. It is a positive or
negative act in violation of penal law; an offense against the state.
(Black's Law Dictionary)
Accused is a person formally charged in court for having
violated a penal law - either the Revised Penal Code or a special
law; a person against whom an accusation is made. (Black's Law
Dictionary)
Sources of Philippine Criminal Law

1. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) which took effect on
January 1,1932, and its amendments;
2. Special laws defining acts and providing penalties for them
passed by the legislative department or branch of Philippine
Government known variously in Philippine history as
Philippine Commission, Philippine Assembly, Philippine
Legislature, National Assembly, Batasang Pambansa and
Congress of the Philippines;
3. Presidential Decrees of Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos during his
term; and
4. Executive Orders of former Pres. Corazon C. Aquino during
her incumbency.
l
POINTERS IN C R I M I N A L LAW
2
% Rights of the Accused

A. Constitutional Rights
1. Right to bail except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclnsion perpehia (and/or death) when
evidence of guilt is strong. (Sec. 13, Art. Ill)
2. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and the right to compulsory
process to secure attendance of witnesses, and
production of evidence. (Sec. 14, Art. Ill)
3. Not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
(Sec. 12, Art. Ill)
4. Right against excessive fines or cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. (Section 19, Art. Ill)
5. Right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. (Sec. 2, Art. Ill)
B. Statutory Rights
1. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. To be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him.
3. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings; to defend himself in
person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he
can protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
4. To testify as a witness in his own behalf.
5. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness
against himself.
6. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him.
7. To have a compulsory process issued to secure the
INTRODUCTION 3
attendance of witnesses and production of other

evidence in his behalf.
8. To have a speedy, impartial and public trial, and
9. To have the right to appeal in all cases allowed and in
the manner prescribed by law. (Sec. 115, Rules of Court)
It must be taken note of that the right to appeal is not a
constitutional right. Congress may therefore pass a law eliminating
or taking away this right.
Cardinal Features or Main Characteristics or

Components of Philippine Criminal Law
There are three (3):
1. General
— meaning that Philippine criminal laws are binding
on all persons who live or soj ourn in the Philippines. Whoever
you are, whatever be your creed, religion, sex or nationality,
as long as you reside in the Philippine territory, penal laws
of the Philippines shall apply on you. Thus, the contention of
the accused that being an American citizen he can not be
prosecuted for, much less convicted of, Illegal Possession of
Firearm because it is a constitutional right of the citizens of
the U.S.A. "to keep and bear arms" without need of securing
government license therefor is untenable since the Philip-
pines, as a sovereign state, has a right to uphold its law and
maintain order within its domain, and with the general
jurisdiction to punish persons for offenses committed within
its territory. (People vs. Galacgac, C.A. 54 O.G. 1027) \ /
There are e^gjjjjgn^to this general application of criminal
law:
(j^) Principles of Public International law
Thus, sovereigns and other chiefs of state,
Ambassadors, Ministers plenipotentiary, Ministers
residents, and charges d'affaires even if residing or
sojourning in the Philippines, and committing crimes
herein are not subject to our penal laws.
POINTERS IN CRIMINAL LAW
4
0 Treaties or Treaty Stipulations

The persons who are exempted from the operation
or application of our criminal laws under the provisions
of the treaties entered into by the Philippines with
another country are likewise exempted. Under the
Hpfiinct Military Basps Agreement entered into by the
Philippines and U.S. A. on March 14,1947—any offense
committed outside the bases by any member of the
armed forces of the United States where the offended
party is also a member of the said armed forces is not
cognizable by Philippine courts.
Laws of Preferential Application

An example is Sec. 11 of Art. VI of the Constitution
which provides that "No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in Congress or in any committee thereof". Thus,
if Senator A delivers a libelous speech in Congress
against B, he can not be punished or be held liable
even if he is residing in the Philippines.
2. Territorial
— in that our criminal law undertakes to punish crimes
committed only within the Philippine territory. Outside of
the parameters of the Philippine archipelago, Philippine
criminal laws can not be enforced.
There are exceptions however. Under Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, there are five (5) instances where the
provisions shall be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of our
country against those who:
A. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship.
B. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of
the Philippines or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippines.
C. Should be liable for acts connected wi th the introduction
INTRODUCTION 5
into the Philippines of the obligations and securities

mentioned in the preceding number.
D. While being public officers or employees, should
commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
or
E. Should commit any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations defined in Title One of
Book Two of this Code.
3. Prospective
— meaning that a penal law can not make an act
punishable when it was not punishable when committed.
In other words, crimes are punished under the laws in
force at the time the same were perpetrated. It is in
consonance with the constitutional prohibition against
Ex P o s t F a c t o Law . It reflects the maxim: nullum
crimen sine poena; nulla poena sine lege - that is, there is no
crime without a penalty and there is no penalty without a
law.
Exception however is provided for by Article 22. It says:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect

insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code x x x.
The retroactive effect shall benefit the accused even if at

the time of the publication of the law, a final judgment has
been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence.
Even if the law uses the words "felony" and "habitual
criminal as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62", this
is applicable to special laws which provide more favorable
conditions to the accused. (People vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5;
People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555; People vs. De Lara, 236
SCRA 291)
There is no retroactive effect however, even if the law is
favorable to the accused if he is a habitual delinquent or
P O I N T E R S IN C R I M I N A L L A W
6
where the law is expressly made inapplicable to pending

actions. (Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 468)
If the repealing law favors the accused by diminishing
the penalty, or doing it away altogether, then the same
should be applied to the extent it is favorable to the offender.
(People vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5)
Book One
General Provisions Regarding the Date of

Enforcement and Application of the Provisions
of this Code, and Regarding the Offenses, the
Persons Liable and the Penalties
Title One
FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH

AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
CHAPTER ONE
FELONIES
Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by law. (Art. 3,

first par.) The word "felony" has been understood to mean an act
or omission punished by the Code; it does not cover a crime
punished by special law. (Filipinas Life Assurance Co. vs.
Tolentino, SP-05858, Oct. 1,1976)
They are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) — tha t
is, when the act is performed with deliberate intent, but also by
means of fault (culpa) meaning, when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Art. 3, 2nd and 3rd paragraphs)
Felonies take the form of a positive act — like killing a per-
son—Homicide or Mufder, or taking unlawfully personal property
— Theft or Robberyôr)an omission or failure to perform an act,
like failure to issue a receipt of a public officer entrusted with
collection of taxes (Illegal Exaction) or failure to deliver within
the prescribed time a person arrested (Delay in the Delivery of
Detained Person). In felony by omission however, there must
be a law requiring the doing or the performance of an act. Thus,
mere passive presence at the scene of a crime, mere silence and
failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy is not punishable. Where therefore R, about a meter
away from M, her live-in partner, did not do anything despite NTs
threat that he would bum the house which he actually put on fire,
she can not be held criminally liable with M, there being no proof
9
P O I N T E R S IN C R I M I N A L LAW
10
of conspiracy between them. (People vs. Silvestre & Atienza, 56

Phil. 358)
CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES
A. According to manner or mode of execution (ArtT3),

1. Intentional felonies — committed by means of deceit or
malice.
2. Culpable felonies -f- where the wrongful acts result
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack
of skill.
B. According to stage of execution (Art. 6)
1. Consummated — when all the elements necessary for
its execution and accomplishment are present.
2. Frustrated — when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
3. Attempted — when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.
C. According to gravity (Art. 9)
1. Grave felonies — those to which the law attaches the
capital punishment or penalties which in any of their
periods are afflictive in accordance with Art. 25 of the
• RPC.
2. Less Grave felonies — those which the law punishes with
penalties which in their m a x i m u m period are
correctional.
3. Light felonies — those infractions of law for the
commission of which the penalty of arresto menor$)a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos, fo^ both, is provided.
CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES 11
While Article 3 classifies the crimes into Intentional and

Culpable, a third class can be grouped with it - that is, those
defined and penalized by special laws which include crimes
punished by city or municipal ordinances. They are generally
referred to as mala prohibitn. As a rule, intent to commit the crime
is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. The act alone,
irrespective of the motives, constitutes the offense. Good faith is
not a defense.
Mala in se and Mala prohibita, distinguished

Mala in se are crimes which are wrong from their nature, such
as murder, theft, rape, etc., while those that are mala prohibita are
wrong, merely because they are prohibited by statute, like Illegal
Possession of Firearm or violation of the Omnibus Election Law.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on
society as to call for the almost unanimous condemnation of its
members, while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules
of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of
the affairs of society.
When the acts however are inherently immoral, they
are mala in se, even if punished under special law and before
the actor can be held liable, there must be malice or criminal in-
tent. ^
Thus, election inspectors and poll clerks who were tasked to
transfer the names of excess voters in one precinct to a newly t
created precinct and because of pressures of work and fatigue, \
omitted some names of persons, who then were not allowed to /
vote, when charged with violation of the Election Code, relied on
good faith as a defense.
The CFI, reasoning that the offense is malum prohibitum
and good faith is not a defense, convicted them. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals in acquitting the accused ruled that the failure
or omissionto include a voter's name in the registry list of voters
is not only wrong because it is prohibited, it is wrong per se
because it disenfranchises a voter and violates his constitutional
right. To be held liable, the election inspectors and poll clerks
] 2 P O I N T E R S I N C R I M I N A L LAW
must act willfully and maliciously. (People vs. Sunico et. al.,C. A.
50 O.G. 5880)
INCURRENCE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminal liability shall be incurred:

C
' ^ , ( 1 ) By any person commi t ting^ felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done b^differenT^rom that which he
intended, and
(2) By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means. /Ârtjf).
This article does not mean to exclude offenders who are
liable even if they do not fall under any of the situations spoken
of in the said article. Thus, a person who committed a crime which
he really intended is no doubt liable for that offense like, if A,
intending to kill his father, shot him, he is liable for the death of
his father. The opening sentence of Article 4 should have been:
"Criminal liability shall ^lso^be incurred by".
tj) No. 1 speaks of a situation where a person was committing
ci felony but the consequence was not the one he had intended. He
must, however, be perpetrating or committing an offense other-
wise there can be no criminal liability. Thus, if A, in attempting to
commit suicide, jumped out from the window of a four-story
building and fell on another person who was killed, you can not
hold him criminally liable for Intentional Homicide because he
was not committing a felony at that time since committing suicide
is not a felony.
There are three (3) scenarios under paragraph 1 of Article 4:

^ Error in personae (mistake in the identity of the victim) —
w o e a c e
> ^ ^ P officers were ordered to arrest Balagtas,
&" <• an escaped notorious convict, and proceeding to the
latter's house, saw amansleepingwithhisback towards
the door and fired at him but the man turned out to be
I N C U R R E N C E OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 13
ftyi^ Serapio Tecion, the Supreme Court ruled they are guilty
of murderyjPeople vs. Oanis, et al., 74 Phil. 257)
When they fired on the sleeping man without
making ajiy inquiry and believing him to be the notorious
escape^ the peace officers were committing a felony.
Their wrongful intent was to hit or kill Balagtas but the
wrongful act that was done was the killing of Serapio
Tecson.
Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) — Thus, if X,
intending to kill Y, fired at the latter but the shot hit Y
only superficially and killed Z, his own father, he (X) is
criminally liable for Attempted Homicide with Parricide.
When X shot Y, he was perpetrating a telony with the
wrongful intent to kill Y. The wrongful act committed
wasthe killing of his own father which he never intended.
IrrPeople vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307, the accused who
threw a hand grenade at Pres. Roxas but killed Simeon
Varela and injured several persons was found guilty of
Murder with Assault and Multiple Attempted Murder.
/ C.J Praeter intentionem (injurious result is greater than that
intended) — Thus, if A slapped his wife who fell on the
ground, her head hitting a hard pavement rendering
her unconscious and thereafter died, A is liable for
Parricide. When he slapped his wife, A was committing
a felony. His wrongful intent is only to cause injury but
the wrongful act done was greater — the killing of the
, spouse.
h/u.S. vs. Marasigan, 27 Phil. 504, where the accused
attacked the offended party with a knife, and in the process of
warding off the same, his left hand was injured, severing the
extensor tendon in one of the fingers, the Supreme Court held
that the accused is criminally liable. The fact that the original
condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation
is immaterial and the victim is not obliged to submit to a surgical
operation to relieve the accused of the natural and ordinary
results of his crime.
The wrong done however, must be the direct and natural
consequence of the felonious act. Stated otherwise, the felony
14 P O I N T E R S IN C R I M I N A L LAW
^committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting

injury. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred". (Vda. de Batacan, et. al. vs.
Medina, 102 Phil. 181 citing Vol. 38 of Am. Jur.) -
In Bringas vs. People, et al., 125 SCRA 687, where the
conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan" knowing that the train
would reach the Lusacan Station full three minutes more and
deceased Martina Bool, a passenger, walked towards the left front
door facing the direction of Tiaong, Quezon carrying a child with
one hand and holding her baggage with another, and when the
train that slowed down suddenly picked up speed causing Martina
Bool and the three-year-old child she was carrying to fall from the
door causing their deaths, the Supreme Court said:
"The proximate r a u s p of the death of the victims

was the premature and erroneous announcement of the
conductor. This announcement prompted the two
victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without
said announcement, the victims would have been safely
seatetrin their respective seats when the train jerked as
it picked up speed. The connection between the
premature and erroneous announcement of the accused
and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural,
unbroken by any intervening efficient causes."
Even if other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result

as long as the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to
destroy or endanger life, the actor is liable. This is true even
though the immediate cause of death was erroneous or unskillful
medical or surgical treatment, refusal of the victim to submit to
surgical operation, or that the deceased was suffering from
tuberculosis, heart disease or other internal malady or that the
resulting injury was aggravated by infection (see the Revised
Penal Code, Book I by Luis B. Reyes citing U.S. vs. Marasigan,
27 Phil. 504; People vs. Illustre, 54 Phil. 594; People vs. Reyes, 61
Phil. 341, People vs. Quianson, 62 Phil. 162; and People vs. Red,
C.A. 43 O.G. 8072)
I N C U R R E N C E OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 15
There must however be no_efficient intervening cause. In

U.S. vs. Valdez, it was ruled t h a O n ^ e r s c m a g a i n s t whom a
criminal assault is directed, reasonably believes himself to be in
danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape^
jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, •
the assailant is responsible for Homicide — the death resulting'
from drowning owing to his possible inability to swim or the*
strength of the current. The inability to swim and the strong
current can be considered intervening causes but not efficient
ones since they are not acts or facts absolutely foreign from the
criminal act. On the other hand, in People vs. Rockwell, 39 Mich.*
503, an American case, the assailant was not held responsible for
the death of a person whom he knocked down with his fist but j
who was jumped on by a nearby horse killing him, because the \
act of the horse constitutes an efficient intervening cause.
Impossible Crime
An act performed with malice which would have been
an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. This is
the only crime provided for in Book I of the Revised Penal
Code. The Court, having in mind the social danger and the de-
gree of criminality shown by the offender shall impose the
penakjKof arresto mayor /or) a fine ranging from P200 to P500.
(Art^)RPC) ^
The requisites are:
A. The act performed would be an offense against persons or
property like Parricide, Murder, Homicide, Abortion, Duel
or Physical Injuries, or Robbery, Brigandage, Theft,
Usurpation, Culpable Insolvency, Estafa and Other Deceits,
Chattel Mortgage, Arson and Malicious Mischief.
B. That the act was done with evil intent.
C. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible or that the
means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual-
Examples: Inherent Impossibility (Legal and Physical)
16
w
LL A saw B lying down whom he thought was only sleep-
ing. So with intent to kill, he stabbed B several times on his
chest. It turned out that B had been dead twenty or thirty
, minutes ago.
Legal Impossibility
X stole the ring which Y inadvertently left on his desk.
It turned out that the said ring was the one X lost two (2)
days ago.
Physical Impossibility
A, B, C, D & E, all armed, proceeded to the house of X
whereupon A pointed to the room that X used to occupy and
all fired at the said room. Nobody was hit as no one was
inside the room. This is a case of Impossible Crime to Commit
Murder. (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 215 SCRA 52)
A saw a beautiful lady lying down already dead, but thinking
that she was only sleeping, undressed and had sex with her. This
is an Impossible Crime to Commit Rape considering that under
R.A. 8353, the crime of rape has been reclassified as an offense
against persons, no longer a crime against chastity.
Ineffectual means — Giving a person a drink mixed with sugar

which accused believed to be poison.
Inadequate means — If it were really poison, the quantity is not
sufficient to kill.
Is There A Common Law Crime in the Philippines?

No, as the first paragraph of Art. 5, RPC provides that
whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall
render the proper decision, that is, dismiss the case, and shall
report to the Chief Executive through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induced the court to believe that said act should
be made the subject of penal legislation.
B.P. Big. 22 is a product of this article, considering the
DUTY OF COURT W H E N PENALTY IS EXCESSIVE 17
difficulty of securing a conviction for Estafa committed by issuing

a postdated check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) since the defense of
having been issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation has
always come as a ready-made defense. Under this law, even if the
dishonored check was issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation, and the drawer or maker commits no deceit, he is
criminally liable.
DUTY OF COURT WHEN PENALTY IS EXCESSIVE
Courts Are Not Concerned With Wisdom, Efficacy

Or Morality Of Laws
The court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Dept. of Justice, such statement as maybe deemed proper, with-
out suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into considera-
tion the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
(Art. 5, 2nd par., RPC)
A daughter who killed her father while he was sleeping
because the latter had raped her, resulting in her pregnancy,
should be punished with death by the court since Parricide is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and there is an
aggravating circumstance of treachery. The ordinary mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense, or passion or
obfuscation will not affect the imposable penalty as the same is an
indivisible penalty (Art. 63). However, the Judge may write the
President of the Philippines for the granting of Executive Clemency
to the poor daughter on account of the circumstances of the case.
In People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244, it was ruled:
"We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in

imposing the death sentence because of his religious
convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his
predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a
court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the
morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law
itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in
POINTERS I N C R I M I N A L L A W
18
specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort

faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty
is an ancient one but it is a matter upon which judges
have no choice."
fl/Jj L STAGES OF EXECUTION
Felonies could be attempted, frustrated or consummated. It

is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present (Art. 6, first par.). Thus, if A,
intending to kill B, shoots the latter to death, the crime is
consummated Homicide or Murder, as the case may be.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts

of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator (Ibid.). In the example
above, if A hit B on a vital portion of the body which injury could
cause the death of B but because of timely medical attention B did
not die, this is a case of Frustrated Homicide or Frustrated
Murder.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other thanhisownspontaneous
desistance (3rd par., Ibid.). So, if in the above-cited example, A
shot B but missed or hit B only on a superficial part of his body
which would could not cause B's death, A is liable only for
Attempted Homicide or Attempted Murder. In the same vein, if
A poked a gun at B and squeezed the trigger but it jammed and no
bullet was fired, the attempted stage has been reached.
How To Properly Determine The Stage Of Execution

In determining whether the felony is attempted, frustrated
or consummated, it is important to consider (1) the nature of the
crime;,(2) the elements constituting the offense; and (3) the manner
of committing the same.
Thus, considering th^nature)of the crime of Arson when a
DUTY OF COURT W H E N PENALTY IS EXCESSIVE 19
buildingte set on fire, it is not necessary that it should b£ entirely,

tonsumeg in order to constitute the consummated stage, nor is it
airecTed by the prompt extinction of the fire. (US vs. Po Chengco
23 Phil. 487)
Where the offender is&bj>uiJo_s.e_t on firea building but was
apprehended before any portion gets burned, it would be
Attempted Arson. Where rags and jute sacks soaked in gasoline
and placed near the house that the offender intends to burn, were
put on fire before any part of the house catches fire, the crime
would be Frustrated Arson.
With respect to Theft, the same is consummated once the
offender takes or gets hold of the material possession of the
property with intent to gain. It is not necessary that he be able to
carry it away. Thus, the accused who abstracted a leather bel t from
a Japanese tourist and placed it in the drawer of his desk, he being
an inspector of the Bureau of Customs, is guilty of Consummated
Theft. (US vs. Adiao,38 Phil. 754). So also, where the accused, after
untying a carabao from a tree near the offended party's house,
was apprehended after pulling the carabao away by about two or
three meters, the crime is Consummated Qualified Theft. ^
(
This is to be distinguished from Estafa where darnag&io the
offended party is one of thdCdementjSo consummate it. In US vs.
Dominguez, 41 Phil. 408, the accused, a salesman was held liable
only for Frustrated Estafa even if the proceeds of the sale which he
failed to turn over to the cashier was found out to be in his pocket.
There was no damage vet to the owner of the store because of the
timely discovery.
In Robbery with Force Upon Things (Arts. 299 or 302), where
the accused had entered the building or house, and had removed /
the property he intended to steal but was apprehended before he >
could get out, the crime is Frustrated Robbery. (People vs. Jose D e l \
Rosario, C. A. 46 O.G. 332). If he was caught in the act of removing
the property, the crime would be Attempted Robbery. If he was
able to bring the property out of the house or building, he would
be guilty of Consummated Robbery.
Anent thg/maruierl>f committing crime, there are offenses^
which are consummated in one instant and the act cannot be split ^
20
into parts to be categorized as attempted or frustrated like Slander

or Libel. They are called Formal Crimes.
There are also crimes which are consummated by mere
attempt, proposal or overt act. Thus, the crime of Flight to Enemy's
Country (Art. 121) is consummated by mere attempt. In Abuses
Against Chastity (Art. 245), mere solicitation or proposal
consummates the offense. So also, Art. 185 (Machinations in
Public Auctions) which punishes any person who shall solicit any
gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part
in any public auction.
In material crimes like Homicide, Rape, Murder, etc., there
are three (3) stages of execution. Thus, if A would stab or shoot B,
missing him or injuring him only superficially, the crime is
Attempted Homicide or Murder; but if he hit B and inflicted
injuries which otherwise would have been fatal were it not for
timely medical attention, it is Frustrated; if B dies, the case is
Consummated Homicide or Murder.
In the crime of rape, the accused who placed himself on top
of a woman, raising her skirt and unbuttoning his pants, the
endeavor to have sex with her very apparent, is guilty of Attempted
Rape.
Note^ (If the effort to have sex is not clear, the crime is only
Acts of Lasciviousness)
On the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the female

organ by the penis, even without rup ture of the hymen or laceration
of the vagina, consummates the crime. (People vs. Tayabas, 62
Phil. 559; People vs. Royeras, 56 SCRA 666; People vs. Amores, 58
SCRA 505)
This brings us to the question of Frustrated Rape. In People vs.
Orita, 184 SCRA 105. th Supreme Court said:
P
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the

offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished
xxx the felony is consummated, xxx Any penetration of
the femalp organ hv thp male organ is sufficient, xxx
CONSPIRACY A N D PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY 21
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration

of the female organ because not all acts of execution was hsO J
performed. The offender merely commenced the /
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking
into account the nature, elements and manner of
execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the
matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage
in rape can ever be committed.
The Court continued that the case of People vs. Eriha, 50

Phil. 998, where the accused was found guilty of Frustrated
Rape, appears to be a "stray" decision in as much as it has not been
reiterated in their subsequent decisions, and that the particular
provision on Frustrated Rape in Art. 335 as amended by R.A.
No. 2632 and R.A. No. 4111 is a dead provision prompted pro-
bably by the Eriha case. (NOTE: R.A. 7659,Sec. 11 also contains the
provision that when the Rape is attempted or frustrated and a
Homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death).
LIGHT FELONIES tiUrf. 7

Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
f^nsummated) with theie^capjion"tof those committed against
persons or property. Thus, a person who, within any town or
public place, attempts to fire or to discharge his gun is not
criminally liable even if his acts would fall under Art. 155 punish-
ing Alarms and Scandals in its attempted stage as thi? lieht felony
is a crime against public order.
; ;
Likewise, in light felonies, only thcrjjrinr pals^nd.accompiice^
are liable (Art. 16) so that a policeman who assists in the escape of
a person who slightly injured another (Slight Physical Injuries) is
not liable. (NOTE: See P.P. 1829 however)
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY ^
Conspiracy and Proposal to commiUeJony are punishable

only in the cases in which the law^Bpeciallv3rovides a penalty
therefor. (1st par., Art. 8)
22
Conspiracy to commit a felony as-ia^lLas Proposal to com-

' mit a felony are, generally speakingfoot crimes* As such, they are
not punishable. Thus, although conspiracy to murder a per-
son is apparent, the conspirators can not be held criminally
liable because there is no law punishing Conspiracy to Commit
Murder.
If what was done however was Conspiracy to, Commit
Rebellion, then the conspirators are liable because there is a law
that punishes Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion (Art. 136). The
same is true with Proposal to commit a felony. Unless there is
a law that punishes Proposal to commit a crime, the proponents
are not liable.
Art. 115 punishes Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit
Treason, while Sec. 5 of RA 6968 penalizes Conspiracy and Pro-
posal to Commit Coup d'etat. On the other hand, Conspiracy to
Commit Sedition (not Proposal) is punishable under Art. 141,
while Sec. 8 of P.D. 1613 punishes Conspiracy (not Proposal) to
Commit Arson.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. (2nd par., Ibid.) It couldbe evidenced by a written
agreement among the conspirators(or)by their verbal covenant,
/6nit could be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
miring and after the commission of the crime. (People vs. Manuel,
234 SCRA 532)
There is proposal when the person who has decided to
commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or
persons. (3rd par., Ibid.). To constitute proposal, in law, the
proponent himself must be determined to commit the crime so
that if he only aired his grievances against the government and
made suggestions on how to fight the authorities, he can not be
considered liable for Proposal to Commit Rebellion.
OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE CODE
Special Laws
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE CODE 23
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter

should specially provide the contrary. (Art. 10)
Thus, in case of conflict between the provisions of the special
laws and those of the Revised Penal Code, the former shall
prevail. The provisions of the latter however shall be
supplementary to special laws whenever applicable. In People
vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 citing People vs. Macatanda (109 SCRA
35), it was held:
"While these are special laws, the fact that the

penalties thereunder are those provided for in the
Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory intent
to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies
under the Code the corresponding application to said
special laws, in the absence of any express, or implicit
proscription in these special laws."
CHAPTER TWO
C I R C U M S T A N C E S AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
There are five (5) circumstances affecting the criminal liability

of an individual. They are justifying, exempting, mitigating,
aggravating, and alternative circumstances. (Arts. 11,12, 13, 14
and 15)
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Self-Defense
No. 1 in justifying circumstances is SELF-DEFENSE. Thus,
anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights incurs no
criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur:
(1) Unlawful Aggression;
(2) Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to
prevent or repel it; and
(3) Lack of Sufficient Provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
This includes defense of honor, defense of home as well as
defense of property.
Unlawful Aggression on the part of the injured or the victim
is the first element of self-defense. This is an indispensable requisite
even in incomplete self-defense. (People vs. Deopahte, G.R. No.
102772, Oct. 30,1996). Without this requisite, we can not speak of
c^rmDleJeêlf-defense as a justifying circumstance, or incomplete
self-defense as a mitigating circumstance. (Art^l3, par. 1)
Unlawful Aggression means an assault or attack, jjr/a threat
in an imminent and immediate manner which places the
24
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES 25
defendant's life in actual peril (Philippine Law Dictionary by

Moreno, 3rd ed., 1980). There must be an actual assaultffi a threat
but in case of the latter, i t mus t be imminent and positively strong
to palpably show the wrongful intent to cause injury. Mere
intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Thus, barging on the door
of the accused with shouts of threats to kill can not be considered
Unlawful Aggression. (People vs. Trison, G.R. No. 106345-46,
Sept. 16,1996). Likewise, if the accused agrees to fight, Unlawful
Aggression is wanting because by accepting the challenge and
immediately approaching the victim, the accused places himself
in an unlawful status and himself becomes an unlawful aggressor,
as aggression as an incident of the fight is bound to arise. (People
vs. Galas, G.R. No. 114007, Sept. 24,1996)
To give rise to self-defense, the aggression must not be a

lawful one like the attack of ariusband against a paramour of his
wife whom he surprised in an uncompromising situation, or a
"Vchief of police who threw stones at the accused who was running
away to elude arrest for a crime committed in his presence. Their
aggression was not considered unlawful.
The second element is Reasonable Necessity of the Means
Employed to prevent or repel it. There must be a reasonable
necessity of the course of actiorUak-€4vand reasonable necessity of^
the means used. In People vsC Iaurigue,^6 Phil. 174, while it was
ruled that when the deceased placed his hand on the upper thigh
of the lady accused, there was unlawful aggression but when the j
latter immediately stabbed him with a knife killing him, there was
no reasonable necessity of her course of action since in the chapel /
where the killing took place, there were many people including!
her father, it was well lighted and there is no possibility of her \
being raped. Consequently, she was convicted.
On the other hand, whether the means employed asonable,-
or not depends upon the nature and quality of the weapon used
by the aggressor, his physical condition, character and size, as
well as of the person defending and the place and occasion of the
assault. (See Revised Penal Code by Luis B. Reyes, 1993 ed., p. 176)
The third element - Lack of Sufficient Provocation on the
part of the person defending himself—pictures a situation where
26 POINTERS IN C R I M I N A L L A W
there was total lack of provocation on the part of the accused as

when he was attacked without any reason at all, or when the
accused gave provocation but is not sufficient for the offended
party to assault him, or where provocation is sufficient but is not
immediate to the act (US vs. Laurel, 22 Phil. 252) or where the
sufficient provocation was givenby the companion of the accused
of which the latter had no part.
2J Defense Of Relatives
The law speaks only of spouse; ascendants, meaning parents,
grandparents, great grandparents, etc.; descendants, meaning
children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, etc.; brothers and
sisters; relatives by affinity in the same degrees, that is,parents-in-
, law, children-in-law, and brothers or sisters-in-law as relatives.
Outside of these people, the persons are considered, in criminal
J a w , as strangers.
There are three (3) requisites — first is unlawful aggression,
second is reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it, and third is that the relative being defended gave no
provocation. Anent the third requisite however, the law gives a
leeway — that is, even if the relative being defended gave the
provocation, if the relative making the defense had no part
therein, he can successfully invoke defense of relative.
r \
( 3 . ) Defense Of Stranger
Outside of himself, and those relatives mentioned in
paragraph 2 of Art. 11, any person who acts in defense of the
person or rights of another can legitimately claim the defense of
stranger. The first two (2) requisites however, that is, unlawful
aggression, and reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it, must be present. The law adds another re-
quisite, which is, that the person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment or other evjl motive.
Thus, one who, seeing his 78-year-old neighbor held down
on the ground by a strong and robust young man and in serious
danger of being throttled, furnished the person assaulted with a
jjaffjas he himself is also old and may not be able to copTwithlEe
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES 27
assailant, with which his neighbor used to inflict a mortal wound

on^hetrssallarrtJsêntitled to the claim of defense of strangers. (US
v6<SubjngsubingJBl Phil. 376)
Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury

The fourth justifying circumstance speaks of a person who,
in order tovavoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to another. The following however must be present: first,
that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists, second, that the(
injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it, and third, that
there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing
it. (Art. 11, par. 4) y
The doctor who had to kill a foetus to save the mother where
both could not be saved, and he is running out of time, may in-
voke this defense. This is different however from Euthanasia —
the so-called mercy-killing which is not justified in our jurisdiction.
A captainof a ship caught by storm and huge waves in his journey,
who ordered the jettison of cargoes against the will of the owners
to prevent the ship from sinking and save the passengers, can
shield criminal liability behind this provision.
5J Fulfillment of Duty or Exercise of Right or Office

The fifth justifying circumstance provides that no criminal
liability shallbe incurred by any person who acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
Thus, a policeman who killed an escaping prisoner after
making the warning shot and shouting to him not to continue
with his escape, and who prior to that even attacked him with a
spear, acted in the lawful fulfillment of duty.
So also, if A hit B with his fist inside a running passenger jeep
because B was snatching his (A's) watch, and as a consequence B
fell from the jeep, his head hitting the hard pavement causing
his death, A acted in the lawful exercise of a right. And the
executioner of convicts sentenced to die, who would make the
lethal injection in the Bureau of Corrections on the day and
time scheduled by the Court, does so in the lawful exercise of an
office.
28 P O I N T E R S IN C R I M I N A L L A W
6.) Obedience to an Order of a Superior

It is also a justified act if a person acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. (Art. 11,
par. 6)
As an incident of the maneuverings and counter-
maneuverings of coup d'etat promoters, a group of soldiers,
believing that policemen had forcibly overtaken a municipal
building, attacked and killed policemen stationed in the
municipal building upon orders of their superior whom they
did not know was himself a member of the rebel soldiers,
cannot be held criminally liable.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 12 enumerates persons who are exempted from

criminal liability. Unlike in justifying circumstances, here
there was a crime committed, there is a criminal but for
reasons of public policy, no penal liability shall be inflicted on
him.
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
lj An Imbecile or an Insane Person Unless the Latter has

Acted During a Lucid Interval.
An imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency
while an insane person is one who has an unsound mind
or who suffers from mental disorder. An insane person
may have lucid intervals but an imbecile has none. (People
vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 citing 1 Viada Codigo Penal,
4th ed.)
Imbecility is defined as feeble-mindedness or a mental
condition approaching that of one who is insane. It is
analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile within
the meaning of Article 12 is one completely deprived of
reason nr discernmpnt and freedom of will at the time of
committing the crime. While advanced in age, he has a
mental development of children between two and seven
years of age. The reasoning of the accused that he resorted to
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES 29
cutting grass instead of guarding his victim could hardly be

indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may be considered
negligence. (People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 412429-30, July 23,
1997)
In People vsU3ungo A99 SCRA 860, it was held that

>
one who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission

of the offense can not in a legal sense entertain a criminal
intent and carmot]je-he44-cximinally responsible for his
acts. In People vsQLormigone§}87 Phil. 658, the ruling was
that, in order that a person could be regarded as an
imbecile within the meaning of Art. 12 of the RPC so as to
be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the
will at the time of committing the crime.
Any deprivation therefore of reason or discernment at
the time of t h e / n l a n p f the case is not an exempting
circumstance. ^-
2j) A Person Under Nine Years of Age. ^

( 3 . ) A Person Over Nine and Under Fifteen Unless He Has
Acted With Discernment. /!f,
It is clear therefore that even if a person has acted
with discernment, if he is under nine years of age, he is free
from penal responsibility. On the other hand, if he is over
nine years of age but under fifteen, he will be held,
criminally liable if he acted with discernment. If a youth
committeji4«>mi€id£_during his 9th birthday— meaning,
he wasfexactly nine^years old at that time and he acted
with discerrunent, it would seem that, following the I
policy that penal laws are to be strictly construed against
the Government and liberally in favor of the accused, he
should be exempt from criminal liability.
An accused who knows the morality of his acts, or ,
can fully appreciate the consequences of his actuation (
has acted with discernment which can be shown by the |
m a n n p r Hie crime was committed {6r\is conduct after its
commission.
Any Person Who, While Performing a Lawful Act With

Due Care, Causes an Injury by Mere Accident Without
Fault or Intention of Causing It.
So, one driving his car duly licensed to do so, in the
proper lane and within the limits prescribed by law, who hits
a boy who suddenly darted into the street is exempt from
criminal liability due to accident.
Problem:
A, armed with a .38 caliber and B, who has no
weapon, jobbed a store; but in the course thereof,
were seen by P, a policeman who was armed with a .45
caliber gun, and when he demanded for the surrender
of A and B, A shot him but missed, and so P repelled
the attack. Tn thp pyrhangp Q£ shots, A was killed,
together with B, and C the owner of the store. The three
were killed by the bullets fired from a .45 caliber. In such
case, P is not liable for the death of A due to self-defence.
as all the three (3) elements were present. He is also not
liable for the death of B, not because of self-defense
because the latter being weaponless can not commit
unlawful aggression, but because of performance of duty.
For the death of C, the store owner, P, is also not
criminally liable obviously not because of self-defense
nor of fulfillment-ef- duty but because of accident
provided for in par. 1 of Art. 12.
Any Person Who Acts Under the Compulsion of an

Irresistible Force.
Thus, a person who was compelled to bury the body of
one who was murdered by the killers, striking him with the
butts of their guns, threatening to kill him too, is not criminally
liable as an accessory.
Any Person Who Acts Under the Impulse of an

Uncontrollable Fear of an Equal or Greater Injury.
If A with a revolver in his hand threw a knife at B, and
ordered him to kill C, a person sleeping nearby otherwise he
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES 3 1
will shoot B, the latter can ask exemption from criminal

liability if he stabbed C to death.
/ 7J Any Person Who Fails to Perform an Act Required by

Law When Prevented by Some Lawful or Insuperable
Cause.
A policeman who arrested a man who had just killed

another in his (policeman's) presence, at 6:00 p.m. of a
Saturday in a small town in the province, is not liable under
Article 125 of the RPC when he filed the criminal complaint
only in the morning of the following Monday (more than 36
hours as required by the said Article) since there was no
court where to file the complaint. He was prevented by a
lawful or insuperable cause to comply with the requirement
of the law.
Absolutory Causes l^JLûaX^*/

Absolutory causes are those where the actors are granted
freedom from charge or immunity from burden for reasons of
public policy and sentiment even if their acts constitute a crime.
They are:
1. Accessories with respect to spouse, ascendants, des-
cendants, brothers and sisters or relativesby affinity within
the same degrees except those falling under par. 1 of Art.
19. (Art. 20, RPC)
2. Spouse or parents who inflicted Less Serious or Slight
Physical Injuries on his/her spouse or their daughters living
with them, whom they surprised in the act of sexual
intercourse with another. (Art. 247, RPC)
3. Any person who entered another's dwelling to prevent
serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or
a third person or rendered some service to humanity or
justice, or entered cafes, taverns, inns and other public
houses while the same were open. (Art. 280, 3rd par.)
4. In case of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed
or caused mutually by spouses, ascendants and descendants
or relatives by affinity in the same line, and brothers and

sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law if living
together. (Art. 332)
5. Instigation, where the actor otherwise innocent, was induced
by a public officer to commit the crime such that the latter
himself becomes a principal by inducement or by
indispensable cooperation.
[NOTE: Entrapment however is not an absolutory cause.

In Entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the
authorities to trap and capture the actor, already a law-breaker,
in the execution of his criminal activities. Buy-bust operation is
a form of entrapment and the accused entrapped is liable.
(People vs. Juma, 220 SCRA 432; People vs. Nicolas, et al.,
G.R. No. 110116, Feb. 1, 1995)]
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Mitigating circumstances are those which do not entirely

free the actor from penal responsibility but serve only to lessen
or reduce the penalty imposable. There are two (2) classes —
Ordinary Mitigating which can be offset by aggravating
circumstances, and which if present tends to reduce the penalty
by periods, and Privileged Mitigating which can not be offset by
any aggravating circumstance, and which if present tends to
reduce the penalty by degrees.
The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Incomplete justifying and incomplete exempting
circumstances.
2. When the offender is under eighteen (18) y e a r s ^ o v e r
seventy (70) years of age.
^ ) When the offender had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed.
4. When there was sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party that immediately preceded
the act.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 33
5. When the act was committed in the immediate

vindication of a grave offense to the person commit-
ting the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants^
brothers or sisters or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees.
6. When the a c c u s e d acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation.
7. Voluntary surrender to person in authority or his agents
by the accused, or if he voluntarily confessed his guilt
before the court prior to prosecution's presentation of
evidence.
8. If the offender is deaf and dumb, blind in two eyes, or
otherwise suffering from physical defect which restricts
his means of action, defense or communication with his
fellow beings.
9. Such illness on the part of the offender as would diminish
the exercise of his will power without depriving him of
the consciousness of his acts.
10. Any other circumstance of a simila r nature or analogous
to those above mentioned.
Incomplete Justifying and Incomplete Exempting

Circumstances
In incomplete self-defense, incomplete defense of
relative and incomplete defense of stranger, the element of
Unlawful Aggression on the part of the victim is an
indispensable requisite. It is the second or the third element
that is lacking, otherwise there is no incomplete justification
as a mitigating circumstance under par. 1 of Art. 13.
An illustration of incomplete exempting circumstance
of uncontrollable fear is one where the accused, while
sleeping, was awakened by a shot, and because he was
expecting an attack by a group of armed men, shot a man he
saw in the dark who turned out to be an unarmed innocent
person. (People vs. Magpantay, CA 46 OG 1655) He acted
under an impulse of a fear which is not uncontrollable

although it promised an equal or greater injury.
Under 18 or over 70 Years old

For purposes of criminal liability, the age of a person
may be divided as follows:
1. nine (9) years or below — exempted from penal
responsibility. ^^
2. over nine (9) years but below fifteen (15) — condi-
tional liability — that is, if he acted without
discernment, he is exempted. ?
3. over nine (9) and below fifteen (15) acting with

discernment — mitigated liability at least by two (2)
degrees lower. (Art. 68, par. 1) / U ^ ^ X ^ C
4. over fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of
age — mitigated liability by one degree lower. (Art.
68, par. 2)
5. over eighteen (18) and below seventy (70) years of age
— complete criminal liability.
6. over seventy (70) years of age — mitigated liability.
Lack of Intent to Commit so Grave a Wrong

Intention partakes of the nature of a mental process,
an internal act. It can be gathered from and determined by
the conduct and external acts of the offender and the
results of the acts themselves. So, the accused who was
charged with Rape with Homicide, and who admitted that
"My only intention was to abuse her, but when she tried to
shout I covered her mouth and choked her, and later I
found that because of that she died", is not entitled to this
mitigating circumstance, for he knew that the girl was
very tender in age (six years old), weak in body, helpless
and defenseless and he ought to know the natural and
inevitable result of the act of strangulation. (People vs. Yu,
1 SCRA 199)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 35
4^/Sufficient Provocation or Threat

The sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
victim must immediately precede the act of the offender.
A killed his father-in-law who warned him to be careful
because he would kill him before the end of the day, after
he told said father-in-law that he can not live anymore
with his adulterous wife whom he caught in flagrante
with her paramour. He is entitled to this mitigating
circumstance. (People vs. Rivero 242 SCRA 354). He could
/
have interpreted this warning as a serious threat which

prompted him to decide to eliminate his father-in-law
before he could carry out such threat.
sTÎmmediate Vindication of a Grave Offense

The word "immediate" in par. 5 is not an accurate
translation of the Spanish—text-which uses the term
"proxima" and somehow a4apse of timgjs allowed between
the grave offense and the vindication unlike in provocation
or threat (par. 4) that should immediately precede the act.
Thus, in People vs. Parana, 64 Phil. 331, where it was
after a few hours from the time he was slapped by the
deceased in the presence of many people, when he killed said
deceased, the Supreme Court considered this mitigating
circumstance in his favor since the influence of said offense
"by reason of its gravity and circumstances under which it
was inflicted, lasted until the moment the crime was
committed". However, in People vs. Pajares, 210 SCRA 237,
where the brother of the accused was mauled by the victim's
companion and the victim himself ten (10) hours earlier, the
accused who killed the deceased was adjudged not entitled
to the benefits of this circumstance since such interval of
time was more than sufficient to enable him to recover his
serenity.
It would seem that the rule is that, the court must
consider the lasting effect and influence of the grave offense
to the offender when he resorted to commit the crime to
vindicate such grave offense.
"OINTERS IN CRIMINAL LAW
Passion or Obfuscation
To be considered mitigating, the same must arise from
lawful sentiments provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
of the offended party.
While watching a TV show, the ballcaster of the swivel
chair on which the accused was seated broke and got detached,
and so he called F, his stepson, to buy one but because it took
time for the latter to awaken, accused started shouting bad
words to F who finally got up, got dressed and went to the
comfort room to brush his teeth. This further angered the
accused who boxed him (F), and when F got out of the house,
accused followed him, and because he could not see F at
once, he shot him when finally he saw him returning to the
house. Held: No mitigating circumstance of passion or
H obfuscation as the anger of the accused did not arise from
V~ lawful sentiments. The delay in obeying his request to buy
the ballcaster is too trivial a matter as to fairly and justly
cause such overreaction on his part. (People vs. Tiongco, 236
SCRA 458)
Voluntary Surrender and Plea of Guilty

Accused who went into hiding for two and a half years
after killing the victim cannot claim this mitigating
circumstance for in order that voluntary surrender may be
appreciated, it is necessary that the same be spontaneous in
such manner that it shows the intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capturevfPeople vs. Ablao, 183 SCRA 658 citing People vs.
Lingatong, G.R. No. L-34019, Jan. 29,1990)
So also, it must be surrender of the body of the accused
to the persons in authority or their agents. So the surrender
of his gun, not himself, by handing over the weapon through
the balustrade of the faculty room, and the surrender being
made to his brother who was not a person in authority nor an
agent can not be considered an a ttenua ting circumstance. He
MITIGATING C I R C U M S T A N C E S 37
holed in the faculty room, in effect holding some teachers

and students as hostages, as the faculty room was surrounded
by soldiers and there was no escape open to him. (People vs
Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601)
^sT^Spontaneous Plea of Guilty

To be appreciated as an attenuating circumstance, the
plea of guilty must be made before the prosecution presents
its evidence, and it must be an unconditional plea. (People
vs. Serafica, 27 SCRA 123). However, if it is a plea to a lesser
offense—let us say, where the charge is murder and the offer
is a plea of guilty to Homicide, and the court allows the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the qualifying
circumstance, and it fails to establish the aggravating
circumstance that would qualify the killing to murder, the
accused is entitled to this mitigating circumstance. The
forum however must be the court that has jurisdiction
over the offense.
Illness Which Restricts Means of Action

The law says that the offender is deaf and dumb, meaning
not only deaf but also dumb, or that he is blind, meaning
blind in both eyes, but even if he is only deaf and not dumb,
or dumb only but not deaf, or blind only in one eye, he is still
entitled to a mitigating circumstance under this article as
long as his physical defects restrict his means of action,
defense or communication with his fellowmen. The restriction
however must relate to the mode of committing the crime.
Thus, even if he is armless or somehow limping because he
was a polio victim in his younger days, if the charge is libel
or oral defamation, his illness does not give him the privilege
to mitigate his criminal liability for the said crime.
( ^ ^ ) I l l n e s s Diminishing Will Power

If the illness not only diminishes the exercise of the
offender's will power but deprives him of the consciousness
of his acts, it becomes an exempting circumstance to be
classified as insanity^r) imbecility.
Feeblemindedness of the accused who, in a fit of

jealousy, stabbed his wife, then carried her up to the house,
laid her on the floor and then lay down beside her, warrants
the finding in his favor of this mitigating circumstance.
(People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658)
Mitigating Circumstances of Similar Nature

Return of the property stolen is analogous to voluntary
surrender, testifying for the prosecution by a co-accused
divulging the truth of what really transpired is akin to plea
of guilty; esprit de corps is similar to passion or obfuscation;
over 60 years old with failing sight is analogous to over 70
(see Revised Penal Code by Reyes, 1993 ed., pp. 312 to 314
citing People vs. Villamora, 86 Phil 287; People vs. Reantillo
and People vs. Navasca, 76 SCRA 72)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Those which if present in the commission of the crime serve

to increase the penalty imposable, without however exceeding
the maximum period prescribed for the offense.
Kinds of Aggravating Circumstances

A. Specific — those that apply only to some particular
crimes like disregard of respect due the
offended party on account of rank, sex or
age which are applicable only to crimes
against persons or honor. Ignominy which
applies only to crimes against chastity;
cruelty which applies only to crimes against
person.
B. Generic — those which generally, can be applied to all
offenses like dwelling, recidivism, in
consideration of price, reward or promise.
C. Inherent — those which necessarily accompany or inhere
in the commission of the crime like evident
premeditation in theft or robbery.
AGGRAVATING C I R C U M S T A N C E S 39
D. Qualifying — those which if attendant, alter or change the

nature of the crime necessarily increasing
the penalty, such as by means of poison,
with aid of armed men in killing persons
or grave abuse of confidence which makes
stealing one of qualified theft. These
circumstances however must be alleged in
the information to make them qualifying.
The aggravating circumstances are as follows (Art. 14):
& That advantage be taken by the offender of his public

position. (Art. 14, par. 1)
Under Sec. 23,1(a) ofÂT7659/When in the commission of
the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public
position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum
regardless of mitigating circumstances.
It would seem that when this aggravating circumstance is
present in the commission of heinous crimes, it can not be offset
by any mitigating circumstance.
For this circumstance to be appreciated as aggravating,/
the accused must be a public official who used his influence, r
prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing \
his purpose. ^
If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without
occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position.
Since no evidence was adduced to prove that the killing was in
any way facilitated by the public position of the accused, in fact,
it was not even shown whether the accused wore his uniform or
used his service firearm, this aggravating circumstance is not
present. (People vs. Sumaoy, 263 SCRA 460)
However ifCPeople vs. Madrid^88 Phil. 1, this circumstance
was considered against the accused, a law officer, as he committed
the crime (Robbery with Homicide) with the a id o f a gun which he
had been authorized to carry as a peace officer, and he succeeded
in going through the check point unmolested and unsuspected
because of his official position. Where the public position is an
element of the offense like Bribery (Direct — Article 210, Indirect
POINTERS IN C R I M I N A L L A W
40
— 211, or Qualified Bribery — Sec. 4, I ^ ^ T ^ ) , this circumstance

can not be taken into consideration.
fl) That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult

to public authorities, (par. 2)
Public authorities are public officers directly vested with
jurisdiction and who have the power to govern and execute the
laws. They are also called persons in authority. So that if X,
despite his knowledge of the presence of the Mayor or Governor
or a fudge, who made known of his presence to him, still continued
to assault his opponent, this circumstance must be taken against
him. If it were however, a policeman or an NBI agent, this
aggravating circumstance can not be considered, as a policeman
or an NBI agent is a mereâgent.of a person in authority.
The public authority however must be engaged in the exercise
) of his duties, must not be the person against whom the crime is
/ committed, and the offender must know that he is a person in
I authority.
6 3J That the act be committed (a) with insult or in disregard of

the respect due the offended party on account of his rank,
age or sex, or that (b) it be committed in the dwelling of the
offended party if the latter has not given any provocation,
(par. 3)
a. Insult or Disregard of Rank, Age or Sex
Considering the fact that the deceased, Silvina Cuyos, was
already sixty (60) years old at the time she was killed by the
accused who was then only twenty three (23) years old, whom
witnesses saw as if wrestling wi th the said deceased who sustained
fatal injuries at the neck, there is disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of her age. (People vs. Rubio, 257 SCRA
528)
A clerk in the Cash Section of the Civil Service Commission

who attacked the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Division of the
said government office has committed a crime aggravated by
disresppct due the offended party on account of his rank. (People
vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 4 1
Where the accused took turns in hitting the victim, a 70-year-

old woman, with pieces of wood they brought in going to the
house of the said victim, the circumstance of disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of her sex and age is
present. (People vs. Lapaz, 171 SCRA 539)
NOTE: While nighttime is absorbed in treachery, the

aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex and age can not be
similarly absorbed, as Treachery refers to the manner of
commission of the crime, while the latter pertains to the relationship
of the victim with the offender. (Ibid.)
It would seem that for this circumstance to be taken against

the accused, there must be a showing of insult or disregard of the
age, sex or rank of the offended party.
b. Dwelling
It must be taken note of, that dwelling is a building or
struchare exclusively used and devoted for rest and comfort, and
it includes every dependency of the house which forms as integral
part thereof. It may mean only the room of the bedspacer in a
boarding house. Thus, the crime of Rape against the offended
party who was renting a bedspace in a boarding house is
aggravated by dwelling. (People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511)
To consider it however, as an aggravating circumstance, the
victim must not have given the provocation. However, even if the
attacker was outside the house, and the victim was inside his
dwelling when he was fired upon, as long as the latter had not
provoked the offender, there is dwelling as an aggravating
•circumstance. So also, if the assault was commenced inside the
dwelling and terminated outside the same, dwelling can be
considered. The victim should be the owner, occupant or lessee of
the house. However, in People vs. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566, it was
held that the victim need not be the owner or occupant of the,
dwelling where he was shot, since "the stranger, as an invited
guest, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the same
intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for
a brief moment, home to him".
While this aggravating circumstance can not be considered
in Trespass to Dwelling/o^Robbery in an Inhabited House as it is
included necessarily in these crimes (Art. 62), it can be considered

in Robbery with Homicide because this kind of Robbery can be
committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of
the house. (People vs. Pareja, 265 SCRA 429)
4.) That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or

obvious ungratefulness, (par. 4)
Where the accused is the uncle of the victim and who had
taken shelter in the house of the victim's parents, the rape that he
committed against his niece is attended with Abuse of Confidence
and Obvious Ungratefulness. (People vs. Cabresas, 244 SCRA
362)
(jj/ That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief

Executive, for in his presence, (bp where authorities are
. 7 engaged in the discharge of their duties (jar, in a place 1
' dedicated to religious worship, (par. 5)

To consider the palace of the President, or a placededicated
to religious worship, the accused must have the (ntentipft to
commit the crime in such place so that if the meeting of the
offender and the victim was only casual, this circumstance cannot
be considered.
In a place where authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties, it is necessary that jJrtuaj) fulfillment of functions be
going on, so that if the Judge declared a recess, and during such
recess a crime was committed in his courtroom, this circumstance
is not present. However, if it is a place dedicated to religious
worship, any offense committed thereat everfif no)ceremony is
taking place, is aggravated by this circumstance.
I The President or Chief Executive need not be in the Palace tq „
aggravate the liability of the offender. As long as he was present/)
and his presence is known to the accused when he did the crimed
there is aggravating circumstance.
(jLyThat the crime be committed in the nighttime(oi in an

uninhabited place,(oi)a band whenever such circumstances
may facilitate the commission of the offense.
Night has been defined as a period of time from sunset to
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 43
sunrise. (Art. 13, Civil Code). Viada poetically defines it as the

beginning of dusk to the end of dawn (See Revised Penal Code by
Reyes, p. 356). It is not however the period or the time that is
material. It is more of the darkness or nocturnitv that enshrouds
the situation. Thus, if at 10:30 p.m. a killing occurred in a dance
party where the place was bright or keenly illuminated, there is
no nighttime to speak of.
And even if it was really dark, for nocturnity to beconsidered
as an aggravating circumstance^jf must have beeri^particularly
sought for by the accused, or taken advantage of by him to
facilitate the commission of the,erime or to^nsure his immunity
from capture or otherwise to^facilitate his getaway. (People vs.
Pareja, 265 SCRA 429)
So also if the criminal act was commenced while the
atmosphere or environment was still bright, and terminated
when it was already dark, this aggravating circumstance is not
present. Contrariwise, if the offender began to perpetrate the
crime while it was still dark, but finished it already at daybreak
where the place is already bright, there is likewise no nighttime as
an aggravating circumstance.
There is a band whenever more than three (3) armed
malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of the
offense. (People vs. Landicho, 258 SCRA1). Thus, at least four (4)
must be the number (People vs. Polones, 230 SCRA 279) and they
must be armed although the arms need not be limited to firearms.
When the two (2) groups are almost similarly armed, like where
the group of the offended party numbered five (5) but only three
(3) were armed so that there is no band, while the offenders were
^fpur (4) who were all armed and therefore constituted a band,
i there is no band as aggravating circumstance as it didnot facilitate
[tjje commission of the crime. Likewise, if the meeting is casual, the
homicide committed by the killers comprising a band is not
aggravated.
The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the
distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether
or not in the place of the commission, there was reasonable
44
possibility of the victim receiving some help/Considering that the

killing was done during nighttime a n d ^ a n y fruit trees and
shrubs obstructed the view of neighbors and passersby, there was
no reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any assistance.
(People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35)
That the crime be committed on the occasion of

conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other
calamity or misfortune.
v
If the crime coincidentally took place during the occasion
of the misfortune or calamity, this aggravating circumstance is
not present because the offender did nortake advantage of the
situation. It must be noted that the reason behind this
circumstance is found in the debased form of criminali ty met in
one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid
to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of
their misfortune to despoil them. (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil.
150)
8.) That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men/or/
ergons who insure or afford impunity.
The law uses the words "men" and "persons" — meaning in
the plural form and so at least two (2) persons are involved.
If the accused relied on the^resence of armed men, availing
himself of the aid of the latter, his liability is aggravated. However,
where it appeared that appellants Were not merely present at the
scene of the crime but were in conspiracy with the assailant,
shooting the victim and leaving the scene together after apparently
accomplishing their purpose clearly evincing conspiracy, this
circumstance can not be appreciated. (People vs. Umbrero, 196
SCRA 821)
If accused^ upon assurance of policemen A and B that
they would not patrol the area so that he could commit theft or
robbery thereat, the commission of burglary in the said area
where no routine patrolling was done is aggravated by the aid
of persons who insure or afford impunity.
(9 That the accused is a recidivist. ^

The law defines recidivist as one who, at the time of hi^triaL
for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final |
judgment of another crime embraced in the same TiHp of the/
Revised Penal Code. J
Where accused was convicted okKomicioWm September
15, 1983 and there being no appeal, judgment became final on
October 1, 1983 and thg .second conviction was rendered on
October 26, 1983 for (quirderPhe is a recidivist. (People vs.
Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611) " ~"
If accused committed (£heft^n June 1,1990 and Robbery on
July 1, 1990 but after his apprehension, the trial for the two (2)
crimes wereônsolidated in one hearing as there was only one
victim; and thereafter the court rendered a loint Decision finding
hinTguilty of both offenses, there is^fto recidivism^ there was no
previous final judgment of conviction. While he was convicted of
Theft committed on June 1,1990 when the same was promulgated,
there was no prior or previous final judgment. His conviction for
Theft was not yet final. Another requisite is that the crimes
involved must be embraced in the same title under the Revised
Penal Code; so that if the previous conviction is for Homicide and
when it was already final there is a subsequent conviction for
Rape - recidivism exists as Rape is now a crime against persons.
(R.A. 8353)
10y That the offender has been<jneviously^punished for an

offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty (or)for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty.
The crimes should not be embraced in the same title of the
Code for accused will then be classified as a recidivist. Thus, if
A has been convicted of Murder, and after grant of parole
committed Homicide, he labors under this paragraph (10)
known as reiteracion, but he is also suffering from recidivism
(reincidencia). In such a case, he will be considered only as
recidivist, and par. 10 will no longer apply to him.
The previous crimes for which accused underwent
punishment must be at least two (2) in number if the law imposes

a penalty lower than the crime he had been currently convicted;
but if the penalty is equal or greater, a single offense is sufficient.
Thus, if A had been punished for Slight Physical Injuries in 1985
and then underwent punishment again for Perjury in 1986, and
later on committed Rape, his liability for the last offense will be
aggravated by reiteration. On the other hand, if the previous
conviction is Homicide, and later on the conviction is for
Falsification (lighter than Homicide), reiteration is also present.
( l l y That the crime be committed in consideration of a price,

reward or promise.
To consider this circumstance, the price, reward or pro-
mise must be the primary reason or the primordial motive for
the commission of the crime. Thus, if A approached B and told
the latter what he thought of X, and B answered "he is a bad
man" to which A retorted, "you see I am going to kill him this
afternoon", and so B told him "If you do that, I'll give you
P5,000.00" and fter killing X, A again approached B, told him he
had already killed X, and B, in compliance with his promise,
delivered the P5,000.00, this aggravating circumstance is not
present.
Whenever present however, this aggravating circumstance
affects not only the accused who perpetrated the crime because
of the money or consideration but also the accused who offered,
as the former becomes a principal by direct participation while
the latter, a principal byinducement. (People vs. Gerolaga, 263
SCRA 143)
Mere promise, as long as it is the reason why the offense was
done, is sufficient.
( ^ ) That the crime be committed by/fneamvof inundation, fire,

poison, explosion, stranding m a vessel or intentional
damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive or by the use of
any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
The(|)urpose>ri employing the(means/- that is, inundation,
fire, poisoTreTxTTmust be tcT kill the ofTended party to consider it
AGGRAVATING C I R C U M S T A N C E S 47
as aggravating. Thus, where the purpose of the offenders in

putting in flames the polo shirt of the victim was for further
merriment because the victim continued to dance even while his
clothes were on fire, to the delight of the crowd, there is no
aggravating circumstance of by means of fire, as obviously the
objective of using fire to kill the victim is not present.
Under R.A. 8294 which amends P.P. 1866, when a person
commits any crime under the Revised Penal Code or special laws
\with the use of explosives including but not limited to pillbox,
molotov cocktail bombs, detonation agents or incendiary devices
resulting in the death of a person, the same is aggravating.
(Section 2)
That the act be committed with evident premeditation.

The following requisites must be ^royecPbefore this
circumstance may be appreciated: (1) theJimejvhen the accused
dptprminpd to commit the crime; (2) an act or acts manifestly
indicating that the accused has clungjo his determination, and
(3) sufficient lapse_of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
acts.
So, where A and B had a fistic fight and A found himself at
the receiving end despite his size and threa tened to kill B shouting,
after they separated "Hanggang bukas na lang ang buhay mo"
and thereafter forgot everything but when he saw B in the afternoon
of that day, he stabbed him, there is no evident premeditation to .
speak of because requisite no. 2 is lacking. However, if after
making the threat A went to his friends borrowing firearm, and (
when nobody lent him, he bought a bolo, sharpened it the whole |
morning of the following day and looked for B whom he killed
with the said bolo, evident premeditation shall be taken against j
him.
In People vs. Mojica, 10 SCRA 515, the lapse of one hour
and forty five minutes (4:15 p.m. to 6 p.m.) was considered by
the Supreme Court as sufficient. In People vs. "Cabodoc, 263
SCRA 187, where at 1:00 p.m., the accused opened his balisong
arid uttered "I will kill him (referring to the victim)", and at 4:30
p.m. of the said date accused stabbed the victim, it was held
that the lapse of three and a half hours (3 1/2 hours) from the
inception of the plan to the execution of the crime satisfied the last
requisite of evident premeditation.
Where it appears that after the fight was broken up, the
accused returned to kill the victim after four hours, it can not be
deduced with certainty that he clung to his decision to kill the
victim. There is no evident premeditation. (People vs. Nell, et al.,
G.R. No. 109660, July 1,1997)
14/ That craft, fraud or disguise be employed. ^

-Craft is present since the accused and his cohorts pretended
to be bonafide passengers of the jeep in order not to arouse
suspicion; when once inside the jeep, they robbed the driver and
other passengers. (People vs. Lee, 204 SCRA 900)
However, in People vs. Aspile, 191 SCRA 530, appellants
are ruled not to have employed craft since they had already
boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in
exchange for the dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even
without such pretense, they could nonetheless have carried their
unlawful scheme. ^
/ While craft is a circumstance characterized by trickery or
cunning resorted to by the accused (People vs. Barrios, 92 SCRA
195), fraud involves acts, oi/spoken or written words, by a party
to misled another into believing a fact to be true when it is not so.
(Antazo vs. People, 138 SCRA 292). Thus, where A, armed with a
knife and ready to meet B, who was holding a lead pipe, told the
latter that if he (B) would just drop his weapon their differences
would be settled amicably but once B dropped his lead pipe, A
immediately attacked him with his knife, fraud is said to be
present.
There is only a hairline distinction between craft and fraud

and the Supreme Court in various cases has used them
înterchangeably. Justice Luis Reyes in his book, The Revised
Penal Code, Book I, 1993 ed., p. 399 has distinguished/the two
terms, in that when there is a direct inducement by^nsidious
words or machinations/iraud>is present; otherwise, the act of the
AGGRAVATING C I R C U M S T A N C E S
49
accused donejnorder not to arouse the suspicion of the victims

constitutes <£rafjV
Disguise is the use of any device or artifice by the accused to
conceal his identity. Thus, where the accused wore masks to cover
their faces, even if the masks subsequently fell down, thus paving
the way for their identification, this aggravating circumstance is
present as there could have been no other purpose but to conceal
their identities. (People vs. Cotabato, 160 SCRA 98)
If the offender put charcoal on his entire naked body, entered
the house of his neighbor and raped her, the crime of rape is
aggravated by this circumstance.
But the accused must be able to hide his identity during the
initial stage, if not all through out, tb/e commission of the crime
and his identity must have been discovered only later on, to
consider this aggravating circumstance. If despite the mask worn
by the accused, or his putting of charcoal over his body, the
offended party even before the initial stage knew him, he was not
able to hide his identity and this circumstance can not be
appreciated.
That advantage be taken of superior strengthôrjmeans

employed to weaken the defense.
The accused who, with sand in his hand, threw the same into
the eyes of the offended party when they were about to strike each
other causing momentary blindness on the part of the latter has
employed means to weaken the defense.
The fact however that there were two persons who attacked
the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed
with abuse of superior strength. To take advantage of superior
strength means tcVpurposely use excessive force out of proportion
to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself.
(People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37) _
Where appellants' group numbered more than five (5), two
of whom were armed with bladed weapons while the victim was /
unarmed surrounded by the group, with his hand held by at least ^
one, and was stabbed fatally sustaining two (2) frontal wounds
and other injuries, the crime is aggravated by abuse of superior
50 POINTERS IN CRIMINAL LAW
strength in as much as no alevosia was proven as the appellants

did not consciously adopt their mode of attack. (People vs. Daen,
Jr., 244 SCRA 382)
Had treachery or alevosia been proven, it would have
absorbed abuse of superior strength. (People vs. Panganiban, 241
SCRA 91)
The attack of the three (3) men all armed with bladed weapons
against an unarmed woman whose body bore seventeen stab
wounds, clearly shows the presence of this circumstance.
That the act be committed with treachery.

There is (alevosia) treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
^
For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a)
the employment of means of execution which would ensure the
safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the
victim, giving said victim no opportunity to defend himself, and
(b) the means, method and manner of execution were deliberately
and consciously adopted by the offender. (People vs. Malabago,
265 SCRA 198).
Where the accused, suddenly and without any warning, shot
the deceased from behind knowing he was carrying a bolo, there
is treachery. (People vs. Escander, 265 SCRA 444)
Even if the attack is frontal, treachery may also be considered
if the attack on the victim, although preceded by a warning "Tara
Sergio", was undoubtedly sudden and unexpected and prevented
the unsuspecting victim, who had just stood up, from defending
himself. (People vs.'Estanislao, 265 SCRA 810)
For treachery to be appreciated however, this circumstance
must be present at the inception of the attack and if absent, and the
attack is continuous, treachery at a subsequent stage is not to be
considered. (People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 382). However, if there
is a break in the continuity of the aggression, it is not necessary
that treachery be/present in the beginning of the assault; it is

sufficient that when the fatal blow was inflicted, there was
treachery. (U.S. vs. Balagtas, 19 Phil. 164)
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally
or from behind, is treachery if such mode eii attack was coolly
and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving
the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. (People vs. Real,
242 SCRA 671). However, mere suddenness of the attack, or one
made from behind, does not necessarily compel a finding of^
treachery for theVessence of/this circumstance lies in the adoption
of ways and means tha^minimize or neutralize any resistance
which may be put up by the off ended pa rty. (People vs. Gonzagan
Jr., 247 SCRA 220)
(17.") That means be employed or circumstances brought about

which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
Ignomiiry is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order,
which addstlisgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by
the crime, so that killing a man in the presence of the wife does not
constitute ignominy (U.S. vs. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417) but raping her
J n the presence of the husband shows ignominy .and aggravates
the offense. ^
Where before the victim, a landowner, was killed, he was
made to kneel in front of his househelpers, this aggravating
circumstance would be present. (U.S. vs. de Leon, 1 Phil. 163)
When the victim was raped with the accused forcing her,
using the same position as dogs do, that is, theôg-style position
in the sexual act, the Rape is aggravated by ignominy. (People vs.
Saylan, 130 SCRA 159)
The original intent of the accused did not comprehend the
commission of rape. Hence, the crime of Rape cannot be regarded/
as principal offense. But since it attended the commission ofs
Robbery with Homicide, the Rape is deemed to aggravate the (
crime. Instead of ignominy, it is the Rape itself that aggravates the \
crime. (People vs. Aspile, 191 SCRA 530) J
There is likewise ignominy when the accused "plastered"
with mud the vagina of the offended party right after raping
her. (People vs. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511)
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.

In taking away certain valuable articles from the house,
accused entered through the window. The crime committed is
Robbery; but because this circumstance is not alleged in the
information, the offense is classified as Theft. HoweveMhe crime
is aggravated by Unlawful Entry. (People vs. Sunga, 43 Phil. 205)
Since the accused entered the second-floor window of the
residence of the accused, a waynot intended for ingress, the crime
of Robbery with Homicide is aggravated by Unlawful Entry.
(People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA 218)
Where the escape was done through the window, the crime
is not attended by this circumstance since there was no unlawful
entry.
9.) That as a means to the commission of a crime, a wall, roof,

floor/door or window be broken.
The'breaking of the parts of the house must be made as a
means to commit the offense. So, if A entered the door of his
neighbor and after killing him, escaped by breaking the jalousies
of the window or the door, this aggravating circumstance is
absent.
While the law uses the words "wall, roof, floor, door or
window", in one case, where accused entered a field tent by
..cutting the-ropes at the rear of the tent, and killed the victim
soldiers sleeping thereat, the Supreme Court considered the
,crime of Murder, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
forcible entry.
^2o) That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under
fifteen years of a g e ^ b y means of motor vehicles, airships
or other similar means.
The minors here could be accessories, accomplices or
principals who aided the accused in the commission of the crime.
Said minors could avail of the exempting or mitigating

circumstance due them on account of minority. The law intends
to put a stop to the practice of professional criminals of employing
people whom they know could be exempt from criminal liability
or would not be fully punished under the law.
The crime is aggravated by the use of motor vehicle where
the accused deliberately availed themselves of a tricycle in order
to consummate their dastardly act and to use it as aôver to
facilitate the commission of Murder. (People vs. de la Cruz, 190
SCRA 328)
Likewise, the use of motor vehicle by the accused aggravated
the commission of Robbery with Homicide since the vehicle was
used to facilitate their escape from the scene of the crime. (People
vs. Bartulay, 192 SCRA 621)
Other similar means provided for in this article should be
understood to refer to motorized vehicles or other efficient means
of transportation similar to automobile or airplane (See Revised
Penal Code by Reyes, 1993 ed., p. 459) since the purpose of
aggravating the penalty isto discourage the criminals from taking
advantage of the great T a c i l i t i e s offered by modern means of
transportation and communication.
That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be

deliberately augmented by causing another wrong not
necessary for its commission.
This is^cruelty provided for in Art. 248 as a qualifying
circumstance. There is cruelty when the offe \der deliberately and
inhumanly augmented the suffering of the victim.
The fact that the victim's decapitated body bearing forty
three (43) stab wounds, twenty four (24) of which were fatal, was
found dumpedin the street is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty
where there is no showing that the accused, for hisTleasure and
satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully and
inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. (People vs.
llaoa, 233 SCRA 231)
It would seem that there must be proof showing that when
the second and subsequent stab wounds were inflicted, the victim
was still alive because the essence of cruelty is that the culprit
finds uelight in prolonging the suffering of the victim.
In People vs. Binondo, 214 SCRA 764, when the victim was
decapitated, the Supreme Court considered the presence of this
aggravating circumstance stating that: "no greater outrage, insult
or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to sever the head
therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the person and any
violence directed towards it can not but be deliberately or
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse."
Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs

Sec. 17 of B.P. Big. 179 promulgated on March 2, 1982
provides:
"The provision of any law to the contrary

notwithstanding, when a crime is committed by an
offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs,
such state shall be considered as qualifying aggravating
circumstance."
In People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601, it was said that "in the
absence of competent medical or other direct evidence of ingestion
of a dangerous drug, courts must be wary and critical of indirect
evidence considering the severe consequences for the accused
of a finding that he acted under the influence of a prohibited
drug."
However, if the evidence is clear that the accused perpetrated
ithe act while under the influence of illegal drugs, the crime is
aggravated.
Use of Unlicensed Firearm

Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm is not aggravating under
Art. 14, RPC, it may still be taken into consideration to increase the
penalty because of the explicit provisions of Presidential Decree
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES 55
No. 1866asamendedb(y R.A. 8294^Section (1), 3rd par. of said law

says that ifhomicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearjtfi, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Further, under Sec. 3
thereof, when a person commits any of the primes defined in the
Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use of explosives like
pill box, molotov cocktail bombs, fire bombs or other incendiary
devices which result in the death of any person, such use shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Organized/Syndicated Crime Group

The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized /syndica ted
crime group.
V ••/
An organized/syndicated crime group means a "group of
two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime. (Art. 23, R.A. 7659)
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 15)
They are those circumstances which must be taken into

consideration as aggravating orinitigating according to the nature
and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its
commission.
The law enumerates them as (1) relationship of the offender
and the offended party (2) intoxication, and (3) degree of instruction
and education of the offender.
Relationship
Relationship shall be considered when the offended party
is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender, like
parents-in-law, children-in-law, or brothers-in-law or sisters-
in-law. The relationship of step-daughter and step father is
included (People vs. Tan Jr., 264 SCRA 425) but not that of uncle
and niece. (People vs. Cabresos, 244 SCRA 362)
When is relationship a mitigating circumstance? In crimes

against property, it is mitigating, applying by analogy Art. 332
which provides that there is no criminal but only civil liability
in case of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by spouses, ascendants, descendants, brothers
and sisters, and relatives by affinity in the same line, with a
proviso that incase of brothers or sisters and brothers-in-law or
sisters-in-law, they must be living together.
In crimes against persons, except serious physical injuries,
where the offended party is a relative of a higher degree, or where
he is of the same level as the offender, relationship is aggravating,
otherwise it is mitigating. If it results in the death of the victim
even if he is of a lower level, the relationship is aggravating.
However, this rule is subject to the "other conditions attending
the commission of the crime."
(^2/ Intoxication
The ordinary rule is that, intoxication may be considered
either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication
has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if the intoxication is nqt
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime; upon the
other hand, when intoxication is habitual or intentional, it is
considered as an aggravating circumstance. The person pleading
intoxication must present proof that he had taken a quantity of
alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient
to produce the effect of blurring his reason; and at the same time,
he must prove that not only was intoxication not habitual but also
that his imbibing the alcoholic drink was not intended to fortify
his resolve to commit the crime. (People vs. Buenaflor, 211 SCRA
492)
(z^ Degree of Instruction and Education of the Offender

High degree of education and instruction of the offender is
always aggravating, never mitigating when applicable. In a case
for Homicide or Murder, the liability of the offender is not
aggravated even if he is a bar or board examination topnotcher,
and has graduated summa cum laude from his college degree. On
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES 57
the other hand, the liability of an accountant or a lawyer who

commits Estafa by means of "Kiting" oryiolation of the Trust
Receipts Law shall be aggravated since he used his high degree of /
education and knowledge in committing the criminal act. J
/ Low degree of instruction or educa tion, on the other hand is
always mitigating, never aggravating when applicable. Where
the accused did not finish even the first grade in elementary
school, the murder he committed is attenuated by this alternative
circumstance. (People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35)
The rule however is that not only illiteracy, but also lack of i
sufficient intelligence, is necessary to successfully avail of this
alternative circumstance as mitigating. "
In Molesa vs. Director of Prisons, 59 Phil. 407, the Supreme
Court ruled:
"This Court has held that the mitigating

circumstance of lack of instruction should not be taken
into consideration in connection with the crime of rape,
x x x No one is so ignorant as not to know that the crime
of rape is wrong and violation of the law."
Title Two
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR
FELONIES
Who are the particeps criminis — that is, those participants
in the crime? They are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. However, for light felonies, the persons criminally
liable are only the principals and the accomplices. (Art. 16)
By the personal nature of criminal liability, only natural
persons can be the active subject of a crime. However,
corporations and juridical persons can be ordered to pay fine as
a punishment under some special laws, like the Corporation
Law, General Banking Act, Omnibus Election Code, etc. In
some cases, the officers of the corporation a n d / o r partnerships
are the ones personally held liable.
1. Principals
There are three (3) Classes of Principals — (a) Principals by
Direct Participation — that is, those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; (b) Principals by Inducement or Induction —
those who directly forceînduce others to commit the crime; and
(c) Principals by Indispensable Cooperation, who are those who
cooperate in the execution of the offense by another act without
which the crime would not have been accomplished. (Art. 17)
Principals by Direct Participation are those who, participating
in the criminal resolution, proceed to perpetrate the crime and
personally take part in its realization, executing acts which directly
tend to the same end (People vs. Guballo, 16401-R, February 19,
1957). To hold liable thus as principals by direct participation,
they must have conspired with each other (and with other
participants if there are any) and went to the scene of the crime to
personally execute what they agreed upon, their acts tending
58
PRINCIPALS 59
towards the same objective. Thus, if A, B, C and D conspired with

each other to kill X and then proceeded to the house of X, but
before reaching the same, D pretending to answer the call of
nature went out of the way and did not join A, B, and C anymore
when the three (3) [A, B & C] killed X, D can not be considered a
principal by direct participation since even if he conspired with
the three, he did not proceed to the scene of the crime.
So also, if X, Y and Z passed by the house of W who was
apparently not in the mood and upon Z's loud calling, went out
of his house with a bolo whereupon Z tried to wrest possession of
said bolo, and while grappling with W, the latter's wife came out
from nowhere and stabbed Z with her spear, W can not be
classified as a principal by direct participation as he did not
conspire with his wife in killing Z even if he was at the scene of the
crime.
Xr The acts of the participants must be towards the same end in
carrying out their plan. So that in the first example above, even if
A only acted as look-out in the yard of X's house, and B just
accompanied C to the room where X was sleeping, ready to assist
C if the need arises, and it was only C who fired the gun that killed
X, all the, three (3), meaning A, B and C are principals by direct
participation.
Where the accused conspired with his three (3) co-accused to
kill the two (2) victims and the role assigned to him was to kill one
of the victims which he did, he is aprincipalbydirectparticipation
in the two (2) murders. c
Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, there is
collective criminal responsibility, for in conspiracy, the act of one I
is the act of all. On the other hand, if there is no conspiracy proved, I
individual criminal liability may ensue.
Principals by Induction are of two (2) classes: those who
directly induce others to commit the crime, and those who directly
force another to perpetrate the offense. The one forced or induced
is the principal by direct participation.
There are two (2), ways of directly inducing another to
commit a crime:
(a) By giving price, reward or promise. To fall under the

scenario, the price, reward or promise must be the
primordial consideration why the principal by direct
participation proceeded to commit the crime. So that if
he would commit the offense just the same with or
without the price, promise or reward, the one who gave
the price or reward is not liable. Necessarily, there must
be conspiracy between the giver of the consideration,
and the doer of the act.
(b) By using words of command. To hold the principal by
inducement liable, it is necessary that the inducement
be made directly to secure the commission of the crime,
and that such inducement be the determining cause of
the execution of the act by the principal by direct
participation.
Mere suggestion, or a thoughtless expression or a chance
word spoken without any intention or expectation that it would
produce the result can not hold the utterer liable as principal by
inducement. Thus, if A, in response to B who was narrating to him
his (B's) bitter experience with X in a chance conversation, told B,
"Kung ako ikaw eh papatayin ko iyang si X " , and later on, B killed
X, A can not be considered a principal by inducement.
Even if the inducement be directly made, with the inducer
insistent and determined to procure the commission of the crime,
he still can not be classified as principal by induction if the
inducement is not the determining cause for committing the
crime. Thus, if the actor has reason of his own to commit th£
offense, there can be no principal by induction.
Those who directly forced another to commit a crime are also
categorized as Principals by Inducement.
Thus, with a gun in his hand, A gave B a knife and ordered
him to kill X who was sleeping nearby otherwise he (A) would
shoot him (B). If B would stab X to death, A is a principal by
inducement by directly forcing another to perpetrate a crime. B,
on the other hand, is a principal by direct participation although
he would be exempt from criminal liability under Article 12,
par. 6. '
ACCOMPLICES 61
Principals by Indispensable Cooperation are those who coope-

rate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. Like in the case of
Principal by Inducement, it presupposes the existence of the
principal bv direct participation otherwise with whom shall he
cooperate with indispensably?
The cooperation spoken here is an assistance knowingly or
intentionally rendered which can not exist without previous
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. (Phil.
Law Dictionary by Moreno, 3rd ed., p. 213) In other words, before
an accused can be taggedas-a^principal by indispensable
cooperation, he must have^nspirecLwith the principal by direct
participation or must have a unity of criminal purpose and
intention with him immediately before the commission of the
offense, but his cooperation is in the performance of another
act without which the criminal act would not have been accom-
plished.
Where both accused conspired and confederated to commit
rape, and one had sex with the offended party while the other was
holding her hands, and thereafter the latter was the one who
raped the victim, both are principals by direct participation and
by indispensable cooperation in the two (2) crimes of rape
committed. (People vs. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511)
Where A, a municipal treasurer, conspired with B for the
latter to present a false receipt and which receipt was the basis of
the reimbursement approved by A, and both thereafter shared the
proceeds, A is the principal by direct participation and B by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of Malversation.
2. Accomplices
An accomplice is one who, not having participated as
principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous
/ore imultaneous act. (Art. 18)
The existence of an accomplice presupposes the existenceof,
a principal by direct participation. The accomplice does (pot_
conspire with the principal althoughhe cooperated in the execution
of the criminal act.
6 2 POINTERS I N C R I M I N A L LAW
If A approached B, borrowing the latter's gun, telling him

^ that he (A) is going to kill X, and B knowing A's criminal design,
lent his gun with which A shot and killed X, B is an accomplice
cooperating by previous act.
In the above example, take note that while B did not coo-
perate and consprrewith A to kill X, he (B) concurred with A in his
purpose. Had he/Tjonspirej^with A, B is a principa 1 by indispensable
, cooperation. Thp act of A however must have a relation to the
participation of B. Thus, if while B, knowing A's purpose to
kill X, still lent his gun to A, but A used a bolo in killing X, then B
can not be considered an accomplice.
While X was choking Y, W went behind Y without any know-
ledge of X and once within striking distance, stabbed Y. Even
upon seeing the stabbing made by W, X continue d choking Y, who
died of stab wounds. Choking contributed to the death of Y. In this
case, W is an accomplice cooperating by simultaneous act.
If the offender, however, even if performing the acts of an
accomplice, has participated as a principal, he will be punished as
a principal, and no longer as an accomplice.
3. Accessories (Art. 19)

They are those who, having knowledge of the commission of
the crime, and without having participated as, principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the

effects of the crime.
The most common example is a person who, without
having participated as principal or accomplice in Robbery or
Theft but knowing that the property being offered to him is
the proceeds or subject matter of the said crime^bought^Dr
purchased or dealt in any manner with such property,
obtaining benefit from said transaction or helping the thief or
robber to profit therefrom. If the robber or thief requests him
to sell the property, stolen, and he does so and thereafter
given a share, he is also an accessory.
ACCESSORIES 63
Under P.P. 1612, otherwise known as Anti-fencing

Law, any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should have known to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
shall be punished depending on the value of the property
involved. (Sec. 2)
The accessory however should not take the property
without the consent of the principal or accomplice in
possession of the same, otherwise he is a principal in the
crime of theft since a stolen property can also be the subject
of theft or robbery.
A person who profits or assists the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime is also illustrated in a kidnapping case
where the kidnappers ask a persoji--wriO has not partici-
pated in theâetua] kidnapping, tj^contact Ihe parents of the
victim to n£gotiatejhe delivery of ransom money, and having
successfully done so, receives a share from the same. He is
also an accessory.
But if a person being ac.o-conspiratorin theft or robbery,
sold some of the property stolen, he should no longer be
punished as an accessory since he will be held already as a
principal.
© By concealing or destroying the body of tf(esrime)>r th£gf(ects)or

i 'mstrurtmf^hereof to prevent its discovery.
Where A, knowing tha t B and C had killed X, buried the
corpse to prevent the discovery of the killing, he is an
accessory.
The body of the crime however does not only mean the
body of the person killed. This phrase refers to CORPUS
DELICTI — that is, the body or the substance of the offense
(People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil 841). ( ^ j u ^ e l ^ simply
means the fact that a crime has actually been committed.
(People vs. Madlangbayan, 94 SCRA 685)
Placing a weapon in the hand of the deceased who was

killed by his friend, to make it appear that his friend had
killed the victim in self-defense constitutes an act of an
accessory.
Where the wife misled the authorities by informing
them that the person who killed her husband was a thief
who has fled, when in truth, the killer was her paramour, the
wife is liable as an accessory for concealing the body of the
crime.
If A, aftexkilling a person, went to B and told the latter
to hide the(gunjhe used, which B did with the objective of
concealing the crime, B is an accessory by concealing the
(instrumentfof the crime. So also, if X would deliver th£car)\e
had carnapped, to Y, telling the latter of the carnapping he
did, and asking him to conceal the car so that the crime would
not be discovered, and Y did so, he is an accessory by
concealing the effects of the crime.
By luirboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal

qf the crime^ provided the accessory acts with abuse of public
l
functions (or/whenever he author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive,[oil is known to be guilty of some other crime.
If the one who harbors or assists in the escape of the
principal is a public officer, whatever be the crime committed
by the said principal provided it is not a light felony, will
make him an accessory. Thus, if A rapes a woman, and he is
assisted in his escape by a public officer, the latter is liable as
an accessory.
However, if the one who assists the rapist in his escape
is a private individual, he is not liable as an accessory under
this article because in case of a private individual assisting
the escape of the principal, the crime committed must be
treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive.
Thus, if A and B agreed to fight, and after killing B, A
was assisted by private individual. C in his escape, C is not
ACCESSORIES 65
liable as an accessory because the crime committed by A is

only Homicide there being an agreement to fight.
While accessories' liability is subordinate to that of the
principal, the acquittal of the latter does not mean acquittal
of the accessory. So that if A, charged as principal in a murder
case, with B indicted as accessory for helping him escape
hpftjrp hp was finally arrested, and A was acquitted because
of^f-defenseôr that the court adjudged the crime to be only
(Bomicide^B is not liable as an accessory. But if A was
acquitted because of insanity, or the case against him
dismissed because he died during the trial, Bean still be held
liable as accessory as long as it was proven that the crime was •
murder, and he assisted A in his escape.
In connection with this matter, Presidential Decree No.
1829 provides that the penalty of prision correctional in its
maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos
or both, shallfie imposed upon any person who knowingly
or willfullyôbstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects ancK the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases b ^harboring or concealing, or
facilitating the escape of any person whom he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws^jn order to prevent his
arrest, prosecution and conviction. This is what is popularly
known as Obstruction of Justice.
Title Three
PENALTIES
In General
Penalty is the punishment imposed by lawful authority
upon a person who commits an unlawful, deliberate or negligent
act. (People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 431)
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony
shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to
its commission but the law can not impose cruel and unusual
punishment as the Constitution prohibits it. In a judgment of
conviction for any crime, the court should specify the appropriate
name of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code or in
special laws. (People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851)
Classification of Penalties
Art. 25 categorizes penalties into Principal penalties which
are death which is the Capital punishment; reclusion perpetua,
reclusion temporal, perpetual or temporary absolute dis-
qualification, perpetual or temporary special disqualification
and prision mayor which are considered Afflictive penalties;
yrision correctional, arresto mayor, suspension and destierro which
are Correccional penalties; arresto menor and public censure
which are Light penalties; and Accesson/ penalties which are
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or
temporary special disqualification, suspension from public
office, civil interdiction, indemnification, forfeiture or
confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense, and ^
the payment of costs. Principal penalties are those expressly ]
imposed by the court while Accessory penalties are those that (
are deemed included in the principal penalties imposed.
66
CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES 67
In the order of severity and for the purpose of successive

service of sentences, the penalties have the following scale:
1. Death
2. Reclusion Perpetua
3. Reclusion Temporal
4. Prision Mayor
5. Prision Correctional
6. Arresto Mayor
7. Arresto Menor
8. Destierro
9. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification
10. Temporary Absolute Disqualification
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
voted for, the right to follow profession or calling
12. Public censure
The maximum duration however of the convict's sentence
shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding
to the most severe of the penalties imposed. Said maximum
period shall in no case exceed forty years. (Art. 70)
With respect to Reclusion Perpetua and Life Imprisonment
which more often than not become somehow confusing, the
following are their differences:
1. Reclusion Perpetua is imposed by the Revised Penal
Code while Life Imprisonment is by Special Law;
2. Reclusion Perpetua entails imprisonment for only thirty
(30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon while Life Imprisonment does not appear to
have any definite extent or duration; and
3. Reclusion Perpetua carries Accessory penalties, while it
is not so in Life Imprisonment. (People vs. Abapo, 239
SCRA 373)
For the purpose of graduating the penalties in the light of the
68
mitigating and aggravating circumstances present in the

commission of the offense, the courts shall observe the following
graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1 SCALE NO. 2
1. Death 1. Perpetual absolute dis-
qualification
2. Reclusion Perpetua
2. Temporary absolute disqua-
3. Reclusion Temporal
lification
4. Prision Mayor
3. Suspension from public
5. Prision Correctional office, the right to vote and
be voted for, and the right to
6. Arresto Mayor
follow a profession or call-
7. Destierro ing
8. Arresto Menor 4. Public censure
9. Public censure 5. Fine (Art. 71)
10. Fine
A(Jiri6? however, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, shall be considered afflictive if it exceeds
P6,000; correctional penalty, if it does not exceed P6,000.00 but
not less than P200.00, and light, if it be less than P200.00.
Duration of Penalties
Article 27 specifies the duration of penalties. This was
amended by Section 21 of R.A. 7659 which provides:
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 27. Reclusion Perpetua. — The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and one
day to forty years.
Reclusion Temporal. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to
twenty years.
Prision Mayor and temporary disqualification..—
The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and
PREVENTIVE AND SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT 69
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and

one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in
which case, its duration shall be that of the principal
penalty.
Prision correctional, suspension and destierro. —
The duration of the penalties of prision correctional,
suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and
one day to six years, except when suspension is imposed
as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall
be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of
arresto mayor shallbe from one month and one day to six
months.
Arresto menor.— The duration of the penalty of
arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.
xxx
Reclusion perpetua, despite its "defined duration" in R.A.
7659 — 20 years and one day to 40 years — is still to be classified
as an indivisible penalty (People vs. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537), and
should be imposed in its entire duration in accordance with Art.
63 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Magallano, 266 SCRA
305)
Preventive and Subsidiary Imprisonment

Preventive imprisonment is the incarceration undergone by
a person accused of a crime which is not bailable,ffir)even if
bailable, can not afford to post the bond. During the trial of his
case, he is detained in jail. He is known as detention prisoner.
Subsidiary imprisonment, on the other hand, is the personal
penalty prescribed by law in substitution of the payment of fine
embodied in the decision when the same can not be satisfied
because of the culprit's insolvency. (People vs. Jarumayan, 52
O.G. 248)
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive impri-
sonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced,

and his case is not ye t termina ted, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings
on appeal. (Art. 29, RPC)
So that, if the trial of A for Attempted Homicide is still going
on for more than six (6) years, and he has been detained from the
beginning of the trial for failure or inability to post bail bond, he
shall be ordered immediately released, for the crime is punishable
by prision correctional (Art. 249 in relation to Articles 6 and 51), and
the range of this penalty is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years only (Art. 27). But the trial shall proceed so that in case of
acquittal, he will have no criminal record. In case of conviction, he
will not be imprisoned anymore.
The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused
shall be credited fully, to be subtracted from his sentence, if he
agrees in writing to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed on
convicted p risoners; otherwise, only four-fifths of the time during
which he has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
deducted.
The following are exceptions however:
l^y If the convict is a recidivist(o^ has been previously
convicted twice or more of any crime;
»—,
[l) When upon being summoned for the execution of his
sentence, he shall have failed to surrender voluntarily.
(Art. 29, RPC)
t
Application of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
The court must first consider whether the penalties imposable
are Divisible or Indivisible. Indivisible penalties are those which
have no fixed duration like death, reclusion perpetua, perpetual
absolute or special disqualification, and public censure; while
Divisible penalties are those having fixed duration and can be
divided into three (3) periods.
In case the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, like
reclusion perpetua to death (the penalty for Infanticide, Parricide,
Murder, etc.), the presence of one mitigating circumstance would
result in the application of the lesser penalty, while the presence
APPLICATION OF MITIGATING A N D 71
AGGRAVATING C I R C U M S T A N C E S
of an aggravating circumstance would mean the application of

the greater penalty. If there is no mitigating and no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. If there be
present both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the court
shall reasonably allow them to offset one another. (Art. 63)
When the penalty is single indivisible, like the penalty for
Piracy under Article 122 as amended by Sec. 3, R.A. 7^559 — which
is reclusion peryetua, such penalty shall be applied regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance present except in
case of privileged mitigating circumstance such as minority, in Y
which case, the penalty may be reduced by a degree. Such is also
the rule in case of two indivisible penalties like reclusion perpetua
to death. If the mitigating circumstance in attendance is privileged
mitigating, the penalty shall be lowered by one degree. Thus,
when the crime proven is Murder, (the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code as amended
by Sec. 6 of R.A. 7659), and the accused is a minor below sixteen
(16) years old, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
When the penalty isdivisible and there is nei ther aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its
medium period. If there is one ordinary mitigating circumstance,
it shall be applied in its minimum period, and if there is one
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period. If the mitigating circumstance present is a
privileged one, the reduction of the penalty shall be by degree, not
only by period. If there are both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the court shall reasonably offset them according to
their relative weight. (Art. 64)
If the commission of the crime was attended by both mitigat-
ing and aggravating circumstances, the rules (Art. 62) are as
follows:
[y Aggravating circumstances which in themselves
constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which
are included by the law in defining a crime shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the
penalty.
Example: "By means of fire" (Art. 14, par. 1 2 ) s h a l l @ )
be considered in the crime of Arson. That the
crime was committed in the dwelling of the

offended party (Art. 14, par. 3) shall not
aggravate the liability of the offender
convicted of Trespass to Dwelling.
So also,"bymeans ofpoison" (Art. 14, par. 12) will
not be considered to increase the liability in Murder
qualified by using poison.
Aggravating circumstances which are inherent in the
crime to such a degree that they must of necessity
accompany the crime shall not increase the penalty.
Example: Abuse of confidence (Art. 14, par. 4) shall
no longer be considered in Qualified Theft
with grave abuse of confidence to increase
the penalty.
Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise
from the moral attributes of the offender or from his
private relations with the offended party or from any
personal cause shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the
liability of the culprit to whom they are attendant.
Example: X, Y and Z, conspiring with each other,
killed W who is X's brother-in-law. Z
committed it with evident premeditation
while Y is a recidivist. The aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation
applies only to Z, the fact that the victim is
X's brother-in-law would affect the liabi-
lity only of X, while recidivism which is
personal to Y shall increase the liability of
Y only.
However, the mitigating c i r c u m s t a n c e of

abandonment by the husband provided for in adultery
under Art. 333 applies to both the wife and her lover
because their act is only one, judicially speaking. [People
vs. Avelino, et al. (C.A.) 40 O.G. 194]
The circumstances which consist in the material
execution of the act, or in the means employed to
OTHER EFFECTS OF PENALTY 73
accomplish it shall aggravate or mitigate the liability of

those who had knowledge of them at the time of the
execution of the act.
Example: A, B and C agreed to kill X and so armed
with guns, they proceeded to the house of
the latter whereupon A told B and C that he
would just stay in the yard to prevent any
relative of X fromhelping the victim. When
B and C entered the room of X, and saw him
sleeping, it was C who shot him. The
treachery that attended the commission of
the crime shall also affect B and not only C
who treacherously killed X in his sleep
because B had knowledge of the
employment of the treacherous act being
present actually during the shooting. A's
liability is not aggravated by treachery as
he had no knowledge of it, being in the
yard.
So also, A, B and C agreed to kill X and in a
drinking spree, A saw the opportunity and put poison
in the glass of X. B saw (j£j*9T'1' 11 in n il iu i i • 11 l iy A)
pouring the poison while C did not see it and was
unaware of it. X died after taking the poisonous drink.'-
The aggravating circumstance of "by means of poison"
affects only A and B.
Other Effects of Penalty

Every penaltyjmposed for the commission of a felony shall
carryjwithiit the(fprfeitureôf the^p7oceed§)of the crime and the
Instruments^ tools with which it was committed. Such proceeds
and instruments or tools shall be confiscated in favor of the
Government unless they be property of a third person not liable
for the offense; but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed. (Art. 45)
This forfeiture or confiscationôijnstruments and proceeds
of the offense is provided for as arjaccessoryênalty under Article
25. If A stole the gun of B who is duly licensed to possess it, and
74
used it in killing C, the gun will no longer be confiscated in favor

of the government but would be returned to C. If the proceeds or
tools can not be subject of lawful transaction like marijuana or
shabu, then they shall be ordered burned or destroyed.
Complex Crimes and Their Penalties (Delito Compuesto)

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
f e l o n i e s ^ when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
to be applied in its maximum period. (Art. 48)
Art. 48 is not applicable in case of special complex crimes
specifically provided for in the Revised Penal Code like Robbery
with Homicide or Rape or with Arson (Sec. 9, R.A. 7659 amending
par. 1 of Article 294, or Rape with Homicide (Sec. 11, R.A. 7659
amending Article 335) and applies only when no specific penalty
is stated in the law.
Art. 48 speaks of two (2) types of complex crimes:(fH) when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
otherwise known as compound crime, and {fy when an offense is a
necessary means of committing the other, which is the complex
crime proper.
An example of No. 1 - that is, compound crime, is when A
with a revolver shot B, missing him but the bullet hit X who is A's
father. A committed the crime of Attempted Homicide with
Parricide. Or, when in recklessly driving his car, Y hit the car of W
which in turn hit the car of A, the damages suffered by the two (2)
cars resulting in grave or less grave felonies (not merely light).
An example of No. 2 - that is, complex crime proper, is when
the Municipal Treasurer, who received PI 0,000.00 from a taxpayer
placed in the duplicate original of the receipt the amount of
PI ,000.00 and then misappropriate the difference of P9,000.00 is
guilty of Malversation through Falsification of a Public Document
because Falsification is a necessary means to commit Malversa tion.
11 is however, Estafa through Falsifica tion of Publ ic Document,
not Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Document, when a casual employee of the Bureau of Lands
encashed a treasury warrant by affixing his signature thereon,
CONTINUING CRIME 75
when in fact the treasury warrant is not payable to him. He is

not an accountable officer. (Sabiniano vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 249 SCRA 24)
The accused, who, through intimidation, brought out the
victim from her house to a nearby school building where he raped
her is guilty of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with
Rape. (People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596) ^_
In complex crimes, one offense should not be punish-
able under another law. Both must be a violation of the Revised t
Penal Code. Thus, while Illegal Possession of Firearm could be '

argued as a necessary means to commit Murder or Homicide,
there is no complex crime committed because one crime is
punishable under a special law while the other is by the Revised
Penal Code.
Continuing Crime (Delito Contimiado)

A single crime consisting of a(seriepDf acts arising from pne
criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. (Philippine
Law Dictionary by Moreno)
In People vs. Encila, 76 O.G. 5824, it was definedâs-a.
continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by aCsingle^
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force however longâ
time it may occupy.
When the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right
violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a
delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of
a single particular delict, such concurrence of delictual acts is
called "delito continuado". (Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 314)
Where in a train, the accused-twins ran amuck killing eight ^
persons during that occasion, it was to be a single crime of
Multiple Murders to be punished by o,ne ppnaltv only. CPeople vs. ^
Toling, 62 SCRA 17). The taking of several cows belonging to
different owners while admittedly committed through several (
acts was held to be punished only as one crime when done or (
perpetrated during the same occasion.
76
Indeterminate Sentence Law

(Act 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225)
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which, shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
[rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within
Ahe range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
L for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.
Since the opening sentence of this law says: "xxx in imposing
a prison term xxx" this Indeterminate Sentence Law is not
applicable to destierro. So that if a concubine is found guilty under
Article 334, the court shall impose a straight penalty of not less
than six (6) months and one (1) day nor more than six (6) years as
this is the range of destierro provided for in Article 27. The Judge
thus can sentence a concubine to a straight prison term of six
months and one day, or ten (10) months, or one (1) year, or five (5)
years, etc.
v / How to Apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law
To cite a specific example: If A who is only seventeen years

^ l d was found guilty of Homicide with a mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender, the court shall first determine the applicable
, penalty by applying the mitigating circumstances present. Since
the accused is only seventeen (17) years old, he is entitled to a
mitigating circumstance of minority which is a^p^Hvilegedône.
Thus, the penalty of reclusion femporfl£prescribedôr Homicide
(Art. 249) will be reduced.to yrision mayor, which is one degree
lower. The court will then consider the other mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender so that the3»a_xjmjjijfcperiod
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law \sprision mayor minimum
which has a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years.
I N D E T E R M I N A T E S E N T E N C E LAW 77
erm shall be any range of prision correctional

which is the penalty next lower in degree to prision mayor. The
sentence of the court thus is as follows:
"Accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate

prison term of six (6) months and one (1) day (or more
but not exceeding six years) of prisioii correctional as
minimum, to six years and one day (or more but not
exceeding eight years) of prision mayor as maximum.
If in the above example, the 17-year-old convict did not

voluntarily surrender but is a recidivist, then the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence is prision mayor in its maximum
period, that is 10 years and one day to 12 years but the minimum
is the same — any range within prision correctional.
y This Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to special
laws as it says: "if the offense is punished by any other law". Thus,
in People vs. Viente, 225 SCRA 361, the accused was found guilty
of catnapping under Rep. Act No. 6539 and was sentenced by the
trial court to a straight imprisonment of thirty (30) years. The
Supreme Court, ruling that the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies to violation of special laws, modified the penalty to,,
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirty
years (30) as maximum since Section 14 of the said Republic Act
provides that, if catnapping is committed by means of violence or
intimidation, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years.
There arejexceptions to the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Thus, Section 2 provides that the law shall not
apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death
p e n a l t y ^ life imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, con-
spiracy or proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage or piracy; to those who are habitual -
delinquents: to those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence; to those who violated the conditional pardon
granted by the Chief Executive; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of the Act.
78
Accused Mary Rose Ondo, having been sentenced t o ^ e

imprisonment for Large Scale Illegal Recruitment is not entitled
to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (People vs.
Ondo, 227 SCRA 562). The Court also refused to grant her the
benefits of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code.
J Although there is a great distinction between reclusion
perpetua and Life Imprisonment, and the Indeterminate Sentence
Law does not mention reclusion perpetua as an exception, the
courts have uniformly refused to apply this law to persons
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and the Supreme Court has
consistently affirmed such ruling.
V Recidivists are entitled to the a vailment of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law since those disqualified are Habitual Delinquents.
(People vs. Venus, 63 Phil"435)
When the accused iscapecPfrom jail while his case was on
appeal, he is not entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. (People vs. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712)
N / A youthful offender whose sentence is suspended under
Sec. 192 of P.D. 603 and who escaped from his confinement is
still entitled to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. The same is true with an accused confined in the Na-
tional Center for Mental Health (formerly National Mental
Hospital) since their confinement can not be considered
punishment but more of administrative matters for their
rehabilitation. (People vs. Soler, 63 Phil. 868; People vs. Co, C.A.
67 O G . 7451)
v A person sentenced to destierro who entered the prohibited

area within the prohibited period has evaded the service of his
sentence (People vs. Abilog, 82 Phil. 174) and when he committed
a crime in that area, he will not be entitled to the benefits of the
Îndeterminate Sentence Law for the new crime.
Where the prison term does not exceed one year, it is error to
apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the accused has to be
sentenced to a straight penalty.
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is based
o n
the penalty actually imposed, not on the imposable penalty,
PROBATION LAW 79
and its purpose is to uplift and redeem valuable human material,

and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness.
Probation Law
Probation is a disposition under which a defendant, after
conviction and sentence is released, subject to conditions imposed
by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer. (Sec.
3(a), P.P. 968 as amended by P.D. 1257, P.P. 1990 and B.P. Big. 76)
Under Section 4 of the law, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon appli-
cation by said defendant within the period of perfecting an^
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the,
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions at it may deem best: provided that no such
application shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation is a mere privilege, not a right of the accused. It is
rather an act of grace or clemency or immunity conferred by the
Sta te which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law.
The benefits of the law shall not be extended to those:
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum of imprisonment of
more than six years.
2. Convicted of subversion or any crime against
national security or the public order.
3. Who have previously been convicted by final judgment
of an offense punishedby imprisonment of not less than
one month and one day and/or a fine of not more than
(should be not less than) P200.00.
4. Who have been once on probation.
5. Who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable.
If the accused is sentenced to more than six (6) years
imprisonment even by a day, he is no longer entitled to the

benefits of the Probation Law.
However, multiple prison terms imposed against the accused
found guilty of several offenses in one decision should not be
added up, and their sum total should not be determinative of his
eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation since the
J a w uses the word "maximum" not "totel'.Uermofimprisonment^
7 (Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, et al(^243 SCRA 384)./Thus, if A,
having been charged for five (5) cases which were jointly heard is ,
sentenced in one decision for one (1) year and eight (8) months for (
each of the charges so that the totality of the prison term is more
than six (6) years, he is not disqualified to avail of the provisions
of the Probation Law.
Conditions of Probation
Every probation order issued by the court shall contain the
following conditions:
1. That probationer shall present himself to his designated
supervising probation officer within seventy two (72)
hours from receipt of the order.
2. He shall report to the probation officer at least once a
month at such time and place specified in the order.
The trial court may impose other conditions for the
probationer to comply.
Title Four
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
TOTAL AND PARTIAL
Criminal liability is totally extinguished by:

1. Death of the convict;
2. Service of the sentence;
3. Amnesty;
4. Absolute Pardon;
5. Prescription of the crime;
6. Prescription of the penalty; and
7. Marriage of the offended woman as provided for in Art.
344. (Art. 89)
On the other hand, it is partially extinguished by:
1. C onditional Pardon;
2. Commutation of the sentence; and
3. Good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn
while serving sentence.
The grant of probation may be considered as a form of
extinction of criminal liability which was bestowed while
accused who has never been incarcerated, was out on bail, may
thus be categorized as total extinction thereof. However, if it
was granted after the conviction of the accused who was in jail,
it can be considered as partial extinction only. It must be noted
however, that unlike in service of sentence, in probation, the
probationer is still required to report to a Probation Officer at a
certain period until the duration of the probation period.
81
POINTERS I N C R I M I N A L L A W
82
1. Death of the Accused

If the accused dies, at whatever stage of the case, his
personal penalty is totally and permanently extinguished.
You can not imprison a dead person. With respect to pecu-
niary liabilities like fine or costs of the proceedings, they are
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.
With respect to civil liability of the accused, if he dies
after the judgment has become final, the same is not
extinguished and it can be enforced against the estate of the
deceased. If he dies however, before promulgation of sen-
tence, or even after, but the same is not yet final, on account
of an appeal or a motion for reconsideration duly filed, the
civil liability is also extinguished. The offended party
nevertheless is allowed to file a separate civil action, this time
based on either contract, quasi-contract, law or quasi-delicts
(the other sources of obligation under Article 1157 of the
Civil Code). The statute of limitations on the civil liability in
such a case is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case. (People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239)
2. Service of Sentence
When the accused has fully served his sentence, his
personal or criminal liability is to be considered permanently
terminated.
3. Amnesty and Absolute Pardon

Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts,
granted bv the Government to a certain class of persons
charged or guilty of crime, usually political offenses, and
often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty
within a prescribed time. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth
Edition, p. 108)
Pardon is an act of grace which exempts the individual
on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts
for the crime he has committed. (De Leon vs. Dir. of Prisons,
31 Phil. 60)
E X T I N C T I O N O F C R I M I N A L LIABILITY: T O T A L A N D P A R T I A L 83
It is the Chief Executive who can grant both but in the

case of Amnesty, it needs concurrence of Congress. While
pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
Amnesty looks backward and abolishesand puts into oblivion
the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with whichhe is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense. (Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez, et al., 82
Phil. 642). Thus, Art. J # says "xxx by amnesty which
7
completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects/
Thus, if A was convicted of Homicide and was granted
Absolute Pardon, and later on committed Murder or.
Homicide, he will be considered a recidivist. However, if his |
first offense is Rebellion and was granted amnesty and later
on was found guilty of sedition, recidivism can not be
considered against him.
Pardon, to be considered as a mode of extinction of
criminal liability should b&.pardon by the President of the
Philippines and not pardon by the offended party which
only extinguishes civil liability (Art. 23, RPC). Pardon by the
offended party, however, in cases of Adultery, Concubinage,
Rape, Acts of Lasciviousness, Seduction or Abduction when
granted before the institution of the criminal action also
extinguishes criminal liability (Art. 344, RPC). Under R.A.
8353, in the crime of rape, if it is the husband who is the
offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty except when the
marriage is void ab initio. (Sec. 2)
4. Prescription of Crime
It is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to
prosecute the offender(or)file criminal action after the lapse
of a certain period of time, (see Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Book I) Crimes punishable by death, reclusion yeryetua or
reclusion temyoral shall prescribe in twenty (20) years; those
punishable by other afflictive penalties (likeprision mayor), in
fifteen (15) years; and those by correctional penalty, in Jen
(10) years except those by arresto mayor which shall prescribe

in five (5) years while grave oral defamation and grave
slander by deed prescribe in sjx (6) months. Light offenses
shall prescribe in two (2) months. When the penalty imposable
is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the
basis,of the application of the rules on prescription. (Art. 90)
The period of prescription shall commence to run from
tbp day of discovery of the crime by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents (Art. 91). Thus, if A witnessed the
killing of X by B, and since A not being related to X, got
scared, and did not report the crime to the authority, the
crime (Murder or Homicide) will never prescribe. But if A is
the son of X, or even if not related to X, he reported to the
police authorities what he witnessed, and no complaint is
filed in court within twenty (20) years, then the crime will
prescribe, and after twenty years and one day from the
discovery of the crime, no charge can be filed against B
anymore.
The period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him. (Ibid.)
The filing of the complaint even with the Fiscal's
office only (Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538;
Calderon-Bargas vs. RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, 227 SCRA
56) or with the court shall interrupt the prescriptive period. ^
Thus, in the example above, if B was charged before the court /
or the prosecutor's office on the tenth (10th) year from Y
discovery, the prescriptive period is interrupted. If one y e a r j
after the filing of the complaint or information, the -\
proceedings were stopped without fault on the part of B, or /
was dismissed, the period shall begin to run again, and after ^
nine (9) years and one day, the crime of B shall be deemed ]
prescribed since the ten-vear period that lapsed w i t h o u t ^
filing anv criminal complaint shall be considered so that only
nine (9) years and one day would be needed to complete the
prescriptive period of twenty (20) years.
Criminal cases, however, which are covered by the Rule

on Summary Procedure unrigr.the Rules of Court must be
filed with the Court, otherwise, they shall prescribe even if
filed with the Fiscal's office, after the lapse of sixty (60) days.
(Zaldivia vs. .Reyes, et al., 211 SCRA 277)
Prescription of Falsification of Public Documents shall
begin from registration of the falsified document with
the Register of Deeds since the registration is the official
notice to the whole world; but the crime of Bigamy shall
commence to prescribe from discovery by the offended party
or the authorities of the crime, and not from the time the
bigamous marriage was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar since marriage is not property which would be
registered in the place where it is located, and a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into in a place where the
offender is not known to be a married person, in order to
conceal his legal impediment. (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 233 SCRA 155)
5. Prescription of Penalty
Prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture of the
right of the State to execute the final sentence of conviction
after the lapse of a certain period of time.
The penalties of death and reclusion yeryetua pres-
cribe in twenty (20) years; other afflictive penalties (like
reclusion temporal and yrision mayor), in firieen vi5) years
while correctional penalties except arresto mayor which
prescribes in five (5) years, p.<Lscribe in ten_(10)_years.
Light penalties shall prescribe in one (1) year. (Art. 92,
RPC)
The penalty, to be subject of prescription must have
been imposed by final judgment. Thus, if A after conviction
by the trial court, appealed the decision, and escaped from
jail where he has been detained during trial, the penalty
will never prescribe, bt prescription of penalty, the offender
must be serving sentence, and must have escaped, committing
the crime of Evasion of Service of Sentence. From the day
86
he escaped, the prescription of penalty commences to run. If

the penalty imposed is 4eath or reclusion perpetua, he must be
able to hide from the authorities for a period of jwenty (20)
years, or if it is reclusion temporal, for fifteen (15) years. If
within the prescriptive period he should give himselfup, or
be captured, or would go to a foreign country with which the
Philippines has no extradition treaty, or should commit
another crime, then the period is interrupted and the penalty
will not prescribe anymore.
Problem:
A was sentenced to reclusion temporal for
Homicide and while serving sentence, escaped on
jjjjJ K January 1,1980. Hemustbeabletoeludeauthorities
n up to January 2, 1995 to consider the penalty
prescribed. Suppose he was arrested after five (5)
years of escape — that is, on January 1,1985, and
was able to re-escape on January 1,1986, he must
hide for just ten (10) more years. The five-year
period during his first escape must have to be
considered for purposes of completing the fifteen
(15)-year period for the prescription of the penalty
of Homicide.
Reason for Prescription of the Crime and/or Penalty

During the period that the accused/convict escaped, he lives
a life of a hunted animal, hiding mostly in the mountains and
forest in constant mortal fear of being caught. His life, far from
being happy, comfo'rtable and peaceful, is reduced to a mere
existence filled with fear, discomfort, loneliness and misery.^
As the distinguished penal commentator Viada said, the convict
who evades sentence is sometimes sufficiently punished by
his yoluntarv and self-imposed punishment, and at times, his~
voluntary exile is more grievous than the sentence he was trying
to avoicj. And all the time he has to utilize every ingenuity and
means to outwit the Government agencies bent on recapturing
him. For all this, the Government extends to him a sort of
condonation or amnesty. (See Infante vs. Provincial Warden, 92
Phil. 310)
Marriage of the Offended Party with the Offender

* In cases of Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness (SARA), the marriage of the offender with the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed- upon him. The provision of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices
and accessories after the fact of the above-named crimes. (Art.
344, last par.)
In other crimes, marriage of the complainant and the accused
does not extinguish criminal liability. In the crimes of SARA
(Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness), the
marriage must be entered into in good faith, and if undertaken
only to avoid criminal prosecution, such marriage does not result
in the extinction of penal liability. (People vs. Santiago, 51 Phil.
68) If done in good faith however, the marriage benefits the
accessory or accomplice even if he is already serving sentence.
(Laceste vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 472). Under R.A. 8353, the subsequent
valid marriage between the offender and the offended party in the
crime of rape shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty
imposed. In case of multiple rapes, however, the principle does <
not apply. Thus, if A, B and C raped W in that when A was having
sex with W, B and C were holding the legs and arms of W, and
when it was B's turn, A and C were the ones holding W's legs and
arms, and when C was the one having sex with W, the ones
holding her arms and legs were A and B. Even if later on, A
contracted marriage with W, there is no extinction of penal
responsibility because this is a case of multiple rapes.
Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability

Conditional Pardon by the Chief Executive partially
extinguishes the penal liabihty of a convict. It is that pardon
granted to a prisoner which is subject to some conditions, one of
which is that he will not commit any crime anymore. Oftenly, this
kind of pardon is delivered to a convict still serving sentence who
must accept the condition in order to be effective. Thus, part of
his sentence is remitted which he will no longer undergo.
Qommutation is the substitution of a lesser penalty for that of
a greater punishment imposed on the convict by the Chief

Executive. Thus, instead of pardon, the President may com-
mute the death penalty to reclusion perpetua, or if the penalty is
reclusion temporal, he may grant a commutation altering or
changing the penalty to prision mayor. There is no doubt a partial
extinction of criminal liability occurs. The commutation of the
original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall
have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the
former (Art. 96). Unlike in conditional pardon, the commutation
of penalty in favor of the convict does not need his acceptance. (22
R.C.L. 530)
With respect to Gfiod Conduct Allowances, Art. 97 provides for
the guidelines which by its nature may be expanded or
Supplemented by the prison's authority. The prisoner however,
to be entitled, must be serving his sentence. If the accused is
enjoying liberty under a conditional pardon, he can not be
entitled to the good conduct allowances. (People vs. Martin, 68
Phil. 122)
The allowances for good conduct granted by the Director of
Prisons (now Bureau of Corrections) shall not be revoked. (Art.
99)
Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY
Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. (Art. 100). Thus, if A committed Murder, Theft or Rape,
aside from imprisonment, he is obliged to pay the offended
party the civil liability which includes restitution, reparation of
the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages (Art. 104). Of course, if the crime is one from which
no civil liability may arise, like Illegal Possession of Firearm
(P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294) or Illegal Sale, Trans-
port or Possession of Prohibited or Regulated Drugs (R.A.
6425 as amended by R.A. 7659), the convict incurs no civil
liability.
If an accused however was not held criminally liable, it
does not mean he is not civilly liable. In fact, under the Rules of
Court, in case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that
the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist,
the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the offended party. (Rule 120, Sec. 2)
Civil Liability of Parents and/or Guardians

For the crimes committed by minors and insane persons
who are exempt from criminal liability, the civil liability shall
devolve upon those having lggal authority or control over
them unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part or that they are insolvent, in which case, the property
of the minor or the insane shall be liable, excepting property
exempt from execution. (Art. lf)l . R P C ) This is thus a direct and
primary liability of the parents or guardian.
89
Subsidiarypability of Inn Keepers, Tavcm-Kccpcrs, Employers,

Teachers or Persons Engaged In Industry
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-
keepers and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly
liable for the crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulations shall have been committed by them or
their employees. (Art. 102)
A restaurant or movie house owner who opens his esta-
blishment before 9:00 o'clock in the morning despite the
existence of an ordinance that they canopen only after 9:00 a.m.
so as not to coincide with rush-hour traffic will be civilly liable
if a person is killed inside their establishments, and the accused-
killer is insolvent to satisfy the civil liability.
The same rule applies to employers, teachers or persons
engaged in any kind of industry, for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties. (Art. 103)
The_qvil obligations arising from crimes devolve upon the
hejrjs_of the person criminally liable, and the action to demand
likewise descends to the heirs of the person injured. (Art. 108,
RPC)
; Thus, if A was found guilty of killing B, and was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of B, P50,000.00 but
died while serving sentence, his (A's) heirs are bound to pay
the heirs of B the said amount of P50,000.00 if he left properties
sufficient to cover the civil liability.
However, if on account of a business transaction between
the heirs of A, and the heirs of B, the latter owe the former
P30,000, the heirs of the convicted man A, can deduct the said
indebtedness from the P50,000.00 award provided in the
decision, since civil liability arising from the crime shall be
extinguished in the same manner as other obligations in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. (Art. 112,
RPC)
The convict shall be obliged to satisfy the r i v i l liability

S U B S I D I A R Y L I A B I L I T Y O F I N N K E E P E R S , T A V E R N - K E E P E R S , ETC. 91
contained in the judgment of conviction even if he has served his

sentence, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.
(Art. 113, RPC)
BOOKTWO
CRIMES AND PENALTIES

CHAPTER ONE
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
C r i m e s Over W h i c h Philippine Courts Have Jurisdiction Even

If Committed Outside The Country
These are the offenses spoken of in Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. They are Treason (Art. 114), Conspiracy and Proposal
to Commit Treason (Art. 115), Misprision of Treason (Art. 116)(
and Espionage (Art. 117) which are crimes against râllonal:
"seruTjtyând Inciting to War or Giving Motives for Reprisals (Art.
118), Violation of Neutrality (Art. 119), Correspondence with
Hostile Country (Art. 120), Flight to Enemy's Territory (Art. 121),
and Piracy and Mutiny_pn theHigh Seas (Art. 122) which are
crimes against theUaw of nationsÊven if committed anywhere,
the Philippine courts would have jurisdiction over them.
1. Treason — is committed by a Filipino citizen or a
resident alien who levies war against the Government of the
Philippineg(Wadheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort.
No person can be convicted of treason unless based upon the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act(or/on the
confession of the accused in open court. This is a wartime crime,
and cannot be committed in times of peace. This is one of the
heinous crimes specified in R.A. 7659. (Sec. 2)
If the offender is a Filipino citizen, he can commit this crime
even if he is outside the Philippines. If he is an alien, he must be
residing in the Philippines.
2. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Treason — They
are punishable even if they are mere preparatory acts for
treason since in this crime, the very existence of the State is in
jeopardy.
The two-witness rule required in Treason is not applicable
95
in this crime being a distinct offense. (U.S. vs. Bautista, et al.,

6 Phil. 581)
3. Misprision of Treason — is committed by a Filipino
citizen who, having knowledge of any conspiracy against the
Philippine Government, conceals or does not disclose or make
known the same as soon as possible to the Governor or Fiscal of
the Province or Mayor or Fiscal o f the city in which he resides. This
is actually a crime of omission.
4. Espionage — is committed by any person who, without
authority therefor, enters a warship, fort, naval or military
establishment or reservation to obtain any information, plans,
photographs or dataofa confidential nature relative to the defense
of the Philippinesôr)being in possession by reason of the public
office he holds of articles, data or information, discloses their
contents to a representative of a foreign nation. (Art. 117)
Various ways of committing Espionage are provided for in
Commonwealth Act No. 616.
5. Inciting to War or Giving Motives for Reprisals — is
committed by any person who by unlawful or unauthorized acts,
provokes or gives occasion for a war involving or liable to involve
the Philippines,^ exposes Filipino citizens to reprisals on their
^persons or property. Thus, a public officer private individual
who burns a Singaporean flag in public to protest against the
execution of a Filipino maid convicted of a crime in Singapore,
commits this offense.
6. Violation of Neutrality —,any person who, on the
occasion of a war in which the Philippines is not involved, violates
any regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of
enforcing neutrality is guilty of this crime. The regulation must be
issued by a competent authority like the President of the Philippines
or the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, during
a war between different countries in which the Philippines is not
taking sides.
7. Correspondence with Hostile Country — any person,

who in times of war in which the Philippines is involved, makes
correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 97
enemy troops when such correspondence is prohibited by the

Government^rârries ciphers or conventional signs(o^>contains
notice or information which might be useful to the enemy, shall
be held liable for this offense. This is also a wartime crime.
8. Flight to Enemy's Country — an offense committed in
times of war by any person owing allegiance to the Philippine
Government, either a Filipino or a resident alien, who attempts to
flee or go to an enemy country when prohibited by competent
authority. Mere attempt is punishable.
9. Piracy — is committed by any person who, not being a
member of the complement nor a passenger, shall, on the high
seas, attack or seize a vessel, its equipment or personal belongings
of its complement or passengers (Art. 122, RPC). While under the
Revised Penal Code the scene of the attack is the high seas, under
R.A. 7659, even if theâttack is in Philippine waters, there is still
piracy. (Sec. 3 , R . A / f 6 J 9 l k ^ ^ ^ ^
And while Article 122 limits the offenders to non-passengers
or non-members of the crew, P.P. 532 states that the attack upon
or seizure of any vessel, or taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers committed bvianyêrson including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel shall be
considered Piracy.
The following circumstances qualify Piracy, raising the
penalty to reclusion perpetua to death:
Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or
firing upon the same;
^Z) Whenever they abandoned their victims without means
of saving themselves; and
(3) Whenever the crime is accompanied by Murder,
Homicide, Physical Injuries, or Rape. (Sec. 3, R.A.
7659)
Qualified Piracy has been categorized as a heinous crime-
Mutiny on the High Seas carries the same penalty. In People
vs. Baruga, this offense was defined as:
"At sea, mutiny consists in attempts to usurp the

command of the vessel from the master, or to deprive him in
the free and lawful exercise of his authority; the overthrowing
of the legal authority of the master, with an intent to remove
him, against his will, and the like." (See Philippine Law
Dictionary of Moreno, p. 614) _ ' t / A.
CHAPTER TWO
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
When is Killing a Person Parricide, Infanticide, Abortion,

Murder, Homicide, Death Under Exceptional Circums-
tances, Death in a Tumultuous Affray, Giving Assistance
to Suicide or Duel
1. Parricide — any person who shall kill his father,
mother or child whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
other ascendants or other descendants (meaning — legitimate)
or his spouse shall be guilty of Parricide. (Art. 246, RPC; Sec. 5,
R.A. 7659)
If the spouse is the one killed, the accused must be married
to him/her otherwise the crime is Homicide or Murder. The best
proof of the relationship is the marriage certificate but in the
absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered especially if it is not objected to. (People vs. Malabago,
265 SCRA 198)
A, an illegitimate son of B, who killed the legitimate father of
the latter, is not guilty of Parricide because in case of other
ascendants (grandparents, great grandparents, etc.), the rela-
tionship with the killer must be legitimate. The same is true with
other descendants - that is, grandchildren, great grandchildren,
etc.
If A who legally adopted X killed the adopted, there is no
Parricide even if the adoption vests in him all the rights and
privileges of a legitimate child since in Parricide, relationship of
the offender with the victim is the paramount element.
If A, father of victim V, was assisted by N, a nephew, in
killing the latter, A is guilty of Parricide, while N committed
Murder (as deceased was killed while sleeping) and not Parricide
99
100
since only relatives by blood in the direct line are involved in this
crime.
2. Infanticide — is the killing of a child less than three
(3) days old. (Art. 255; Sec. 7, R.A. 7659)
Even if the killer is the mother or the father or the legitimate
grandparents, the crimp is still Infanticide and not Parricide. The
penalty however, is that for Parricide.
If the killer is not related within the purview of Art. 246, the
crime is also Infanticide but the penalty would be that for Murder
(Art. 255). (Of course, since the penalty for Parricide and Murder
is the same — reclusion perpetua to death—as Sec. 6 of R.A. 7659
amended Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code by changing the
penalty, such part of Article 255 becomes a surplusage.)
3. Abortion — Intentional when the offender shall
intentionally cause the abortion (Art. 256) and Unintentional
when the offender caused an abortion unintentionally but by
violence.
The dictionary defines Abortion as an expulsion of a non-viable
fetus. However, as long as the fetus dies as a result of the violence
used or the drugs administered, it is Abortion, even if the fetus is
full-term. (People vs. Pastrana, 21680-CR, March 31,1980)
In Intentional Abortion, the intention to abort is paramount.
Thus, a boyfriend, knowing that his girlfriend is pregnant, gives
her drug to alleviate her stomach pain, is not guilty of Intentional
Abortion if the drug caused the death of the fetus since the
intention of the boyfriend is not to cause abortion. And even if a
husband mauls his pregnant wife in the course of a heated
argument, which caused the abortion, as long as there is no
intention on the part of the husband to cause the abortion, he
cannotbe held liable for Intentional Abortion. Insuchcase however,
he is guilty of Unintentional Abortion.
In the latter case however, that is, Unintentional Abortion,
while no intention to cause abortion is present, it nonetheless
occurred but the offender used violence on a pregnant woman.
Stated differently, Unintentional Abortion is committed only by
means of violence willfully exerted.
MURDER
101
So. if A pointed a gun at a pregnant lady who became so

frightened, causing her abortion, he is not liable for Unintentional
Abortion as there was no violence exerted. If he intended the
abortion however, his crime is Intentional Abortion.
4. Murder (Art. 248) — killing of another which is not
Parricide, not Infanticide and provided that the following
circumstances are attendant:
A. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or means to insure or afford
impunity;
B. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
C. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment of or assault
upon a street car or locomotion, fall of an airship, by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin;
D. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of
a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other
public calamity;
E. With evident premeditation;
F. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse. (Art. 248, RPC)
Murder is one of the instances when man descends to a level
lower than that of the beast, for it is non-instinctive killing, a
deliberate destruction of a member of the same species for reasons
other than survival. (People vs. Tuson, 261 SCRA 711)
While the circumstance of "by a band" is not among those
enumerated that could qualify killing to murder, it would seem
that if the killer constituted a band, the crime is murder because
the circumstance of "with the aid of armed men" is included in
the qualifying circumstances.
These circumstances however must be alleged in the
102 POINTERS IN C R I M I N A L LAW
information otherwise they will be considered only as ordinary

aggravating to the crime of Homicide.
When killing was accomplished "by means of fire" alleged in
the information, it does not qualify killing to Murder unless the
use of fire was employed to kill the victim. Thus, A and B, to
enhance further the merriment, poured gas on the cloth of a
mental retardate who continued dancing even while his cloth was
on fire to the delight of the crowd gathered, are not guilty of
murder if the mental retarda te died of third-degree burns because
the fire was employed not to kill the victim. (People vs. Pugay,
G.R. No. 74314, Nov. 17,1988)
When victims are children of tender age, aged five, six or
seven, killing is always Murder qualified by treachery or abuse of
superior strength. (People vs. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1)
5. Death Under Exceptional Circumstances - (Art.
247) — Any legally married person who, having surprised his
spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another, shall kill any
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injury shall be penalized by
destierro.
The same is true to the parents withrespect to their daughters
under eighteen years of age and their seducers, while their
daughters are living with their parents.
If only Less Serious or Slight Physical Injuries were inflicted,
there is no penalty to be imposed. (Art. 247, RPC)
This provision does not define and provide for a specific
crime but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing
of another or the infliction of Serious Physical Injuries. (People vs.
Araquel, 106 Phil. 677)
It is not necessary that the spouse actually saw the sexual
intercourse being committed. It is enough that he/she surprised
them under such circumstances that no other reasonable conclusion
can be inferred but that a carnal act was being performed or has
just been commited.
The killing or the infliction of physical injuries must be intne
act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Thus, where
HOMICIDE 103
the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the carnal act
but when the latter ran away, he first chased him and unable to
catch up with him, returned to his wife whom he found at the
stairs of their house, no longer in the place where he saw her
having sex with the paramour, and killed her, he can avail of Art
247.
And in People vs. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735, accused, a bar
examinee who killed the paramour of his wife in a mahjong
session, qn hour after he had surprised them in the act of sexual
intercourse in his house, since at that time, he had to run away and
get a gun as the paramour was armed, was granted the benefits of
this article.
The Supreme Court sîd that Art. 247 does not require that
the accused should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the
outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse
in the basest act of marital infidelity.
If the accused fails to establish the circumstances called for in
Article 247, he/she will be guilty of Parricide and Murder or
Homicide if the victims were killed.
6. Homicide (Art. 249) — It is the killing of a person
when not any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248
(Murder) is attendant (even if present but not alleged in the
information), the killer is not the relative mentioned in Art. 246
(Parricide), and the victim is not less than three (3) days old. In
other words, to classify killing as Homicide, it must not be
Murder, Parricide, Infanticide or Abortion. It would seem that the
process would be one of elimination. The killing however must
not be justified under any of the justifying circums tances provided
for in Article 11, RPC.
If a boxer Jkilled his opponent in a boxing bout duly licensed
by the Government without any violation of the governing rules ,
and regulations, there is no Homicide to speak of. If he hit his
opponent below the belt without any intention tn do so. it is (
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence if the latter died as a ,
result. If he intentionally hit his opponent on that part of his body \
causing the death, the crime is Homicide.
104 POINTERS I N C R I M I N A L L A W
Where the accused hurled a challenge to the deceased who

readily accepted but who was thereafter killed, the accused is
guilty only of Homicide as treachery can not exist under that
scenario.
When there is an agreement to fight between the accused and
the deceased, the killing will always be categorized as Homicide.
The shooting of a peace officer who was fully aware of the
risks in pursuing the malefactors when done in a spur of the
moment is only Homicide. (People vs. Porras, 255 SCRA 514)
7. Death in a Tumultuous Affray (Art. 251) — When
several persons not composing groups organized for the purpose
of assaulting each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each
other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and somebody died
in the course of the affray, and it can not be ascertained who killed
the deceased, those who inflicted serious physical injuries shall
be the ones liable, and the penalty is prision mayor.
If those who inflicted the serious physical injuries can not
be ascertained too, then those who shall have used violence
upon the deceased shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods. Even if a participant only
kicked the accused, he would be held liable for the death of the
victim although such act can not result in the death of the victim
as those who inflicted the serious physical injuries are
undeterminable.
If those who actually killed the victim can be determined,
they will be the ones to be held liable, and those who inflicted
serious or less serious or slight physical injuries shall be punished
for said corresponding offenses provided no conspiracy is
established with the killers.
This is what is known in local dialect as "labo-labo". There is
no particular group against another group. The riots in city jails
and / or Mun tinlupa brigades d o no t fall under this article because
f
he participants are members of different gangs.
The participants must be more than three (3) considering the
definition of "tumultuous" under Article 153, third paragraph,
that the disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be
DUEL 105
tumultuous if caused by more than three (3) persons who are

armed or provided with means of violence.
The person killed could be a participant or anybody caught
in the melee.
8. Giving Assistance To Suicide (Art. 253) — Any per-
son who assists another to commit suicide to the extent of doing
the killing himself shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.
This penalty is the same penalty for those guilty of Homicide
under Article 249. Thus, one who, upon a plea of his friend to pull
the trigger of the gun which he himself poked on his temple as he
could no longer bear the pain due to a brain cancer, squeezed the
said trigger causing the death of his long-suffering friend, is
liable under this article.
Even if the suicide did not materialize, the person giving
assistance to suicide is also liable but the penalty shall be one or
two degrees lower depending on whether it is frustrated or
attempted suicide.
9. Duel (Art. 260) — The penalty of reclusion temporal
shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill his adversary in
a duel.
A duel involves or an agreement to fight under determined
conditions and with the participation and intention of seconds,
who fix such conditions. (People vs. Navarro, 7 Phil. 723) _
If the accused and the deceased, after a verbal heated ^
argument in a bar, left the place at the same time and pursuant
to their agreement, went to the plaza to fight each other to
death with knives which they bought on the way, the facts do
not constitute the crime of dueling since there were no seconds
who fixed the conditions of the fight in a more or less formal
manner. If one was killed, the crime committed would be
Homicide.
CHAPTER THREE
CRIMES INVOLVING PRISONERS
Since when we speak of Criminal Law, we always talk of an

accused person who is potential candidate to become a prisoner,
let us list down all the crimes involving prisoners.
Delivering Prisoners from Jail (Art. 156)

This is committed by any person who shall remove from any
jail or penal establishment, any person confined therein or shall
help the escape of such person. If he uses violence, intimidation or
bribery, the penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period. If other means are used,
the penalty is arresto mayor.
The offender should not have custody of the prisoner,
otherwise the crime will be Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners.
However, the prisoner could either be a detention prisoner or a
prisoner by final judgment.
Even if the prisoner is in the hospital or asylum or any place
for detention of prisoner, as long as he is classified as a prisoner,
that is, a formal complaint or information has been filed in court,
and he has been officially categorized as a prisoner, this article
applies, as such place is considered extension of the penal
institution. Thus, if A was arrested by a policeman for Theft and
locked in jail but minutes before the case is filed in court, B helped
him escape, B is not liable under this article.
As long as the person who was assisted in his escape is a
prisoner, whatever means is employed by the person who removed
him from jail is punishable under this law. If a twin brother of a
prisoner helped the latter escape by substituting himself, and
because of their very similar appearance was not at once noticed
by the guard, that twin brother is liable.
106
INFIDELITY IN T H E CUSTODY OF PRISONERS 107
F.vpn i f thp prisoner returned to the iail after several hours.

the one who removed him from jail is liable. So that if A,
pretending to be an NBI agent, asked the jailer of prisoner B to
turn the latter over to him on the pretext that he (A) will
investigate the prisoner, but after several hours of drinking
liquor with B in a store, returned the said prisoner to the jailer,
A is criminally liable under this article.
So also a jail guard who, while he was off duty, brought a
released prisoner inside the jail to substitute for a detention
prisoner whom he brought out of jail, returning him inside the jail
after five hours may be held liable under this article. (People vs.
del Barrio, et al., 4 C. A. Rep. 337)
^Z) Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners (Arts. 223 & 224)

This is the offense committed by the public officer who has
in his custody or charge, a prisoner, whether detention prisoner or
one by final judgment.
(a?) Conniving with or Consenting to Evasion
Thus, any public officer who shall consent to the escape of
a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum period and temporary
special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual
special disqualification if the prisoner is a prisoner by final
judgment, and prision correctional in its minimum period and
temporary special disqualification, if he is only a detention
prisoner.
A municipal mayor who utilized the prisoner's services for
domestic chores in his house, including using him as a cook is |
liable for faithlessness in the custody of prisoner (Art. 223) even
though the convict may not have fled, in as much as the prisoner's
leaving the prison was effected through him. (See People vs.
Evangelista, C.A. 38 O.G. 158)
( & ) Evasion through Negligence
If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through
the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or
m s t o d y of the escaping prisoner, the penalty is arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum

period with temporary special disqualification.
The escaping prisoner here is either a detention prisoner
or a prisoner by final judgment. The negligence which is
punishable however is not such definite laxity at all but that
which amounts to deliberate non-performance of the jailer or
v
the guard. So that if a policeman on guard duty unlocked the
door of the jail to let a detention prisoner go out so he can clean
the premises, but on the latter's third trip to a nearby faucet, he
walked behind the police headquarters, climbed over the wall
and escape, this crime is not committed. (See People vs. Solis
(CA) 43 O.G. 580)
^ Mere order, however to a prisoner to keep close while
answering a telephone is not a sufficient precaution under the
circumstances and for the escape of the prisoner, he is liable under
Article 224. He should have locked the prisoner back in jail before
answering the telephone as there was nothing in the call
necessitating preference to accused's official duty of locking him
back in jail. (See People vs. Remocal, 71 Phil. 429)
( ^ ) Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners by a Private Person

Article 225 provides that any private person, to whom the
conveyance or custody of a prisoner or person under arrest shall
have been confided, who shall ^consent to the escape of said
prisoner or shall allow the escape through negligence shall suffer
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the
public officer, excluding of course t e m p o r a r y s p e c i a l
disqualification provided for in Art. 223.
The offender under this article is not the one who arrested the
escaping prisoner but one who agreed to have the custody or
charge of the prisoner or person under arrest.
Evasion of Service of Sentence

This crime deals with the offenses committed by the prisoner
himself. There are three (3) classes of this crime:
A- Evasion of Service of Sentence (Art. 157)
EVASION OF SERVICE OF S E N T E N C E 109
B. Evasion of Service of Sentence on the Occasion of Disorders

(Art. 158) "
C. Violation of Conditional Pardon (Art. 159)
In all these three (3) crimes, the prisoner involved is only a
prisoner by final judgment. A detention prisoner even if he
escapes from confinement has no criminal liability. Thus, es-
caping from his prison cell when his case is still on appeal does
not make said prisoner liable for Evasion of Service of Sentence.
Article 157 provides that any convict who shall evade service
of his sentence by escaping during his term of imprisonment by
final judgment shall be punished by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. The penalty shall be prision
correccional in its maximum period if the evasion or escape shall
have taken place by means of unlawful entry, breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using picklocks, false
keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation or through
connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal
institution.
This is also known as Jail-Breaking. (Alvarez vs. Dir. of
Prisons, 80 Phil. 43)
It is clear that if a convicted person escapes from his
confinement by any means, he is liable under Article 157. This
article however, uses the phrase "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment" which is an inaccurate translation of the Spanish
text which states "fugandose mientras estuviere sitfriendo privation
de libertad" meaning, "by escaping during the term of his sentence
which consists in deprivation of liberty", so that even if the
penalty imposed is that of destierro where the accused is prohibited
to enter a certain place within a certain period, when he entered
the prohibited area within the prohibited time, he is guilty of this
crime. (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 174)
A, a foreigner, was found guilty of violation of the law, and
was ordered by the court to be deported. Later on, he returned to
the Philippines in violation of the sentence. Held: He is not guilty
of Evasion of Service of Sentence as the law is not applicable to
offenses executed by deportation. (U.S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil. 867)
no
If on the occasion of a disorder resulting from a conflagration,

earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe affecting the penal
institution where he is confined, or during a mutiny in which he
did not participate, a prisoner leaves the jail and fails to return or
give himself up to the authorities within forty-eight (48) hours
following the issuance of a proclamation by the President
announcing the passing away of such calamity, he shall suffer an
increase of one-fifth (1 / 5 ) of the period of his sentence remaining
to be served. (Art. 158, first par.)
If he shall give himself up within the above-mentioned
period of forty-eight (48) hours, he shall be entitled to a deduction
of one-fifth (1/5) of the entire period of his sentence. (2nd paragraph
of Art. 158 in relation to Art. 98)
A convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by
the Chief Executive shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period. If the penalty remitted by the pardon be higher
than six (6) years, he shall suffer the unexpired portion of his
original sentence. (Art. 159)
The condition imposed upon the prisoner not to be guilty of
another crime is not limited to those punishable under the Revised
Penal Code. It includes those punished under Special Law. (People
vs. Corral, 74 Phil. 357)
Usually, the condition of a conditional pardon is that, the
prisoner shall not commit any crime anymore. So if he committed
an offense while on pardon, he has violated this article. However,
there must be a final conviction for the second offense, otherwise
we could not say there was violation of the condition of the
pardon as he would still be presumed innocent.
Quasi-Recidivism (Art. 160)

Any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment before beginning to serve sentence or
while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
To apply this article, the new offense must be a felony, that
M A L T R E A T M E N T OF PRISONERS 111
is, a violation of the Revised Penal Code, so that if a prisoner is

serving sentence for Homicide, and later on found guilty of
violation of the Anti-Dangerous Drugs Law or Illegal Possession
of Firearms, this provision is not violated. The reverse however,
that is, where he is serving sentence for Illegal Possession of
Firearms (or for any crime for that matter) and then committed
Homicide which is a violation of the Revised Penal Code, makes
this article applicable.
( 6 . Maltreatment of Prisoners (Art. 235 amended by E.O.

^ - ^ N o . 62)
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, in addition to his
liability for physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who shall overdo himself
in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner-
under this charge, by the imposition of punishment n o t /
authorized by the regulations, or by inflicting such punishment \
in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession,
or obtain some information from the prisoner, the penalty shall
be prision mayor in its minimum period, temporary absolute
disqualification, and a fine not exceeding P6,000.00.
It is necessary for the application of this article that the
offender be a public officer or employee who has under his
charge a prisoner, whether by final judgment or merely a
detention prisoner, who imposed punishment not authorized
by law or regulation, or inflicted punishment or disciplinary ^
action authorized by law in a cruel and humiliating manner.
Thus, hitting a prisoner by a latigo even if the purpose is to
instill discipline is not authorized by law and constitutes viola-
tion of this article. On the other hand, requiring prisoners to dig
a canal where culverts shall be placed to prevent flooding in the
prison compound is authorized by law and does not violate this
article; but if the public officer would order the prisoners to do so
from morning up to late evening without any food, then this
article is also violated, as he inflicted such authorized punishment
in cruel and humiliating manner.
If a Barangay Captain maltreats a person after the latter's

arrest but before confinement, the offense is not maltreatment but
physical injuries. The victim must actually be confined either as a
convict or a detention prisoner for Art. 235 to apply. (People vs.
Baring, etal., 37 0 . G . 1366)
Q) Abuses Against Chastity ( A ^ ^ Z ^ a r . 2)

The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, and temporary special disqualification shall
be imposed upon any warden or other public officer directly
charged with the care and custody of prisoners or persons under
arrest who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to
a woman under his custody.
If the person solicited be the wife, daughter, sister, or relative
within the same degree by affinity, of the prisoner, the penalties
shall be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
and temporary disqualification.
This crime is committed by mere proposal of immoral or
indecent advances even if the woman rejected the said proposal.
Only a lady can be a complainant here so that a gay guard or
warden who makes immoral proposals or indecent advances to a
male prisoner is not liable under this law.
CHAPTER FOUR
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
The offenses against property are Robbery, Theft, Brigandage,

Usurpation, Culpable Insolvency, Estafa, other Forms of
Swindling, Arson, and Malicious Mischief.
1. Robbery (Art. 293)

It is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall
take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or by using force
upon anything. (Art. 293)
Classification of Robbery
A. Robbery with violation against, or intimidation of persons (Art.
294, par. 1 to 5)
1. Robbery with Homicide — the penalty to be imposed
is reclusion yeryetua to death when by reason or on
occasion of the Robbery, the crime of Homicide shall
have been committed/^} when the Robbery shall have
been accompanied by Rapefoi/ Intentional MutilatiorKor^
Arson. (Article 294, par. 1 as amended by Section 9 of
R.A. 7659)
The original criminal design of the culprit must be
Robbery and the Homicide is perpetrated with a view to^
the consummation of the Robbery. Thus, if A, a hired
assassin, shot B and when about to leave the scene, saw (
the watch of B, and took the same before finally exiting, /
there is no Robbery with Homicide. The offenses arel
Murder and Theft.
On the other hand, as long as the criminal objective
113
or plan^s^cM-ob/ whether the killing committed by

r e a s o n or on occasion thereof is intentiona^bfaccidental,
the crime is Robbery with Homicide. (People vs. Pecato,
151 SCRA 14)
If, after forcibly taking the watch of B, A with a gun
in his hand, shot to death B, who was trying to get back
the watch, there is Robbery with Homicide. The same
crime is committed even if the killing is merely
"accidental, if what A did in the above example was to
fire his gun upward to scare B from pursuing the latter's
intention to recover the watch, and fatally hit C who
was watching from his window.
Where the act of killing was done to defend the

possession of the stolen property even if the said
killing was perpetrated after the robbers were on
their way to escape, the crime is Robbery with
Homicide as the Homicide was perpetrated by reason
of the robbery. (People vs. Lara, 227 SCRA 668). On
the other hand, as long as there was killing when
Robbery was taking place, Robbery with Homicide
was committed, the killing occurring on the occasion
thereof.
The word "Homicide" in Robbery with Homicide

is used in its generic sense as it includes Murder and
absorbs Serious Physical Injuries committed during
the Robbery. (People vs. Feliciano, 256 SCRA 706).
The special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide
should not be multiplied and be made dependent on
the number of persons killed — the multiplicity of
victims slain could only be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. (People vs: Salvatierra,
257 SCRA 489)
The same rule obtains even if Rape and Physical

Injuries ^ c o m p a n i e d ^ Robbery with Homicide. The
crime is to be categorized as Robbery with Homicide,
while Rape and other offenses will be considered only
as aggravating circumstances. (Ibid.)
ROBBERY WITH RAPE
115
Problem:
A, B, C and D robbed a bank. When they were
about to flee, policemen came, and they traded
shots with them. If one of the policemen was
killed, the offense is robbery with Homicide. If
one of the robbers was the one killed, the remaining
robbers shall be charged also with Robbery with
Hnmiridp. If a bank employee was the one killed
either by the robbers or by the policemen in the
course of the latter's action of arresting or trying to
arrest the robbers, the crime is still Robbery with
Homicide.
As long as the criminal intent is to rob, that is,

robbery was the real motive, the offense would still be
classified as Robbery with Homicide eyen if the killing
preceded or was done ahead of the robbing. (People vs.
Tolentino, 165 SCRA 490)
Thus, a member of the "agaw-armas" gang whose
plan and design is to rob a policeman of his service
revolver, but because he fears that said policeman may
beat him to the draw, first shoots the policeman fatally
and only after when the latter lies dead, does he get the
gun — the crime is still considered Robbery with
Homicide.
2. Robbery with Rape—Actually, the law uses the phrase
"shall have been accompanied by".
Where six (6) accused entered the house of the
offended party, brandishing firearms and knives and
after ransacking the house of money and jewelry,
brought the offended party out of the house to a grassy
place where she was ordered tbjjndress and although
she was able to run away, was chased and caught, and
thereafter raped by all of the accused, the latter
committed Robbery with Rape. (People vs. Villagracia,
et al., 226 SCRA 374)
However, if the two (2) crimes were separated
both by time and space, there is no complex crime of
P O I N T E R S I N C R I M I N A L LAW
116
Robbery with Rape. Thus, when complainant went

out of her room about 1:30 a.m. to urinate, one of the
accused grabbed her, poked an icepick on her neck,
and dragged her out of the house and was made to
board a taxi; and before boarding, she saw the two (2)
companions of the man carrying her typewriter and
betamax and then joining them in the taxi, and that
after alighting from the taxi, the two (2) companions
left her, and the man who had grabbed her brought
her to a motel, where by means of force and
intimidation he was able to have sex with her, the
c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d are R o b b e r y and F o r c i b l e
Abduction with Rape. The Rape committed cannot be
complexed with Robbery. (People vs. Angeles, 222
SCRA 451)
If by reason or on occasion of Robbery any of the
physical injuries mentioned in Subdivision 1 of Article
263 shall have been committed, the penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The
penalty is reduced if the physical injuries are those
described in subdivision 2. or those in subdivisions 3
and 4 of the said article.
The Article(263)nentioned here is the provision
that penalizes Serious Physical Injuries.
4." It is still Robbery if the physical injuries^re other
IqAss*^ Physical injuries provided for in Article/26^ — Less
Serious Physical Injuries, and in Article(2&6)— Slight
£ Physical Injuries.
In fact, even if the accused employs threat or
intimidation only in effecting the taking away of the
personal property of another, with intent to gain, the
crime would still be considered Robbery, (par. 5, Art.
294)
B. Robbem with Force Upon Things (Art. 299)

In this kind of Robbery, no violence or intimidation against
persons is ever used.
ROBBERY IN AN INHABITED HOUSE 117
Robbery in an Inhabited House (^Public Building(or)

Edifice Devoted to Religious Worship (Art. 299)
For this Robbery to exist, the malefactors who took
personal property with intent to gain inside the house
or building must have entered the same through any of
the following means:
1. through an opening not intended for entrance or

egress (through an open window or a closed one
which was opened without destroying it).
2. byvbreakinâny wall, roof, or floor or breaking any
door or window (if accused entered the house
through a door, and it was while escaping that he
broke any wall, floor or window after taking
personal property inside the house — there is no
Robbery committed, only Theft).
The breaking of the door, roof, floor, etc. must
be done in order to be able to enter the house.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
(False keys are genuine keys stolen from the owner
(oy any keys other than those intendpd by the
owner for use in the lock forcibly opened by the
offender, (Art. 305) while picklocks or similar tools
are those specially adopted to the commission of
Robbery. (Art. 304)
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the use
of public authority. (If A and L cold the occupant of
the house that they were the nephews of the spouse
of the owner of the house, and because of that, the
closed door was opened, or that they were NBI
agents executing a warrant of arrest, and so the
occupant opened the door, any taking of personal
property thereat with intent to gain, would be
Robbery.
5. By breaking doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other
, kind of locked or sealed fiimihire or receptacle.
(If accused entered through the main doc»r and

broke the door of the master's bedroom, or broke
the keyhole of the door of a wardrobe, the crime is
Robbery.
6. By taking sealed box, furniture or receptacle away
to be broken or forced open outside the place of
, j
r robbery. (The robbers here entered through the
door but once inside, took the sealed box, sealed
furniture, etc.)
The penalty in this kind of Robbery depends on
whether the robbers are^rmedpr not, and thecvaluôf
the property. There is no person inside the place of
Robbery, or even if there is, the offenders did not
employ intimidation or exert violence in taking the
personal property, for if so, Article 294 shall be the one
applicable^Jfthe Robbery be committed in one of the
y<dependencie]&bf the inhabited house, public building or
edifice dedicated to religious worship, the penalties
will be reduced by one degree.
Inhabited house means any shelter, ship or vessel
constituting the dwelling of one or more persons even
though the inhabitants thereof be temporarily absent
when the Robbery was committed, while a public
building includes every building owned by the Govern-
ment or belonging to a private person but used or
rented by the Government.
Dependencies are all interior courts, corrals,
warehouses, granaries or inclosed places contiguous to
the building or edifice, having an interior entrance
connected therewith and which form part of the whole.
(Art. 301)
In the absence of evidence to show how bandits
effected an entrance into the convent which they
robbed, there can be no conviction under this article.
The act would be treated only as Theft. (U.S. vs.Callotes,
2 Phil. 16)
A small store located on the ground floor of a
ROBBERY IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE 119
house is a dependency of the house, there being no

partition between the store and the house, and in going
to the main stairway, one has to enter the store which
has a door. (U.S. vs. Ventura, 39 Phil. 523)
2. Robbery in an Uninhabited Place or in Private Building
(Art. 302)
The Spanish text used "lugar no Iwbitado" which
was inaccurately translated as "uninhabited place" but
since the term "lugar no habitado" is the antonym of
"casa habitada" (inhabited house) in Article 299, the
phrase Uninhabited Place would or should mean
Uninhabited House or Building. (See People vs. Jaranilla,
55 SCRA 563)
A /tore^may or may not be an inhabited place
depending upon the circumstances of whether or not it
is usually occupied by any person lodging therein at
night. Although it maybe used as a dwelling to sustain
a conviction under Art. 299, the jnfomation must allege
that the same was used and occupied as a dwelling.
(People vs. Tubog, 49 Phil. 620), otherwise Art. 302 is
applicable, &*J^-**u
Any Robbery committed in an Uninhabited Place (House) or

in a Building other than those mentioned in Article 299 shall be
punished, provided any of the following circumstances be present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening
not intended for entrance or egress. (So that if the
entrance was made through the door which was open,
or closed but unlocked, and not through the window,
the person who took personal property from the house
with intent to gain is guilty only of Theft and not
Robbery. Where an opening created by the accidental
bumping of a vehicle in the store's wall was made the
entrance of the malefactor, the taking of personal
property inside said store i^jobbery not Theft because
the hole is not intended fc entrance or egress.)
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has
been broken. Again, like in Robbery in an Inhabited

House, the breaking should be made in order to effect
the entrance into the place; so if the wall, roof, floor etc.
was broken in the course of escaping, the act committed
is not Robbery.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false
keys, picklocks or other similar tools. (See Comment on
Robbery in an Inhabited Place)
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed
furniture or receptacle has been broken; and
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, has been removed even if the
same be broken open elsewhere. Under pars. 4 and 5,
the robber did not enter through a window or effected
entranceby breaking the floor, door, wall, etc., otherwise
these circumstances by themselves already make the
act as that of Robbery. In these two (2) paragraphs, the
J/* Robbers entered through the door, and once inside,
broke wardrobe, sealed or closed receptacle etc.ôr>took
away closed or sealed receptacle to be broken elsewhere.
It must be taken note of, that the entrance by using
\ any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public
\ authority is not among those mentioned in Article 302
/ because the place is Uninhabited and therefore without
A person present. Likewise, in fais class of Robbery, the
ojK j penalty depends on theCamounDtaken disregarding the
^JÂ circumstance of whether the robbers are armed or not as
^ \ in the case in Robbery in Inhabited Place.
2. Theft (Art. 308)

Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
) la tier's consent.
" Like in Robbery, there must be intent to gain which is
presumed, in the malicious taking of property of another, and the
property taken is a personal property belonging to another. It may
THEFT 121
be a stolen property but as long as it does not belong to the thief

or robber, it can be the subject of the crime.
The taking of personal property in Theft is without the
consent of the owner or possessor of the said property. Thus,
while praying in a church, A felt and saw his wallet being'
taken by B, but because of the solemnity of the proceedings, did
not make any move; while the taking was with his knowledge, it
was without his consent, and Theft is committed.
In Theft, it is not required that the thief be able to carry away
the thing taken from the owner. The consummation of this crime
takes place upon the voluntary and malicious taking of the
property which is realized upon the material occupation of the
taking, that is, when he had full possession thereof even if he did
not have the opportunity to dispose of the same. (People vs.
Jaranilla, infra; People vs. Naval, et al., 46 O.G. 2641)
Proof that the accused is in possession of a recently stolen
property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the
property. (People vs. Alhambra, 233 SCRA 604 reiterated in
People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167)
Personal property does not only mean corporeal things but
also includes incorporeal property like electricity which can be
stolen by using a "jumper" (U.S. vs. Carlos, 21 Phil. 553). The test
of what is the proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether
the subject is corporeal but whether it is capable of appropriation
by another.
In case of Theft of checks, the argument that checks can
not be the proper subject of larceny because the paper itself has
no intrinsic value and is merely an evidence or token of the
existence of money or property elsewhere, while tenable under
the common law rule, can not be sustained in our jurisdiction for
the Supreme Court of Spain has repeatedly ruled that checks and
pther commercial papers are subject of larceny. (U.S. vs. -
Wickersham, 20_Ehil^440). In such a case, the penalty shall be
based on theiarnount;Jnf money represented by the checks or
promissory note since, while it may not be of value to the thief, it
is undoubtedly of value to the offended party. (People vs. Koc
Song, 63 Phil. 369)
w Theft is likewise committed by:

A y Any person who, having found lost property shall fail
to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner. Lost property includes stolen property so that
the accused who found a stolen horse is liable if he fails
to deliver the same to the owner or to the authorities
since the term "lost" is generic in nature and embraces
loss by stealing or by any act of a person other than the
owner as well as by the act of the owner himself through
same casual occurrence. (People vs. Rodrigo, 16 SCRA
475)
Where the finder of the lost or mislaid property
entrusts it to another for delivery to a designated owner,
the person to whom it is thus confided, assumes by
voluntary substitution, as to both the property and the
owner, the same relation as was occupied by the finder.
If he misappropriates it, he is guilty of Theft as if he were
the actual finder of the same. (People vs. Avila, 44 Phil.
720)
Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or objects of the damage caused by him.
"i.J Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field
where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another,
and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals or other
forest or farm products. (Art. 308)
3. Qualified Theft (Art. 310)

The crime of Theft shall be punished by penalties two (2)
degrees higher if comrnitted by a domestic servantjfor)with grave
abuse of confidence/w)if the property stolen is a motor vehicle,
mail matter or large ca ttle or consists of coconut from the premises
f
of a plantation, or fish taken from the fishpond, or when taken on

the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Art.
310, RPC as amended by B.P. Big. 71, approved on May 1,1980)
THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE 123
A houseboy who stole money from his master commits

Qualified Theft, he being a domestic servant.
If the offense is to be qualified by "abuse of confidence", the
abuse must be grave, like an accused who was offered food and
allowed to sleep in the house of the complainant out of the latter's
pity and charity, but stole the latter's money in his house when he
left the place.
Where accused who are employees of the offended party
enjoying free access to the different places and parts of the
establishment, steal and carry away several liters of gasoline
which they received from complainant's supplier with the task of
selling them to custpmers, they are liable for Qualified Theft
committed through Grave Abuse of Confidence. (Cortez vs. Court
of Appeals, 245 SCRA 198)
An Assistant Agent In Charge and Acctg. Cashier of the PNB
entrusted with and accountable for all its collections and deposits
including equipment and supplies, was accused of having taken
PI 26,190.00 found in his drawer. It was held that the crime of Theft
is qualified by the relation of trust between the accused and the
PNB creating a high degree of confidence which the former
gravely abused. He willfully took advantage of his position, his
knowledge of the safe combinations and his physical possession
of the money to carry out and consummate the Theft. (People vs.
Jacalan, 230 SCRA 1)
4. Theft of Motor Vehicle

When the subject is motor vehicle, the Theft becomes qualified.
Under R.A. 6539, Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, the term motor
vehicle includes, within its protection, any vehicle which uses the
streets, with or without the required license, or any vehicle which
is motorized using the streets, such as a motorized tricycle. (Izon
vs. People, 107 SCRA 123)
In People vs. Chao, 17592-CR, Feb. 13,1976, it was said that
the term "motor vehicle" includes all vehicles propelled bv power
other than muscular power including a motorcycle. The phrase as
used in Article 310, Revised Penal Code is so general and generic y
that it can embrace any and all kinds of vehicles which operate by
the use of a motor. /
R.A. 6539 defines "carnapping" as the taking, with intent to

gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent/orjb y means of violence aga inst or in timida t ion of persons,
^VisingTorce upon things.
^ Thus, the taking of a motor vehicle which would be Qualified
Theft if committed without the owner's or possessor's consent,
I and Robbery if with violence against or intimidation of persons or
with force upon things, can be punished now as Carnapping.
/Under Section 14, the penalty of imprisonment irrespective of
the value of the motor vehicle is for not less than fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months and not more than seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months when committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment
of not less than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months and not
more than thirty (30) years when committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The
penalty will be life imprisonment to death when the owner, driver
''or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the
commission of the Carnapping.
^JS. Brigandage (Art. 306)

When more-than three (3) armed persons form a band of
robbers for thejmrpose^f committing robbery in the highway^r)
kidnapping for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom(oj> for
any other purpose to be attained by means of force and violence,
they shall be deemed highway robbers or brigands.
^ This is the crime called Brigandage. The penalty is prision
mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period but if they commit offenses punishable by higher penalties,
they shall also suffer such higher penalties. The arms carried by
them need not necessarily be firearms - any deadly weapon is
sufficient. However, in case firearms are the ones carried or
possessed by the offenders, and any of them is unlicensed, it shall
be presumed that said persons are highway robbers or brigands.
Under Article 307. any person knowingly and in any manner
aiding, abetting or protecting a band of brigands, or giving them
information of the movement of the police a u t h o r i t i e s n r a r q n i r i n g
BRIGANDAGE 125
or receiving the property taken by such brigands is liable for the

crime of Aiding and Abetting a band of brigands and shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium period to prision
mayor in its minimum period.
Presidential Decree 532 is a modification of Articles 306 and
307 of the Revised Penal Code on Brigandage which is committed
by more than three persons. According to the late Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino, as i t is committed by a cuadrilla, Brigandage is
sometimes confounded with the robo en cuadrilla in Article 295 of
the same Code. The clear indication is that the number of offenders,
as well as the frequency with which they perpetrate robbery may
determine whether a crime is simple RobberVorHighway Robbery
as defined in P.D. 532. (People vs. Sandovair254 SCRA 436)
In People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85, the Supreme Court
ruled that P.D. 532 punishes as Highway Robbery or Brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately,
against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined
therein and not acts of robbery committed against only a pre-
determined or particular victim as the pre-ambular clauses of
P.D. 532 provide:
"Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies

reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredations upon persons x x x who travel from one
place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order
and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic
and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either
piracy or highway robbery/brigandage x x x condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries;
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements
be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredations x x x."
In People vs. Sandoval, supra citing the Puno case, the Court
said that P.P. 532 treats of "highway robbery/brigandage" or
"indiscriminate highway robbery". Thus, if there is a particular
victim specified by the robbers who are more than three and
armed, the crime is Robbery in band (Artf296^RPC) unless there

is clear proof that this band had been engaging in committing
robberies in Philippine highways.
o
It does not mean however that to constitute violation of P.D.
532, there must be a band. One or two persons can be held liable
under this law if they perpetrated their acts of depredation in
Philippine Highways against persons who are not pre-determined
victims. ^
P.r3.532jzlefines Highway Robbery/Brigandage as the seizure
of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes,
(*or)the taking away of the property of another by means of violence
against or intimidation of personsfor force upon things or other
unlawful means committed by/flr\y>person on any Philippine
Highway.
6. Usurpation of Real Rights (Art. 312)

Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, shall take possession of any real property, or shall
usurp any real rights in property belonging to ano ther, in addition
to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him,
shall be punished by a fine ranging from 50% to 100% of the gain
which he shall have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
Since this is a crime against property, there must be intent to
gain. In the absence of the intent to gain, the act may constitute
Coercion. This crime deals with real property unlike Theft or
Robbery.
In one case (People vs. Dimacutak, et al., CA 51 O.G. 1389),
where the offenders employed stealth in securing possession of
the land occupied by the offended party, the Court ruled that the
acts gave rise only to a civil action.
If the accused however is the owner of the property which he
usurped from the possessor, he can not be held liable for
Usurpation. (US vs. Frester, 2 Phil. 695)
Another crime under Usurpation is Altering Boundaries or
Landmarks (Art. 313) which punishes the altering of boundary
marks or monuments of towns, provinces or estates or any mark
intended to designate boundaries of places.
ESTAFA 127
7. Culpable Or Fraudulent Insolvency (Art. 314)

Any person who shall abscond with his property to the
prejudice of his creditors shall be punished by prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. If he
is a merchant, the penalty is prision mayor in its full extent.
Accused concealed his property fraudulently but it turned
out that he has some other property with which to satisfy his
obligation. He is not liable under this article.
8. Estafa (Swindling) (Art. 315) . ^ ^ ^ tAjidL , fbu^tut/

Any person who shaljdefrau^bnother b y any of the following
means shall be guilty of Swindling (Estafa):
With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
n j a. By altering the substance, quality or quantity of
anything of valuevyj\ichjhe offender shall deliver
fJff by virtue of an'ôbTigatlun to do so, even though
s u c n
sJl (/JLAXLO obligation he based on an immoral or illegal
J consideration.
b. /Ryrnigapprr>pri^tjn£nrfr^n\yprting. to thpprpjudirp
' • ^(_J[ V of another, money, goods or any other personal
lU^-' , \ propertj^recervecpby the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any
'^CAJA^- (_ other obligation mvolving^the duty to make
Q fjj" delivery of or to return th^sarngj even though such
obligation be to^LJy or partially guaranteed by a
A. bondô^by denymg having received such money,
jj> goods or other property.
k £ c. By taking advantage of the signature of the offended
ty*^"" v\ party inblank, and by writing any document above
^V*"^ such signature in blank to the prejudice of the
A offended party or any third person.
\t J**
fl) By means of any of the following false pretenses(oO
f y fraudulent acts executed fjmosô or simultaneously
MJLXL^ with the cornmission of the fraud:
By using a fictitious name, (br)falsely pretending

to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imagi-
nary transactions; pr)by means of other similar
deceits.
By altering the quality, fineness, or weight of
anything pertaining to his art or business;
By pretending to have bribed any Government
employee without prejudice to the action for
calumny, which the offended party may deem
proper to bring against the offender.
By postdating a check,^îssuing a check in pay-
ment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank,/or his funds deposited
^)f)k therein were pot sufficient to cover the amount
" v _ _ S of the check. The failure of the ^drawgrôf the
ofiA check to deposit tKe amount necessary to cover
$4ffr his check within three (3) days from receipt of
t
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
j? that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shallbe prima facie evidence
j U / ^ X >pf /deceilônstituting false pretense or fraudulent
, \ O*^ /-)(eJ) obtaining ar

By obtaining any food, refreshment or accom-
modation at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding
house, lodging house, or apartment house and the
like without paying therefor, with intent to defraud
.~ the proprietor or manager thereof, or by obtaining
(2) credit at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house_or apajiment house by the use of
any pre tense forlbv abandoning or surreptitiously
removing any part of his baggage from a hotel, inn,
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house or
apartment house after obtaining credit, food,
refreshment or accommodation therein, without
paving for his food, refreshment or accommo-
dation.
ESTAFA 1 2 9
Through any of the following fraudulent means:

/a^ By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign
^ any document;
fb) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure
success in a gambling game;
By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole
or in part, any court record, office files, document
o r any other papers. / /
In general, the elements of Estafa are as follows:
1. That the accused^defrauded)another by abuse of
confidence (or/by means of deceit, and . - .^n fl.
2. Thatâmagejpr prejudice capable of pecuniary esti-
mation is caused to the offended party or third party.
When the accused deceived the complainants into believing
that there were indeed jobs waiting for them in Taiwan, and the
latter sold their carabaos, mortgaged or sold their parcels of land
and even contracted loans to raise the P40,000.00 placement fee
required of them by the accused, the assurances given by the latter
made the complainantspart with whatever resources they had,
clearly establishJngêcelf)and(5amagejwhich constitute the
elements of Estafa. Of course, accused was held liable too for
Illegal Recruitment since it was proven that he was not authorized
or licensed to engage in recruitment activities. (People vs. Bautista,
241 SCRA 216)
Thus, where accused is bound by virtue of a contract of
sale, payment having been received to deliver first class of rice -
say milagrosa - but delivered an inferior kind, or that he bound
himself to deliver one thousand sacks but delivered less than one
thousand because other sacks were filled with different materials,
he is guilty of Estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence b y /
altering the quantity or quality of any thing of value by virtue ory.
an obligation to do so.
Failure t((jeturn)a dump truck which was delivered to the
accused by virtue of a deed ofjease after the expiration of the lease
contract and despite demands would constitute Estafa by
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the subject of
the obligation. (See Manahan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 255

SCRA 202)
The accused received iir^truspthe money from the
complainants for the particular purpose of investing the same
with the Philtrust Investment Corp. with the obligation to make
delivery thereof upon demand but failed to return the same
despite demands. It was admitted that she used the money for her
business. Accused is guilty of Estafa through Misappropriation.
(Article 315,1(b); (Fontanilla vs. People, et al., 258 SCRA 460)
A money market transaction however partakes of the nature
of ^loanjand non-payment thereof would not give rise to criminal
liability for Estafa through misappropriation or conversion. In
money market placements, the unpaid investor should institute
against the middleman or dealer, before the ordinary courts, a
simple action for recovery of the amount he had invested, and if
there is allegation of fraud, the proper forum would be the
/Securities and Exchange Commission. (Sesbreno vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 240 SCRA 606)
Under P.D. No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts
Law, the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust
receipt, to the extent of the amount owing to the entrustor, or as
appears in the trust receipt, or his failure to return said goods,
documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in
accordance with the terms of the trust receipt, shall constitute
Estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code.
The act of the accused in signing somebody else's name,

without permission from the person concerned, to secure 100
sacks of rice that belonged to the latter to be delivered by NARIC,
constitutes Estafa since the NARIC had to deliver again another
100 sacks of rice to the real buyer. (People vs. Francisco, 98 Phil.
241)
Falsely pretending to possess power, influence, property,

credit, business or imaginary transaction, acquiring money or
anything of value as a result thereof to the damage of another or
a third person is also Estafa.
ESTAFA B Y M E A N S O F I S S U A N C E O F C H E C K S 131
The representation that accused possessed influence, to

deceive and inveigle the complainant into parting with his
money must however be false to constitute deceit under No. 2
of Article 315, RPC. (De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
265 SCRA 299)
Estafa by Means of Issuance of^Checks

It is necessary that the offender knew that his check had no
sufficient funds in th^F3ANK (his failure to cover the amount of the
check within three (3) days from notice creates ^ prima facie
evidence of deceit) and that the same was i s s u e d T i o t in payment
of a pre-existing obligation.
T h u s , J ^ A issued a check in favor of B for a debt he has
incurred a month or so ago, the dishonor of the check for
insufficiency of funds in thebank-does not constitute Estafa. But
if A told B to deliver to hirrf^Q,000X)0Vid he (A) would issue in
his favor a check in the sum of PI1,000.00 as it was a Sunday and
1
he (A) needed the cash urgently, and B gave his P10,000.00 having
in mind the profit of P1.000.Q0 when he encashes the check the
following Monday, and the check bounced when deposited, A
can be held liable for Estafa. In such a case, it was clear that B
would not have parted with his P10,000.00 were it nor for the
issuance of A's check. / I
Batas Pambansa Big. 22 however provides:
Sec. 1. Any person who makes or dfawsand issues

umylcheck to apply on account or foyvarue, knowing at J£ ^ v
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds ^

in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon-its presentment, which check is Ufi
subsequently dishonored by the.drawee bank for <0
insufficiency of funds or credit (or)vvould have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, 'r
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop '
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty davs b u t n o t more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Peso^Qjf both such fine and

imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The offender here is thac^rawer or rrtaker)of the check who

issued it. Thus, if A draws or makes a check and delivers it to &
who in turn uses said check as his payment for a debt he incurred
in favor of C, and the check is dishonored, B can not be held liable
since he is not a drawer nor a maker. He only issued the check. It
is A who violates B.P. Big. 22. Even if it were only a memorandum
check with the word "memorandum" or "memo" or "mem"
which in commercial parlance would mean that it is only an
evidence of debt against the drawer not intended to be presented
for payment, A is liable (People vs. Nitafan, et al., 215 SCRA 79),
or even if it were a check drawn against the dollar account of A
with a foreign bank (drawn and issued in the Philippines though
payable outside) since the law does not distinguish between
foreign and local checks (De Villa vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
195 SCRA 722), or even if Mr. A told the payee that his check has
no sufficient funds and should not be deposited in bank, he i s '
liable nonetheless, for the knowledge of the payee of the lack or /
insufficiency of the funds with the drawee bank is immaterial \
since deceit is not an essential element of the offense. (Cruz vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 233 SCRA 301)
The fact likewise, that the check is a cross check or is restricted/,
is of no moment, for the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of ]
âbad check. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum'
prohibitum. The mischief created by unfunded checks in circulation
is injurious not only to the payee or holder but to the public a_s~
well. This harmful practice can very well pollute the channels of i
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually 1
hurt the welfare of society and public interest. _
In fact, under the second paragraph of Section 1 of this law,
the maker or drawer is liable even if he had sufficient funds at the
time he made or drew and issued his check, if he fails to maintain
a credit for a period of ninety (90) days. Thus, it provides:
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any

person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with
ESTAFA T H R O U G H F R A U D U L E N T M E A N S 133
the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a

check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain
a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank."
Presidential Decree No.. 818 increases the penalty for Estafa

committed by issuinglor postdating checks [Art. 315, par. 2 (d)]. It
does not apply to thoseacts committed before October 22,1975 as
the said law took effect on October 22,1975. (People vs. Villaraza,
81 SCRA 95)
B. Estafa Through Fraudulent Means

A induced an illitera te owner who was desirous of mortgaging
his property for a certain amount, to sign a document which he
believed was only a power of attorney but in truth was a deed of
sale. A is guilty of Estafa under paragraph 3(a) and the damage
could consist at least in the disturbance in property rights. (U.S.
vs. Malong, 36 Phil. 821)
Failure to pay food or accommodation in a hotel, restaurant
or inn usually gives rise to civil liability but if the intent to defraud
is clear like a surreptitious removal of baggage from the hotel, or
resorting to deceitful means to evade payment, the act shall be
punished criminally as Estafa.
When a lawyer, pretending to verify a certain pleading in a
case pending before a court, borrows the folder of the case, and
removes or destroys a document which constitutes evidence in
the said case, said lawyer is guilty of Estafa under par. 3(c) of
, Article 315, RPC.
f
?
C . Distinctions Between and Among Robbery, Theft and
Estafa
1. While only personal property is involved in Robbery
and Theft, in Estafa, the subject matter may be real
property.
2. In Robbery, the taking of personal property is effected
by means of force upon things or violence against or

intimidation of persons; not so in Theft and Estafa.
3. In Theft and Estafa, the penalty depends on the amount
involved which is not necessarily so in Robbery,
particularly in Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons.
4. In Estafa, the offender receives the property, while
in Theft or Robbery, he takes foe same without the
consent of the owner by using threats, intimidation
or violence.
NOTE: The crime is Theft even if the property was deli-

vered to the offender by the owner or possessor, if the latter
expects an immediate return of the property delivered, that is,
he delivered only the physical or material possession of the
property. (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000). However, if what was
delivered was juridical possession of the property, that is, a
situa tion where the person to whom it was delivered can set of f his
right to possess even as against the owner, and the latter should
n o t be expecting the immediate return of the property, the
misappropriation or taking of that property is Estafa. (U.S. vs.
Figueroa, 22 Phil. 270)
9. Other Forms of Swindling (Art. 316)

This kind of Estafa is committed by any of the following
means^
1 . J By conveying, selling, encumbering or mortgaging any
real property by pretending to be owner thereof;
®2j By disposing real property knowing it to be encumbered

even if the encumbrance be not recorded;
3y By wrongfully taking personal property from its
lawful possessor to the prejudice of the latter or a
third person;
By accepting any compensation given to him under the
belief it was in payment of services or labor when he did
not actually perform such services or labor;
ARSON 135
By selling, mortgaging or in any manner encumbering

real property while being a surety in bond without
express authority from the court or before being relieved
from the obligation.
10. Arson (Art. 320 to 326-B as amended by P.D. No. 1613 and
R.A. 7659)
After considering all the articles involving arson, it would
seem that the appropriate definition of this crime is that it is
a, malicious destruction ofj'ealjbropertv by means of fire. If
the property burned is personal propertyêxcepptrain, air-
plane, vessel, watercraft or conveyance fortransportation of
persons or property (fee. 2 of P.D. 1613 as amended by Sec. 10 of
R.A. 7659), in motion, it would seem that the crime is malicious
mischief.
' In the following Cases, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death, and the crime is known as Destructive Arson:
0 1f the property burned is one or more buildings or

edifices, (or)as a result of simultaneous burnings (or)
committed on several occasions;
If it is abuilding of public or private ownership devoted
0 to the public in general or where people usually gather
or congregate for a definite purpose such as but not
limited to official governmental function or business,
private transaction, commerce, trade workshop,
meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyance or
stops or terminals whether the building is occupied or
not or regardless of the knowledge of the offender;
Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or
6 > airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or
public use, entertainment or leisure;
Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto which are devoted to the service
of public utilities;
5) Where the purpose of burning the building is to conceal

or destroy evidence of another violation of the law, or
for concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to
collect from insurance;
When the arson is perpetrated by two (2) or more
persons, or by a group of persons even if the burning
merely constitutes an overt act in the commission of
another violation of the law;
Burning of any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military
powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse,
archives or general museum of the Government;
Burning in an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory
of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of any of the acts enumerated above,
death results, the mandatory penalty shall be death.
The burning of any other building outside of the
^circumstances mentioned in Destructive Arson is classified as
Other Cases of Arson. Where the accused was charged with
violation of P.P. 1613 without specifying the particular
provision breached and with the information failing to allege
whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not having
established that it was situated in a populated or congested
ârea, he should be deemed to have been charged only with
plain Arson under Sec. 1 of of P.P. 1613. (People vs. Gutierrez,
258 SCRA 70)
If the property burned shall be the exclusive property of
the offender, he shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional minimum, if arson shall
have been committed for the purpose of defrauding or causing
damage to another, or prejudice shall have been actually caused
f Art. 326, RPC as amended). In the absence of such purpose or
of any damage, it would seem that no crime was committed.
11. Malicious Mischief (Art. 327)

Any person who shall deliberately cause the property
of another any damage not falling within the terms of the
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF 137
next preceding chapter (Arson) shall be guilty of Malicious

Mischief.
Thus, the killing of a goat or dog of another or burning
another's toys or dress is Malicious Mischief. The act of damaging
another's property must be done merely for the sake of damaging
it, and the property must be personal (not real) property.
CHAPTER FIVE
CRIMES A G A I N S T C H A S T I T Y
Title Eleven of Book II of the Revised Penal Code deals with

crimes against chastity. They are Adultery, Concubinage, Rape,
Acts of Lasciviousness, Qualified Seduction, Simple Seduction,
Acts of Lasciviousness With Consent of the Offended Party,
Corruption of Minors, and White Slave Trade.
1. Adultery (Art. 333)

Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall
have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband/andjby the
man who has carnal knowledge of her knowing her to pe~fharried,
even if the marriage be subsequently declared void. The penalty
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum period but if the
guilty wife was abandoned without justification by the offended
husband, the penalty shall be lowered by one degree.
The woman must be married, and if she is only in common-
law relationship with the complainant, there is no Adultery. If the
marriage contract however is not shown, the presumption of the
law that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage [sec. 2 (aa) of
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court] may be availed of. So also, the fact
of marriage may be established by a husband's declaration or by
a witness to the marriage. Even if the marriage of the guilty
woman with the offended party be declared subsequently void,
there is Adultery because until the marriage is declared to be null
and void by competent authority in a final judgment, the offense
to the vows taken and the attack on the family, exist.
When the complaining husband entered into an agreement

with his wife that each of them was to live separately and could
marry other persons; but about a year after discovering his wife's
138
CONCUBINAGE 139
infidelity, he filed a complaint, he is not authorized by law to

institute thp criminal proceedings as he had consented to, and
acquiesced in, the adulterous relations of his wife. This does not
however speak of pari delicto which term relates to contracts with
illegal consideration under Article 1411 of the Civil Code. Clearly,
the concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code.
(Arroyo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 203 SCRA 750) Thus, the
defense that the complaining husband's extra-marital affair
precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the ground
of pari delicto is unavailing.
However, if the facts, mistakenly argued or perceived as
constituting pari delicto, established consent or pardon on the part
of the complainant, they would benefit the accused provided they
were given prior to the filing of the criminal complaint under
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Concubinage (Art. 334)

Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or shall have sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances with a woman not his wife, or shall cohabit with
her in any other place shall be guilty of Concubinage. He shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods while his concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Unlike in Adultery where a single sexual intercourse may
constitute such a crime, in Concubinage, a married man is liable
only when he does any of the following acts:
1. By keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling;
2. By having sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances with a woman not his wife
3. By cohabiting with her in any other place.
If the charges consist in keeping a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, there is no need for proof of sexual intercourse. The
conjugal dwelling is the house of the spouses even if the wife
happens to be temporarily absent therefrom. The womanhowever
must be brought into the conjugal house by the accused husband
as a concubine to fall under this article. Thus, if the co-accused was
voluntarily taken and sheltered by the spouses in their house, and

treated as an adopted child being a relative of the complaining
wife, her illicit relations with the accused husband does not make
her a mistress. (People vs. Hilao, et al. (C. A.) 52 O.G. 904)
If the charge ig^habiting)tvith a woman not his wife in any
otherplace, proof of actual sexual intercourse may not be necessary
too. But the term "cohabit" means intercourse together as husband
and wife or living together as husband and wife. (Black's Law
• Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 326). The cohabitation must be for some
period of time which may be a week, a year or longer as
distinguished from occasional or transient meetings for unlawful
sexual intercourse. Thus, where the wife surprised her husband in
a room in the Philippine General Hospital lying on one bed with
another woman, her husband wearing pants while the co-accused
wore an ordinary dress, cohabitation was not established since
the man had his quarters in the hospital while his co-accused lived
in a nearby house in the same street. And even if the prosecution
was able to prove that the accused was married and that he was
the father of the child born of his co-accused, there is J\O
Concubinage committed. The rule is that, if a married man's
conduct with a woman who is not his wife was not confined to
occasional or transient interview for carnal intercourse but is
carried on in the manner of husband and wife and for some period
of time, then such association is sufficient to constitute cohabita-
tion. (People vs. Zufdga, CA 57 O.G. 2497; See also the Revised
Penal Code by Aquino, 1988 ed., pp. 377)
3. Sexual Intercourse Under Scandalous Circumstances

To quote former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino in his book,
" x x x for the existence of the crime of concubinage by having
sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances, the latter
must be imprudent and wanton as to offend modesty and sense of
morality and decency. The unlawful union of a married man with
a woman not his wife, when the two live within a town and in the
same house as lawful husband and wife, go together through the
streets of the town, frequent places where large crowds gather I
and commit acts in plain sight of the community without caution'
and with effrontery, is a procedure that gives rise to criticism and
j
RAPE 141
general protest among the neighbors. By its bad example, it

offends the conscience and feeling of every person". (The Revised
Penal Code by Aquino, 1988 ed., p. 375 citing Santos and Espiritu
cases)
Thus, where the accused and his mistress lived in the same
room of a house, comported themselves as husband and wife i
publicly and privately, giving the impression to everybody that/
they were married, and performed acts in sight of the community >
which gave rise to criticism and general protest among the
neighbors, they committed Concubinage. v.
The crimes of Adultery and Concubinage shall not be,
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse
who must include both the parties if they are both alive. Should
said offended spouse consented or pardoned the parties, the same
shall bar the prosecution of the offenses, provided it be done
before the institution or filing of the criminal complaint. (Art. 344,
RPC; People vs. Infante, 57 Phil. 138). In case of pardon, it may be
express or implied unlike in the case of Rape where the same must
be express. Under R. A. 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape
Law of 1977", in case it is the legal husband who is the offender, -
the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall (
extinguish the criminal action or penalty giving tne logical

implication that in such a case, the pardon need not be express nor
granted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
4. Rape (Art. 335 as amended by R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8353? (

The article is now Art. 266-A, 266-B, 266-C and 266-D.
Republic Act 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of
1997 has classified Rape as a crime against persons, amending the (
Revised Penal Code, and mandating the incorporation of Articles

266-A, 266-B, 266-C and 266-D as additional articles in Title Eight
of the said Code to be known as Chapter Three thereof.
Under Article 266-A, rape is committed:
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
aT) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
® When the offended party is deprived of reason or

otherwise unconscious;
By means of fraudulent machinations or grave
abuse of authority; and
When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of ageôr)is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
|r ( 2y By any person who, under any of the circumstances
y mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice .(or) any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.
To establish Rape under Art. 335(1) of the Revised Penal
Code (now Art. 266-A), two elements must be shown:
1. That the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended
party;
2. That coitus was done through the use of force or
intimidation.
Thus, when private complainant struggled with the accused
until she fainted, and when she regained consciousness, she was
aching, naked from waist down, T-shirt soiled and with sticky
matter upon the nest of her maidenhood, and lying next toherwas
the accused who was zipping up his pants, the crime of Rape has
been committed on her. (People vs. Fabro, 239 SCRA 146)
When at knife point, accused ordered the complainant to
pull down her pants, and when she refused and pleaded, he
responded by pressing harder the knife at her throat,and thereafter
he was able to penetrate her, and before finally leaving the scene>
threatened her not to report the matter to anybody otherwise he
will come back and kill her, a clear case of Rape exists. (People vs.
Castaheda, 252 SCRA 247). It is not necessary that the force or,
intimidation employed be so great or of such character as couldn
not be resisted — it is only necessary that it be sufficient tot,
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. (People _
vs. Canada, 253 SCRA 277). As succinctly explained in one case,
physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats
RAPE 143
and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to

the embrace of her rapist because of fear (People vs. Villanueva,
v
254 SCRA 202)

Carnal knowledge with a woman who isgsleepfonstitutes
Rape since she was either deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious at that time (People vs. Caballero, 61 Phil. 9WyTKus,
where at about 1:00 A.M., the offended party was awakened when
she felt something hard penetrating her private organ and found
a man on top of her and when she shouted "Sino ka", he stood up
and fled, the Supreme Court ruled that rape was committed.
(People vs. Conde, 252 SCRA 681)
So also, sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged or
mentally deficient, feeble-minded or idiotic woman is Rape pure
and simple. The deprivation of reason contemplated by law need
not be complete; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient.
This is Rape of a woman deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious since the victim has no will. (People vs. Atud, 261
SCRA 339)
The new law, R.A. 8353, added e ne,w^circumstance - that is,
when carnal knowledge was had by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority. It would seem that if a /
woman of majority age had sexual intercourse with a man through /
the latter's scheme of pretending to marry her which is the>
condition upon which the woman agreed to have sex with him,
manipulating a sham marriage, the man would be guilty of Rape
under this section. So also, a prostitute who willingly had sexual
congress with a man upon the latter's assurance that she would be
paid handsomely, may be guilty of Rape if later on he refuses to
pay the said amount. J
A person in authority who maneuvered a scheme where a
woman landed in jail, and who upon promise of being released
after having sex with the officer, willingly consented to the sexual
act, may also be found guilty of Rape under this new section.
When the woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, sexual intercourse with her is always Rape,. Force, /
intimidation or physical evidence of injury is immaterial. (People
vs. Andres, 253 SCRA 751)
P O I N T E R S I N C R I M I N A L LAW
144
Since the victim was under twelve (12) years of age, carnal
knowledge alone of her, is rape. It is not required that the assailant
used force or intimidation, or that she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious. This is Statutory Rape as defined under
Article 335(3) of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Lagrosa, Jr.,
230 SCRA 298; People vs. Cagto, 253 SCRA 455), now Art. 266-A,
par. 4.
If the victim however is exactly twelve (12) years old (she was
raped on her birthday) or more, and there is consent, there is no
rape. However, Republic Act. No. 7610, Sec. 5 (b) provides:
x x x
(b) those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjectedjo other sexual abuse: provided
that when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Art. 335, par.
3 and Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code for rape or
lascivious conduct as the case may be.
and since children exploited in prostitution and other sexual

abuse has been defined as persons below eighteen (18) years of
age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition, it would seem that the act is within the prohibition of
this law otherwise J i c n o w n as the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act even if
the victim is over twelve (12) years old and the carnal act was with
her consent as long as she falls under the classification of a child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
A person is guilty of Rape when he has sexual intercourse

with a female who is mentally incapable of validly giving consent
to or opposing the carnal act. Thus, in People vs. Gallano, 108
SCRA 405, the 31-year-old victim had the mental level of a 7-year
old child; People vs. Asturias (134 SCRA 465), the 17-year-old
offended party had a mental level lower than a 7-year-old child;
People vs. Sunga (137 SCRA 130), the 23-year-old complainant
RAPE 145
has a mentality of an 8 to 9-year-old girl. (See also People vs

Antonio, 233 SCRA 283)
of Republic Act No. 8353 gives the
T b o c o m n H paragraph
impression that not only a male person can be the offender in the
crime of rape and that not only the penis or the vagina but that
other parts of the human body can be involved in this crime. It
says:
x x x
2. By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into another person's mouth, or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
Thus, a lesbian who, under any of the circumstances

mentioned in paragraph 1, would have oral sex with a lady or
even a man, or would insert any instrument into the victim's
genitals or anal orifice would be committing Rape under this
y Simple Rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, if

it is committed with the use of a deadly weapon(or)by two or more
personsyofjwhenby reason or on the occasion thereof, the victim
becomes-insane. or when Rape is attempted and a Homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereofythe penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
The penalty shall be death under any of the following
circumstances:
a) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed;
b) When the victim is under 18 years of age, and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
146 P O I N T E R S I N C R I M I N A L LAW
c) When the victim is under the custody of the police

or military authorities or any law enforcement or
penal institutions;
d) Whencommitted in full view of the spouse, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the
third degree of consanguinity;
e) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate
religious vocation or calling and is personally
known to be such by the offender;
f) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years
old;
g) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with
Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus ( H I V ) /
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
or any other sexually transmissible disease and the
virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;
h) When committed by any member of the AFP or
paramilitary units thereof or the PNP or any law
enforcement agency or penal institution, the
offender taking advantage of his position to
facilitate the commission of the crime;
i) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim suffered permanent physical mutilation or
disability;
j) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the
offended party, or of her mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap at
the time of the commission of the crime.
In Rape cases, courts must always be guidedby the following
principles:
1) An accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is

difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS 147
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the

complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and
3) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
(People vs. Ricafort, G.R. No. 118332, March 26,1997)
5. Acts of Lasciviousness (Art. 336)

Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances J
mentioned in Art. 335 shall be punishable by pjvsinn correccional. \
The feeling of lasciviousness is an emotional process that
differs in intensity among different persons in different situations,
discernible only by overt acts so that no inflexible rule can be laid
down as an accurate measure (U.S. vs. Gomez, 30 Phil. 22). When*,
the accused not only kissed and embraced the complainant but
also fcmdled her breast with the particular design to independently
derive vicarious pleasure therefrom, the element of lewd design ,
exists. To be guilty of this crime however, the acts of lasciviousness
must be committed under any of the circumstances that had there (
been sexual intercourse, the crime would have been Rape. Where
circumstances however are such, indicating a clear intention to lie
with the offended party, the crime committed is Attempted Rape.,
Thus, when the accused lifted the dress of the offended party, and
placed himself on top of her but the woman awoke and screamed /
for help and despite that, the accused persisted in his purposey
tearing the drawers, kissing and fondling her breasts, the crime is I
not only Acts of Lasciviousness but that of Attempted Rape. If, on J
the other hand, lewd design can not be proven as where the^
accused merely kjssed and embraced the complainant either out ;
of passion or other motive, touching her breast as a mere incident, \
the act would be categorized as Unjust Vexation. (People vs. \
Climaco, C.A. 46 O.G. 3186) ->
This crime (Art. 336) can be committed by either sex unlike
in Acts of Lasciviousness with Consent under Article 339. Thus, a
lesbian who toyed with the private part of an eleven-year-old girl
who enjoyed it since she was given $50 dollars before the act, is
guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under this article as the victim is
below twelve years old; and had sexual intercourse been possible
ajid done, the act would have been Rape.
6. Seduction — Qualified and Simple (Arts. 337 and 338)

Sexual intercourse with a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age by any person in authority, priest, house
servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any
capacity, is entrusted with the education or custody of the woman,
constitutes the crime of Qualified Seduction. (Art. 337) Here, the
sexual intercourse was done with the consent of*the woman,
otherwise the crime is Rape. Here too, the girl is over twelve but
below eighteen otherwise the crime again would be Rape.
Where the offended party is a sister or a descendant of the
offender, the crime is Qualified Seduction even if the former is not
a virgin and over eighteen (18) years old.
The virginity referred to here, is not to be understood in so
material a sense as to exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous
woman of good reputation. Thus, when the accused claims he had
prior intercourse with the complainant, the latter is still to be
considered a virgin (U.S. vs. Casten, 34 Phil. 808). But if it was
established that the girl had carnal relations with other men, there
can be no crime of Seduction as she is not a virgin.
There are three (3) classes of offenders in Qualified Seduction.
They are:
( £ ) Those who abused their authority like the person in
public authority, guardian, teacher, or any person who
in any capacity is entrusted with the custody or education
of the woman seduced;
^ J ) Those who abused confidence reposed in them, like the
priest, house-servant or domestic; and
( c ) Those who abused their relationship, like the brother
seducing his sister, or an ascendant who seduced his
descendant.
Where the complainant who is sixteen years old lives in the
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS WITH THE CONSENT OF 149
T H E O F F E N D E D PARTY
same house where the accused, her uncle, also lives, the latter
is guilty of Oualifipd Seduction when he had sexual inter-
course with her with consent since he is considered a domestic.
(People vs. Subing Subing, 228 SCRA 168). A ^bmes'tit) is applied
to a person usually living under the same roof pertaining to the
r
same house, and constituting in this sense a part thereof,

distinguishing it from the term servant. (People vs. Alvarez, 55
SCRA 92)
The sexual intercourse with a woman who is single or a
widow of good reputation over twelve but under eighteen years
of age committed with her consent which was obtained through
deceit is Simple Seduction. (Art. 338). If the offended party is below
twelve, the crime would be Statutory Rape. The deceit generally
takes the form of an unfulfilled promise to marry, and this
promise need not immediately precede the sexual act.
Where the accused failed to have sex with his sweetheart
over twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years old because the
latter refused as they were not yet married, and the accused
procured the performance of a fictitious marriage reremonv
because of which the girlfriend yielded, he is guilty of Simple
Seduction. (U.S. vs. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109). Here, there was
deceit employed. This act may now be considered Rape under
R.A. 8353, Sec. 2, par. 6.
7. Acts of Lasciviousness with the Consent of the Offended

Party (Art. 339)
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed to punish any
other Acts of Lasciviousness committQ,J by tLu same person and
under the same circumstances as those provided in Articles 337
and 338. In other words, where the acts of the offender were
limited to acts of lewdness or lasciviousness, and no carnal
knowledge was had; but had there been sexual intercourse, the
offense would have been Seduction, he is guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness under this article. Compared to Acts of
Lasciviousness under Art. 336, Acts of Lasciviousness under Art.
339 is committed with the consent of the offended party, and the
offended party is over twelve, but below eighteen years of age.
Moreover, under this article (Art. 339), only a woman can be the
offended party unlike in Article 336 where even a male person can
become the victim.
8. Corruption of Minors (Art. 340)

Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution
or corruption of persons underage to satisfy the lust of another is
guilty of corruption of minors and shall be punished by prision
mayor. (Art. 340)
Originally, before this article was amended by B.P. Big. 92,
approved on December 24,1980, the law used the phrase "xxx
habitually or with abuse of authority or confidence xxx" after the
word "shall" and before "promote" such that, a single act, or one
done without abuse of authority or confidence was not deemed
punishable (U.S. vs. Javier, et al., 20 Phil. 337). Under the present
wordings of the law, a single act of promoting or facilitating the
corruption or prostitution of a minor is sufficient to constitute
violation of this article.
This is usually the act of a pimp who offers to pleasure
seekers, women for the satisfaction of their lustful desires. A mere
proposal would consummate the crime. But it must be to satisfy
the lust of another, not his (proponent's). The victim must be
below eighteen. (See Revised Penal Code, Book II by Luis B.
Reyes)
9. White Slave Trade (Art. 341)

This is the crime committed by any person who, in any
manner, or under any pretext, engages in the busmess/ot) shall
profit by prostitution(orêjuists the services of womenfor the
purpose of prostitutiortTTt consists of any of the three acts:
1) Engaging in the business of prostitution;
2) Profiting by prostitution; and
3) Enlisting the services of women for the purpose of
prostitution. (People vs. Buenaventura, 01478-CR, Oct.
10,1972)
10. Abduction - Forcible (Art. 342) and Consented (Art. 343)

^ The abduction of any woman against her will and with lewd
ABDUCTION 151
designs is Forcible Abduction to be punished by reclusion temporal

while the abduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen
years of age, carried out with consent and with lewd design is C
Consented Abduction. If the female abducted be under twelve
years of age, the crime is Forcible Abduction even if it was with her
consent.
Unlike in Rape and Seduction, in the crime of Abduction,
whether Forcible or Consented, there is no sexual intercourse. The
acts are limited to taking away from a place the victim, but the
same must be with lewd designs, that is, with unchaste design
manifested by kissing and touching the victim's private parts. In
People vs. Corpus, 222 SCRA 842, the Supreme Court ruled that
lewd design in forcible abduction became evident when later on,
the victim was in fact, raped by the accused. Where lewd design
was not proved or shown, and the victim was deprived of her
liberty, the crime is Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention
under Article 267, RPC.
If the accused carried or took away the victim by means of
force and with lewd design and thereafter raped her, the crime is |
Forcible Abduction with Rape, the former being a necessary
means to commit the latter. The subsequent two (2) other sexual
intercourses committed against the will of the complainant would
be treated as independent separate crimes of Rape. (People vs.
Bacalso, 210 SCRA 206)
In consented Abduction, it is not necessary that the young
victim (a virgin over twelve and under eighteen) be personally
taken from her parents' home by the accused; it is sufficient that
he was instrumental in her leaving the house. He must however
use solicitation, cajolery or deceit, or honeyed promises of marriage
to induce the girl to escape from her home. Actually, the purpose
of the law is not to punish the wrong done to her, because she
consented thereto but to prescribe punishment for the disgrace of
her family and the alarm caused to the parents by the disgrace of
a beloved one who by her age and sex, is susceptible to deceit,
cajolery and even perdition. (U.S. vs. Reyes, 20 Phil. 510)
CHAPTER SIX
CRIMES C O M M I T T E D BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Crimes Known As Bribery

There are three (3) crimes denominated as Bribery. They are
Direct Bribery, Indirect Bribery and Qualified Bribery.
1. Direct Bribery (Art. 210)

Any public officer who shall( agreeJHo perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his
official duties, in consideration of any offer, ^ o m i s e ^ g i f t or
present received by such officer, personally or through the
mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
medium and maximum period and a fine of not less than three
times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding
to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
(Art. 210,1st par. of RPC as amended by B.P. Big. 871)
i This is the first form of Direct Bribery. If a court stenographer,
UKConsideration of a gift or present or even a promiseâgrees^vith
the accused to alter the notes takenby him during the trial to make
it appear that a witness testified favorably to the accused, when in
truth, his testimony was adverse to him, said stenographer is
guilty of bribery. He agreed to perfonrrjalsification^hich is a
crime. He and the accused shall likewise be held liable for
Falsification of Public Documents.
"^^--T-he,second paragraph of Art. 210 says that if the gift was

7accepted_iri c o n s i d e r a tion of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime (but which must be unjust), and the officer
executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty for Direct
Bribery provided in the first paragraph; and if said act shall not
have been a c c o m p l i s h e d , the officer shall suffer the penalties of
152
DIRECT BRIBERY 153
prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than
twice the value of such gift.
This second form of Direct Bribery has the same elements as
those of the first form with the difference that the act agreed to be
performed does not amount to a crime, although said act must be
unjust. So also, in this second form, mere promise or offer as
consideration is not enough. The public officer must have accepted
the gift or the consideration. (
Thus, the secretary of the Municipal Mayor who was under

instruction to receive the application for awards in the
municipality's public market for only ten persons there being
only ten sâ4Js4hat could be leased, and in consideration of some
money, received j r o m the eleventh applicant, making it appear
that his application was the tenth is guilty of this form of Direct
Bribery. The act of the secretary who is a public officer is not a
crime but it is unjust, it being unfair to the tenth applicant.
^ ) The third paragraph provides that "if the object for which the
jpiLwas received or promised was to make the public officer
_refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do,
he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not less
than three times the value of such gift ".
A police traffic officer who, in consideration of gift received
or promise offered by a taxi driver who beat the red traffic light,
refrains from issuing a TVR and from confiscating the driver's
license when it is his duty to do so, commits this third form of
Direct Bribery.
Robbery should be distinguished from Bribery where a law
enforcer, say a policeman, extorts money from a person, employ-
ing intimidation and threatening to arrest the latter if he will not
come across with money may be guilty of Robbery (Art. 294, par.
5) or Bribery (Art. 210). If the victim actually committed a crime,
and the policeman demanded money so he will not be arrested,
the crime is,Bribery. But if no crime has been committed and the
policeman is falsely charging him of having committed one,
threatening to arrest him if he will not come across with some
consideration, the crime is Robbery.
154 P O I N T E R S I N C R I M I N A L LAW
2. Indirect Bribery (Art. 211)

The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, suspension and public censure shall be imposed
upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by
reason of his office. (B.P. 871, Sec. 1 amending Article 210 of the
RPC)
If the public officer does not accept the gift, this crime is
not committed but the offeror is guilty of Corruption of Public
Officials under Article 212.
>
Example of Indirect Bribery is when a Judge accepts the gift
or consideration offered by the plaintiff so that he would decide
the case in his favor, but the Judge decides the case in favor of the
defendant.
So also, a Prosecutor who, after a preliminary investigation,
resolved the case in favor of the complainant, and after the
information was filed with the court, received a gift from the said
complainant as a form of gra ti tu de, commits this felony of Indirect
Bribery.
3. Qualified Bribery (Art. 211-A, RPC)

Sec. 4 of R.A. 7659 provides that there shall be incorporated
after Article 211, a new article to read as follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. — If any public

officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift, or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense
which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such
gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death."
The crime involved in Qualified Bribery is a heinous crime

and the offender who is a public officer is one entrusted with law
enforcement. He need not receive the gift or present because a
mere offer or promise is sufficient.
THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 155
Incidentally, under Pres. Decree No. 46, it is punishable

for any public official or employee, whether of the national or
local governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for
private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or
other valuable thing on any occasion, including Christmas,
when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by
reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the
same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to
receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public
official or employee concerned in the discharge of his official
functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of
parties or entertainment in honor of the official or employee or of
his immediate relatives.
This law has not been amended or repealed and imposes a

penalty of not less than one year nor more than five years and
perpetual disqualification from public office.
4. R.A. 3019, (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
Persuading, inducing or influencing another
public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties
of the latter, or allowing himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense.
) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official

capacity has to intervene under the law.
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any
person for whom the public officer, in any
manner or capacity, has secured or obtained,
or will secure or obtain, any Government
permit or license, in consideration for the
help given or to be given, without prejudice
to Section Thirteen of this Act.
Accepting or having any member of his family
accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him
during the pendency thereof or within one
year after its termination.
Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provi-
sion shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or
request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any. matter
pending before him for the purpose of
obtaining directly or indirectly, from any
person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage,
or for purpose of favoring his own interest or
giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested
party.
T H E ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 157
^g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into

any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether
or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
^/h) Directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract
or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity,
or in which he is prohibitedby the Constitution
or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested,
for personal gain, or having material interest
in any transaction or act requiring the approval
of a board, panel or group of which he is a
member, and which exercises discretion in
such approval, even if he votes against the
same, or does not participate in the action of
the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be
presumed against those public officers
responsible for the approval of manifestly
unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transac-
tions or acts by the board, panel or group to
which they belong.
j 6 Knowingly approving or granting any license,

permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled
to suchlicense, permit, privilege or advantage,
or of a mere representative or dummy of
one who is not so qualified or entitled.
J* k) Divulging valuable information of a

confidential character, acquired by his office
or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized
release date, xxx
Receiving gifts includes the act of accepting, directly or

indirectly, a gift from a person other than a member of the public
officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or any member of
his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, by
consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the
gift is under the circumstances, manifestly excessive.
When the public officials disregarded the provisions of
contracts, tying up payments in accordance with the percentage
of work accomplished, or failed to enforce a clause providing for
liquidated damages for delay in the accomplishment of the work,
they acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith. (Quibal
vs. Sandiganbayan, 244 SCRA 224)
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office
plagued by all too common problems — dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or
plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every
single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and
investigate the motive of every person involved in a transaction
before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
(Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309)
5. R.A. 1379 (Law on Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth)

R.A. 1379 which authorizes the forfeiture to the state of the
property of a public officer or employee manifestly out of
proportion to his salary is civil in nature and not criminal (Seneda,
Sr. vs. Perez, 5 SCRA 970), but in a later case (Cabal vs. Kapunan,
Jr., 6 SCRA 1059), it was held that proceedings thereon, if referring
to substantial as well as procedural rights of the respondent
not only on purely procedural aspect are deemed criminal or
penal, and exemption of defendant to be a witness against himsel f
is applicable.
6. R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for

Public Officials and Employees)
R.A. 6713 provides for some other prohibited acts. Section 7
provides:
C O D E OF CONDUCT A N D E T H I C A L STANDARDS 159
FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS A N D E M P L O Y E E S
In addition to acts and omissions of public officials

and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
^(a) Public officials and employees shall not,
directly or indirectly, have any financial or
material interest in any transaction requiring
the approval of their office.
/(fj) Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept em-
ployment as officer, employee, consul-
tant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or
nominee in any private enterprise
regulated, supervised or licensed by their
office unless expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position
ina private enterprise which has a regular
or pending official transaction with their
office.
These prohibitions shall continue to
apply for a period of one (1) year after resig-
nation, retirement or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b)
(2) above, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition
shall likewise apply.
(c) Public officials and employees shall not use
or divulge, confidential or classified

information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available
to the public either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give
undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
(d) Public officials and employees shall not solicit
or accept directly or indirectly, any gift,
gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
' anything of monetary value from any person
in the course of their official duties or in
connection with any operation being
regulated by or any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office.
Section 8 provides:
Statements and Disclosures. — Public officials and
employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right
to know, the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial
and business interests including those of their spouses
and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of
age living in their households.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CRIMES INVOLVING LIBERTY
While Title Nine of Book II enumerates crimes against

personal liberty and security, there are offenses which in effect are
directed against liberty and yet are not included thereat. It is
therefore important to have in mind some of these crimes. We
have Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267), Slight
Illegal Detention (Art. 268), Unlawful Arrest (Art. 269), Slavery
(Art. 272), Arbitrary Detention (Art. 124), Delay in the Delivery of
Detained Persons (Art. 125) and Forcible Abduction (Art. 342).
1. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267 as

amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. 7659)
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any manner deprive him of his liberty shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted for
more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or if threats to
kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor
except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or deten-
tion was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circums-
161
162
tances mentioned above were present in the commission of the

offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
K t s , the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The essence of the offense is the actual deprivation of the
nctim's liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.
There must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of liberty. The
restraint however need not be permanent. (People vs. Godoy, 250
SCRA 676; U.S. vs. Peralta, et al., 8 Phil 200)
Accused took complainant's child to Escolta from Intramuros
where t h e complainant was having a round of drinks with a
group. It was however established that the complainant was told
by t h e accused that they would just go "for a stroll around the
vicinity". There is no kidnapping. (People vs. Villanueva, 253
SCRA 155)
3 ^ In Kidnapping, the culprit takes and carries away the victim^
depriving the latter of his liberty. If the detention lasts for more
than three (3) daysô^ is committed simulating public authority,
(6r)any serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim,(oj)|
threats to kill him are made, or if the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, a female or a public officer, it is serious.
.Otherwise, the crime is Slight Illegal Detention (Art. 268). Thus,**'
if the person kidnapped or detained is a male person of major i
age who is not a public officer, the detention being less than j
three (3) days and no serious physical injuries or threats to kill him '
were inflicted or made, Slight Illegal Detention is the offense
committed.
However, whenever there is a demand for ransom, even if

the circumstances that make the crime a serious one are absent,
the penalty shall be death. (People vs. Cua, 232 SCRA 507).
Ransom may refer to money, price, or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. Thus, if a person was
kidnapped, and the accused demanded the payment of
hospitalization expenses of his brother as the condition for the
ARBITRARY DETENTION 163
release of the victim, this is ransom just the same. (People vs.
Akiran, 18 SCRA 239; People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85)
If the victim was not kidnapped or taken away but was
restrained and deprived of his liberty, like in the case of a hostage
incident where the accused, who was one of the occupants of the
house, grabbed a child, poked a knife on the latter's neck, called
for media people and demanded a vehicle from the authorities
which he could use in escaping, as it turned out that there was an
unserved arrest warrant against him, the proper charge is Serious
Illegal Detention (without kidnapping anymore) but likewise
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Where after taking the victim with her car, the accused called
the house of the victim asking for ransom but upon going to their
safehouse saw several police cars chasing them, prompting them
to kill their victim inside the car, there were two crimes committed
— Kidnapping for Ransom and Murder, not a complex crime of
Kidnapping with Murder as she was not taken or carried away to
be killed, killing being an afterthought. (People vs. Evanoria, 209
[ 2. JArbitrary Detention (Art. 124)

,i/wrAnv public officer or employee who; without legal grounds^
detains a person shall be guilty of Arbitrary Detention and shall L
be penalized as follows: if the detention has not exceeded _three
days - arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum,
more than three days but not more then fifteen days — prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, more than
fifteen days but not more than six months — prision mayor, and if
the detention shall have exceeded six months, the penalty is that
of reclusion temporal.
Like in the case of Serious Illegal Detention as well as Slight
Illegal Detention (Arts. 267 and 268), the accused detains a person
Of restrains his liberty without any legal ground, but unlike in the <
two (2) cases, in Arbitrary Detention, the offender is a public
officer whose functions have something to do with the protection J
of life and property and maintenance of peace and order. Thus, if f
the one who arrests another without legal ground is a clerk in the
Office of the Central Bank Governor, Arbitrary Detention is not

the proper charge.
The arrest or detention must be without legal grounds. The
following are the legal grounds: (1) commission of a crime by the
person arrested; (2) violent insanity or any other ailment requiring
compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital (Art. 124, last
par.) and (3) when the person to be arrested is an escaping
prisoner (Sec. 5, Rule 113). When the peace officers acted in good
faith even if the three (3) grounds mentioned above are not
obtaining, there is no Arbitrary Detention. In one case, two BIR
secret service agents, strangers in the municipality who were
spying the neighborhood of the market place and acting generally
in a manner calculated to arouse the suspicion of any one not
advised as to their duty, were arrested by policemen of the town.
The Supreme Court ruled the policemen acted in good faith and
can not be held liable for Arbitrary Detention (U.S. vs. Batalliones,
et al., 23 Phil. 46)
In Arbitrary Detention, like in Illegal Detention, there must

be actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended
party so that where the latter had freedom to leave the premises,
or is not actually restricted to get out, there is no crime of
Detention. The victim however need not be placed in an inclosure.
(People vs. Crisostomo, et al., 46 Phil. 775)
Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons (Art. 125)

In this^Grirrte, unlike in Arbitrary Detention (Art. 124), the
arrest was^legaLin the beginning but became illegal because the
arresting officer fails to deliver the person detained or arrested to
the proper judicial authorities within twelve hours if arrested for
Jight felonies, within eighteen hours if arrested for less grave
felonies and within thirty-six hours for grave felonies. (Art. 125 as
amended by Executive Order No. 272). Like Arbitrary Detention
however, this crime of Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons
d
° e s not apply if the public officer is armed with a warrant of
arrest, or any court order from courts of justice. ^ ^ ^ ^
4. Unlawful Arrest (Art. 269) ^ f fl'P t
The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500

FORCIBLE ABDUCTION 165
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case other
than those authorized by law, or without reasonable ground
therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the purpose of delivering
him to the proper authorities.
This article speaks of any person so that even if the offender
is a public officer, as long as Article 124 on Arbitrary Detention
does not apply, said public officer is liable under this article. A
private individual whose purpose is to bring the person arrested
to the proper authorities is liable for Unlawful Arrest if the ground
for the arrest is illegal or not authorized by law. In the absence of
such purpose, his crime is Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention or Slight Illegal Detention. (Arts. 267 and 268)
5. Slavery (Art. 272)

The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P10,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any one who shall purchase, sell,
kidnap or detain a human being for the purpose of enslaving him.
Like in Unlawful Arrest, the purpose of the offender under
this article is paramount. Absent such purpose, the crime could be
Arbitrary or Illegal Detention.
6. Forcible Abduction (Art. 342)

If the taking away, kidnapping or abduction of a woman
against the latter's will be carried with lewd design, the crime is
Forcible Abduction. If the victim is below twelve, it is still Forcible
Abduction even if it was with her consent. The offended party is
a woman, and the taking away was against her will and carried
wjth lustful or lewd design. Absent the lewd design, the crime
could be Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CRIMES INVOLVING FALSEHOOD A N D F A L S I T Y
There are various crimes in the Revised Penal Code that,

involve falsehood and fa Isity. They are False Testimony mCriminal^
Cases (Arts. 180 and 181), False Testimony in Civil Cases (Art. I
182), False Testimony in Other Cases and Perjury (Art. 183) and
V
Falsification (Art. 172).
1. False Testimony Against a Defendant (Art. 180)

Any person who shall give false testimony against
the defendant in any criminal case shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal if the defendant shall have
been sentenced to death, prision mayor if the sentence is
reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal, prision correccional,
if it is afflictive penalty, or arresto mayor if the sentence
consists of correctional penalty or fine, or if the accused
shall have been acquitted.
This crime is applicable only when there is a criminal

.proceeding, and the offender testified falsely. He must however
testify on material matters so that even if he actually lied during
his testimony on immaterial matters like his or her age, this article
is not violated. If he testified on relevant or material matters
proven to be false, he is liable just the same even if the judge does
not consider his testimony.
For this crime to come into play, the decision in the criminal
case where he testified must have been already final.
2. False Testimony Favorable to the Defendant (Art. 181)

Any person who shall give false testimony in favor
of the defendant in a criminal case shall suffer the
166
FALSE T E S T I M O N Y IN O T H E R C A S E S A N D P E R J U R Y 167
penalty of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional

minimum and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos, if the
prosecution is for a felony punishable by an afflictive
penalty, and that of arresto mayor in any other case.
Falsehood is ever reprehensible; but it is particularly odious

when committed in judicial proceedings, as it constitutes an
imposition upon the court and seriously exposes it to a miscarriage
of justice. While false testimony in favor of an accused may be less
obnoxious than the one against him, both forms are equally
repugnant to the orderly administration of justice. (People vs.
Reyes, (CA) 48 O.G. 1837)
It is not necessary that the testimony given should directly
influence the decision of acquittal, if being sufficient that it was
given with the intent to favor the accused.
3. False Testimony in Civil Cases (Art. 182)

Any person found guilty of false testimony in a
civil case shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P6,000
pesos if the amount in controversy shall exceed P5,000
pesos, and arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional
minimum and a fine not to exceed P1,000 pesos if the
amount in controversy shall not exceed said amount or
can not be estimated.
The testimony must be given in a civil case, and must relate

to the issues in said case. Moreover, said testimony must be false
and the offender knows it to be false. Art. 182 is not applicable
when the proceedings is not the ordinary civil cases as provided
for in the Rules of Court. Thus, it does not apply to special
proceedings. (See Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book II citing
People vs. Hernandez)
4. False Testimony in Other Cases and Perjury (Art. 183)

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correctional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly
making untruthful statements and not being included

in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall
testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.
Since it was clearly established that the statement made by

the accused — that he reached fou rth year A.B. and that he studied
for this course at the Cosmopolitan Colleges and the Harvardian
Colleges from 1950-54 is devoid of truth, and that the records of
these colleges do not at all reveal that he was even enrolled at any
time from 1950 to 1954, when he filled out the prescribed personal
information sheet Civil Service Form 212 and swore to the truth
and veracity of the data and information therein furnished by him
before the proper administering officer in connection with his
appointment (promotion) as School Administrative Asst. I of the
same school, he committed a violation of Article 183 of the
1
Revised Penal Code and not Falsification of Official Document
under Art. 171, par. 4. (Diaz vs. People, et al., 191 SCRA 86 citing
People vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 255 and the earlier case of U.S. vs.
Tupasi, 29 Phil. 119)
It would seem that if a person testified falsely against a
defendant in a criminal case (Art. 180) and the defendant was
sentenced to arresto menor, he committed Perjury.
If there is no requirement of law to place the statement or
testimony under oath, there is no Perjury considering the phrase
"oath in cases in which the law so requires" in Art. 183.
Under the second paragraph of Art. 183, any person who, in
case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit
any of the falsehood mentioned in this and the three preceding
articles, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein, so
that while it is a requirement under the Rule on Summary
Procedure that sworn affidavits of witnesses be submitted to
support the position papers of the parties in the case, if the affiants
do not take the oath but instead declare in solemn affirmation in
lieu of an oath, and the assertions therein are found to be false,
then Perjury is committed.
FALSIFICATION 169
5. Falsification (Art. 171)

The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify
a document by committing any of the following acts:
\ . J Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,

signature or rubric;
02/ Causing it to appear that persons have par-

ticipated in an act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;
Attributing to person who have participated
in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
Making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts;
Altering true dates;
Making any alteration or intercalation in
a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy, a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative
to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry,
or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical
minister with respect to any record or document of such character
that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
If the offender is a private individual or a public officer who
has no duty to make or prepare or intervene in the preparation of
the document or who does not have the official custody of the
document, then the act is punishable under Article 172 of the

Revised Penal Code and not under this article.
In Falsification, the basic principle is that the tampering or
changing of the contents of the document is for the purpose of
making the document speak a falsity so that if the purpose of the
alteration is for the documents to speak the truth, there is no
falsification.
Where a municipal mayor issued an appointment in favor of
his son as a meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer,
and taking advantage of his official position issued the certification
which is a public document stating therein that he is not related to
the appointee, said public officer is guilty of Falsification of Public
Document. (Layno vs. People, 213 SCRA 686)
In Falsification committed by making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts, the following requisites must concur: (a)
That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in
a narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him; (c) That the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false. When the mayor issued a certification
prepared with the standard forms prescribed by the government
(specifically the Civil Service Commission) stating that funds
were available for the position to which his appointee was
appointed when he knew in reality that the position itself did not
even exist, and no funds had been appropriated therefor, the
mayor committed Falsification of Public Document under this
article.
In one case, the Supreme Court held that "we are satisfied
that the Court and the respondent Court did not err in relying
upon the presumption that possessor and user of a falsified
document is presumed to be the forger thereof." (Caubang vs.
People, 2 SCRA 377)
In making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document,
the accused can not be held liable if the alteration or tampering
does not change the meaning of the document; thus, to change the
word "his" to "her" to conform to gender is not falsification.
In falsification by altering true dates, the said date must be
FALSIFICATION 171
essential to the document, that is, it must affect either the veracity
of the document or the effects thereof. (People vs. Reodica, et al.,
62 Phil. 567)
Where the vault keeper extracted the original of a marriage
contract in the file and changed it with another document so as not
to disrupt the numbering of the documents numerically filed, to
help prove the claim that no marriage was solemnized, he is guilty
of Falsification for intercalating any instrument or note relative to
the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.
fc CHAPTER NINE
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
The most common crimes under this classification are

Rebellion or Insurrection (Art. 134), Sedition (Art. 139), Direct
Assaults (Art. 148), and Indirect Assaults (Art. 149).
1. Rebellion or Insurrection (Art. 134)

The crime of Rebellion or Insurrection is committed
by rising publicly and taking arms against the
£ X Government for the purpose of removing from the
y
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory

of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
tJc land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.
<
" There must be a public uprising and taking up of arms for the
specified purpose or purposes mentioned in Art. 134. The acts of
the accused who is not a member of the Hukbalahap organization
of sending cigarettes and food supplies to a Huk leader; the
changing of dollars into pesos for a top level communist; and the
helping of Huks in opening accounts with the bank of which he
was an official, do not constitute Rebellion. (Cariho vs. People, et
al., 7 SCRA 900)
Accused not only confessed his membership with the Sparrow

Unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing
of policeman Manatad while the latter was manning the traffic in
Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4,1987. It is of judicial
notice that the Sparrow Unit is the liquidation squad of the New
People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend
172
SEDITION 173
that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to, or

in furtherance oL_the subversive ends of thp NfA Thp crime <
committed is Rebellion and not Murder with Direct Assault.
(People vs. Dasig, 221 SCRA 549)
Usually, Art. 134 is committed by people outside of the
government service. With the occurrence of coup d'etat in the
international scene, and with the repeated attemptsby the military
to topple the Aquino Administration, Congress passed Republic
Act No. 6968 entitled an Act Punishing the Crime of Coup d'etat,
inserting Art. 134-A in our Revised Penal Code which provides in
Section 3 thereof:
The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack

accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy
of stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities C
of the Republic of the Philippinesj(ni/any military camp
or installation, communications networks, public
utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and /
continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously /
carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person /
or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding
any public office or employment, with or without civilian
/support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or
^ diminishing state power. . • ^ x ^ s ^ ^ j ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
This law was directed against members of tReâxmed forces >

who would endeavor to overthrow the government with or
without civilian support.
2. Sedition (Art. 139)

The crime of Sedition is committed by persons
who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain r
bv force, intimidation or by other means ou tside of legal ^
methods, any of the following: « j
( 1 J To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or

the holding of any popular election;
^ To prevent the National Government or any provincial
or municipal government, or any public officer thereof

from freely exercising its o r his functions, or prevent the
execution of any administrative order;
îj To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of any public officer or employee;
/ 4) To commit for any political or social end, any act of hate
^ or revenge against private persons or any social class;
and
^5?) To despoil, for any political or social end, any person,
municipality or province, or the National Government,
of all its property or any part thereof.
While like in Rebellion, there is public uprising, in Sedition,
there is no taking up of arms against the Government although the
public uprising must be tumultuous, meaning committed by at
least four (4) persons.The tumultuous uprising must be publicly
made for the purposes mentioned in Art. 139. The objective in
Sedition is not always against the Government, its property or
officer. It could be against a private person or a social class. A>
o 'A
^ 3. Direct Assaults (Art. 148)
Any person or persons whc^wdimûTaûblic uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposesênumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
seditionj(or)shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged
in the performance of official duties, (or) on occasion of such
performance shall be guilty of Direct Assault.
v There are two ways of committing Direct Assault: (l) when
there is no public uprising, but force or intimidation was employed
to attain any of the purposes mentioned in Rebellion or Sedition;
or Jg) where there is an attack, employment of force or serious
'intimidatiqn or resistance to a person jnauthorit)@j his agents in
the performance of official duties (yrjon the occasion thereof.
(People vs. Abalos, 258 SCRA 523)
^ - ^ - f h e more common occurrence is the commission of the
second mode of Direct Assault. The elements are: (1) actual
DIRECT ASSAULTS 175
assault or use of physical force, or intimidation or serious resis-

tance; (2) that such assault or physical force or intimidation
should have been executed upon a person in authority @ his
agent; (3) that at the time of such assault, intimida tion or resistance,
the offended party was in the actual performance of his duties or
that it was done by reason of the performance of duty; and (4) the
offender knows that the offended party is a person in authority
or his agent.
When the accused, with his hand or fist, hit ôlicemap)ivho
was in the performance of duty, in the breast and nothing more,
no Direct Assault is committed because if the victim is only an
agent of a person in authority, the employment of force must be
of a serious character to show defiance of the law and its
representative at all hazards. However, if the victim is a person in
authority, not a mere agent, the force necessary to constitute the
crime need not be so serious, as the law with respect to persons in
authority uses the phrase "xxx lays hands upon a person in
authority". (U.S. vs. Tabiana, et al., 37 Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Gumban,
39 Phil. 76)
Considering the nature of the crime, this offense of Direct

Assault is always most likely to be complexed with another crime.
Thus, if A would attack a policeman while engaged in the
performance of his duties, that of maintaining peace and order
during a barangay fiesta, the crime would be Murder or Homicide
with Direct Assault depending on the presence of qualifying
circumstances in killing the victim. (People vs. Abalos, 258 SCRA
523). In one case, when the victim intervened to prevent a violent
encounter between the accused and the Ramos group, he was
discharging his duty as Barangay Captain to protect life and
property and enforce law and order in the barrio, thus, the assault\
resulting in his death is Homicide with Direct Assault (People
vs. Rillorta, et al., 180 SCRA 102). Under Art. 152 of the RPC
and P.D. 299, a Barangay Chairman is a person in authority. Had
only serious physical injuries been inflicted, the crime would be
Direct Assault with Serious Physical Injuries. If the shot directed
against a public officer did not hit him but he was in the actual»,
performance of duty, the offense is Attempted Homicide with
Direct Assault.
4. Indirect Assaults (Art. 149)

The penalty of prision correccional minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall make use
of force or intimidation upon any person coming to the
aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the
commission of Direct Assault.
Here, the crime of Direct Assault is being committed against

a person in authority or his agent, and somebody came to the aid
of the latter, but he himself was attacked. In other words, for the
crime of Indirect Assault to exist, there must be a person in
authority or an agent being a victim of Direct Assault, and
^somebody came to his rescue, and the offender assaulted that
somebody. Thus, if uponpromulgationof a judgment of conviction,
the accused attacked the judge, and his (accused) lawyer came to
the rescue of the judge but the brother of the accused who was in
the courtroom assaulted the lawyer, the brother of the accused is
guilty of Indirect Assault.
Considering however that any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in
authority (2nd par., Art. 152), the attack or employment of violence
against him of a serious nature or character shall constitute not
only Indirect Assault but Direct Assault under Art. 148.
CHAPTER TEN
CRIMES AGAINSTHONOR
The common offenses in this class of crimes are (1) Libel (Art.
353), Slander (Art. 358), Slander by Deed (Art. 359), Incriminating
Against Innocent Persons (Art. 363), and Intriguing Against Honor
(Art. 364).
1. Libel (Art. 353)

A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
The elements of libel are: (1) imputation of a discreditable act
or condition to another; (2) publication of the imputation; (3)
identity of the person defamed; and (4) existence of malice. All of
these are present when the accused wrote the mayor a letter
charging the latter of having a dirty (salaula) and corrupt (bulok)
administration, of teaching (tinuturuan) his police to become
collectors of bribe money, and of refusing (ayaw) to have the
municipal Treasurer collect hundreds of thousands of taxes,
copies of which were furnished the Municipal Court, the Municipal
Council and the Chief of Police, the crime of Libel was committed.
(Daez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 191 SCRA 61)
In defamatory imputation, malice is presumed and the test is
the character of the words used. The meaning of the writer or
author is immaterial. Six decades ago, in the case of U.S. vs.
O'Connell, the Court laid down the test for libelous meaning: x x
x Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made.
Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander.
177
x x x Said another court much more recently: "The test of libelous

meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component phrases
with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the
import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary
reader." (Lacsa vs. FAC, et al., 161 SCRA 427) <x
In libel cases, the question is not what the victim means b u t /
what the words used by him mean. (Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, (
255 SCRA 692) ^
J
But aside from being malicious, there must be a publication
of the libelous article, that is, there must be some communication
of the defamatory matter to some third person or persons. In U.S.
vs. Crame, 10 Phil 135, the delivery of the article to the typesetter
is sufficient publication. In U.S. vs. Ubihana, 1 Phil. 471, the
sending to the wife of a letter which maligns the husband was
considered sufficient publication, for the spouse is a third to the
person defamed.
The following are liable for Libel:
1. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing
or by similar means, and
2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor
or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, for defamation contained therein to
the same extent as if he were the author thereof. (Art.
360, RPC)
The common defense in Libel is that it is covered by privi-
leged communication. There are two kinds: first is the absolute(
privileged which is not actionable even if the author has acted in
bad faith, like the statements made by members of Congress in the
discharge of their functions, allegations or statements made by
the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during
the hearing of judicial proceedings, provided that they are relevant
to the issue, or pronouncements of courts of justice in the course
of the performance of duties; and second is conditional or qualified/
like a private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty, and a fair and
ynie report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
SLANDER 179
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are

not of confidential nature. Here, even if the statements are
defamatory, there is no presumption of malice. Thp prosecution
must prove malice in fact to convict the accused.
Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of
public officers which are related to the discharge of their official
duties will not constitute libel if the accused proves the truth of the.
imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the
public officers on matters which are not related to the discharge of
their official functions may constitute Libel.
Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot
be classified as privileged when publicly published and circu la ted.
(Sazon vs. Court of Appeals)
2. Slander (Art. 358)

Art. 358 does not define the meaning of Slander. It means :
Oral Defamation. Where the defamation is not committed;

by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,C
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematogra-T
phic exhibition or any similar means, it is Slander. Defama-)
tion through television is Libel but those uttered in a gathering')
through a microphone would be considered Slander. The\
penalty for Grave Slander is arresto mayor maximum to prisioii
correccional minimum while for Simple Slander, it is arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding P200 pesos. The punishment for
Libel is higher.
Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over
Libel cases but Slander is within the jurisdiction of the MTC or
MCTC.
3. Slander by Deed (Art. 359)

The penalty of arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional
minimum or a fine from P200 to P1,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall perform any act which shaH cast
dishonor, discredit of contempt upon another person. If said act
is not of a serious nature, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding P200 pesos.
While written communications or published statements

which cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of another person
are categorized as Libel, and oral or verbal words are to be labeled
as Slander, acts perpetrated for the same purpose are classified as
Slander by Deed. Thus, slapping a lady in a dance, not for the
purpose of hurting her but to cause her shame and humiliation for
refusing to dance with the accused is Slander by Deed.
4. Incriminatory Machinations (Art. 3 6 3 & 3 6 4 )

The felonies under Incriminatory Machinations are Incri-
minating against Innocent Persons (Art. 363) and Intriguing
Against Honor (Art. 364).
Any person who, by any act not constituting Perjury, shall
directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person, the
commission of a crime shall be guilty of Incriminating Innocent
Persons and shall be punished by arresto mayor. This is what we
refer to in law as planting evidence and the like. Thus, the officers
manning a checkpoint who would place illegal or prohibited
drugs or a paltik, in the car of a motorist for the purpose of
imputing a criminal charge against him, commit this crime. The
motorist however must himself be innocent.
Any person who shall make any intrigue, which has for
its principal purpose, to blemish the honor or reputation of
another person is guilty of Intriguing Against Honor. The penalty
is arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 pesos.
Where the sources of polluted information can be traced and
pinpointed, and the accused adopted as his own the information
he obtained, and passed it to another in order to cause dishonor
to the complainant's reputation, the act is Slander and not
Intriguing Against Honor. But where source or the author of the
derogatory information can not be determined and the accused
borrows the same, and without subscribing to the truth thereof,
passes it to others, the act is one of Intriguing Against Honor.
(See Criminal Law by Padilla. 11th edition, Vol. Ill, pp. 769 to 770
citing People vs. Pelayo, Jr., 10 C.A. Rep. 633)
a i m
C i r a i m a i & s i l l L a w
by
EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL
Associate Justice
Sandiganbayan
R.T.C. Judge of Oriental Mindoro — January 1983

to November 1986; R.T.C. Judge of Manila — No-
vember 1986 to March 1996.
Law Professor & Pre-Bar Reviewer — Ateneo de

Manila; Arellano University; Far Eastern Univer-
sity; Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila; Per-
petual Help University; San Sebastian College; Uni-
versity of the East; University of Manila and Uni-
versity of Sto. Tomas.
Bachelor of Laws — (Cum laude-Valedictorian)

Far Eastern University.
Published £ Distributed by
Book Store
856 Nicanor Reyea, Sr. St.
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Manila, Philippines
Philippine Copyright 1998
by
No portion of this book may be copied or

reproduced in books, pamphlets, outlines or
notes, whether printed, mimeographed, type-
written, copied in different electronic devices or
in any other form, for distribution or sale, with-
out the written permission of the author, except
brief quotations in books, articles, reviews or
legal pleadings and in judicial or other official
proceedings with proper citation.
Any copy of this book without the corre-

sponding number and the signature of the author
on this page either proceeds from an illegitimate
source or is in possession of one who has no
authority to dispose of the same.
m 7208
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
BY THE AUTHOR
Printed February 2002
Printed by:
REX pRIMTINq COMPANY, INC
T y p o q R A p h y & c n c A i i v c lirhoqiMphy
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Dedication
This book is devotedly and lovingly dedicated to my mother, the

late FRANCISCA GLORIA SANDOVAL, herself a brilliant author
of mathematics books for Grades V & VI used for a time in public
schools all through out the Philippines, my wife Pelagia, my daughters
Dra. Maritess, and Atty. Shy Marie, and my precious cutie-pie
granddaughter, Maria Tricia Anne Cueto Sandoval.
Preface
While intended principally and primarily for bar reviewers

and bar examinees, the author hopes that this book could also be
of immense assistance to law professors, justices, judges,
prosecutors, practitioners and law students. Newly decided cases
are incorporated together with the new laws enacted by the
current Congress. Whenever convenient, correlation of various
rulings and laws are made, in author's sincere desire to make the
interpretation as simple and as understandable as possible.
Citations of learned authors on the subject are mentioned to help
the readers in their quest for deeper meaning.
Thanks is hereby expressed to the staff of the author — Atty.
Leoveminda Ambojia-Villanueva, Friendaline O. Ilagan and Aida
Aguila-Eguia who have assisted him in the preparation of the
manuscript, as well as to the thousands of law students and bar
examinees who have urged the author to prepare such a book as
this.
Sandiganbayan
Manila, Philippines
v
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Book One
GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE DATE OF
ENFORCEMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE, AND REGARDING THE
OFFENSES, THE PERSONS LIABLE AND THE PENALTIES
Title One
FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One. — Felonies

1. Classification of Felonies 9
2. Incurrence of Criminal Liability 12
3. Duty of Court When Penalty is Excessive 17
4. Stages of Execution 18
5. Light Felonies 21
6. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felony. 21
7. Offenses not Subject to the Code 22
Chapter Two. — Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability

1. Justifying Circumstances 24
2. Exempting Circumstances 28
3. Mitigating Circumstances 32
4. Aggravating Circumstances 38
5. Alternative Circumstances 55
Title Two
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
1. Who are criminally liable

2. Principals
vii
3. Accomplices 61
4. Accessories 62
Title Three
PENALTIES
1. Penalties in general 66
2. Classification of Penalties 66
3. Duration of Penalties 68
4. Preventive and Subsidiary Imprisonment.... 69
5. Application of Mitigating and
Aggravating Circumstances 70
6. Other Effects of Penalty 73
7. Complex Crimes and Their Penalties 74
8. Continuing Crime 75
9. Indeterminate Sentence Law 76
10. Probation Law 79
11. Conditions of Probation 80
Title Four
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
TOTAL AND PARTIAL
1. Extinction of Criminal Liability

(Total and Partial) 81
2. Reason for Prescription of the Crime and/
or Penalty 86
3. Marriage of the Offended Party with
the Offender 87
4. Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability 87
Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY
1. Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies 89

2. Civil Liability of Parents and/or
Guardians 89
3. Subsidiary Liability of Inn Keepers,
viii
Tavern Keepers, Employers, Teachers
or Persons Engaged in Industry 90
Book Two
CRIMES AND PENALTIES
Chapter One. - CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Treason 95
' 0 72. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit
Treason 95
3. Misprision of Treason 96
4. Espionage 96
5. Inciting to War or Giving Motives
for Reprisals 96
6. Violation of Neutrality 96
7. Correspondence with Hostile Country 96
8. Flight to Enemy's Country 97
9. Piracy 97
Chapter Two. - CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

/ 1. Parricide 99
U
~ 2. Infanticide 100
p 3. Abortion 100
4. Murder 101
5. Death Under Exceptional Circumstances 102
6. Homicide 103
7. Death in a Tumultuous Affray 104
8. Giving Assistance to Suicide 105
9. Duel 105
Chapter Three. - CRIMES INVOLVING PRISONERS

/ \. Delivering Prisoners from Jail 106
9
"^2. Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners 107
3. Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners
by a Private Person 108
4. Evasion of Service of Sentence 108
5. Quasi-Recidivism HO
6. Maltreatment of Prisoners HI
7. Abuses Against Chastity H2
ix
Chapter Four. - CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
1. Robbery H3
2. Theft 120
3. Qualified Theft 122
4. Theft of Motor Vehicle 123
5. Brigandage 124
6. Usurpation of Real Rights 126
7. Culpable or Fraudulent Insolvency 127
8. Estafa 127
9. Other Forms of Swindling 134
10. Arson 135
11. Malicious Mischief 136
Chapter Five. — CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

1. Adultery 138
2. Concubinage 139
3. Sexual Intercourse Under Scandalous
<>v Circumstances 140
Rape 141
5. Acts of Lasciviousness 147
6. Seduction (Qualified & Simple) 148
7. Acts of Lasciviousness with the Consent of
the Offended Party 149
8. Corruption of Minors 150
9. White Slave Trade 150
10. Abduction (Forcible & Consented) 150
Chapter Six. - CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. Direct Bribery 152
2. Indirect Bribery 154
3. Qualified Bribery 154
4. R.A. 3019 155
5. R.A. 1379 158
6. R. A. 6713 158
Chapter Seven. - CRIMES INVOLVING LIBERTY

£ L ) Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention . 161
2. Arbitrary Detention 163
3. Delay in the Delivery of Detained
Persons 164
x
4. Unlawful Arrest 164
5 ; \ Slavery 165
Qs.J Forcible Abduction 165
Chapter Eight. — CRIMES INVOLVING FALSEHOOD

r\ AND FALSITY
8 V 1. False Testimony Against a Defendant 166

\ 2. False Testimony Favorable to
J the Defendant 166
)3. False Testimony in Civil Cases 167
/ 4. False Testimony in Other Cases
and Perjury 167
5. Falsification 169
Chapter Nine. — CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
1. Rebellion or Insurrection 172
' 2. Sedition 173
? 3. Direct Assaults 174
4. Indirect Assaults 176
Chapter Ten. — CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
Q 1. Libel 177
J
2. Slander 179
, A 3. Slander by Deed 179
' i 4. Incriminatory Machinations 180
xi

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INTRODUCTION

Sources of Philippine Criminal Law

% Rights of the Accused

attendance of witnesses and production of other

Cardinal Features or Main Characteristics or

0 Treaties or Treaty Stipulations

Laws of Preferential Application

into the Philippines of the obligations and securities

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect

The retroactive effect shall benefit the accused even if at

where the law is expressly made inapplicable to pending

General Provisions Regarding the Date of

FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH

Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by law. (Art. 3,

of conspiracy between them. (People vs. Silvestre & Atienza, 56

A. According to manner or mode of execution (ArtT3),

While Article 3 classifies the crimes into Intentional and

Mala in se and Mala prohibita, distinguished

INCURRENCE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Criminal liability shall be incurred:

There are three (3) scenarios under paragraph 1 of Article 4:

^committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting

"The proximate r a u s p of the death of the victims

Even if other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result

There must however be no_efficient intervening cause. In

Ineffectual means — Giving a person a drink mixed with sugar

Is There A Common Law Crime in the Philippines?

difficulty of securing a conviction for Estafa committed by issuing

DUTY OF COURT WHEN PENALTY IS EXCESSIVE

Courts Are Not Concerned With Wisdom, Efficacy

"We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in

specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort

fl/Jj L STAGES OF EXECUTION

Felonies could be attempted, frustrated or consummated. It

A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts

How To Properly Determine The Stage Of Execution

buildingte set on fire, it is not necessary that it should b£ entirely,

into parts to be categorized as attempted or frustrated like Slander

On the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the female

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the

Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration

The Court continued that the case of People vs. Eriha, 50

LIGHT FELONIES tiUrf. 7

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY ^

Conspiracy and Proposal to commiUeJony are punishable

Conspiracy to commit a felony as-ia^lLas Proposal to com-

OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE CODE

Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter

"While these are special laws, the fact that the

There are five (5) circumstances affecting the criminal liability

defendant's life in actual peril (Philippine Law Dictionary by

To give rise to self-defense, the aggression must not be a

there was total lack of provocation on the part of the accused as

assailant, with which his neighbor used to inflict a mortal wound

Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury

5J Fulfillment of Duty or Exercise of Right or Office

6.) Obedience to an Order of a Superior

Article 12 enumerates persons who are exempted from

lj An Imbecile or an Insane Person Unless the Latter has

cutting grass instead of guarding his victim could hardly be

In People vsU3ungo A99 SCRA 860, it was held that

one who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission

2j) A Person Under Nine Years of Age. ^