Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192799 October 24, 2012

ROLEX RODRIGUEZ y OLAYRES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED DOMECQ SPIRITS AND WINES, represented by
ALLIED DOMECQ PHILS., INC., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner assails the March 2, 2010 Decision1 and June 29,
2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108789, which affirmed the April
14, 2009 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24 in Manila, denying due course to
petitioner’s Notice of Appeal in Criminal Case No. 02-206499.

The RTC convicted petitioner for Unfair Competition penalized under Sections 155, 168, 160 in
relation to Sec. 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines,
and sentenced him to serve imprisonment of two (2) years, to pay a fine of PhP 50, 000 and actual
damages of PhP 75,000.

The pertinent factual antecedents are undisputed.

After promulgation of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 02-206499 convicting him for unfair
competition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the RTC on the 15th or the last day
of the reglementary period to appeal. Fourteen (14) days after receipt of the RTC Order denying his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal.4 Thus, the denial of his Notice of
Appeal on the ground of its being filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Before the RTC, the CA and now here, petitioner was unwavering in his assertion of the
applicability of the "fresh period rule" as laid down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.5

The rationale of the "fresh period rule" is:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.6
Neypes elucidates that the "fresh period rule" applies to appeals under Rule 40 (appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the RTC) and Rule 41 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA or this Court);
Rule 42 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
CA); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to this Court).7 A scrutiny of the said rules, however, reveals
that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes need NOT apply to Rules 42, 43 and 45 as there is
no interruption in the 15-day reglementary period to appeal. It is explicit in Rules 42, 43 and 45 that
the appellant or petitioner is accorded a fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision,
award, judgment, final order or resolution or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed.8

The pivotal question is whether the "fresh period rule" is applicable to appeals from conviction in
criminal cases governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122 which pertinently provides:

Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel
at which time the balance of the period begins to run. (Emphasis supplied.)

While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases, the issue
was squarely addressed in Yu v. Tatad,9 which expanded the scope of the doctrine in Neypes to
criminal cases in appeals of conviction under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus, the Court held in Yu:
1âwphi1

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure x x x.10

xxxx

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a
litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case—a
situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced.

We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over 1âw phi1

time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not
allowed in law—Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.

Thus, we agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case,
where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which
is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such
denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.
Verily, the application of the statutory privilege of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must
be accorded the same statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day
period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of their motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal
case is more stringent than those of civil cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases—
under the spirit and rationale in Neypes—greater leeway in filing an appeal through the "fresh period
rule," with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases which involve the
accused’s "sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."12

Consequently, in light of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner seasonably filed his notice of appeal
on February 2, 2009, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from January 19, 2009, the date of
receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April 14, 2009 Order of the RTC,
Branch 24 in Manila and the assailed March 2, 2010 Decision and June 29, 2010 Resolution of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 108789 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Notice of Appeal of petitioner
Rolex Rodriguez y Olayres dated January 29, 2009 is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Let the case
records be elevated by the RTC to the CA for the review of petitioner’s appeal with dispatch. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII or the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting member per Special Order No. 1343 dated October 9, 2012.

1
Rollo, pp. 69-81. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
concurred in by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and Francisco P. Acosta.

2
Id. at 82-83.

3
Id. at 62-63. Penned by Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr.

4
Id. at 56-59, dated January 29, 2009.

5
G.R. No. 241524, April 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.

6
Id. at 644-645.

7
See Panolino v. Tajala, G.R. No. 183616, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 309, 315.

8
Sec. 1 of Rule 42; Sec. 4 of Rule 43; and Sec. 2 of Rule 45.

9
G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 421.

10
Id. at 428.

11
Id. at 430.

CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1; Macasasa v. Sicad, G.R. No. 146547, June 20, 2006, 491
12

SCRA 368, 383.