FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M.

BAARES,
EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners, vs.
ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC,
EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA
ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA
ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY
ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO MANO, EVANGELINE
CABILTES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo,
Rizal, respondents.

G.R. No. 132624

March 13, 2000

PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:

Balising filed complaints for estafa against Baares and other accused. They
pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the filing
of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo
conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Baares furthermore
contended that since they lived in the same barangay and the amount involved
in each of the cases did not exceed P200.00, the cases were to be referred to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa first before being filed in court (based on the LGC
and Rules on Summary Procedure).

The MTC ruled in favour of Baares and dismissed the cases pursuant to the
Rules on Summary Procedure. After 2 months, Balising filed a motion to
revive the criminal cases stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon had
already been complied with. This was granted by the MTC. Baares contends that
the Order of the MTC dismissing the cases had long become final and
executory, thus Balising should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to
revive.

Balising, on the other hand, claimed that the revival was in accordance with sec.
18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It states that the rule on finality of
judgments do not apply to cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
They further insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for noncompliance
with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa may be
revived summarily by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number
of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rule on finality of judgments apply to the Rules on Summary
Procedure?

HELD:

First, one must distinguish between a final order and interlocutory order. A "final
order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else
to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. As
distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of
a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. Previous
jurisprudence state that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. As
such, the dismissal of the criminal cases against Baares is a final order. The law
grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his receipt of the court's
decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to
reconsider the same. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes
final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further amend or revoke. But what about the contention of
Balising that these rules do not apply to the Rules on Summary Procedure?
First, let us take a look at Sec. 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It states that
“cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only
after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not
apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.”

The contention of Balising that the case may be revived by a motion is wrong
because Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of
the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of
the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the
Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case
may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which
to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed. Lastly, Sec. 22 of
the Rules on Summary Procedure state that “the regular procedure prescribed in
the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a
suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.

The petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II dated August 26, 1997 and its Order dated January
29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092 are hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839,
94-0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854 and 94-0058 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo are ordered DISMISSED, without
prejudice, pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.