[ GR No.

47616, Sep 16, 1947]

JOSE TAN CHONG v. SECRETARY OF LABOR +

DECISION

79 Phil. 261

PADILLA, J.:

On 15 October 1941, a decision was promulgated in the case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, G. R. No. 47616, whereby this Court
affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which had granted the writ of habeas corpus applied for by Tan Chong, on the
ground that he, being a native of the Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a citizen of the Philippines.
On the same date, in the case of Lam Swee Sang vs. Commonwealth of the Philippines (G. R. No. 47623), this Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition of the applicant for naturalization filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, on the ground that the applicant,
having been born in Sulu, Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a citizen of the Philippines. The dismissal of the petition
implies and means that there was no need of naturalization for the applicant who is a Filipino citizen.

On 21 October 1941, a motion for reconsideration was filed in both cases by the Solicitor General. The latter contends that even if the petitioner
in the first case and the applicant in the second were born in the Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, still
they are not citizens of the Philippines under and pursuant to the laws in force at the time of their birth, and prays that both decisions be set
aside and the judgments appealed from be reversed. This motion for reconsideration was pending in this Court when the Pacific war broke out.
During the battle for liberation, the records of both cases were destroyed. Upon petition of the Assistant Solicitor General, Mr. Roberto A.
Gianzon, the records were reconstituted in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3110. The record of the first case, G. R. No. 47616, was
declared reconstituted on 5 June, and of the second case, G. R. No. 47623, on 28 June 1946. Upon these reconstituted records, we now
proceed to dispose of the motion for reconsideration.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the principle of jus soli applies in this jurisdiction. It is embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States , and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." In the case of U. S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S.
, 649, the Supreme Court of the United States applying the principle of jus soli held that a person born in the United States of Chinese parents
domiciled therein is a citizen of the United States. It further held that the Fourteenth Amendment was declaratory of the common law as existed
in England and in the United States before and after the Declaration of Independence. From that decision, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom
concurred Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented. The principle of jus soli was the rule in this jurisdiction until the 30th of September, 1939, when in the
case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor (68 Phil., 649), this Court abandoned it and held that a person of Chinese parentage born in the
Philippines in 1914 is not a citizen thereof, because she followed the citizenship of her Chinese parents and she is not a citizen of the
Philippines under the provisions of section 2 of the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. But in the cases of Torres and
Galloffn vs. Tan Chim (69 Phil., 518), decided on 3 February 1940 (69 Phil., 518), and Gallofin vs. Ordoñez, decided on 27 June 1940 (70 Phil.,
287), this Court reverted to the rule of jus soli laid down in the cases prior to the decision in the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, supra.

The Solicitor General heeding the opinions of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. G. S. Messermith, of 15 January 1938; of the Second
Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Alvey A. Adee, dated 12 September 1921, and of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Huntington Wilson, of 5
April 1912, who held that a person born in the Philippines of alien parentage is not a citizen thereof, because the common law principle of jus
soli or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was not extended to the Philippines the same opinions upon which
the Solicitor General had relied in the case of Chua vs. The Secretary of Labor, supra, in his contention that the rule applying the principle
of jus soli in this jurisdiction should be abandoned urges upon this Court to reconsider its decisions in the cases under consideration.

In the case of Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 Phil., 494, the Court applied the principle of jus soli to a person born in the Philippines of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and in so doing it cited the case of U. S. vs. Go-Siaco, 12 Phil., 490 where, according to the Court, the
principle had been applied. But nowhere in the decision of the last mentioned case was such principle applied, because the only question
passed upon was whether a person detained for not having a certificate of registration, as required by Act 702, could be admitted to bail
pending determination of his appeal by this Court as to whether he did come within the provisions of said Act.

In the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315, this Court passed upon the question as to whether a person born in the Philippines
of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, legally married, is a citizen thereof. In this case this Court took into consideration the provisions of
articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Civil Code in view of the fact that the petitioner was born on 6 July 1889; the second paragraph of Article IX of the
Treaty of Paris; section 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of 1 July 1902) and the amendatory Act of Congress of 23 March 1912, these
being the laws then applicable. Commenting on sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill, as amended, this Court said:
"By section 4 the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth which prevails in the United States was extended to the Philippine Islands,
but with limitations. In the United States every person, with certain specific exceptions, born in the United States is a citizen of that
country. Under section 4 every person born after the 11th of April, 1899, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued
to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands. From the reading of section 4 and taking
into consideration the Act of March 23, 1912, it is clear that Congress realized that there were inhabitants in the Philippine Islands who did not
come within the provisions of said section, and also that Congress did not then by express legislation determine the political status of such
persons. Therefore, the inquiry is Did Congress intend to say that all of the inhabitants who were not included in section 4 are to be 'deemed
and held to be' aliens to the Philippine Islands?" (Pp. 333-334.) (Italics supplied.)

In answering the question in the negative, this Court cited the case of an unmarried woman, a native of Porto Rico, 20 years of age, who
arrived in New York by steamer from Porto Rico on 24 August 1902. She was detained at the Immigrant station, examined by a board of
special inquiry, and excluded. The writ for habeas corpus having been denied by the Circuit Court, for the reason that she might become a
public charge, she appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States which held that she was not an alien to the United States. But the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case cited does not answer negatively the question asked by this Court, because it
does not appear that she is of alien parentage and it appears that she was a resident of Porto Rico on 11 April 1899. (192 U. S. 1.) Further
commenting on section 4, this Court said:

This section declares that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the Philippine Islands. It does not declare that other inhabitants shall
not be citizens. Neither does it declare that other inhabitants shall be deemed to be aliens to the Philippine Islands, and especially it does not
declare that a person situated as is the appellant shall not be nor shall not elect to be a citizen of the country of his birth. The appellant could,
as we have said, elect to become a citizen of the United States had he been born in that country under the same circumstances which now
surround him. All the laws and the rulings of the courts on the subject so declare, and this has been the declared policy of the United States.
While it has been decided that the Constitution and acts of Congress do not apply ex proprio vigore to this country, but that they must be
expressly extended by Congress, nevertheless, some of the basic principles upon which the government of the United States rests and the
greater part of the Bill of Rights, which protects the citizens of that country, have been extended to the Philippine Islands by the instructions of
the President to the first Philippine Commission and the Philippine Bill. (P. 339-340.)

The declaration that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the Philippines is tantamount or equivalent to declaring that those who do
not belong to that class shall not be. Realizing the weakness of the position taken, in view of the express provisions of section 4 of the
Philippine Bill, as amended, and of the fact that the Constitution of the United States and Acts of Congress do not apply ex proprio vigore to the
Philippines, the Court hastened to add another ground in support of the pronouncement that petitioner Roa is a Filipino citizen, and for that
reason entitled to land and reside in the Philippines. The additional ground is that the petitioner's father having died in China in 1900, his
mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship which he being under age followed upon the death of his father. The concluding pronouncement in
the decision of the case is, as follows:

The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and
never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country.

If all the native inhabitants residing in the Philippines on the 11th day of April 1899, regardless of their alien parentage, are citizens thereof, the
amendatory Act of Congress of 23 March 1912 empowering the Philippine Legislature to provide by legislation for the acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by those natives excluded from such citizenship by the original section 4 of the Philippine Bill, would be meaningless.

We are not unmindful of the importance of the question submitted to us for decision. We know that the decision upon the motion for
reconsideration in these cases is momentous. We have given the time and the thought demanded by its importance. While birth is an important
element of citizenship, it alone does not make a person a citizen of the country of his birth. Youth spent in the country; intimate and endearing
association with the citizens among whom he lives; knowledge and pride of the country's past; belief in the greatness and security of its
institutions, in the loftiness of its ideals, and in the ability of the country's government to protect him, his children, and his earthly possessions
against perils from within and from without; and his readiness to defend the country against such perils, are some of the important elements
that would make a person living in a country its citizen. Citizenship is a political status. The citizen must be proud of his citizenship. He should
treasure and cherish it. In the language of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, "the question of citizenship in a nation is of the most vital importance. It is a
precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition." ( U. S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, supra.) Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is
allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle of jus soli to
persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of
which such persons might claim to be citizens.

The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed for years,
no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not and should not apply
when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in
violation of the law in force.

It appears that the petitioner in the first case was born in San Pablo , Laguna, in July 1915, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully
married, left for China in 1925, and returned to the Philippines on 25 January 1940. The applicant in the second case was born in Jolo, Sulu, on
8 May 1900, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. It does not appear whether they were legally married, so in the absence of proof to the
contrary they are presumed to be lawfully married. From the date of his birth up to 16 November 1938, the date of the filing of his application for
naturalization, and up to the date of hearing, he had been residing in the Philippines. He is married to a Filipino woman and has three children
by her. He speaks the local dialect and the Spanish and English languages.

Considering that the common law principle or rule of jus soli obtaining in England and in the United States, as embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, has never been extended to this jurisdiction (section 1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Act of
29 August 1916); considering that the law in force and applicable to the petitioner and the applicant in the two cases at the time of their birth is
sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act of 23 March 1912, which provides that only those "inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands," we are of the opinion and so hold that
the petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the second case, who were born of alien parentage; were not and are not, under said section,
citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Needless to say, this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it cannot divest, of their Filipino citizenship those who had been
declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred, by the courts because of the doctrine or principle of res
adjudicata.

Accordingly, the decision of this Court in the first case confirming the lower court's judgment is set aside; the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila appealed from is reversed; the petitioner is recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration to be dealt with
in accordance with law; and the decision of this Court in the second case is set aside; the decree of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
appealed from granting the applicant's petition for naturalization filed on 16 November 1938 is affirmed, for the applicant comes under section 1
(a), Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and possesses the qualifications required by section 3 of the same Act, as amended, which was the
law in force at the time of the filing of the petition for naturalization. No costs shall be taxed in both cases.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

HILADO, J.:

I concur in the entire majority opinion. I concur in the revocation of the doctrine of jus soli enunciated, among other cases, in Roa vs. Insular
Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315. Besides, the ruling in that case can not be invoked in favor of the petitioner in G. E. No. 47616 nor of the
applicant in G. R. No. 47623 for the reason that, while Tranquilino Roa in that case was born in the Philippines in the year 1889, when articles
17 et seq. of the Civil Code were yet in force here and made him a Spanish subject, the said petitioner and applicant in the instant cases were
born, although also in the Philippines, in 1915 and 1900, respectively, i. e., after the abrogation of said articles, due to their political character,
upon the change of sovereignty following the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American war (Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.,
315, 330; Halleck's International Law, Chapter 34, par. 14; American and Ocean Insurance Companies vs. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. [26 U.
S.], 511, 542, 7 Law. ed., 242). As declared in the majority opinion, the citizenship of said petitioner and applicant should be determined as of
the dates of their respective births.

At the time the petitioner in G. R. No. 47616 was born (1915) the law on Philippine citizenship was contained in the Philippine Bill, section 4, as
amended by the Act of Congress of March 23, 1912. Under this provision said petitioner could not be a Filipino citizen upon the date of his birth
because his father, who was legally married to his mother, was a Chinese citizen and not a subject of Spain. If his father had been a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899, like his mother, who was a native Filipina, before their marriage and in that case, after said marriage, she would have
acquired the citizenship of her husband even if she had been a foreigner then under section 4 of the Philippine Bill, as amended, said parents
of said petitioner would have become citizens of the Philippines unless they should have elected to preserve their allegiance to Spain in the
manner and within the period therein prescrived; and then, too, the petitioner upon being born in 1915 would automatically have acquired
Philippine citizenship. But such was not the case.

The applicant in G. R. No. 47623 could not possibly be a Filipino citizen upon his birth (1900) because, aside from the fact that his father, who
is presumed to have been legally married to his mother, was a Chinese subject, there was no law on Philippine citizenship at that time,
because, firstly, even the aforecited articles of the Civil Code had previously been abrogated, as already stated by the change of sovereignty in
the Philippines following the Spanish-American war, secondly, said articles at any rate did not regulate Philippine citizenship nor did they make
said applicant's father a Spanish subject, and, thirdly, the Philippine Bill was not enacted until July 1, 1902.

In the case of the applicant in G. R. No. 47623, his father was a Chinese subject on April 11, 1899. And his mother, upon her marriage with her
Chinese husband, acquired his nationality. So that when said applicant was born in 1900 his parents were Chinese subjects. When the
Philippine Bill was enacted on July 1, 1902, therefore, said applicant and his parents were not subjects of Spain and consequently could not
have acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of section 4 thereof. It was only after the Philippine Naturalization Law was enacted, pursuant to
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law), that the said applicant had his first opportunity to become a naturalized citizen of this
country.

Consequently, I reach the same conclusion as the majority.

TAN CHONG vs SECRETARY OF LABOR

JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee
SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant
G.R. No. 47616. October 15, 1941. EN BANC.

FACTS:

Petitioner Jose Tan Chong, was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915 of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, who were legally married.
Sometime in 1925 when Chong was about ten years old he was taken by his parents to China. On January 25, 1940, he arrived at the port of
Manila and sought entry as a native born citizen. The Board of Special Inquiry assigned to hear his case, denied him admission on the alleged
ground that he is a Chinese citizen. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Board and ordered the deportation of Chong
to the port from whence he came. Chong sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was granted.

ISSUE:

WON Chong is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

Yes, Chong having been born in the Philippines before the approval of our Constitution, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a Filipino
citizen. His sojourn in China did not adversely affect his Philippine citizenship, it appearing that ever since he was twelve years old he wanted
to return to the Philippines but his father would not allow him to come, and he did not have the means to pay for his transportation back to the
Philippines until the date of his return. Animus revertendi existed here.

Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/may1996/104215.htm

Facts:

In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165
and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract
without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.

However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer
available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an
allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.

On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received
a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231.

Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the difference between his salary
and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid to him.

On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."

Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned
the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos.

Held:

No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On
March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691
and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 71177 February 29, 1988

ERECTORS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND DANILO CRIS, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This case should not have reached this Tribunal. It should have, in fact, been terminated three years ago but for the petitioner's counsels who
had the temerity to cite a non-existent law with the obvious intention of delaying the proceedings if not outrightly evading financial responsibility
under the law. This actuation, indeed, is flagrant dishonesty. We cannot let it pass.

But before we proceed, a recital of the background of the controversy is in order.

The private respondent, Danilo Cris, a contract worker as Earthworks Engineer in Taif, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, filed the case with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on February 27, 1984 for the illegal termination of his contract of employment with the
petitioner herein, Erectors, Inc. The petitioner, as a defense, contended that the private respondent was estopped from questioning the legality
of his termination as he already voluntarily and freely received his termination pay. The POEA, on September 27,1984, rendered a decision
adverse to petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents ERECTORS, INC. and SOCIETE AUXILLAIRE
D'ENTERPRISES (S.A.E.) jointly and severally, to pay the complainant, DANILO CRIS the sum of SEVEN THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SIX DOLLARS AND SIXTY SIX CENTS ($ 7,166.6), or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at
the time of actual payment, representing the unpaid salaries for the unexpired term of complainant's contract. 1
The decision was received by the petitioner on October 25, 1984. Fifteen days later, or on November 9 of the same year, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration with the respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The motion which was treated as an appeal was
dismissed by the NLRC "for having been filed out of time." 2

The petitioner, through counsel, alleged that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case and affirmed
that the motion for reconsideration or appeal was seasonably filed explaining thus:

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that between 25 October 1984 (date of receipt of the POEA decision) and 09 November 1984 (actual date
of filing of petitioner's motion for reconsideration), there were actually fifteen (15) calendar days, however, it can not be
disputed that within said period there were only ten (10) working days, and five (5) non-working or legal holidays, which
were as follows:

October 26, 1984--Saturday

October 27,1984--Sunday

November 1, 1984--All Saint's Day

November 3, 1984--Saturday

November 4,198--Sunday 3

xxx xxx xxx

In support of its contention, the petitioner cited two provisions allegedly of the 1984 POEA rules and procedures, specifying Rule XXIV, sec. 1,
and Rule XXV, sec. 2, thereof, which purportedly provide:

Rule XXV

xxx xxx xxx

Section 2. Finality of Decision, Order or Award — all decisions, orders or award shall become final after the lapse of ten
(10) working days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties and no appeal has been perfected within same period.

RULE XXIV

Section 1. Motion for Reconsideration. — The aggrieved party may within ten (10) working days from receipt of the
decision, order or resolution of the Administration, may file for a motion for reconsideration; otherwise, the decision shall
be final and executory (Emphasis supplied) 4

These cited rules do not exist. Nowhere in any law or rules relative to the POEA may the above provisions be found.

The POEA was created only on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797. Pursuant to the said Executive Order, the then Minister of
Labor, Blas F. Ople promulgated on September 5, 1983 the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment which took effect on
January 1, 1984. These 1984 Rules were superseded on May 21, 1985 by the POEA Rules & Regulations.

For the reason that the petitioner's appeal with the NLRC was filed on November 9,1984, the 1984 Rules should govern. And this was precisely
what the petitioner insisted upon — the POEA rules obtaining in 1984 must be applied. 5 Yet therein, it is clear that the period for perfecting an
appeal or a Motion for Reconsideration is ten (10) calendar days. The pertinent rule on the matter is found in Book VII, Rule 5, of the 1984
Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment (POEA/MOLE) to wit:

Section 1. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR APPEAL. The aggrieved party may, within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of the decision, order or resolution file a motion for reconsideration which shall specify in detail the
 particular errors and objections, otherwise the decision shall be final and executory. Such motion for reconsideration shall
be treated as an appeal as provided in this Rule otherwise the same shall not be entertained.

The above rule is expressed in a language so simple and precise that there is no necessity to interpret it.

Moreover, as early as 1982, this Court, in the landmark case of Vir-Jen Shipping & Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC6construed the ten (10) day
period for filing of appeals7 from decisions of Labor Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators as ten (10) calendar days, as well as the raison d' etre for
the shorter period, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

...if only because We believe that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded that labor cases be
promptly, if not peremptorily, disposed of. Long periods for any acts to be done by the contending parties can be taken
advantage of more by management than by labor. Most labor claims are decided in their favor and management is
generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the employers more opportunity not only to prepare even
ingenious defense, what with well-paid talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager
resources of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than what is
due them.

xxx xxx xxx

The POEA rule applicable in this case is precisely in consonance with the above ruling in that it expressed in no uncertain terms that the period
for appeal is ten (10) calendar days. For "not even the Secretary of Labor has the power to amend or alter in any material sense whatever the
law itself unequivocably specifies or fixes." 8

There is, thus, no doubt that the law mandates that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal with the NLRC is ten (10)
calendar days and not ten (10) working days.

It is, therefore, obvious that the counsels for the petitioner deliberately tried to mislead this Court if only to suit their client's ends. On this
regard, said counsels have much explaining to do.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of the public respondent, dated
December 28, 1984, AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on July 10, 1985 is hereby LIFTED. The counsels for
the petitioner are also admonished for foisting a non-existent rule with the warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely. With triple costs against the petitioner.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rendered by POEA Administrator Patricia A. Sto. Tomas.

2 Penned by Ricardo C. Castro and concurred in by Cecilio T. Sero and Federico O. Borromeo.

3 Rollo, 4.

4 Rollo, 4.
5 In a resolutions dated October 20 and December 16, 1987, we ordered the petitioner to furnish us with the source of
the rules appearing on page 3 of the petition. The petitioner, in compliance with the resolution manifested that the source
of the said rules is the 1984 Rules and Procedures of the POEA but did not bother to submit a copy thereof to this Court.

6 No. L-58011-12, July 20,1982,115 SCRA 347.

7 Art. 223 of the Labor Code.

8 Id.