Theories:

"if trade crosses borders, soldiers won't."

Intro(for all)
The history of the world is the history of changes in the theoretical interpretation of
international relations.
In any given era, a paradigm, or dominant way of looking at a particular subject such as international
relations, has arisen to infl uence judgments regarding which characteristics of the subject are most
important, what puzzles need to be solved, and what analytic criteria should govern investigations.

These paradigms, or “fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are studying”
(Vasquez 1997), tend eventually to be revised in order to explain new developments.

Cycles are embedded in history, and theory is forever evolving in an effort to stay in sync with history’s
pendulum.

Realism:

Features:
 Clear focus on political as opposed to economic religious or cultural

 Clear distinction bw domestic and intl politics, gives importance to latter(liberals talk about
internal characters)

 Theories within the tradition are theories of conflict, cooperation is rare

Contributors:
Realism is the oldest of these three contending schools of thought, and has a long and distinguished
history that dates back to Thucydides’ writings about the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece.

Other infl uential fi gures that contributed to realist thought include sixteenth-century Italian
philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli(the prince) and seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas
Hobbes.

Realism deserves careful examination because its worldview continues to guide much thought about
international politics.
Dominant theory:
Realism has historically been the dominant theory of International Relations and a point of reference for
alternative theories, even if only critically.

It aspires to be suprahistorical, explaining in all epochs the fundamental features of international

politics: first and foremost, conflict and war.

Pessimistic look:
 CHRACTERIZED by strong sense of tragedy
 A degree of pessimism as regards the prospect of more peaceful world

Emerging in the 1930s, realism’s polemical target was the progressive, reformist optimism connected
with liberal internationalists such as American president Woodrow Wilson.

Against this optimism, realism comported a more pessimistic outlook which was felt to be necessary in
the tragic realm of international politics.

Not a proper theory- set of thoughts:

Despite the efforts of late twentieth-century neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), realism is not
properly speaking a theory – an explicative coherent whole, clearly defined by an explicit set of axioms
and propositions.

Rather, realism is the name given by exponents and critics alike to a tradition of thought, signifying an
approach to international relations which claims to avoid wishful thinking by dealing with
international politics as they actually are, rather than as we would like them to be

Leviathan- Thomas hobbes:

In Leviathan, Hobbes set out his doctrine of the foundation of states and legitimate governments and
creating an objective science of morality.[citation needed] Much of the book is occupied with demonstrating
the necessity of a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and civil war.
Beginning from a mechanistic understanding of human beings and their passions, Hobbes
postulates what life would be like without government, a condition which he calls the state of nature.
In that state, each person would have a right, or license, to everything in the world. This, Hobbes
argues, would lead to a "war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes).

The Realist Worldview

Objective study of IR:
(6 principles of political realism by Morgenthau )

Sees world as it is, not as it ought to be: EH carr, hens morgenthau(Scientific Man versus Power
Politics (1946), politics among nations, The Purpose of American Politics , n Defense of the National
Interest)

Selfish nature:
 Lust for power is in human nature
People are by nature selfish and are driven to compete with others for domination and self-advantage.
Machiavelli captures the realist view of human nature in his work The Prince, arguing that people in
general :

“are ungrateful, fi ckle, and deceitful, eager to avoid dangers, and avid for gain, and while you are
useful to them they are all with you, offering you their blood, their property, and their sons so long as
danger is remote, but when it approaches they turn on you.” - machiavelli

 Carr and Morgenthau traced the roots of war in selfish nature of human

Promote national interest:

By extension, the primary obligation of every state—the goal to which all other national objectives
should be subordinated—is to promote its national interest and to acquire power for this purpose.
“Might makes right,” and a state’s philosophical or ethical preferences are neither good nor bad. What
matters is whether they serve its self-interest.

As Thucydides put it, “The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel . . . the
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.

Because the threat of armed aggression is ever present, realism recommends that war be placed at the
very top of a state’s concerns, and that to contain dangers, the pursuit of power must be prioritized
above all others

States-unitary actor:
 as applied to contemporary international politics, views the state as the most important actor
on the world stage because it answers to no higher political authority.

 States are sovereign: they have supreme power over their territory and populace, and no
other actor stands above them wielding the legitimacy and coercive capability to govern the
global system.

Struggle for power:

Given the absence of a higher authority to which states can turn for protection and to resolve disputes,
realists depict world politics as a ceaseless, repetitive struggle for power where the strong dominate
the weak and there is inherently a constant possibility of war.

In the spirit of seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes(LEVIATHAN), who viewed the
natural human condition as one of “war of all against all” and advised that successful states are those
that hold the “posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fi xed on one
another,”

the major trends in military spending, the arms trade, and weapons technology that countries are
relying on to militarily exercise infl uence and deter attacks from potential enemies.
In the pursuit of power, states must acquire suffi cient military capabilities to deter attack by potential
enemies and to exercise infl uence over others; hence states “prepare for war to keep peace.”

Element of power:
Of all the components of state power potential, realists see military capability as the central element.
Realist theory maintains that the ability to coerce militarily is more important than the ability to reward
favors or to buy concessions. Realists therefore reject the view of liberal strategic thinkers who maintain
that under conditions of globalization linking countries economically, politically, and culturally in webs of
interdependence, economic resources are increasingly more critical to national strength and security
than are military capabilities

Economic growth is important primarily as a means of acquiring and expanding state power and
prestige and is less relevant to national security than is military might.

Power; not morality

If you want peace, prepare for war

Might is right

Self help –arms race:

If you want peace, prepare for war.” ― J.B. Salsbury
Because each state is ultimately responsible for its own survival and feels uncertain about its neighbors’
intentions, realism claims that prudent political leaders seek arms and allies to enhance national
security.

In other words, international anarchy leads even well-intentioned leaders to practice self-help,
increase their own military strength, and opportunistically align with others to deter potential threats.

Security dilemma:
Views given by HERZ

International anarchy and a lack of trust perpetuate the principle of self-help and can give rise to the
security dilemma. As a state builds up its power to protect itself, others inevitably become threatened
and are likely to respond in kind.

An arms race is commonly seen as a manifestation of the security dilemma, for even if a state is truly
arming only for defensive purposes, it is rational in a self-help system for opponents to assume the
worst and keep pace in any arms buildup.

The views of Herz, who gave the concept of the security dilemma, are a reminder of Thucydides’
argument that, “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this
caused in Sparta
Prisoner’s dilemma:
Mistrust and suspicions are the main elements behind the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Mistrust is the thinking
that the other actor is determined to take advantage of one’s cooperation rather than repaying it. The
Cold War period can best explain the phenomena where mistrust was the root cause of a conflict
between the US and the Soviet Union, therefore, they resorted to offensive measures against each
other.

States can live peacefully if both the actors show consent. On the contrary, if they believe that the other
side has some hidden agenda and is unwilling to cooperate it leads to conflicts and anarchy. 8

Mistrust can hinder cooperation among groups just as it can between two individuals. Scholars such as
Thucydides, Hobbes and Herz has emphasised the anarchical nature of world politics which creates
mistrust among states, prevents cooperation and creates the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

The views of Herz, who gave the concept of the security dilemma, are a reminder of Thucydides’
argument that, “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this
caused in Sparta.”9 Therefore, attaining cooperation in such an environment of mistrust is against
reality. As a result, it becomes extremely difficult for states to trust each other and they largely view
other’s intentions negatively.

Offensive realists hold that parity of power is responsible for insecurity and mistrust.14 They view
mistrust as a permanent feature of international relations, which shapes the behaviour of the states and
compels them to maximise their power at the cost of other states

Defensive realists such as Jervis do not consider mistrust a static phenomenon and rather calls it a
changeable phenomenon. At one point of time, it is high enough to maintain cooperation, they believe
that some states trust each other enough to cooperate and enter into agreements and can have normal
relations. While there are other states who have deeprooted mistrust of each other which leads to
security dilemma

Rare cooperation
 Alliances temporary, should not be trusted

Hardcore realists or offensive realists believe that there is a deep rooted, incoercible mistrust
between states that prevents states from cooperation and causes conflicts.

The main proponent of this view is John Mearsheimer

Realist theory does not preclude the possibility that rival powers will cooperate on arms control or on
other security issues of common interest.

Rather, it asserts that cooperation will be rare because states worry about the unequal distribution of
relative gains that can result from cooperation to the disadvantage of one of the parties and the
possibility that the other side will cheat on agreements. Leaders should never entrust the task of self-
protection to international security organizations or international law, and should resist efforts to
regulate international behavior through global governance.
Peace – BoP:
If all states seek to maximize power, stability will result by maintaining a balance of power, facilitated
by shifts in the formation and decay of opposing alliances that counter each other’s expansionist
motives.

Thus allies might be sought to increase a state’s ability to defend itself, but their loyalty and reliability
should not be assumed, and commitments to allies should be repudiated if it is no longer in a state’s
national interests to honor them

Neo-realism:
Whereas these so-called classical realists sought to explain state behavior by examining assumptions
about peoples’ motives at the individual level of analysis, the next wave of realist theorizing
emphasized the global level of analysis.

Kenneth Waltz (1979), the leading proponent of neorealism (sometimes called “structural realism”),
proposed that international anarchy—not some allegedly evil side of human nature—explained why
states were locked in fi erce competition with one another.

The basis of neorealism is a scientific method that systematises core doctrines of realist thought into a
structural model of international relations.

Elaborated during the second half of the Cold War (see Chapter 20), it is based more on economic
theory and philosophy of science than on historical reflection.

The neo world view:

In Waltz’s (1959, 1979) parsimonious version, neorealism breaks the connection between the internal
and external dimensions of politics, denying that the internal structure of states has any serious effect
on interstate relations.

By defining the structure of the international system, neorealism seeks to establish the autonomy of
international politics

1. Waltz rejects the classical realist arguments that human nature or the domestic character of
states are relevant factors in explaining fundamental aspects of international relations.

2. War, alliances, the formation of a balance of power, and the precariousness of cooperation
cannot be explained by focusing on the behaviour of the ‘units’ or states in themselves, an
approach Waltz criticises as reductionist.

3. States, or ‘units’, according to Waltz, must be treated as empty boxes because their domestic
arrangements and characteristics do not really make a difference at the level of the
international system, which is the concern of international relations theories. At the system
 level, it is the fundamental structure of anarchy that shapes the behaviour of states or units, not
their internal make-up.

For a systemic analysis of structure, Waltz says, there are only three elements that matter:

 the differentiation of units,

 the organising principle,
 and the distribution of capabilities

However, with regard to the international system, the differentiation of units is irrelevant since states
are undifferentiated in their primary function: to produce their own security. States are required to
pursue their own security because no one else can be counted on to do so.

The reason is that the organising principle of the international system is anarchy, not hierarchy; and
‘self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order’ (Waltz 1979: 111). This structural
condition obliges each state constantly to guard its security and defend its relative position with regard
to other states without relying on others.

CO-operation and neorealism:

Anarchy imposes mistrust and uncertainty on others’ intentions, obstructing mutually advantageous
cooperation even in ‘soft’ dimensions like economics and trade (Grieco 1990).

States, like oligopolistic firms, must be concerned with the asymmetric distribution of advantage,
worrying about relative gains (‘Who will gain more’?) rather than absolute gains (‘Will both of us make
some gain?’).

Further, cooperation under anarchy is limited because to be dependent on others who are free to
cheat is risky. Interdependence thus produces not just amity, as liberals claim, but also, and more
importantly, reciprocal vulnerability, according to neorealists

Distribution of capabilities:
Virtually all states ‘at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal
domination’ (Waltz 1979: 118). Hence the distribution of capabilities across states, especially in the
military field, is the only fundamental changing element in the international system.

As a result it can be bipolar (with two great powers) or multipolar (more than two). These systemic
configurations are regularly produced by the balance of power, which counteracts excessive
accumulation of power, even provoking war.

Balance of power:
Waltz (1979) thinks, like Rousseau ([1756] 1917: 138), that the balance of power works as an automatic
mechanism. It is not the product of intentional diplomatic efforts made by states.

On the contrary, it is an unintentional and inevitable outcome of their interactions under conditions of
anarchy.

Facing the unavoidable repercussions of balance of power constraints, great powers tend to adopt a
defensive behaviour that upholds the status quo. For this reason the international system, like the
market, always tends towards equilibrium, according to Waltz’s theory of international politics.
Searching for opportunities:
Neorealists, however, present at least one other view. John Mearsheimer (2001: 29, 250), concentrating
on war and strategy in his Tragedy of great power politics, suggests that great powers ‘are always
searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals’.

Here Mearsheimer diverges from both Waltz and Carr. Great powers, he argues, are rarely satisfied
and, instead, seek to extend their hegemony. This implies that the ultimate concern for states is not
simply for security, as Waltz asserted (1979), but for maximising power. (offensive realism)

Here Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is closer to Morgenthau’s classical realism than to Waltz’s
neorealism.

Mearsheimer has studied how offensively-oriented states could behave as revisionist powers in
response to structural constraints. Thus he has considered one of the criticisms made of neorealism by
contemporary realists. These realists, who have integrated into their thinking elements of the classical
tradition (and thus earn the name ‘neoclassical’ realists), have contested neorealism’s assumption that
all states have an equal set of interests (Schweller 1998). Some have reaffirmed the relevance of
domestic politics and human nature factors, like perceptions and motivations (Walt 1987); others have
challenged the automaticity that neorealism attributes to the political process, primarily the balance of
power (Schweller 2006). All this suggests that realism is a broad tradition of thought with an ongoing
debate about the relative importance of power and security in grasping the interests of states under
conditions of anarchy.

Summary:
Whereas these so-called classical realists sought to explain state behavior by examining assumptions
about peoples’ motives at the individual level of analysis, the next wave of realist theorizing
emphasized the global level of analysis.

Kenneth Waltz (1979), the leading proponent of neorealism (sometimes called “structural realism”),
proposed that international anarchy—not some allegedly evil side of human nature—explained why
states were locked in fi erce competition with one another.

The absence of a central arbiter was the defi ning structural feature of international politics. Vulnerable
and insecure, states behaved defensively by forming alliances against looming threats.

According to Waltz, balances of power form automatically in anarchic environments. Even when they
are disrupted, they are soon restored

Defensive vs offensive:
There are several members of the realist family as shown in Table 2.1. Structural realism as envisioned
by Kenneth Waltz is often referred to as defensive realism to distinguish it from the more recent
variant, offensive realism.

Although both are structural realist theories, defensive realism sees states as focused on maintaining
security by balancing others and essentially preserving the status quo, while offensive realism sees
states as seeking to ensure security by aggressively maximizing their power (Mearsheimer 2001).
Classical realism (now often referred to as neoclassical realism) differs from both in that it assumes
“states differ with regard not only to their relative power but also their primary motivation,” and it
emphasizes “how systemic-level variables are ‘translated through unit-level intervening variables such
as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structure’”

Offensive realists hold that parity of power is responsible for insecurity and mistrust.14 They view
mistrust as a permanent feature of international relations, which shapes the behaviour of the states and
compels them to maximise their power at the cost of other states

Defensive realists such as Jervis do not consider mistrust a static phenomenon and rather calls it a
changeable phenomenon. At one point of time, it is high enough to maintain cooperation, they believe
that some states trust each other enough to cooperate and enter into agreements and can have normal
relations. While there are other states who have deeprooted mistrust of each other which leads to
security dilemma

Criticism:
1. Because much of realist theorizing was vague, it began to be questioned.

2. Realism offered no criteria for determining what historical data were signifi - cant in
evaluating its claims and what epistemological rules to follow when interpreting relevant
information (Vasquez and Elman 2003).

3. Even the policy recommendations that purportedly fl owed from its logic were often divergent.

4. Realists themselves, for example, were sharply divided as to whether U.S. intervention in
Vietnam served American national interests and whether nuclear weapons contributed to
international security.

5. Similarly, whereas some observers used realism to explain the rationale for the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq (Gvosdev 2005), others drew on realist arguments to criticize the invasion
(Mansfi eld and Snyder 2005a; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003).

6. A growing number of critics also pointed out that realism did not account for signifi cant new
developments in world politics.
 For instance, it could not explain the creation of new commercial and political institutions in
Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, where the cooperative pursuit of mutual advantage
led Europeans away from the unbridled power politics that brought them incessant warfare
since the birth of the nation-state some three centuries earlier.

 Other critics began to worry about realism’s tendency to disregard ethical principles and about
the material and social costs that some of its policy prescriptions seemed to impose, such as him
Liberalism:

Intro:
Liberalism is often seen as the characteristic political philosophy of the modern West. Its central
principles – freedom, (human) rights, reason, progress, toleration – and the norms of constitutionalism
and democracy are deeply embedded in Western political culture.

Nonetheless, liberal theories of IR were until recently disdained as utopian, by IR scholars no less than
by diplomats.

The two world wars and the Cold War seemed to bear out the realist thesis that the international milieu
was inevitably subject to the harsh imperatives of power politics.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the world has looked quite different. There is no hostile power
threatening the liberal democracies, indeed major war has come to seem unthinkable, and the
international economy is organised in accordance with the norms of the liberal market.

Liberal internationalism has gained a new relevance. The predominant school of liberal IR theory, most
strongly represented in the United States, focuses on the forces of change that are regarded as having
brought about this transformation: democratisation, institutionalisation and economic
interdependence.

Historical background:
The term ‘liberalism’ dates only from the nineteenth century, but the distinctive liberal pattern of ideas
crystallised much earlier, in the political struggle against monarchical absolutism in seventeenth-century
England, and were formulated as a coherent political doctrine by the English philosopher, John Locke,
whose Two treatises of government ([1690] 1988) ranks as the first great liberal text. For Locke the
rights and freedoms of the individual were paramount; government should rest on consent, not
monarchical or religious authority, its powers should be strictly limited, and it should practise religious
toleration

Liberalism developed as a full-fledged ideology in the ideas of the French Enlightenment philosophes
and the American founding fathers.

History, viewed as the advance of civilisation, had reached a stage where the oppressive absolutist
regimes of the day lacked all rational justification. Liberal thought on political economy developed
along similar lines.

Adam Smith’s Wealth of nations ([1776] 1998) with its themes of the division of labour, free trade and
the beneficent ‘invisible hand’ of the market, remains the Bible of liberal economists, much revered but
little read, its qualifications long forgotten

Early liberal thought was not democratic. In line with Locke’s emphasis on property rights, ‘consent’
meant election by property-holders, then a small minority. Kant’s republics were not democracies. The
violence of the French Revolution confirmed liberal fears of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ – or, more
simply, ‘the rule of the mob’. Liberal democracy dates only from the nineteenth century – relatively
early in the US, much later in Europe, initially for men only. Women had to wait until the twentieth
century

Contributors:
Liberalism has been called the “strongest contemporary challenge to realism” (Caporaso 1993, p. 465).
Like realism, it has a distinguished pedigree, with philosophical roots extending back to the political
thought of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith.

Main assumptions:
1. Application of reason and ethics:
Liberalism; a paradigm predicated on the hope that the application of reason and universal ethics to
international relations can lead to a more orderly, just, and cooperative world; liberalism assumes that
anarchy and war can be policed by institutional reforms that empower international organization and
law

Liberalism warrants our attention because it speaks to issues realism disregards, including the impact
of domestic politics on state behavior, the implications of economic interdependence, and the role of
global norms and institutions in promoting international cooperation.

2. Individual as seat of moral value:

Liberals view the individual as the seat of moral value and assert that human beings should be treated
as ends rather than means.

Whereas realists counsel decision makers to seek the lesser evil rather than the absolute good, liberals
emphasize ethical principle over the pursuit of power, and institutions over military capabilities (see
Doyle 1997; Zacher and Matthew 1995). Politics at the global level is more of a struggle for consensus
and mutual gain than a struggle for power and prestige.

3. Internal conditions of actors:

Instead of blaming international confl ict on an inherent lust for power, liberals fault the conditions
under which people live. Reforming those conditions, they argue, will enhance the prospects for peace.
The fi rst element common to various strands of liberal thought is an emphasis on undertaking
political reforms to establish stable democracies.

Woodrow Wilson, for example, proclaimed that “democratic government will make wars less likely.”

Franklin Roosevelt later agreed, asserting “the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy
constitute the most important guarantee of international peace.” Based on tolerance, compromise, and
civil liberties, democratic political cultures are said to shun lethal force as a means of settling
disagreements.

4. Diplomacy over force:

In place of force, diplomacy provides a means for achieving mutually acceptable solutions to a common
problem, and enables leaders to negotiate and compromise with each other in a peaceful manner.

Politics is not seen as a zero-sum game, as the use of persuasion rather than coercion, and a reliance on
judicial methods to settle rival claims is the primary means of dealing with confl ict.
 5. Conflict resolution methods:
According to liberal theory, confl ict-resolution practices used at home can also be used when dealing
with international disputes. Leaders socialized within democratic cultures share a common outlook.
Viewing international politics as an extension of domestic politics, they generalize about the applicability
of norms to regulate international competition. Disputes between democratic governments rarely
escalate to war because each side accepts the other’s legitimacy and expects it to rely on peaceful
means of confl ict resolution. These expectations are reinforced by the transparent nature of
democracies. The inner workings of open polities can be scrutinized by anyone; hence, it is diffi cult to
demonize democratically ruled states as scheming adversaries.

6. Free trade:
“if trade crosses borders, soldiers won’t – Immanuel kant

The second thrust common to liberal theorizing is an emphasis on free trade. The idea that commerce
can reduce confl ict has roots in the work of Immanuel Kant, Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, Adam
Smith, Jean-Jacque Rosseau, and various Enlightenment thinkers. “

The doctrine that unfettered trade helps prevent disputes from escalating to wars rests on several
propositions.:

a) First, commercial intercourse creates a material incentive to resolve disputes peacefully: War
reduces profi ts by interrupting vital economic exchanges.
b) Second, cosmopolitan business elites who benefi t most from these exchanges comprise a
powerful transnational interest group with a stake in promoting amicable solutions to festering
disagreements.
c) Finally, the web of trade between countries increases communication, erodes national selfi
shness, and encourages both sides to avoid ruinous clashes.

7. Global institutions:
Finally, the third commonality in liberal theorizing is an advocacy of global institutions. Liberals
recommend replacing cutthroat, balance-of-power politics with organizations based on the principle
that a threat to peace anywhere is a common threat to everyone. They see foreign policy as unfolding in
a nascent global society populated by actors who recognize the cost of confl ict, share signifi cant
interests, and can realize those interests by using

Idealism:
the time the carnage was over, nearly twenty million people were dead. For liberals such as U.S.
President Woodrow Wilson, World War I was “the war to end all wars.” Convinced that another horrifi c
war would erupt if states resumed practicing power politics, liberals set out to reform the global system.
These “idealists,” as they were called by hard-boiled realists, generally fell into one of three groups (Herz
1951). The fi rst group advocated creating global institutions to contain the raw struggle for power
between self-serving, mutually suspicious states. The League of Nations was the embodiment of this
strain of liberal thought. Its founders hoped to prevent future wars by organizing a system of collective
security that would mobilize the entire international community against would-be aggressors. The
League’s founders declared that peace was indivisible: an attack on one member of the League would be
considered an attack on all. Because no state was more powerful than the combination of all other
states, aggressors would be deterred and war averted.

A second group called for the use of legal procedures to adjudicate disputes before they escalated to
armed confl ict. Adjudication is a judicial procedure for resolving confl icts by referring them to a
standing court for a binding decision. Immediately after the war, several governments drafted a statute
to establish a Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Hailed by Bernard C. J. Loder, the court’s fi
rst president, as the harbinger of a new era of civilization, the PCIJ held its inaugural public meeting in
early 1922 and rendered its fi rst judgment on a contentious case the following year. Liberal champions
of the court insisted that the PCIJ would replace military retaliation with a judicial body capable of
bringing the facts of a dispute to light and issuing a just verdict.

A third group of liberal thinkers followed the biblical injunction that states should beat their swords into
plowshares and sought disarmament as a means of avoiding war. Their efforts were illustrated between
1921 and 1922 by the Washington Naval Conference, which tried to curtail maritime competition among
the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy by collective security a security regime agreed
to by the great powers that sets rules for keeping peace, guided by the principle that an act of
aggression by any state will be met by a collective response from the rest. Chapter 2 41 placing limits on
battleships. The ultimate goal of this group was to reduce international tensions by promoting general
disarmament, which led them to convene the 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference.

neoliberalism
the “new” liberal theoretical perspective that accounts for the way international institutions promote
global change, cooperation, peace, and prosperity through collective programs for reforms

Fueled by the recent history that suggested that international relations can change and that increased
interdependence can lead to higher levels of cooperation, neoliberalism emerged in the last decade of
the twentieth century to challenge realism and neorealism.

This new departure goes by several labels, including “neoliberal institutionalism” (Grieco 1995),
“neoidealism” (Kegley 1993), and “neo-Wilsonian idealism” (Fukuyama 1992a).

Like realism and neorealism, neoliberalism does not represent a consistent intellectual movement or
school of thought. Whatever the differences that divide them, however, all neoliberals share an interest
in probing the conditions under which the convergent and overlapping interests among otherwise
independent transnational actors may result in cooperation.

Neoliberalism departs from neorealism on many assumptions (see Controversy: Neorealism versus
Neoliberalism). In particular, neoliberalism focuses on the ways in which infl uences such as democratic
governance, public opinion, mass education, free trade, liberal commercial enterprise, international law
and organization, arms control and disarmament, collective security, multilateral diplomacy, and
ethically inspired statecraft can improve life on our planet. Because they perceive change in global
conditions as progressing over time, haltingly but still in the same trajectory through cooperative efforts,
neoliberal theorists maintain that the ideas and ideals of the liberal legacy could describe, explain,
predict, and prescribe international conduct in ways that they could not during the confl ict-ridden Cold
War.
Neo vs neo debate:
• The Nature and Consequences of Anarchy. Whereas everyone recognizes that the global system is
anarchical because effective institutions for global governance are lacking, neorealists argue that
anarchy does not matter much and in fact may be preferable to the restraints of world government.

Neoliberals see anarchy as a big problem that can be reformed through the creation of strong global
institutions

international Cooperation. Although neorealists and neoliberals agree that international cooperation is
possible, neorealists think cooperation is difficult to sustain, whereas neoliberals believe cooperation
can be expected because collaboration produces rewards that reduce the temptation to selfishly
compete.

Relative versus Absolute Gains. Both neorealists and neoliberals are concerned with relative gain as
well as absolute gain. Neorealists believe that the desire to get ahead of their competitor by obtaining
relative gains is the primary motive

, whereas neoliberals believe that states are motivated by the search for opportunities to cooperate that
will produce absolute gains for all parties to the cooperative exchange.

Priority of State Goals. Both national seurity and national economic prosperity are seen as important
state goals by neorealists and neoliberals. However, neorealists stress security as the most important
goal, and neoliberals believe states place a greater priority on economic welfare.

Intentions versus Capabilities. Contemporary neorealists maintain that the distribution of states’
capabilities is the primary determinant of their behavior and international outcomes. Neoliberals
maintain that states’ intentions, interests, information, and ideals are more infl uential than is the
distribution of capabilities.

Institutions and Regimes. Both neorealists and neoliberals recognize that states have created a variety
of new international regimes and institutions to regulate their relations since World War II. Neoliberals
believe that institutions such as the World Trade Organization create norms that are binding on their
members and that change patterns of international politics. By contrast, neorealists emphasize that
organizations such as the United Nations are arenas where states carry out their traditional competition
and political rivalry for infl uence.

Feminism:
Beginning in the late 1980s, feminism began challenging conventional international relations theory.
Cast as a “critical theory,” contemporary feminist scholars called for a “shift from mechanistic causal
explanations to a greater interest in historically contingent interpretive theories” (Tickner 2010, p. 37).

In particular, feminist theory was concerned with the gender bias inherent in both mainstream theory
and the practice of international affairs, and sought to demonstrate how a gendered perspective is
relevant to understanding and explaining world politics.

As feminist theory evolved over time, it moved away from focusing on a history of discrimination and
began to explore how gender identity shapes foreign policy decision making and how gendered
hierarchies reinforce practices that perpetuate inequalities between men and women (see Ackerly and
True 2008; Bolzendahl 2009; Enloe 2004; Peterson and Runyan 2009; Tickner 2005).

Behaviouralism:
behavioralism the methodological research movement to incorporate rigorous scientifi c analysis into
the study of world politics so that conclusions about patterns are based on measurement, data, and
evidence rather than on speculation and subjective belief.

behavioralism arose to challenge interpretations of international relations that were based more on
speculative assessment than on systematic observable evidence. Behavioralism was not a new theory of
international relations so much as a new method of studying it, based largely on the application of
scientifi c methods to the study of global affairs

Constructivism:
 Reality doesn’t exist

 Alexander wendth: “ people act towards objects and people on the basis of the meanings that
the objects have for them”

 constructivism a paradigm based on the premise that world politics is a function of the ways
that states construct and then accept images of reality and later respond to the meanings given
to power politics; as consensual definitions change, it is possible for either conflictual or
cooperative practices to evolve
comparison with realism:
.
 though constructivism is “a loose paradigm of related interpretations [that] share certain
assumptions with realists and liberals” (Steele 2007, p. 25), it departs from realism and
liberalism in important ways.

Common features:
 state as key actors
 anarchy exists
 states often have offensive capabilities- maximizing power
 states cannot be absolutely certain about other states – prisoner’s dilemma
 accepts structuralism
 states behave rationally

contrasting features:
1) Material factors vs ideas:

 In contrast to realism and liberalism, which emphasize how material factors such as military
power and economic wealth affect relations among states, constructivism emphasizes how
ideas defi ne identities, which in turn impart meaning to the material capabilities and behavior
of actors.

2) Reality is defined by images

international reality is defi ned by our images of the world. Constructivists stress the
intersubjective quality of these images—how perceptions are shaped by prevailing attitudes
 Iran nuclear from atoms of peace to revisionist
 Mujahideen to Taliban
 Iraq WMDs

3) Politics is socially constructed:

 Social construction can be either positive or negative(example of gorbachev)
 constructivists differ from realists and liberals most fundamentally by insisting that world
politics is individually and socially constructed. That is to say, material conditions acquire
meaning for human action only through the shared knowledge that circulating ideas ascribe to
them. Socially popular visions of realities provide transnational actors with certain identities and
interests, as well as material capabilities with certain meanings

4) anarchy depends on knowledge:

 Hence, the meaning of a concept such as “anarchy” depends on underlying shared knowledge.
anarchy among allies, for example, holds a different meaning for the states in question than an
anarchy composed of bitter rivals. Thus, British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the
United States than the same weapons in North Korean hands, because shared Anglo-American
expectations about one another differ from those between Washington and Pyongyang. The
nature of international life within an anarchy, in other words, is not a given. Anarchy, as well as
 other socially constructed concepts such as “sovereignty” and “power,” are simply what states
make of them

 The unraveling of the Warsaw Pact and subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union
stimulated scholarly interest during the 1990s in constructivist interpretations of world politics.
Neither realism nor liberalism foresaw the peaceful end to the Cold War, and both theories had
diffi culty explaining why it occurred when it did

5) Power- Intentions vs capabilities:

 For constructivists, the game of international power revolves around actors’ abilities, through
debate about values, to persuade others to accept their ideas. People and groups become
powerful when their efforts to proselytize succeed in winning converts to those ideas and norms
they advocate, and a culture of shared understandings emerges. The capacity of some activist
transnational nongovernmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch or Greenpeace, to
promote global change by convincing many people to accept their ideas about political liberties
and environmental protection are examples of how shared conceptions of moral and legal
norms can change the world. Consensual understandings of interests, self-identities, and images
of the world—how people think of themselves, who they are, and what others in the world are
like—demonstrably can al ter the world when these constructions of international realities
change

Postcolonial International relations scholarship posits a critical theory approach to International

relations (IR), and is a non-mainstream area of international relations scholarship. According to
Baylis postcolonial international relations scholarship has been largely ignored by mainstream
international relations theorists and has only recently begun to make an impact on the
discipline. Post-colonialism focuses on the persistence of colonial forms of power and the continuing
existence of racism in world politics.[1]
Postcolonial IR challenges the eurocentrism of IR—particularly its parochial assumption that
Western Enlightenment thinking is superior, progressive and universally applicable. Postcolonialists
argue that this is enabled through constructing the Other as irrational and backwards.[2]
Postcolonial IR attempts to expose such parochial assumptions of IR; for example, in the
construction of white versus coloured peoples. An example is the IR story of a "white men's burden"
to educate and liberate coloured men and women, to protect coloured women from coloured men.
Often this is linked to other postpositivist theories, for example, through Postcolonial feminism, which
analyze issues in IR through the lenses of gender and culture.
Examples of the parochialistic nature of IR include geographical parochialism and cultural
chauvinism. For the former, the construction of the Cold War era as a time of peace ignores the
reality that major conflicts continued in the developing world. Furthermore, the oft-cited history of IR
is constructed in western terms (more information under history); and IR has been used to justify
everything from imperialism to a playground for skirmishes between the two Cold War superpowers.
For the latter, the West (through IGOs such as the IMF's quick rush to "save" Asia in the aftermath of
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–8) could be seen as both a white men's burden to save Asia or to
reformulate Asian capitalism in a Western image.[3]
Criticisms and defense[edit]
Such IR stories are purposefully limited in scope in terms of statecentric modelling, cataloguing and
predicting in formal terms; and like other postpositivist theories, they do not attempt to form an
overarching theory as after all, postpositivism is defined as incredulity towards metanarratives. This
is replaced by a sensitivity and openness to the unintended consequences of metanarratives and
their negative impacts on the most marginalised actors in IR. In defence, postpositivists argue that
metanarratives have proven unworkable. Thus, such theories, although limited in scope, provide for
much greater possibilities in the normative work of developing an emancipatory politics, formulating
foreign policy, understanding conflict, and making peace, which takes into account gender, ethnicity,
other identity issues, culture, methodology and other common issues that have emerged from
problem-solving, rationalist, reductive accounts IR.

Strategic

depth , in Military terms, refers to the internal distance within a state from its Forward Defended
Localities (FDLs) or the distance from the frontline to its centre of gravity or Heartland, its core
population areas or important cities or industrial installations. It refers to the consideration
relating to the vulnerability of the centre of gravity of a country to the enemy’s onslaught in case
of war as against the capability provided by the space available within the territory to halt
enemy’s advance, counter attack and restore the balance. Militarily, a country having
more strategic depth is considered to be at a greater advantage as compared to the one having
lesser space. Strategic depth is a geographical factor, which naturally strengthens the defense
capability of a country and on the other hand places great challenges on the aggressor; it
reinforces the natural capacity to absorb a military aggression from the defender’s point of view,
and also burdens the aggressor with the problem of maintaining a long logistical tail. Thus
the strategic depth of a country is directly proportional to its national security, especially in case
of hostile neighbors.
In military history, Russia is considered to be a classic example of a country gifted with
great spaces within its territory, which the aggressors had to venture in order to reach its
centre of gravity. The deeply located heartlands of Russia; Moscow and Stalingrad,
seriously hampered the advances of the Napoleonic and the German invasions in 1812
and World War II respectively. The long logistical tails of these invaders, which could not
be effectively maintained, took a heavy toll on their armies. This factor, apart from adverse
weather conditions is considered to be the major cause for their failures. Thus
the strategic depth of Russia played a substantial role in defeating the advance of these
invaders.

On the other hand, Israel, for being a geographically narrow state is the best example of
a country having lesser strategic depth . From military point of view, the critical lack of
physical internal space makes it very vulnerable to its neighbors. The Israeli aggression
in 1967 during the Six Days War, besides getting control of the water resources at Golan
Heights of Syria, pushed its line of defense forward to a formidable obstacle, the River
Jordan, by capturing the West Bank territory of Jordan. Mainly, the aim was to increase
the internal space in order to provide more strategic depth to the Country.

After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, President, General Zia ul Haq’s
endeavors in the process of helping the Afghans, desperate to evict the invaders and
USA eager to destroy its long time cold war enemy, were also aimed at restoration of
the strategic depth of Pakistan from the north which had been lost as a result of the
invasion.

Unfortunately, given the aggressive designs of its hostile neighbour, Pakistan, being a
geographically narrow country is at a great disadvantage as compared to India. The
physically constricted breadth of Pakistan from east to west astride the river Indus, and a
3000 km Eastern border (including LOC) with India, makes it very vulnerable against a
potential sweeping offensive by Indian military. India has about three times
more depth than Pakistan and the proportional average depth of Pakistan as compared
to India is meagre. Thus, in the opinion of some military strategists, the Afghan territory
could provide a strategic depth to Pakistan in case of an Indian onslaught, where, at the
time of need Pakistan Army can withdraw, reorganise, and after gaining their balance,
can carry out counter attacks in order to evict the enemy form the captured areas. The
factors of terrain, demography and sustainability in this regard are best suited for
Pakistan, provided the political government in Afghanistan is friendly and supportive.

Notwithstanding the military factor, there is another dimension to the strategic depth; a
political one, which deals with the treaties and alliances with different friendly countries
based on trade, economic, social, cultural, demographic, political and military factors.
These could be at the regional or global level which can be in the shape of combination
of strategies; political, economic and military co-operations between those countries
having similar threats and national interests. In this regard, Pak-China strategic and
economic collaboration is a landmark of cooperation between two countries, which has
placed Pakistan’s political strategic depth in China.

Similarly, Russia, who historically had great strategic depth acquisition ambitions in
Europe and Central Asia, has now restricted herself at the regional level by focusing her
efforts in the Eastern Europe whereby these countries provide her
required strategicdepth from the west. In the case of Israel, her
political strategic depth lies thousands of miles away in USA. Indian active involvement
in Afghanistan despite non-existence of any Indo-Afghan border has also to be attributed
to a preemptive strategy aimed at denying the strategic depth to Pakistan.

Although the concept of strategic depth has historically been factored into the strategies
of several nations of which a few examples have been quoted above, and still continues,
the concept / strategy is invariably restricted to the military strategic plans of these
nations and guarded as top secret information. Due to the fact that it may involve
hegemonic attributes, this concept is not usually discussed openly.

The recent book published by the foreign minister of Turkey, Ahmet Devatoglu, is a
milestone in geopolitical studies which deals with the strategic depth doctrine of Turkey.

The strategic depth concept of Pakistan has been criticized by a number

of strategicanalysts from within the country as well as abroad. The main reason for this
criticism has to be attributed to their belief that it manifests a hegemonic posture.
Alarmingly however, another factor for its criticism from a particular section of
press/electronic media could be ascribed to vested interests related to the outcome of
Indian interests to deny strategic depth to Pakistan as mentioned above… a common
practice of yellow journalism in Pakistan.

Strategic depth is a sound concept . Every country, in order to secure its sovereignty
strives to gain and retain it. Pakistan’s strategic depth doctrine is purely political in nature
and is based on having congenial relationships with her neighbours. The statement of the
ex COAS of Pakistan Army that they don’t want to control Afghanistan, rather want to
have good relations with them, clearly manifest this policy.

Pakistan has historical, cultural and demographic ties with Afghanistan and the
geopolitical locations of both countries demand common national interests for both the
countries. This lays emphasis on intimate mutual cooperation between two countries to
face the challenges of the menace of Taliban together. Afghanistan has to realize that
due to its geographical location and historical ties, finally it is Pakistan who would be a
natural ally to them in the future rather than India which does not even share any border
with them. They have to co-exist with Pakistan and not India. Thus, given the interest of
all the great nations in central Asia, Afghanistan has to be mindful of the fact that where
Afghanistan provides strategic depth to Pakistan, the later also provides strategic depthto
Afghanistan from the south against two emerging powers of Asia, China and India.

Balance of Power Theory

As a theory, balance of power predicts that rapid changes in international power and status—
especially attempts by one state to conquer a region—will provoke counterbalancing actions.
For this reason, the balancing process helps to maintain the stability of relations between
states. A balance of power system functions most effectively when alliances are fluid, when
they are easily formed or broken on the basis of expediency, regardless of values, religion,
history, or form of government. Occasionally a single state plays a balancer role, shifting its
support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest. A weakness of the balance of power
concept is the difficulty of measuring power.
Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel
Fortmann, eds. Stanford, CA: Stanford UIniversity Press, 2004; Little, Richard. The Balance of Power in
International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models.New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007; Saltzman, Ilai Z. Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic
Reconceptualization. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2012; Extract from 'Balance of Power,' Microsoft
Encartar Online Encyclopedia 2000 http://encarta.msn.com c.1997-2000 Microsoft Corporation. All rights
reserved.

Behavioralism
An approach to the study of politics or other social phenomena that focuses on the actions
and interactions among units by using scientific methods of observation to include
quantification of variables whenever possible. A practitioner of behavioralism is often referred
to as a behavioralist. Behaviorism refers to the ideas held by those behavioral scientists who
consider only observed behavior as relevant to the scientific enterprise and who reject what
they consider to be metaphysical notions of "mind" or "consciousness."
Li-hua, Jin. "Probe on different Behavorist Views of Western Political Theory." Journal of Chengdu
Teacher's College 3 (2005); Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations Theory.
Macmillan Publishing Company, New York.

Chaos Theory
In mathematics and physics, chaos theory describes the behavior of certain nonlinear
dynamical systems that may exhibit dynamics that are highly sensitive to initial conditions
(popularly referred to as the butterfly effect). As a result of this sensitivity, which manifests
itself as an exponential growth of perturbations in the initial conditions, the behavior of chaotic
systems appears to be random. This happens even though these systems are deterministic,
meaning that their future dynamics are fully defined by their initial conditions, with no random
elements involved. This behavior is known as deterministic chaos, or simply chaos. Since the
International System can be considered a nonlinear dynamic system, it is reasonable to take
this theory into account for the study of the International Order.
Faber, Jan and Henk Koppelaar. “Chaos Theory and Social Science: A Methodological Analysis.” Quality
and Quantity 28 (November 1994): 421-433; Gregersen, Hal and Lee Sailer. "Chaos Theory and Its
Implications for Social Science Research." Human Relations 46 (July 1993): 777-802; Mostly
from Wikipedia.
Classical Realism
Also called human realism and associated with Morgenthau's exposition of realism in which
the power pursuit propensity of states is derived from the basic nature of human beings as
power maximisers. This perspective holds that ideological, as well as material, factors may
constitute 'power' (e.g. power over public opinion) and hence has some social underpinning.
Williams, Michael C. “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism,
and the Moral Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 58 (Autumn 004): 633-665;
Vasquez, John A. The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated
on 14 March 2013.

Collective Defense
Though the term existed before 1949, a common understanding of collective defence with
regards to NATO can be found in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty: 'The Parties agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against
them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area' (NATO
Handbook: 232). In the context of NATO, then, collective defence is based on countering
traditional challenges as understood by the realist/neorealist paradigm, specifically to
territory, and finds its focus on an identifiable external threat or adversary.
Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense. Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated
on 14 March 2013; Oneal, John R. "Testing the Theory of Collective Action Nato Defense Burdens, 1950-
1984." Journal of Conflict Resolution 34 (September 1990): 426-448.

Collective Efficacy, Theory of

Collective efficacy is defined as the presence of local social cohesion and a shared
expectation for informal social control, or collective action (Sampson, 2006). Although often
used within the study of criminology, collective efficacy is not exclusively a theory of crime; it
is also employed more broadly in the study of neighborhood context and well-being.
Examples of informal actions characteristic of high collective efficacy include neighbors’
intervening to prevent an act of vandalism, organizing to defend a local institution (e.g., a fire
hall threatened with budget cuts), offering support to an injured or ill neighbor, and providing
mutual assistance during a natural disaster. Unlike theories that attribute outcomes to
explanations based on variation in “different kinds of people,” collective efficacy focuses on
the influence of “different kinds of places” (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Places have different
levels of collective efficacy based on variation in ecological context. The underlying
perspective is that community-level instability constrains friendship choices and reduces local
social cohesion and a norm of informal social control. The theory of collective efficacy
recognizes that social cohesion is directly measured through the presence of social networks.
In this way, collective efficacy breaks from traditional theories of social disorganization that
attribute local social problems to macrofactors, such as invasion and succession (e.g.,
immigration), the breakdown of traditional institutions (e.g., church, family, local government),
and mobility.
Sampson, R. J. (2006). "Collective Efficacy Theory: Lessons Learned and Directions for Future Inquiry." In
F. T. Cullen, J. P. Wright, and K. R. Blevins (Eds.), Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological
Theory (Advances in Criminological Theory: Vol. 15, pp. 149-167). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction;
Kubrin, C. E., and Weitzer, R. (2003). "New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory." Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40 (4), 374-402.

Collective Security
Employed during the construction of the League of Nations, the concept of collective security
goes beyond the pure idea of defence to include, according to Inis Claude, 'arrangements for
facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes,' assuming that the mechanisms of preventing war
and defending states under armed attack will 'supplement and reinforce each other'
(1984:245). Writing during the Cold War, Claude identifies the concept as the post-WWI name
given by the international community to the 'system for maintenance of international peace...
intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance-of-power'
(1984:247). Most applicable to widely inclusive international organizations such as the
League and the United Nations, ideally, the arrangement would transcend the reliance on
deterrence of competing alliances through a network or scheme of 'national commitments
and international mechanisms.' As in collective defence, collective security is based on the
risk of retribution, but it can also involve economic and diplomatic responses, in addition to
military retribution. From this, it is theorized that perfected collective security would
discourage potential aggressors from angering a collectivity of states. Like balance-of-power,
collective security works on the assumption that any potential aggressor would be deterred
by the prospect of joint retaliation, but it goes beyond the military realm to include a wider
array of security problems. It assumes that states will relinquish sovereignty and freedom of
action or inaction to increasing interdependence and the premise of the indivisibility of peace.
The security that can be derived from this is part of the foundation of the neoliberal
institutionalist argument.
Butfoya, Andrew. “Collective Security: Theory, Problems and Reformulations.” Australian Journal of
International Affairs 47 (1993): 1-14; Kupchan, Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan. “The Promise of
Collective Security.” International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 52-61; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms,
Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Communitarianism
A theory that became influential in the 1990s and sought to place the community at the heart
of political theorizing. Communitarians express strong opposition towards the abstract
individual of liberal theory, arguing that people need to participate in running their lives. They
view with alarm the tendency to retreat from political and social involvement into privatised
worlds in which people act simply as consumers. Communitarians are aware that elevating
the community may generate a regime that imprisons rather than empowers the individual.
Order and autonomy, they contend, should nourish one another, so that individuals become
more able to govern their own lives when consciously participating in communities. It is
important to see communities, they argue, in the plural. A community is a ‘set of attributes’,
Etzioni argues, not a place, so that people should be committed to numerous communities,
each with their norms and culture. The more individuals are monopolised by any one
community, the less ‘communitarian’ such a society will be. Each community is deemed part
of a wider community, so that values cannot be restricted to one particular group, but must
be linked to global values – values that express the interest of the community of communities.
Etzioni, Amitai, Communitarianism (2003). Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual
World, Vol. 1, A-D, Karen Christensen and David Levinson, eds., Sage Publications, 2003, pp. 224-228.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157152; Hoffman, John. Glossary of Political Theory,
PaloAlto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007; Communitarianism. (2007). In Political Philosophy A-Z.
Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/edinburghppaz/communitarianism

Complex Adaptive Systems Theory

The field of complex adaptive systems theory (a.k.a., "complexity theory") seeks to
understand how order emerges in complex, non-linear systems, such as, ecologies, markets,
and social systems. Three assumptions underpin the behavior of agents within a complex
system: 1) autonomous agents--all the agents make choices simultaneously, both influencing
and limiting each other's actions; 2) networked structure--the agents do not act randomly, but
rather, share some common rules about how they decide what to do next; and, 3) profuse
experimentation--these edge of chaos systems are full of novelty and experimentation. They
have a quality of dynamic stability that is characteriszed by occasrional rapid and
unpredictable shifts in shape and direction.
Brunk, Gregory G. “Why Do Societies Collapse? A Theory Based on Self-Organised Criticality.” Journal of
Theoretical Politics 14 (April 2002): 195-230; Cleveland, John. "Complex Adaptive Systems Theory: An
Introduction to Basic Theory and Concepts."Innovation Network for Communities, 1994, rev.
2005. Slideshare Presentation; William de. Mills, Analyzing the Future Web site; Mark Beavis, IR
Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Complex Interdependence Theory

The term 'complex interdependence' was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye
and refers to the various, complex transnational connections (interdependencies) between
states and societies. Interdependence theorists noted that such relations, particularly
economic ones, were increasing; while the use of military force and power balancing were
decreasing (but remained important). Reflecting on these developments, they argued that the
decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms of
interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states. The complex
interdependence framework can be seen as an attempt to synthesise elements of realist and
liberal thought. Finally, anticipating problems of cheating and relative gains raised by realists,
interdependence theorists introduced the concept of 'regimes' to mitigate anarchy and
facilitate cooperation. Here, we can see an obvious connection to neo-liberal institutionalism.
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. 3rd edition. New York: Longman,
2001. Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013; Wikipedia.

Complexity Theory
See Complex Adaptive Systems Theory.

Constitutional Order Theory

Philip Bobbitt’s central thesis is that the interplay between strategic and constitutional
innovation changes the constitutional order of the state. In putting his thesis, Bobbitt also
contends that: epochal wars have brought a particular constitutional order to primacy; a
constitutional order achieves dominance by best exploiting the strategic and constitutional
innovations of its era; the peace treaties that end epochal wars ratify a particular constitutional
order for the society of states; and each constitutional order asserts a unique basis for
legitimacy. In terms of the current international system, Bobbitt argues that it is transitioning
from an order of nation-states to market-states. The value of Bobbitt’s thesis is that it better
explains relations between states, as well as changes within states and in the international
system, than the (previously) dominant theory of neo-realism, which assumes that all states
are the same and seek only to survive in an anarchical and competitive system through on-
going power balancing.
Bobbit, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. New York: Knopf, 2002; Mark
Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Constitutive Theory
Constitutive theory is directly concerned with the importance of human reflection on the nature
and character of world politics and the approach to its study. Reflections on the process of
theorizing, including epistemological and ontological issues and questions, are typical.
Constitutive theory is distinguished from explanatory or empirical theory (see below) and may
be described as the philosophy of world politics or international relations.
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Constructivism
Constructivist theory rejects the basic assumption of neo-realist theory that the state of
anarchy (lack of a higher authority or government) is a structural condition inherent in the
system of states. Rather, it argues, in Alexander Wendt's words, that 'Anarchy is what states
make of it'. That is, anarchy is a condition of the system of states because states in some
sense 'choose' to make it so. Anarchy is the result of a process that constructs the rules or
norms that govern the interaction of states. The condition of the system of states today as
self-helpers in the midst of anarchy is a result of the process by which states and the system
of states was constructed. It is not an inherent fact of state-to-state relations. Thus,
constructivist theory holds that it is possible to change the anarchic nature of the system of
states.
Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics." International Organization, 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425; "Constructivism in International Relations
Theory." (2001). In Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/routsocial/constructivism_in_international_relations_theory.

Corporatism
This refers to organised interest groups that mediate between society and the state. In fascist
theory, corporatism is seen as a substitute for democracy so that major groups are “licensed”
by the state to exercise control over “their” section of the population. In the post-war period,
corporatism is not restricted to business corporations, but often includes the larger trade
unions as well. A limited number of relatively privileged groups play a role in determining
public policy in consultation with the state. This contradicts the assumptions of liberal theory.
Individuals are not all equal, and the role played in the determination of policy by a relatively
small number of actors is unrecognised in the democratic process. Unlike the notion of
interest-group pluralism, corporatism assumes that relatively few organizations of a non-
competitive kind relate to the state in a privileged way. A distinction is sometimes made
between “societal corporatism,” where powerful groups in society are recognized by the state,
and “state corporatism,” where the state itself takes the initiative and imposes a scheme upon
dominant groups. The latter is usually associated with more authoritarian state systems.
Corporatism is defended as a way of imposing order upon society, so that the market itself is
controlled and inflation and unemployment managed.
"Corporatism." (2007). In A Glossary of Political Theory. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/edinburghgpt/corporatism; "Corporatism." (2008). In Key Concepts in
Governance. Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageukgov/corporatism; Schmitter,
Philippe C. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics 36 (January 1974): 85-131; Schmitter,
Philippe C. and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds. Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications, 1979.

Cosmopolitanism
The word ‘cosmopolitan’, which derives from the Greek word kosmopolitês (‘citizen of the
world’), has been used to describe a wide variety of important views in moral and socio-
political philosophy. The nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all
human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single
community, and that this community should be cultivated. Different versions of
cosmopolitanism envision this community in different ways, some focusing on political
institutions, others on moral norms or relationships, and still others focusing on shared
markets or forms of cultural expression. The philosophical interest in cosmopolitanism lies in
its challenge to commonly recognized attachments to fellow-citizens, the local state,
parochially shared cultures, and the like.
Walker, Thomas C. “The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine's Cosmopolitanism and International
Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 44 (March 2000): 51–72; From the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy: Cosmopolitanism.

Critical Social Theory

Not really a theory, but an approach or methodology which seeks to take a critical stance
towards itself by recognising its own presuppositions and role in the world; and secondly,
towards the social reality that it investigates by providing grounds for the justification and
criticism of the institutions, practices and mentalities that make up that reality. Critical social
theory therefore attempts to bridge the divides in social thought between explanation and
justification, philosophical and substantive concerns, pure and applied theory, and
contemporary and earlier thinking.
George, Jim and David Campbell. “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social
Theory and International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly, Special Issue: Speaking the Language
of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies 34 (September 1990): 269-293; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms,
Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Cultural Internationalism
Cultural internationalism is the idea that world order can and should be defined through
interactions at the cultural level across national boundaries. From this point of view, an
alternative view of world order is created by artists, writers, thinkers, popular movements, and
civil society organizations which is often in contrast the view of a world system dominated by
great powers and the realist demands of geopolitics.
Iriye, Akira. Cultural Internationalism and World Order. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1997; Merryman, J. H. “Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property.” The American Journal of
International Law 80 (October 1986): 831–853; Stamatoudi, Irini A. Cultural Property Law and Restitution:
A Commentary to International Conventions and European Union Law. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar,
2011 [see chapter 1].

Decision Making Analysis

The discipline comprising the philosophy, theory, methodology, and professional practice
necessary to address important decisions in a formal manner. Decision analysis includes
many procedures, methods, and tools for identifying, clearly representing, and formally
assessing the important aspects of a decision situation, for prescribing the recommended
course of action by applying the maximum expected utility action axiom to a well-formed
representation of the decision, and for translating the formal representation of a decision and
its corresponding recommendation into insight for the decision maker and other stakeholders.
Hudson, Valerie M. “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International
Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (March 2005): 1-30; Raiffa, Howard. The Art and Science of
Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982; Wikipedia.

Defensive Realism
Defensive realism is an umbrella term for several theories of international politics and foreign
policy that build upon Robert Jervis's writings on the security dilemma and to a lesser extent
upon Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory (neorealism). Defensive realism holds that
the international system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions.
Anarchy (the absence of a universal sovereign or worldwide government) creates situations
where by the tools that one state uses to increase it security decreases the security of other
states. This security dilemma causes states to worry about one another's future intentions
and relative power. Pairs of states may pursue purely security seeking strategies, but
inadvertently generate spirals of mutual hostility or conflict. States often, although not always,
pursue expansionist policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that aggression is the
only way to make their state secure. Defensive realism predicts great variation in
internationally driven expansion and suggests that states ought to generally pursue moderate
strategies as the best route to security. Under most circumstances, the stronger states in the
international system should pursue military, diplomatic, and foreign economic policies that
communicate restraint. Examples of defensive realism include: offense-defense theory
(Jervis, Stephen Van Evera, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Charles Glaser), balance-of-power theory
(Barry Posen, Michael Mastanduno), balance-of-threat theory (Stephen Walt), domestic
mobilization theories (Jack Snyder, Thomas Christensen, and Aron Friedberg), and security
dilemma theory (Thomas Christensen, Robert Ross, and William Rose).
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'Security-Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered,' International
Security, 25, 3, Winter 2000/2001: 152-86; Mearsheimer, John J. Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2002.

Democratic Peace
All democratic peace theories seek to explain the disputed empirical fact that two
constitutional democracies have never gone to war with each other in recent history (1816
onwards). As such, they rest on a similar hypothesis: that relations between pairings of
democratic states are inherently more peaceful than relations between other regime-type
pairings (i.e. democratic versus non-democratic or non-democratic versus non-democratic).
To prove the reality of the democratic peace, theorists such as Michael Doyle have sought to
show a causal relationship between the independent variable - 'democratic political structures
at the unit level' - and the dependant variable - 'the asserted absence of war between
democratic states'. Critics, such as Ido Oren, dispute the claims of democratic peace theorists
by insisting that there is a liberal bias in the interpretation of 'democracy' which weakens the
evidence.
Rasler, Karen A. and William R. Thompson. Puzzles of the Democratic Peace Theory, Geopolitics, and the
Transformation of World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Rosato, Sebastian. “The Flawed
Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.” American Political Science Review 97 (November 2003): 585-602;
Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.
Dependency Theory
Dependency theorists assert that so-called 'third-world' countries were not always 'poor', but
became impoverished through colonial domination and forced incorporation into the world
economy by expansionist 'first-world' powers. Thus, 'third-world' economies became geared
more toward the needs of their 'first-world' colonial masters than the domestic needs of their
own societies. Proponents of dependency theory contend that relationships of dependency
have continued long after formal colonization ended. Thus, the primary obstacles to
autonomous development are seen as external rather than internal, and so 'third-world'
countries face a global economy dominated by rich industrial countries. Because 'first-world'
countries never had to contend with colonialism or a world full of richer, more powerful
competitors, dependency theorists argue that it is unfair to compare contemporary 'third-
world' societies with those of the 'first-world' in the early stages of development.
Caporaso, James A. “Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development
Studies.” International Organization 34 (September 1980): 605 - 628; Smith, Tony. “The Underdevelopment
of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory.” World Politics 31 (1979): 247-288.Mark
Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Deterrence Theory
Deterrence is commonly thought about in terms of convincing opponents that a particular
action would elicit a response resulting in unacceptable damage that would outweigh any
likely benefit. Rather than a simple cost/benefits calculation, however, deterrence is more
usefully thought of in terms of a dynamic process with provisions for continuous feedback.
The process initially involves determining who shall attempt to deter whom from doing what,
and by what means. Several important assumptions underlie most thinking about deterrence.
Practitioners tend to assume, for example, that states are unitary actors, and logical according
to Western concepts of rationality. Deterrence also assumes that we can adequately
understand the calculations of an opponent. One of the most important assumptions during
the Cold War was that nuclear weapons were the most effective deterrent to war between the
states of the East and the West. This assumption, carried into the post-Cold War era,
however, may promote nuclear proliferation. Indeed, some authors suggest that the spread
of nuclear weapons would deter more states from going to war against one another. The
weapons would, it is argued, provide weaker states with more security against attacks by
stronger neighbors. Of course, this view is also predicated on the assumption that every state
actor's rationality will work against the use of such weapons, and that nuclear arms races will
therefore not end in nuclear warfare.
Lowther, Adam B., ed. Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First
Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Quackenbush, Stephen L. Understanding General
Deterrence: Theory and Application. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; edited extract from Post-Cold
War Conflict Deterrence, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, National Acadamy of Sciences,
1997.

Dialectical Functionalism
Theory based on an opposition to statist solutions to world order problems at all levels of
social interaction, especially at the global level. It states that integration progress causes a
protectionist backlash at the national level. Governments give in to these demands and
choose a nationalist direction that slows the integration process down. When the negative
consequences of this policy become obvious, the politicians initiate the next integrationist
step.
Dorette Corbey, Dorette “Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as a Booster of European
Integration.” International Organization Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 253-284.

Domino Theory
A theory which says that small nations in the developing world are vulnerable to military,
political, and psychological pressures resulting from the `fall' of their neighbors to
communism, and that, therefore, the West should supply military, economic, and political
assistance to threatened regimes as necessary. In the 1950s and 1960s it was held that the
fall of Vietnam would topple dominoes in much of South-East Asia, but the aftermath of the
Vietnam War has belied the prediction. Indeed US intervention in Vietnam probably caused
the fall of neutral Cambodia, which might otherwise not have happened. Domino theories
typically overlook the division in international communism, particularly in Asia, which have
caused communist regimes like China to align with Western and pro-Western nations such
as the US and Thailand. They also underestimate the nationalist resiliency and sheer social
inertia of Third World countries. The term `domino' was first used by US President Eisenhower
in 1954 at the time of the French defeat in Indochina.
"Domino Theory." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Ed. William A. Darity, Jr. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008), pp. 434-
436. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 25 Mar. 2013; Domino
Theory. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social,
and Military History, 2011. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/abcvw/domino_theory; Domino Theory. History.com.

Dynamic Interaction Theory

Living systems and human systems are self-organizing, meaning that they generate high
degrees of order through complex relationships among their parts and with the environment
rather than as a consequence of any clear external agency. The system is maintained through
dynamic interaction of its subsystems. In the largest human system, the global political
economy, it involves the dynamic interaction of corporations, governments, international
organizations, banks and nongovernmental organizations. In both cases, the systems may
be said to be ‘self-making’.
Litfin, Karen. "Gaia Theory: Intimations for Global Environmental Politics." In Handbook of Global
Environmental Politics [electronic resource]. Peter Dauvergne, editor. 2nd ed., Revised. Northampton:
Edward Elgar Publishing, July 2012.

Emancipatory International Relations

Emancipatory international relations is characterised by a number of schools of thought most
broadly falling under the umbrella of Wesern or Hegelian Marxism, such as neo-Gramscian
theory and approaches to IR based on the Frankfurt School philosophy. These approaches
to emancipatory IR can be shown to be reformist rather than revolutionary, in the sense that
visions of an alternative world order fail to transcend the state. Thus, some would suggest
that approaches to IR that are derived from an anarchist political philosophy, for example, are
more appropriate for an emancipatory conception of IR which is revolutionary rather than
reformist.
Spegele, Roger D. “Emancipatory International Relations: Good News, Bad News or No News at
All?” International Relations 16 (December 2002): 381-401; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and
Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Empirical Theory
An empirical theory in the social or natural sciences relates to facts and provides an
explanation or prediction for observed phenomena. Hypotheses associated with empirical
theories are subject to test against real-world data or facts. The theorist need not have any
purpose in developing such empirical theories other than satisfying his or her intellectual
curiosity, although many will seek to make their work "policy relevant."
Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification
and Measurement of Cases Since 1945.” International Studies Quarterly 32 (September 1988): 359-371;
Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1987.

Ethnic Conflict Theory

Ethnic conflicts are old. It is violence for state recognition, autonomy or to join a neighboring
state. Such conflicts received serious attention by scholars in the aftermath of the Cold War
and with the demise of the former Yugoslavia and USSR into several independent states.
Ethnic conflict studies can be a source for understanding international relations bearing in
mind that no single book, concept or theory can expect to capture such a complex
phenomena in its entirety. Political scientists use concepts and theories of sociologists such
as Evans (1993), Giddens (1993), Smith (1986), Rex (1986), Hurd (1986) and Laitin (1986)
to explain endemic ethnic conflicts caused by alienation and deprivation of ethnic minority
groups bonded by history, descent, language, religion and culture living in a defined territory.
This group perceives itself as 'me-you,' 'we-they,' 'insiders-outsiders,' and 'minority-majority.'
Three contending ethnic conflict theories: a) Primordialists stress the importance of instinctive
behavior of belonging; b) Instrumentalist or Circumstantialists cite compelling socio-
economic-political factors; and c) Constructivists point to the social nature of ethnic groups.
For ethnic conflict management models of political 'accommodation' or 'arrangements' see
Walker, C. 1994, Ethnocentrism: The Quest for Understanding (Chapters 6 & 8), Princeton
University Press; McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (eds), 1993, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict
Resolution: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts (Chapter 1), Routledge; and Lijphart,
A. 1997, Democracy in Plural Societies (Chapters 1 & 2), Yale University Press. For further
perspectives, see Toft, M. 2003, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and
the Indivisibilty of Territory, Princeton University Press; Anderson, B. 1991, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso; and Huntington,
P. 1996, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster.
Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Evolutionary World Politics

A sub-field of the study of International Relations that poses the question: what explains
structural change in world politics, in the past millennium in particular? It rests on two core
premises: that political change at the global level is the product of evolutionary processes,
and that such processes might be best understood through the application of evolutionary
concepts such as selection or learning, without yet embracing biological determinism.
Focussing on longer-term, institutional, change it contrasts with, and complements, rational
choice approaches that illuminate shorter-term, ends-means decision-making. Components
of it might be recognized both in the realist, and the liberal schools of international relations.
Structural change may be studied at three levels: at the actor level, by looking at long cycles
of global politics; at the level of global political formation, by inquiring into world empire, the
nation-state system with global leadership, and global organization, as alternative forms of
coping with global problems; and at the of human species evolution, by asking about the
emergence of basic world institutions. Global political change co-evolves with cognate
processes in the world economy, and is nested in the longer-term developments in
democratization, and changes in world opinion.
The Evolutionary World Politics Homepage. George Modelski, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political
Science, University of Washington.

Feminism
A branch of Critical Social Theory (see above) that seeks to explore how we think, or do not
think, or avoid thinking about gender in international relations (IR). Feminists argue that
traditional IR thinking has avoided thinking of men and women in the capacity of embodied
and socially constituted subject categories by subsuming them in other categories (e.g.
statesmen, soldiers, refugees), too readily accepting that women are located inside the
typically separate sphere of domestic life, and retreating to abstractions (i.e. the state) that
mask a masculine identity. Gender-minded analysts therefore seek to move from suspicion
of officially ungendered IR texts to their subversion and to replacement theories. Some recent
gender-attentive research streams include: critique and reappropriation of stories told about
the proper scope of the field of IR; revisions of war and peace narratives; reevaluations of
women and development in the international system and its parts; feminist interpretations of
human rights; and feminist understandings of international political economy and
globalization.
Steans, Jill. Gender and International Relations: Theory, Practice, Policy. 3rd edition. Cambridge: Polity,
2013; Adapted from Sylvester, Christine. "Feminist Theory and Gender Studies in International
Relations." International Studies Notes, volumes 16-17, Glendale, Arizona: Thunderbird, The American
Graduate School of International Management, 1991; Zalewski, Marysia. Feminist International Relations:
Exquisite Corpse. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Fourth World Theory

A theoretical framework, based on the distinction between nations and states, examining how
colonial empires and modern states invaded and now encapsulate most of the world's
enduring peoples. The term Fourth World refers to nations forcefully incorporated into states
which maintain a distinct political culture but are internationally unrecognized. Fourth World
analyses, writings and maps aim to rectify the distorting and obscuring of indigenous nations'
identities, georgraphies and histories and expose the usually hidden 'other side' of invasions
and occupations that generate most of the world's wars, refugees, genocide, human rights
violations and environmental destruction. The distinction between political terms such as
nation, state, nation-state, a people and ethnic group - which are commonly used
interchangeably in both popular and academic literature despite the fact that each has a
unique connotation - provides a geopolitcal perspective from which one can paint a 'ground-
up' portrait of the significance and centrality of people in most world issues, problems and
solutions. Fourth World Theory was fashioned by a diverse assortment of people, including
activists, human rights lawyers, academics and leaders of indigenous nations. Similar to
World Systems Analysis scholars, proponents of Fourth World Theory seek to change the
world, not just describe or explain it.
Griggs, Richard and Joseph E Fallon. The Meaning of Nation and State in the Fourth World. Kenmore, WA:
Center for World Indigenous Studies, 1992; Neitschmann, B. “The Fourth World: Nations verses States.” In
G. J. Demko and W. B. Wood, eds. Reordering the World Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century.
Oxford: Westview, 1994), pp. 225–242; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-
dated on 14 March 2013.

Frustration-Aggression Theory
A theory that argues that social movements occur when frustration leads to collective, often
aggressive behavior. According to the theory and its later variations, frustration has a variety
of sources. It may, for example, result from deprivation caused by poor economic conditions
or social oppression. For example, deprivation can in turn take two forms. It can be absolute
— when people simply do not have enough to survive — or relative — when people have
enough to survive but have less than those around them with whom they make comparisons.
Frustration-Aggression Theory. The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, 2000. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/bksoc/frustration_aggression_theory)

Functionalism
A focus on purposes or tasks, particularly those performed by organisations. Some theorists
have explained the growth of organisations, particularly international organisations, as a
response to an increase in the number of purposes or tasks demanding attention.
Neofunctionalism as a theory of regional integration emphasizes the political calculation and
pay-off to elites who agree to collaborate in the performance of certain tasks.
Game Theory
A decision-making approach based on the assumption of actor rationality in a situation of
competition. Each actor tries to maximize gains or minimize losses under conditions of
uncertainty and incomplete information, which requires each actor to rank order preferences,
estimate probabilities, and try to discern what the other actor is going to do. In a two-person
zero-sum game, what one actor wins the other loses; if A wins, 5, B loses 5, and the sum is
zero. In a two-person non-zero or variable sum game, gains and losses are not necessarily
equal; it is possible that both sides may gain. This is sometimes referred to as a positive-sum
game. In some games, both parties can lose, and by different amounts or to a different
degree. So-called n-person games include more than two actors or sides. Game theory has
contributed to the development of models of deterrence and arms race spirals, but it is also
the basis for work concerning the question of how collaboration among competitive states in
an anarchic world can be achieved: The central problem is that the rational decision for an
individual actor such as a state may be to "defect" and go it alone as opposed to taking a
chance on collaboration with another state actor. Dealing with this problem is a central
concern of much of the literature on international regimes, regional integration, and conflict
resolution.
Allan, Pierre and Christian Schmidt, eds. Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences,
Information, and Empirical Evidence. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1994; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi,
eds. International Relations Theory. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

Globalization
Globalization, as a theory, argues that states and societies are increasingly being 'disciplined'
to behave as if they were private markets operating in a global territory. 'Disciplinary' forces
affecting states and societies are attributed to the global capital market, transnational
corporations (TNCs), and structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank, which are all driven by neo-liberal economic ideology. Some scholars,
such as Stephen Gill, see these agents as representing an emerging system of global
economic governance ('disciplinary neo-liberalism') based on a quasiconstitutional framework
for the reconstitution of the legal rights, prerogatives, and freedom of movement for capital
on a world scale ('new constitutionalism').
Gill, Stephen. "New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy." Pacifica Review:
Peace, Security and Global Change 10 (1998): 23-38.

Globalism
An image of politics different from realism and pluralism. Globalism focuses on the importance
of economy, especially capitalist relations of dominance or exploitation, to understanding
world politics. The globalist image is influenced by Marxist analyses of exploitative relations,
although not all globalists are Marxists. Dependency theory, whether understood in Marxist
or non-Marxist terms, is categorised here as part of the globalist image. Also included is the
view that international relations are best understood if one sees them as occurring within a
world-capitalist system.
Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and
Beyond. 3rd edition. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1999; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International
Relations Theory. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention

Thomas Friedman's theory that no two countries that both had McDonald's had fought a war
against each other since each got its McDonald's. More specifically, Friedman articulates it
thus: 'when a country reached the level of economic development where it had a middle class
big enough to support a McDonald's network, it became a McDonald's country. And people
in McDonald's countries didn't like to fight wars anymore, they preferred to wait in line for
burgers'.
See Chapter 12 in Friedman, Thomas L.. The Lexus and The Olive Tree. London: Harper Collins
Publishers, 2000.

Hegemonic Stability Theory

The central idea of this theory is that the stability of the international system requires a single
dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among the most important
members of the system. For a state to be a hegemon, it must have three attributes: the
capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system
which is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. A hegemon's capability rests
upon the likes of a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or
economic sector, and political power backed up by projective military power. An unstable
system will result if economic, technological, and other changes erode the international
hierarchy and undermine the position of the dominant state. Pretenders to hegemonic control
will emerge if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair.
Webb, Michael C. and Stephen D. Krasner. "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical
Assessment." Review of International Studies 15 (April 1989): 183-198; Snidal, Duncan. "The Limits of
Hegemonic Stability Theory." International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985): 579-614; Extract from lecture
notes on the theory of hegemonic stability by Vincent Ferraro, Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International
Politics at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts.

Historical Materialism
The theory argues that social life is based upon material production. People have to produce
goods and services in order to survive, and an important distinction has to be made between
the forces and relations of production. The forces of production refer to the technology and
science involved in the production process such as the use of machinery and computers in
contemporary work-places. The relations of production refer to questions of ownership and
control, so that Marx believed that under capitalism, for example, there was a growing conflict
between socialised forces of production and their ownership by particular individuals. The
theory asserts that in all societies there is a tension between the forces and relations of
production, but in class-divided societies this tension reaches antagonistic proportions, since
particular groups have a vested interest in perpetuating a set of productive relations. The
antagonism between the forces and relations of production is, for Marx, the reason why
revolution is inevitable, although it has to be said that in all societies some tension between
the two will exist. The fundamental proposition of historical materialism can be summed up in
a sentence: “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the
contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness.” (Marx, in the Preface to
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy). It is a theory that privileges the economic
in explanation of non-economic phenomena.
Anderson, Perry. In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984;
"Historical Materialism." (2007). In Political Philosophy A-Z. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/edinburghppaz/historical_materialism.

Historical Sociology
Any sociology focusing on the study of past societies or using historical sources. It pays
particular attention to culturally, geographically, and temporally located facts. Although
historical sociology, which arose in the late nineteenth century, fell out of favor for a long
period, it has regained respect as the result of some major studies performed by researchers
in the United States and Britain. Historical sociology attempts to develop new theories which
are capable of providing more convincing, comprehensive explanations for historical patterns
and structures. It concentrates more on the experiences people lived rather than the
transformations of institutions. To test their theories, historical sociologists use deductive
reasoning (attempting to locate evidence that supports or refutes their theories), case
comparisons (looking at similarities and differences between equal entities), and case
illustrations (comparing several cases to a single theory or concept). Four research areas that
produce respected historical sociology studies are capitalist expansion, the growth of national
states and systems of states, collective action, and sociology of religious development.
Studies of capitalist expansion examine topics such as the emergence and consequences of
the Industrial Revolution, the rise of the working class, population growth, and the
developmental operations of the modern world system. Studies of the growth of national
states and systems of states examine political topics such as revolutions, state
bureaucratization, the democratization of politics, and the interaction of nations in the
international arena.
Abrams, Philip. Historical Sociology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982; Kent, Stephen A.
"Historical Sociology." Encyclopedia of Sociology. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA,
2001. 1195-1202. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 25 Mar. 2013.

Idealism
Idealism is so widely defined that only certain basic tenets can be described. Idealists believe
strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is possible to base a political system primarily
on morality, and that the baser and more selfish impulses of humans can be muted in order
to build national and international norms of behavior that foment peace, prosperity,
cooperation, and justice. Idealism then is not only heavily reformist, but the tradition has often
attracted those who feel that idealistic principles are the "next-step" in the evolution of the
human character. One of the first and foremost pieces of the "old world" and "old thinking" to
be tossed on the trash heap of history by idealism is that destructive human institution of war.
War, in the idealistic view, is now no longer considered by either elites or the populace of the
great powers as being a plausible way of achieving goals, as the costs of war, even for the
victor, exceed the benefits. As John Mueller says in his book Quiet Cataclysm, war is passing
into that consciousness stage where slavery and dueling reside - it can fade away without
any adverse effect, and with no need for replacement.
Brown, Chris. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1992; Herz, John H. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma." World Politics 2 (January
1950): 157-180; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Imperialism
Hans J. Morgenthau defines imperialism as a national foreign policy aimed at acquiring more
power than the state actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations, in other
words, a favorable change in power status. Imperialism as a national foreign policy is in
contrast to 'status quo' foreign policy and a foreign policy of 'prestige.' The policy of
imperialism assumes the classical realist theory perspective of analysis at the unit level in
international relations. Furthermore, imperialism is based on a 'balance-of-power' construct
in international relations. The three types of imperialism as outlined by Morgenthau are:
Marxist theory of imperialism which rests on the foundation that all political phenomena are
the reflection of economic forces; the Liberal theory of imperialism which results because of
maladjustments in the global capitalist system (e.g., surplus of goods and capital which seek
outlets in foreign markets); and finally, the 'devil' theory of imperialism which posits that
manufacturers and bankers plan wars in order to enrich themselves.
Chapter 5, "The Struggle for Power: Imperialism". In Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1948. Klusmeyer, Douglas B. “Contesting
Thucydides' Legacy: Comparing Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Imperialism, History and
Theory.” The International History Review 33 (2011): 1-25; Long, David and Brian C. Schmidt,
eds. Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2005.

Incrementalism
The term given to a pattern of decision making. It implies changes in policy are made by slight
increments over a continuous period. It best applies to budgetary policy: it is common for
democratic governments not to want to shock the voters by presenting them with a sudden
change in their economic expectations. On the other hand its use as a model can be
exaggerated. Much policy has to be made in response to unexpected external forces and
incremental change in such circumstances is not appropriate.
Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssis G. “Incrementalism and Path Dependence: European Integration and
Institutional Change in National Parliaments.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (September
2001): 405-422; "Incrementalism." (2008). In Key Concepts in Governance. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageukgov/incrementalism.

Integration Theory
According to Haas (1958), integration is a process by which "political actors in several distinct
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities
toward a new center, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing
national states." This is a broad definition that includes both social processes (shifting
loyalties) and political processes (negotiation and decision-making about the construction of
new political institutions above the participating member states with a direct say in at least a
part of the member states’ affairs). Broader, more recent developments have formed a field
of integration theory studies that is more focused on the outcomes of integration rather than
the process. Significant attention has been paid in this respect to the formation and
maintenance of the European Union.
Chapter 1. Theories of European Integration. In George, Stephen. Politics in the European Union. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001; "Integration." (2002). In Greenwood Encyclopedia of International
Relations. Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/abcintrel/integration.

Intergovernmentalism
In its most basic form, intergovernmentalism explains interstate cooperation and especially
regional integration (e.g. EU) as a function of the alignment of state interests and preferences
coupled with power. That is, contrary to the expectations of functionalism and
neofunctionalism, integration and cooperation are actually caused by rational self-interested
states bargaining with one another. Moreover, as would be expected, those states with more
‘power’ likely will have more of their interests fulfilled. For example, with regard to the EU, it
is not surprising, according to proponents of this theory, that many of the agreed-upon
institutional arrangements are in line with the preferences of France and Germany, the so-
called ‘Franco-German core.’ Andrew Moravcsik is probably the most well-known proponent
of intergovernmentalism right now.
Moravcsik, Andrew. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist
Approach." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (December, 1993): 473–524.

Internationalism
Internationalism is a political movement that advocates greater economic and political
cooperation among participating actors for the benefit of all. It is by nature opposed to
ultranationalism, jingoism and national chauvinism and presupposes the recognition of other
nations as equal, in spite of all their differences. Indeed, it is most commonly expressed as
an appreciation for the diverse cultures in the world and as a desire for world peace. It also
encompasses an obligation to assist the world through leadership and cooperation,
advocating robust global governance and the presence of international organizations, such
as the United Nations.
Long, David and Brian C. Schmidt, eds. Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International
Relations. SUNY series in Global Politics. Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2005; Mark
Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

International Political Economy

A method of analysis concerning the social, political and economic arrangements affecting
the global systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected
therein (Strange, p18). As an analytical method, political economy is based on the assumption
that what occurs in the economy reflects, and affects, social power relations.
Lawton, Thomas C., James N. Rosenau, and Amy C. Verdun, eds. Strange Power: Shaping the Parameters
of International Relations and International Political Economy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000; Strange,
Susan. States and Markets. 2nd edition. New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms,
Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

International Regime Theory

A perspective that focuses on cooperation among actors in a given area of international
relations. An international regime is viewed as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms,
rules, and procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a particular issue-area.
An issue-area comprises interactions in such diverse areas as nuclear nonproliferation,
telecommunications, human rights, or environmental problems. A basic idea behind
international regimes is that they provide for transparent state behaviour and a degree of
stability under conditions of anarchy in the international system. International regime analysis
has been offering a meeting ground for debate between the various schools of thought in IR
theory.
Gale, Fred. "Cave 'Cave! Hic Dragones': A Neo-Gramscian Deconstruction and Reconstruction of
International Regime Theory." Review of International Political Economy 5 (1998): 252-283; Krasner,
Stephen D. International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Just War Theory

Normative theory referring to conditions under which (1) states rightfully go to war (jus ad
bellum) with just cause, as in self-defense in response to aggression, when the decision to
go to war is made by legitimate authority in the state, as a last resort after exhausting peaceful
remedies, and with some reasonable hope of achieving legitimate objectives; (2) states
exercise right conduct in war (jus in bello) when the means employed are proportional to the
ends sought, when noncombatants are spared, when weapons or other means that are
immoral in themselves are not used (typically those that are indiscriminate or cause needless
suffering), and when actions are taken with a right intention to accomplish legitimate military
objectives and to minimize collateral death and destruction. Many of these principles of just
war are part of the body of international law and thus are legally binding on states and their
agents.
Brooks, Thom, ed. Just War Theory. Boston, MA: Brill, 2013; Crawford, Neta C. “Just War Theory and the
U.S. Counterterror War.” Perspectives on Politics 1 (March 2003): 5-25; Hehir, J. Bryan. “Just War Theory
In A Post-Cold War World.” The Journal of Religious Ethics 20 (Fall 1992): 237-257; Viotti, P. and M.
Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

Legal Positivism
A legal theory that identifies international law with positive acts of state consent. Herein,
states are the only official 'subjects' or 'persons' of international law because they have the
capacity to enter into legal relations and to have legal rights and duties. Indeed, they are the
only entities with full, original and universal legal personality; the only proper actors bound by
international law. As far as non-state entities (such as individuals, corporations, and
international organisations) are concerned, their ability to assert legal personality is only
derivative of and conditional upon state personality and state consent. This predominant
ideology originated in the nineteenth century when legal positivism took the eighteenth
century law of nations, a law common to individuals and states, and transformed it into public
and private international law, with the former being deemed to apply to states and the latter
to individuals. Thus, only states enjoy full international legal personality, which can be defined
as the capacity to bring claims arising from the violation of international law, to conclude valid
international agreements, and to enjoy priveleges and immunities from national jurisdiction.
Edited text taken from Cutler, C. "Globalization, Law and Transnational Corporations: A Deepening of
Market Discipline." In Cohn, Theodore H., Stephen McBride, and John Wiseman. Power in the Global Era:
Grounding Globalization. Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000; Hall, Stephen. “The Persistent
Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism.” European Journal of
International Law 12 (2001): 269-307; Wright, Quincy. “Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg
Judgment.” The American Journal of International Law 42 (April 1948): 405-414.

Liberalism (Liberal Internationalism)

A political theory founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy of the
individual. It favors civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the
governed, and protection from arbitrary authority. In IR liberalism covers a fairly broad
perspective ranging from Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories
and the democratic peace thesis. Here states are but one actor in world politics, and even
states can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that
undermine the propensity to base interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent
and other actors such as Transnational Corporations, the IMF and the United Nations play a
role.
Hoffman, Stanley. "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism." Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995): 159-177; Paris,
Roland. "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." International Security 22 (Fall 1997): 54-
89; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Marxism
A body of thought inspired by Karl Marx. It emphasises the dialectical unfolding of historical
stages, the importance of economic and material forces and class analysis. It predicts that
contradictions inherent in each historical epoch eventually lead to the rise of a new dominant
class. The era of capitalism, according to Marx, is dominated by the bourgeoisie and will give
way to a proletarian, or working class, revolution and an era of socialism in which workers
own the means of production and move toward a classless, communist society in which the
state, historically a tool of the dominant class, will wither away. A number of contemporary
theorists have drawn on Marxian insights and categories of analysis - an influence most
evident in work on dependency and the world capitalist system.
Kubálková, V. and A.A. Cruickshank. Marxism and International Relations. New York: Clarendon Press,
1985; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1987.

Materialism
A set of ideas associated with the view that only the material world explains all manner of
mental phenomena. Man's attempt to cope with it is basic and human feelings and beliefs are
secondary. The Marxist theory that economics ultimately determines historical development
is the form known as dialectical materialism, though it was Engels who elaborated the
materialist conception of history. Idealist philosophers and religious believers are bound to
challenge these ideas.
Gill, Stephen, ed. Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1993; "Materialism." (2010). In Encyclopedia of American Studies. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/jhueas/materialism.

Modernization Theory
A theory presuming that all countries had similiar starting points and follow similar paths to
'development' along the lines of contemporary 'first-world' societies. The theory of
modernization normally consists of three parts: (1) identification of types of societies, and
explanation of how those designated as modernized or relatively modernized differ from
others; (2) specification of how societies become modernized, comparing factors that are
more or less conducive to transformation; and, (3) generalizations about how the parts of a
modernized society fit together, involving comparisons of stages of modernization and types
of modernized societies with clarity about prospects for further modernization.
Harrison, David. The Sociology of Modernization and Development. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988;
"Modernization Theory." (2001). In Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/routsocial/modernization_theory.

Neo-Classical Realism
Neoclassical realism holds that the actions of a state in the international system can be
explained by systemic variables, such as the distribution of power capabilities among states,
as well as cognitive variables, such as the perception and misperception of systemic
pressures, other states' intentions, or threats - and domestic variables like state institutions,
elites, and societal actors within society, which can affect the power and freedom of action of
the decision-makers in foreign policy. While holding true to the neorealist concept of balance
of power, neoclassical realism further adds that states' mistrust and inability to perceive one
another accurately, or state leaders' inability to mobilize state power and public support can
result in an underexpansion or underbalancing behaviour leading to imbalances within the
international system, the rise and fall of great powers, and war. Appropriate balancing occurs
when a state correctly perceives another state's intentions and balances accordingly.
Overbalancing occurs when a state incorrectly perceives another state as threatening, and
uses too many resources than it needs to in order to balance. Underbalancing occurs when
a state fails to balance, out of either inefficiency or incorrectly perceiving a state as less of
threat than it actually is. Nonbalancing occurs when a state avoids balancing through buck
passing, bandwagoning, or other escapes.
Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and
Foreign Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and
Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51 (1998):144–172; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches
and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Neo-Conservatism
The kind of intellectual conservatism which arose in the United States, partly in reaction to
the social and political movements of the 1960s, and partly in support of US foreign policy
during the cold war. The leading neo-conservatives were urban intellectuals, academics and
publicists, many of them converts from social democracy, who had been disturbed by what
they saw as the immanent breakdown of American society, as a result of sexual liberation,
multiculturalism, political correctness, and the dependency culture. Prominent among them
were writers associated with Commentary (under the editorship of Norman Podhoretz) and
The Public Interest (under the editorship of Irving Kristol). Growing from the original neo-
conservative position there has been a movement in the world of politics to put into practice
certain principles and aspirations arising from the original neo-conservative debates. Some
members of this movement have obtained prominent positions in government and
administration in the US, so that considerable attention has been focused on their philosophy,
which does not always coincide with neo-conservatism in sense 1. The ruling idea is that
American society owes its success to its democratic tradition, and its respect for individual
freedom. Threats to America come from people who envy this success and do not possess
the institutions and customs that enable them to emulate it. The answer is not to contain them,
as in the past, within their borders. The answer is to change the regimes that foster them: to
spread democratic institutions and free economies wherever we can, so that the whole world
can enjoy the privileges that are presently enjoyed in America. The Iraq war has inevitably
focused attention, much of it hostile, on that position. Some of the hostility comes from more
traditional conservatives (sometimes described as ‘paleo-conservatives’), who defend an
isolationist foreign policy and a more inward-looking and skeptical approach to the democratic
inheritance.
Joseph, Lawrence B. “Neoconservatism in Contemporary Political Science: Democratic Theory and the
Party System.” The Journal of Politics 44 (November 1982): 955-982; Lipset, Seymour Martin.
“Neoconservatism: Myth and Reality.” Society 25 (July-August 1988): 29-37; "Neoconservatism." (2010).
In Culture Wars: An Encyclopedia of Issues, Viewpoints, and Voices. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sharpecw/neoconservatism; Murray, Douglas. Neoconservatism:
Why We Need It. New York: Encounter Books, 2006.

Neo-Gramscian
A relatively new approach to the study of International Relations and the global political
economy that explores the interface of ideas, institutions and material capabilities as they
shape the specific contours of the state formation. It analyzes how the particular constellation
of social forces, the state and the dominant ideational configuration define and sustain world
orders. In this sense, the neo-Gramscian approach breaks the decades-old stalemate
between the so-called realist schools of thought, and the liberal theories by historicizing the
very theoretical foundations of the two streams as part of a particular world order, and finding
the interlocking relationship between agency and structure. The theory is heavily influenced
by the writings of Antonio Gramsci. Furthermore, Karl Polanyi, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Niccolò
Machiavelli, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Michel Foucault are cited as major
sources within the Critical Theory of International Relations. The beginning of the neo-
Gramscian perspective can be traced to York University professor emeritus, Robert W. Cox's
article “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory,” Millennium 10 (1981) 2 and “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An
Essay in Method,” Millennium 12 (1983) 2. In his 1981 article, Cox demands a critical study
of IR, as opposed to the usual "problem-solving" theories, which do not interrogate the origin,
nature and development of historical structures, but accept for example that states and the
(supposedly) "anarchic" relationships between them as Kantian Dinge an sich ("thing-in-
itself").
Bieler, Andreas et al. Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramscian
Perspectives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; Budd, Adrian. Class, States and International
Relations: A Critical Appraisal of Robert Cox and Neo-Gramscian Theory. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, 2013; Germain, Randall D. and Michael Kenny. “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations
Theory and the New Gramscians.” Review of International Studies 24 (1998): 3-21; Wikipedia.

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
Encompasses those theories which argue that international institutions play an important role
in coordinating international cooperation. Proponents begin with the same assumptions used
by realists, except for the following: where realists assume that states focus on relative gains
and the potential for conflict, neoliberal institutionalists assume that states concentrate on
absolute gains and the prospects for cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalists believe that the
potential for conflict is overstated by realists and suggest that there are countervailing forces,
such as repeated interactions, that propel states toward cooperation. They regard cheating
as the greatest threat to cooperation and anarchy as the lack of organisation to enforce rules
against cheating. Institutions are described by neoliberals as 'persistent and connected sets
of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape
expectations.' (Robert Keohane is the scholar most closely identified with neoliberal
institutionalism).
Baldwin, David A., ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993; Ganesan, N. “Testing Neoliberal Institutionalism in Southeast Asia.” International
Journal 50 (Autumn 1995): 779-804; Keohane, Robert O. "International Institutions: Two
Approaches." International Studies Quarterly 32 (December 1988): 379-396.

Neo-Liberalism
The label employed to describe an economic philosophy that has become increasingly
prominent since the late 1970s which rejects state control and positive government
intervention in the economy and focuses instead on free market methods, fewer restrictions
on business enterprise and the importance of property rights. Associated with the
conservative Right, the ideology stresses the shrinking of the state by lowering tax levels,
privatizing assets and encouraging and rewarding personal achievement and responsibility.
Its adherents oppose environmentalism, fair trade and socialism and labor policies such as
collective bargaining rights and the minimum wage. It is usually described as Thatcherism in
the United Kingdom and Reaganomics in the United States.
Campbell, John L. and Ove K. Pedersen, eds. The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001; Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005; Wikipedia.

Neo-Marxism
A term denoting various currents in twentieth-century Marxism, perhaps starting with the work
of Lukács, and continuing in the Frankfurt school. These currents diverge from traditional
Marxism in emphasizing, not historical materialism, but the description of consciousness, as
the central component in Marx’s social analysis. Some neo-Marxists find inspiration in the
elements in Marx that derive directly from Hegel, emphasizing, for example, the analysis of
alienation, the concept of the dialectic, the supposed movement of history towards a utopian
ideal. Others, in reaction, try to detach Marx from Hegel, uniting his thought, perhaps, with
existentialism or with some kind of structuralism.
Arato, Andrew. From Neo-Marxism to Democratic Theory: Essays on the Critical Theory of Soviet-Type
Societies. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993; Cattell, David T. “A Neo-Marxist Theory of Comparative
Analysis.” Slavic Review 26 (December 1967): 657-662; Glassman, Jim. “The Spaces of Economic Crisis:
Asia and the Reconfiguration of neo-Marxist Crisis Theory.” Studies in Comparative International
Development 37 (Winter 2003): 31-63; "Neo-Marxism." (2007). In Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political
Thought. Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/macpt/neo_marxism.

Neo-Realism
A theory developed by Kenneth Waltz in which states seek to survive within an anarchical
system. Although states may seek survival through power balancing, balancing is not the aim
of that behaviour. Balancing is a product of the aim to survive. And because the international
system is regarded as anarchic and based on self-help, the most powerful units set the scene
of action for others as well as themselves. These major powers are referred to as poles;
hence the international system (or a regional subsystem), at a particular point in time, may
be characterised as unipolar, bipolar or multipolar.
May, Ernest R., Richard Rosecrance and Zara Steiner, eds. History and Neorealism. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010; Keohane, Robert O., ed. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Neo-Traditionalism
A position derived from communist social scientists that the distinctive quality of communist
societies is the coexistence of modern and traditional elements. Neo-traditionalism is
contrasted to totalitarianism because it stresses that communist societies have a high level
of societal organization, power is particularistic rather than impersonal, and that positive as
well as negative levers of deference are used. Neo-traditionalism is more at odds with group
pluralism. Walder (1986) rejects the underlying analogy with western society, arguing that
communist society is defined by institutions set up by the state, and therefore social networks
rather than group endeavors provide the pattern of social activity. The masses are still
atomized in a sense, for they are gelled into a comprehensive and monolithic social structure
which is organized by and serves the interests of the party-state, and which is a different
species from liberal western society. The concept is centered around two principal and related
aspects--organized dependence, which refers to the structural character of the work unit,
and principled particularism to rational behavior consonant with that framework.
Walder, Andrew G. Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986.

New Growth Theory

While classical and neoclassical growth economic system theories emphasize physical
resources and free trade as major factors contributing to economic growth, the main thrust of
this new growth theory is on human capital and new technologies for growth. Scholars such
as Romer (1990), advocate state that, while classical and neoclassical theories stress
resource scarcity as a major impediment to growth, the new growth theory remains optimistic
about the continuity and expansion of wealth creation enhanced by new ideas, products, and
markets. There is an attempt to clearly distinguish knowledge (a form of capital) from physical
capital. New growth theory holds that technology is endogenous; it is a central part of the
economic system.
Romer, Paul. "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 5, "Part 2:
The Problem of Development: A Conference on the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Systems."
(Oct. 1990), pp. 71-102.

New War Theory

Mary Kaldor’s new war theory argues that contemporary types of warfare are distinct from
the classic modern forms of warfare based on nation-states. New wars are part of a globalised
war economy underpinned by transnational ethnicities, globalised arms markets and
internationalised Western-global interventions. The new type of warfare is a predatory social
condition which damages the economies of neighbouring regions as well as the zone of
conflict itself, spreading refugees, identity-based politics and illegal trade. It is also
characterised by new forms of violence (the systematic murder of ‘others’, forced population
expulsion and rendering areas uninhabitable) carried out by new militaries (the decaying
remnants of state armies, paramilitary groups, self-defence units, mercenaries and
international troops) funded by remittances, diaspora fund-raising, external government
assistance and the diversion of international humanitarian aid. Whereas 80 per cent of war
victims early last century were military personnel, it is estimated that 80 per cent of victims in
contemporary wars are civilians. According to Kaldor, this new form of warfare is a political
rather than a military challenge, involving the breakdown of legitimacy and the need for a new
cosmopolitan politics to reconstruct affected communities and societies.
Chan, Stephen. “On the Uselessness of New Wars Theory: Lessons from African Conflicts.”
In Experiencing War. Christine Sylvester, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 94–102; Kaldor, Mary. New
and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 3rd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012;
Newman, Edward. “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed.” Security Dialogue 35
(June 2004): 173-189.

Non-Hegemonic International Order Theory

To varying degrees, mainstream international relations theories, including realism, liberalism,
and constructivism, have privileged hegemonic power and socialization in international order-
building. Nonhegemonic international order theory holds that international order is not simply
a function of the power and preferences of hegemonic actors (or powerful states). A
nonhegemonic international order may be defined as a relative stable pattern of interactions
among a group of states without the individual or collective hegemony of the great powers.
Nonhegemonic international order theory makes the following assumptions: (a) the main
actors/agents in international relations are states, social groups, and international
organizations; (b) the international system is in anarchy, but hegemony is not a natural or
inevitable solution to anarchy; resistance to hegemony may be a more a natural tendency;
(c) the structure of the international system is both material and ideational and hence
resistance to hegemony can be both material and ideational; (d) international cooperation is
possible not only to organize resistance to, but also the socialization of, hegemony-seeking
actors; and (e) nonhegemonic actors are not just passive recipients of universal ideas or
collective goods, but active borrowers and exporters (Acharya, 2008).
Acharya, Amitav. “Nonhegemonic International Relations: A Preliminary Conceptualization.” Department of
Politics University of Bristol. Paper presented to 2008 ISA Convention, San Francisco.

Normative Theory
Normative theory deals precisely with values and value preferences. Unlike empirical theory,
however, propositions in normative theory are not subject to empirical test as a means of
establishing their truth or falsehood. Normative theory deals not with what is, the domain of
empirical theory. Rather, normative theory deals explicitly with what ought to be - the way the
world should be ordered and the value choices decision makers should make.
Brown, Chris. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1992; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1987.

Nuclear Utilization Theory

An off-spring of limited war and flexible responsive theories, proponents of Nuclear Utilization
Theory, mostly international relations scholars, policy analysts and military practitioners in the
US, are not satisfied with the deterrent role accorded to nuclear weapons by Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) advocates. Dismissing the possibility that any use of nuclear weapons
would necessarily escalate to a general nuclear Armageddon, they advocated the controlled
use of nuclear weapons to fight and win a war. This strategic doctrine is an attempt to gain
nuclear advantage, destabilizing the deterrence offered by the balance of MAD
Offensive Realism
Offensive realism is a covering term for several theories of international politics and foreign
policy that give analytical primacy to the hostile and unforgiving nature of the international
system as the cause of conflict. Like defensive realism, some variants of offensive realism
build upon and depart from Waltz's neorealism. Offensive realism holds that anarchy (the
absence of a worldwide government or universal sovereign) provides strong incentives for
expansion. All states strive to maximize their relative power because only the strongest states
can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits
of doing so outweigh the costs. States face the ever-present threat that other states will use
force to harm or conquer them. This compels them to improve their relative power positions
through arms build-ups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign economic
policies, and opportunistic expansion. Ultimately every state in the international system
strives to become a regional hegemon - a state that enjoys a preponderance of military,
economic, and potential power in its part of the globe. Offensive realists however, disagree
over the historical prevalence of hegemonic regional systems and the likely responses of
weaker states to would-be regional hegemons (e.g., balancing, buck-passing, or
bandwagoning). In particular, there is a sharp disagreement between proponents of the
balance-of-power tradition. (John Mearsheimer, Eric Labs, Fareed Zakaria, Kier Lieber, and
Christopher Layne) and proponents of the security variant of hegemonic stability theory
(Robert Gilpin, William Wohlforth, and Stephen Brooks).
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security-Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered."' International
Security 25 (Winter 2000/2001): 152-186; John J. Mearsheimer, John J. Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002.
Parallelism Theory
Based on a fusion of Weberian and Freudian concepts, Parallelism argues that, at the macro
level, states fall into two general categories, paternal and fraternal, and that the struggle
between the two types characterizes international relations. In the ancient world, paternal
systems were predominant because they were militarily superior, but since the rise of the
nation-state, fraternal states have become predominant. The engine of historical change is
the revolution-hegemonic war cycle, which brings paternal and fraternal systems into conflict
with one another. There are at least four examples of this type of hegemonic conflict occurring
in documented history: 1) the rise of Macedonia and Alexander the Great's war with Persia;
2) the rise of Mongolia and Gheghis Khan's war of expansion; 3) the French Revolution and
the Napoleonic Wars; and 4) Weimar Germany and World War II. There are other types of
hegemonic conflicts (e.g., WW I, Seven Years War), but these four represent parallel events.
Victory in revolutionary and hegemonic conflict has determined the direction of the world
system, towards paternalism or fraternalism.
For more information, refer to the Center for the Study of Political Parallelism.

Peripheral Realism
A foreign policy theory arising from the special perspective of (Latin American) peripheral
states and represented by the work of Carlos Escude, for example. This view of international
relations regards the international system as having an incipient hierarchical structure based
on perceived differences between states: those that give orders, those that obey, and those
that rebel. The peripheral approach introduces a different way of understanding the
internatonal system: that is, from the unique viewpoint of states that do not impose 'rules of
the game' and which suffer high costs when they confront them. Thus, the foreign policies of
peripheral states are typically framed and implemented in such a way that the national interest
is defined in terms of development, confrontation with great powers is avoided, and autonomy
is not understood as freedom of action but rather in terms of the costs of using that freedom.
Escude, Carlos. “An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and its Implications for the Interstate System:
Argentina and the Condor II Missile Project.” In International Relations Theory and the Third World.
Stephanie G Neuman. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 55-76; Mark Beavis. IR Paradigms,
Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Pluralism
A tradition in international relations that argued that politics, and hence policy, was the product
of a myriad of competing interests, hence depriving the state of any independent status.
Pluralism can be seen to derive principally from a liberal tradition, rooted in Locke's 'Second
Treatise of Government', and to pose an anti-realist vision of the centrality of the state in world
politics. Pluralists make four key assumptions about international relations. Primarily, non-
state actors are important entities in world politics. Secondly, the State is not looked upon as
a unified actor, rather, competition, coalition building, and compromise between various
interest groups including multinational enterprises will eventually culminate into a 'decision'
announced in the name of the state. Thirdly, pluralists challenge the realist assumption of the
state as a rational actor, and this derives from the second assumption where the clash of
competing interests may not always provide for a rational decision making process. Finally,
the fourth assumption revolves around the nature of the international agenda, where it is
deemed extensive by the pluralists and includes issues of national security as well as
economic, social and environmental issues. Hence, pluralists reject the 'high politics' 'low
politics' divide characteristic of realism. They also contend with the predominance of a
physical conception of power inherent in realism.
Berman, Paul Schiff, A Pluralist Approach to International Law. Yale Journal of International Law 32 (2007):
301-; Princeton Law and Public Affairs Working Paper No. 07-001. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=970688; Jackson, Robert H. “Review Articles: Pluralism in International Political
Theory.” Review of International Studies 18 (July 1992): 271-281; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches
and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Policy-Relevant Theory
Policy-relevant theories may have explicit purposes that stem from the value preferences of
the theorist, such as reducing the likelihood of war or curbing the arms race. Acting on such
theories, of course, is the domain of the policy maker, a task separate from that of the
empirical theorist. Theorists who become policy makers may well make choices informed by
what theories say will be the likely outcomes of implementing one or another alternative. Their
choices may be informed by empirical theory or understanding of world events, but the
decisions they make are still based on value preferences.
Herrmann, Richard K. “Policy-Relevant Theory and the Challenge of Diagnosis: The End of the Cold War
as a Case Study.” Political Psychology [Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L.
George] 15 (March 1994): 111-142; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making

Poliheuristic theory suggests that leaders simplify their choice problems according to a two-
stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options and outcomes is
reduced by application of a 'noncompensatory principle' to eliminate any alternative with an
unacceptable return on a critical, typically political, decision dimension (Mintz 1993). Once
the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the decision maker,
the process moves to a second stage 'during which the decision maker can either use a more
analytic, expected utility-like strategy or switch to a lexicographic decision strategy.' (Mintz
1997; Mintz et al. 1997; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz and Astorino-Courtois 2001). In setting
out a pivotal preliminary stage to expected utility decision making, the poliheuristic theory
bridges the gap between research in cognitive psychology (Taber and Steenbergen 1995)
and the considerable insights provided by rational analyses of decision making (e.g., Bueno
de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Morrow 1997).
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992; Mintz, A. Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of
Foreign Policy Decision Making. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Taber, Charles S. and Marco R.
Steenbergen. "Computational Experiments in Political Behavior." In Political Judgement: Structure and
Process. Milton Lodge and Kathleen M. McGraw, eds. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995),
pp. 141-178.

Positivism
Positivism is sometimes used to denote a “scientific” approach, but positivism is far more than
this. It asserts that science can only deal with entities that can be directly experienced.
Positivism is based upon an empiricist rejection of value judgements and argues that science
must be confined to the “is” rather than the “ought.” Positivism can be traced back to the
empiricism of Hume, but in the nineteenth century it was developed by Comte (1798–1857)
who sought to integrate all sciences into an overarching system of what he called ‘positive
philosophy’. Positivists have generally taken natural sciences as their model. Positivists seek
to stress the quantitative aspects of political and social life, and behavioralism is attracted to
a positivist view of science. The positivist view of society is now regarded as naïve. Imagine
a discussion about democracy that does not indicate normative preferences. The attempt to
separate facts from values denies that facts are relational, and it is out of the relationships
that facts presuppose, that values emerge. The fact that patriarchy oppresses women and
privileges men has obvious value implications, and attempts by positivist social scientists to
devise a ‘value-free’ language have not been persuasive. Moreover, it is a myth that the
natural sciences are value free.
"Positivism." (2001). In Dictionary of World Philosophy. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/routwp/positivism; "Positivism." International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Ed. David L. Sills. Vol. 12. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 389-395. Gale Virtual Reference
Library. Web. 25 Mar. 2013.

Post-behavioralism
A position which tried to make American political science relevant to social problems: it
criticized behavioralism for concealing an ideology of empirical conservatism, for losing touch
with reality, and being over-sophisticated with research techniques; it demanded research
about and the constructive development of values; and it encouraged the politicization of the
profession.
Berndston, Erkki. “Political Science in the Era of Post-Behavioralism. The Need for Self-
Reflection.” Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 10, 1975.

Post-internationalism
Unlike many other theories, postinternational theory is organized around the premise that our
time is marked by profound and continuous transformations and turbulence. It seeks to
account for the dynamics of change and anticipate where they might be leading the world. Its
prime focus is on the transformation of three basic parameters: one at the micro level of
individuals, another at the micro-macro level where individuals and their collectivities interact,
and the third is at the macro level of collectivities and their global structures. The central
concept at the micro level involves a skill revolution, whereas at the micro-macro level it
involves the pervasiveness of authority crises experienced by all kinds of collectivities; and at
the macro level it posits a bifurcation of global structures into the state-centric world of
sovereignty-bound actors and the multi-centric world of sovereignty-free actors. This
formulation is theoretical in the sense that it anticipates the conditions under which continual
turbulence and transformation are likely to sustain world affairs. Examples of transformations
at each level include the increasingly manifest readiness of individuals to engage in collective
action (micro level), the 'battle of Seattle' (micro-macro level), and the pattern - indeed,
institutionalization - whereby the NGO and state-centric worlds converge around common
interests (macro level).
Rosenau, James N. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1990; Hobbs, Heidi H. Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the
Twenty-First Century? Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.

Post-modernism
A more extreme branch of Critical Social Theory (see above) that can be identified in terms
of its critical stance toward (western) modernity and the unambiguous narratives of reason,
truth and progress. Whereas the dominant narrative of modernity upholds reason as the
foundation of objective truth and the source of progress, postmodernism emphasises the
interplay of a plurality of discursive practices, ways of knowing, social identities and possible
worlds.
Jarvis, Darryl S.L. International Relations and the "Third Debate": Postmodernism and its Critics. Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2002. Jarvis, Darryl S. L. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism:
Defending the Discipline. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2000. Mark Beavis, IR
Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Post-positivism
In the philosophy of science, the term post-positivist has been used in two ways: (1) To refer
to scientific philosophies that arose after, and in reaction to, positivism. This use of the term
would include (among others) phenomenology, Marxism, critical theory, poststructuralism,
and postmodernism (see Postpositivism) and (2) To refer to a reformed version of positivism
that addresses criticisms made by the schools of thought listed under the first definition, but
preserves the basic assumptions of positivism, i.e. ontological realism, the possibility of
objective truth, and the use of experimental methodology. Post-positivism of this type is
common in the social sciences for both practical and conceptual reasons. Practically, it is
often impossible or unethical to use the kind of carefully controlled laboratory studies
characteristic of physics or chemistry for social phenomena. Conceptually, it is often noted
that unlike the subjects of natural science, people are reflexive, that is, they may alter their
behavior based on the presence or findings of the researcher. Critics of this type of post-
positivism charge that it has not gone far enough from the basic assumptions of positivism.
Poststructuralist theories of IR developed in the 1980s from postmodernist studies in political
science.
Lapid, Yosef. “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist
Era.” International Studies Quarterly 33 (September 1989): 235-254; Thomas J. Biersteker, Thomas J.
“Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 33
(September 1989): 263-267; "Post-positivism." (2007). In The Social Science Jargon-Buster. Retrieved
from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageukssjb/post_positivism; Post-positivist. Academic
Dictionaries and Encyclopedias; Wikipedia.

Post-structuralism
The movement of ideas, centered on the French left and in particular on the journal Tel Quel
(edited by Philippe Sollers), which followed the brief ascendancy of structuralism in literary
and political circles in Paris during the early 1960s. Not a school, but a loose assembly of
thinkers who flirted with structuralism and then rejected it, looking elsewhere for cultural and
political foundations. Foucault is usually described as a post-structuralist, as is Derrida;
deconstruction is also said to be a form of post-structuralism. In general, post-structuralism
emphasizes the importance of language in structuring our experience of the world - meanings
are not inherent in the thing or action itself but are created by words and their relationship to
other words. Meanings, it is argued, cannot be fixed or remain stable, but are endlessly
remade through the process of reading/speaking and changes in social life. At the heart of
the post-structuralist perspective lies the principle that language produces social reality,
which varies across cultures and time.
"Poststructuralism." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Ed. William A. Darity, Jr. 2nd ed.
Vol. 6. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008. 398-401. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 25 Mar.
2013; Structuralism/post-structuralism. (2003). InThe A-Z of Social Research. Retrieved from
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/sageuksr/structuralism_post_structuralism.

Power Transition Theory

Created by A.F.K. Organski and originally published in his textbook, World Politics (1958),
power transition theory today describes international politics as a hierarchy with (1) a
"dominant" state, the one with the largest proportion of power resources (population,
productivity, and political capacity meaning coherence and stability); (2) "great powers," a
collection of potential rivals to the dominant state and who share in the tasks of maintaining
the system and controlling the allocation of power resources; (3) "middle powers" of regional
significance similar to the dominant state, but unable to challenge the dominant state or the
system structure, and (4) "small powers," the rest. The principle predictive power of the theory
is in the likelihood of war and the stability of alliances. War is most likely, of longest duration,
and greatest magnitude, when a challenger to the dominant power enters into approximate
parity with the dominant state and is dissatisfied with the existing system. Similarly, alliances
are most stable when the parties to the alliance are satisfied with the system structure. There
are further nuances to the theory: for instance, the sources of power transition vary in their
volitility, population change being the least volatile and political capacity (defined as the ability
of the government to control resources internal to the country) the most volatile.
Chan, Steve. China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory A Critique. New York: Routledge, 2008;
Tammen, Ronald L. et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Chatham House
Publishers, 2000.

Pragmatic Idealism
Pragmatic Idealism was first developed as a conceptual and axiological clarification of
'Canadian internationalism' in Costas Melakopides' Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign
Policy 19945-1995 (McGill-Queens Úniversity Press, 1998). It argued that Canada, along
with such 'like-minded middle powers' as Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and
Sweden, had adopted during the Cold War a self-conscious departure from classic
Realpolitik, through foreign policies that cultivated moderation, mediation, legal and
diplomatic solutions to international conflicts, and authentic commitment to peacekeeping,
peace-making, human rights, foreign aid, and ecological rationality. Today, Pragmatic
Idealism can be said to characterize any foreign policy - including the international role of the
European Union - that embraces the aforementioned principles and values.
Melakopides, Costas “Pragmatic Idealism Revisited: Russia’s Post-1991 Cyprus Policy and Implications for
Washington.” Mediterranean Quarterly 23 (2012):107-134; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and
Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Prisoner's Dilemma
Cooperation is usually analysed in game theory by means of a non-zero-sum game called
the "Prisoner's Dilemma" (Axelrod, 1984). The two players in the game can choose between
two moves, either "cooperate" or "defect". The idea is that each player gains when both
cooperate, but if only one of them cooperates, the other one, who defects, will gain more. If
both defect, both lose (or gain very little) but not as much as the "cheated" cooperator whose
cooperation is not returned. The problem with the prisoner's dilemma is that if both decision-
makers were purely rational, they would never cooperate. Indeed, rational decision-making
means that you make the decision which is best for you whatever the other actor chooses.
Suppose the other one would defect, then it is rational to defect yourself: you won't gain
anything, but if you do not defect you will be stuck with a loss. Suppose the other one would
cooperate, then you will gain anyway, but you will gain more if you do not cooperate, so here
too the rational choice is to defect. The problem is that if both actors are rational, both will
decide to defect, and none of them will gain anything. However, if both would "irrationally"
decide to cooperate, both would gain.
Axelrod, Robert. “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.” In The Dynamics of
Norms. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997) pp. 1-17; Snyder, Glenn H. "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" Models in International
Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 15 (March 1971): 66-103; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches
and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Prospect Theory
Prospect theory is a psychological theory of decision-making under conditions of risk and
derives its name from the tenet that the notion of risk involves some prospect of loss. Thus
prospect theory posits loss-aversion, rather than risk-aversion (as claimed by rational choice
theorists) and takes into account the psychological primacy of relative positioning. The theory
states that there are two phases affecting decision-making: 1) framing, where perception or
presentation of the situation in which decisions must be made affect the disposition towards
some alternatives over others; and 2) evaluation, where the decision-maker assesses gains
and losses relative to a movable reference point depending on the perspective of the
decision-maker. It helps focus on how utilities are formed rather than how they are maximised.
Prospect theory originally was called 'value theory' by its founders Kahneman and Tversky in
the late 1970s.
Levy, James S. “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical
Problems.” Political Psychology [Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political Psychology]. 13 (June 1992):
283-310; edited passages from McDermott, Rose.Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004.

Psycho-Cultural Theory
The psycho-cultural theory of modernization focuses on the implications of various
psychological and cultural factors for socio-economic development. These theorists attempt
to demonstrate that it is the unique characteristics of various psycho-cultural factors in
advanced capitalist societies which have contributed to their socioeconomic progress over
time. It is also argued that it is the unique psycho-cultural features of Third World countries
that are held responsible for their “backwardness.” Some of the prominent theorists espousing
this development perspective are Weber, Schumpeter, Hagen, and McClellen.
T. B. Aquinas. "A PsychoCultural Theory of Democracy." Blog post, February 28, 2010; Dadoun, Roger.
"Politics and Psychoanalysis." International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. Ed. Alain de Mijolla. Vol. 2.
Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 1293-1294. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 25 Mar. 2013.

Rationalism
A theoretical qualification to the pessimism of realism and the idealism of liberal
internationalism. Rationalists view states as comprising an international society, not merely
an international system. States come to be a part of an international society by accepting that
various principles and institutions govern the way in which they conduct their foreign relations.
In doing so, it can be argued, states also display a commitment to the idea that it is
inappropriate to promote the national interest without any regard for international law and
morality.
Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013).

Realism
A particular view of the world, or paradigm, defined by the following assumptions: the
international realm is anarchic and consists of independent political units called states; states
are the primary actors and inherently possess some offensive military capability or power
which makes them potentially dangerous to each other; states can never be sure about the
intentions of other states; the basic motive driving states is survival or the maintenance of
sovereignty; states are instrumentally rational and think strategically about how to survive.
Clinton, W. David. The Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations. Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 2007; Pettman, Ralph. World Politics: Rationalism and Beyond. New
York: Palgrave, 2001; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March
2013.

Reflectionism
A new philosophical framework for questioning social values. The Reflectionist philosophy
borrows from the Situationist movement in art and, in particular, an aspect of the Situationist
movement called detournement, in which artists often appropriate tools of the "oppressor"
and then resituate these tools in a disturbing and disorienting fashion. Reflectionism attempts
to take this tradition one step further, not only by appropriating the tools of the oppressor, but
by turning those same tools against the oppressor. Mann (1998) coined the term
"Reflectionism" to describe the "mirrorlike" symmetry that is its end goal and because the goal
is also to induce deep thought ("reflection") through the construction of this mirror.
Reflectionism allows society to confront itself or to see its own absurdity.
Mann, Steve. "'Reflectionism' and 'Diffusionism': New Tactics for Deconstructing the Video Surveillance
Superhighway." Leonardo 31(1998): 93-102.

Regime Theory
See International Regime Theory.

Schema Theory
Schema theory developed in response to findings that opinions do not appear to be organized
by ideology. Schema theorists propose that opinions are structured by cognitive frameworks
of knowledge about a group, an event, a person, or an abstract concept, which include both
knowledge of concept and associations to related concepts. Psychologists Susan Fiske and
Shelly Taylor (1984) have conducted the most comprehensive examination of schema theory
to date. They propose that schemas provide a mental shortcut in terms of what an individual
filters in and thinks about pertaining to a concept. According to Axelrod (1973), schema is
essentially a pre-existing assumption made by an individual about the way the world is
organized.
Axelrod, Robert. “Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition.” The
American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973): 1248-1266; Public Opinion and Polling Around
the World: A Historical Encyclopedia. [electronic resource]. John G. Geer, editor. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, 2004; Fiske, Susan T. and Shelley E. Taylor. Social Cognition. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.

Securitization Theory
Securitization theory argues that security situations, or exceptional situations, have no
objective qualities that necessitate certain forms of politics. Rather, security is a process by
which issues are made into security issues through securitizing “speech-acts.” Securitization
theory treats security as a discourseor field that is characterized by certain types of language,
ways of speaking, subject positions, institutional structures, and so on. Neal argued that
although this approach is needed and welcome, it still tends to reify security as an identifiable
and unified special category, thus maintaining the norm/exception split and, therefore,
supporting Schmitt’s argument that the exception takes primacy over the norm. Deploying
securitization theory as a means of understanding contrasting policy solutions for given
security projects can fill the conceptual void masked by certain diplomatic terms of art, such
as "national will," "leadership," "consensus," "willingness," etc.
Balzacq, Thierry, ed. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. New York:
Routledge, 2011; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March
2013; Wikipedia.

Security Dilemma
A security dilemma refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict,
possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire
conflict. Essentially, the security dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure
in relation to other states. None of the states involved want relations to deteriorate, let alone
for war to be declared, but as each state acts militarily or diplomatically to make itself more
secure, the other states interpret its actions as threatening. An ironic cycle of unintended
provocations emerges, resulting in an escalation of the conflict which may eventually lead to
open warfare.
Posen, Barry R. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 35
(1993): 27-47; Kanji, O. "Security." in Burgess, G. and H. Burgess (eds.). Beyond Intractability. Boulder,
CO: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003.

Social Constructivism
Social constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life. As such,
constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action: the capacity
and will of people to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.
This capacity gives rise to social facts, or facts that depend on human agreement that they
exist and typically require human institutions for their existence (money, property rights,
sovereignty, marriage and Valentine's Day, for example). Constructivists contend that not
only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share
the stage with a whole host of other ideational factors emanating from people as cultural
beings. No general theory of the social construction of reality is available to be borrowed from
other fields and international relations constructivists have not as yet managed to formulate
a fully fledged theory of their own. As a result, constructivism remains more of a
philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study
of international relations.
Guzzini, Stefano. “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations.” European Journal of
International Relations 6 (June 2000): 147-182; edited passage from Ruggie, J. "What Makes the World
Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." International Organization 52
(Autumn 1998): 855-885.

Sociological Liberalism
Rejects realists view that IR is primarily a study of relations between sovereign states as too
narrowly focused and one-sided. Sociological Liberalism argues that IR is not only about state
to state relations but is also about transnational relations, i.e., relations between people,
groups, and organizations belonging to different countries. This emphasis on society has led
some theorists to identify liberal thought by the term “pluralism.” In focusing on transnational
relations, sociological liberals return to an old theme in liberal thinking: the notion that
relations between people are more cooperative and supportive than are relations between
national governments. Many sociological liberals hold the idea that transnational relations
between people from different countries help create new forms of human society which exist
alongside or even in competition with the nation-state.
Jackson, Robert H. and Georg Sorensen. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches.
3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; Rosenau, James N. The Dramas of Political Life: An
Introduction to the Problems of Governance. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1980.

State Cartel Theory

State cartel theory is an institutionalist approach with a focus on regional integration. It imports
its terminology from the classical cartel theory of economic enterprises. Realising that the
benefits of cooperation most often outweigh the costs of conflict, states are willing to cartelize
political issues in international institutions. A members’ assembly is the primary institution,
with further organisations being an expression of the will and needs of members. A good
example is the Council of the European Union and its allied European Commission and
European Court.
Westlake, Martin. The Council of the European Union. New York: Stockton, 1995; Mark Beavis, IR
Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Structural Idealism
According to Mann (2002), structural idealism encompasses a belief that social and historical
explanation has to be both structuralist and idealist at the same time. To understand an
individual social act, or a collection of such acts, it is not enough to just give an account of
the intentions of the actor. Nor is it enough to list external factors, whether economic, political,
or biological, that influenced or caused that act. Structural idealists believe that a full account
of a social act requires an explanation that shows how individual intentions are related or
shaped by structural factors, and how in turn these structural actors are instantiated and
sustained by individual acts (without which, they would cease to exist.
Mann, Doug. Structural Idealism: A Theory of Social and Historical Explanation. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 2002.

Structuralism
A much misused term for any science, pseudo-science or critical method which finds the
significance of human things (especially social and cultural products) in their structure.
Structuralist theories have been proposed for the interpretation of all of the following: actions,
rituals, religions; texts, clothes, buildings; poetry, music, architecture; and, most important
perhaps, since it is often thought to be the root product of any culture, language. To have
structure, an object must have parts united under ordered relations. To say that structure is
the determinant (rather than a determinant) of meaning is to say that it is not the parts
themselves but the relations among them that are significant. This does not mean that the
meaning remains unchanged when parts are changed, but that it remains invariant with
respect to any systematic change of parts. Confusion has been caused by the fact that there
are two kinds of theory which might be called ‘structuralist’: (1) the structuralist anthropology
of Claude Lévi-Strauss and his followers, which finds significances by discovering repeated
patterns. It is supposed that relations (exemplified, e.g., by rituals) remain unchanged from
culture to culture, while the parts related may be systematically different. It is then argued that
meaning attaches to the recurring pattern of relations (the ‘structure’) and not to the local
variants that are fitted into it; (2) the linguist’s theory of grammatical structure, according to
which the meaning of a sentence is determined in part by its structure – i.e. not merely by the
words employed, but by the rules governing their conjunction. In case (1) what is interpreted
is the pattern divorced from its component parts; in case (2) what is interpreted is the whole,
as structured from its parts. The two kinds of interpretation are entirely different, since only in
the first is the structure thought to have an independent significance. The confounding of the
two has led to the impression that everything that has significant structure (architecture, music
and literature, for example) also has the structure of language, and is to be interpreted in
terms that might be equally used in the interpretation of linguistic signs. The confusion has
even been extended to political theory, e.g. by Althusser.
Haggard, Stephen. “Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations Theory.”
In Progress in Postwar International Relations. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 403-; "Structuralism." (2009). In Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural
Anthropology. Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/routencsca/structuralism;
"Structuralism." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Ed. William A. Darity, Jr. 2nd ed. Vol. 8.
Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008. 181-183. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 25 Mar. 2013.

Supranationalism
Supranationalism is a process by which national governments share sovereignty with
transnational institutions whose laws and policies are binding on those governments. Majority
voting by national representatives in order to make decisions, an executive authority and
parliamentary body independent of national control, and an independent court whose
jurisprudence is binding at the national level are the most important and distinctive features
of a supranational organization. The European Union is the sole instance (as at the beginning
of the twenty-first century) of a supranational organization.
Tsebelis, George and Geoffrey Garrett. “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and
Supranationalism in the European Union.” International Organization 55 (March 2001): 357-390; “The
Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism.” Yearbook of European Law 1 (1981): 267-
306; Mark Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Third World Security Dilemma

Concept first proposed by Mohammed Ayoob (1995) who argued that the major threat that
confronts security building in the Third World is presented as a lack of “adequate stateness.”
The argument is that “Third World” states, as opposed to states in the “Western” world, are
still busy with state-building. Therefore, they need to be given time and space to construct,
“credible and legitimate political apparatuses with the capacity to provide order--in many
respects the foremost social value--within the territories under their judicial control." This lack
of “adequate stateness” prevents Third World states from “imposing a legitimate political order
at home and from participating effectively in the international system.” Critics such as Bilgin
and Morton (2002), point out several problems with this analysis. First, by way of taking the
Western state as a finished project, Ayoob fails to push his argument to its logical conclusion
and call for more comprehensive conception of security, cognizant of the character of the
state as an “unfinished project.” Critics argue that state building in the Third World and
elsewhere is an ongoing process, its identity in need of re-inscription, its sovereignty in need
of reaffirmation by the recognition of other states and the symbolic acts of diplomacy.
Furthermore, the problem with such an approach has less to do with an exaggerated focus
on the state than a lack of analysis of the state. Finally, such policy recommendations almost
always neglect the security concerns of those individual and collective identities that are
marginalized by strong and weak states alike.
Ayoob, Mohammed. The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the
International System. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995; Bilgin, Pinar and Adam David Morton.
"Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social
Sciences?" Third World Quarterly 23 (2002): 55-80.

Traditionalism
An approach to international relations that emphasises the studying of such disciplines as
diplomatic history, international law, and philosophy in an attempt to develop better insights.
Traditionalists tend to be skeptical of behavioralist approaches that are confined to strict
scientific standards that include formal hypothesis testing and, usually, the use of statistical
analysis.
Kaplan,Morton A. “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations.” World
Politics 19 (October 1966): 1-20; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.
.
Transnational Historical Materialism
Transnational historical materialism falls within the Marxist tradition. This contemporary
Marxism takes its inspiration from Antonio Gramsci and gives greater significance to the role
of culture and ideas, along with focussing on economic aspects of order and change. It is
seen as a corrective to the economism of classical Marxism.
Overbeek, Henk. Transnational Historical Materialism: Theories of Transnational Class Formation and
World Order.” In Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories. Ronen Palan, ed. 2nd edition. (New
York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 174-191; van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. “Theorizing the Transnational: A Historical
Materialist Approach.” Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (2004): 142-176; Mark
Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories. Last up-dated on 14 March 2013.

Transnationalism
Interactions and coalitions across state boundaries that involve such diverse
nongovernmental actors as multinational corporations and banks, church groups, and
terrorist networks. In some usages, transnationalism includes both nongovernmental as well
as transgovernmental links. The term transnational is used both to label the actor (for
example, a transnational actor) or a pattern of behavior (for example, an international
organisation that acts transnationally--operates across state borders). Theorists focusing on
transnationalism often de-emphasize the state as primary and unitary actor.
Cerny, Philip G. Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010; Anderson, James, ed. Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border
Crossings. New York: Routledge, 2002; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

Two-World Order
An approach proposed by Singer and Wildavsky (1993) that sees the key to understanding
the real world order after the fall of the Soviet Union is to separate the world into two parts.
One part is zones of peace, wealth, and democracy. The other part is zones of turmoil, war,
and development. The dominating features of the new international world order in the zones
of peace are that the countries there are modern, wealthy democracies that will not go to war
with one another and that each country’s safety and bargaining power will not depend on its
military forces or its position in a delicate balance of power. The dominating features of the
new international world order in the zones of turmoil and development will be traditional and
familiar conflicts and imperatives. But the traditional pattern will be significantly modified by
new factors. These include: the changing nature of wealth, which makes land and asset
grabbing much less attractive than it used to be, and less attractive than improving the
nation’s social and intellectual quality; the example provided by the zones of peace and
democracy; the requirements and results of changing to become more productive; and, the
responses of the democracies to conflict in the zones of turmoil.
Singer, Max and Aaron Wildavsky A. The Real World Order. Zones of Peace / Zones of Turmoil. Chatham,
N.J: Chatham House, 1993.

Virtual Theory
First outlined in James Der Derian (2000), virtual theory posits that the retrieval of facts--
empirical or social--is preceded by interpretation, conveyed by technical media, conducted
through experimentation, and succeeded by the creation of new virtualities. IR is still in need
of approaches that study what is being represented. But it is also in need of a virtual theory
which can explore how reality is seen, framed, read, and generated in the actualization of the
virtual by the event. This does not preclude a scientific investigation, unless one ignores the
advances of Heisenberg, Einstein and quantum physics, and confines science (as is often
the case in the social sciences) to the Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian mechanistic model.
Virtual theory relies on the scientific approach mapped out by Heisenberg.
Der Derian, James. “Global Events, National Security, and Virtual Theory.” Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 30 (December 2001): 669-690; Der Derian, James. “Virtuous War/Virtual
Theory.” International Affairs 76 (Oct., 2000): 771-788.

World Capitalist System

An approach to international relations that emphasises the impact of the world wide spread
of capitalism. It focuses on class and economic relations and the division of the world into a
dominant centre or core of industrialised countries, a subordinate periphery of less developed
countries and a semi-periphery of countries that occupy an intermediate position between
core and periphery.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for
Comparative Analysis.” In Essential Readings in World Politics. Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, eds. (New
York: Norton, 2004), pp. 130-138; Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, eds. International Relations Theory. New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

World-Systems Analysis
World-systems analysis is not a theory or mode of theorizing, but a perspective and a critique
of other perspectives within social science. Its social origins were located in the geopolitical
emergence of the Third World in the late 1960s and the manifest insufficiencies of
modernization theory to account for what was happening. The unit of analysis is the world-
system rather than a state or society, with particular emphases on the long-term history and
totality of the system. The notion of totality (globality, unidisciplinarity and holism)
distinguishes world-systems analysis from similar approaches such as global or international
political economy which look at the relationships between the two segregated streams of
politics and economics. Proponents of world-systems analysis also regard it as an intellectual
movement, capable of transforming social science into a vehicle for world-wide social change.