Panganiban v.

Borromeo, 58 PHIL 367

FACTS: Husband and wife Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala signed a contract before the notary public of Elias
Borromeo. The contract had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Atty. Borromeo
cooperated in the execution of the document. He was quite knowledgeable about its contents although he did not
know it fully because of a difference in dialect. The contract is an agreement between the husband and the wife
which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with
another man, without opposition from either one of them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is valid

HELD: No. Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon to his or her offender spouse, this doesn’t mean
that the purpose of the legislature is to legalize adultery and concubinage. A notarized contract that permits
concubinage and adultery is not judicially recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution
of the said crimes, the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is
constitutionally provided for.
3. Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606, December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have
cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial
separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision
was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal
property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the
separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was
not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her
to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support
her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept
her.

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD:

SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the
case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights,
with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support
to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their
conjugal property.
 Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property
of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the
determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have been
illegally registered in the name of the persons.

4. Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz

GR 19565, January 30, 1968

FACTS:

Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children. During their
coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action
against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from
abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had
always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he
was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling
instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was
affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets
in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an abused of his
authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:

The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the family. To be legally
declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back
and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never
failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more than one visit.
Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of
P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the witness himself.

SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for
abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

5. Bugayong vs. Ginez

GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956

FACTS:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan
while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality
before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later
moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local
college.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-law) and some from
anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy
legal department.

In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendant’s
godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night
as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth
on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of
the action.

HELD:

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary
act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the
parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
6. CASE 1: People v. Zapata & Bondoc

1.) In the CFI of Pampanga, Andres Bondoc filed a complaint of adultery v. wife Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio
Bondoc, her paramour
a. For cohabiting and repeated sexual intercourse from 1946 to 1947 (date of filing complaint)
b. Dalmacio knew Guadalupe to be married
2.) Guadalupe pleaded guilty; 4 mos. Of arresto mayor
3.) Andres filed another complaint in 1948 for adulterous acts committed by his wife and Dalmacio from 1947 to 1948
a. Defendants filed motion to quash complaint bec. They would be put in jeopardy of punishment for SAME
OFFENSE.
b. CFI quashed 2nd complaint of Andres
i. Ruled that adulterous acts charged in 1st and 2nd complaints be deemed ONE CONTINUOUS
OFFENSE
a. Same parties, two sets of unlawful acts from 1946-1947; 1947 to 1948
b. “No person shal be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”
SC Ruling:
1.) Adultery is a crime of result, not of tendency
a. SC of Spain: INSTANTANEOUS CRIME
i. Consummated or exhausted or completed at the moment of carnal union
2.) EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE constitutes A CRIME OF ADULTERY
3.) Identity of offended, status, society does not argue against commission of the crime of adultery as many times as
there were carnal acts consummated
i. As long as status remains unchanged; nexus remains undissolved or unbroken
a. Encroachment upon that status = crime
ii. No consti or legal provi. Barring filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous
acts committed
a. Each constitutes ONE CRIME
4.) CONCEPT of CONTINUOUS CRIME
a. Favorable to transgressors; against interest of society
i. To exist, plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time
ii. Unity of penal provisions infringed upon or violated
iii. Unity of criminal intent or purpose
 1. 2 or more viol. Of the same penal provi. Are united in one and same intent leading to
perpretation of same criminal purpose or aim
b. In People v Zapata & Bondoc:
i. Unity does not exist
1. Culprits perpetrate crime in every sexual intercourse
2. Need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it
3. Culprits committed adulterous acts AGAIN after adulterous acts filed in complaint
ii. Another crime of adultery committed
1. If defendants, after releave during pendency of their case after which they were convicted
HAD SEX. INTERCOURSE up to time when they were sent to prison to serve penalty
nd
5.) 2 complaint does not violate double jeopardy clause of consti
a. If defendant alleged he did not know Guadalupe was a married woman in response to the first complaint,
i. How can he be absolved of said crime in the 2nd complaint, knowing then that Guadalupe WAS NOT
SINGLE.
1. This fact would remain unpunished
b. Even w/ pardon, pardon does not cover acts during 1946 to 1947
i. Pardon refers to previous, NOT subsequent adulterous acts

7. Matubis vs Praxedes

Facts; In 943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In 1948, they entered into a contract wherein they agreed that they
shall live separately and that they should not prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their
separation. In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who later gave birth to their child. In April 1956, Socorro filed a complaint
for legal Separation on the ground of abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription and condonation/consent.

Issue:

1.) Did the action prescribe?

2.) Did Socorro consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband?

Held:
1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on
which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57,
FC). The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know
the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956.

2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent
on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied
but expressed. The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of
the court's sympathy.

8. Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property.
She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation
between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted.
Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received
plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of
the plaintiff on March 17,1980.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in
declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis
and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

HELD:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and
of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case
be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off”
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to
it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”

9. ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)

FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals
of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She
claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as his wife.

ISSUES:

1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction

HELD:

1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife
was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de
facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary,
stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.
“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they
cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…”
(Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much
criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to
return. She is also not entitled to support.

10. TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano

CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she
and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents
in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint
for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought
for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich
citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign
divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in
the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and
attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño,
P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

11. EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-
Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan
de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her and the accused-
appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.
However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would
threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with
the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are
you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her
reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on
the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
 The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping
his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them
down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him
away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over
the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within
the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute
the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.

The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales
which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
 Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege
was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another
person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the accused. The accused argued
that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

12. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence
at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the
legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her
lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband
to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent.
Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his
own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate
his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar,
the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore
claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

13. PELAYO VS. LAURON Case Digest

ARTURO PELAYO VS. MARCELO LAURON
12 Phil 453
January 12, 1909

FACTS: On November 23, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo and Juana Abella. He alleged that on October 13,
1906 at night, Pelayo was called to the house of the defendants to assist their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child. Unfortunately,
the daughter-in-law died as a consequence of said childbirth. Thus, the defendant refuses to pay. The defendants argue that their daughter-in-law
lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation, that her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous event.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants should be held liable for the fees demanded by the plaintiff upon rendering medical assistance to the
defendants’ daughter-in-law.

RULING: No. The Court held that the rendering of medical assistance is one of the obligations to which spouses are bound by mutual support,
expressly determined by law and readily demanded. Therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the in-laws but rather on the part of the
husband who is not a party.

Thus, decision affirmed.