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TITLE I: MARRIAGE
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
Cabague v. Auxillo 11/26/1952
Facts:
There was an agreement to marry between Cabagues’s son and
Auxillo’s daughter . The consideration of which is for Cabague to
improve the house of Auxillo and spend for the wedding feast
and the needs of the bride. When Auxillo’s daughter refused to
carry out the agreement, Cabague filed an action for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement may be proved in court.
Held:
The rules of court applicable at the time provides that, “ any
agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than
mutual promise to marry should be in writing, or in any notes or
memorandum and subscribed by parties, otherwise it shall be
unenforceable.
In this case, the action for damages for the breach of promise to
marry may prosper and evidence of such mutual promise is
admissible. But the agreement between Cabague and Auxillo may
not prosper , since such agreement is oral and may not be proven
in court.
Domalagan v. Bolifer
Facts:
Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a contract to marry their son
and daughter upon a consideration that Domalagan will pay
Bolifer P500. And So Domalagan paid P500 and P16 as token of
future marriage. But, Bolifer’s daughter got married with another
man. Domalagan filed an action for damages, and demanded the
return of the money he has given.
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered.
Held:
Damages may be recovered for the breach of promise to marry
although the same is made orally.
The rules of court applicable at the time provides that, “ any
agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than
mutual promise to marry should be in writing, or in any notes or
memorandum and subscribed by parties, otherwise it shall be
unenforceable.
Hermosisima v. CA
Facts:
Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and 10 years older than Francisco
Hermosisima, they were regarded as engaged. She got pregnant
and she told Francisco that she was in the family way, and this
was when Francisco promised to marry her. But, subsequently he
married other woman.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable for breach of
promise to marry.
Held:
Moral Damages cannot be recovered.
In the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866, the supreme
court ruled that breach of promise to marry is not actionable,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced
upon the faith of such promise. The history of breach of promise
suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many
of the American States.
An award of moral damages may be recovered in case there is
seduction upon showing that because of defendant-appellant's
seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for
him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and
self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of
Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
but in this case Francisco cannot be liable for seduction, , not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became
intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by
her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
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Wassmer v. Velez
Facts:
They decided to get married. Two days before their wedding day,
Wassmer received a telegram from Velez to postponed the
wedding because his mother opposes it, and yet he reassured
Wassmer that nothing has changed. But on their wedding day, he
did not show up. Despite the fact that Invitations were printed
and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances, The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased, Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared, A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought, Bridal showers were given and gifts
received.
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered based on the beach
of promise to marry.
Held:
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts
not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code.
Tanjanco v. Ca
Facts:
Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both
being of adult age; that in consideration of defendant's promise
of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas
for carnal knowledge, as a result of which the latter conceived a
child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her
job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving
P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to
support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to
marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was
bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her
support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and
exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered under Article 21.
(seduction)
Held:
Damages may not be recovered.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example
set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort
upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement.
The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
Araceli a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with apolonio tanjanco, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion;
for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
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alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises.
Baksh v. Ca
Facts:
Baksh was an Iranian citizen and an exchange student taking a
medical course. He later courted and proposed to marry Marilou
Gonzales, a 22 year-old, Filipina and a waitress in a luncheonette,
with a reputation duly respected in their community. Baksh
visited Marilou’s parents to secure their consent. With the
consent of Marilou’s parents they lived together but defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and
he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made
her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a
result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him
of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do
so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That
was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents.
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Held:
Damages may be recovered.
Gen. Rule:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong.
Rationale:
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on
the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in
the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise
suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in
many of the American states. . . .
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article
21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-
delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed
it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. An example
will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either
has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl
and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved,
would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number
of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of
the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is
in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
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In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the xxx xxx xxx
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
without judicial approval was void.
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of Lichauco de leon v. Ca
every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its Facts:
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private Jose Vincent and Sylvia Lichauco were married. A de facto
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable
the seduction. marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home. Sylvia
went to the United States where she obtained American
citizenship. Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of marriage
against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia also
MARRIAGE CONTRACT NOT SUBJECT TO STIPULATION
filed claims for support and distribution of properties. It appears,
however, that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident
Selanova v. Mendoza
and did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to
hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime,
Facts:
concentrated her efforts to obtain some sort of property
settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza was charged with gross ignorance of
the law for having prepared and ratified a document ,
, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her
extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon, which We
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the
quote in full, as follows:
liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be) would
withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each
Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/ or yourself in a joint and
had filed against the other and that they waived their "right to
several capacity:
prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one
would commit against the other.
1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and encumbrances
and subject to no claims in any form whatsoever the following
Issue:
properties to Sylvia Lichauco-de Leon hereinafter referred to as
Held: the wife

Obligations of the wife:

that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of
conjugal assets of the spouses by allocating to the husband a
thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the residential house
and lot. The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed
either spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a
ratification of their personal separation. The agreement in
question is void because it contravenes the following provisions
of the Civil Code:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;
1. To agree to a judicial separation of property in
accordance with Philippine law and in this connection to
do all that may be necessary to secure said separation of
property including her approval in writing of a joint
petition or consent decree.
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the
amount of P100,000 and US$35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in
compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the aforestated
Letter-Agreement.
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval
of dissolution of their conjugal partnership, the main part of
which reads as follows (pp. 37-38,Rollo):
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5. For the best interest of each of them and of their minor child,
petitioners have agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership and
to partition the assets thereof, under the following terms and
conditions-this document, a pleading being intended by them to
embody and evidence their agreement:
Issue:
Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid. The third
paragraph of the Letter-Agreement.
Held:
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the
Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations with
her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a
joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the
consideration was the termination of marital relationship.
“the parties contemplated not only to agree to a judicial
separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue
with divorce proceedings”
This Court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause or
consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having
executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the termination of the marital
relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia
Lichauco de Leon.
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the
contract is void and inexistent from the beginning.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from
the beginning:
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up
the defense of illegality be waived.
But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social
institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulations...
From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court is
of the considered opinion and so holds that intervenor's
undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of
marital relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to
Filipino morals and public Policy. As such, any agreement or
obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is
contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void.
(emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates properties
belonging to the spouses and not those belonging to a third
party, who, in the case at bar., is Macaria. In the petition for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to appear
that the said properties are conjugal in nature. However, Macaria
was able to prove that the questioned properties are owned by
her. Neither Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any contrary
evidence.
Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration of the
Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations, We
agree with the respondent court that (pp. 46-47, Rollo):
... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the
following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;
FAMILY CODE (ART. 7(2))
Villar v. Paraiso
Facts:
Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a
result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as
the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However,
contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor
because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under
section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted
the present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be
declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as
mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be
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declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of
respondent Paraiso.
Issue:
whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold
office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or
whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the
elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby
removing his disability.
Held:
we have not found any reason for deviating from the finding of
the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the
order to which he belonged and that the resignation he claims to
have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere
scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding
ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if
respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of
the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose
of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and
have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau
of Public Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be
underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to
inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to
discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of
any change in his religious status. This information is necessary
for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to
the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which
is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It
is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of
the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but
upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of
such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such
cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the
interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in
the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do.
And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of
candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing
full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a
municipal office.
Aranes v. Occiano
Facts:
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Martinez v. Tan
Facts:
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called
an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace,
dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and
the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually
agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of
the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage.
Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by
the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by
Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of
the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it
where actually present in the office of the justice on the same
day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the
petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked for.
It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the
marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the
husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following
this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace
and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the
25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the
plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of
the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own
testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the
peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that
she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it
in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the
defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to
ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
Issue:
whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on
the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace,
Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
Held:
The parties were legally married.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the
justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the
defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.
General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take
each other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the
occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until
after the document was signed and then addressing himself to
the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The
petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive
statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they
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asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The
document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice
of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the
marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the
certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting
parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the
officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before
the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as
husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such
presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of
the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage
certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can
only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when
they appeared and signed the said document which so states
before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was
proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to
read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold,
that what took place before the justice of the peace on this
occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
Madridejo v. De leon
Facts:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one
child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de
Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana
Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of
births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June
1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being
furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-
day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no
mention being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920,
Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of
Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9, 1920,
leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the
plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged
second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the
2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact
that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that
the essential requisites required by law for its validity were
lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT
Borja-Manzano v. J. Sanchez
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four
children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment
that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and
Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What
he knew was that the two had been living together as husband
and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage,
as manifested in their joint affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be exempt.
Held:
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to
apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
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3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that
he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he
had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were “separated.”
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make
the subsequent marriage null and void
Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage
tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all
the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case
at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit
of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had
been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge
to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment
of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the
law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Ninal v. Bayadog
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February
19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was
void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of marriage license.
Held:
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection
to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and
a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
9
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature
of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt
the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was
involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case
is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime
before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have
no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50
in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
10

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree ART. 26, FAMILY CODE
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the Republic v. Orbecido III
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
Facts:
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind There was a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage celebrated in the Philippines. Later, the wife went to the US, and
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of acquired American citizenship. After, She obtained a divorce
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the decree and remarried an American while in the US, The Spouse
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of left in the Philippines, orbecido, invokes art 26, par 2, to allow
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever him to remarry.
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact Issue:
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
Whether or not Orbecido should be capacitated to remarry under
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
art 26, par 2.
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will
be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not
like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked Held:
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
same cannot be considered imprescriptible. validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute Legislative Intent
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
remarriage. 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
11
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE (RULE 131, SEC 3)
Perido v. Perido
Facts:
Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was
Benita Talorong,. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina
Baliguat. The children and grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,"
The heirs from the first marriage opposed the declaration of the
CA that Lucio’s children in the 2nd marriage are his legitimate
chiidren.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of
Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that
said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three
were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's
first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and
were not recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita
Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as
testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by
petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was
still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title
issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established
through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is actually married with his 2 nd wife.
Held:
Petition cannot be sustained.
This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review.
Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to
marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in
1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the
certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that
he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore,
it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons
living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved,
as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part
of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee 1 this Court explained the rationale behind this
12
presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in
concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore,
legitimate.
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE
People v. Aragon
Facts:
The accused under another name contracted marriage with his
first wife. While his first marriage was subsisting, he contracted
his 2nd marriage. The accused and his 2nd wife did not live happily
for the accused used to maltreat his 2nd wife. During the absence
of the 2nd wife, he again contracted a 3rd marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of bigamy.
Held:
It was the 2nd marriage which was bigamous.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence
of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of
an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab
initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa
C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria
Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial
declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the
latter.
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act
No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by
any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of
the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not
renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third
marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid
one and appellant’s prosecution for contracting this marriage can
not prosper.
Tolentino V. Paras
Facts:
The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a
second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente,), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G.
Tolentino, was still subsisting.
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal, upon
Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the
corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison
sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private
respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate
carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry,
petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in
the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G.
Tolentino", her name.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is the lawful surviving spouse of
the deceased.
Held:
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for
Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the
marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better
proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the
existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity
of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without
need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that
13
private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased
Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly
made.
Wiegel v.Sempio-Dy
Facts:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at
the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati,
Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for
short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony
having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said
prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and
void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been
allegedly forced to enter said marital union
Issue:
Whether or not the status of the 1st marriage was void voidable.
Held:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art.
80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.
Donato v. Luna
Facts:
An information for bigamy was filed against Leonilo Donato by
Paz Abayan. Before Leonilo’s arraignment, Paz filed a civil action
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Leonilo. Said civil
case was based on the ground that private respondent consented
to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's
second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner
was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed
the defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for bigamy which is pending
should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment.
Held:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in
a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in a criminal case. 5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case
at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second
marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was
petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B.
Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit.
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage
must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.
14
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that
his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use
of threats, force and intimidation.
Dorothy Terre v. Atty. Jordan Terre
Facts:
Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a
member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage
with complainant remained subsisting.
Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned
that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla
sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her
prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private
meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was
then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that
believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null
and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem.
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified
substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the first time
in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School, she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while
respondent was single respondent was aware of her marital
status p. it was then that respondent started courting her but
nothing happened of the courtship); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued
their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum
University ); respondent continued courting her, this time with
more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come
of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her
that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first
husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his
explanation and having secured favorable advice from her
mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13,
16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant's]
objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining
that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to
go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married
before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June
14, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not he should be guilty of gross immoral conduct.
Held:
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming
that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no
action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have
known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case
law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely,
that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the
same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his
own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre
must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage
to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal
in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply
flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced
the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null
and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to
marry him.
He was disbarred.
Morigo v. People
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were sweethearts. They got
married in the phils, but Lucia had to leave Canada for work.
While in Canada, a petition for divorce was filed by Lucia. Upon
learning this, Lucio got married with another woman in the phils.
A year after, Sept 1993, Lucio filed a case for judicial declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place because what transpired
is just a mere signing of marriage contract without the presence
of solemnizing officer. In Oct, 1993 Lucio was charged of bigamy.
However, petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy
would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the
instant case.
Issue:
15
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether
his defense of good faith is valid.
Held:
The elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not
been for the existence of the first.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused
must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is
no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity
of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no
first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
Jones v. Hortiguela
Facts:
PHSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Republic v. Ca and Molina
Facts:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity
and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred
to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned
from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo
had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served;
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared void.
Held:
The marriage remains valid.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity'
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
16
Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and
solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
17
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence —
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
Leni Choa v. alfonso choa
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married. Respondent filed an
annulment of his marriage to petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity, because allegedly that the filing by
petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the
latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for
perjury,false testimony, concubinage and deportation. And also
respondent basically complains that about three aspects of
petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention
to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of
procreative sexuality."
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be void due to PI.
Held:
In Santos v. CA,37 this Court clearly explained that "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."38 Said the Court:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's ‘Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated."
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely
shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other.
There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical
antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union.
18
Barcelona v. Ca
Facts:
Respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana on the ground of Psychological
incapacity, The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of
their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their
varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house.
She would go to her sister’s house or would play tennis the whole
day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages
suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent
withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her
husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months
pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating
her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily
leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she
wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioner’s marital authority
and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy
another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate
respondent’s desire, but no amount of plea and explanation
could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave
their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the
respondent’s pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave
their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in
Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between
the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived his
right to the conjugal dwelling in respondent’s favor through an
extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains.
The separation in fact between the petitioner and the
respondent still subsists to the present time.
Issue:
w/n the marriage should be void.
Held:
xxx “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (“new Rules”).[15] Specifically,
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages –
x x x.
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of
the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules
providing that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the
19

petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of
the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of
neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine
the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do
not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to
allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity.
In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main
issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on
the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that,
based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition
sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule
on forum shopping.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
See the case of republic v. Ca and Molina, guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness.

Facts:

Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for

declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. According to the complainant, Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest
only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her
and their child.

Court of appeals granted the nullity of marriage, The appellate

court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and
to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. But the office of the solicitor general stated that
Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality
disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines
set in Molina.

Issue:

Held: