G.R. No.

183448 June 30, 2014

SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO ABALON, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 183464

HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO ABALON, Petitioners,

vs.
MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL AND AL, ARNEL AND AL, SPOUSES DOMINDOR PERALTA AND
OFELIA PERALTA, and HEIRS of RESTITUTO RELLAMA, represented by his children ALEX,
IMMANUEL, JULIUS and SYLVIA, all surnamed RELLAMA.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before us are the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the 30 May 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85542. The CA had reversed the 14 April 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Fifth Judicial Region of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 9243.

The civil case before the RTC of Legaspi City involved a parcel of land registered under the name of
Bernardina Abalon and fraudulently transferred to Restituto Rellama and who, in turn, subdivided the
subject property and sold it separately to the other parties to this case – Spouses Dominador and
Ofelia Peralta; and Marissa, Leonil and Arnel, all surnamed Andal. Thereafter, Spouses Peralta and
the Andals individually registered the respective portions of the land they had bought under their
names. The heirs of Bernardina were claiming back the land, alleging that since it was sold under
fraudulent circumstances, no valid title passed to the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were
now title holders of the subject parcel of land, averred that they were buyers in good faith and sought
the protection accorded to them under the law.

THE FACTS

The RTC and the CA have the same findings of fact, but differ in their legal conclusions. There being
no factual issues raised in the Petitions, we adopt the findings of fact of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 85542,
as follows:

The subject parcel of land, described as Lot 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi, consisting of
8,571 square meters, was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and
registered in the name of Bernardina Abalon (Abalon). It appears that a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed over the subject property in favor of Restituto M. Rellama (Rellama) on June 10, 1975. By
virtue of such conveyance OCT No. (O) 16 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 42108 was issued in the name of Rellama. The subject property was then subdivided
into three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold to Spouses
Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and Ofelia M. Peralta (Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254
was issued in their names. Lot 1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to Eduardo Lotivio (Lotivio)
who thereafter transferred his ownership thereto to Marissa Andal, Arnel Andal, and Leonil Andal (the
Andals) through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 9, 1995. On even date, TCT No. 42482 was
issued in the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679-C as evidenced by the
issuance of TCT No. 42821 in their favor on December 27, 1995.

Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was a forged
document, and claiming further that they acquired the subject property by succession, they being the
nephew and niece of Abalon who died without issue, plaintiff-appellees Mansueta Abalon and Amelia
Abalon filed the case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and the Andals, the herein defendants-
appellants and the Bank of the Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped as a party defendant.

It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint, under five separate causes of
action, that Rellama was able to cause the cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, and in lieu thereof the
issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his own name from which the defendants-appellants derived their own
titles, upon presentation of a xerox copy of the alleged forged deed of absolute sale and the order
granting the issuance of a second owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor in
Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648, which he had filed on the pretext that Lot 1679 covered by
OCT No. (O) 16 was sold to him and that the owner’s duplicate copy of the said title got lost in 1976
after the same was delivered to him. They averred that the owner’s duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16
had always been with Abalon and that upon her death, it was delivered to them. Likewise, they alleged
that Abalon had always been in possession of the subject property through her tenant Pedro Bellen
who was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta Bellen, and then his son, Godofredo Bellen. On
the other hand, they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was claiming. They further
alleged that after the ownership over the subject property was transferred to them upon the death of
Abalon, they took possession thereof and retained Godofredo as their own tenant. However, they
averred that in 1995 the defendants-appellants were able to wrest possession of the subject property
from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the defendants-appellants are not buyers in good faith as
they were aware that the subject land was in the possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they
made the purchase. They thus claim that the titles issued to the defendants-appellants are null and
void.

In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is genuine and that
the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 had been delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed
of transfer.

As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to the complaint, they mainly
alleged that they are buyers in good faith and for value.

During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.

After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of presenting their own evidence, the
defendants-appellants and the Heirs of Restituto Rellama, on different occasions, filed a demurrer to
evidence.

On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees and ordered
the restoration of OCT No. (O) 16 in the name of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles issued to the
defendants-appellants. The fact that only a xerox copy of the purported deed of sale between Rellama
and Abalon was presented before the Register of Deeds for registration and the absence of such xerox
copy on the official files of the said Office made the court a quo conclude that the said document was
a mere forgery. On the other hand, the court a quo noted that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in
the hands of the plaintiffs-appellees bears [sic] the perforated serial number B 221377, which it held
is a convincing proof of its authenticity and genuineness. It thus stated that "Miscellaneous Cadastral
Case No. 10648 is a (mere) strategem [sic] fraudulently concocted ... for the issuance of a fabricated
(second) owner’s duplicate certificate of Oct No. (O) 16" since the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No.
(O) 16 has not been lost at all. It said that any subsequent registration procured by the presentation
of such forged instrument is null and void. The dispositive portion of the court a quo’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [p]remises [c]onsidered, judgment is rendered as follows, to wit:

1. Ordering the restoration of Original Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 embracing Lot 1679 in the
name of Bernardina Abalon into the official files of the Registry of Deeds of Legaspi City – a
copy of the owner’s duplicate certificate embodying the technical description of Lot 1679
forming official part of the record as Exhibit "D" – as well as ordering the cancellation of any
and all transfer certificates of title succeeding Original Certificate of title No. (O) 16 – including
Transfer Certificates (sic) of Title Nos. 42108, 42254, 42255, 42256, 42821 [,] and 42482;

2. Ordering the defendants Marissa Andal, Leonil Andal, Arnel Andal[,] and the spouses
Dominador and Ofelia Peralta to vacate Lot 1679 and to peacefully surrender such lot to the
plaintiffs;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as litigation
expenses; and

4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.

The counterclaims by [sic] the defendants are all dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Spouses Peralta and the Andals filed their separate Notices of Appeal and thereafter, upon approval,
filed their respective Defendants-Appellants’ Briefs. The Heirs of Rellama, on the other hand, opted
not to challenge the ruling of the lower court.3

The Andals and Spouses Peralta – appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 – raised several issues, which
the CA summarized as follows:

1. Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was spurious

2. Whether the Andals and Spouses Peralta were buyers in good faith and for value

3. Who among the parties were entitled to their claims for damages.4

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

On 30 May 2007, the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed judgment
setting aside the RTC Decision. The CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the
subject property showed badges of fraud or forgery against Rellama. It found that Abalon had not
parted with her ownership over the subject property despite the claim of Rellama that they both
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. As proof, the CA pointed out the existence of a notarized contract
of leasehold executed by Abalon with Ruperta Bellen on 11 June 1976. The genuineness and due
execution of the said leasehold agreement was uncontroverted by the parties. On this basis, the
appellate court concluded that Abalon could not have leased the subject parcel of land to Bellen if the
former had parted with her ownership thereof.5

The CA also found no evidence to show that Rellama exercised dominion over the subject property,
because he had not introduced improvements on the property, despite claiming to have acquired it in
1975.6 Further, the CA noted that he did not cause the annotation of the Deed of Sale, which he had
executed with Abalon, on OCT No. (O) 16. It observed that when the original copy of OCT No. (O) 16
was allegedly lost in 1976, while Rellama was on his way to Legaspi City to register the title to his
name, it took him almost 20 years to take steps to judicially reconstitute a copy thereof. To the
appellate court, these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of Rellama’s claim of ownership over
such a significant property, which was almost a hectare.7

The CA also ruled that the heirs of Bernardina Abalon had the legal standing to question the sale
transaction between Rellama and their predecessor-in-interest. It concluded that the heirs of Abalon
had acquired the subject property by ordinary acquisitive prescription and thus had every right to attack
every document that intended to divest them of ownership thereof,8 which in this case was the Deed
of Sale that Bernardina executed in favor of Rellama. Lastly, the appellate court considered the
Spouses Peralta as buyers in bad faith for relying on a mere photocopy of TCT No. 42108 when they
bought the property from Rellama.9 On the other hand, it accorded the Andals the presumption of good
faith, finding no evidence that would rebut this presumption.10

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and a new judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42482 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42821, both in
the names of Andals, are held legal and valid.

2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42254 registered in the names of Spouses Peralta is
cancelled for being null and void. Hence, they are ordered to vacate the land covered thereby
and to surrender possession thereof in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.11

The heirs of Abalon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 May 2007 Decision, insofar as the CA
declared the Andals to be buyers in good faith of the subject property and, thus, that the land title
issued in their favor was valid. Spouses Peralta, for their part, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
of the said CA Decision pertaining to the portion that declared them as buyers in bad faith which
accordingly nullified the title issued to them.
On 10 June 2008, the CA denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the movants for lack of
merit.12

On 11 August 2008, Spouses Peralta filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the 30 May 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542.13 On the same day, the
heirs of Bernardina Abalon, represented by Mansueto Abalon, filed a similar Petition questioning the
portion of the mentioned CA Decision declaring the validity of the title issued to the Andals, who were
adjudged by the appellate court as buyers in good faith.14 THE ISSUES

The Petition filed by Spouses Peralta, docketed as G.R. No. 183448, lists the following issues:

a) The case for annulment should have been dismissed because the purported Deed of Sale
executed by Abalon and Rellama was not introduced in evidence and thus, forgery was not
proven.

b) The heirs of Abalon are notforced heirs of Bernardina Abalon; hence, they do not have the
legal personality to file the action to annul the subject Deed of Sale.

c) The heirs of Abalon failed to prove that they had inherited the subject property.

d) Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith and, thus title to their portion of the subject property
must be upheld15

As for the heirs of Abalon, their Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183464, raises the following issues:

a) The Andals cannot be considered as buyers in good faith by simply applying the ordinary
presumption in the absence of evidence showing the contrary.

b) The CA erred in applying in favor of the Andals, the doctrine that a forged instrument may
become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, because Abalon
never parted with her possession of the valid and uncancelled title over the subject property

c) The CA erred in declaring the validity of the title issued in the names of the Andals, because
Rellama was bereft of any transmissible right over the portion of the property he had sold to
them.16

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions and affirm the ruling of the CA.

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether a forged instrument may become the root of a
valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in
possession of the genuine title, which is valid and has not been cancelled.

It is well-settled that "a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens
system of land registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title."17

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,18 we explained the purpose of the Torrens system and its legal
implications to third persons dealing with registered land, as follows:

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate
of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order
the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or
irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond
the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that
the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted,
public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are
now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy
purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder
once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

The Torrens system was intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of
registration, but the system cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the
registered land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. It cannot be used to
divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of transferring it to another one who has not acquired
it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens system cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner or to shield the commission of fraud or to enrich oneself at the
expense of another.19

It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is dealing with a registered parcel
of land need not go beyond the face of the title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens
and claims that are annotated on the title.20 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, which we
explained in Clemente v. Razo:21

Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the absence of any
suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing
on the face of the certificate. And, he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title.

We do acknowledge that the rule thus enunciated is not cast in stone. For, indeed, there are exceptions
thereto. Thus, in Sandoval vs. CA, we made clear the following:

The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered
land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge ofa defect or
the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into
the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses
suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit
the protection of the law.22

Thus, the determination whether one is a buyer in good faith or can be considered an innocent
purchaser for value becomes imperative. Section 55 of the Land Registration Act provides protection
to an innocent purchaser for value23 by allowing him to retain the parcel of land bought and his title is
considered valid. Otherwise, the title would be cancelled and the original owner of the parcel of land
is allowed to repossess it.

Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and
fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some
other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from
whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not
close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are
acting in good faith.24

The assailed Decision of the CA held that the Andals were buyers in good faith, while Spouses Peralta
were not. Despite its determination that fraud marred the sale between Bernardina Abalon and
Rellama, a fraudulent or forged document of sale may still give rise to a valid title. The appellate court
reasoned that if the certificate of title had already been transferred from the name of the true owner to
that which was indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have been
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, whose title is thus considered valid.25 The CA concluded
that this was the case for the Andals.

The appellate court cited Fule v. Legare26 as basis for its ruling. In the said case, the Court made an
exception to the general rule that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. A
fraudulent document may then become the root of a valid title, as it held in Fule:

Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was
able to secure a registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed
to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys
no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19). However, we have also laid down the doctrine
that there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One
such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner
to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.
For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz,
G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).

We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system,
"registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs.
50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were
otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to
insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De
Guzman vs. Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation
for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. In the end, the business community stands to
be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.

Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of John W. Legare,
and thereafter registered the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired
valid title to the house and lot here disputed. When, therefore, he transferred this title to the herein
petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code.
The registration in John W. Legare's name effectively operated to convey the properties to him.

After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under fraudulent circumstances, Rellama
succeeded in obtaining a title in his name and selling a portion of the property to the Andals, who had
no knowledge of the fraudulent circumstances involving the transfer from Abalon to Rellama. In fact,
the Decisions of the RTC and the CA show no factual findings or proof that would rebut the
presumption in favor of the Andals as buyers in good faith. Thus, the CA correctly considered them as
buyers in good faith and upheld their title.

The Abalons counter this ruling and allege that the CA erred in relying on Fuleto justify its assailed
Decision. They argue that Torres v. Court of Appeals27 is the applicable ruling, because the facts
therein are on all fours with the instant case.28

In Torres, the subject property was covered by TCT No. 53628 registered in the name of Mariano
Torres. His brother-in-law Francisco Fernandez, misrepresenting that the copy of the title had been
lost, succeeded in obtaining a court Order for the issuance of another copy of TCT No. 53628. He then
forged a simulated deed of sale purportedly showing that Torres had sold the property to him and
caused the cancellation of TCT No. 53628, as well as the issuance of TCT No. 86018 in his name.
Soon, Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota. Upon learning of the fraud committed by
Fernandez, Torres caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the former’s copy and succeeded in
having Fernandez’s title declared null and void. Meanwhile, Mota was able to foreclose on Fernandez’s
real estate mortgage, as well as to cause the cancellation of TCT No. 86018 and the issuance of a
new one– TCT No. 105953 – in her name. The issue to be resolved in Torres was whether Mota can
be considered an innocent mortgagee for value, and whether her title can be deemed valid. Ruling in
the negative, the Court explained:

There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act or omission which could
have jeopardized his peaceful dominion over his realties. The decision under review, however, in
considering Mota an innocent mortgagee protected under Section 65 of the Land Registration Law,
held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where
Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that the certificate of title issued in the
name of Mota prevails over that of Torres'. As correctly pointed out by Torres, however, his properties
were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, and hence, the purchaser thereof was bound by
his notice of adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT. Moreover, even
if We grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court
that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still
holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in a realty. The doctrine would
apply rather when, as in the cases for example of De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 [1916], Fule v. De
Legare, No. L-17951, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, and Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, April
10, 1989, the forger thru insidious means obtains the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, converts it
in his name, and subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in
such a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec.55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529).
But if the owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against the
whole world, and not that of the innocent holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" as We have said in
Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, No. L-17641, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 46, citing
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil.590, Roman Catholic Bishop v. Philippine Railway, 49 Phil. 546, Reyes v.
Borbon, 50 Phil. 791.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

We do not agree with the contention of the Abalons that the ruling in Torresis controlling in this case.
They quoted a portion in the said case that is clearly an obiter. In Torres, it was shown that Mariano
had annotated an adverse claim on the title procured by Fernandez prior to the execution sale, in
which Mota was the highest bidder. This Court declared her as a mortgagee in bad faith because, at
the back of Fernandez’s title, Torres made an annotation of the adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens. The annotation of the adverse claim was made while the forged document was still in the
name of the forger, who in this case is Fernandez. That situation does not obtain in the instant case.

The records of the RTC and the CA have a finding that when Rellama sold the properties to the Andals,
it was still in his name; and there was no annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals,
there was no doubt that Rellama was the owner of the property being sold to them, and that he had
transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus, they had every right to rely on the face
of his title alone.

The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception
thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the
forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there must be a
complete chain of registered titles.30 This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful
owner to the innocent holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly
registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Contrary to what the Abalons would
like to impress on us, Fuleand Torresdo not present clashing views. In Fule, the original owner
relinquished physical possession of her title and thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the fraud,
which resulted in the cancellation of her title and the issuance of a new one. The forged instrument
eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The new
title under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value.
Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered titles.

On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of the title, but through fraud, his
brother-in-law secured a court order for the issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name
of the forger, the original owner annotated the adverse claim on the forged instrument. Thus, before
the new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to a third person, a lien had already been
annotated on its back. The chain of registered titles was broken and sullied by the original owner’s
annotation of the adverse claim. By this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad faith.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of
the Andals. Neither were they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious
of the nature of Rellama’s ownership over the subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the CA’s ruling
that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the validity of their title to the parcel of the
land bought from Rellama must be upheld.

As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. The
appellate court made a factual finding that in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on
the photocopy of the title provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a mere photocopy of the title
should have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw in the title of Rellama,
because he was not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was supported by evidence.
The CA pointed out Spouses Peralta’s Answer to the Complaint of the Abalons in Case No. 9243 in
the RTC of Legaspi City, Branch 5. In their Answer, they specifically alleged as follows:

2- These defendants [Spouses Peralta] acquired lot No. 1679-A by purchase in good faith and
for value from Restituto Rellama under Doc. No. 11212, page No. 26, Book No. 60, Series of
1996 of Notary Public Atty. Otilio Bongon, Legaspi City on March 2, 1995 copy of which is
attached as and made part of this answer as Exhibit "1;"

3- That these defendants were handed over by Rellama xerox [sic] copy of the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42103 issued by the Register of Deed of Legaspi City on the 2nd day of
August 1995 copy attached and made integral part as Exhibit "1-A" and also Original Certificate
of Title No. (O) 16 as Exhibit "1-B"31

We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is supported by the evidence on
record. Spouses Peralta filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only
questions of law to be raised. It is a settled rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in this kind of
appeal. Under Rule 45, Section 1, "petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."32 A question of fact arises when there is "as to the truth or falsehood
of facts or when there is a need to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation."33 It is further pointed out
that "the determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which generally is
outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review."34

Whether or not Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith, is without a doubt, a factual issue. Although
this rule admits of exceptions,35 none of these applies to their case. There is no conflict between the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC and those of the CA, both of which found them to be
buyers in bad faith. The fact that they did not participate in the proceedings before the lower court
does not help their case either.

On the issue of the legal standing of the Abalons to file this case, we find that the CA correctly upheld
their standing as heirs of the deceased Bernardina Abalon. The appellate court ruled that during her
lifetime, Bernardina Abalon had promised her heirs - siblings Mansueto and Amelia - that she would
give them the subject property. A duplicate copy of OCT No. (0) 16 was delivered to them upon her
death. Thus, the CA concluded that the two siblings acquired the subject property by ordinary
prescription. Further, it deduced that the mode of transmission of the property from Bernardina to her
nephew and niece was a form of donation mortis causa, though without the benefit of a will.36 Despite
this omission, it still held that Mansueto and Amelia acquired the subject property through ordinary
acquisitive prescription because, since the death of their aunt Bernardina, they had been in possession
of the property for more than 10 years that ripened into full ownership.37

Under Article 97538 of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia Abalon are the legal heirs of
Bernardina, the latter having had no issue during her marriage. As such, they succeeded to her estate
when she passed away. While we agree with the CA that the donation mortis causa was invalid in the
absence of a will, it erred in concluding that the heirs acquired the subject property through ordinary
acquisitive prescription. The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive prescription is
not applicable.39 Upon the death of Bernardina, Mansueto and Amelia, being her legal heirs, acquired
the subject property by virtue of succession, and not by ordinary acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 183448 and 183464 are DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

NO CASE DIGEST FOUND.

_____________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 132681 December 3, 2001

RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner,

vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE REYES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of
Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of 94 square
meters, and registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of
Deeds for Manila.

The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed
of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as
donee, and two instrumental witnesses.1 The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which
states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged
that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of
the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand
margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness.2 The Acknowledgment reads:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )

QUEZON CITY ) S.S.

Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb.
1981, personally appeared CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No. 19055265
issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to me and to me known to be the same
person who executed the foregoing instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is her
own free and voluntary act and deed.

I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages, including the page on which
this acknowledgment is written, has been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental
witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand margin of page 2 and both pages have been
sealed with my notarial seal.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of Quezon, Philippines, this 20th
day of Feb., 1981.

(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC

Until December 31, 1981

(illegible)

DOC NO. 22;

PAGE NO. 6;

BOOK NO. XV;

SERIES OF 1981.

The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214
was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.

On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner
Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.

Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming
to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed
of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described
property.

On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the
Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for
the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17. Subsequently, respondents
withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo T. San Pedro and he was dropped as a party-defendant.

The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was
acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no
acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void.
Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that Violeta
was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as an adopted child, but there was no
positive evidence that the adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court found that respondents
were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the
trial court ruled that respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be registered. The trial court
rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda

Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:

1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter vivos executed on
February 20, 1981 by Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and
11-A.);

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143015
in the name of Violeta Quilala and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Estate
of Catalina Quilala;.

3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement (Exhs. B and B-1,) and the issuance by the Register of Deeds of Manila of a transfer
certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs; and

4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause
of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and
testament.4

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following

MODIFICATION:

(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of the
necessary probate proceedings by the interested parties so as not to render nugatory the right
of the lawful heirs.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on February 11,
1998.5 Hence, this petition for review, raising the following assignment of errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION OF

REAL PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS NOT REGISTRABLE.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S RULING

THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA.6

The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under
Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in
order to be valid,7 specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of
the acceptance by the donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from
accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,10 and
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be made
during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.12 It may be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document,13 and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.14

In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well as the
technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in
consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of
liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined
as "an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another,
who accepts it."16

The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the
deed, which reads:

That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation made in her favor by the
DONOR and she hereby expresses her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and
generosity of the DONOR.17

Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their
signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor,
Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her acceptance
before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of
the instrument. We disagree.

The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:

Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other voluntary

instruments, whether affecting registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with
law in the form of public instruments shall be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument
shall be signed by person or persons executing the same in the presence of at least two
witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and
deed of the person or persons executing the same before a notary public or other public officer
authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the instrument so acknowledged consists
of two or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment is written, each page of
the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not
contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page where
the signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument shall be signed on the left margin
thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses, and all the
pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated
in the acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer,
mortgage or encumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise
be set forth in said acknowledgment." (italics supplied).

As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears,
was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other
witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their
witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the
law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties.
The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been
duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the
instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.

Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of
the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of
authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed
substantially complied with.

In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also
render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument.
The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no
moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act.
In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her
acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made
in a public instrument.

It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not make a determination of whether
Violeta was the daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These issues should
be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings affecting the respective estates of
Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation, which we declare herein to be valid, will still
be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771,18 in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912
of the Civil Code. Moreover, property donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the donor's
death,19 whether the donation was made to a compulsory heir or a stranger,20 unless there is an
express prohibition if that had been the donor's intention.21

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court
of Appeals , is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered dismissing Civil Case
No. 84-26603.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST
RICKY Q. QUILALA v. GLICERIA ALCANTARA, GR No. 132681, 2001-12-03
Facts:
Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala
over a parcel of land
"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages.
first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina
Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses... second... page
contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared
before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act
and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of
Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of
Violeta Quilala and the other witness.
deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds
TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala
alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to
be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed
a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto... themselves the
above-described property.
respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo... an action for the declaration of
nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of
Violeta Quilala.
trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was
acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.
Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument,
thus rendering the... donation null and void.
trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that Violeta was
Catalina's daughter.
Violeta was referred to therein as an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that
the adoption was... legal.
trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, since it
appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents' deed of
extrajudicial settlement can not be registered.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter vivos executed on February
20, 1981 by Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied
Hence, this petition for review
Issues:
principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta
Ruling:
In the case at bar,... It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the
"love and affection which the DONEE... inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and
generosity."[15] This was sufficient cause for a donation
The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate
paragraph of the deed, which reads:
DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation made in her favor by the DONOR
and she hereby expresses her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity
of the DONOR.
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed
their signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned
only the donor, Catalina Quilala
Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure... to acknowledge her acceptance before
the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of
the instrument. We disagree.
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee
and the other witness on the right-hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting...
parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the...
falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties.
Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that
he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory.
The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate
the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in...
the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
Principles:
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public
instrument in order to be valid,[7] specifying therein the... property donated and the value of
the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee,[8] and is
perfected from the moment the... donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,[9] provided
the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the
donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,[10] and the donee... becomes
the absolute owner of the property.[11] The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the
lifetime of both the donor and the donee.[12] It may be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document,[13] and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.[14]... lack of
an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation
null and void.
The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document
in part and a public document in another
The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public
in the acknowledgment is of no moment.
In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment
only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of
donation, was made in a public... instrument.

__________________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955

ANTONINA CUEVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CRISPULO CUEVAS, Defendant-Appellee.

Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.

Teodoro P. Santiago for appellee.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled "Donacin Mortis
Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in
barrio Sinasajan, municipality of Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A). In the same
instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.

"Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument entitled "Revocacion
de Donacion Mortis Causa" (Exhibit B) purporting to set aside the preceding conveyance; and on
August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of First Instance to recover the land conveyed, on
the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor; and
(2) even it if were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it was not properly
accepted; (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own maintenance, and (c)
because the donee was guilty of ingratitute, for having refused to support the donor.

Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance denied the recovery sought, and
Antonina Cuevas thereupon appealed. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court
because, the case having been submitted on a stipulation of facts, the appellant raised only questions
of law.

The first issue tendered converns the true nature of the deed "Exhibit A"; whether it embodies a
donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis causa revocable freely by the transferor at any
time before death.
It has been rules that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a donation is "to take
effect at the death of the donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations
(Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the
controversy revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:

Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, and lupa na ipinagkakaloob
ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin and patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho, makikinabang at
ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindo ko binabawian ny buhay
ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa
kaniya.

There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor reserves to herself "the
right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I am not
deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same donor states that she "will not takle away"
(the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when I die."

The question to be decided is whetehr the donor intended to part with the title to the property
immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the donation
is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted with a disposition mortis causa, void
from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil Code, Arts.
728 and 828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 2 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568; Tuason vs. Posadas,
54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 8 July 1943).

We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the present donation is operative inter vivor
lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko nga iya-alis"
in the original) the land "because I am reserving it to him upon my death." By these words the donor
expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right essential to
full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the property in
favor of the donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such irrevocability
is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post
mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides:

ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction
of this right is void.

It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she should
retain the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably
pass to the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions heretofore discussed can be given full effect;
and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the "possession, cultivation, harvesting
and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant only the dominium utile, not the full
ownership. As the Court below correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes of ownership"
should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and
harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute
ownership she had no need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights
are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right of free
disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself.

Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid donation inter vivos, with
reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor. We may add that it is highly desirable that
all those who are called to prepare or notarize deeds of donation should call the attention of the donors
to the necessity of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the
right to control and dispose at will of the property before their death, without need of the consent or
intervention of the beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be conclusive
indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and therefore, the formalities of
testaments should be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free disposition
would place the inter vivos character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568).

The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed "merely recites that (1) the
donee has duly read all the contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its terms'; and
(3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his gratitude" but there is no show of acceptance
(Appellant's brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the donation, and at the same time
express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance, If the donee did not
accept, what had he to be grateful about? We are no longer under the formulary system of the Roman
law, when specific expressions had to be used under paid of nullity.

Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void because the donor failed to reserve
enough for ther own support. As we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived. During that time, she suffered no diminution
of income. If that was not enough to support her, the deficiency was not dur to the donation.

Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeaboe with ingratitude, because it was expressly stipulated
that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support himself, his
wife and his two children. Evidently his means did not allow him to add the donor's support to his own
burdens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance, appellant having obtained
leave to litigate as a pauper. So ordered.

CASE DIGEST
ANTONINA CUEVAS v. CRISPULO CUEVAS, GR No. L-8327, 1955-12-14

Facts:

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled "Donacion
Montis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered
land in Nueva Ecija. In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas. on May
26,1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument... purporting to set aside the preceding
conveyance... on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of First Instance to recover the...
land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked
by the donor; and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it
was not properly accepted; (b) because... the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude, for having refused to support the
donor. Court of First Instance denied the recovery. Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court...
crux of the controversy revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:

"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas m samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na ipinagkakaloob
ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabaho, makikinabang at
ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindi ko binabawian ng... buhay
ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko ñga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa
kaniya."... apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor reserves to herself "the
right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I am not
deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same donor... states that she "will not take away"
(the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when, I die." :

Issues:

whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis causa revocable freely
by the transferor at any time before death

The question to be decided 13 whether the donpr intended to part with the title to the property
immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the donation
is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted... with a disposition mortis causa, void
from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not observed

Ruling:

We agree with the Court below that the .decisive proof that the present donation is operative inter
vivos lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko ñga
iya-alis" in the priginal) the land "because I am reserving it... to him upon my death." By these words
the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in. favor of another (a right
essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked, title to
the property in favor of the... donee.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she should
retain-the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably
pass to the donee... and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the "possession,
cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant only the dominium
utile, not the full ownership. The words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be construed
ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly
enumerated in the deed.

Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership... she had no need to specify possession,
cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor would
she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that
she reserved for herself.

Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid donation inter vivos, with reservation
of beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor.

The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed "merely recites that (1) the
donee has duly read all the contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its terms'; and
(3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his... gratitude" but there is no show of acceptance
(Appellant's brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect.the terms of the donation, and at the same time
express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance.

Also unmeritorious is the contention that the donation is void because the donor failed to reserve
enough for her own support. As we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived.

Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude, because it was expressly stipulated that
the donee had a total income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support himself, his wife
and his two children. Evidently his means did not allow him to add the... donor's support to his own
burdens.

Principles:

neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a donation is "to take effect at the death of
the donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs. Mata

As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such irrevocability is characteristic of
donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem. Witness
article 828 of the New Civil

Code, that provides:

"Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction
of this right is void."... it is highly desirable that all those who are called to prepare or notarize deeds...
of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity of clearly specifying whether,
notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property
before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of the... beneficiary, since the express
reservation of such right would be conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's
death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments should be observed; while, a converso, the express
waiver of the right of free... disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation beyond
dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals