Additional Cases under PD 705
Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by
CASE NO. 11
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the
Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002
Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner)
for violation of Section 68,3 Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),4 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003
denied admission of petitioner's motion for reconsideration.5
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon,
Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,
for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside
a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over
which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims
ownership.6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco
learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco
reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil.
On 24 December 1998,7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with
Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree,
petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the
permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought
the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de
retro sale.
Calix's wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester
Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez
confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier
claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calix's permission. Hernandez
ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had
converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR
employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw
that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez
took custody of the lumber,9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and
issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled
tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted
an investigation on the matter.10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section
68 of PD 705, as amended. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner
submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree
with Calix's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor11 found probable cause
to indict petitioner and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including
Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on the events leading to
the discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as
the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had no part
in the tree-cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty
as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered
the seizedlumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.12 The trial court dismissed
petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions
that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With
this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court
held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial.
Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and
not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the
penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's
favor.13 The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner
is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod
Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing
irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR
forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation
by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of
its ruling, sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of
Appeals held that "the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution
dated 14 May 2003, did not admit his motion for having been filed late.15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED
PROHIBITING THE CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND
REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM
ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN
PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-
COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY
SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE
CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING AUTHORITY
COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS
AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-
COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS
AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING
OF THE SAME.16
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
countered that (1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even
though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed the complaint
against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint filed by
Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised
Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified
individuals,18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction
from trying such cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation
and other crimes against chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68
of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705
provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of
the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the
presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized
officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the
forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly
committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the
report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or
report, the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary
complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to
conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file
an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and
complaints" in Section 80 refers to "reports and complaints as might be
brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers
or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed
in their presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to
Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private
citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez
cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there
is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."23 At any rate,
Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the
Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its
part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as
the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.24
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD 705,
provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land
without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered,
collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private
land28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever,
should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]
timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence
showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or
removing" but only the act of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case
hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x xtimber" in the Mayod
Property without a DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property
without a DENR permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his
trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra
tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission.
However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question.
We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions
bind him.30 Petitioner does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public
officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the
stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that
the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further,
petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization to Royo and
Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property.
Petitioner has no use of Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the
trial, he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod
Property constitutes "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD
705 does not define "timber," only "forest product" (which circuitously
includes "timber.")31 Does the narra tree in question constitute "timber"
under Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber"
in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed
log."32 In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with
specified dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation age."34 In Mustang
Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar task
of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine
whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling
in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or
common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of
the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the
market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far
as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we.36 x
x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68
cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or
suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or
tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables,
or chairs cannot be considered timber.38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted
the same into "several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6
and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x." These
measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez
issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in
evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled
log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the
big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was
2.8 meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to
lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls
under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified
Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of
the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall
be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional
in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is
over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5
pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the
theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
. SO ORDERED.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under
the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber
measuring 111 board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of
the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the amount increases
to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on
Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension
receipt he issued, are his "estimates" based on "prevailing local price."41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken
for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the
RPC, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated
"estimate" of such fact.42 In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty
under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here,
the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's
evidence for the lumber's value consisted of an estimate made by the
apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was
compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not
presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the
minimum penalty under Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner,
under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the
Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification
that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
CASE NO. 12
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Regional Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VIII, Tacloban
City, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police officers of the
Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe
while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and
logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the
alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists
against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the
owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge
alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut
forest products violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A1and Administrative Order No. 59,
Series of 1990.2 Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority
to order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the
complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for
appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office.
In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the
preliminary investigation, he found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is
principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of
hollow blocks. On his way home after delivering hollow blocks in Barangay
Sto. Niño II, he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced lumber
and deliver the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be used for the
construction of a barangay high school building. They were apprehended
when the truck had a flat tire. After changing the tire, both the lumber and
the truck were ordered deposited at the police station of Hinunangan.
Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the
crime of illegal logging and, being a mere accessory, he might be utilized by
the Acting Chief of Police as prosecution witness against Cabig. More
importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig, respondent
Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of the
truck owned by Golpe.
The Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator recommended
that a formal investigation be conducted. An excerpt from its Memorandum
states:
We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. While
he is authorized to conduct preliminary investigation in all
cases of violations of P.D. 705, as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Sec.
68-A thereof provides that it is the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative who may order the
confiscation and disposition of the forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on
the matter.
There may be some facts that are not extant in the records
which can only come out during a formal investigation to
better establish clear culpability or exoneration over the
respondent.
In view thereof, and to give respondent an opportunity to
clear himself, it is respectfully recommended that this matter
be referred to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr.,
 RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty days
from receipt of the records.3
In the Resolution of November 8, 1993, the Court resolved to refer the case
to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San
Juan, Southern Leyte, for investigation, report and recommendation, within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.4
During the first two hearing dates, complainant was unable to attend but sent
his representatives, DENR lawyer Constantino Esber and legal assistant
Romeo Gulong. Respondent Judge appeared with his counsel. However, on
the third hearing date, respondent Judge failed to appear as he suffered a
stroke and was hospitalized. Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber manifested
that their office has filed a motion for reinvestigation and for the turnover of
the jeep to the PNP and subsequently, to the DENR. He also manifested
that the complainant is submitting the administrative matter for resolution
and recommendation without adducing evidence against respondent.
Respondent's counsel did not object to complainant's manifestation. The
counsel of both complainant and respondent jointly agreed to submit the
case for appropriate action.
The Investigating Judge's confidential report, in part, states:
In view of this development in the course of an intended
investigation this investigator could not elicit additional facts
than are found in the records, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory. Respondent was given an opportunity to
explain the unfavorable circumstances against him but he
was overtaken by a serious illness. So much was expected
from the complainant to supply the facts not extant in the
records, but he lost interest in substantiating his April 1993
report to the Supreme Court. In fact, he was submitting this
administrative matter for resolution without adducing
evidence against respondent.
Except for the 21 January 1994 motion for reinvestigation of
DENR counsel Esber which sought for the inclusion of jeep
owner and driver Dionisio Golpe in the criminal information,
there is nothing new that can be added to the facts found by
the Honorable Deputy Court Administrator as reflected in his
Memorandum for the Honorable Chief Justice dated 12
October 1993.
There being no actual investigation conducted, no additional
facts could be reported and consequently, there is no basis
for a recommendation on the basis of facts.
This investigator can only recommend appropriate action by
the Supreme Court on the basis of the facts already extant
in the records with a prayer for consideration of respondent
plight especially so since on account of this investigation his
health has deteriorated and may affect his efficiency output
as a judge. Perhaps, allowing him to bow out of the service
with honor and corresponding benefits.5
During the pendency of this case, respondent Judge filed for disability
retirement. His application was approved but his pension was not released
pending the outcome of this case.
We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by
Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any
disciplinary sanction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very
penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which
it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds and
instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense."
In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber,
cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not
indicted. Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge not to
release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705,
Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly
authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained
or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws.
However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in
relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.
We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he harmony of nature"7 in order to preserve our natural resources for the benefit
conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied himself that there was of the generations still to come.
no reason to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705
and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation SO ORDERED.
proceedings under Adm. Order No. 596 is different from the confiscation Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in
the event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized
again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the CASE NO. 13
truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as
manifested before the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. FIRST DIVISION
Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the
conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any
criminal action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any person ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448
who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense." Petitioner,
Present:
Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances, respondent Judge PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
should have turned over the truck to the Community Environment and CARPIO,
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte for CORONA,
appropriate disposition. No doubt, this would have simplified matters and - versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
prevented the present situation from occurring wherein one government BERSAMIN, JJ.
official files a complaint against another. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No.
59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices, deputized military
personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field Respondent. July 27, 2009
offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
and disposition. A period of about two weeks lapsed from the time the
seizure was made before a complaint was filed. During this period, the DECISION
apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs and the truck
to the nearest DENR field office for proper action and disposition since the CARPIO, J.:
duty to turn over the truck to the nearest DENR field office rests on the
The Case
officials apprehending the illegal logs. There being no mandatory duty on
the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be visited
with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 June 1997
office in San Juan, Southern Leyte. Decision[2] and 24 September 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National Police, the DENR, The Antecedent Facts
the prosecutors, and the members of the bench to coordinate with each
other for a successful campaign against illegal logging. It behooves all the On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the
concerned agencies to seriously strive for the attainment of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application
constitutionally-declared policy to "protect and advance the right of the to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be
used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.

On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team
composed of members from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger
of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks
Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be
cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued
a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and
conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the
permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine
seedlings in an appropriate place within the area. In the absence of
plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant within forest
area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly
maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of
the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under
Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of
forestry laws and regulations shall render this permit null and void without
prejudice to the imposition of penalties in accordance with existing laws
and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from
issuance hereof or as soon as the herein authorized volume is exhausted
whichever comes first.[4]
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel
Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis
received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp
without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found
Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng
supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto
Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site, together with
Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also
supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps,
out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees
cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut
without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut
without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab,
Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto,
in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
aiding one another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total
volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd.
ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge
of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp,
Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the
aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit
as he was not given a copy of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine
trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession of
the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about
four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was
cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He
stated that petitioner was in possession of the permit. He stated that he cut
10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two were stumps and two
were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as
sawyers and they merely followed petitioners instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees
to be cut before the permit was issued. He stated that the trees cut by
Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July
1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the trees in petitioners
presence.

Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees
at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he
was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still
supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map
used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not
prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and
Santiago were accompanied by three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO
AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO
SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25,
representing the market value of and forest charges on the Benguet pine
trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby
declared forfeited in favor of the Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and
MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de
oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional liberty in the
amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated
February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released
to them upon proper receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number
of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting
of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts
Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial
courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The
accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby
acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found guilty,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award
of damages is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the
CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and
to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit which only
he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp
which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a
bolder action by his fear of Santiago because petitioner could have informed
his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of Appeals further rejected
petitioners contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without
permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were
not covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently
proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution failed to
prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals
likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders as to
which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
 The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied
because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not questions of
law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[10] For questions to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants.[11] The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[12]
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of
PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest
Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of
PD 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[13]
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather,
collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise
the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered,
collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68
of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber
was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be
convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused
were acquitted of the charges against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to
restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered by the
permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his
superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only
make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict
him under Section 68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section
68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or
corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in
possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997
Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 17534.Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge
of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 14
MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.
FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of foresters
and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In
the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard
the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with
its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because
of the refusal of the owner.
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from
Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date
from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings,
and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000
board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is
different from timber
HELD:
No, The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no
definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q)
of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant."
Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the
1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the
market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's

lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume
of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand
the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets,
and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to
prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession

of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against
him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.
CASE NO. 15
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008
AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and
arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of
abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to
petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the
seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section
68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in
the morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province
of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck
bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products,
particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine
Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume
of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with
an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred
Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without any
authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial
on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable
doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The
dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with
respect to accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt,
and MODIFIED with respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa
and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.5
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He
alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of
the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.
We deny the petition.
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because
Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the
seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was
loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and
Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the
truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's)
exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The
acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of
timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of
the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that
Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
on Taopa. temporal in its minimum period.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators.
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified
theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or
other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the
medium period11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods
or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days
of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere
between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22
years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

Articles 309 and 310 read: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008
decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: CR No. 30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado
Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law.
be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten SO ORDERED.
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)

2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by

the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber

was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable
penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods
or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years
plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa

shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case,
the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14
CASE NO. 16 of lumber indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany
valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from Potencio.[5] Later on, petitioner
SECOND DIVISION was arrested, but Potencios whereabouts had been unknown since the time
of the seizure[6] until he surfaced on 3 January 1998.[7]
GALO MONGE, G.R. No. 170308
Petitioner,
Present: An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City,
Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 68[8] of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[9] as amended by Executive Order
CARPIO, (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997. The inculpatory portion of the information
Acting Chairperson, reads:
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,* That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 oclock in
TINGA, and the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within
VELASCO, JR., JJ. the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating with each other, without any authority of law, nor
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, armed with necessary permit/license or other documents, with intent to gain,
Respondent. Promulgated: did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, transport and have in
March 7, 2008 their possession three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with
a[n] appropriate volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x (0.18) cubic meter with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the DENR in the aforesaid amount.
RESOLUTION
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
TINGA, J.:

At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative

This is a Petition for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails the Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his conviction as well
as the discharge of accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.
The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner
and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in
possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in
Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then,
the tanods demanded that they be shown the requisite permit and/or
authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce
any.[3] Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was
brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO).[4] The DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces
plea.[11]
Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the
circumstances of the apprehension but for failing to appear in court for cross
examination, his testimony was stricken out.[12] On 16 January
1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of
the prosecutor.[13] Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the
arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely requested by
petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from
the mountain. Potencios testimony was materially corroborated by
Molina.[14] Petitioner did not contest the allegations, except that it was not he
but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to
what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring
the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into
pieces.[15]

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was
imposed nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years
and eight (8) months of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods
and ordered to pay the costs.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he
challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that
the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no
absolute necessity for his testimony.[17] The appellate court dismissed this
challenge and affirmed the findings of the trial court.However, it modified the
penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8) months
of prision mayor as maximum.[18] His motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence the present appeal whereby petitioner reiterates his challenge against
the discharge of Potencio.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
Petitioner and Potencio were
caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession of,
processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR.
Petitioner has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself
from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who
requested his assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and in
transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is
unavailing.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277,
criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting,
gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents required under existing laws
and regulations.[19] DENR Administrative Order No. 59
series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber
and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the
transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly
issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products may
be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second
offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere
possession of forest products without the requisite documents
consummates the crime.[20]
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner
and Potencio of the subject mahogany lumber and their subsequent failure
to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has already given
rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the
second act punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of
Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the circumstances surrounding
the apprehension well establishes petitioners liability. Petitioner cannot take
refuge in his denial of ownership over
the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in his claim that his help
was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in
transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that
punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions
under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as
defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches
once the prohibited acts are committed.[21] In other words, mere possession
of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even
absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal.[22] It would therefore make no
difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the
subject pieces of lumber.
Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing
less than petitioners guilt of the offense charged, there is no cogent reason
to reverse his conviction.
Petitioners challenge against Potencios discharge as a state
witness must also fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine that
the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is left to the
exercise of the trial courts sound discretion[23] limited only by
the requirements set forth in Section 17,[24] Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be
the least guilty and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his
testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being
competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial
court with respect this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the
appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion.[25] No such
grave abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to
the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they cannot
be addressed for the first time on appeal.[26]
 Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused CASE NO. 17
from the information in order that he may testify for the prosecution has the SECOND DIVISION
effect of an acquittal.[27]Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any
future development showing that any or all of the conditions provided in RODOLFO TIGOY, G.R. No. 144640
Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal Petitioner,
consequence of an acquittal.[28] Any witting or unwitting error of the Present:
prosecution, therefore, in moving for the discharge and of the court in PUNO, J., Chairperson,
granting the motionno question of jurisdiction being involvedwill not deprive - versus SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his right against CORONA,
double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged AZCUNA, and
accused because he would then be faulted for a failure attributable to the GARCIA, JJ.
prosecutor. It is inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal COURT OF APPEALS AND
policy of placing the fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of anyone PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
who may handle the prosecution.[29] Indeed, the only instance where the Respondents.
testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he June 26, 2006
deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his
commitment,[30] as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
his commitment and for that reason, petitioners challenge against his
discharge must be dismissed. DECISION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of AZCUNA, J.:
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
SO ORDERED. assailing the decision and resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and August 23,
2000, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864
entitled People of the Philippines v. Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy,
acquitting Nestor Ong for insufficiency of evidence, while convicting Rodolfo
Tigoy for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The facts of the case are as follows:

On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the

trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly introduced by his
friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent
the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao
del Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered
into between Ong and Bertodazo, the salient portions of which state:

1. That the party of the First Part is an owner of Cargo Trucks

with place of business at Iligan City;
 2. That the party of the Second Part is a businessman dealing
in buy and sell of General Merchandise, dry goods and construction
materials;
3. That the party of the Second Part will engage the services
of the two (2) cargo trucks of the party of the First Part;
4. That the services agreed upon should be rendered by the
party of the First Part on August 3, 1993 from Larapan, Linamon, Lanao
del Norte to Dipolog City for an agreed amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) Pesos per truck or a total of TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency for the carriage of cement and
other merchandise owned by the party of the Second Part;
5. That any legal controversy involving the cargo or of and
when the cargo trucks are not actually used for the purpose herein
stipulated, it is agreed that the same is the sole responsibility of the party
of the Second Part without any liability of the party of the First Part.[1]
In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor
Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy who had been employed by him
as truck drivers for two (2) years and ten (10) years, respectively, to
bring the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte
which is about fifteen (15) minutes away from Iligan City. He instructed
the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the
construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for
the trip to Dipolog City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang
and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four
oclock in the morning the next day. When they arrived, the trucks had
been laden with bags of cement and were half-covered with
canvas.[2] Before departing, they allegedly checked the motor oil, water,
engine and tires of the trucks to determine if the same were in good
condition.
That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico Lacay Tome
(then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City), while escorting Provincial
Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with
the members of the Special Operation Group, received a dispatch from the
466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City,
informing him that two trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, that
were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint. Upon
receiving the report, Tome, along with PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3
Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to
intercept the two trucks at Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City.[3]
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in uniform among
the police officers, flagged down the two trucks but the same just sped away
and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol
vehicle, they chased the trucks and overtook the same at Barangay
Manabay. They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the two trucks to
stop.
According to Senior Inspector Tome, he asked the driver who had alighted
from the green truck why he did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did
not answer. When he inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver
replied that there is S.O.P, which means grease money in street
parlance.[4] This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded
with hot items.
Meanwhile, the blue truck which had been speeding behind the green truck
and was being driven by Sumagang was intercepted by PO3 Real. Upon
inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the
cement bags in both trucks. Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit for the
lumber but the latter could not produce any.
The drivers were brought and turned over to the investigator at the City Hall
in Ozamis City. The truckmen, namely, Felix Arante and Doro Lopez, and
another passenger whom Tigoy identified as Lolong Bertodazo, who were
riding with them in the trucks, were not investigated. According to Nuqui,
they did not notice that the group had left. It was later learned that they were
instructed by Sumagang to inform Nestor Ong of the incident.
Afterwards, the group of Tome proceeded back to the ICC Arts Center and
informed the Provincial Director of the apprehension. Meanwhile, the
drivers, Tigoy and Sumagang, were detained at the Ozamis City Police
Station while Arante and Lopez were released.[5]
Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Community and Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),[6] after receiving a call from the Ozamis
City Police Station that two trucks were apprehended transporting sawn
lumber without a permit and were brought to the City Hall, sent Rolando
Dingal, Forester of the DENR, together with Teodoro Echavez, Juanito
Taruc and Lucio Penaroya, to investigate.
Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the registration papers
of the two trucks and appearing therein was the name of Nestor Ong as the
owner. After ascertaining that the sawn lumber loaded on the two trucks did
not have supporting documents, Dingal and his companions scaled the
subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet. Loaded in the blue Nissan ten-
wheeler truck were 229 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 6,232.46
board feet; and, in the green Isuzu eight-wheeler truck, 333 pieces of lumber
with a total volume of 5,095.5 board feet.[7] Consequently, the lumber and
the vehicles were seized upon the order of the DENR Regional Executive
Director.[8]
On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong,
Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest
products without legal permit, thus:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1993 at Barangay Catadman,
Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, for a common design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally possess and transport without
the necessary legal documents nor permit from the lawful authorities, sawn
dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany), in the following manner, to wit:
accused Nestor Ong, being the owner of 2 ten wheeler trucks with Plate
Nos. GDA-279 and PNH-364 facilitated and allowed the use and transport
of above-stated sawn [lumber] from Larapan, Lanao del Norte, but
intercepted by the PNP authorities in Ozamiz City; while the accused Lolong
Bertodazo facilitated the loading and transport of said sawn lumbers, while
accused Nestor Sumagang y Lacson drove the Nissan 10 wheeler cargo
truck bearing Plate No. GDA-279 which was loaded with 333 pieces of said
sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes
equivalent [to] 5,095.5 board feet which was concealed under piled bags of
cement, which lumbers [were] valued at P134, 242.36; while accused
Rodolfo Tigoy drove the 8 wheeler Isuzu truck bearing Plate No. ONH-364,
which was loaded and transported with 229 pieces of sawn dipterocarp
lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent to 6,232.46
board feet which was concealed under piled bags of cement which lumbers
[were] valued at P92,316.77 or total value of P226,559.13, without,
however, causing damage to the government, inasmuch as the aforestated
lumbers were recovered.
CONTRARY to Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code.[9]
Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the
arraignment. Sumagang died after the case was filed while the other co-
accused, Lolong Bertodazo, was not arrested and has remained at large.
On October 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy [GUILTY]
beyond reasonable doubt of possession of dipterocarp lumber [VALUED] at
more than P22,000.00 without the legal documents as required by existing
laws and regulations, penalized as qualified theft, this Court sentences them
to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to eighteen (18) years and three (3) months of reclusion temporal.
The lumber and the conveyances used are forfeited in favor of the
government. With costs.
The DENR is ordered to sell/dispose of the lumber and conveyances in
accordance with the existing laws, WITHOUT DELAY. Let the Court of
Appeals, Fourteenth Division, before which accused Ongs appeal of this
Courts denial of his action for replevin relative to his trucks is pending, be
furnished with a copy of this judgment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Declaring that constructive possession of unlicensed lumber is not within the
contemplation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, and for failure by the
prosecution to prove the complicity of Ong, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on March 6, 2000 modifying the ruling of the lower
court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that
accused-appellant Nestor Ong is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and
his two (2) trucks are ordered returned to him. The conviction of Rodolfo
Tigoy is upheld and the decision dated October 11, 1996 is AFFIRMED in
all respects.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On March 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Reconsideration praying for his acquittal but the same was denied
on August 23, 2000.
Hence, this petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I officers in flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING COLLUSION BETWEEN
LOLONG BERTODAZO AND PETITIONER TIGOY;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING
THE AFFIDAVIT OF LOLONG BERTODAZO AGAINST HIS PENAL
INTEREST;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER TIGOY TO
HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE LUMBER HE WAS TRANSPORTING; AND,
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
TIGOY HAD ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
UNDOCUMENTED LUMBER.[12]
Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or not petitioner Tigoy
is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without the
necessary permit in violation of the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. . . .
There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting,
gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license;
and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required
legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a
permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang
and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police
from Larapan to Dipolog City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo
as he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed
that what he was transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract
between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo
loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.
This contention by petitioner, however, was not believed by the lower
court. In declaring that petitioner connived with Bertodazo in transporting the
subject lumber, the court a quo noted:
x x x The evidence of the prosecution established that the two drivers of
accused Ong refused to stop at a checkpoint, a fact admitted by both in their
affidavit, Exhs. E and E-2. Likewise, the two drivers refused to stop on the
national highway near a bus terminal when required by a uniformed
policeman. When finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome
identified as the driver of the green truck, Sumagang, but who actually was
Tigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to the road
block first, being the lead driver) offered S.O.P. which to witness Tome
meant that the trucks were carrying hot items.
Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they fear
inspection of their cargo? Why would S.O.P. (which in street parlance is
grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only
logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers knew that they were
carrying contraband lumber. This Court believes that the drivers had
knowledge of the fact that they were transporting and were in possession of
undocumented lumber in violation of law.[13]
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is
prohibited by a special law such as in the present case, the commission of
the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the
intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done
knowingly and consciously.[14]
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to
prove conspiracy.[15] Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial
evidence.[16] It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by
which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.[17] It is not even required that the participants have an
agreement for an appreciable period to commence it.[18]
Petitioners actions adequately show that he intentionally participated in the
commission of the offense for which he had been charged and found guilty
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Finding that petitioners conviction was reached without arbitrariness and
with sufficient basis, this Court upholds the same. The Court accords high
respect to the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the
evidence of the parties as well as its conclusions[19] especially when these
are in agreement with those of the Court of Appeals, which is the case here.
As a matter of fact, factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally final and conclusive.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution,
dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 18
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000]
PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. Spped
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming
petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of 68 [2] of
the Revised Forestry Code[3] (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally
cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice
milling and trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided
the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a
warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw.
As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner
produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag,
Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however,
give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit
to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber
were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill
operator. Jo spped
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted
29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day,
September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces
measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE
stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order[4] was
served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company,
but he refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber.
Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza,
who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the
operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was
filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the
motion was denied.[5] Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated.
By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As
before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders
issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel
Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president
of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were
charged with violation of 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended. The Information
alleged:[6]
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior
thereto at the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation
Compound, municipality of Valencia, province of Bukidnon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess
2,115 pieces [of] lumber of different dimensions in the total
volume of 29,299 .25 board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic
meters with an estimated value of FOUR HUNDRED
EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine
Currency, without any authority, license or legal documents
from the government, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the amount of P488,334.45.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994,
judgment was rendered as follows:[7]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Perfecto Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having in their possession
timber products worth of P488,334.45 without the legal
documents as charged in the information in violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended and are,
therefore, each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN
(10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of Reclusion temporal as maximum. The lumber
subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the
government. Spped jo
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED
for lack of evidence against them.
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which,
on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko
for lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the
seized lumber.[8]
Hence this petition which raises the following issues:[9]
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER PALLADA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE
PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S
POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR
FLITCHES.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PRESENCE OF
 ERASURES IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN
RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE.
First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as
summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal:[10]
1. Exh. 6 - Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated
December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent to
12.23 cubic meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del
Sur of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken
from the forest area of Wahab and H.D. Pangcoga
Exh. 6-A - Auxiliary InvoiceMiso
Exh. 6-B - Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for
short)
Exh. 6-C - Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463
pieces of lumber equivalent to 5,056.94 board feet
Exh. 6-D - Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from
WHP Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the
Corporation for the lumber mentioned in Exh. "6-C"
Exh. 6-F - Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP
Enterprises, dated December 16, 1991, for the 5,056.94
board feet of lumber
Exh. 6-D-1 - [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above
2. Exh. 7 - CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent
to 25.4 cubic meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain
Somira M. Ampuan in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM
Exh. 7-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 7-B - CTA
Exh. 7-C - Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961
pieces of lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet
Exh. 7-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation
issued by SMA Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992
Exh. 7-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to
Somira M. Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991
Exh. 7-F - Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the
Corporation in payment to SMA Trading Company for
10,758.02 board feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992
3. Exh. 8 - CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an
equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area
of Wahab Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February
25, 1992
Exh. 8-A - Auxiliary InvoiceNex old
Exh. 8-B - CTA
Exh. 8-C - Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber
Exh. 8-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation
issued by WHP Enterprises,
Exh. 8-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 8-F - Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for
8,024.99 board feet of lumber issued by the Corporation
payable to WHP Enterprises
4. Exh. 9 - CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent
volume of 12.24 cubic meters from licensee Somira M.
Ampuan of Lama Lico, Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned
to the Corporation, (undated). Stamped "Release 3/2/92"
Exh. 9-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 9-B - CTA, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-C - Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992
 Exh. 9-D - Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading
Company to the Corporation, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 9-F - Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189
board feet of lumber
Exh. 9-D-1 - Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"
The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of
Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company
should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.[11] For indeed, as BFD
Circular No. 10-83[12] states in pertinent parts: Mani kx
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . .
and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the
attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which
form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as
accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD
officers. . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required
shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and
as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in
accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing
guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore,
the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been
considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the
lumber.[13] In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[14]
The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber
is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces
lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the
phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705
means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the
documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess
lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether
separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber.
Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and
non-timber forest products.[15] As already noted, the opening paragraph of
BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate
certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability
and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in
documenting the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute
for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and
defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial
court:[16]
Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of
flitches, the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the
Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash
Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . . Maniks
In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420
pieces of log, respectively. But the supporting documents
describe the forest product[s] as lumber.
The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions
678 pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also
states the same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed
the "mistake" of mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice
and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written down and
enclosed in parenthesis.
The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]
The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic)
Cagayan de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A")
mentions Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation as the
consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page) that
the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact,
the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.
In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name
of the consignee was clearly erased and changed to
 "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".
In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the
name and address of the consignee was smudged with a
typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was
originally typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked
Exh. "9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh.
"[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]".[17]
Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly
accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in
blank. Manikan
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7
bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were
"scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is
dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes
and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut
lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when
the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches
and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.[18]
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they
are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court
in giving no credence to the same.[19]
It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be
taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber dealers.
In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being
public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their
execution.[20]
This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal
effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may
not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case,
as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner
should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken
steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert
that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.[21]
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the
CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The
presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents
are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished.[22]
Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised
Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, 68, provides:
ART. 309. Penalties.- Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by: Oldmis o
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000
pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. . . .
As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,[23] the penalty to be imposed should be six (6)
years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31,
1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to
six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur. Ncm
CASE NO. 19
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant
PUNO, J.:p
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705 1 as amended by Executive
Order (E.O.) 277. 2
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz,
a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded
with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said
information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several
times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. 3
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and
SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the
morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue
and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate
number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at
the Marcos Bridge. 4
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao,
accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver
identified accused- appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo. 5
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs.
When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were
sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. 6
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting
documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of
transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and
(5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut
slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents . All he
could show was a certification 7 from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally
acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate
transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 7
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task
Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the
members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under
the coconut slabs. 9
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force,
together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination
confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile
lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing
the tanguile lumber. 10 When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled
the seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces
of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic
meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50. 11
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
owner of an I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No.
PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and
custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products
chainsawn lumber (species of Tanguile) with a total volume
of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued
in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft.,
necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the
proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of
the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
 CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he
acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the
trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa 13 and
Elpidio Sabal. 14 The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose
timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the
tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa
and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment
for his hauling services. 15
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of
lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an
illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber
and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive
portion of the Decision 16 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277 and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the
accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for
the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile
specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-
548 which was used in the commission of the crime are
hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of
errors: 18
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section
68, PD 705 as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations on the
ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first
time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are
no existing forest laws and regulations which required
certain legal documents for possession of timber and other
forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation
of the constitutional rights of accused against unlawful
searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation
of the constitutional rights of accused under custodial
investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be
convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which
amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other
forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
 penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(emphasis supplied).
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer
to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the
enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would
render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to
the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations
existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR
Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required
for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of
logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products
and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities
shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin,
issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the
succeeding sections.
xxx xxx xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport
of lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF
LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly
authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the
processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber
firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be
valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet
or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales
invoice.
xxx xxx xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present
any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court
found:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . When apprehended by the police officers, the accused
admittedly could not present a single document to justify his
possession of the subject lumber. . . .
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by
the police offices, he readily showed documents to justify his
possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a
certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger,
of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E")
and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering
the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut.(Exhibit
"F").
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994
states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1)
truckload of coconut slabs to be transported
by Mr.Wilson Que on board truck bearing
Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from
matured coconut palms gathered inside the
private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under
OCT No. P-11614(8) located at
Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of
facilitating the transportation of said coconut
slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid
up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of
its cargoes at its final destination, whichever
comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given
permit by the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was
apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with
coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well.
Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside.
The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless
the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and
rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the
accused was very much aware that he needed documents
to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure
one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the
same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police
authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged
letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO
Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the
CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on
March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto.
Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason
that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber.
(Exhibits "8", "8-A").
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by
CENRO on March 4, 1994, the Court has doubts that this
was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the
accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and
returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then
informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not
identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber
because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and ".
. . came from PLTP." (Ibid) The letter-request was returned
to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates
doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or other
papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a
government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person
files or submits any document to a government agency, the
agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate
copy to show that he has filed such document with the
agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of
the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the
letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance.
Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked
about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who
returned the letter-request to him answered that he could
recognize the person ". . . but they were already reshuffled."
(TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused
also said that he did not know if that person was an
employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last
paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of
Transport Agreement in view of the fact that
I am hauling and transporting my own
lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same
as his certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was
telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes
from a polluted source. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any
documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of
P.D. 705.
We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession
of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he
proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest
products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished
under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
 (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by
presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether
or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277
considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the
seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous
tree". Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation
of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as
his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was
summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista, 20 thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be
stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a
search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be
found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence
obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall,
among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had
been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of
evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in
the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to
search appellant's truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal
Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos
Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were
patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck
described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge,
accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there
were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers
asked for the lumber's supporting documents, accused-appellant could not
present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the
existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of
appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to
prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether
appellant's right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The
Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
CASE NO. 20
EN BANC
LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.), A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen.
Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G.
W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.
On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National
Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV
General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans
containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The
shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid
inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).[1]
On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives
from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the
container vans at a port in MandaueCity, Cebu. The team discovered the
undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and
consignees:
Container Van No. Shipper Consignee
NCLU 2000492-22GI Polaris Chua Polaris Chua
IEAU 2521845-2210 Polaris Chua Polaris Chua
NOLU 2000682-22GI Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot
INBU 3125757-BB2210 Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot
NCLU 20001591-22GI Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez
GSTU 339074-US2210 Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez
CRXU 2167567 Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
NCLU 2001570-22GI Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of
origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest
products, as required by DENRAdministrative Order No. 07-94. Gen.
Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a
reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and,
on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a
seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc.[2]
On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to
NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the government
should not confiscate the forest products.[3] In an affidavit[4] dated 9
February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.s Branch Manager Alex Conrad
M. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the government should
not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had
no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans.
On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer
Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin
boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown
owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February
2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the
adjudication.[5] In a resolution[6] dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting as
adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director
Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the
government.
In a complaint[7] dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge
Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin
be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and
others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment
be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued
a writ of replevin[8] ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession
of the forest products.
In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,[9] the defendants DENR,
CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside:
(1) Edmas bond was insufficient; (2) the forest products were falsely
declared as cassava meal and corn grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-
interest; (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal document;(5)
nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time; (6)
the forest products were already considered abandoned; (7) the forest
products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper; (9) courts could not take cognizance
of cases pending before the DENR; (10) Edma failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (11) the DENR was the agency responsible for
the enforcement of forestry laws. In a motion to dismiss ad
cautelam[10] dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the complaint
for replevin and damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative
remedies; (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and (4) Edma
failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the
forest products.
In an order[11] dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the
motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit.
Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an
affidavit-complaint[12] dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with
gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. Gen. Dagudag
stated that:
During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest
partiality in favor of x x x Edma. DENRs counsel was lambasted, cajoled and
intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as SHUT UP and
THATS BALONEY.
xxxx
Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood
shipment from the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies
available to him. The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have done was
to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
xxxx
[Judge Paderangas] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin
suit, issuing the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to
quash clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law.
In its 1st Indorsement[13] dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed
Judge Paderanga to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In his
comment[14] dated 6 September 2005, Judge Paderanga stated that he
exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin and that he could
not delve into the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they were related
to a case pending before him.
In its Report[15] dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge
Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3) used
inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended that the case be
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge Paderanga be
held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Section 6,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary;[16] and that he be fined P30,000.
In its Resolution[17] dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case
as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the
pleadings already filed. Judge Paderanga manifested his willingness to
submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed.[18] Since
Gen. Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court considered him to
have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006 Resolution.[19]
The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the
law and for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry
laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be
the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the countrys natural resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products without the
required legal documents is punishable.Section 68-A states that the DENR
Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation
of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or
abandoned.
In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC
Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were
abandoned by the unknown owner.Consequently, the DENR seized the
forest products.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three
reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court held that:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless
the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the
proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and
correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum. (Emphasis ours)
In Dy v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court
of Appeals,[22] the Court held that:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity
to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy
should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is
susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative
remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and
damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states
that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development
Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of
the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot
review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,[23] the Court held that all actions
seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be
directed to that agency not the courts. In Paat,[24] the Court held that:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of
replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a
condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
xxxx
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to
question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in
pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of
the said law is explicit that actions taken by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement
of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of
DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except
through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. (Emphasis ours)
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special
competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of
forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members
of DENRs Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and
brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had
custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have
been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed
outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan[25] a case with a similar set of facts as
the instant case the Court held that:
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized
by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the
NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR for official disposition and
appropriate action. x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have been
sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized
items and that administrative proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for
respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit
outright. (Emphasis ours)
In Paat,[26] the Court held that:
[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial
court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes
an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. (Emphasis ours)
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be
the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code
and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub
v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the
DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure
was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were validly
deemed in custodia legis. [They]could not be subject to an action for
replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of
issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the
law. In Tabao,[28] the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he
plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the
DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The
prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin
suit outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or
his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.
xxxx
Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly
demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep
abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to
have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and
jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross
ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a
judge. (Emphasis ours)

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial
office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps
to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with
legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.[29]
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge
Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in
the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative
remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit
outright. In Espaol v. Toledo-Mupas,[30] the Court held that:
Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the
judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of
our courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to
embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and
title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in
court: We x x x find respondents intemperate use of Shut up! and Baloney!
well nigh inappropriate in court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled
for.[31]
Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that
Judge Paderanga was impatient, discourteous, and undignified in court:
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is...
Judge Paderanga: I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]
xxxx
Atty. Luego: I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to...
Judge Paderanga: Ready to what? Proceed.
Atty. Luego: Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your
Honor, on the grounds, first and foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor,
with all due respect of [sic] this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin
dated March 29, 2005 was improper, Your Honor, for the reasons that
the lumber, subject matter of this case, were apprehended in accordance
with...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is
your proof? Is that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your
seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: Under the rules...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your seizure receipt? You read your
rules. What does [sic] the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it
does not need any seizure receipt? You look at your rules. You point out the
rules. You take out your rules and then you point out. Do you have the
rules?
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the
apprehension, Your Honor, there was no claimant.
Judge Paderanga: Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic]
appeared.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no...
Judge Paderanga: Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you
taking it from?
Atty. Luego: From the shipping company, Your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the
ownership of that lumber.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: But the shipping company, Your Honor,...
Judge Paderanga: Shut up. Thats baloney. You are seizing it
from nobody. Then how can you seize it from the shipping company. Are
you not? You are a lawyer. Who is in possession of the property? The
shipping company. Why did you not issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping
company?
Atty. Luego: But the... May I continue, Your Honor?
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did
not issue a seizure receipt here. Well, Im telling you you should have issued
[a] seizure receipt to the shipping company.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. You should know how to
write pleadings. You write the pleadings the way it should be, not the way
you think it should be.
Atty. Luego: Im sorry, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: You are an officer of the court. You should be careful with
your language. You say that I am wrong. Its you who are [sic] wrong
because you do not read the law.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Then you read the law. How dare you say that the Court
is wrong.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]?
Atty. Luego: Yes, in this case, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: Then you are representing them. They are
your clients. What kind of a lawyer are you?[32]
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of
Appeals [case] that the Court should not interfere, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: No.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: The problem with you people is you do not use your
heads.
Atty. Tiamson: We use our heads, your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our
heads, your Honor.[33] (Emphasis ours)
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in
relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
states that judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for
the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all
times. They must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile
language.[34] They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in
speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint;
and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their
court.[35] In Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas,[36] the Court held that:
A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who
appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the
peoples faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays
lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be
temperate in his language. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care
and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his
discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him
one[42] for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the other[43] for gross
misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser
of justice. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never
allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words x x
x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.
Judge Paderangas refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of
replevin, repeated interruption of the lawyers, and utterance of shut up, thats
baloney, how dare you say that the court is wrong, what kind of a lawyer are
you?, and the problem with you people is you do not use your heads are
undignified and very unbecoming a judge. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Paderanga,[37] the Court already reprimanded Judge
Paderanga for repeatedly saying shut up, being arrogant, and declaring that
he had absolute power in court. He has not changed.
The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have
fallen short of their accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that
violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the
people in the judicial system.[44]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAWand UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly,
the Court DISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the
law as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public
office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[38] Section 10 of Rule 140
classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by
(1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2)
censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.[39]

The Court notes that this is Judge Paderangas third offense. In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Paderanga,[40] the Court held him liable for grave
abuse of authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a
lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having absolute power and for
repeatedly telling a lawyer to shut up. In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,[41] the
Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of
nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits. In both cases,
the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another
offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two
cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderangas arrogance,
incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge.
CASE NO. 21
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN,
SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated
May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order
had denied petitioners' (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein
private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for
a Writ of replevin.2
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand
and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued
at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a
certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand
two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of
illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one
Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon.
. . .3
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-
PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure
receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.5 Felipe
Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed
before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal complaint
against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68
[78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.6
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon
and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer
Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon
and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public
Prosecutor.7
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143,
was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in
Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at
Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products
with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70.
Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a
certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for
violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by
Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.8
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in
order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao
and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and
ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.9
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle
owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application
for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The
trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding
writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992. 10 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
which was denied by the trial court. 11
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for
Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court
issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further
proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents
from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products
seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products
seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said
property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the
Supreme Court. 12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court
referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate
disposition. 13
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit.
It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority
granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277
does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According
to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR
or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and
disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for
that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the
appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation,
forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of
offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by
E.O. No. 277. 14
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to
observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series
of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR
Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render
a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover,
petitioners' failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission
of petitioners' counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the
seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing
to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject
vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. 15
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners' claim that
private respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government.
Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no
pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted
illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit
against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing
or withholding the possession of the property of another. 16
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based
on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contradicted by its own findings. 17 Their petition was
found without merit. 18
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors: 19
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE
SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A
[78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA
LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT
CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL
SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A]
OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS
NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate
number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
 (2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against
the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78
states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products without License. — Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with
the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-
310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles
were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly
no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest
products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in
the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They
read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His
Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. — In all
cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and
all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission
of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. — A forest officer or
employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense. . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. — All
conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,
found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of
P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or
disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. — The Secretary
or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers
and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR
are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and
guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and
officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest
products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field
offices, and turn oversaid forest products and conveyances for
proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is
made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with
the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for
safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without
pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said
timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was
allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined in
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following
the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly
took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again,
when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the
second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the
DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a
writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure
was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly
deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin.
For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in
the custody of the law, and not otherwise. 20
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,
promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded
by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited
in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property
was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the
property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of
partial Sheriff's Return, and wait for the judge's instructions on the proper
procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v.Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:
. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous
plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are
implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in
this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be
undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin. . . 21
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the
two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the
State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent. 22 And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect,
a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable. 23However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. 24 In the present case, the
acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly
official in nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of
the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so
within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their
part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit
against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor General's line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion
of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. 26 If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed
waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. 27
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET
ASIDE.1âwphi1 Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the
Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the
subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the
custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this CASE NO. 22
decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate
action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation Republic of the Philippines
of the Revised Forestry Code. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Costs against private respondents.1âwphi1.nêt
SECOND DIVISION
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-98-1264 July 28, 1999
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
BASILIO P. MAMANTEO, FLORENTINO B. TRINIDAD, BONIFACIO
MANGANIP and EDGAR S. SALLIDAO, complainants,
vs.
DEPUTY SHERIFF MANUEL M. MAGUMUN, 1 respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

What should the sheriff do when he is informed by the defendant in a

replevin that the property to be seized is in custodia legis and in fact already
forfeited in favor of the government by order of another government agency?

This question assumes importance in light of the charges of grave

misconduct filed by complainants Basilio P. Mamanteo, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources (PENR) Officer; Florentino B. Trinidad,
Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENR) Officer; and
Bonifacio Manganip and Edgar S. Sallidao, both DENR forestry employees
stationed in Tabuk, Kalinga, against Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun of
the Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

On 12 April 1996 forestry employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative

Region, Tabuk, Kalinga, tasked with the enforcement of forestry laws,
intercepted a San Miguel Corporation van with Plate No. PJC-321 loaded
with narra flitches wrapped in nylon sacks and covered with empty beer
bottles and cartons. Confronted by the forestry employees, Villamor
Martinez, driver of the van, could not produce any legal permit authorizing
him to transport the narra lumber. Hence, after issuing seizure receipts, the
vehicle and its load of narra flitches were confiscated by the DENR forestry
employees.

On 24 May 1996 a criminal complaint against driver Villamor Martinez was

filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tabuk, Kalinga, for violation
of Sec. 78 of P.D. 705 2 as amended, and implemented by DENR
Administrative Order 59. 3 On 24 July 1996, after due notice and opportunity
to be heard, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was issued by
the DENR Regional Office pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority to
administratively order the confiscation and forfeiture of lumber possessed
without permit including its conveyance.
Thereafter, San Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, through its
agent Aimardo V. Interior, filed a case for recovery of personal property and
damages with application for writ of replevin with the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, against herein complainants. The trial court
issued a warrant of seizure of personal property directing its sheriff to take
hold of the van and its contents.
On 1 August 1996 Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun, escorted by Sheriff
Jacinto Contapay of RTC-Br. 1, Tabuk, Kalinga, and agents of the Philippine
National Police, went to the office of the DENR in Tabuk, Kalinga, to enforce
the warrant issued by the trial court but the forestry employees and officials
refused to release the van on the ground that it had already been forfeited
in favor of the government and was now in custodia legis. Despite this
explanation, on 7 August 1996, Deputy Sheriff Magumun accompanied this
time by Sheriff John Dongui-is Jr. of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tabuk,
Kalinga, and twenty (20) other persons, took the van without permission of
the employees and officials of the DENR. On 13 August 1996, after the lapse
of the five-day period prescribed by law for filing an opposition to the writ,
the vehicle was delivered to Aimardo V. Interior, agent of SMC.
In his comment, Deputy Sheriff Magumun explained that it was his
ministerial duty to execute the warrant in accordance with its mandate and
his duties as sheriff under the Rules of Court and the Manual for Clerks of
Court. 4He conceded that he was informed by the forestry employees and
officials of the forfeiture of the vehicle subject of the warrant of seizure but
he reasoned that it was not within his discretion to withhold the
implementation of the warrant. 5 The execution of a warrant of seizure on a
vehicle allegedly forfeited in favor of the government was a question of law
too technical for him to resolve 6 and faced with such a dilemma he opted to
follow the order of the court and execute the warrant in accordance with its
mandate.
On 20 October 1997 the complaint was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA
observed that Deputy Sheriff Magumun made a very literal interpretation of
Sec. 4, Rule 60, of the Rules of Court as amended. 7 The OCA noted that
while Rule 60 was silent on what should be done when the sheriff is informed
by the defendant in the replevin that the personal property to be seized has
been forfeited in favor of the government and is already in custodia legis,
Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property
subject of the warrant of seizure. 8 The appropriate action should have been
for respondent to inform his judge of the situation by way of partial Sheriff's
Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be
observed. 9 For such ignorance of proper procedure the OCA recommended
that Sheriff Magumun be penalized in the amount of P5,000.00 at the very
least. 10
We agree. Respondent was placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle
subject of the warrant of seizure had already been confiscated by another
government agency and forfeited in favor of the government. However, the
novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use his discretion and justify
his insistence on taking the property subject of the warrant without waiting
for instructions from his judge. A sheriff's prerogative does not give him the
liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of
the attached property, 11 much less does he have any discretion to decide
which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand.
When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence
of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it according to its mandate. 12 However, the prompt
implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in instances where
there is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where
the plaintiff has shown by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possession of the property; that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant; that the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized
under execution or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure, 13 then the executing officer has no other recourse but to execute
the warrant or writ expeditiously.
In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the
property had been impounded due to violation of forestry laws and an order
for its forfeiture had already been issued by the DENR. Moreover, he was
advised that the proper remedy for SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal
the order of forfeiture to the Secretary of the DENR. 14 The prudent recourse
then for respondent was to desist from executing the warrant and convey
the information to his judge and to the plaintiff. Instead, Deputy Sheriff
Magumun carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure with
undue haste as evidenced by the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first
served the warrant of seizure on the DENR officials to the time of his
precipitate seizure of the van. A warrant could be returned within a period of
not less than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by
the executing officer. 15 Within this time frame, Deputy Sheriff Magumun
should have conferred with his judge and thereafter execute the warrant
judiciously and with more certainty.
True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement
writs promptly and expeditiously, but equally true is the principle that sheriffs
by the nature of their functions must at all times conduct themselves with
propriety and decorum and act above suspicion. 16 There must be no room
for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as officers of the
court have conspired with any of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable
judgment or immediate execution. The sheriff is the front line representative
of the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.
As observed by the OCA, the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by
unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of
the Tariff and Customs Code, 17 tax assessment, attachment or execution.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to
be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid
seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple
devise of a writ of replevin. Hence, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, as agents of
the law, are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost
diligence because in serving the court's writs and processes and
implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of
justice. 18
WHEREFORE, respondent Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun is found
guilty of grave misconduct and, as recommended, is fined P5,000.00 for
arbitrarily implementing the warrant of seizure of personal property and for
ignorance of the proper procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where
the personal property to be recovered has already been seized and forfeited
in favor of the government for violation of forestry laws. Respondent is
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe
sanction.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
CASE NO. 23
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121587. March 9, 1999]
SOLEDAD DY, doing business under the name and style RONWOOD
LUMBER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ODEL BERNARDO
LAUSA, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP 33099 setting aside two orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City (Branch 5) and the appellate courts resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows.
On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No.
93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log
smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs,
lumber, flitches and other forest products in that city.[2] The team was
composed of personnel of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police
(PNP), the Department of Natural Resources (DENR), and the Office of the
City Mayor of Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was the
acting chief of civilian security in the mayors office, was a member of the
team.
On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received confidential
information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to
Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the
team set up a check-point along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City.[3] What
happened thereafter is summarized in the following portion of the decision
of the Court of Appeals:[4]
At around 10:00 p.m., two trucks with Plate Nos. KAK-542 and KBL-214
and loaded with lumber approached the checkpoint. They were flagged
down by the operatives but instead of stopping, they accelerated their
speed hence, the task force gave chase. They finally caught up with the
two vehicles at the compound of Young Metalcraft and Peterwood Agro-
Forest Industries at Baan, Butuan City, about two kilometers from the
checkpoint. When requested by the operatives, Pulcita Lucero,
caretaker/in charge of the compound could not produce any document as
proof of the legality of the origin/possession of the forest products.
Forester Resurreccion Maxilom of the DENR issued a temporary
seizure order and a seizure receipt for the two vehicles and their cargo
consisting of several pieces of lumber of different sizes and dimensions, but
Lucero, the caretaker of the compound where they were seized, refused to
accept them. The seized lumber and vehicles were then taken to the City
motorpool and placed in the custody of respondent Lausa.
The next day, July 2, 1993, Maxilom submitted a memorandum-report
to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
of Butuan City on the seizure of the lumber and the two vehicles.[5] On July
6, the CENRO issued a notice of confiscation which was duly posted for
three days.
For lack of claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul
Geollegue recommended to the Secretary on July 29, 1993 the forfeiture of
the lumber and the two vehicles. [6] Accordingly, on July 30, 1993, DENR
Regional Director De la Rosa ordered the CENRO of Butuan City to issue
the requisite forfeiture orders,[7] which CENRO Angelita Orcasitas issued on
August 15, 1993.[8]
On October 20, 1993, more than two months after the lumber had been
forfeited, petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the lumber, filed a suit for
replevin in the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) for its recovery.
The next day, October 21, 1993, the trial court issued a preliminary writ of
replevin.
On October 29, 1993, respondent Lausa filed a motion for the approval
of a counterbond. Before the court could act on his motion, he moved to
dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin on the ground that the lumber in
question, having been seized and forfeited by the DENR pursuant to P.D.
No. 705, as amended (Revised Forestry Code), was under its custody and,
therefore, resort should first be made to the DENR.
On November 29, 1993, the trial court denied respondent Lausas
application for the approval of the counterbond as well as his motion to
dismiss and/or quash the suit for replevin. For this reason, respondent filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals in which he sought the
approval of his counterbond and the nullification of the two orders, dated
October 21, 1993 and November 29, 1993, granting petitioners prayer for a
preliminary writ of replevin and denying his Motion to Dismiss Case and/or
Quash Writ of Replevin.
On January 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and
a. The Orders dated 21 October 1993 and 29 November 1993 are SET
ASIDE.
b. Respondent judge is directed to approve a duly qualified counterbond to
be filed by petitioner, even with a period of at least one year.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution, dated July 26, 1995. Hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that:
FIRST ERROR
WITH DUE RESPECT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE VERIFICATION MADE BY LORENCIO DY AND NOT
BY PETITIONER SOLEDAD Y. DY WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE ISSUANCE OF THE REPLEVIN WRIT.[10]
SECOND ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A
COUNTERBOND IN REPLEVIN WHICH IS EFFECTIVE FOR ONLY ONE
YEAR IS VALID TO CAUSE THE RETURN OF THE PROPERTY TO
DEFENDANT.[11]
THIRD ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.[12]
The appeal is without merit. The threshold question is whether the
Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit,
considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited
by law enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705 (Revised granting petitioners application for a replevin writ and denying private
Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277. respondents motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No.
705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR
The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to
he can resort to the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that agency.
that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the
by the administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative respondent agent of the DENR to file a counterbond in order to recover
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his to dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a courts done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her claim
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a courts before the Department of Natural Resources (DENR).
intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding
of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause In view of the conclusion reached in this case, it is unnecessary to
of action.[13] discuss the errors assigned by petitioner. These pertain to the questions
whether petitioners complaint below was properly verified and whether
Section 8 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides: private respondents counterbond should be approved. Both are based on
the premise that the trial court can take cognizance over the case. As shown
SEC. 8. Review. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to above, however, such is not the case.
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 19,
the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the 1995, and its Resolution, dated July 26, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP 33099 are
lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of said AFFIRMED with the modification that the complaint for recovery of personal
decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive property is DISMISSED.
Order No. 19, series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may
not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action SO ORDERED.
for certiorari or prohibition.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
In Paat v. Court of Appeals,[14] where, as in the case at bar, the trial
court issued a writ of replevin against the DENR, thus allowing the claimant
to obtain possession of the conveyance used in transporting undocumented
forest products, this Court stated:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of
the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper cause of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently
issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the
remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent
prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an
element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to
be waylaid by the lower court.[15]
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies,
the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court
CASE NO. 24
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013
EFREN S. ALMUETE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the May 4, 2007 Resolution4 and the September 4, 2007
Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502.
Factual Antecedents
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R.
No. 144332 and promulgated on June 10, 2004.
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
27, with violation of Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,
otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2672.9
On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioner’s counsel
informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not
notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The RTC, however, found their
absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as
scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of the September 8, 1998 Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y
Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended, they are each sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum
period. Costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and
Lloren13 and issued warrants of arrest against them.14
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the
validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction,
and the correctness of the penalty imposed.15
On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the CA.17
On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED. On the basis of the evidence on record, accused Efren S.
Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him.
The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the presence
of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their own choice,
after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the complete records of this case
be remanded to the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.18
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate
the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144332.
On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal and reinstated
the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order, to
wit:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated September
8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied
by this Court in a Resolution dated January 17, 2005.20
On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration,
which were denied by this Court in its March 28, 2005 and November 9,
2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still
appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without
action his Motion for Clarification in its July 26, 2006 Resolution.24
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Repromulgation25 of the September 8, 1998 Decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for
Repromulgation.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its
February 20, 2007 Order.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari28 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its
Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by the CA in
its September 4, 2007 Resolution.31
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:
1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner
Almuete of the charge against him passed the requisite conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether x x x the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC
convicting the petitioner was valid despite the absence of the
petitioner and regardless of petitioner’s intention to be present at the
promulgation of the Decision.
3. Whether x x x the Honorable CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it acquitted petitioner Almuete in a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
4. Whether x x x the judgment of acquittal by the Honorable CA bars
further proceedings and that to do so would constitute a violation of
petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.
5. Whether x x x the denial of the RTC of petitioner’s motion for re-
promulgation is in order, the denial being based on an inappropriate
Administrative Order of this Honorable Supreme Court (Administrative Order
No. 16-93).32
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly
convicted by the RTC because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.33 He argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial and
hearsay evidence as he was convicted only because he owns the truck
containing the lumber.34 Thus, he contends that his earlier acquittal by the
CA was proper,35 and that his acquittal can no longer be assailed without
violating the principle of double jeopardy.36
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the judgment
against him since it was made in his absence.37 He insists that he had a
valid reason for not attending the promulgation of the judgment as he was
suffering from stress, anxiety, and some physiological disturbance, and thus,
was advised to rest.38 He also claims that the RTC’s denial of his Motion for
Repromulgation was not proper.39 Hence, a repromulgation of the judgment
should be made to allow him to avail of his right to appeal.40
Respondent’s Arguments
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, contends that the issues and
arguments raised by petitioner may no longer be entertained as these have
been addressed in People v. Court of Appeals,41 which is already the "law
of the case."42 He likewise points out that the promulgation of judgment in
absentia is allowed under Section 643 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure,44 and that the denial of petitioner’s Motion for
Repromulgation of the September 8, 1998 Decision is proper as the same
is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.45
As to petitioner’s right to appeal, respondent opines that petitioner’s right
has prescribed,46 as the same should have been filed within 15 days from
the time he or his counsel received a copy of the September 8, 1998
Decision instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.47
However, notwithstanding the finality of petitioner’s conviction, respondent
recommends that the penalty be modified by reducing the same to six (6)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL).48
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The denial of the Motion for
Repromulgation is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93
Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, provides
that:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS
RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY
SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS OF JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial courts in
criminal cases after their judgments of conviction shall have been affirmed
or modified by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, attention is invited
to the decisional and statutory guidelines set out hereunder.
1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in
criminal cases, differs from that prescribed for the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals where promulgation is effected by filing the signed copy of
the judgment with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies thereof to be
served upon the parties. The procedural consequence of this distinction was
reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of Prisons, to wit:
By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in
relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment
is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment
for execution.
In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it
was explained that "the certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of
the appellate court to the lower court under section 9 of rule 53, not for the
promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of
the judgment against him," it "not being necessary to promulgate or read it
to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney
had already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as
amended, of the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51)," and
that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is
merely to see that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of
the court of first instance is necessary to that end.
2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for
"promulgation" of the judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be
immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage entailing
unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the
convict was already under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and
the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court.
Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if
the convict is under detention, the trial court should issue forthwith the
corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the prisoner may be
considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison
facility for confinement and service of sentence. When the convict is out on
bail, the trial court shall immediately order the bondsman to surrender the
convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the
corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this
Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date
of such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear
before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by
this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer
allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC in denying the
Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision which
was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.49
The promulgation of judgment is valid.
Petitioner’s attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTC’s
September 8, 1998 Decision must likewise fail as this has already been
addressed by this Court in People v. Court of Appeals.50 As this Court has
explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation because
petitioner’s absence was unjustifiable.51 Hence, no abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of
petitioner.52
It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained
finality. In fact, an Entry of Judgment was made by this Court on February
15, 2005.
Petitioner’s right to appeal has prescribed.
As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998
Decision, we rule in the negative.
In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal by
the CA as it was made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained
that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the
authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its
judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of
error."54 Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner
availed of the wrong remedy. Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused,
respondents herein, guilty of the crime charged based on the evidence on
record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and
305 of the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law to overturn the decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of
the promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial court’s denial of their
motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of
error, from the decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The
appeal of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the findings of facts
of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the
penalty imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate court can
reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned, found
in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error,
the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the
decision of the trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction and
the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely
hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged
mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It behooved the
appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course
and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial court’s assessment of the evidence on record, its
findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA
forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which
to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent Almuete of the
crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured
beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari
proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal
by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent
Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute
to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise
the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application,
the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a
particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case,
the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment.
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create
rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete cannot
base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate court’s
decision.55 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s right to appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision
has long prescribed. Consequently, the said Decision is no longer open to
an appeal.
The penalty imposed must be modified.
Nonetheless, we agree with the suggestion of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the penalty imposed by the RTC in its September 8, 1998
Decision must be modified. Concededly, this case is an offshoot of G.R. No.
144332 which the Court decided on June 10, 2004 which found grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CA in acquitting Almuete.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state
that:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation
or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied)
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty
as prescribed in Article 310 which is two degrees higher than those specified
in Article 309.56 This is erroneous considering that the penalty prescribed in
Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed under any the
following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these
circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is ₱57,012.00. Since the
amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods57 should be imposed in its maximum period58 plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000 pesos in excess of
₱22,000.00 or three more years.59 Thus, the correct imposable maximum
penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one
degree lower than that prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum
penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years.
This Court is not unaware of the rule that "a final judgment may no longer
be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest court
of the land, rendered it."60 However, this Court has suspended the
application of this rule based on certain recognized exceptions, viz:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an
examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings
of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.61
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty
of petitioner. If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be
not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside
the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper
imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the
maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice
demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the
power of the court to suspend its own Rules or except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when
there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax
the same in the interest of substantial justice."62 Suspending the Rules is
justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the
ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all, the Court’s
"primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x."64
Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty imposed
notwithstanding the finality of the assailed decision.
In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin) and Joel
Barro (Joel) were charged with murder. After trial, the trial court convicted
them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin filed their notice of appeal. Joel
failed to appeal as he escaped from confinement. Hence, the trial court’s
Decision insofar as Joel is concerned had become final and executory. In
the Court’s Decision of August 17, 2000, the appeal filed by Benigno and
Florin was found without merit. However, the Court noted that as regards
Joel, the penalty imposed by the trial court was "outside the range"66 of the
penalty prescribed for the offense. Consequently, the Court modified the
penalty imposed on him notwithstanding that the same had already become
final and executory. The Court ratiocinated that:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense,
is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Two degrees lower is
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped
from jail, hence, he is disqualified from the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight penalty of eight
years which is within the medium period (6 years 1 month and 11 days to 8
years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court erred in imposing the
penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the
range of said penalty. The records show that Joel Barro did not appeal.
However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal
was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed
on the accused can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty
prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become
final and executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court
to have it conformable with law.67
In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa. While
the trial was pending, petitioner jumped bail. Understandably, during the
promulgation of judgment in 1997, petitioner was absent. Two years later,
or in 1999, petitioner was arrested. She then moved for reconsideration of
the trial court’s Decision. The same was denied for having been filed out of
time. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which was
denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case before this Court. In its Decision
dated August 25, 2005, the Court ruled that petitioner’s trial in absentia was
proper; that she was not denied due process; and that the denial by the trial
court of her motion for reconsideration was proper as the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period. However, the Court noted that the penalty
imposed by the trial court (which is 12 years of prision mayor to 24 years as
maximum) on petitioner was erroneous. As computed by the Court,
considering that the amount defrauded is only ₱68,700.00, the proper
minimum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "6 months,
and 1 day of prision correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional in its medium period"69while the proper
maximum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "10 years, 8
months and 21 days and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum
period."70 Hence, notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s Decision, the
Court modified the penalty imposed, as the same was outside the range
prescribed by law.
In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also
modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner notwithstanding the finality of
the trial court’s Decision based on the observation that the penalty imposed
by the trial court was erroneous because it was outside the range prescribed
by law. The Court ruled thus:
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of
the trial court that must be rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial
court erroneously included an additional one day on the maximum period of
arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the
range of said penalty. The duration of arresto mayor is only from one month
and one day to six months. Adding one day to the maximum penalty will
place it within the range of prision correccional.
Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four years,
four months and one day of prision correccional is also incorrect as it is
outside the range of the penalty imposable in this case. x x x
xxxx
The error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it
conform to the penalty prescribed by law as it is within the Court’s duty and
inherent power. x x x
xxxx
Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty
imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with the law and nothing
else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in order to be favorable to the
petitioner nor an increase so as to be prejudicial to him.72
In People v. Gatward73 the Court explicitly stated that by merely modifying
the penalty imposed, it is not reopening the case; neither is it saying that
there was error in judgment. In the same manner, in this case, we are not
reopening G.R. No. 144332, much more reversing it. Thus:
x x x In the case of U Aung Win, and the same hold true with respect to
Gatward, the penalty inflicted by the court a quo was a nullity because it was
never authorized by law as a valid punishment. The penalties which
consisted of aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty are self-
contradictory in terms and unknown in penal law. Without intending to sound
sardonic or facetious, it was akin to imposing the indivisible penalties of
public censure, or perpetual absolute or special disqualification, or death in
their minimum or maximum periods.
This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by inflicting
a penalty higher or lower than the one imposable under the law but with both
penalties being legally recognized and authorized as valid punishments. An
erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid judgment. But a
judgment which ordains a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of
penalties or which is an impossible version of that in the roster of lawful
penalties is necessarily void, since the error goes into the very essence of
the penalty and does not merely arise from the misapplication thereof.
Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final and executory.1âwphi1
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his case
was reopened in order that a higher penalty may be imposed on him. There
is here no reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is being affirmed
but with a correction of the very substance of the penalty to make it
conformable to law, pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The
penalty has not been changed since what was decreed by the trial court and
is now being likewise affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua which, unfortunately, was imposed by the lower court in an
elemental form which is non-existent in and not authorized by law. Just as
the penalty has not been reduced in order to be favorable to the accused,
neither has it been increased so as to be prejudicial to him.
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the
imposition upon him of the corrected duration, inherent in the essence and
concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence with
an illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial
legislation and unequal protection of law. He would thus be the victim of an
inadvertence which could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment
and the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually have
served. Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the remedial
and corrective measures interposed by this opinion protect him against the
risk of another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period of
imprisonment.74
Also, it would not be amiss to mention that the Office of the Solicitor General
prayed for the modification of the imposable penalty.75
Finally, pursuant to Section 11(a),76Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the favorable modification of the penalty should likewise
apply to petitioner's co-accused who failed to appeal.77
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 4, 2007 and the
September 4, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98502 are hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, for reasons stated above, the
September 8, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya,
Branch 27, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672, is hereby MODIFIED
insofar as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The accused, namely,
Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz are each
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 25
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision1 of the
First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-
0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of
General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized under
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier
in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed
of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the
end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest
products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the
organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the
OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and
Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government organization that
operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon
province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate
the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall
issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the
municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to
transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of
which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one
hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T.
Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221
Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority
or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person
given the permit, and official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly
read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria,
both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of
their official position and committing the offense in relation to their office,
conspiring and confederating with each other did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest
product) to (person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number)
under the pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to
do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial
agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence and submit
the case for decision based on the documentary evidence and joint
stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused
and the prosecution submitted their respective memoranda.6
Ruzol's Defense
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence
based on following arguments:
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon,
he is authorized to issue permits to transport forest products
pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers
but also those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers
expressly granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate
or incidental to the LGU’s efficient and effective governance. The
LGU is likewise given powers that are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare of the inhabitants. The general welfare clause
provided in Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is
a massive grant of authority that enables LGUs to perform or
exercise just about any power that will benefit their local
constituencies.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain
functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And the
permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function
to manage and control communal forests with an area not exceeding
fifty (50) square kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the
payment of Transport Fees levied by the municipality for the use of
local public roads for the transport of salvaged forest products.
Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129,
Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article
Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the municipality is
granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log,
timber or lumber is denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or
CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber;
hence, even if accused issued the Transport Permits on his side, a
person wanting to transport the said forest products would have to
apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR. The Transport
Permits issued by the accused were never taken as a substitute for
the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said permits contain the
annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."
 (5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The
Transport Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria in his capacity
as Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to
impute upon the accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing
that may have been committed in the issuance thereof following the
ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the
issuance of the 221 Transport permits through the Provincial
Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in
a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority
since they did not act "under the pretense of official position,"
accused Ruzol having issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor
and there was no pretense or misrepresentation on his part that he
was an officer of DENR.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19,
2008 a Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as
follows:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is
hereby rendered finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Two Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of Usurpation
of Official Functions as defined and penalized under Article 177 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for
each case a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be
entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article 70
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M.
SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash bond
posted by him for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by
said accused upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing
payment thereof subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by this Court
dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the Order issued by the Bureau
of Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including the name of Sabiduria
in the Hold Departure List is ordered recalled and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority
to issue transport permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that
such authority had not been devolved to the local government of General
Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits
constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence
of Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to
transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether the
authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the
authority to issue transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the
Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation to
Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization
Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall
have jurisdiction and authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all
forest reservations including watershed reservations presently administered
by other government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management,
regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and
supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the
taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof;
the implementation of multiple use and sustained yield management in
forest lands; the protection, development and preservation of national parks,
marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the implementation of measures
and programs to prevent kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and
grazing lands; in collaboration with other bureaus, the effective, efficient and
economic classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement
of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and
regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills,
veneer and plywood mills and other wood processing plants and conduct
studies of domestic and world markets of forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of
the present and future generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the
Department shall have the following functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposal lands, and mineral resources and in the process of
exercising such control the Department shall impose appropriate
payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration
and use of the country’s forest, land and mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development,
protection, conservation, licensing and regulation as provided for by
law, where applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation and
monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and
permittees for the extraction, exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources products; the implementation of
programs and measures with the end in view of promoting close
collaboration between the government and the private sector; the
effective and efficient classification and sub-classification of lands of
the public domain; and the enforcement of natural resources laws,
rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements,
licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges and
arrangement concerning the development, exploration and
utilization of the country’s natural resources and shall continue to
oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; to cancel or
cause to cancel such privileges and arrangement upon failure, non-
compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for all other
causes which are furtherance of the conservation of natural
resources and supportive of the national interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the
processing of forest products, grading and inspection of lumber and
other forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and
other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78)
which mandates that the permittee should secure the necessary transport
and other related documents before the retrieved wood materials are sold
to the buyers/users and/or wood processing plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges
the entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a
"permit issued by the DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs,
drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress,
tree stumps, tops and branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only
be allowed to gather or recover logs or timber which had already been
marked and inventoried by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for
Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with
the authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
products.1âwphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating
salvaged forest products" is not one of the DENR’s functions which had been
devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160)
or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of
the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and
review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects
which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects;
management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding
fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and
similar forest development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the
devolved functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the
implementation of community-based forestry products; (2) management and
control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest
development projects.13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No.
30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest
management functions, programs and projects of the DENR which had been
devolved to the LGUs, as follows:14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry
projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of
regular appropriations, except at least one project per
province that shall serve as research and training laboratory,
as identified by the DENR, and those areas located in
protected areas and critical watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects,
except those areas located in protected areas and critical
watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract
reforestation projects, subject to policies and procedures
prescribed by the DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance
with DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and
other guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of
financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000)
hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the
concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into
community forestry projects;
 c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small
watershed areas which are sources of local water supply as
identified or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project
areas, small watershed areas and communal forests, as defined in
Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and
regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging,
smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered
species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming and other
unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances,
equipment and other implements used in the commission of
offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277,
series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the
devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest
products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions,
the correlative authority to issue transport permits remains with the
DENR15and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity.
As shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991,
ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor
and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set
forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged
with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of
the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only
government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has
designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment,
it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive
prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal
parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with
"sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor
EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such
authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e.,
LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is
easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the
LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed
with authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon
them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the
municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced
and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and
maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate
ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology
and, accordingly, provide adequate measures in the proper utility and
conservation of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be
deduced from Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint
Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject
permits to transport were issued by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest
products found within the municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent
abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and
regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance of appropriate
permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by
the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs
shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the
responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the
environment and natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction."20 The
significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in
Joint Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of
Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest
Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the DILG and the
DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and
DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic
policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU partnership on
devolved and other forest management functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable
development of the country’s environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the forest resources
within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the
LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and
partnership in forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are
important tools in the holistic and efficient management of forest
resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with
other government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning
as an integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to
determine the optimum and balanced use of natural resources to
support local, regional and national growth and development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared
responsibilities in the sustainable management of forest land
resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance the
capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest management.
Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the
management of the devolved functions. As the LGUs’ capacity in
forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the
management of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs
and the role of the DENR becomes assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation
with the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions and
responsibilities to the local government units, or enter into
agreements with them for enlarged forest management and other
ENR-related functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve
community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the
partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned
sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of local
communities for forest management including enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest
products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather
an additional measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to
regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting
one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts
must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws
deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the
government."21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between
promulgated statutes, rules or regulations issued by different government
instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold one and
annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery
Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to
its power under the general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules or
ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol
are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth
by law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature
of transport fees levied by the municipality for the use of public roads.23 In
this regard, he argues that he has been conferred by law the right to issue
subject permits as an incident to the LGU’s power to create its own sources
of revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may
impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
xxxx
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local
government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on
any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed
under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended,
or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not
be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared
national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes,
fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing
conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his
power and authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any
violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral,
marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and
effective property and supply management in the municipality; and protect
the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance
is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by
the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is
exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an
appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees
are prescribed.24 Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local
fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources
expressly authorized by law or ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the
authority of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should be
"pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the
legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact
ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal
logging, and smuggling of logs and other natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s
Revised Municipal Revenue Code27 and Municipal Environment
Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the
permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance
for the regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to
transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved
function to "manage and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the
LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the LGU’s
authority in the management and control of communal forests within its
territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and
enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law
for its effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from the same
Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage and control communal
forests should be "pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision,
control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest"30 has
a well-defined and technical meaning.31Consequently, as an entity endowed
with specialized competence and knowledge on forest resources, the DENR
cannot be discounted in the establishment of communal forest. The DILG,
on behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which
outlined the following procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and
municipal governments shall be governed by the following general
procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall
undertake the actual identification and assessment of existing
communal forests. The assessment shall determine the suitability of
the existing communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then
these communal forests may be disestablished. The Approval for
disestablishment shall be by the RED upon recommendation of the
DENR-LGU assessment Team through the PENRO and the RTD for
Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by
the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their
purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is
located shall pass resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the
turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon
receipt of said resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an
Administrative Order officially transferring said communal forest to
the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer
to the concerned LGU within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of
the administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative
Order and turnover of said communal forest to the city or
municipality, the LGU to which the communal forest was transferred
shall formulate and submit to the Provincial ENR Council for
approval a management plan governing the sustainable
development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan,
DENR shall, in coordination with the concerned LGU, undertake a forest
resource inventory and determine the sustainable level of forest resource
utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest
management planning to ensure sustainable development. The
management plan should include provision for replanting by the
communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the
following guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned
city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential communal forest
areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a
forest land use planning to be undertaken jointly between the DENR
and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall
indicate, among others, the site and location of the communal
forests within the production forest categorized as such in the forest
land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief
executive shall initiate the passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a
resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative
Order declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The
required administrative order shall be issued within sixty (60) days
after receipt of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest,
the city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management plan and
submit the same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall
include provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of
the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total
of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal
forest, the following requirements must be accomplished: (1) an
identification of potential communal forest areas within the geographic
jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan
which shall indicate, among other things, the site and location of the
communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through a resolution
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative
order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a
communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these
requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of an established
communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there was no way
that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the
management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory
requirements for the issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity
of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. As earlier
discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not
substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an
additional measure in the regulation of salvaged forest products. To
elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to
acquire a Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before
obtaining the corresponding permit to transport issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of
Official Functions as defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to
wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall
knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government
or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position,
shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer
of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of
committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to
be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person
in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign
government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do
so.32 The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the
latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions
for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products under the
alleged "pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do
so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the
crime were attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the
subject permits belongs solely to the DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved and that to overcome the presumption, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution.36As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our
criminal justice system, the accused, during a criminal prosecution, having
a stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that
he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his
conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any
person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the
Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The
constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than
casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence
of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the
only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.39 As explained
by this Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a
criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the
contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of
command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded
as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an
attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant
engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These
inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be
no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral
certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding
this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of usurpation of official functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the
prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality
that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The
prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly
belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government
agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the
transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the
general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as
can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to
complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the
DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under
his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions
granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that
Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be
used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good
faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this Court
enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for
usurpation of official functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to
describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all
information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction
unconscientious."44 Good faith is actually a question of intention and
although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one’s
self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and
outward acts.45
In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as
follows:
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A.
7160 to issue the subject permits, why did he have to secure the approval
of the various NGOs, People’s Organizations and religious organizations
before issuing the said permits? He could very well have issued subject
permits even without the approval of these various organizations if he truly
believed that he was legally empowered to do so considering that the
endorsement of these organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had
to arm himself with their endorsement could only mean that he actually knew
that he had no legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look
elsewhere for support and back-up.46 (Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis
nor established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is negated
when an accused sought another person’s approval. Neither is there any
doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is present when one seeks the
opinion or affirmation of others.
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the
conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign
supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of
salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward
illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits
to transport was not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a
result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it
was the participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the
Office of the Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the
latter’s authority as local chief executive.47
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated
by the fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to issue the subject
permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence and obtain the
permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral
Assembly.48
The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for
concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the
official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution, he would not
have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and
credibility to publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation.
Thus, the presence of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly
does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment
is placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us,
whether in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to
play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but also
a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the
rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing
scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and
share in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural
resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by
exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an act which was executed
with the concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations,
industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar.
Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that
such mistakes automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in
consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to
demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the
accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful
act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject
permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor,
intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within General
Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find
that to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would
be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of
encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the
environment and conservation of our natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and
considering further that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's
guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for
which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only
subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this
instance, pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s
acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to
0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of
reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.
SO ORDERED.