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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW SYLLABUS

The basic textbook for the course is The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviwer by Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.. All references will be to the 2011 edition of the book.

LECTURE 1
Preamble, National Territory, Principles and State Policies

Philippine Constitution (1987)

Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just
and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

Reading Assignment:
1987 Constitution, Preamble, Articles I and II.
Bernas, pp. 1 – 22.
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Cases: (Note: Cases with asterisks are priority reading)

Article I: National Territory

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea,
the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around
between, the connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, from part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

• Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011 *

FACTS: Congress enacted RA 9522, amending RA 3046 and making it compliant with the terms
of the UNCLOS III. In so doing, RA 9522 shortened on baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of the islands” whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

ISSUE: WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

RULING: NO. RA 9522 is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and
continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine territory. Baseline laws such as
RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III states to mark out specific basepoints along their coasts
from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. UNCLOS III and its
ancillary baseline laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or diminution of territory.
States acquire (or lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription.

• Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2013-19, In the Matter of the South China Sea
Arbitration, 12 July 2016 *

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines(Philippines) instituted an arbitration case against the
People’s Republic of China(China) under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea(Convention or UNCLOS) since both parties have ratified the Convention. However,
China have consistently stated its view on the lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the matter.

The arbitration concerns disputed between the parties regarding the legal basis of maritime
rights and entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain geographic features in the
South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in the South China Sea.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Tribunal has jurisdiction
2. WON China has claims under historical rights and the “nine dash-line”
3. What is the status of features in the South China Sea
4. WON the activities of China in the South China Sea is lawful.
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5. WON the actions of China since the commencement of arbitration have aggravated and
extended the dispute.
6. What is China’s future conduct?

RULINGS:
1. Article 288 of the Conventions states that “In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or
tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.”

2. With respect to Submission No. 1, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal concludes that,
as between the Philippines and China, the Convention defines the scope of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein.
The Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South
China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the
Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and
substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal
concludes that the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.

3. Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile
territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not. The Tribunal noted that
the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the
Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in
evaluating the features.

Article 121 establishes a regime of islands as follows:

Article 121 Regime of Islands

1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have
no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.

The tribunal found that although there were evidence of transient habitation on the features,
there was no showing of permanent habitation that the features could support a stable
community therefore they are considered rocks. Thus, having found that none of the features
claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found
that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any
possible entitlement of China.

4. The Tribunal finds that China has, by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement
vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger to
Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15,
and 16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to be in breach of Article 94 of the Convention.
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5. Yes, it has.
(a) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning their respective rights and entitlements
in the area of Mischief Reef by building a large artificial island on a low-tideelevation located in
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.

(b) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and preservation of the
marine environment at Mischief Reef by inflicting permanent, irreparable harm to the coral reef
habitat of that feature.

(c) China has extended the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and preservation of the
marine environment by commencing large-scale island-building and construction works at
Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi
Reef.

(d) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the status of maritime features in the
Spratly Islands and their capacity to generate entitlements to maritime zones by permanently
destroying evidence of the natural condition of Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef,
Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef.

6. The Tribunal considers it beyond dispute that both Parties are obliged to comply with the
Convention, including its provisions regarding the resolution of disputes, and to respect the
rights and freedoms of other States under the Convention. Neither Party contests this, and the
Tribunal is therefore not persuaded that it is necessary or appropriate for it to make any further
declaration.
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Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies

In General:

The “Declaration of Principles and State Policies” is the statement of the basic ideological
principles and policies that underlie the Constitution. As such, the provisions shed light on the
meaning of the other provisions of the Constitution and they are a guide for all departments of
the government in the implementation of the Constitution.

• Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995. *

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the
gross amount of ticket or  at least  P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is
allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment
for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same
as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is
still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates
Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it
has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease.
There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the
Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral
crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has the requisite personality to question the validity of the
contract in this case

Held: Yes. Kilosbayan’s status as a people’s organization give it the requisite personality
to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that “the
State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to
pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means,” that their right to
“effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged.”

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest
or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The
jurisdiction of the Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by
the “case and controversy” requirement of Art. VIII, Sec. 5. This requirement lies at the
very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts
from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the
bringing of suits by just any party.

It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers
and concerned citizens in cases involving “paramount public interest.” Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in
cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not
meet these requirements on standing.
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Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds. or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional.
Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of their obvious
interest in the validity of such laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the
constitutional question they raise is of “transcendental importance” which must be settled
early. Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which
they claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators.

Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have.
Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement
for bringing taxpayer’s suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money
is “being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections
against abuses of legislative power” or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Besides, the institution of a taxpayer’s suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial
review. The Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer’s suit
should be entertained.

Petitioners’ suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers’ suits.

Thus, petitioners’ right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens
can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for
the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be
invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

• Tondo Medical v. CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007. *

FACTS: In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for
five general areas of reform:
1. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
2. Secure funding for priority public health programs;
3. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective
performance;
4. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
5. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP)
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
“Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for
the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services
to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the
devolution of basic services to local government units.
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A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines
1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,”
The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9,
10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain
to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It
reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the
people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about
the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political
department.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violate the constitution?

HELD: The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of
the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of  Tañada v. Angara,
wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such
broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the
records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal
protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would
still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of
Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or
transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order
No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be
abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.
The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order
No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of
the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
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• BCDA v. COA, G.R. No. 178160, February 26, 2009. *

Facts:

Congress approved RA 7227 creating Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). It

provides therein that one of the functions of the Board is to adopt a compensation and benefit
scheme at least equivalent to that of BSP, which they did and which then Pres. Ramos
approved. Thus in 2000-2002, BCDA officials and employees received 30k year-end benefit.
This was disallowed in audit by COA. COA contended that the grant of year-end benefit to
Board members was contrary to DBM Circular 2002-2. The members of the BOD are not
salaried officials of the gov’t, as such they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB. Such
allowances, being fringe benefits granted in addition to salaries, can only paid only when basic
salary is also paid.

BCDA also claims that the Board members are full-time consultants who should be granted the
year-end benefits because it is consistent with Sec. 5 and 18, Art. II of the Constitution.

Issue:

WON the Board Members are entitled to year-end benefits?

Held:

No. Art. II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very
title, Art. II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of
enforceable rights. They are not self-executing provisions.

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Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.

• In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno, A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29, 1992. *
Facts:
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the
entire government, including the Judiciary.President Aquino, exercising legislative powers by
virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned
reorganization of the Judiciary.The Screening Committee recommended the return of Petitioner
as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven
(11) in the roster of appellate court justices. The rank was based on the precedence or seniority
enjoyed by the Petitioner in the CA and IAC prior to the issuance of EO 33. When the
appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking
changed from number 11 to number 26. Petitioner alleged that the change in his seniority
ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the
provisions of EO 33.
ISSUE:



Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim
to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior to Executive Order No. 33.



HELD:



It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and
distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched
by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power
(EDSA) revolution in 1986. A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it”, or
as “a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.”



It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state”
and from there is derived “the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing
form of government without regard to the existing constitution.”



These summarize the Aquino government’s position that its mandate is taken from “a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people.



A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was
overthrown by the Aquino government. “A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such
code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state
operates under a written constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a reading of
its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their
enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution, comprise the
legal order of that constitutional state.” It is assumed that the legal order remains as a “culture
system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and that a point may be reached, however,
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where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by the
population nor enforced by the officials.



It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government
which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of
the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system
then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.



The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of
the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made
by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.
• Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001; Same, Resolution of Motion for
Reconsideration, April 3, 2001.
Facts:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. In October 2000,  Ilocos Sur  governor  Luis
“Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada
money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-
based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which
culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on
November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from
the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The  Philippine
National Police  and the  Armed Forces of the Philippines  also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office. At 6:15pm, Estrada again
appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”.  Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines. At 2:00  pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would
give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later
left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be
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the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be  decided by the people  in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which  full discretionary
authority  has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.  It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct
demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government
entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987
constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, the question of
whether the previous president (President Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review.
The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned,  there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.    It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the
sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test:
  prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
• Ocampo v. Admiral Enriquez, G.R. No. 225373, November 8, 2016.,
FACTS:
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to
the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of
President Duterte.
Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army
(PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in
their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined
under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims 

Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013). 


2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as 

members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild. 


3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal

capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of
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Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation

and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the
martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official
capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of 

Representatives of the Philippines. 


4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of 


the Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State- 

sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos. 


5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and 

several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers. 


6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several 

others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers. 


7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson 

of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the
martial law regime of Marcos. 


8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate
of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen. 


ISSUES:
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. 


2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions. 


3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and

hierarchy of courts.
4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate
the Constitution, domestic and international laws.
RULING:
Justiciable controversy
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present:
• there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; 


• the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; 


• thequestionofconstitutionalitymustberaisedattheearliestopportunity;and 


• theissueofconstitutionalitymustbetheverylismotaofthecase. 

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In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.
Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches
of government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. As they
are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided
a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
Locus standi
Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an
act complained of, such proper party has no standing.
Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in
their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they
have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is
essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement
of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by
either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative
processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought.
 Page 14 of 91

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in
this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can
also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order
and injunction when proven necessary.
Constitutionality
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has
the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an
authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter”
and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a
clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke
Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of
Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.
As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective
history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to
just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos
burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing. Thus:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.”
The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the
nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the

disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”

xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.
Note:
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, C.J.:

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this
 Page 15 of 91

Court must zealously protect.


Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the
Filipinos’ enduring values. The protection of those values has consequently become the duty of
the Court. That this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly
comported itself in its constitutional role has been declared in various fashions by the Court
itself.

See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, women,
children, labor, the indigenous people, and consistently, those who have been or are in danger of
being deprived of their human rights.
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the
protection of human rights, and how the Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated
the writs of kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.
Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect
the cherished values of the Constitution would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is
designed to be passive relative to the “active” nature of the political departments is a given. But
when called upon to discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has
shown zealousness in the protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness that has been its
hallmark from then up to now. It cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of
protective activism.

• Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468

FACTS: Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut
Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested
said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during
the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed
transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of
their fees.
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani
and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor
General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice
circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment
of the fees in question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount
of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.
Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within
the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set
up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain
functions of government, make them a part of the Government of the Philippines.
 
RULING: No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come
under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for
the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in
the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the
 Page 16 of 91

proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far
as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.
Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the government namely: constituent and ministrant.
The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while
ministrant is more on public welfare like public works, education, charity, health and safety.
From such, we may infer that there are functions which our government is required to exercise
to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an
attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people.
The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic
life of the people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled
corporation which is governed by Corporation Law.
Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however, it was
given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to
the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it
may exercise are concerned.
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”
used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and
in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they
be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.
Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of fees in
question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.

• ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 *

Facts:

(ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other
hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA),
referred to as the Unions, are labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-
and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).

On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial
Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice,
namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of
the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said
members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain.

The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of
the CIR en banc. Hence this appeal.
 Page 17 of 91

During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with the
Court of Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents
for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA.Trial court agreed
with this move.

However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted.

Issue:

WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election
given that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions

Held:

The Unions are not entitled.

Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other
governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture.
According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be
reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the requirements and objective of this Code
and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration. These include powers non really
accorded to non-government entities such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial
services, and prosecution of officials.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their
affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which
only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise.

Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration , a
government agency tasked t implement land reform.

Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the President himself.

The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective
bargaining powers in the respondent Unions within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and
hence against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining
units. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions.

These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as
distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating
to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent
functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these letter functions being ministrant, he
exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
 Page 18 of 91

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various
agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute
as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the
capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental
function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public
hospitals.

Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the
Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the
employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as
a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA.

• PVTA v. CIR, 65 SCRA 416

Facts:
This case involves the expanded r o l e  of the
government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
 In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and
the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. 
Petitioner denied the allegations  for lack  of a  cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.  Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for
certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore
exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. 
PVTA contended it  is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No.
444.

Issue: 
Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

Held:
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government
has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people.
R A  N o .  2 2 6 5  p r o v i d i n g f o r  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n s t i t u e n t  a n d t h e
ministrant  functions  is  irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing
complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete.” 
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant
consideration. There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency.
As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA
case.  The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between
constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It
does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct
respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage
of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

• VFP v. Reyes, 483 SCRA 526 *

Facts:
 Page 19 of 91

The VFP is a corporate body duly organize under RA 2640. One of its purpose is to provide
benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their
surviving spouses and orphans.Respondent issued a department circular asking for the
information and report of the VFP and Phil. Vetarans Bank believing that it is a Public
Corporation under the Secretary of National Defense. Subsequently, Respondent issued an
order directing the conduct of a management audit of the VFP. The VFP now questions the
department circular and claims that there is erroneous exercise of supervision and control for it
is not a public nor a governmental entity but a private organization on the grounds that: 1. It
does not possess a portion sovereign power, 2. It’s funds are not public funds, 3. That it is
civilian federation of veterans voluntarily formed by the veterans themselves, 4. The
Administrative Code does not state that the VFP is under the Department of National Defense,
5. And that the DBM declared that the VFP is a non-government organization.
Issue:
Issue:  Whether  or not veterans  federation  created  by law is  a public  office, considering that it
does not possess a portion of the sovereign functions of the government and considering
further that, it has no budgetary appropriation from DBM and that its funds come  from
membership dues.

Ruling: 
Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public office is defined as the right,
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the
public. In the instant case, the functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war veterans
which promotes social justice and reward patriotism – certainly fall within the category of
s o v e r e i g n f u n c t i o n s .  T h e f a c t t h a t V F P h a s  n o b u d g e t a r y
appropriation  is  only  a  product  of  erroneous  application  of  the law  by  public officers in the
DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and
supervision of DND is proper.

• Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, 499 SCRA 375 *

FACTS: Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia
were charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted
the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS.
Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information
and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was
later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan
sustained Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal case. Upon denial
of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.
RULING: NO! THE AFP-RSBS IS A GOVERNMENT ENTITY. It was created by Presidential
Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly
 Page 20 of 91

excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel,
who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS
for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. Its enabling law further mandates that the
System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him
and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of
funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for
the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from
appropriations. While it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution
of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in
order to provide additional benefits to them. The above considerations indicate that the
character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold
that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.

• Javier v. Sandiganbayan, 579 SCRA 324 *

FACTS:

Javier was charged with malversation of public funds. Javier was the private sector
representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development
Act”. R.A. No. 8047 provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven
(11) members who are appointed by the President, five (5) of whom come from the government,
while the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book
publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private education
sector.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. In an
Information dated February 18, 2000, Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated
February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear the case as the information did not allege that she is a
public official who is classified as Grade “27” or higher. Neither did the information charge her
as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee and
that she belongs to the NBDB only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence,
she may not be charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed that
she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power to
speak of – that she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as
participant in the government’s book development policy.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javier’s motion.
Javier filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Javier hinges her petition on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft
 Page 21 of 91

and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She
advanced the following arguments in support of her petition, to wit: first, she is not a public
officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2) informations, which is in violation of
her right against double jeopardy.
Issue:
1. Is a private sector representative to the board a public officer? 


2. WON there is double jeopardy. 


Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that Javier was a public officer:

To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a
private sector representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic
purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for
the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the
President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for
the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was
enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for
the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the
Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. . .
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the
nature of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a
public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB,
the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that
the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the
book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact
that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of
the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was
appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was
enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one
body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that
they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate
the book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-
Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed
to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the
NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a
public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section
7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such
 Page 22 of 91

allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent
laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one’s appointment,
and whether the compensation one receives from the government is only nominal, is immaterial
because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of
R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public
functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or
classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of
several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the
country in the canceled book fair in Spain.
In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer.
On the issue of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no double
jeopardy.
Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses
penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for
double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the
instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law.
She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had
filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach
considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein
petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.
It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated
without his express consent.[38] The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at
bar.

• MIAA v. CA, 495SCRA 591 *

Facts:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA). As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the
land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred
to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land.The MIAA Charter further provides that no
portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode
unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real
estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated
with... respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then
 Page 23 of 91

paid some of the real estate tax already due. MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque
The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and
Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with the Court of
Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction. The petition sought to restrain the
City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying... against, and auctioning for public
sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary
period. It also denied the motion for reconsideration. MIAA insists that it is exempt from real
estate tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code because the Airport Lands and
Buildings are owned by... the Republic.
To justify the exemption, MIAA invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself.
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew the
tax exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled corporations" upon the
effectivity of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws.

Ruling:
Yes. First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of
the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of
MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a
government-owned or controlled corporation. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only
governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of
eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges.

• Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011 *
FACTS: 

The COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under
Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No.
7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a "government-
controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and that
"the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987
Administrative Code."

ISSUE: Does COA have jurisdiction over BSP?




HELD: After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the
applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, [the Supreme Court found] that the BSP is a
 Page 24 of 91

public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.



The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled "An Act
to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define
its Powers and Purposes" created the BSP as a "public corporation"



There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as
presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,falls under the second classification.Article
44 reads:



Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:



(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2)Other corporations,institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations forprivate interest or purposeto which the law
grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member.



The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law
creating it under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides:



Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the
laws creating or recognizing them.



Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.



Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of
this Code concerning partnerships.



The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to
implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:



Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate
in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.



and governed by Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public
purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of "public corporations"
defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code the law which creates it, pursuant to Article
45 of the same Code. DENIED.

• Funa v. MECO and COA, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014 *

Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus by the petitioner compelling COA to audit and examine the
funds of Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO).
MECO is non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under the Corporation Code. It has been
entrusted by the PH gov’t with the responsibility of fostering friendly and unofficial relations
 Page 25 of 91

with the people of Taiwan, particularly in areas of trade, economic cooperation, investment,
cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges. It was authorized by the gov’t to perform certain
consular and other functions that relates to the promotion, protection, and facilitation of PH
interests in Taiwan.
Petitioner invokes that MECO be audited by COA, contending that it is a GOCC, since it is
under the operational supervision of DTI, and thus subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as “taxpayer, concerned citizen, a member of the PH
Bar, and a law book author.” He posits that by failing to audit the accounts of MECO, COA is
neglecting its duty under Sec. 2(1) of Art. IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an
otherwise bona fide GOCC or gov’t instrumentality.
COA argues that petitioner lacks locus standi to bring the suit, the petitioner having not shown
that he had been aggrieved or prejudiced by its failure to audit the accounts of MECO. It also
argues that the petition has already become moot when COA Chairperson Pulido-Tan directed a
team of auditors to proceed to Taiwan to audit MECO, among others. COA clarifies that it does
not consider MECO as GOCC or gov’t instrumentality, and maintains that it is a non-
governmental entity. Despite being a non-governmental entity, MECO may still be audited with
respect to the “verification fees” for overseas employment documents that it collects from
Taiwanese employers in behalf of DOLE. COA claims that under Joint Circular No. 3-99, MECO
is mandated to remit to DOLE a portion of such verification fees. The COA, therefore, classified
MECO as a non-governmental entity required to pay xxx government share subject to partial
audit of its account under PD 1445 (State Audit Code of PH).
Issues:
1. WON petitioner has standing to file the instant mandamus petition (related to the topic)
2. WON the petition has become moot and academic
3. WON MECO is subject to audit by COA
Held:
1. Yes. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
a. The case involve constitutional issues;
b. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of pubic funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional;
c. For voters, there must be showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question;
d. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
e. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
The instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are with the
performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA. thus, petitioner, as a
concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the instant mandamus petition.
Petitioner does not need to make any prior demand on MECO or the COA in order to maintain
the instant petition. The duty of the COA sought to be compelled by mandamus emanates from
the Constitution and law, which explicitly require or demand that it perform the said duty. To
the mind of this Court, petitioner already established his cause of action against COA when he
alleged that COA had neglected its duty in violation of the Constitution and the law.
2. Yes, but SC refused to dismiss outright the instant petition. The mandamus petition was able
to craft substantial issues presupposing the commission of a grave violation of the Constitution
and involving paramount public interest, which need to be resolved nonetheless.
 Page 26 of 91

3. Yes, but only with respect to the verification and consular fees it collects in behalf of PH gov’t.
Moreover, MECO is neither a GOCC nor a gov’t instrumentality. It is a Sui generis entity.

• Phil. Society v. COA, 534 v. 112 *

Facts:
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January
19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. Both the SEC and the Corporation Law are not yet in
existence at the time of the Petitioner’s incorporation. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in
Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the
protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things
which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.
Subsequently, the COA issued a memorandum asserting that Petitioner is subject to its audit
authority being a body politic exercising a portion of sovereign authority, that is, it is tasked to
enforce the laws for the protection and welfare of animals which ultimately redound to the
public good and welfare.
Issue:
Whether Petitioner is a body politic exercising a portion of sovereign power and thus under the
audit authority of COA
Held:
No. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that
circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be
private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the
public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are
private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other
eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they
are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations
are utility, railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and
transportation companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of
private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the
public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation. The true
criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the
totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as
the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions,
then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private.

• Serana v. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 224 *

FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada  as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term.
Petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman. Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President
Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the
proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of
the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and
the  Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils
 Page 27 of 91

within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her
brother Jade Ian D. Serana for  estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent, claiming that she was not a public officer since she
merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a
student regent.
The OMB opposed the motion. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of
administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP.The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a public officer.
 
RULING:
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in
the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

• People v. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476 *

This is a case of Loreta Gozo, convicted of violation of City Ordinance of Olongapo challenging
the higher court decision on constitutionality in relation to “Jurisdiction” based on Article 3-
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and in relation to “Due Process” which is based on
Article 4 – Bill of Rights citing the case of People vs. Fajardo.
Facts:

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation Area within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the old house and built another one in
its place without building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo.
On Dec. 29, 1966, her four (4) carpenters were apprehended while working on the house of the
accused by the personnel of City Engineering Office and Olongapo City Police Force and
brought to the City for interrogation.
After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No.14
series of 1964 with the City Fiscal’s Office. The City Court found her guilty of violating
 Page 28 of 91

Municipal Ordinance No.14, Series of 1964 and sentenced her to imprisonment of one (1) month
as well as to pay the costs.
She elevated the case to the Court of First Instance invoking “due process” citing the case of
People vs. Fajardo which was taken out of context thus affirmed the decision of the City Court
convicting her of violation of city ordinance for failing to secure mayor’s permit before
constructing her new house. She appealed her case to the Court of Appeal, this time invoking
that the ordinance is not applicable to her because it is located inside the United States Military
Reservation Area which was within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, the decision of the court is unconstitutional on ground of “jurisdiction”
and “due process”.
Rulings:
1. The court has legal basis in convicting Loreta Gozo for violating the City Ordinance of not
securing mayor’s permit for building construction. Municipalities
and cities have the authority to enact ordinances in lieu of statutory powers vested upon. They
are considered as municipal corporations and as such the authority is predicated upon general
welfare clause. The general welfare clause is wide in scope, well nigh all embracing, covering
every aspect of public health, public morals, public safety and the well being and good order of
the community. Municipal corporations’ authority is subject to limitations. If its exercise is in
violation of any constitutional right, then its validity could be challenge. At the very least, its
applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned.
Loreta Gozo challenged the applicability of the ordinance invoking “due process”, a contention
premise on jurisprudence, People vs. Fajardo. The cited jurisprudence was taken out of context
in the sense that the applicability of the ordinance presented some element of oppression to
Fajardo. In Loreta Gozo’s case, the element of oppression is not present and thus her contention
has no leg to stand.
2. ExtentofPhilippineSovereigntyoverAmericanBases:

It should be noted in the Agreement that Philippine Government merely consents that
the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as
a matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested
itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional
rights not granted but also such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of. 


3. Municipalcorporationretainsadministrativejurisdiction.

What was sought to weaken this case is the so called administrative jurisdiction of a
municipal corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are
vested upon, it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority not therein conferred,
whether expressly or impliedly belongs to the national government and not to an alien
country. 


Decision:
The higher court affirmed the decision of the lower courts as it found Loreta Gozo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.14, Series of 1964.

• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 *

 Page 29 of 91

FACTS: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution,
then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the
PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in
the active service or retired.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). Later, the AFP Board issued
a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search
warrant captioned “Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” The raiding team seized
the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search
warrant. The raiding team seized firearms, jewelry, and land titles.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
(“RA No. 1379”) against Ramas. The complaint was amended to include Elizabeth Dimaano, the
alleged mistress of Ramas, as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.” The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.
Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because
there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated, among others.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure “on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.” Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were “taking power in the name
and by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents’ exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies
only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken
from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure,
private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal
HELD: The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT legal.
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance
of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.“  The resulting government was indisputably a
 Page 30 of 91

revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty

obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines,
assumed under international law.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission
on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by
mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
The protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained in effect
during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.”
The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the UDHR did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only a UDHR, the Court has interpreted the
UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.
Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the
rights of individuals under the UDHR.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations
under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that
the Court considers the UDHR as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as
human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the ICCPR. The
fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal
law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
 Page 31 of 91

adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.  The Provisional Constitution
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per
se,  and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from
the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

• Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 *

FACTS
Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the CFI of
Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, respondent Judge
Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of
the defunct Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES
I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the American occupation.
II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to
annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the
proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied
or liberated by the American and Filipino forces
HELD
I
AFFIRMATIVE. [A]ll acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. If [the governments established in
these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments], the
judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that
 Page 32 of 91

the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.
II
NEGATIVE. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only
to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional,
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the
Islands during the Japanese occupation.
[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies
his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the
restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military
forces of invasion and occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who
was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United
States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act
against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later
embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907.
III
AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the
invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the
ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect.
[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they (the
municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.”
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to
substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision
of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far
as military necessity will permit.
 Page 33 of 91

Section 2: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Cases here will be assigned under Public International Law lectures

 Page 34 of 91

Section 3: Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of
the State and the integrity of the national territory.

• IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 *

Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings
and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, orderedthe PNP and the Marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the
AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked
to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP
Chief, through Police Chief SuperintendentEdgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000[1](the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
Force Tulungan,would be conducted.[2]Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of
the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of theMarines
in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
PNP Chief.[3]In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and
order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including
increased police patrols.[4]The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the
metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.[5]Invoking his powers as Commander-in-
Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
[6]Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until suchtime when the situation
shall have improved.[7]
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to
uphold the rule of law andthe Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement
Issues: 

1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2, Section
3 of the Constitution;

2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;

3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform
civilian functions of the government

4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under the
Constitution.



The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2)
Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
is subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the
PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP.





Held: 
 Page 35 of 91

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. The

question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same
involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols,
which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.





In view of standing

Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. 



National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the
joint visibility patrols. 



Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional
cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein
the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political questions are
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or
measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of
powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch
unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the
Constitution.





In view of abuse of discretion

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.



President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling the
armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the
resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.   



By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that
is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the President calls the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. 





In view of burden of proof on factual basis

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is,
likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the
power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
 Page 36 of 91

civilian supremacy over the military.




The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military
will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether it is the
calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of
martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the exercise of the President's powers as
commander-in-chief, requires proof — not mere assertion. 4 As has been pointed out, "Standing
is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . . . but requires . . . a factual showing
of perceptible harm." 



Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on these
questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is not even
the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement. We need to
have evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the President's power to call
out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the
limitation that the exercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety. 



Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require
it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The
only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the
President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as
compared to the two other powers.





In view of the Courts concurrence

We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the
light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places.
These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol
procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. 



Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military
in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.



Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." 2 They have
two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act. 3 The exercise of the
 Page 37 of 91

discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch of government was often the area
where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.
 Page 38 of 91

Section 4. prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government
may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.

• Kilosbayan v. Morato, supra.

 Page 39 of 91

Section 6: The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Cases here will be assigned under Article III, Sec. 5 (Freedom of Religion)
 Page 40 of 91

Section 7:

• Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 See MR July 16, 2016)
Facts:
-EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the Philippines
and America wherein it  authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to  and conduct
activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. After eight rounds of negotiations for
two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed
the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It
was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no longer
necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution expresses the "strong
sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted
to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence

Issues:
1. Whether the President may enter into an  executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.
 
2. Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties.

Held:
 Petition DISMISSED.
1. EDCA is constitutional in its arrangement as an executive agreement.

2. It remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
Rationale

The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not  expressly granted by the law,
is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution the law”, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is
legal and necessary for  Philippine defense interests (commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is
considered an executive agreement, therefore may be  bound through the President without
the  need of senatorial votes for its  execution. The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by
long usage.

TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Formal documents which require ratification with Become binding through executive action without
the approval of two-thirds of the Senate the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress

International agreements involving political issues I n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements

or changes of national policy and those involving embodying adjustments of detail, carrying out well
agreements of a permanent character established national policies and traditions and
those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature.
 Page 41 of 91

Considered superior to executive agreements and Must remain traceable to an express or implied
is regarded as being on the same level as a statute authorization under the Constitution, statutes, ort
as they are products of the acts of the Executive reaties
and the Senate

• Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
 Page 42 of 91

Section 8:
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
FACTS :
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military bases
agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory
by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the
Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the
treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels and aircraft.
In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises
between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence and security
relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US
exchanged notes and discussed, among other things,  the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text
and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA.
On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora
officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the
VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999,
the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US
Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under
which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing
grave abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the agreement.

ISSUE :
Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.

RULING :
Petition is dismissed.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes,
reads: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : “After the expiration
in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate
by the other contracting state”.
The first cited provision applies to any form of  treaties and international agreements in general
with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by
the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign
military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some
common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art.
VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.
 Page 43 of 91

Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must
sufficiently meet the following requisites :
a) it must be under a treaty
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress,
ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum
c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State
There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites.  The third requisite implies that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is
inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding
obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of
the constitution.
The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the executive
department as to their power to ratify the VFA.
 Page 44 of 91

Section 12:
• Roe v. Wade, 410 US 390
Brief Fact Summary
Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all
woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing
all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Facts:
Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory
judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent
defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that
she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a
licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and
that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion.
Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the
statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue.
Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her
pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy
protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by
the Ninth Amendment?
Held.
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving
from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law
abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero)
was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established
common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus. Three reasons have been advanced for
the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken
seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure
is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern
medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively
safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the
prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be
prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be
criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate
abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in
promoting the health of the mother.
 Page 45 of 91

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except
where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the
potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to
privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.
Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case
of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to
privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is
narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the
viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.

• Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 *

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution
  
 
Issue/s:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the:

Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
 Page 46 of 91

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude 

HELD:

• Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it
behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
1.  The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
“judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing
operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have
the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.
2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of
the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
3. The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge,
also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the
First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right
of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction,
the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
 Page 47 of 91

fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive

Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
4. The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and
just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to
be taken away before taking action.
5. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
6. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one
title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title
is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
• SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous.”
Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only
after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of implantation
as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not
an inanimate object – it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only
to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine
wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life.
2. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
These provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need
for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions. In Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS, it was stated:
 Page 48 of 91

1.   x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is

necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
–… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing. . . .
2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
3. It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives
or one’s participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church … are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.”
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this
realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority
to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority
to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is
not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will
cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one
render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as
he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A.
Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
1. The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in
the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
2. The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions
 Page 49 of 91

should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative
of the freedom of religion.
3. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and
services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The punishment of
a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional
guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
4. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
5. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the
Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
6. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must
not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health
care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt
an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does
not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the “promotion
and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
 Page 50 of 91

8. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation
or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision,
however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation
with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and
non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to
provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat
is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of
such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does
not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized
that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious
beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.
9. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under
the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health
products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food
and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers
and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the
mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only
food and medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the declared
policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only
those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice, as follows:
1. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have
the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of
health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of
barangay health workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
 Page 51 of 91

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily”
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

• Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 US 510

• Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 LW 4426 *
Brief Fact Summary.  Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to
send their children to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the
constitution.



Synopsis of Rule of Law.  The law compelling parents to send their children to public school
until the age of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the
Amish religious beliefs.


Facts. 
Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion.
Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend
public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to
public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the
 Page 52 of 91

law and fined $5 each.





Issue. 
Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Held. 
The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked
variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment
hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a crucial period in
their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that
the compulsory attendance could result in not only great psychological harm to Amish children
but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community.
The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents to
provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. The State’s power is subject to
a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children.
In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State does not
deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious beliefs
that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.
The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system. Second,
education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We
accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an additional one or two
years of formal high school would do little to serve those interests. Such education may be
necessary for preparation for the modern society in which we live, but is not for the separated
agrarian community of the Amish faith.
The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must be
protected by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a highly
successful social unit within our society, producing productive and law-abiding citizens. The
State also supports its position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave the
Amish community. This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the practical
agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that did choose to leave.
The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed
to not only provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness.
In these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in compelling school attendance is less substantial for
Amish children than for children generally.
The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s
substantive right to a secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as
parens patriae. On this record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish parent’s
are preventing children who wish to further their education from attending school.
Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of the parents and the
State. The children also have a legitimate interest in their education. The inevitable effect of the
 Page 53 of 91

decision is to impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children. It is the future of
the student, not the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. The views of the two children
in question were not canvassed, and should be on remand.



Discussion.  The majority’s decision did not determine that the statute would violate
Constitutional rights if the children wanted to pursue further education, but found that such a
decision was unnecessary because no such claim was made on the record. The dissent
suggested that the cause should be remanded to determine the desire of the children.

• Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629

FACTS:
Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long
Island in New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called
“girlie” magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased
copies of “Sir” and “Mr. Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents to lay the
grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies
of “Man to Man” and “Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in
question contained pictures of nudes, and “Escapade” and “Mr. Annual” contained verbal
descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct.
Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of
age of 1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or
sexual excitement, if these materials were “harmful to minors.” It defined “harmful to minors”
as that quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement,
or sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid
interest of minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
with respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors.
Ginsberg argued that the ordinance violated the constitutional freedom of expression. He
contended that the right to see or read material associated with sex should not be determined
on the person’s age. The trial court deemed the law constitutional and the appellate court
affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was
found guilty on two counts of violating Section 484-h.
ISSUE:
Is the New York ordinance a violation of the constitution?
HELD:
NO.
The Court determined that the concept of obscenity may vary according to whom the material
is directed at. Thus, the state had an interest in preventing such inappropriate material to
recognized vulnerable populations, like minors. It further held that it was reasonable for the
state to consider such material obscene, even if it is not so for adults.
Justice Brennan focused on Ginsberg’s argument that the scope of the constitutional freedom to
read material concerned with sex did not depend upon whether that person was an adult or a
minor. He rejected Ginsberg’s contention that Section 484-h was a violation of minors’
constitutionally protected freedoms, characterizing Section 484-h as New York’s attempt to
adjust the assessment of obscenity in terms of the sexual interests of minors. Justice Brennan
wrote that New York had an interest in the well-being of its children, and that this subject was
within New York’s constitutional power of regulation.
 Page 54 of 91

• Orceo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010

[DOCTRINE: ART II Section 12 Family Life; Mother; Unborn]

FACTS: Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as follows:
(1) Annulling Resolution No.8714 insofar as it includes airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations within the meaning of “firearm,” and declaring the Resolution
as invalid;
(2) ordering the COMELEC to desist from further implementing
Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are
concerned;
(3) ordering the COMELEC to amend Resolution No. 8714 by removing airsoft
guns and their replicas/imitations within the meaning of “firearm”; and
(4) ordering the COMELEC to issue a Resolution directing the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, Philippine National Police and other law enforcement agencies
deputized by the COMELEC to desist from further enforcing Resolution No.
8714 insofar as airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are concerned.
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family
members. Families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to choose and enjoy their
recreational activities. These liberties, Petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the
COMELEC.
Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the
State policies in these constitutional provisions:
(1) Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
(2) Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
(3) Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to x x x sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
COMELEC’s response: We adhere to the aforementioned state policies, but even
constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to some extent to serve
appropriate and important interests.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
PROVISIONS: Resolution No. 8714 is entitled Rules and Regulations on the:
(1) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly
Weapons; and
(2) Employment, Availment or Engagement of the Services of
Security Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections.
It contains the implementing rules and regulations of Sec. 32 (Who May Bear Firearms) and
Section 33 (Security Personnel and Bodyguards) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166,
entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
RULING: NO. The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
including airsoft guns and airguns in the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 for
 Page 55 of 91

purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The COMELEC’s intent in the
inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their resultant coverage by the election gun
ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror
during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a
real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by
the use of a real gun or a recreational gun, which is sought to be averted. Ultimately, the
objective is to ensure the holding of free elections. However, the replicas and imitations of
airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714.
DISPOSITION: 1. PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicas and imitations of
airsoft guns from the term “firearm” is concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns
and airguns are hereby declared excluded from the term “firearm” in Resolution No.
8714.2.
The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft guns from the term
“firearm” in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft guns and airguns are covered by the gun ban during
the election period.
 Page 56 of 91

Section 13:
• Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, supra.
 Page 57 of 91

Section 14:
• Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 173267, June 6, 2013 *
Facts:              
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given time allowance to answer,
the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues:
a) WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
b) WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
c) WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
d) WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
e) WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Held:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not
be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In  Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union,  the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is
 Page 58 of 91

that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as
violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that
by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any
part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws.  The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function.  The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. 
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
 Page 59 of 91

Section 15:
• Imbong v. Ochoa, supra.
 Page 60 of 91

Section 16:
• Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 *
Facts:
The petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The
complaint was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleges that plaintiffs are all citizens of
RP, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforests. The petition bears upon the right of the Filipinos
to a balanced and healthful ecology (under Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution) which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility”
and “inter-generational justice.” They prayed for the cancellations of timber license agreements
(TLA) in the country, and for defendants to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. The petitioners’ cause of action includes, among
others, that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
Respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of action, the petitioners failing to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an environmental right which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the protection
by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.

Issue:
WON petitioners have cause of action under Sec. 16, Art. II of the Constitution

Held:
Yes.
On Intergeneration responsibility (Locus Standi)
The petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations can file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

WON they have cause of action

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right— the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
“Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
 Page 61 of 91

the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Azcuna who sponsored the section
remarked that sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance.
Conformably with the said right, Pres. Cory Aquino promulgated EO 192, Sec. 4 which
expressly mandates DENR as the primary gov’t agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resouces.
It is also to be noted that before the ratification of 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already
paid special attention to the “environmental right” of the present and future generations, such
as PD 1151 (Phil. Environmental Policy) and PD 1152 (Phil. Environmental Code).
Thus the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty— under EO 192 and Administrative Code of 1987— to
protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which the claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

• LLDA v. CA, 231 SCRA 292

FACTS
• The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint with
the  Laguna Lake Development Authority  (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation of the
City Government of Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollution of the
surrounding water.
• LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining the open
dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance
Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR. They also found
the water to have been directly contaminated by the operation of the dumpsite.
• LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other entities
to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other
waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
• The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an action
for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as
the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of
the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
• LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the
review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not
the RTC.
• RTC denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the
case.
• The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the  LLDA has no power
and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
·          The residents seek a review of the decision.
 Page 62 of 91

ISSUE
WoN the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was
injunctive.

THEORY OF THE PARTIES

City Government of  Caloocan: As a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare
provision of the Local Government Code, they have the mandate to operate a dumpsite and
determine the effects to the ecological balance over its territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA: As an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers
and functions by RA No. 4850, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order pursuant to various provisions in EO No. 927.

RULING

YES.

1.        LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human life
and ecological systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution
in the Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.
• While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from
special laws that provide another forum.
• In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass
upon or approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and
agencies within the region and their underlying environmental/ecological
repercussions.
• The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the
DENR acted as intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city
government, LLDA and the residents.

2.        LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
a.        Explicit in the law.
§4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
         While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power “to issue an ex-parte cease and
desist order” in that language, the provision granting authority to “make (…)  orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution”, has the same effect.

b.        Necessarily implied powers.

           Assuming  arguendo  that the cease and desist order” was not expressly conferred by
law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect.
         While it is a fundamental rule that  an administrative agency has only such power as
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express
powers. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency.
         In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the PAB has
the power to issue an  ex-parte  cease and desist order on  prima facie  evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country.
 Page 63 of 91

       LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the
projects within the Laguna Lake region, and this includes the implementation of relevant
anti-pollution laws in the area.
• Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014 *
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for
the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013,
the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in
Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles
east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports
of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan,  Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

HELD:
YES.Petitioners have legal standing
                              Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a
generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court
has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
                              In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a  balanced  and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the  Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
                On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

• Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, G.R. 180771, April 21, 2015 *

FACTS
• On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
 Page 64 of 91

(GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX). 


• The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in
Tañon Strait was conducted. 


• On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Tañon Strait. 


• From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to
determine the area’s underwater composition. 


• During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well.
Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan
where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other
Purposes.” 


• On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait
issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of the latter’s
application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). 


• On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. 


• From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a
depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town. 


• On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that
the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution. 


• The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit
the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their
protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, 


non-governmental organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region
VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
- A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish catch by
50-70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef.
 Page 65 of 91

- The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public consultations and
discussions prior to its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions,
and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7- kilometer radius from
the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius exclusion
zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
• The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of
Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the
alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations are:
• -   The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the
petition. 


• -  SC-46 is constitutional. 


• -  The ECC was legally issued. 


• -  The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 


June 2008. 

1. WONthecaseismootandacademic 2. WONPetitionershavealegalstanding 3.
WONSC-46isunconstitutional 

RULING 


1. No.TheCourtmakesclearthatthe“mootandacademic”principleisnotamagic formula that

can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of
SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls
within the exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution,
the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest,
and the respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. 


2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases 


ISSUES
allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected baragngays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective
provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be retroactively
 Page 66 of 91

applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested
rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the SC
had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In
Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
3. Yes.Section2,ArticleXIIofthe1987Constitutionprovidesinpart:
“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.” (Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the
President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified of such contract, renders it
null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then Secretary
Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress
was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards
were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and
likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by
ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE,
obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a guide
for the Government when executing service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been
declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management
plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an Environment
Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2nd sub-
phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that no
environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were conducted. Unless
the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were
done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the
 Page 67 of 91

Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration
and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be
done in said protected seascape.

• Paje v. Casino, 749 SCRA 39

FACTS: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental

Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be
implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against
RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual
environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the
respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance
of an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC.
Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC
and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its
amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that
it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan?

RULING:
(1) Yes. A writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage
of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who
invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not
only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at
least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC
and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be
dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the
noble and laudable purposes of the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
(2) As to the claims that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and LGC and that the
LDA, likewise, violated the IPRA Law, we find the same not to be within the coverage of the
writ of kalikasan because, assuming there was non-compliance therewith, no reasonable
connection can be made to an actual or threatened violation of the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
Writ of Kalikasan:

The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/
s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of
damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended “to provide a stronger
defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of
enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen short” and seeks “to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.”
 Page 68 of 91



Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary
remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

• International Service v. Greenpeace, G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015 *

FACTS:
In this case, plaintiffs, a collective of environmental NGO, member of the civil society and
scientist, challenged the decision of granting a Biosafety permits and allowing field test of a new
pest resistant biotechnologically engineered aubergine.
The plaintiffs alleged that the field trials of the bioengineered aubergine were a violation of their
constitutional right to health and balanced ecology because the environmental compliance
certificate No.1151 was not secured prior to the project implementation and because there is no
scientific peer reviewed studies that shows that the Bt gene used in the genetically modified
organism is safe for human consumption and for the environment. Consequently, the plaintiffs
called for the application of the precautionary principle to this case. In addition to that, the
plaintiffs claimed that the field test project did not comply with the required public consultation
under Section 26 & 27 of the Local Government code.
ISSUE: W/N the constitutional right to health and balanced ecology of plaintiffs were violated
CFI & CA Decision:
The plaintiffs prevailed and the judges applied the principle of precaution and issued a writ of
kalikasan against the defendants, namely the authorities in charge of delivering the different
permits such as the Environmental Management Bureau, the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority,
and the promoter of the bioengineered aubergines : the University of the Philippines Los Baños,
the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications.
The defendants appealed the decision arguing that they had respected all measures of
environmental law and that there was no evidence that the Bt gene of the aubergine could cause
any environmental damage or prejudice the life, health and property of the neighbouring
inhabitants.
SC Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the previous court and held that the risk of
releasing biotechnological plants in a biodiversity rich country like the Philippines was too high
because the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would
be disastrous and irreversible. At the same time, the Supreme Court considered that there was a
preponderance of evidence that GMO could be a threat to both ecosystems and health. As a
result, the Supreme Court supported the application of the precautionary principle and upheld
the previous court decisions and dismissed the appeal.
• West Tower v. PIC, 798 SCRA 292 *
Facts:
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan filed following the leak in the oil pipeline owned
by First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati City. The two pipelines were
supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety allowance against
leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than
twice the current operating pressure and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is
 Page 69 of 91

deeper than the US Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 meters. In May 2010, however,
a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair.
Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to
prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units
on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut down. Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any
leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of WestTower shouldered the expenses of hauling
the waste water from its basement, which eventually required the setting up of a treatment
plant in the area to separate fuel from the waste water.
FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL. West Tower Condominium
Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding
communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City prayed that respondents FPIC and its board of
directors and officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board of directors and officers be
directed to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in the
performance of... their functions as a common carrier; (2) continue to check the structural
integrity of the whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same; (3) make periodic reports
on their findings with regard to the 117-kilometer pipeline and their replacement of the same;
(4) rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal and West Tower, at
least to what it was before the signs of the leak became manifest; and (5) to open a special trust
fund to answer for similar and future contingencies in the future. Furthermore, petitioners...
pray that respondents be prohibited from opening the pipeline and allowing the use thereof
until the same has been thoroughly checked and replaced, and be temporarily restrained from
operating the pipeline until the final resolution of the case.
Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file
their respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from
operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of
the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any
untoward incident that may result from any... leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon
within 60 days from receipt thereof.
FPIC directors alleged that: petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is no
allegation that the environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or
provinces; and the continued operation of the pipeline should be allowed in the interest of
maintaining... adequate petroleum supply to the public. Verified Return claiming that not all
requirements for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan are present and there is no showing that
West Tower Corp. was authorized by all those it claimed to represent.

Issue:
Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower
and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the
condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units
at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was
shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to
 Page 70 of 91

their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real
parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit
owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a
condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4 726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act,43 it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant
case, the condominium corporation .is the management body of West Tower and deals with
everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing
of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly
put by the CA, not measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but
on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.
a While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as
The Condominium Act,[43] it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the
instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals
with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users. Nowhere
did We apply the precautionary principle in deciding the issue on the WOPL’s structural
integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human
activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be
established with full scientific certainty. the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of
the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that the
creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby
DENIED. Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification is PARTLY GRANTED.
Precautionary Principle, provides that “[w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court... shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.” claim for damages, which is
prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

• LNL Archipelago v. Agham, G.R. 2091651, April 12, 2016 *

Facts:
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in
Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in
Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and other
minerals extracted from the mines and make the venture economically feasible.
LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port project:
LAMI stated that Mayor Marty unduly favored some mining companies in the municipality and
allegedly refused to issue business and mayor's permits and to receive payment of occupation
fees from other mining companies despite the necessary national permits and licenses secured
by the other mining companies.
On 24 April 2012, Mayor Marty issued an order directing LAMI to refrain from continuing with
its clearing works and directed the Sta. Cruz Municipal Police Chief Generico Binan to
implement his order.
Thereafter, Rep. Dan Fernandez, a member of the Committee on Ecology of the House of
Representatives, passed House Resolution No. 117 (HR 117) entitled "Resolution Directing the
Committee on Ecology to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Implementation of
 Page 71 of 91

Republic Act No. 7942, Otherwise Known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Particularly on
the Adverse Effects of Mining on the Environment."
The DENR PENRO team found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC.
Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV) dated 1 June 2012 was issued against LAMI for
violation of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from further
constructing and developing until such time that the ECC conditions were fully complied.
On 8 June 2012, a technical conference was held where LAMI presented its reply to the NOV.
The DENR-EMB R3 ascertained that LAMI's violations of the four conditions of its ECC
constitute minor violations since they only pertain to non-submission of documents.
However, the leveling of the elevated portion of the area was a major violation.
On 11 June 2012, LAMI wrote a letter to the DENR-EMB R3 regarding the commitments agreed
upon during the technical conference. LAMI signified compliance with the conditions of DENR-
EMB R3.
The composite team found that LAMI's activities in its property would not result to any
environmental damage to its surrounding communities.
Thereafter, the DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to have
complied with the requirements.
Meanwhile, earlier, or on 6 June 2012, respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its
President, former Representative Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the Zambales Police Provincial
Office (ZPPO).
Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner. The appellate court found that the
government, through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to cut trees and LAMI strictly followed the
proper guidelines stated in the permit.
Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
In an Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
its original Decision dated 23 November 2012.

Issues:
WON
1. LAMI violated the environmental laws (Revised Forestry Code, and Philippine Mining Act)
as alleged by Agham— NO
2. LAMI flattened any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces — NO

Ruling:
1. NO. Since LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by the CENRO and even passed the
evaluation conducted after the issuance of the permit, then clearly LAMI had the authority
to cut trees and did not violate Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

LAMI did not also violate Sec. 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act. First, LAMI is not
conducting any mining activity on the port site. LAMI’s mine site is about 25 kilometers away
from the port site. Second, LAMI secured all the necessary permits and licenses for the
construction of a port and LAMI’s activity was limited to preparatory works for the port’s
construction. The Philippine Mining Act deals with mining operations and other mining
activities. Sections 57 and 69 deal with the development of a mining community and
environmental protection covering a mineral agreement or permit.
Here, Agham reasoned that LAMI was destroying the environment by cutting mountain trees
and leveling a mountain to the damage and detriment of the residents of Zambales and the
 Page 72 of 91

nearby towns of Pangasinan. Agham simply submitted a picture taken on 4 June 2012 where
allegedly the backhoes owned by LAMI were pushing the remnants of the mountain to the sea.
This explanation, absent any concrete proof, is untenable.
Clearly, Agham did not give proper justifications for citing Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine
Mining Act. Agham did not even present any evidence that LAMI violated the mining law or
any mining undertakings in relation to LAMI’s construction of a port facility. Agham only
alleged in very general terms that LAMI was destroying the environment and leveling a
mountain without conducting any scientific studies or submitting expert testimonies that would
corroborate such allegations.
The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1)
environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission
complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

2. NO. Agham, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not cite any law
allegedly violated by LAMI in relation to this claim. Agham did not present any proof to
demonstrate that the local residents in Zambales, and even the nearby towns of Pangasinan,
complained of any great danger or harm on the alleged leveling of the land formation which
may affect their lives, health or properties. Neither was there any evidence showing of a
grave and real environmental damage to the barangay and the surrounding vicinity.

To belie Agham’s contentions, the records, from the testimonies of those experts in their fields,
show that there is in fact no mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

Principles:
Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.Section 1,
Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy:

(1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology;
(2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or private individual or entity; and
(3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
 Page 73 of 91

forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
 Page 74 of 91

Section 18
• PNB v. Padao, G.R. No. 180849, November 2011
MAIN POINT: While the 1987 Constitution underscores the protection and importance and
economic significance of labor when it declared in Art II, Section 18 that it affirms labor as a
primary social economic force, and as such, the State is bound to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare, it is also an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its
employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest.

FACTS:
Dan Padao was a credit and loan officer in PNB Dipolog who was allegedly involved in the
granting of behest loans, where the collateral was over appraised and the credit standings of the
loan applicants were fabricated allowing them to obtain larger loans from PNB causing PNB to
suffer millions in losses. After due investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of gross and habitual
neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the banks Board
of Directors but was ignored. So after almost 3 years, Padao filed a complaint against the PNB
with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. IX in Zamboanga City for  reinstament,
backawages, illegal dismissal and treachery/badfaith and palpable discrimination in the
Treatment of Employees with administrative cases. 
The ELA found the dismissal valid but still awarded separation pay of one-half (1/2)
months pay for every year of service, citing PLDT v. NLRC & Abucay. And further stating that
in the case of Padao, there was no clear conclusive showing of moral turpitude and thus he
should not be left without any remedy.
  Padao appealed to the NLRC which reversed and declared Padao’s dismissal to be
illegal. He was ordered to be reinstated to his previous position without loss of seniority rights
and PNB was ordered to pay him full backwages and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary award.
 PNB filed an MR but was denied by the NLRC and thus it filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Padao was illegally dismissed by PNB.

HELD:

NO. Padao was not illegally dismissed by PNB as he was terminated under an authorized or
just cause as laid down in Article 282 (b - Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties) of the Labor Code which . While the 1987 Constitution underscores the protection and
importance and economic significance of labor when it declared in Art II, Section 18 that it
affirms labor as a primary social economic force, and as such, the State is bound to protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare, it is also an employer’s basic right to freely select
or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its
interest. Thus the law sets the valid grounds for termination as well as the proper procedure to
be followed when terminating the services of an employee in the Labor Code of the Philippines
 Page 75 of 91

Section 19:
• Garcia v. BOI, 191 SCRA 288 *
FACTS:
1. In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, the petitioner, as congressman for the second district of Bataan, assails
the approval by the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) of the amended application for registration of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation, which seeks to transfer the site of its petrochemical
complex from Bataan, the original situs of choice, to the province of Batangas
.
2. The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC for short) is a wholly government-owned
corporation, located in Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of
naphtha.

Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical
Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic
producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. One
of the terms and conditions for the registration of the project was the use of
"naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant.
The petrochemical project was to be a joint venture with PNOC.

3. However, in February 1989, A. T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation,

the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose
Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989, advising him of BPC’s desire to
amend the original registration certificate of its project by changing the job site
from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas (Annex F, p. 51, Rollo). News of the shift was
published by one of the major Philippine dailies which disclosed that the cause
of the relocation of the project is the insurgency and unstable labor situation in
Bataan. The presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot
owned by the Pilipinas Shell Corporation was another consideration.chanrobles
vi

4. On May 25, 1989, the BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC’s
petrochemical project





ISSUES:

Whether or not BOI and DTI gravely abused their discretion:

(a) in not observing due process in approving without a hearing, the

revisions in the registration of the BPC’s petrochemical project;



(b) in refusing to furnish the petitioner with copies of BPC’s application
for registration and its supporting papers in violation of the
Government’s policy of transparency;



(c) in approving the change in the site of BPC’s petrochemical plant from
 Page 76 of 91

Bataan to Batangas in violation of PD Nos. 949 and 1803 which establishes

Lamao, Limay, Bataan as the "petrochemical industrial zone

HELD:

This Court is not about to delve into the economics and politics of this case. It is concerned
simply, with the alleged violation of due process and the alleged extra limitation of power and
discretion on the part of the public respondents in approving the transfer of the project to
Batangas without giving due notice and an opportunity to be heard to the vocal opponents of
that move.

Since the BPC’s amended application (particularly the change of location from Bataan to
Batangas) was in effect a new application, it should have been published so that whoever may
have any objection to the transfer may be heard. The BOI’s failure to publish such notice and to
hold a hearing on the amended application deprived the oppositors, like the petitioner, of due
process and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOI.



There is no merit in the public respondents’ contention that the petitioner has "no legal interest"
in the matter of the transfer of the BPC petrochemical plant from the province of Bataan to the
province of Batangas. The provision in the Investments Code requiring publication of the
investor’s application for registration in the BOI is implicit recognition that the proposed
investment or new industry is a matter of public concern on which the public has a right to be
heard. And, when the BOI approved BPC’s application to establish its petrochemical plant in
Limay, Bataan, the inhabitants of that province, particularly the affected community in Limay,
and the petitioner herein as the duly elected representative of the Second District of Bataan
acquired an interest in the project which they have a right to protect. Their interest in the
establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst is actual, real, and vital because it will
affect not only their economic life but even the air they will breathe.
Hence, they have a right to be heard or "be consulted" on the proposal to transfer it to another
site for the Investments Code does require that the "affected communities" should be consulted.

The petitioner’s request for xerox copies of certain documents filed by BPC together with its
original application, and its amended application for registration with BOI, may not be denied,
as it is the constitutional right of a citizen to have access to information on matters of public
concern under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The confidentiality of the records
on BPC’s applications is not absolute for Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides
that they may be disclosed "upon the consent of the applicant, or on orders of a court of
competent jurisdiction." As a matter of fact, a xerox copy of BPC’s position paper dated April 10,
1989, in support of its request for the transfer of its petrochemical plant to Batangas, has been
submitted to this Court as Annex A of its memorandum.



However, just as the confidentiality of an applicant’s records in the BOI is not absolute, neither
is the petitioner’s right of access to them unlimited. The Constitution does not open every door
to any and all information. "Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc. is
subject to limitations as may be provided by law (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny" (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
150 SCRA 530). The trade secrets and confidential, commercial and financial information of the
applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security are excluded from the privilege.
 Page 77 of 91

• Tanada v. Angara, supra.

 Page 78 of 91

Section 21:
• Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011
MAIN POINT: While the 1987 Constitution underscores the protection and importance and
economic significance of labor when it declared in Art II, Section 18 that it affirms labor as a
primary social economic force, and as such, the State is bound to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare, it is also an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its
employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest.

FACTS:
Dan Padao was a credit and loan officer in PNB Dipolog who was allegedly involved in the
granting of behest loans, where the collateral was over appraised and the credit standings of the
loan applicants were fabricated allowing them to obtain larger loans from PNB causing PNB to
suffer millions in losses. After due investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of gross and habitual
neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the banks Board
of Directors but was ignored. So after almost 3 years, Padao filed a complaint against the PNB
with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. IX in Zamboanga City for  reinstament,
backawages, illegal dismissal and treachery/badfaith and palpable discrimination in the
Treatment of Employees with administrative cases. 
The ELA found the dismissal valid but still awarded separation pay of one-half (1/2)
months pay for every year of service, citing PLDT v. NLRC & Abucay. And further stating that
in the case of Padao, there was no clear conclusive showing of moral turpitude and thus he
should not be left without any remedy.
  Padao appealed to the NLRC which reversed and declared Padao’s dismissal to be
illegal. He was ordered to be reinstated to his previous position without loss of seniority rights
and PNB was ordered to pay him full backwages and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary award.
 PNB filed an MR but was denied by the NLRC and thus it filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Padao was illegally dismissed by PNB.

HELD:

NO. Padao was not illegally dismissed by PNB as he was terminated under an authorized or
just cause as laid down in Article 282 (b - Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties) of the Labor Code which . While the 1987 Constitution underscores the protection and
importance and economic significance of labor when it declared in Art II, Section 18 that it
affirms labor as a primary social economic force, and as such, the State is bound to protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare, it is also an employer’s basic right to freely select
or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its
interest. Thus the law sets the valid grounds for termination as well as the proper procedure to
be followed when terminating the services of an employee in the Labor Code of the Philippines
 Page 79 of 91

Section 25: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

• Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

FACTS: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for
being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the
people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only
106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the
LGC.
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the
intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application
of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in
the instant case.


ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 valid.


RULING: Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-
fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express
provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it
into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
-DISCUSSION/RULING RE:LOCAL AUTONOMY-
In  Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011),  the Honorable Supreme
Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared VALID.
 Page 80 of 91

According to the SC, “with respect to the creation of  barangays, land area is not a
requisite indicator of viability.  However, with respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.”
“But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1)
or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section
442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”
xxx “There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities
and municipalities, but not to provinces.  In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form
part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities.It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the
exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative
intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR.”
xxx“Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective
local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The
strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-
productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that
consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of
islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the
minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the
LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000
square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean
that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous
land area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of
self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the
constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-
square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies
of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.”
xxx “What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking
into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than
the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere  fait accompli  circumstances
which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.” (Navarro vs. Executive
Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011)
 Page 81 of 91

• Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

 Page 82 of 91

Section 26: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

• Pamatong v. COMELEC, 427 SCRA 96 *

FACTS:



Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.



Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all
the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for
the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.




ISSUE:



Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?




RULING:



No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject
to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.



The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.



Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as
written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is
difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
 Page 83 of 91

inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.



The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.



The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed
at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.



The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception
of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is
a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Navarro v. Ermita, supra.
Facts:
RA 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, was passed and ratified through
plebiscite. Petitioner sought to nullify for being unconstitutional. They pointed out that when
the law was passed, Dinagathad a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population
of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section
461 of the LGC, on both counts. For the creation of a Province under the LGC, the land area
must be at least 2,000 sq. km. and a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants. Respondents,
however, claimed that the Dinagat Island, composing of 2 or more island, should be exempt
from land area requirement as provided by LGC-IRR.
Issue:
Whether RA 9355 is unconstitutional in violation of the requirements under the Local
Government Code
Held:
RA 9355 is constitutional. In creation of a Province under the LGC, the exemption of the
requirement of land area where the proposed province is composed of one or more islands is
absent unlike in the creation of Barangay, Municipality, or City. However, the LGC-IRR provides
 Page 84 of 91

for the exemption of the requirement of land are in the creation of a province composed of one
or more island. There is disparity between LGC and LGC-IRR.
The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic
viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their
constituents.The primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability and not land area or population. The land area, while considered
as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat
cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of ₱82,696,433.23 at
the time of its creation, four times the required annual income in the LGC. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Upon examination of the disparity, the SC concluded that the exemption was inadvertently
omitted. This was addressed by the oversight committee and the exemption was expressly
inserted in the LGC-IRR. Dinagat Islands, composed of 1 or more island, is exempt from land
area requirement.

• Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

NATURE: These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’
chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least  P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493  – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566  - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions
of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,  be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President
Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES: xxx
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members
of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention
of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
 Page 85 of 91

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)


RULING: At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said
provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to
be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the
Court must defer from ruling on this issue.


In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.

 Page 86 of 91

Section 27:
• Dimapilis-Baldoz v. COA, G.R. No. 199114, June 16, 2013
FACTS:

Labrador was the former Chief of the POEAs Employment Services Regulation Division
(ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered
his dismissal from service as he was found to have bribed a certain Madoline Villapando, an
overseas Filipino worker, in the amount ofP6,200.00 in order to expedite the issuance of her
overseas employment certificate.
Aside from the foregoing administrative proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was
instituted against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999,
the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated a Decision,convicting him of the aforementioned crime.
Labrador applied and was subsequently granted probation which then suspended te execution
proceedings.
The SB, however, withheld the approval of the recommendation that the probation be
terminated and Labrador be discharged from its legal effects and, instead, issued a Resolution
stating that Labradors application for probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his
previous appeal from his judgment of conviction, in violation of Section 4 of the Probation Law.
Almost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV, Crescencia L. Escurel, issued
an Audit Observation Memorandum which contained her audit observations on the various
expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries and benefits to Labrador for the
period covering August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. Consequently, it ordered Dimapilis-Baldoz,
among other POEA employees, personally liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly
received by Labrador in the amount ofP1,740,124.08, paid through various checks issued from
August 1999 to March 15, 2004.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the COAs disallowance in this
case.

2. Whether or not Dimapilis may be held liable for the salaries paid to Labrador
HELD: No.
Political Law- COA has the authority to rule on the legality of the disbursement of
government funds.
COAs exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life
to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, it has also
been declared that the COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.
Pursuant to its mandate, the COA disallowed the disbursements pertaining to the personnel
benefits paid to Labrador, reasoning that the latter should have stopped reporting for work as
early as June 28, 2000 when the denial of his appeal from the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision
rendered his conviction for the crime of direct bribery final and executory, notwithstanding the
grant of his application for probation. In this regard, it opines that the period of disallowance
should be reckoned from May 3, 2000 which is the date the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision had
become final and executory.
Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of the disallowance is the undisputed
fact that, pursuant to an order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing, Labrador had
already been made to suffer the administrative penalty of dismissal from service on May 2,
1997, which was long before the SB convicted him of direct bribery on August 31, 1999. As a
matter of law, a department secretarys decision confirming the removal of an officer under his
 Page 87 of 91

authority is immediately executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed public
officer.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
COA in fixing the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records
are bereft of any showing that it had any knowledge of Labradors prior dismissal on May 2,
1997. To hold otherwise would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of discretion,
much less countenance a speculative endeavor.
Remedial Law- presumption of good faith
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the
discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted
with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may
result from the performance of an official duty
While admitting that Labrador did indeed continue to report for work despite the SBs August
31, 1999 Decision convicting him of direct bribery, these antecedents show that she merely acted
in good faith and lawfully exercised her duties when she approved the payment of Labradors
salaries, wages, and other personnel benefits for the period beginning August 31, 1999 to March
2, 2004.
To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the salaries and benefits
which Labrador unduly received when he continued to hold office despite his conviction, the
liability for refund cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-Baldoz because she had no knowledge or
any reasonable indication that the payment of salaries to
Labrador was actually improper. Two important incidents impel this conclusion: first,
Labradors 201 File with the POEA was without any record of the SB case; and second,
Dimapilis-Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction when her office was furnished a copy of
the SBs March 2, 2004 Resolution which ordered the revocation of Labradors probation. In
addition, Dimapilis-Baldozs good faith is further strengthened by the fact that she lost no time
in issuing the Separation Order as soon as she was apprised of Labradors situation. Thus,
absent any proof to the contrary, it cannot be gainsaid that Dimapilis-Baldoz's approval was
spurred only by the honest belief that the payment of salaries disbursed to Labrador was due
and owing to him.
COA ruling affirmed with modification as to the personal liability of Dimapilis.
 Page 88 of 91

Section 28:
• Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the  National Economic and Development
Authority  (NEDA), was invited by the respondent  Senate Committees  to attend their joint
investigation on the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This
project was contracted by the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm  Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he
testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then  Commission on
Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange
for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed  President  Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo  about the  bribery  attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring
him to appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary  Eduardo
Ermita  sent a letter dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with
Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the
ground that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the  People’s Republic of China,” and given the confidential nature in
which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot provide the Committee
any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the respondent
Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause
why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20
November. On 29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did
not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not
yet taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself.
He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and that his
conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters
relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the
possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. Respondents
found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and
consequently ordering his  arrest  and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms
until he appears and gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt
Order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid
claim to  executive privilege  in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of  Senate vs.
Ermita  (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006). For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they
did not exceed their authority in issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid
justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In addition, they claimed that the refusal of
petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s right to public information, and
that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means to conceal the criminal
act of bribery in the highest levels of government.
 Page 89 of 91

Issue:
Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered
by  executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees
void.

Held:
The divided  Supreme Court  (voting 9-6)  was convinced that the three questions are covered
by  presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by
the executive department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate
may issue against him for not answering such questions.
The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in
contempt of the Senate Committee and directing his arrest and detention was nullified.
Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements
needed to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are:
1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with
the President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that
the communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process,” and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear
then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being
a member of the President’s Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege
and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch
seeking access to such conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show
a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law
under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative
oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function
of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution itself provides that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.”

• Gamboa v. Teves, supra.

 Page 90 of 91

• Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011 *

Facts:
Ann anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service Commission
Chairperson alleging that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering for public officials with
pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in
information technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in
the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at
the PALD and the Legal Services Division. Within the same day, the investigating team finished
the task. It was found that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to and being
used by the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in
the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the
petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He

asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave,
and that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his relatives and
associates, and that he is not authorize the activities as they are in violation of his constitutional
right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. 
Also, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent are inadmissible as
evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). On 24 July
2007, the CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of the same merits and meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution
was also brought to the CA by herein petitioner.

By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials.  His motion
for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON the search conducted and the copying of petitioner’s files without his knowledge and
consent lawful?

Held:
Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and
seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons for warrantless
searches involving public employees for work related reasons to the case at bar, we now address
the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
 Page 91 of 91

and computer files? (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair reasonable in its inception
and scope?

The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files for he
failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-
issued computer which contained his personal files.  He did not allege that he had a separate
enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors.  He did not use passwords nor adopted any means to
prevent access by others of his computer files. The CSC also implemented a policy which
implies on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business purposes.

The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer
of an employee’s office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in
the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test
of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace.  It bears emphasis that the
Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement.  The nature of the imputation was
serious, as it was grievously disturbing.  If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the Commission
would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions.  It
is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must
be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out.

Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. 
His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section
3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded
to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace
under the aforecited authorities.  We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and
Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child
pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there
being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating
evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint.  This situation clearly falls under the
exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
• Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No. 200238, February 9, 2012 *

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