WEEK 03-05
CASE DIGESTS
(01) Anonuevo vs Heirs of Jalandoni
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
Facts:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate without
an issue.
Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of
Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration with the Court of First Instance, to
commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s estate.
The petitioners and their siblings filed a
Manifestation before the intestate court. In the
Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the
children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)—who, in turn,
was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel)
with one John Desantis.
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their
grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s
death, the legal spouse of the latter. For which reason,
Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
The petitioners and their siblings pray that they be
allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate
proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. As it
was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both
Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the
former predeceasing the latter. The respondent
intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now
represented by Bernardino as its Special
Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed
the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and
their siblings have failed to establish the status of
Isabel as an heir to Rodolfo.
The respondent called attention to the entries in the
birth certificate of Sylvia. As it turned out, the record of
birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of
Isabel and John Desantis. The document also certifies
the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as
"married." The respondent posits that the foregoing
entries, having been made in an official registry,
constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.
According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous
marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was
dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo
bigamous and void ab initio.
Issue:
WON the court was correct in approving the
intervention of petitioners in the settlement
proceedings.
Ruling:
No.
We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that
the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient
evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse
of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and
their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has
interest in Rodolfo’s estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis was adequately established. This holds
true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage
certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on
record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s
birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia
precisely serves as the competent evidence of
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As
mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were
"married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate"
child. In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth
certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis.
(02) People v. Victoriano dela Cruz
GR No. 187683
Facts:
Victoriano is married to Anna. One afternoon,
Victoriano and Anna had an altercation. Victoriano
punched and kicked Anna while they were outside of
their house and then he dragged her inside the house. ,
who was playing tong-its nearby, saw this. Later that
day, Joel saw Victoriano assisting Anna outside of their
house. A asked for the help of Joel. Joel noticed that
blood is coming out of Anna's mouth. Anna died in the
hospital. A was charged with parricide. A testified that
he is married to the victim.
Victoriano argued that he did not intend to
commit so grave a wrong against his wife, evident from
the facts that he carried the injured body of his wife; that
he sought for help after the accident; and that he
brought her to the hospital for medical treatment and at
the time of the incident he was very drunk at the time
although he is not a drink usually. He further argued
that as the actual killing was concerned, Joel's
testimony was merely circumstantial.
On the otherhand the prosecution argued that
all the elements for paricide are present. It is further
argued that based on the circumstantial evidence
available there is no doubt that Victoriano is guilty of the
said crime.
Issue: Whether or not the element of relationship was
sufficiently established
Held:
Yes. The crime of Parricide is defined and
punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased
is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, ora legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
The key element in parricide― other than the fact of
killing ― is the relationship of the offender to the victim.
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the
testimony ofthe accused that he was married to the
victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against penal
interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano
and Anna were husband and wife.
Furthermore, Conviction can be had on the
basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All of
these are present in this case. First, immediately
preceding the killing, Victoriano physically maltreated
his wife, not merely by slapping her as he claimed, but
by repeatedly punching and kicking her. Second, it was
Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their
house, by pulling her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's Report,
Anna sustained injuries in different parts of her body
due to Victoriano's acts of physical abuse. Fourth, the
location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's
intent to kill the victim. Fifth, as found by both the RTC
and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna were inside the
house, other than their young daughter. Thus, it can be
said with certitude that Victoriano was the lone
assailant.
(03) Alejandro Estrada vs. Soledad S. Escritor
A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006
FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of
rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They
allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or
her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus
she should not be allowed to remain employed therein
as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a
widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted
that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and
that they have a son. But as a member of the religious
sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed
on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is
concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they
remain members in good standing in the congregation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found
guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and
immoral conduct.”
RULING:
No. The free exercise of religion is specifically
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words
of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that
the state's interest is important, because our
Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom
sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the
state interest involved in preventing the exemption,
which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit the
fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise
Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the State's broad interest in "protecting
the institutions of marriage and the family," or even "in
the sound administration of justice" that must be
weighed against respondent's claim, but the State's
narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the
cohabitation which respondent's faith finds moral. In
other words, the government must do more than assert
the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must
precisely show how and to what extent those
objectives will be undermined if exemptions are
granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
To paraphrase Justice Blackmun's application of the
compelling interest test, the State's interest in
enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot
be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot
plausibly assert that unbending application of a
criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling
interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that
prohibition.
In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or
bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
The State has never sought to prosecute respondent
nor her partner. The State's asserted interest thus
amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition.
(04) PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.
FACTS: This case involves a contest between two
women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11
November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido
(Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife
of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was
solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
While the a marriage certificate was recorded with the
local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were
destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio
begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in
1954.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to
another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for
being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth
certificate of their children and certificates to the fact
that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the
legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22
September 1989, their marriage having been
celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the
marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s
failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered
as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there
was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla
and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as
husband and wife and begot four children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient
proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well
in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the
legal wife of Eustaquio?
RULING: TECLA
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s
birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without
the marriage certificate, no other proof can be
accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the
parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of
the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by the
eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party
to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the
testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law.
(05) CALIMAG VIRGINIA VS HEIRS OF SILVESTRA
N. MACAPAZ
G.R. No.191936 June 1, 2016
Facts of the case:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated
on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated
September 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173,
an action for annulment of deed of sale and
cancellation of title with damages. The CA Resolution4
dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the
property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra
N. Macapaz (Silvestra)
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr.
(Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia)
(respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother,
Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O.
Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, , is located at No. 1273 Bo.
Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati
City, and was duly registered in the names of the
petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5
In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671
is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela
asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said
property.
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue.
On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a
new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in
the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale
dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly
sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents
submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No.
183088 was an Affidavit dated July 12, 2005
purportedly executed by both the petitioner and
Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of
adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the
Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the
same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005,
Fidela passed away.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that
they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for
Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT
No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and
the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
Issue: whether or not the respondents are legal
heirs of Silvestra.
Contention:
Plaintiff: The respondent assailed the legal capacity of
the respondents to institute the civil action for
cancellation of deed of sale and title on the ground that
they are illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr. that they
have no right over Silvestras estate pursuant to art.
992 of the civil code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of their father and mother.
Petitioner asserts that said documents do not
conclusively prove the respondents legitimate filiation
without offering any evidence to the contrary.
The certificates of live birth contain no entry stating
whether the respondents are of legitimate or
illegitimate filiation making said documents unreliable
and unworthy of weight and value in the determination
of the issue. Moreover, the petitioner states that in
respondents certificates of live birth, only the signature
of fidela appears and that they were not signed by
anastacio. She argues that the birth of certificate must
be signed by the father in order to be competent
evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, invoking roces vs local civil registrar of
manila where it was held that a birth of certificate not
signed by the father is not competent evidence of
paternity!
Respondent: Asserting that they are the heirs of
Silvestra, instituted the action of annulment of deed of
sale and cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with
damages against the petitioner and registry of deeds of
Makati city.
Presented a fax or photocopy of the marriage contract
and the canonical certificate of marriage as proof of
marriage by annastacio and fidela. Also submitted a
certificate of live birth issued by NSO as proof of their
legitimate filiation.
RTC decision: Declaring the deed of sale executed as
null and void and ordering the registrar of deed of
Makati city to cancel the TCT No. 221466 on the basis
of a fraudulent/falsified ded of sale and thereafter to
reinstate the TCT no. 183088 issued in the name of
the petitioner and silvestra with all the liens and
encumbrances annotated including the adverse claim
of fidela
CA decision: Rendered its decision affirming the RTC
decision that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and
the issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the
petitioner were obtained through forgery.
On the issue of legal capacity of the respondents:
The marriage contract in this case clearly reflects a
marriage license number and in the absence of a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued, the marriage between
Anastacio sr. and Fidela may not be invalidated on that
ground.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude
towards marriage is based on prima facie presumption
that a man and women deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.
Here, the fact of marriage between Anastacia and
Fidela was established by competent and substantial
proof. The respondents who were conceived and born
during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore
presumed to be legitimate children in the absence of
any contradicting evidence.
SUPREME COURT decision:
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be
questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, this Court however deems it necessary to
pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so
as to determine their legal rights to the subject
property. Besides, the question of whether the
respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged
heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon
by the parties in the pre-trial.
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage
is not a public document. it has been settled that
church registries of births, marriages, and deaths
made subsequent to the promulgation of General
Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials.34 They are private writings
and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are
all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing
that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical
certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was
duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can
be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's
birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that
consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in
public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."Thus,
being public documents, the respondents' certificates
of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate
must be signed by the father in order to be a
competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find
support in law and jurisprudence. In fact, the
petitioner's reliance on this jurisprudence is misplaced
considering that what was sought to be proved is the
fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not
legitimate filiation.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration
of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall
be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil
register, and only in the registration of birth of an
illegitimate child does the law require that the birth
certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents
of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses
to acknowledge the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753
reads:
 Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -
The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of cither parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local
civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by
the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or
by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned
shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; if) and
such other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate
shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal
in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified, x
xx
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents'
certificates of live birth were duly executed consistent
with the provision of the law respecting the registration
of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the
signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no
moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant
or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as
legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth
also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly
cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years,
as a result of which they had two children — the
second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than
three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact
is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage
this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be
presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony;
b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the
birth and baptismal certificate of children born during
such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.
Moreover, in a catena of cases it has been held that,
"[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation
of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption
accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor
of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded.
Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor
the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case
of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 20, 2009
and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
(06) ABANAG vs. MABUTE
A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011
FACTS: We resolve the administrative case against
Nicolas B. Mabute (respondent), Court Stenographer I
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Paranas,
Samar, filed by Mary Jane Abanag (complainant) for
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.
the complainant filed for Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct, against respondent which courted her and
professed his undying love for her. Relying on
respondent’s promise that he would marry her, she
agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but
after several months into her pregnancy, respondent
brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to
take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not agree,
the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned
her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of her
baby. She also stopped schooling because of the
humiliation that she suffered.
In his comment on the complaint submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator, the respondent
vehemently denied the complainant’s allegations and
claimed that the charges against him were baseless,
false and fabricated, and were intended to harass him
and destroy his reputation. He further averred that
Norma Tordesillas, the complainant’s co-employee,
was using the complaint to harass him. Tordesillas
resented him because he had chastised her for her
arrogant behavior and undesirable work attitude. The
complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself
wrote the letter-complaint
In his Report/Recommendation dated June 7,
2010,2 Executive Judge Avila reported on the
developments in the hearing of the case.
The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the
complainant when he joined the Singles for Christ. He
described their liaison as a dating relationship. He
admitted that the complainant would join him at his
rented room three to four times a week; when the
complainant became pregnant, he asked her to stay
and live with him. He vehemently denied having
brought the complainant to a local "manghihilot" and
that he had tried to force her to abort her baby. He
surmised that the complainant’s miscarriage could be
related to her epileptic attacks during her pregnancy.
Issue:
WON there was a presence of disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
Ruling:
There was NONE
Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is
a bachelor and has maintained an amorous relation
with a woman equally unmarried has nothing to do with
his public employment. The sexual liaison is between
two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy
is but a natural effect of the physical intimacy. Mary
Jane was not forced to live with Nicolas nor was she
impelled by some devious means or machination. The
fact was, she freely acceded to cohabit with him. The
situation may-not-be-so-ideal but it does not give
cause for administrative sanction. There appears no
law which penalizes or prescribes the sexual activity of
two unmarried persons. So, the accusation of Mary
Jane that Nicolas initiated the abortion was calculated
to bring the act within the ambit of an immoral,
disgraceful and gross misconduct. Except however as
to the self-serving assertion that Mary Jane was
brought to a local midwife and forced to take the
abortifacient, there was no other evidence to support
that it was in fact so. All pointed to a harmonious
relation that turned sour. In no small way Mary Jane
was also responsible of what befell upon her.3
The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is
willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.4 To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.5 A grossly immoral act is
one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.6
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the
respondent’s comment, and the findings of the
Investigating Judge, we find that the acts complained
of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly
immoral conduct.
We find it evident that the sexual relations between the
complainant and the respondent were
consensual.lawphi1 They met at the Singles for Christ,
started dating and subsequently became sweethearts.
The respondent frequently visited the complainant at
her boarding house and also at her parents’ residence.
The complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent
and they eventually lived together as husband and wife
in a rented room near the respondent’s office. They
continued their relationship even after the complainant
had suffered a miscarriage.
Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and
consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior.7 The Court
has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a
man and a woman who are not married, where both
are not under any impediment to marry and where no
deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled
act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action.
(07) Rodolfo Espinosa vs Atty. Julieta Omana
A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011
FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and
his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s legal advice on
whether they could dissolve their marriage and live
separately. Omana prepared a document entitled
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal
started implanting the conditions of the said contract.
However, Marantal took custody of all their children and
took possession of most of the conjugal property.
Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow
employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that
the contract executed by Omana was not valid. They
hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against
Omana before the IBP-CBD. Omana denied that she
prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went
to see her and requested for the notarization of the
contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omana
alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she
was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-
time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff
forged her signature and notarized the contract.
ISSUE: W/N Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” W/N the Kasunduaan
ng Paghihiwalay is valid.
HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of
the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public
should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,
which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.
(08) Rosario B. Tambuyat v. Wenifreda B.
Tambuyat
GR No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Facts:
Adriano and Wenifreda, respondent. during marriage,
Adriano acquired real property. The deed of sale over
the said property was signed by Adriano alone as
vendee. One of the signing witness to the dead of sale
was petitioner Roasario Banguis. The TCT of the
subject property was issued under the name of
Adriano Tambuyat married to Rosario Banguis. All this
time Rosario Banguis remained married to Eduardo
Nolasco and was never annulled.
Adriano died intestate.
Wenifreda files for cancellation of the TCT, alleged that
she was the surviving spouse of Adriano, and that
Rosario is still married to Nolasco, thus, could not have
been married to Adriano.
Rosario, denied. She claims she bought the land on
her own. Also that they were married and lived
together and had produced a son.
RTC held: in favor of Wenifreda, TCT was cancelled.
Appealed in CA
CA held: Adriano and Rosario are not co-owners of the
property since they had valid and subsisting marriages
when they conducted their adulterous relation.
Issue: W/n Adriano and Rosario are co-owners of the
property?
Held: No.
Preponderance of evidence points to the fact that
Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano.
Documentary evidence also prove the same that
Adriano was married to Wenifreda and Banguis was
married to Nolasco, thus both being subsisting at the
time of the acquisition of the subject property and
issuance of the certificate title. Thus, it cannot be said
that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to
each other; it cannot even be said that they have a
common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis
cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as
Adriano's spouse; the right and privilege belonged to
Wenifreda alone.
The concept of spouse embraces common law
relationship is not applicable. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not
a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
(09) Republic vs. Tipay
GR No. 209527 February 14, 2018
FACTS:
Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his
birth certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from
"FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name, from
"VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of
birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976." The petition was found
sufficient in form and substance, and the case
proceeded to trial. Soon after, the RTC rendered its
Decision granting Virgel's petition. From this decision,
the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given
due course by the trial court. The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the
change of Virgel's name from Virgie should have been
made through a proceeding under Rule 103, and not
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This argument was
premised on the assumption that the summary
procedure under Rule 108 is confined to the correction
of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes one's
name or date of birth. Since the petition lodged with
the RTC was not filed pursuant to Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, the Republic asserted that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Virgel refuted these arguments, alleging that changes
of name are within the purview of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. He further disagreed with the position
of the Republic and asserted that substantial errors
may be corrected provided that the proceedings before
the trial court were adversarial. He also argued that the
proceedings before the RTC were in rem, which
substantially complies with the requirements of either
Rule 103 or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
However, the CA denied the Republic's appeal in its
Decision stating that while the correction of the entry
on his gender is considered a substantial change, it is
nonetheless within the jurisdiction of the trial court
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The CA also
held that the petition filed with the trial court fully
complied with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule
108 because notices were sent to the concerned local
civil registrar and the OSG.
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CA, the Republic
appealed to this Court insisting that the entries sought
to be corrected are substantial changes outside the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The Republic also
reiterated its earlier arguments, adding that the CA
should not have equated the procedural requirements
under Rule 103 with that of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
WON the petition is correctly filed under Rule 108
HELD:
Yes. The petition is correctly filed under Rule 108.
It is true that initially, the changes that may be
corrected under the summary procedure of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors.
Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a person, are considered substantial
errors that were beyond the purview of the rule.
Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving
room for the correction of substantial errors. The Court
ultimately recognized that substantial or controversial
alterations in the civil registry are allowable in an action
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as long as
the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate
adversarial proceedings— effectively limiting the
application of the summary procedure to the correction
of clerical or innocuous errors.
The RTC was correct in taking cognizance of the
petition for correction of entries in Virgel’s birth
certificate.
R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error
as a mistake committed in. the performance of clerical
work, which is harmless and immediately obvious to
the understanding. It was further amended in 2011,
when R.A. No. 10172 was passed to expand the
authority of local civil registrars and the Consul
General to make changes in the day and month in the
date of birth, as well as in the recorded sex of a person
when it is patently clear that there was a typographical
error or mistake in the entry.
Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition
for correction with the RTC in 2009, R.A. No. 10172
was not yet in effect. As such, to correct the erroneous
gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth certificate, the
proper remedy was to commence the appropriate
adversarial proceedings with the RTC, pursuant to
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The changes in the
entries pertaining to the gender and date of birth are
indisputably substantial corrections, outside the
contemplation of a clerical or typographical error that
may be corrected administratively.
The records of this case show that Virgel complied with
the procedural requirements under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. He impleaded the local civil registrar of
Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, the Solicitor
General, and the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao
Oriental as parties to his petition for correction of
entries.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties who have
a claim or whose interests may be affected were
notified and granted an opportunity to oppose the
petition. Since the Republic was unable to substantiate
its arguments, or even cite a specific rule of procedure
that Virgel failed to follow, the Court has no reason to
depart from the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed
by the CA. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence
refuting Virgel's assertion that he is indeed
phenotypically male, the correction of the entry on
Virgel's sex in his birth certificate, from "FEMALE" to
"MALE," was correctly granted.
With respect to the date of Virgel's birth, the Court
again disagrees with the CA that the alleged date (i.e.,
February 25, 1976) is undisputed. The NSO copy of
Virgel's birth certificate indicates that he was born on
May 12, 1976, a date obviously different from that
alleged in the petition for correction. As a public
document, the date of birth appearing in the NSO copy
is presumed valid and prima facie evidence of the facts
stated in it. Virgel bore the burden of proving its
supposed falsity. Virgel failed to discharge this burden.
The Court is also unconvinced by the other
documentary evidence supposedly showing that Virgel
was born on February 25, 1976 because the
information indicated in the identification card from the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Member Data
Record from the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, were all supplied by Virgel.
Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, G.R. No.
155800 March 10, 2006
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of
Appeals had reversed the judgmentof the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of
Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F.
Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, SC reverses and affirms instead the trial
court.
(10) Heirs of Sy Bang vs.Rolando Sy
GR.No.114217 Oct.13,2009
Facts: Sy Bang died and left a lot of properties and
heirs. During the course of the proceedings regarding
his estate, the judge deferred ruling upon the question
of including properties in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, assigned a receiver,
and ordered the cancellation of notices of lis pendens.
Meanwhile, Rosita, Sy Bang's widow, wanted her
widow's allowance but petitioners said she supposedly
executed a waiver of claims for a bit of money and a
piece of land. Respondents said no, she's too old and
ill to be in full possession of her facilities at the time
she affixed her thumbmark on the waiver and that
she'd thumbmark anything they asked her to. She got
her widow's allowance, which would be drawn from old
Sy Bang's estate. While petitioners questioned this,
respondents filed a petition for guardianship over
Rosita. Rosauro wanted to be the special guardian so
he filed before the guardianship court a Motion to
Order Court Deposit of Widow's Allowance Ordered by
the Supreme Court. He also wanted an order from the
SC to order the petitioners to pay up or they go to jail.
Petitioners pulled out all the stops to evade their
obligation to pay even under the threat of contempt
and imprisonment.
Held: A guardianship court does not have jurisdiction
to enforce payment of widow's allowance. Rather, that
is with the court with jurisdiction over the settlement of
the estate. Generally, the guardianship court
exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot
actually order the delivery of the property of the ward
found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. Only
in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to
the ward or where his title has been judicially decided,
may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
(11) Mercedita Mata Arañes vs. Judge Salvador
Occiano
AM No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
FACTS: Arañes charged Judge Occiano with Gross
Ignorance of the Law. She alleged that the Judge
solemnized her marriage without the requisite marriage
license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. She
alleged that the judge solemnized her marriage to the
late Orobia without the requisite marriage license and
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Judge Occiano averred that he was informed that
Orobia had a difficulty in walking and could not stand
the rigors of travelling almost 25 kilometers, thus he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in their place.
However, before he solemnized the marriage of
Arañes and Orobia, he discovered that the parties did
not possess the required marriage license. Thus,
refused to solemnize the marriage. But due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity of the marriage license and
their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Arañes filed her Affidavit of Desistance, that she
realized her own shortcomings and is bothered by her
conscience.
The Office of the Court Administrator nevertheless
found Judge Occiano guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly marriage license and for doing so
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. WON Judge Occiano is liable for solemnizing the
marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction.
2. WON Judge Occiano possessed the authority when
he solemnized the marriage despite the absence of the
marriage license.
RULING:
As to the first issue:
Judge Occiano is liable for solemnizing the marriage
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or BP
129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as determined by
the Supreme Court.
The Court already held in the case of Navarro vs.
Domagtoy that:
Judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdiction may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. x x x Where
a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
As to the second issue:
Judge Occiano did not possess the authority to
solemnize the marriage due to the absence of the
required marriage license.
The Court held in People vs. Lara that a marriage
which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is
void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
to solemnize a marriage.
(12) BESO v. Judge Daguman
A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000
PRINCIPLE:
Judge’s authority to solemnize marriage and duty to
register them.
FACTS:
Zenaida Beso and her fiance Bernardito A. Yman got
married and the marriage was solemnized by Judge
Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision
in Calbayog City, Samar. After their wedding, Yman
abandoned Beso without any reason which prompted
her to write to the Local Civil Registrar to inquire about
her marriage contract. She was informed by the Civil
Registrar that her marriage was not registered. She
wrote to Judge Daguman regarding the situation in
which she was informed by the latter that all copies of
the Marriage Contract were taken by Yman and that he
retained no copies of it. She filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Daguman averring that the
latter:
1. Solemnized our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Was negligent in not retaining a copy and not
registering our marriage before the office of the Local
Civil Registrar.
In his comment, Judge Daguman averred that the civil
marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito
Yman had to be solemnized by respondent in
Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal
Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar because he was
physically indisposed and unable to report to his
station. He added that in the forenoon of August 28,
1997, without prior appointment, complainant Beso
and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of
respondent in said City, urgently requesting the
celebration of their marriage right then and there for a
number of reasons. Judge Daguman also considered
that Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino
overseas worker, who, respondent realized, deserved
more than ordinary official attention under present
Government policy. Also, at the time he solemnized
the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that
by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of
the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
Also, on Judge Daguman’s failure to register the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
certificate, he pointed out that it was beyond his
control. He narrated that after handling to the husband
the first copy of the marriage certificate, Judge
Daguman left the three remaining copies on top of the
desk in his private office where the marriage
ceremonies were held, intending later to register the
duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth
(sic) in his office. After a few days following the
wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating
to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent
search in the premises and private files, all the three
last copies of the certificate were missing. In which
upon Subpoena, Mr. Yman told him he saw
complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party.
Unfortunately, it was too late to contract complainant
for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's claim.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an
evaluation report found that respondent Judge ". . .
committed non-feasance in office" and recommended
that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with
a warning that the commission of the same or future
acts will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Daguman had authority to
solemnize marriage in Calbayog City.
2. Whether or not Judge Daguman neglected his duty
when he failed to register the marriage of Beso and
Yman.
HELD:
1. No.
Under Article 7 and 8 of the Family Code:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church,
chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted at the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized
at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
In this case, Judge Daguman is the presiding judge of
the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, his authority to solemnize marriage is only
limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction;
and Calbayog City is not within such jurisdiction.
Neither were the instances wherein a judge may
solemnize marriages outside his chambers availing.
Therefore, Judge Daguman had no authority to
solemnize Beso and Yman’s marriage.
2. Yes.
Article 23 of the Family Code which states in
no uncertain terms that:
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the
marriage:
(1) To furnish either of the contracting parties, the
original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6
and
(2) To send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificate not later than fifteen days after the
marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where
the marriage was solemnized.
Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil
registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies
of the marriage certificate.
The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file:
(1) The quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate,
(2) The original of the marriage license and,
(3) In proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a
place other than those mentioned in Article 8.
In this case, Judge Daguman, in failing to retain a copy
of the marriage certificate and to register the marriage
of Beso and Yman, neglected his duty as provided in
Art 23 of the Family Code. It is Judge Daguman’s duty
to send copies of the marriage certificates not later
than 15 days after the marriage, to the Local Civil
Registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized.
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from
the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in
the exercise of his authority and the performance of his
duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded
to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is
properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of
the Family Code.
Therefore, Judge Daguman neglected his duty when
he failed to register the marriage of Beso and Yman.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent
Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(13) MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. BRIX
FERRARIS.
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Facts:
This case is rooted from a petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity filed by
petitioner Armida against husband Brix Ferraris. The
RTC resolved the case denying the petition for reasons
that epilepsy does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36, and that petitioner failed to
substantiate evidence to prove infidelity by respondent.
On appeal to CA, CA affirmed the judgment of the trial
court in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity should be
granted.
Held:
NO.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage
depends crucially, on the facts of the case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court
relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15
which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As all people, may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which
petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality
disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack
of support, and his preference to spend more time with
his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein
respondent preferred to spend more time with his
friends than his family on whom he squandered his
money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance,
and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the
Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations
and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable” and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
(14) Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall
and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A
child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months
later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated
from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991. Only after their
marriage that he learned about her child with another
man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence
and thus declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It
held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the
1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and, generally, under the Molina
guidelines.
RULING:
Yes.
The petitioner, aside from his own testimony,
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of
Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated
his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts
to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed
binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded
to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it
must be considered that respondent had consistently
lied about many material aspects as to her character
and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in
a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden
in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified
that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly
explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters
before she married him prove that her psychological
incapacity was have existed even before the
celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar
makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and
respect.
Sixth, the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled
by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that
Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remains unchanged.
The facts in the case sufficiently prove with the
certitude required by law that based on the depositions
of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s],
the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of
adverse personality constracts that were markedly
antithetical to the substantive content and implications
of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent
in terms of its deliberative component. In other words,
afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent
was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in
the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.
Molina doctrine is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-
case perception. It would be insensate to reason to
mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have
had no impelling cause to present evidence to that
effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more
than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity
has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering
doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent
was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.
(15) Ngo vs Ngu - Te
G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009
Principle:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential
marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond;
To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under
Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
Facts:
Petitioner Edward Kenneth courted Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college when petitioner was
a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Three months after their first meeting, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused,
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their
travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s P80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a
job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila.
Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to
his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and
Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that
she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the
two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years
old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her
uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a
prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied.
Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned
the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward
was able to call home and talk to his brother who
suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home
and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who,
however, suggested that he should get his inheritance
so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his
father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward
that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward
must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of
Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family
then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they
telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena.
Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with
his parents, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives. They then parted ways.10
After almost four years Edward filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner
found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
“Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon
swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,]
is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit
himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the
search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an
introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack
of interest in social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle
that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit
himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent,
as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves.
As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person,
as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a
solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said
to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman.
She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight]
for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take
move on marriage as she thought that her marriage
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is
part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her]
husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization
that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds
her way out of the relationship.
The trial court declared the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The OSG filed a notice of appeal.
On review, the appellate court, reversed and set aside
the trial court’s ruling. t ruled that petitioner failed to
prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided
by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was
not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners Argument:
petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that
the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because
of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due
to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also
points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent.
Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions
of the OCP because the latter represented it during the
trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the
pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27 For its
part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28that the
annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no
statement of the essential marital obligations that the
parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the
petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified.
The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And
the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent.
OSG’s argument:
Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements
in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
Issue:
Whether or not the contracted marriage is void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated
Ruling:
Yes.
Petiioner who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self
to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be
said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations. This finding
takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations
imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.
(16) BENJAMIN G. TING v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-
TING
G.R. NO. 166562 March 31, 2009
Principle: The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.
Facts:
Benjamin and Carmen first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they
were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
The couple decided to move to Carmen's family home
in Cebu City. In September 1975, Benjamin passed the
medical board examinations and thereafter proceeded
to take a residency program to become a surgeon but
shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979,
Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the
said field and, in 1980, he began working for Velez
Hospital, owned by Carmen's family, as member of its
active staff, while Carmen worked as the hospital's
Treasurer.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than
18 years to Benjamin, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code
Carmens complaint:
Prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with
his friends.
Summary:
1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely affected his
family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by his
excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which
Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice
and the property he inherited from his father in order to
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to
pay the same; and
4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as shown
by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support
to his family
Benjamins Answer:
Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated.
He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his
peers would confirm.
During the trial carmen presented two witnesses
Susana Waswas who served as nanny to the spouse’s
children, and Dr. Oñate, a psychiatrist and concluded
Benjamin's compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling
and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications
that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.
To refute Dr. Oñate opinion, Benjamin presented Dr.
Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist, as his expert witness.
Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior.
Contrary to Dr. Oñate findings, Dr. Obra observed that
there is nothing wrong with Benjamins personality,
considering the latters good relationship with his fellow
doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.
The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage
between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the
CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling.
It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
Carmen.
Issue:
Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Ruling:
We find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from
such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's
"defects" were present at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects"
to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have
been the decisive evidence in determining whether to
declare the marriage between the parties null and void.
Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions
provided by these experts strengthened respondent's
allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner's behavior
is a positive indication of a personality disorder, 63 while
Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears to be
greater weight in Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside from
analyzing the transcript of Benjamin's deposition similar
to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report
furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr.
Obra's) personal interview with Benjamin's brothers.
Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr.
Obra's findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning
petitioner's drinking and gambling problems, or his
violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid
excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Unfortunately, this court finds respondent's testimony,
as well as the totality of evidence presented by the
respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him
psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
(17) Republic v. Molina
G.R. 108763 Feb 13, 2009
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14
April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after.
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his
friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on
matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of
his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left
her and their child a week later. The couple is
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own
testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and
a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On
14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should
be construed as psychological incapacity
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
application of Philippine civil laws on personal and
family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with
the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage; where said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing
at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological
incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. In the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is
an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of
proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such
illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital
obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles
220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and
their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church,
and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-
General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed
and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
(18) VERONICO TENEBRO vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
GR no. 150758, February 18, 2004
FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a judge
at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously
and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the
petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that
indeed Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted having married
to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he
denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took
place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office
in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court
found him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of
bigamy.
(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the
second marriage of the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
RULING:
(1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a) that the offender has been legally married;
(b) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
(c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and
(d) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
The prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary
and oral, proved the existence of the marriage between
petitioner and Villareyes. Hence, petitioner is guilty of
Bigamy.
(2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void
ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
(19) SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA
JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON
G.R. No. 165545. March 24, 2006.
Facts: Clemente and Alice contracted marriage in
Sorsogon. 15 years later, C filed before the court to
declare A presumptively dead. 13 years after the
declaration, he married Teresita. Clemente, who was a
member of the Social Security System(SSS) since
1960 and a retiree pensioner, died. Teresita filed a
claim for funeral benefits in SSS. A certain Hermes P.
Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz
P. Diaz," led before the SSS a claim for death
benetsaccruing from Clemente’s death.
SSS cancelled the payment of death pension benets to
Teresita because the court was misled by
misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz, as
presumptively dead. Thus the order of the court
declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the
validity of the order.
Teresita reiterated her request for the release of her
monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with
Clemente was not declared before any court of justice
as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact
Clemente designated her as his beneficiary.
Alice, later on, attesting that she is the widow of Bailon.
That she had only recently come to know of the petition
led by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead and that
it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have
easily located her.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Clemente and
Teresita is valid.
Ruling: YES, the marriage is a valid.
SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to
SSS coverage, benefits and contributions. In so
exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much
less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law. In
interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the
SSC virtually acted as anappellate court. The law does
not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trie withorders
of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to
determine the beneciaries ofthe SSS.
According to the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal
and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the
three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the
marriage under any of these exceptional cases is
deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in
these cases rests on the party assailing the second
marriage.A subsequent marriage being voidable, it is
terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by
either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul
a subsequent marriage is necessary. It provides that
subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated
by the recording of the affidavit of recording of the adavit
of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio. If the absentee reappears, but no step is
taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
adavit or by court action, such absentee's mere
reappearance,even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
However, if the subsequent marriage is not terminated
by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by
judicial declaration but by the death of either spouse
as in the case at bar, the good or bad faith of either
spouse can no longer be raised, because, as in
annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot
be questioned except in a direct action for annulment.
It cannot be attacked collaterally. Such marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either. Upon the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good
abinitio.Thus, since no action for nullification was filed,
the marriage of C and T is valid and T is the rightful
dependent spouse beneficiary of C.
(20) SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. AZOTE
G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015
FACTS:
On 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of
the SSS, were married in civil rites in Albay. On 1994,
Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and
their children as beneficiaries.
On 2005, Edgardo passed away. Edna filed her claim
for death benefits with SSS as the wife of the deceased.
It appeared however from the record that Edgardo had
earlier filed a Form E-4 on 1982 with a different set of
beneficiaries namely: Rosemarie Azote (spouse) and
Elmer Azote (dependent). Consequently, Edna’s claim
was denied.
Thereafter, Edna filed a petition with SSC to claim the
death benefits and insisted that she was the legitimate
wife of Edgardo. SSC denied the petition and answered
that there was a conflicting information in the forms
submitted by Edgardo so Summons were published in a
newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to
file her answer but she was not able to file the said
answer, so she was declared in default. SSS averred
that although Edgardo filed the Form E-4 designating
Edna and their children as beneficiaries, he did not
revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wife-
beneficiary, and she is still presumed to be his legal
wife. SSC further wrote that the NSO records revealed
that the marriage of Edgardo to one Rosemarie was
registered on 1982. Consequently, it opined that
Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was
no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or
dissolved and stated that there must be a judicial
determination of nullity of a previous marriage before a
party could enter into a second marriage.
The CA reversed and set aside the resolution of SSC
and ruled that the SSC could not decide of the validity
or invalidity of the marriage considering that no contest
came from Rosemarie and Elmer. It further ruled that
Edgardo made a deliberate change of his wife-
beneficiary in his 1994 Form E-4, and that it superseded
his former declaration in his 1982 E-4 Form.
The SSC argues that the findings of fact of the CA were
not supported by the records. It submits that under
Section 5 of the SS Law, it is called upon to determine
the rightful beneficiary in the performance of its quasi-
judicial function of adjudicating SS benefits. That Edna
was not the legitimate spouse of the deceased member
Edgardo as there was the NSO Certification showing
that Edgardo was previously married to Rosemarie.
With the death certificate of Rosemarie showing that
she died only on November 6, 2004, it proved that she
was alive at the time Edna and Edgardo were married,
and, therefore, there existed a legal impediment to his
second marriage, rendering it void. Edna is, therefore,
not a legitimate spouse who is entitled to the death
benefits of Edgardo. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not should be declared as the widow
of the deceased and thus entitled to the SSS benefits.
RULING:
NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 8 (e) and (k) of
the R.A 8282, expressly provides that the dependents
shall be the legal spouse, and that until he or she
remarries, the dependent legitimate x x x shall be the
primary beneficiaries.
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282, it is
clear that only the legal spouse of the deceased-
member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s
SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that
Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another
individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when
he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie
as his spouse.
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo
with Edna was celebrated at the time when the Family
Code was already in force. Article 41 of the Family
Code expressly states:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. x x x
In the case at bar, applying the parameters outlined in
Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt,
failed to establish that there was no impediment or that
the impediment was already removed at the time of the
celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Therefore, she
is not entitled to claim SSS benefits.
(21) Ablaza vs. Republic
628 SCRA 27 G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December
26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only
on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license.
He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a
real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even
after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage
being void ab initio.
RTC’s ruling:
Dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner is
not a party to the marriage
CA’s ruling:
Affirmed RTC’s ruling 🡪 surviving brother of the
deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who
stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a
party to said case.
ISSUE:
Whether a non-party can sue for the nullity of another
person’s marriage
HELD:
Yes.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the
relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the
mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such
relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid
marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage
already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law.
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), took effect on March
15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation
demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code.
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule
that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
The following actions for declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the
effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated
under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15,
2003.
In the case at bar, the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949. The
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision
on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when.
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision
in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as
giving a license to just any person to bring an action to
declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. The the
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited
by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit,
for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party
in interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that
the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he
has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a
compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother.
(22) REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
Arguments:
Petitioner:
1. Petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did
not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquired about the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband.
2. Petitioners argues using the Republic vs Jomoc
Case that, a petition for declaration of presumptive
death being a special proceeding, the filing of a
record on appeal with the notice of appeal shall be
sufficient.
Respondent:
1. That under the Family Code, a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding is deemed immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties and is
therefore not subject to ordinary appeals.
FACTS:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees
of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she
did not receive any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother
testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a
Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with
the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC
rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that
Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate
Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The
OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal.
She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus,
not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule
41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus,
judgment thereon is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is
not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the
RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of
presumptive death based on evidence that matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
respondent had presented. under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

RULING: 2. Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the

Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is
absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she
final and immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred
had not adduced the evidence required to establish a
in granting the petition, such order can no longer be
well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already
assailed.
dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive Code.
death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under
present must institute a summary proceeding as
the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
reappearance of the absent spouse.
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be
immediately final and executory. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove
that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
By express provision of law, the judgment of the
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that
marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a
well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits,
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original
motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with
or characterize their disappearance or throw light on
the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases,
their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate
such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
question of his death.
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a The belief of the present spouse must be the
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted
proper subject of an appeal. on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
many circumstances occurring before and after the
losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with
extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of Applying the foregoing standards to the present
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did
decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified
to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from
the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented
to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she
would have sought information from the Taiwanese
Consular Office or assistance from other government
agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have
also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken.
Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether
respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief”
that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her
filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead
is already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than
that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
(23) Capili v People
GR No. 183805 July 3, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner James Capili was charged with crime of
bigamy before the RTC for contracting a second
marriage with Private respondent Shirley Tismo-Capili
without having legally dissolved or annulled his first
marriage to Karla Capili.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the
crime of bigamy on the ground that there is a pending
civil case on the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage by Karla Capili. He claims that in the event that
the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy, and that the
pendency of the civil case is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case of bigamy.
RTC later declared the second marriage void. Petitioner
then filed a motion to dismiss the case for bigamy on the
ground that second marriage between him and private
respondent Shirley had already been declared void.
RTC granted the motion. Private respondent appealed
to CA. CA reversed the RTC decision. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. CA denied. Thus this instant
petition.
Issues:
WON subsequent declaration of nullity of second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of criminal case of
bigamy.
Ruling:
NO.
Bigamy under Art. 394 is a crime committed by any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceednigs.
The elements of bigamy are:
1. offender has been legally married;
2. marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and
4. the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites of validty.
In the present case all elements of bigamy are present.
Further, subsequent declaration of nullity of second
marriage is not a ground for dismissal of criminal case
of bigamy so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
Because the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the
previous one being annulled. Culpability attaches upon
commission of the offense.
Petitioner’s assertion would only delay prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply
file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke pendency of that action as prejudicial question.

(24) PACETE v CARRIAGA JR.
G.R. No. 53880 March 17, 1994
Principle: Unless, exempted by law, failure to observe
the six-month cooling-off period is a ground to set aside
a decision granting legal separation.
FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on
October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one
Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation between her and Pacete, accounting and
separation of property. She averred in her complaint
that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they
had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
subsequently contracted a second marriage with
Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons.
They filed an extension within which to file an answer,
which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by
the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’
evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20,
21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion
in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to
file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and
in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which
decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and
held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to
Clarita.
RULING:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-
appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between parties exists. If there is collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in
order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention
of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the
Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must “in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,”
obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off”
period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of
the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
(25) Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi
G.R. No. 119190, Jan. 16, 1997
Facts:
Chi married Gina at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros
Manila. After the celebration of their marriage, they
slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
Contrary to Gina’s expectation that, as newly weds,
they were supposed to enjoy making love, but Chi just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his
back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The
same thing happened on the second, third and fourth
nights. They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed for almost 6 months. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them.
Hence, the distraught wife filed an action for annulment
of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity alleging that Chi is impotent. Chi admitted in
his pleading that there was no sexual intercourse
between them. During the physical examination, Chi
was asked to masturbate to find out whether or not he
has an erection and the doctor found out that the penis
of Chi lengthened by 1 inch from the original size of 2
inches. The doctor’s findings: Chi only has soft
erection but still capable of having sexual intercourse
with a woman. The trial court annulled their marriage
holding that Chi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse
with Gina is a sign of psychological incapacity and was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Is the trial court correct?
Chi’s contentions:
1. The CA has no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus because it merely relied on
Gina’s admission; and that in actions for
annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
Ruling:
 Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court
reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. — Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a
judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision
was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When Gina testified under oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined
by oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it became
incumbent upon Chi to present his side. He
admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them. Such testimonial evidence and
admission constitutes sufficient proof on the
material facts alleged.
2. The conclusion drawn by the CA on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaces
since it could have been a product of collusion;
 Ruling:
 The case has reached this Court because
petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties.
 The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a
review of both the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record.
3. The CA erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both Chi and Gina to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
 Ruling:
 Neither the trial court nor the CA made a
finding on who between Chi and Gina refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The
fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them.
  Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
 One of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal
of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
(26) Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, et al. vs. CA, et al.
G.R. No. 164401 June 25, 2008
Facts:
In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a
partnership to engage in the marketing of liquefied
petroleum gas. For convenience, the business, pursued
under the name, Shellite Gas Appliance Center
(Shellite), was registered as a sole proprietorship in the
name of Jacinto, albeit the partnership arrangement
called for equal sharing of the net profit.
After Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow,
petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter,
petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the
business without Chua's consent. Chua's subsequent
repeated demands for accounting and winding up went
unheeded, prompting him to file on June 22, 1992 a
Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs,
Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
Chua asked the admission of an accounting
report prepared by CPA Cheryl A. Gahuman. In the
report under the heading, Computation of
Claims, Chua's aggregate claim, arrived at using the
compounding-of-interest method, amounted to
PhP14,277,344.94. Subsequently, the RTC admitted
and approved the computation of claims in view of
petitioners' failure and refusal, despite notice, to appear
and submit an accounting report on the winding up of
the partnership on the scheduled hearings on April 29
and 30, 2002.
Petitioners, on September 24, 2002, submitted
their own CPA-certified valuation and accounting report.
In it, petitioners limited Chua's entitlement from the
winding up of partnership affairs to an aggregate
amount of PhP3,154,736.65 only. Chua, on the other
hand, submitted a new computation, this time applying
simple interest on the various items covered by his
claim. Under this methodology, Chua's aggregate claim
went down to PhP8,733,644.75.
RTC issued a Resolution approving the new
computation of claims Chua submitted. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was rejected by the appellate
court.
The sheriff of Manila levied upon petitioner
Sunga-Chan's property over which a building leased to
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) stood. In the auction
sale of the levied lot, Chua, with a tender of PhP 8
million, emerged as the winning bidder. RTC, via a
Resolution, confirmed the sheriff's final deed of sale,
ordered the Registry of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT
No. 208782, and granted a writ of possession in favor of
Chua.
Issue:
Whether or not the absolute community of
property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with her
husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer
for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment.
Ruling:
The Community Property is liable.
Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the
judgment award, respondent sheriff cannot really be
faulted for levying upon and then selling at public
auction the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan to
answer for the whole obligation of petitioners. The fact
that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or
community property, as the case may be, of spouses
Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not per se vitiate the
levy and the consequent sale of the property. Verily,
said property is not among those exempted from
execution under Section 13, 37 Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.
And it cannot be overemphasized that the
TRO issued by the Court on May 31, 2005 came
after the auction sale in question.
Parenthetically, the records show that
spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married
on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Withal, their
absolute community property may be held liable for
the obligations contracted by either spouse.
Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently
provides:
Art. 94. The absolute
community of property shall be
liable for:
(1) . . .
(2) All debts and
obligations contracted during
the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the community, or by
both spouses, or by one spouse
with the consent of the other.
(3) Debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited.
xxx
Absent any indication otherwise, the use
and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the
assets of Shellite even after the business was
discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be
considered to have been used for her and her
husband's benefit.
It may be stressed at this juncture that
Chua's legitimate claim against petitioners, as
readjusted in this disposition, amounts to only
PhP5,529,392.52, whereas Sunga-Chan's
auctioned property which Chua acquired, as the
highest bidder, fetched a price of PhP8 million. In
net effect, Chua owes petitioner Sunga-Chan the
amount of PhP2,470,607.48, representing the
excess of the purchase price over his legitimate
claims.
Therefore, subject to the payment by Chua
of PhP2,470,607.48 to petitioner Sunga-Chan, we
affirm the RTC's April 11, 2005 resolution,
confirming the sheriff's final deed of sale of the
levied property, ordering the Registry of Deeds of
Manila to cancel TCT No. 208782, and issuing a writ
of possession in favor of Chua.
(27) Corazon G. Ruiz vs. CA and Consuelo Torres
G.R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003
FACTS:
Corazon Ruiz contracted several loans with Consuelo
Torres. The loans were secured by a real estate
mortgage on a lot registered in the name of “Corazon G.
Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos.”
Corazon failed to pay the loans due; thus, Consuelo
sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property. Corazon filed a complaint to enjoin the
foreclosure on the ground that the real estate mortgage
is unenforceable because of the lack of participation and
signature of Corazon’s husband to encumber a conjugal
property.
The trial court granted the prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. It held that the real estate
mortgage is unenforceable because of the lack of the
participation and signature of petitioner’s husband. It
noted that although the subject real estate mortgage
stated that petitioner was “attorney-in-fact for herself
and her husband,” the Special Power of Attorney was
never presented in court during the trial.
The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial
court and lifted the permanent injunction on the
foreclosure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgaged property is conjugal.
HELD:
No.

We affirm the ruling of the appellate court that the real
property covered by the subject deed of mortgage is
paraphernal property.
The property subject of the mortgage is registered in
the name of “Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to
Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos.” Thus, title is registered in the
name of Corazon alone because the phrase “married
to Rogelio Ruiz” is merely descriptive of the civil status
of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that
her husband is also a registered owner.
Furthermore, registration of the property in the name of
“Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio
Ruiz” is not proof that such property was acquired
during the marriage, and thus, is presumed to be
conjugal. The property could have been acquired by
Corazon while she was still single and registered only
after her marriage to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts.
The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code
that properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant
case. Before such presumption can apply, it must first
be established that the property was in fact acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor
presented in the case at bar.
Thus, on the basis alone of the certificate of title, it
cannot be presumed that said property was acquired
during the marriage and that it is conjugal property.
Since there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the
name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as
paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.
The only import of the title is that Corazon is the owner
of said property, the same having been registered in
her name alone, and that she is married to Rogelio
Ruiz.
(28) HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
EDMUNDO T. ACUNA
G.R. NO. 154132
FACTS
Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the
RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe
and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds for
cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not
secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his
wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses
Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan,
made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage;
that he could not have executed the said contract
because he was then working abroad.
Hiyas Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that Alberto failed to comply with Article 151 of the
Family Code, that since the complaint does not contain
any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made prior to its institution, then
the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
Alberto filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss
with Motion to Strike Out and to Declare Hiyas Bank in
Default. He argues that in cases where one of the
parties is not a member of the same family as
contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code,
failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts
toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff
before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion
to dismiss. Alberto asserts that since three of the party-
defendants are not members of his family the ground
relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is
inapplicable and unavailable. Alberto also prayed that
defendants be declared in default for their failure to file
their answer on time.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, a
compromise is not required before the filing of the
instant case considering that the case involves parties
who are strangers to the family. It is a rule that If one of
the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint
that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been
made by plaintiff before filing the complaint, is not a
ground for motion to dismiss.
Insofar as plaintiff’s prayer for declaration of default
against defendants, the same is meritorious only with
respect to defendants Remedios and the Register of
Deeds. A declaration of default against defendant bank
is not proper considering that the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss by said defendant operates to stop the running
of the period within which to file the required Answer.
Hiyas Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration which RTC denied reiterating its ruling
and that it agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is
defendant Remedios Moreno who stands to be
benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code, being a
member of the same family as that of plaintiff, only she
may invoke said Art. 151.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not lack of earnest efforts toward a
compromise is a ground for a motion to dismiss in
suits between husband and wife when other parties
who are strangers to the family are involved in the
suit?
2. Whether or not Petitioner Hiyas Savings and
Loan Bank Inc. Can invoke article 151 of the Family
Code?
RULING
(This case was dismissed for failure to comply with
the principle of judicial hierarchy but SC still
explained why Hiyas bank’s contention lacks merit)
1. NO.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
No suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
The court ruled in the Magbaleta Case that these
considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make
it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be
a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an
action whenever a stranger to the family is a party
thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one.
It is not always that one who is alien to the family would
be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less
relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings
between or among relatives more often than not entail.
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the
determination of the rights of a stranger to the family
who just happened to have innocently acquired some
kind of interest in any right or property disputed among
its members should be made to depend on the way the
latter would settle their differences among themselves.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit
involving members of the same family, the law no longer
makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be
made towards a compromise before the action can
prosper.
2. NO.
Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of
the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply
to suits involving "members of the same family" as
contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, to
wit:
ART. 150. Family relations include those
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full
or half blood.
and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their
descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
The Court has ruled that the requirement under
Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in
cases which are exclusively between or among
members of the same family, it necessarily follows that
the same may be invoked only by a party who is a
member of that same family, as provided for by Article
150 of the Family Code.
(30) Edwin N. Tribiana vs. Lourdes M. Tribiana
G.R. No. 137359 September 13, 2004
FACTS: Edwin Tribiana & Lourdes Tribiana are
husband and wife. Lourdes filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the Regional Trial Court claiming that
Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter
Khriza Mae, 1 year and 4 months old, depriving her of
lawful custody. (It turned our that Khriza was being held
by Edwin's mother, Rosalina). Edwin moved to dismiss
Lourdes' petition on the ground that it failed to allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made as
required by Article 151 of the Family Code. Lourdes
filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss
claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise
but failed. She attached the Certification to file Action
from their barangay. RTC denied Edwin’s motion to
dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin
and his mother to bring Khriza Mae before the RTC.
Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibition and certiorari. The CA denied Edwin’s
petition and also the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, should
have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the
ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent
under art. 151 of Family code.
HELD:
NO.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides: "No suit
between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed."
While it is true that Lourdes failed to allege that she
resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the
petition, the Barangay Certification to File Action
displayed that the parties tried to compromise but were
unsuccessful in their efforts. In habeas corpus
proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child
of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve
immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the
child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving
such child of tender age full protection. This rule has
sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code,
which states, “No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
(31) Perla Patricio v. Marcelino Dario III, et al.
G.R. No. 170829. November 20, 2006.
FACTS:
On 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their
two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was
a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-
school building built thereon situated in Quezon
City.They extrajudicially settled the estate. Thereafter,
petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private
respondent of their intention to partition the subject
property and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property hence
petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 2002, the trial court ordered the partition of the
subject property in the following manner: Perla G.
Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and
Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals,
which denied the same. However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent, the
appellate court partially reconsidered.
Private respondent claims that the subject property
which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a
minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-
year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He
argues that as long as the minor is living in the family
home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary
becomes of age.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject
property remained as a family home of the surviving
heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5,
1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of
the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers
Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III
were already of age at the time of the death of their
father, hence there is no more minor beneficiary to
speak of.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for
partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack
of merit.
ISSUE: Is partition of the family home is proper?
RULING:
Yes.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and
is the repository of cherished memories that last during
one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband
and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside,
including the land on which it is situated. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the
beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and
wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family
home and who depend upon the head of the family for
legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home,
three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among
the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that
the family home shall continue despite the death of one
or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family
for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. After these
periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the
heirs. The intention of the law is to safeguard and
protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he
reaches legal age and would now be capable of
supporting himself.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private
respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under
Article 154 of the Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the term “descendants”
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without distinction;
hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and
great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a
family home. Thus, private respondent’s minor son, who
is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be
actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV
has been living in the family home since 1994, or within
10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he
satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents,
especially his father, herein private respondent who is
the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes
the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is
the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition
the subject property.
(31) JOSE E. HONRADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 166333. November 25, 2005
FACTS:
On December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet
Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of Quezon
City a complaint for sum of money against Jose
Honrado, who was doing business under the name and
style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. Premium sought to
collect the amount of P240,765.00 representing the total
price of veterinary products purchased on credit by
Honrado. For failure of Honrado, as well as his counsel,
to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was declared in
default. Premium was, thus, allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
It turned out that the Spouses Jose and
Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of
Calamba City for the Judicial constitution of the parcel
of land registered in Honrado’s name located in
Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their
family house. In his petition, Honrado declared that his
creditors were Atty. Domingo Luciano, P & J Agriculture
Trading, Inc., and Mr. Tito Dela Merced, and that the
estimated value of the property was not more than
P240,000.00. On February 23, 1999, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Premium directing Honrado to pay
the former.
Honrado filed a Notice of Appeal, however it
was dismissed for his failure to file his brief as appellant.
Thus, entry of judgment was made. Subsequently,
Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution. The RTC granted and the writ was issued.
The Sheriff levied on the parcel of land of the
Honrado’s located in Calamba. The Notice of Levy was
annotated at the dorsal portion of the title and later set
the sale of the property at public auction. Honrado was
served with a copy of the notice of such sale but he
opposed the same.
On May 17, 2001, the property was sold to
Premium, the highest bidder, for the amount of
P650,204.10.8. The corresponding Certificate of Sale
then was issued and annotated at the dorsal portion of
the title. Honrado failed to redeem the property.
In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City
rendered a Decision on the special proceeding case
filed by the Honrados, declaring the property a family
home. Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties
Exempt from Execution under Article 155 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. Premium opposed the motion.
The RTC denied said motion on the ground that
Honrado is deemed to have waived the exemption
considering that he failed to object to the sale of the
property on execution.
On October 14, 2002, Premium filed a Motion
for Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance and Writ of
Possession asserting that the one-year redemption
period had already lapsed, without any redemption
being made by Honrado. The latter opposed the said
motion claiming that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had
already rendered a decision declaring the property a
family home.
Subsequently, the respondent Judge issued an
Order granting the motion of Premium and directing
Honrado to: (1) execute a final deed of conveyance over
the subject parcel of land the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna; and (2) surrender of the subject title.
The respondent Judge further ordered that after
execution of the deed of conveyance, a writ of
possession be issued over the aforesaid property in
favor of Premium and against the Honrado or his
successors-in-interest who are in possession of the said
premises.
Honrado filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the Resolution of the RTC. However, the CA
dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that the Honrado
failed to assert his claim for exemption at the time of the
levy or within a reasonable time thereafter. On
December 2, 2004, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Honrado.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 153 of the Family Code
is applicable in the instant case.
RULING:
NO. The petition has no merit.
Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as the family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by Law.
A family home is a real right, which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over
the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated,
which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy
such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases. Such provision
finds no application in this case.
 Petitioner and his wife failed to disclose in their
petition for the judicial constitution of a family home that
Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. is one of their creditors
considering the fact that the collection case filed against
Honrado was filed in 1997 or prior to the institution of
said petition in 1998. Petitioner never raised the
argument of exemption of his family home before the
trial court before and during the auction sale. It is well-
settled that the right of exemption must be claimed by
the debtor himself at the time of levy or within a
reasonable period thereafter. It is self-evident that
petitioner did not assert their claim of exemption within
a reasonable time. Any claim for exemption from
execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on
execution by the sheriff.
We find that such actions reveal a dilatory intent
to render nugatory the sale on execution and defeat the
very purpose of execution—to put an end to litigation.
(33) Case Title: Simoeon Cabang, Virginia Cabang
and Venancio Cabang alias “Dondon” v. Mr. & Mrs.
Guillermo Basay
GR No. 180587 March 20, 2009
Facts:
Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777 but he
and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the
lot. In 1987, Basay bought the land from Odong for
P8,000.00 but did not occupy the property as well. On
the other hand, Cabang had been in continuous, open,
peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of
land since 1956 on the belief that they were actually
occupying Lot No. 7778. Lot No. 7778 was actually used
by the government as a public road.
Basay filed a complaint with the RTC for the Recovery
of Property against Cabang. The RTC ruled in favour of
Cabang and held that Basay’s rights to recover the land
had been barred by laches. The CA reversed this
decision and held that Basay is entitled to the
possession of the lot, subject to the rights of Cabang
under Articles 448, 546, 547, and 548 of the New Civil
Code. Cabang filed a Petition for Review before the SC
which issued a Resolution denying such petition for late
filing and lack of appropriate service, which became
final and executory on 15 February 2000. The SC
remanded the case to the court a quo to determine the
rights of Cabang.
The RTC disclosed its difficulty in resolving whether the
houses may be the subject of and order of execution
since they are family homes. Basay filed a Manifestation
and Motion for Execution which was denied by the RTC.
Basay elevated this to the CA which reversed the RTC’s
Order of denying the Motion for Execution. Cabang filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
CA. Cabang insists that the property is a duly
constituted family home which is not subject to
execution.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the
judgment of the RTC.
Ruling:
No.
Art. 153 of the Family Code provides that, “the family
home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law. Moreover, Kelley, Jr. v Planters
Products, Inc. provides that, “the family home must be
part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the
property of the unmarried head of the family.
Here, the land on which the alleged family home of
Cabang stands is owned by Basay and the question of
ownership had been decided with finality in the CA. The
petioner’s stay therein was only by mere tolerance by
Basay. Further to this, the SC also held that the family
home must be established on the properties of (a) the
absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or
(c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the
consent of the other. It cannot be established on
property held in co-ownership with third persons.
(34) Jose Lam v. Adriana Chua
GR No. 131286 March 18, 2004
FACTS:
Adriana Chua filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged that they
got married and begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam
and alleged that Jose was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not
then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the
marriage when he frequently failed to go home,
indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities.
Thereafter, she was forced to agree with Jose on the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and
the separation of present and future properties; said
agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City (Branch 149 and they have agreed that
the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the
marriage between her and Jose be declared null and
void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of
their child, John Paul.
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone
witness was Adriana herself. She testified that her
marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents in the
traditional Chinese way. No evidence was presented
regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul
or the capacity of Jose to give support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to
Re-Open which was granted on the ground that she
was able to secure additional new evidence showing
that Jose had been married twice before he married
Adriana in 1984.
RTC Pasay hereby declares the marriage between
petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null
and void for being bigamous by nature and ordered to
give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam
in the amount of P20,000.00.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 thereof but
only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support
to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued that
there was already a provision for support of the child
as embodied in the decision9 dated February 28, 1994
of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to
contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the
benefit of the child.
Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam’s
motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties and approved by
the Makati RTC before the marriage was declared null
and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment
and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by
the latter court.
He appealed to the CA but it affirmed the decision of
RTC Pasay.
ISSUE:
WETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DECIDING
LEGAL QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WHERE THEY
BOUND THEMSELVES TO CONTRIBUTE THE
AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P250,000.00) TO A COMMON FUND FOR
THE BENEFIT OF THEIR CHILD DOES NOT BAR
THE TRIAL COURT IN ANNULMENT CASE TO
AGAIN AWARD SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF THE
CHILD.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the
Pasay RTC and the decision it rendered, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals were proper.
HELD:
The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both
correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of support
is by no means permanent. Judgment for support does
not become final. The right to support is of such nature
that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during
the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered,
in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded
as subject to final determination.
No.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, the
Court deems it proper that the issue on support should
be resolved by the Pasay RTC where the claim for
support of the child was initiated by Adriana.
The trial court’s action of merely ordering in open court
during the July 6, 1994 hearing that a prayer for
support be written and inserted in the petition filed by
respondent Adriana does not constitute proper
amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose.
Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was deprived of
due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the
case on a motion to re-open and render judgment
without giving Jose the requisite notice and the
opportunity to refute the new claim against him.
Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at
the amount of support awarded to John Paul was
whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in
determining the amount of support to be awarded,
such amount should be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred
to in Articles 19521and 196,22 shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the
preceding article shall be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or increase
of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
The Court has no other recourse but to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC
insofar as the award of support is concerned and order
the remand of the case to Pasay RTC for further
proceedings as to the issue regarding support.
(36) Edward V. Lacson vs Maowee and Maonaa
Daban Lacson represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, Lea Daban Lacson
GR No. 150644, August 28, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners A and B are legitimate daughters of X. Not long
after the birth of the B, herein petitioner X left their conjugal
home in Ilo-Ilo City. Due to financial difficulties, Leah and her
two daughters were forced to live with her mother in law, then
her mother and brother N (Noel Daban). M (Leah) did not
badger X for support from the start of their estrangement but
X made his commitment to give support to his daughters which
was memorialized in a note. However, Xfailed to fulfil his
promise. In 1995, M filed a complaint against X for support in
behalf of her daughters and in the complaint, it was alleged
that though X was able to give meager amounts occasionally,
but nevertheless, he failed to give support since 1976 despite
being gainfully employed and owning pieces of lands. They
also alleged that with the neglect and failure of X to give
support, M (mother) had from time to time borrow money from
her brother N and her debt to N reached around 400K-600K.In
their complaint, M and her children prayed for P12, 000
monthly allowance. In his answer, X argued that the land he
owns were unproductive and he has no regular income, and
such were the reasons why he was not able to give support
and not the intentional neglect and that due to financial
constraints, he won’t be able to provide the P12,000 monthly
allowance prayed for.
After due hearing, the RTC granted the support of P12,000
monthly allowace and a specific sum which represented 216
months or 18 years of support in arrears. X appealed to the
CA, affirmed RTC’s Ruling. X moved for reconsideration, and
it was denied. Thus this petition.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred when It affirmed the grant of support in arrears
from 1976 to 1994 since there is no demand.
Ruling:
No, CA did not err.
Article 203 - The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be
paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted
provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995,
since only from that moment can it be said that an effective
demand for support was made upon him.
For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have
been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no
extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand
in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal
advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass
as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to
comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of
the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a
request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found that a
demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had been
made in this case.
(38) Alfredo Ching vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004
FACTS:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). As an added security for the said loan,
Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tadeo and Chung Kiat
Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding
them to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the
PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in
the payment of all its loans.
Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment. Citing as one of the
grounds for the writ was the fraud defendants employed in
incurring the obligations by representing themselves as having
the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not
have such capacity. In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the
deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the
100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of
Alfredo Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by
her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy
on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares
of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her
husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the
Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. She,
likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was
a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of
the properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage
contract with Alfredo Ching.
ISSUE:
Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the
liability?
RULING:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the
properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v.
Court of Appeals, the court held that it is not even necessary
to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the
partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the
parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal
in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption
will still apply, and the properties will still be considered
conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome the same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the
RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp
Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its
corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when
the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This
was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the
petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed
to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The
private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the
petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive
money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were
registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment
Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does
not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the
conjugal partnership, owned the same.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone there must be a
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a
liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to
frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family
as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to
assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial
stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and
in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the
private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the
latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when
the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the
conjugal partnership.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract,
i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in
or for his own business or his own profession, that contract
falls within the term “… obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time
of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from
the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of
the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely
as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the
private respondent. The petition is GRANTED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.
(39) Ayala Investment and Development Corp. vs.
CA (1998)
G.R. No.118305 Feb. 12, 1998
PBM obtained loan from petitioner AIDC worth
50,300,000Php. As an added security to the credit, the
Executive VP of PBM Alfredo Ching makes himself
jointly and severally answerable with PBM's
indebtedness to AIDC. Upon PBM’s failure to pay the
loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM
and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig as Civil
Case No. 42228. After trial, the court rendered
decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount of the loan with interests. Upon pending
appeal of the said case the lower issued a writ of
execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the
issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the
notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal
properties.
Private respondents filed a case of
injunction against petitioners with the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) to enjoin the auction sale
alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment
against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground
that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon
application of private respondents, the lower court
issued a temporary restraining order to prevent
petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale
of the said properties at public auction. Upon petition of
certiorari by AIDC , the CA issued a TRO enjoining the
lower court, thus paving the way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal
properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder for the property. Whether the
loan obtained by PBM as surety by Alfredo
Ching redounded to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses?
Petitioner AIDC contends that there is no need to
prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of
the partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that
the transaction was entered into for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, petitioners aver that: The
wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear:
for the partnership to be held liable, the husband must
have contracted the debt "for the benefit of the
partnership. Petitioners further contend that the ruling
of the respondent court runs counter to the
pronouncement of this Court in the case of Cobb-
Perez vs. Lantin, that the husband as head of the
family and as administrator of the conjugal partnership
is presumed to have contracted obligations for the
benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case
of Cobb-Perez is not applicable in the case at bar. This
Court has, on several instances, interpreted the term
"for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this
Court, we can derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . .
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of
the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial,
if in the end, his business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation
will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within
the context of "obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services
is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership. The loan procured from
respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement
and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-
appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of petitioners-
appellees — this despite the fact that the members of
the said family happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Signing as a surety is not embarking
in a business.This is not to say, however, that we are
unaware that executives are often asked to stand as
surety for their company's loan obligations. This is
especially true if the corporate officials have sufficient
property of their own; otherwise, their spouses'
signatures are required in order to bind the conjugal
partnerships.
The fact that on several occasions the lending
institutions did not require the signature of the wife and
the husband signed alone does not mean that being a
surety became part of his profession. Neither could he
be presumed to have acted for the conjugal
partnership. Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family
Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except to the extent that they redounded to
the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the
family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a
personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family. Petition
DISMISSED.
(40) Syed Azhar (Syed) Abbas vs. Gloria Goo
(Gloria) Abbas
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
Facts:
Syed filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria on the ground of absence of a
marriage license as provided for in Article 4 of the
Family Code. However, in their marriage contract, it
stated that an issued marriage license No. 9969967 was
presented to the solemnizing officer.
Arguments of Petitioner Syed:
In 1991, Syed, a Pakistani citizen met Gloria, a Filipina,
in Taiwan. The following year they got married at Taipei
Mosque. The same year he arrived in the Philippines. In
January 1993, when he was at his mother-in-laws
residence, he was told that for him to stay in the
Philippines, he must undergo some ceremony and was
not told of the nature of said ceremony, where he and
Gloria signed a document. It turned out, it was a
wedding ceremony.
In 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license. He
showed a show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could not be
found. It was confirmed that the Municipal Civil Registrar
issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that
the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract Syed submitted was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan.
Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against
him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage
license on advice of his counsel.
Arguments of Defendant Gloria:
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been
married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did
not know if said marriage had been celebrated under
Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the
time were Chinese.
Gloria presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo (defendants mother) and May
Ann Ceriola as witnesses. Reveren Dauz testified that
he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain,
and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages, that
he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9,
1993. He further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him
the marriage license the day before the wedding, and
that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary. After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of
the marriage license with that office.
Atty. Sanchez testified that he requested a certain
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple,
and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993. He further testified that
he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained. He attended the wedding ceremony, signed
the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the
signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
Ceriola.
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter
and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she
was present at the wedding ceremony held on January
9, 1993 at her house. She testified that she sought the
help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing
the marriage license, and that a week before the
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their
house with the application for marriage license. Three
days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to
Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. She further testified that she did not
read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that
she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage license was validly
obtained.
Ruling:
No.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on
January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family
Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law.
The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read
as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony
which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect
in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable. Art. 35. The following
marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3)
Those solemnized without a license, except those
covered by the preceding Chapter.
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
office had no record of a marriage license was adequate
to prove the non-issuance of said license. Gloria has
failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion
that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect
the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented
by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to
have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license.
About Bigamy case (basin mag ask si Atty):
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his
marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be
that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure
of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage
license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot
be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent,
the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
(42) Bangayan v Bangayan
G.R. No. 201061
BENJAMIN alleged that on 10 September 1973, he
married AZUCENA in Caloocan City.
Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with
SALLY.
Azucena left for the United States of America.
In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her
father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig
where they signed a purported marriage contract.
Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired
several real properties. Benjamin’s father also gave 37
properties to Benjamin’s children as advance
inheritance.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994
when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and
Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage.
WN the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
null and void ab initio and non-existent
Yes.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally is void ab
initio.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10
September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their
marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982,
the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was
valid and subsisting.
The LCR of Pasig testified that there was no valid
marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. The
certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and
absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly,
if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning."
In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the
local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982.
WN the marriage was bigamous
The marriage is also not bigamous.
It is required that the first or former marriage shall not
be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license,
the crime of bigamy was not committed.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In
this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
What property relation should govern their
relationship
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which
states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his
children as advance inheritance.
(43) SPS. ONESIFORO ALINAS VS. SPS. VICTOR
ALINAS
GR NO. 158040, APRIL 14, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioner-
spouses) separated sometime in 1982. They left behind
two lots identified as Lot 896-B-9-A (“Lot A” for purposes
of identification) with a bodega standing on it and Lot
896-B-9-B (“Lot B”) with the petitioner-spouses’ house.
These lots were respectively mortgaged as security for
the loan incurred by the petitioner-spouses: Lot A for
Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO) while Lot B for
Social Security System (SSS).
Petitioner-Onesiforo and brother-respondent Victor
Alinas entered into an agreement. Petitioner-spouses
alleged that they entrusted the abovementioned
properties to respondent-spouses (Victor and Elena). It
was agreed that any income from rentals of the
properties should be remitted to the SSS and to the
RBO.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two
lots were already titled in the name of respondent
spouses. It was then discovered that Lot A was
extrajudicially foreclosed and issued under the name of
RBO-mortgagee. However, on May 2, 1988, the duly
authorized representative of RBO executed a Deed of
Installment Sale of Bank's Acquired Assets conveying
Lot A to respondent-spouses. RBO's TCT over Lot A
was then cancelled and a new TCT covering said lot
was issued in the name of respondent-spouses.
Moreover, Lot B was also foreclosed in favor of SSS.
However, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney
signed by petitioner-Onesiforo in favor of brother-
respondent Victor, the latter was able to redeem Lot B
as evidenced by the Certificate of Redemption issued
by the SSS.
Subsequently, petitioner-Onesiforo executed an
Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 in favor of
respondent-spouses. Said document was notarized and
even captioned as Agreement whereby petitioner-
Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother-respondent
Victor used his own money to redeem Lot B from the
SSS and, thus, brother-respondent Victor became the
owner of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner-
Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and interests
he or his heirs, successors and assigns have or may
have over the subject property. Subsequently, a
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) was issued under the
name of respondent-
spouses.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner-spouses filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City a complaint
for recovery of possession and ownership of their
conjugal properties with damages against respondent
spouses. The lower court affirmed the ownership of
respondent-spouses with Lot A as it was a valid
acquisition from RBO pursuant to the Deed of
Installment Sale but denied and affirmed the ownership
of Lot B to petitioner-spouses since petitioner-
Onesiforo’s sale thereof to respondent-spouses without
the consent of his wife being null and void. In effect,
respondent-spouses redemption thereof from the SSS
did not confer its ownership to them.
Respondent-spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals
contending that Lot B was acquired from the SSS by
mere redemption and not by purchase. However, the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision
of the lower court on this issue: applying the principle of
equity in sustaining the validity of the sale of petitioner-
Onesiforos of his one-half share in the subject property
to respondent-spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of Lot B is valid?
RULING:
NO. Although petitioners were married before the
enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the
sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property
relations are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. x x x
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. x x x
In Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, the
Court categorically stated thus:
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale
of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family
Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
x x x x x x x By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
In the present case, the Court does not see how
applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to
injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that
respondent-spouses were well aware that Lot B is a
conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the
disposition being made by petitioner-Onesiforo is
without the consent of his wife, as they knew that
petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do
not bear the signature of petitioner-Rosario. The fact
that petitioner-Onesiforo had to execute two documents,
namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10,
1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March
10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the
severe infirmities of the sale. It is an established rule that
a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he
acted in good faith. Such being the case, no injustice is
being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked
transacting with petitioner-Onesiforo alone despite their
knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal
property.
Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses
is entirely null and void.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of
non-enrichment at another’s expense, the Court agrees
with the CA that petitioners should reimburse
respondent spouses the redemption price paid for Lot
896-B-9-B in the amount of P111,110.09 with legal
interest from the time of filing of the complaint.
As to the rentals of the bodega and the house, Court
ruled that Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega had been
validly purchased by respondent spouses from the RBO
and a TCT over said property was issued in the name of
respondent spouses on February 22, 1989. Hence, any
rentals earned from the lease of said bodega rightfully
belongs to respondent spouses and cannot be offset
against petitioners' obligation to respondent spouses.
As to rentals for Lot 896-B-9-B and the house thereon,
respondent Victor testified that they never agreed to rent
the house and when they finally took over the same, it
was practically inhabitable and so they even incurred
expenses to repair the house
(45) Elna Mercado-Fehr vs Bruno Fehr
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
Facts:
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna
Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997. After
due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity)
and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of property. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite
204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children.
Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
installment basis at the time when petitioner and
respondent were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence
the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance
with Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner further
claimed that it would not be in the best interests of the
children if she would be made to demand periodically
from respondent his share in the support of the children.
The trial court noted that the parties have already
agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or
proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among
them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3
for respondent and 1/3 for the children.
Issue:
WON the rules on co-ownership will apply with regard to
the Suite 204
Ruling:
Yes.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that
in March 1983, after two years of long-distance
courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with
respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila.
Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael
Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple
got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they
purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite
204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract
to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as
the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as
the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness,
using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion
of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued
in the name of petitioner. cräläwvirtualib
In light of these facts, we give more credence to
petitioners submission that Suite 204 was acquired
during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under
Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family
Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of their family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-
ownership with respect to the properties they acquire
during their cohabitation.
We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102,
Quezon City:21cräläwvirtualibräry
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man
and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of
a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the
Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2)
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void. All these elements are present in
the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner
and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each
other. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife when petitioner moved in with
respondent in his residence and were later united in
marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be
void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of
respondents psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium,
was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at
the time when petitioner and respondent were already
living together. Hence, it should be considered as
common property of petitioner and respondent.
As regards the settlement of the common properties of
petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is
nothing in the records that support the pronouncement
of the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide
the properties into three1/3 share each to the petitioner,
the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact,
alleges in her petition before this Court that the parties
have agreed on a four-way division of the properties1/4
share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4
share each to their two children. ***Moreover,
respondents argument that the three-way partition is in
accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
does not hold water as said provisions relate only to
voidable marriages and exceptionally to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the declaration
of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void.
(46) Atienza vs De Castro
G.R. No. 169698 November 29, 2006
Facts:
Lupo, a married man cohabited with Yolanda as
husband and wife. During their coverture, they allegedly
acquired a real property and registered it under the
name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour,
hence, they parted. He filed an action for partition
contending that they owned it in common under the
concept of limited co-ownership. Yolanda contended
that she alone was the owner as she acquired it thru her
own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared
the property subject of co-ownership, but the CA
reversed it as he failed to prove material contribution in
the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he contended
that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in
the acquisition of the property because with or without
contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that
under Article 484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the
property during their extramarital union, such property
would be legally owned by them in common and
governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the contention
correct?
Issue:
Is the property co-owned by the two parties?
Held:
No. It is not disputed that the parties herein
were not capacitated to marry each other because Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the
time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property
regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, …only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is
required.
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of
property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies
to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions
and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be
equal.
It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent, having
no financial capacity to acquire the property in question,
merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two
(2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.
Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to the property
contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to
Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and
between the respondent and the vendor of said
property, to the exclusion of the petitioner.

The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is

without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate
his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but
likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of
the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so
and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly
find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be
proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere
allegation is not evidence.

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the

name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already
stated, petitioner’s evidence in support of his claim is
either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial
court’s finding that the disputed property falls under the
purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to
petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein
respondent was able to present preponderant evidence
of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-
ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from earnings, not only as an accountant
but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She
presented her clientele and the promissory notes
evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also
presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial
capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.