FULL-­‐TEXTS

 COMPILATION  
 
PART  5:  INTERPRETATION  OF  WORDS  
 
“Previously”  
(14)  Rura  vs  Lopena,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐69810-­‐14,  June  19,  1985  

This   case   involves   the   application   of   the   Probation   Law   (P.D.   No.   968,   as   amended),   more   specifically   Section   9   thereof   which  
disqualifies  from  probation  those  persons:  

(c)  who  have  previously  been  convicted  by  final  judgment  of  an  offense  punished  by  imprisonment  of  not  less  than  
one  month  and  one  day  and  or  a  fine  of  not  less  than  Two  Hundred  Pesos.  

Petitioner  Teodulo  Rura  was  accused,  tried  and  convicted  of  five  (5)  counts  of  estafa  committed  on  different  dates  in  the  Municipal  
Circuit  Trial  Court  of  Tubigon-­‐Clarin,  Tubigon,  Bohol,  denominated  as  Criminal  Case  Nos.  523,  524,  525,  526  and  527.  

The  five  cases  were  jointly  tried  and  a  single  decision  was  rendered  on  August  18,  1983.  Rura  was  sentenced  to  a  total  prison  term  of  
seventeen  (17)  months  and  twenty-­‐five  (25)  days.  In  each  criminal  case  the  sentence  was  three  (3)  months  and  fifteen  (15)  days.  

Rura   appealed   to   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Bohol   but   said   court   affirmed   the   decision   of   the   lower   court.   When   the   case   was  
remanded   to   the   court   of   origin   for   execution   of   judgment,   Rura   applied   for   probation.   The   application   was   opposed   by   a   probation  
officer   of   Bohol   on   the   ground   Chat   Rura   is   disqualified   for   probation   under   Sec.   9   (c)   of   the   Probation   law   quoted   above.   The   court  
denied  the  application  for  probation.  A  motion  for  reconsideration  was  likewise  denied.  Hence  the  instant  petition.  

The  question  which  is  raised  is  whether  or  not  the  petitioner  is  disqualified  for  probation.  

In  denying  the  application  for  probation,  the  respondent  judge  said:  

Though  the  five  estafa  cases  were  jointly  tried  and  decided  by  the  court  convicting  the  accused  thereof,  yet  the  dates  
of  commission  are  different.  Upon  conviction  he  was  guilty  of  said  offenses  as  of  the  dates  of  commission  of  the  acts  
complained  of.  (Rollo,  p,  58.)  

Upon  the  other  hand,  the  petitioner  argues:  

We  beg  to  disagree.  There  is  no  previous  conviction  by  final  judgment  to  speak  of.  The  five  (5)  cases  of  Estafa  were  
tried  jointly  and  there  is  only  one  decision  rendered  on  the  same  date—August  18.  1983.  It  could  not  be  presumed  
that   accused-­‐petitioner   had   been   convicted   one   after   the   other   for   the   five   cases   of   Estafa   because   the   conviction  
in  these  cases  took  place  within  the  same  day,  August  18,  1983  by  means  of  a  Joint  Decision,  and  not  in  a  separate  
decision.  

Previous   conviction,   we   submit,   presupposes   that   there   is   a   prior   sentence   or   that   there   was   already   a   decision  
rendered  which  convicted  the  accused.  In  this  instant  cases,  however,  there  is  only  one  decision  rendered  on  the  
five  (5)  counts  of  Estafa  which  was  promulgated  on  the  same  date.  In  other  words  the  effects  of  conviction  does  not  
retract  to  the  date  of  the  commission  of  the  offense  as  the  trial  court  held.  (Id.,  pp,  8-­‐9.)  

We  hold  for  the  petitioner.  When  he  applied  for  probation  he  had  no  previous  conviction  by  final  judgment.  When  he  applied  for  
probation   the   only   conviction   against   him   was   the   judgment   which   was   the   subject   of   his   application.   The   statute   relates   "previous"  
to  the  date  of  conviction,  not  to  the  date  of  the  commission  of  the  crime.  

WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   granted   and   the   respondent   judge   is   directed   to   give   due   course   to   the   petitioner's   application   for  
probation.  No  costs.  

SO  ORDERED.  

 
 “Term”  vs  “Tenure”  
(15)  Appari  vs  CA,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐30057,  January  31,  1984  

This  petition  for  certiorari  seeks  to  review  the  decision  of  the  then  Court  of  Appeals  (now  Intermediate  Appellate  Court  under  BP  129)  
dated  September  24,  1968,  affirming  the  decision  of  the  then  Court  of  First  Instance  (now  Regional  Trial  Court),  the  dispositive  portion  
of  which  is  as  follows:  

WHEREFORE,   the   judgment   of   the   lower   court   insofar   as   it   decrees   the   dismissal   of   the   present   petition   for  
mandamus  is  hereby  affirmed,  without  pronouncement  as  to  costs  (p.  50,  rec.).  

The  facts  of  the  case  are  as  follows:  

On   January   15,   1960,   private   respondents   (as   members   of   the   Board   of   Directors   of   the   defunct   National   Resettlement   and  
Rehabilitation   Administration   created   under   Republic   Act   No.   1160,   approved   June   18,   1954   —   NARRA)   approved   the   following  
resolution:  

RESOLUTION  NO.  13  (Series  of  1960)  

RESOLVED,  as  it  is  hereby  resolved,  to  appoint  Mr.  Bruno  0.  Aparri,  as  General  Manager  of  the  National  Resettlement  
and  Rehabilitation  Administration  (NARRA)  with  all  the  rights,  prerogatives  and  compensation  appurtenant  thereto  
to  take  effect  on  January  16,  1960);  

RESOLVED   FURTHER,   as   it   is   hereby   resolved,   to   inform   the   President   of   the   Philippines   of   the   above   appointment  
of  Mr.  Aparri  (p.  2,  rec.).  

Pursuant  thereto,  private  respondent  Remedies  O.  Fortich,  in  her  capacity  as  Chairman  of  the  NARRA  Board,  appointed  petitioner  
Bruno  O.  Aparri  as  reflected  in  the  following  letter:  

Manila,  January  22,  1960  

Mr.  Bruno  O.  Aparri  c/o  NARRA,  Manila  

SIR:  

You  are  hereby  appointed  as  GENERAL  MANAGER  in  the  National  Resettlement  and  Rehabilitation  Administration  
(NARRA)  with  compensation  at  the  rate  of  TWELVE  THOUSAND  (P12,000.00)  PESOS  per  annum  the  appointment  to  
take  effect  January  16,1960  .  .  .  .  REINSTATEMENT  ...  (p.  2,  rec.).  

The  power  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  NARRA  to  appoint  the  general  manager  is  provided  for  in  paragraph  (2),Section  8,  Republic  
Act  No.  1160  (approved  June  18,  1954),  to  wit:  

Sec.  8.  Powers  and  Duties  of  the  Board  of  Directors.   —  The  Board  of  Directors  shall  have  the  following  powers  and  
duties:  ...  

2)   To   appoint   and   fix   the   term   of   office   of   General   Manager   ...,   subject   to   the   recommendation   of   the   Office   of  
Economic   Coordination   and   the   approval   of   the   President   of   the   Philippines,   ....   The   Board,   by   a   majority   vote   of   all  
members,  may,  for  cause,   upon  recommendation  of  the  Office  of  Economic  Coordination  and  with  the  approval  of  
the   President   of   the   Philippines,   suspend   and/or   remove   the   General   Manager   and/or   the   Assistant   General  
Manager  (p.  46,  rec.,  emphasis  supplied).  

On  March  15,  1962,  the  same  Board  of  Directors  approved  the  following  resolution:  

RESOLUTION  NO.  24  (Series  of  1962)  

 WHEREAS,   the   Chairman   of   the   Board   has   transmitted   to   the   Board   of   Directors   the   desire   of   the   Office   of   the  
President  Malacanang,  Manila,  to  fix  the  term  of  office  of  the  incumbent  General  Manager  up  to  the  close  of  office  
hours  on  March  31,  1962,  in  accordance  with  the  provision  of  Section  8,  sub-­‐section  2  of  R.A.  No.  1160;  

NOW,  THEREFORE,  BE  IT  RESOLVED,  as  it  is  hereby  resolved,  that  the  Board  of  Directors  hereby  fix,  as  it  is  hereby  
fixed,   the   term   of   office   of   the   incumbent   General   Manager   of   the   National   Resettlement   and   Rehabilitation  
Administration  (NARRA)  to  March  31,  1962  (pp.  6-­‐7,  rec.,  emphasis  supplied).  

Petitioner  filed  a  petition  for  mandamus  with  preliminary  injunction  with  the  then  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Manila  on  March  29,  1962.  
The  petition  prayed  to  annul  the  resolution  of  the  NARRA  Board  dated  March  15,  1962,  to  command  the  Board  to  allow  petitioner  to  
continue  in  office  as  General  Manager  until  he  vacates  said  office  in  accordance  with  law  and  to  sentence  the  private  respondents  
jointly  and  severally  to  pay  the  petitioner  actual  damages  in  the  sum  of  P95,000.00,  plus  costs.  

On   August   8,   1963,   when   the   case   was   still   pending   decision   in   the   lower   court,   Republic   Act   No.   3844,   otherwise   known   as   the  
Agricultural   Land   Reform   Code,   took   effect.   The   said   law   abolished   the   NARRA   (Sec.   73,   R.A.   3844)   and   transferred   its   functions   and  
powers  to  the  Land  Authority.  On  October  21,  1963,  the  then  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Manila  rendered  judgment,  finding  "that  this  
case   has   become   academic   by   reason   of   the   approval   of   the   Agricultural   Land   Reform   Code   (Republic   Act   No.   3844)   and   thereby  
dismissing  the  instant  petition  without  pronouncement  as  to  costs"  (p.  5,  rec.).  

On  appeal  to  the  then  Court  of  Appeals,  the  appellate  tribunal  speaking  through  then  Mr.  Justice  Antonio  C.  Lucero,  affirmed  the  
decision  of  the  lower  court.  in  dismissing  the  petition  for  mandamus.  Pertinent  provisions  of  the  decision  are  as  follows:  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  facts,  it  is  evident  that  Bruno  O.  Aparri  accepted  the  position  of  General  Manager  without  
fixed  term  and  his  appointment  is,  in  essence,  terminable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  appointing  power  which,  in  this  
case,  is  the  Board  of  Directors.  Where,  as  in  the  case  at  bar,  the  appointing  officer,  that  is,  the  Board  of  Directors,  
had  fixed  the  term  of  office  of  the  incumbent  Manager  to  end  on  March  31,  1962,  the  replacement  of  Bruno  O.  
Aparri  is  not  removal  but  by  reason  of  the  term  of  his  office  which  is  one  of  the  recognized  modes  of  terminating  
official  relations.  Considering  that  the  term  of  office  of  the  General  Manager  of  the  NARRA  is  not  fixed  by  law  nor  has  
it  been  fixed  by  the  Board  of  Directors  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  although  it  had  the  power  to  do  so,  it  is  obvious  
that  the  term  of  office  of  herein  petitioner  Bruno  O.  Aparri  expired  on  March  31,  1962  and  his  right  to  hold  the  said  
office  was  thereby  extinguished.  In  other  words,  Bruno  O.  Aparri  cessation  from  office  invokes  no  removal  but  merely  
the  expiration  of  the  term  of  office  which  was  within  the  power  of  the  Board  of  Directors  to  fix.  Hence,  Bruno  O.  
Aparri  continues  only  for  so  long  as  the  term  of  his  office  has  not  ended  (Alba  vs.  Hon.  Jose  N.  Evangelists,  100  Phil.  
683)  [Decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  pp.  48-­‐49,  rec.,  emphasis  supplied].  

The  motion  for  reconsideration  by  petitioner  in  the  then  Court  of  Appeals  was  denied  on  January  10,  1969.  

On  January  20,  1969,  the  petitioner  filed  a  petition  for  certiorari  to  review  the  decision  of  the  then  Court  of  Appeals  dated  September  
24,  1968  (pp.  1-­‐41,  rec.).  The  same  was  initially  denied  for  lack  of  merit  in  a  resolution  dated  January  27,  1969  (p.  55,  rec.);  but  on  
motion  for  reconsideration  filed  on  February  11,  1969,  the  petition  was  given  due  course  (p.  66,  rec.).  

The   only   legal   issue   sought   to   be   reviewed   is   whether   or   not   Board   Resolution   No.   24   (series   of   1962)   was   a   removal   or   dismissal   of  
petitioner  without  cause.  

WE  affirm.  WE  hold  that  the  term  of  office  of  the  petitioner  expired  on  March  31,  1962.  

A  public  office  is  the  right,  authority,  and  duty  created  and  conferred  by  law,  by  which  for  a  given  period,  either  fixed  by  law  or  enduring  
at  the  pleasure  of  the  creating  power,  an  individual  is  invested  with  some  portion  of  the  sovereign  functions  of  the  government,  to  be  
exercise  by  him  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  ([Mechem  Public  Offices  and  Officers,]  Sec.  1).  The  right  to  hold  a  public  office  under  our  
political  system  is  therefore  not  a  natural  right.  It  exists,  when  it  exists  at  all  only  because  and  by  virtue  of  some  law  expressly  or  
impliedly  creating  and  conferring  it  (Mechem  Ibid.,  Sec.  64).  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  vested  interest  or  an  estate  in  an  office,  or  
even  an  absolute  right  to  hold  office.  Excepting  constitutional  offices  which  provide  for  special  immunity  as  regards  salary  and  tenure,  
no  one  can  be  said  to  have  any  vested  right  in  an  office  or  its  salary  (42  Am.  Jur.  881).  
The   National   Resettlement   and   Rehabilitation   Administration   (NARRA)   was   created   under   Republic   Act   No.   1160   (approved   June  
18,1954),  which  provides  that:  

Sec.   2.   NATIONAL   RESETTLEMENT   AND   REHABILITATION   ADMINISTRATION   —   ...   there   is   hereby   created   a  
corporation   to   be   known   as   National   Resettlement   and   Rehabilitation   Administration   hereafter   referred   to   as  
"NARRA"  to  perform  under  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  President  of  the  Philippines,  through  the  Office  of  
Economic  Coordinator  all  the  duties  and  functions  of  the  Bureau  of  Lands  as  provided  for  in  Commonwealth  Act  
numbered  Six  Hundred  and  Ninety-­‐one,  as  amended,  and  such  other  duties  as  are  hereinafter  specified  in  this  Act.  It  
shall   be   headed   by   a   General   Manager   and   an   Assistant   Manager   who   shall   be   appointed   as   hereinafter  
provided  (emphasis  supplied).  

Paragraph  2,  Section  8  of  Republic  Act  1160  expressly  gives  to  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  NARRA  the  power  "to  appoint  and  fix  the  
term  of  office  of  the  general  manager  ...  subject  to  the  recommendation  of  Economic  Coordination  and  the  approval  of  the  President  
of  the  Philippines"  (emphasis  supplied).  

By   "appointment"   is   meant   the   act   of   designation   by   the   executive   officer,   board   or   body,   to   whom   that   power   has   been   delegated,  
of  the  individual  who  is  to  exercise  the  functions  of  a  given  office  (Mechem  op.  cit.,  Sec.  102).  When  the  power  of  appointment  is  
absolute,  and  the  appointee  has  been  determined  upon,  no  further  consent  or  approval  is  necessary,  and  the  formal  evidence  of  the  
appointment,   the   commission,   may   issue   at   once.   Where,   however,   the   assent   or   confirmationof   some   other   officer   or   body   is  
required,  the  Commission  can  issue  or  the  appointment  is  complete  only  when  such  assent  or  condition  is  obtained  (People  vs.  Bissell,  
49  Cal.  407).  To  constitute  an  "appointment"  to  office,  there  must  be  some  open,  unequivocal  act  of  appointment  on  the  part  of  the  
appointing  authority  empowered  to  make  it,  and  it  may  be  said  that  an  appointment  to  office  is  made  and  is  complete  when  the  last  
act  required  of  the  appointing  authority  has  been  performed  (Molnar  vs.  City  of  Aurora,  348  N.E.  2d  262,  38  III  App.  3d  580).  In  either  
case,  the  appointment  becomes  complete  when  the  last  act  required  of  the  appointing  power  is  performed  (State  vs.  Barbour,  53  
Conn.  76,  55  Am.  Rep.  65).  

The  petitioner  was  appointed  as  general  manager  pursuant  to  Resolution  No.  13  (series  of  1960  —  approved  on  January  15,  1960)  of  
the  Board  of  Directors.  A  careful  perusal  of  the  resolution  points  out  the  fact  that  the  appointment  is  by  itself  incomplete   because  of  
the  lack  of  approval  of  the  President  of  the  Philippines  to  such  appointment.  Thus,  We  note  that  Resolution  No.  13  states:  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

...  RESOLVED  FURTHER,  as  it  is  hereby  resolved,  to  inform  the  President  of  the  Philippines  of  the  above  appointment  
of  Mr.  Aparri  (p.  2,  rec.).  

Presumably,   the   Board   of   Directors   of   the   NARRA   expected   that   such   appointment   be   given   approval   by   the   then   President.   Lacking  
such  approval  by  the  President  as  required  by  the  law  (par.  2,  Sec.  8  of  R.A.  1160),  the  appointment  of  petitioner  was  not  complete.  
The  petitioner  can,  at  best,  be  classified  as  a  de  facto  officer  because  he  assumed  office  "under  color  of  a  known  appointment  or  
election,  void  because  the  officer  was  not  eligible  or  because  there  was  a  want  of  power  in  the  electing  body,  or  by  reasons  of  some  
defect  or  irregularity  in  its  exercise,  such  ineligibility,  want  of  power,  or  defect  being  unknown  to  the  public"  (State  vs.  Carroll,  38  
Conn.  449,  9Am.  Rep.  409).  

However,   such   appointment   was   made   complete   upon   approval   of   Resolution   No.   24   (series   of   1962-­‐approved   March   15,   1962)  
wherein  the  President  submitted  to  the  Board  his  "desire"  to  fix  the  term  of  office  of  the  petitioner  up  to  the  close  of  office  hours  on  
March  31,  1962.  The  questioned  resolution  corrected  whatever  requisite  lacking  in  the  earlier  Resolution  No.  13  of  the  respondent  
Board.   Resolution   No.   24,   approved   by   the   respondent   Board   and   pursuant   to   "the   desire   of   the   President"   legally   fixed   the   term   of  
office  of  petitioner  as  mandated  by  paragraph  2,  Section  8  of  Republic  Act  1160.  

The  word  "term"  in  a  legal  sense  means  a  fixed  and  definite  period  of  time  which  the  law  describes  that  an  officer  may  hold  an  office  
(Sueppel  vs.  City  Council  of  Iowa  City,  136  N.W.  2D  523,  quoting  67  CJS  OFFICERS,  secs.  42,  54[1]).  According  to  Mochem,  the  term  of  
office  is  the  period  during  which  an  office  may  be  held.  Upon  the  expiration  of  the  officer's  term,  unless  he  is  authorized  by  law  to  
hold  over,  his  rights,  duties  and  authority  as  a  pubic  officer  must  ipso  facto  cease  (Mechem,  op.  cit.,  Secs.  396-­‐397).  In  the  law  on  
Public  Officers,  the  most  natural  and  frequent  method  by  which  a  public  officer  ceases  to  be  such  is  by  the  expiration  of  the  term  for  
which  he  was  elected  or  appointed.  The  question  of  when  this  event  has  occurred  depends  upon  a  number  of  considerations,  the  most  
prominent  of  which,  perhaps,  are  whether  he  was  originally  elected  or  appointed  for  a  definite  term  or  for  a  term  dependent  upon  
some  act  or  event  ...  (Mechem  op.  cit.,  Sec.  384).  
It   is   necessary   in   each   case   to   interpret   the   word   "term"   with   the   purview   of   statutes   so   as   to   effectuate   the   statutory   scheme  
pertaining  to  the  office  under  examination  (Barber  vs.  Blue,  417  P.2D  401,  51  Cal.  Rptr.  865,  65  C.2d  N5).  In  the  case  at  bar,  the  term  
of  office  is  not  fixed  by  law.  However,  the  power  to  fix  the  term  is  vested  in  the  Board  of  Directors  subject  to  the  recommendation  of  
the  Office  of  Economic  Coordination  and  the  approval  of  the  President  of  the  Philippines.  Resolution  No.  24  (series  of  1962)  speaks  of  
no   removal   but   an   expiration   of   the   term   of   office   of   the   petitioner.   The   statute   is   undeniably   clear.   It   is   the   rule   in   statutory  
construction  that  if  the  words  and  phrase  of  a  statute  are  not  obscure  or  ambiguous,  its  meaning  and  the  intention  of  the  legislature  
must  be  determined  from  the  language  employed,  and,  where  there  is  no  ambiguity  in  the  words,  there  is  no  room  for  construction  
(Black  on  Interpretation  of  Laws,  Sec.  51).  The  courts  may  not  speculate  as  to  the  probable  intent  of  the  legislature  apart  from  the  
words  (Hondoras  vs.  Soto,  8  Am.  St.,  Rep.  744).  The  reason  for  the  rule  is  that  the  legislature  must  be  presumed  to  know  the  meaning  
of  words,  to  have  used  words  advisedly  and  to  have  expressed  its  intent  by  the  use  of  such  words  as  are  found  in  the  statute  (50  Am.  
Jur.  p.  212).  

Removal  entails  the  ouster  of  an  incumbent  before  the  expiration  of  his  term  (Manalang  vs.  Quitoriano,  50  O.G.  2515).  The  petitioner  
in  this  case  was  not  removed  before  the  expiration  of  his  term.  Rather,  his  right  to  hold  the  office  ceased  by  the  expiration  on  March  
31,  1962  of  his  term  to  hold  such  office.  

WHEREFORE,  THE  DECISION  APPEALED  FROM  IS  HEREBY  AFFIRMED.  WITHOUT  COSTS.  

SO  ORDERED.  

“And”  (Conjunctive)  
(16)  Mapa  vs  Arroyo,  G.R.  No.  78585,  July  5,  1989  

We  are  called  upon  once  again,  in  this  special  civil  action  for  certiorari,  for  a  pronouncement  as  to  whether  or  not  there  has  been  
grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  the  executive  branch  of  Government,  particularly  
in  the  adjudication  of  a  controversy  originally  commenced  in  one  of  its  regulatory  agencies.  

Petitioner  herein  seeks  the  reversal  of  the  decision  of  the  Office  of  the  President,  rendered  by  the  Deputy  Executive  Secretary  on  April  
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24,1987,    which  dismissed  his  appeal  from  the  resolution  of  the  Commission  Proper,  Human  Settlements  Regulatory  Commission  
(HSRC,  for  short),  promulgated  on  January  10,  1986  and  affirming  the  decision  of  July  3,  1985  of  the  Office  of  Adjudication  and  Legal  
Affairs  (OAALA,  for  brevity)  of  HSRC.  Petitioner  avers  that  public  respondent  "gravely  transcended  the  sphere  of  his  discretion"  in  
finding  that  Presidential  Decree  No.  957  is  inapplicable  to  the  contracts  to  sell  involved  in  this  case  and  in  consequently  dismissing  the  
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same.    

The  established  facts  on  which  the  assailed  decision  is  based  are  set  out  therein  as  follows:  

Records  disclose  that,  on  September  18,  1975,  appellant  Jose  Antonio  Mapa  and  appellee  Labrador  Development  
Corporation  (Labrador,  for  short),  owner/developer  of  the  Barangay  Hills  Subdivision  in  Antipolo,  Rizal,  entered  into  
two  contracts  to  sell  over  lots  12  and  13  of  said  subdivision.  On  different  months  in  1976,  they  again  entered  into  
two  similar  contracts  involving  lots  15  and  16  in  the  same  subdivision.  Under  said  contracts,  Mapa  undertook  to  
make  a  total  monthly  installment  of  P2,137.54  over  a  period  of  ten  (10)  years.  Mapa,  however,  defaulted  in  the  
payment  thereof  starting  December  1976,  prompting  Labrador  to  send  to  the  former  a  demand  letter,  dated  May  5,  
1977,   giving   him   until   May   18,   1977,   within   which   to   settle   his   unpaid   installments   for   the   4   lots   amounting   to  
P15,411.66,  with  a  warning  that  non-­‐payment  thereof  will  result  in  the  cancellation  of  the  four  (4)  contracts.  Despite  
receipt  of  said  letter  on  May  6,1977,  Mapa  failed  to  take  any  action  thereon.  Labrador  subsequently  wrote  Mapa  
another   letter,   dated   June   15,   1982,   which   the   latter   received   on   June   21,   1982,   reminding   him   of   his   total   arrears  
amounting   to   P180,065.27   and   demanding   payment   within   5   days   from   receipt   thereof,   but   which   letter   Mapa  
likewise   ignored.   Thus,   on   August   16,   1982,   Labrador   sent   Mapa   a   notarial   cancellation   of   the   four   (4)   contracts   to  
sell,  which  Mapa  received  on  August  20,  1982.  On  September  10,  1982,  however,  Mapa's  counsel  sent  Labrador  a  
letter  calling  Labrador's  attention  to,  and  demanding  its  compliance  with,  Clause  20  of  the  four  (4)  contracts  to  sell  
which  relates  to  Labrador's  obligation  to  provide,  among  others,  lighting/water  facilities  to  subdivision  lot  buyers.  

On   September   10,   1982,   Labrador   issued   a   certification   holding   the   implementation   of   the   letter   dated   August   16,  
1982  (re  notarial  cancellation)  pending  the  complete  development  of  road  lot  cul  de  sac  within  the  properties  of  
 Mapa  at  Barangay  Hills  Subdivision.'  Thereafter  on  October  25,1982,  Labrador  sent  Mapa  a  letter  informing  him  'that  
the  construction  of  road,  sidewalk,  curbs  and  gutters  adjacent  to  Block  11  Barangay  Hills  Subdivision  are  already  
completed'  and  further  requesting  Mapa  to  'come  to  our  office  within  five  (5)  days  upon  receipt  of  this  letter  to  
settle  your  account.'  

On  December  10,  1982,  Mapa  tendered  payment  by  means  of  a  check  in  the  amount  of  P  2,137.54,  but  Labrador  
refused   to   accept   payment   for   the   reason   that   it   was   agreed   'that   after   the   development   of   the   cul   de   sac,   he  
(complainant)  will  pay  in  full  the  total  amount  due,'  which  Labrador  computed  at  P  260,138.61.  On  December  14,  
1982,  Mapa  wrote  Labrador  claiming  that  'you  have  not  complied  with  the  requirements  for  water  and  light  facilities  
in   lots   12,   13,   15   &   16   Block   2   of   Barangay   Hills   Subdivision.'   The   following   day,   Mapa   filed   a   complaint   against  
Labrador  for  the  latter's  neglect  to  put  1)  a  water  system  that  meets  the  minimum  standard  as  specified  by  HSRC,  
and  2)  electrical  power  supply.  By  way  of  relief,  Mapa  requested  the  HSRC  to  direct  Labrador  to  provide  the  facilities  
aforementioned,  and  to  issue  a  cease  and  desist  order  enjoining  Labrador  from  cancelling  the  contracts  to  sell.  

After  due  hearing/investigation,  which  included  an  on-­‐site  inspection  of  the  subdivision,  OAALA,  issued  its  decision  
of  July  3,  1985,  dismissing  the  complaint  and  declaring  that  after  the  lapse  of  5  years  from  complainant's  default  
respondent  had  every  right  to  rescind  the  contract  pursuant  to  Clause  7  thereof.  .  .  

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Per  its  resolution  of  January  10,  1986,  the  Commission  Proper,  HSRC,  affirmed  the  aforesaid  OAALA  decision.  

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It  was  petitioner's  adamant  submission  in  the  administrative  proceedings  that  the  provisions  of  Presidential  Decree  No.  957    and  
implementing  rules  form  part  of  the  contracts  to  sell  executed  by  him  and  respondent  corporation,  hence  the  obligations  imposed  
therein  had  to  be  complied  with  by  Labrador  within  the  period  provided.  Since,  according  to  petitioner,  Labrador  failed  to  perform  the  
aforementioned  obligations,  it  is  precluded  from  rescinding  the  subject  contracts  to  sell  since  petitioner  consequently  did  not  incur  in  
delay  on  his  part.  

Such  intransigent  position  of  petitioner  has  not  changed  in  the  petition  at  bar  and  unyielding  reliance  is  placed  on  the  provisions  of  
Presidential  Decree  No.  957  and  its  implementing  rules.  The  specific  provisions  of  the  Decree  which  are  persistently  relied  upon  read:  

SEC.  20.  Time  of  Completion.  —  Every  owner  or  developer  shall  construct  and  provide  the  facilities,  improvements,  
infrastructures  and  other  forms  of  development,  including  water  supply  and  lighting  facilities,  which  are  offered  and  
indicated  in  the  approved  subdivision  or  condominium  plans,  brochures,  prospectus,  printed  matters  letters  or  in  
any   form   of   advertisements,   within   one   year   from   the   date   of   the   issuance   of   the   license   for   the   subdivision   or  
condominium  project  or  such  other  period  of  time  as  may  be  fixed  by  the  Authority.  

SEC.   21.   Sales   Prior   to   Decree.   —   In   cases   of   subdivision   lots   or   condominium   units   sold   or   disposed   of   prior   to   the  
effectivity  of  this  Decree,  it  shall  be  incumbent  upon  the  owner  or  developer  of  the  subdivision  or  condominium  
project  to  complete  compliance  with  his  or  its  obligations  as  provided  in  the  preceding  section  within  two  years  from  
the  date  of  this  Decree  unless  otherwise  extended  by  the  Authority  or  unless  an  adequate  performance  bond  is  filed  
in  accordance  with  Section  6  hereof.  

Failure   of   the   owner   or   developer   to   comply   with   the   obligations   under   this   and   the   preceding   provisions   shall  
constitute  a  violation  punishable  under  Sections  38  and  39  of  this  Decree.  

Rule  V  of  the  implementing  rules,  on  the  other  hand,  requires  two  (2)  sources  of  electric  power,  two  (2)  deep-­‐well  and  pump  sets  with  
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a  specified  capacity  and  two  standard  fire  hose  flows  with  a  capacity  of  175  gallons  per  minute.    

The  provision,  in  said  contracts  to  sell  which,  according  to  petitioner,  includes  and  incorporates  the  aforequoted  statutory  provisions,  
is  Clause  20  of  said  contracts  which  provides:  

Clause  20.  SUBDIVISION  DEVELOPMENT  —  To  insure  the  physical  development  of  the  subdivision,  the  SELLER  hereby  
obliges  itself  to  provide  the  individual  lot  buyer  with  the  following:  

a)  PAVED  ROADS;  b)  UNDERGROUND  DRAINAGE;  c)  CONCRETE  CURBS  AND  GUTTERS;  d)  WATER  SYSTEM;  e)  PARK  
AND  OPEN  SPACE  
 These  improvements  shall  apply  only  to  the  portions  of  the  subdivision  which  are  for  sale  or  have  been  sold.  All  
improvements  except  those  requiring  the  services  of  a  public  utility  company  or  the  government  shall  be  completed  
within  a  period  of  three  (3)  years  from  date  of  this  contract.  Failure  by  the  SELLER  to  reasonably  comply  with  the  
above  schedule  shall  permit  the  BUYER/  S  to  suspend  his  monthly  installments  without  any  penalties  or  interest  
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charges  until  such  time  that  these  improvements  shall  have  been  made  as  scheduled.  

As  recently  reiterated,  it  is  jurisprudentially  settled  that  absent  a  clear,  manifest  and  grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  want  of  
jurisdiction,   the   findings   of   the   administrative   agency   on   matters   falling   within   its   competence   will   not   be   disturbed   by   the  
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courts.     Specifically   with   respect   to   factual   findings,   they   are   accorded   respect,   if   not   finality,   because   of   the   special   knowledge   and  
expertise  gained  by  these  tribunals  from  handling  the  specific  matters  falling  under  their  jurisdiction.  Such  factual  findings  may  be  
disregarded  only  if  they  "are  not  supported  by  evidence;  where  the  findings  are  vitiated  by  fraud,  imposition  or  collusion;  where  the  
procedure   which   led   to   the   factual   findings   is   irregular;   when   palpable   errors   are   committed;   or   when   grave   abuse   of   discretion,  
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arbitrariness  or  capriciousness  is  manifest."    

A  careful  scrutiny  of  the  records  of  the  instant  case  reveals  that  the  circumstances  thereof  do  not  fag  under  the  aforesaid  excepted  
cases,  with  the  findings  duly  supported  by  the  evidence.  

Petitioner's  insistence  on  the  applicability  of  Presidential  Decree  No.  957  must  be  rejected.  Said  decree  was  issued  on  July  12,  1976  
long  after  the  execution  of  the  contracts  involved.  Obviously  and  necessarily,  what  subsequently  were  statutorily  provided  therein  as  
obligations  of  the  owner  or  developer  could  not  have  been  intended  by  the  parties  to  be  a  part  of  their  contracts.  No  intention  to  give  
restrospective  application  to  the  provisions  of  said  decree  can  be  gathered  from  the  language  thereof.  Section  20,  in  relation  to  Section  
21,   of   the   decree   merely   requires   the   owner   or   developer   to   construct   the   facilities,   improvements,   infrastructures   and   other   forms  
of  development  but  only  such  as  are  offered  and  indicated  in  the  approved  subdivision  or  condominium  plans,  brochures,  prospectus,  
printed  matters,  letters  or  in  any  form  of  advertisements.  Other  than  what  are  provided  in  Clause  20  of  the  contract,  no  further  written  
commitment  was  made  by  the  developer  in  this  respect.  To  read  into  the  contract  the  matters  desired  by  petitioner  would  have   the  
law  impose  additional  obligations  on  the  parties  to  a  contract  executed  before  that  very  law  existed  or  was  contemplated.  

We  further  reject  petitioner's  strained  and  tenuous  application  of  the  so-­‐called  doctrine  of  last  antecedent  in  the  interpretation  of  
Section  20  and,  correlatively,  of  Section  21.  He  would  thereby  have  the  enumeration  of  "facilities,  improvements,  infrastructures  and  
other   forms   of   development"   interpreted   to   mean   that   the   demonstrative   phrase   "which   are   offered   and   indicated   in   the   approved  
subdivision  plans,  etc."  refer  only  to  "other  forms  of  development"  and  not  to  "facilities,  improvements  and  infrastructures."  While  
this  subserves  his  purpose,  such  bifurcation  whereby  the  supposed  adjectival  phrase  is  set  apart  from  the  antecedent  words,  i s  illogical  
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and  erroneous.  The  complete  and  applicable  rule  is  ad  proximum  antecedens  fiat  relatio  nisi  impediatur  sentencia.    Relative  words  
refer   to   the   nearest   antecedent,   unless   it   be   prevented   by   the   context.   In   the   present   case,   the   employment   of   the   word   "and"  
between   "facilities,   improvements,   infrastructures"   and   "other   forms   of   development,"   far   from   supporting   petitioner's   theory,  
enervates  it  instead  since  it  is  basic  in  legal  hermeneutics  that  "and"  is  not  meant  to  separate  words  but  is  a  conjunction  used  to  
denote  a  joinder  or  union.  

Thus,   if   ever   there   is   any   valid   ground   to   suspend   the   monthly   installments   due   from   petitioner,   it   would   only   be   based   on   non-­‐
performance  of  the  obligations  provided  in  Clause  20  of  the  contract,  particularly  the  alleged  non-­‐construction  of  the  cul-­‐de-­‐sac.  But,  
even   this   is   unavailing   and   is   obviously   being   used   only   to   justify   petitioner's   default.   The   on-­‐site   inspection   of   the   subdivision  
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conducted  by  the  OAALA  and  its  subsequent  report  reveal  that  Labrador  substantially  complied  with  its  obligation.    

Furthermore,  the  initial  non-­‐construction   of   the   cul-­‐de-­‐sac,   as   private   respondent   Labrador   explained,   was   because   petitioner   Mapa  
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requested  the  suspension  of  its  construction  since  his  intention  was  to  purchase  the  adjoining  lots  and  thereafter  enclose  the  same.    If  
these   were   not   true,   petitioner   would   have   invoked   that   supposed   default   in   the   first   instance.   As   the   OAALA   noted,   petitioner  
"stopped  payments  of  his  monthly  obligations  as  early  as  December,  1976,  which  is  a  mere  five  months  after  the  effectivity  of  P.D.  No.  
957  or  about  a  year  after  the  execution  of  the  contracts.  This  means  that  respondent  still  has  1  and  1/2  years  to  comply  with  its  legal  
obligation   to   develop   the   subdivision   under   said   P.D.   and   two   years   to   do   so   under   the   agreement,   hence,   it   was   improper   for  
complainant   to   have   suspended   payments   in   December,   1976   on   the   ground   of   non-­‐development   since   the   period   allowed   for  
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respondent's  obligation  to  undertake  such  development  has  not  yet  expired."    

ON  THE  FOREGOING  CONSIDERATIONS,  the  petition  should  be,  as  it  is  hereby  DISMISSED.  

SO  ORDERED.  

 
 “Or”  (Disjunctive)  
(17)  People  vs  Martin,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐33487,  May  31,  1971  

This  appeal  by  the  People  of  the  Philippines  from  the  order  dated  August  2,  1968  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  La  Union  dismissing  
criminal  case  A-­‐392  on  the  ground  of  lack  of  jurisdiction,  was  certified  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  to  this  Court,  the  issues  raised  being  
purely  of  law.  

The  central  issue  is  the  proper  interpretation  of  the  provisions  Section  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  613,  as  amended  by  Rep.  Act  144  and  
Rep.  Act  327,  otherwise  known  as  the  Philippine  Immigration  Act.  

The  defendants  Maximo  Martin,  Candido  Martin  and  Rodolfo  Higashi  were  charged  in  criminal  case  A-­‐392  of  the  CFI  of  La  Union  with  
a  violation  of  section  46  of  Com.  Act  613,  as  amended.  The  information  dated  January  12,  1968  recites  as  follows:  

The  undersigned  Acting  State  Prosecutor,  and  Asst.  Provincial  Fiscal  accuse  MAXIMO  MARTIN,  CANDIDO  MARTIN  
and  RODOLFO  HIGASHI  of  Sec.  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  NO.  613  otherwise  known  as  Philippine  Immigration  Act  of  
1940,  as  amended  by  Republic  Act  No.  827,  committed  as  follows:  

That   on   or   about   the   22nd   day   of   September,   1966,   in   the   Municipality   of   Sto.   Tomas,   Province   of   La   Union,  
Philippines,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   court,   the   above-­‐named   accused,   conspiring   and  
confederating  together  and  mutually  helping  one  another  and  in  active  aid  with  Filipino  nationals  who  are  presently  
charged   before   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Bulacan   in   Crim.   Case   No.   6252-­‐M,   did   then   and   there   wilfully,  
unlawfully  and  feloniously  bring  in  and  carry  into  the  Philippines  thirty  nine  (39)  Chinese  aliens  who  traveled  by  the  
Chinese  vessel  "Chungking"  from  the  port  of  Hongkong  and  who  are  not  duly  admitted  by  any  immigration  officer  
or  not  lawfully  entitled  to  enter  the  Philippines,  and  from  the  Chinese  vessel  "Chungking,"  accused  took  delivery,  
loaded,  and  ferried  the  Chinese  aliens  in  the  vessel  "MARU  XI"  owned,  operated,  under  the  charge  and  piloted  by  all  
the   herein   accused   from   outside   into   the   Philippines,   sureptitiously   landing   the   said   aliens   at   Barrio   Damortis,   Sto.  
Tomas,  La  Union,  Philippines  which  place  of  landing  is  not  a  duly  authorized  port  of  entry  in  the  Philippines.  

After  the  thirty-­‐nine  (39)  illegal  entrants  were  landed  in  barrio  Damortis,  as  charged  in  the  indictment,  they  were  loaded  in  a  car  and  
two   jeepneys   for   transport   to   Manila.   They   did   not   however   reach   their   destination   because   they   were   intercepted   by   Philippine  
Constabulary  agents  in  Malolos,  Bulacan.  

For  concealing  and  harboring  these  thirty-­‐nine  aliens,  Jose  Pascual,  Filipinas  Domingo,  Jose  Regino,  Alberto  Bunyi,  Emerdoro  Santiago  
and  Ibarra  Domingo  were  charged  before  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Bulacan  in  criminal  case  6258-­‐M.  The  amended  information  in  
the  said  criminal  case  reads  as  follows:  

The   undersigned   Provincial   Fiscal   accuses   Jose   Pascual,   Filipinas   Domingo,   Jose   Regino,   Alberto   Bunyi,   Emerdoro  
Santiago  and  Ibarra  Domingo  of  the  violation  of  Section  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  No.  613,  otherwise  known  as  the  
Philippine  Immigration  Act  of  1940,  as  amended  by  Republic  Act  No.  827,  committed  as  follows:  

That  on  or  about  the  22nd  day  of  September,  1966,  in  the  municipality  of  Malolos,  Province  of  Bulacan,  Philippines,  
and  within  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Honorable  Court,  the  above  named  accused  and  several  others  whose  identities  
are  still  unknown,  conspiring  and  confederating  and  aiding  one  another,  did  then  and  there  wilfully,  unlawfully  and,  
feloniously,  bring  conceal  and  harbor  39  Chinese  aliens  not  duly  admitted  by  any  immigration  officer  or  not  lawfully  
entitled  to  enter  or  reside  within  the  Philippines  under  the  terms  of  the  Immigration  Laws,  whose  names  are  as  
follows:  Hung  Chang  Cheong,  Hung  Ling  Choo,  Sze  Lin  Chuk,  Chian  Giok  Eng,  Mung  Bun  Bung,  Lee  Chin  Kuo,  Gan  Kee  
Chiong,  See  Sei  Hong  Chun,  Go  Kian  Sim,  Kho  Ming  Jiat,  See  Lee  Giok,  Uy  Chin  Chu,  Go  Su  Kim,  Go  Chu,  Chiang  Tian,  
Chua  Tuy  Tee,  Sy  Jee  Chi,  Sy  Sick  Bian,  Sy  Kang  Liu,  Ang  Chi  Hun,  Kho  Chu,  Chua  Hong,  Lim  Chin  Chin,  Ang  Lu  Him,  
William  Ang,  Sy  Siu  Cho,  Ang  Puy  Hua,  Sy  Chi  Tek,  Lao  Sing  Tee,  Cua  Tiong  Bio,  Kho  Lee  Fun,  Kho  Lee  Fong,  Ang  Giok,  
Sy  Si  Him,  Sy  Lin  Su,  Lee  Hun,  Sy  SiongGo  and  Sy  Cho  Lung,  who  previously  earlier  on  the  same  day,  thru  the  aid,  help  
and   manipulation   of   the   abovenamed   accused,   were   loaded   and   ferried   to   the   shore   from   the   Chinese   vessel  
"CHIUNG  HING"  in  a  fishing  vessel  known  as  the  "MARU  Xl"  and  landed  at  barrio  Damortis,  Sto.  Tomas,  La  Union,  
and  immediately  upon  landing  were  loaded  in  3  vehicles  an  automobile  bearing  plate  No.  H-­‐3812-­‐Manila  driven  and  
operated  by  Emerdoro  Santiago  and  2  jeepneys  with  plates  Nos.  S-­‐27151-­‐  Philippines,  1966  and  S-­‐26327-­‐Philippines,  
1966   driven   and   operated   by   Jose   Regino   and   Alberto   Bunyi,   respectively,   and   brought   southwards   along   the  
MacArthur   highway   and   upon   reaching   Malolos,   Bulacan,   were   apprehended   by   the   agents   of   the   Philippine  
Constabulary,  the  latter  confiscating  and  impounding  the  vehicles  used  in  carrying  and  transporting  the  aid  aliens  
 and  including  the  sum  of  P15,750.00  found  in  the  possession  of  the  accused  Jose  Pascual  which  was  used  and/or  to  
be  used  in  connection  with  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged.  

On  July  1,  1968  the  three  accused  in  criminal  case  A-­‐392  filed  a  "motion  to  dismiss"  [quash]  on  the  ground  that  the  CFI  of  La  Union  has  
no  jurisdiction  over  the  offense  charged  in  the  said  indictment  as  the  court  had  been  pre-­‐empted  from  taking  cognizance  of  the  case  
by  the  dependency  in  the  CFI  of  Bulacan  of  criminal  case  6258-­‐M.  This  motion  was  opposed  by  the  prosecution.  

On   August   2,   1968   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   La   Union   dismissed   the   case,   with   costs   de   oficio.   The   Government's   motion   for  
reconsideration  was  denied;  hence  the  present  recourse.  

In   this   appeal   the   Government   contends   that   the   lower   court   erred   (1)   "in   declaring   that   the   information   in   the   instant   case   [A-­‐392]  
alleges  conspiracy  between  the  accused  herein  and  the  persons  accused  in  criminal  case  6258-­‐M  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  
Bulacan;"  (2)  "in  holding  that  by  reason  of  said  allegation  of  conspiracy  in  the  information  in  this  case  [A-­‐3921],  the  act  of  one  of  the  
accused  in  both  criminal  cases  is  deemed  the  act  of  all  the  accused  and  that  as  a  consequence  all  those  accused  in  the  two  cases  are  
liable  and  punishable  for  one  offense  or  violation  of  section  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  613,  as  amended,  although  committed  by  and  
through  the  different  means  specified  in  said  section;"  (3)  "in  holding  that  the  violation  of  section  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  613,  as  
amended,   committed   by   the   accused   in   both   criminal   cases   partakes   of   the   nature   of   a   transitory   or   continuing   offense;"   and   (4)   "in  
declaring  that  it  lacks  jurisdiction  and  is  now  excluded  from  taking  cognizance  of  this  case  [A-­‐392]  and  in  dismissing  it."  

Section  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  613,  as  amended,  reads  as  follows:  

Any  individual  who  shall  bring  into  or  land  in  the  Philippines  or  conceal  or  harbor  any  alien  not  duly  admitted  by  any  
immigration   officer   or   not   lawfully   entitled   to   enter   or   reside   within   the   Philippines   under   the   terms   of   the  
immigration  laws,  or  attempts,  conspires  with,  or  aids  another  to  commit  any  such  act,  and  any  alien  who  enters  the  
Philippines   without   inspection   of   admission   by   the   immigration   officials,   or   obtains   entry   into   the   Philippines   by  
wilful,  false,  or  misleading  representation  or  wilful  concealment  of  a  material  fact,  shall  be  guilty  of  an  offense  and  
upon  conviction  thereof,  shall  be  fined  not  more  than  ten  thousand  pesos,  imprisoned  for  not  more  than  ten  years,  
and  deported  if  he  is  an  alien.  

If  the  individual  who  brings  into  or  lands  in  the  Philippines  or  conceals  or  harbors  any  alien  not  duly  admitted  by  any  
immigration  officer  or  not  lawfully  entitled  to  enter  or  reside  herein,  or  who  attempts,  conspires  with  or  aids  another  
to  commit  any  such  act,  is  the  pilot,  master,  agent,  owner,  consignee,  or  any  person  in  charge  of  the  vessel  or  aircraft  
which   brought   the   alien   into   the   Philippines   from   any   place   outside   thereof,   the   fine   imposed   under   the   first  
paragraph  hereof  shall  constitute  a  lien  against  the  vessel  or  aircraft  and  may  be  enforced  in  the  same  manner  as  
fines   are   collected   and   enforced   against   vessels   under   the   customs   laws:   Provided,   however,   That   if   the   court   shall  
in  its  discretion  consider  forfeiture  to  be  justified  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  shall  order,  in  lieu  of  the  fine  
imposed,  the  forfeiture  of  the  vessel  or  aircraft  in  favor  of  the  Government,  without  prejudice  to  the  imposition  to  
the  penalty  of  imprisonment  provided  in  the  preceding  paragraph.  

To  be  stressed  at  the  outset  is  the  significant  repetition,  in  the  second  paragraph  above-­‐quoted,  of  basic  words  and  concepts  set  forth  
in  the  first  paragraph.  Thus,  the  first  paragraph  begins  with:  "Any  individual  who  shall  bring  into  or  land  in  the  Philippines  or  conceal  
or  harbor  any  alien  ...;"  the  second  paragraph  starts  with  "If  the  individual  who  brings  into  or  lands  in  the  Philippines  or  conceals  or  
harbors  any  alien  ..."  (emphasis  supplied)  Scanning  section  46  in  its  entire  context,  it  is  at  once  apparent,  there  being  no  indication  to  
the  contrary,  that  the  act  of  bringing  into,  the  act  of  landing,  the  act  of  concealing,  the  act  of  harboring,  are  four  separate  acts,  each  
act  possessing  its  own  distinctive,  different  and  disparate  meaning.  "Bring  into"  has  reference  to  the  act  of  placing  an  alien  within  the  
territorial  waters  of  the  Philippines.  "Land"  refers  to  the  act  of  putting  ashore  an  alien.  "Conceal"  refers  to  the  act  of  hiding  an  alien.  
"Harbor"  refers  to  the  act  of  giving  shelter  and  aid  to  an  alien.  It  is  of  course  understood  that  the  alien  brought  into  or  landed  in  the  
Philippines,  or  concealed  or  harbored,  is  an  "alien  not  duly  admitted  by  any  immigration  officer  or  not  lawfully  entitled  to  enter  or  
1
reside  within  the  Philippines  under  the  terms  of  the  immigration  laws."  

The  rule  is  too  well-­‐settled  to  require  any  citation  of  authorities  that  the  word  "or"  is  a  disjunctive  term  signifying  dissociation  and  
independence  of  one  thing  from  each  of  the  other  things  enumerated  unless  the  context  requires  a  different  interpretation.  While  in  
2
the  interpretation  of  statutes,  'or'  may  read  'and'  and  vice  versa,  it  is  so  only  when  the  context  so  requires.  

A  reading  of  section  46  above-­‐quoted  does  not  justify  giving  the  word  "or"  a  non-­‐disjunctive  meaning.  
Bringing  into  and  landing  in  the  Philippines  of  the  39  aliens  were  completed  when  they  were  placed  ashore  in  the  barrio  of  Damortis  
on   September   22,   1966.   The   act   of   the   six   accused   in   criminal   case   6258-­‐M   before   the   CFI   of   Bulacan   of   transporting   the   aliens  
constitutes  the  offenses  of  "concealing"  and  "harboring,"  as  the  terms  are  used  in  section  46  of  our  Immigration  Laws.  The  court  a  quo  
in  point  of  fact  accepted  this  interpretation  when  it  observed  that  "it  could  happen  that  different  individuals,  acting  separately  from,  
and   independently   of   each   other   could   violate   and   be   criminally   liable   for   violation   of   the   immigration   Act,   if   each   individual  
independently  commits  any  of  the  means  specified  under  said  section  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  613,  as  amended  by  Republic  Act  827.  
For   example,   an   individual   act   independently,   with   the   use   of   a   motor   boat,   brings   into   the   country   and   lands   several   Chinese   aliens  
and  after  doing  so  he  goes  away.  There  is  no  question  that  said  individual  violated  said  section  46  of  the  Immigration  Act,  for  bringing  
into   and   landing   in   the   Philippines   some   alien.   Now,   after   the   said   landing   of   the   said   aliens   another   individual   also   acting  
independently,  without  connection  whatsoever  with  the  one  who  brought  and  landed  the  said  aliens,  and  knowing  that  the  Chinese  
aliens  have  no  right  to  enter  the  country  or  unlawfully  conceals  or  harbors  the  said  aliens.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  is  also  liable  and  
punishable  for  another  separate  violation  of  said  section  46  of  Commonwealth  Act  613."  

This  notwithstanding,  the  court  dismissed  this  case  on  the  ground  that  there  is  an  express  allegation  in  the  information  of  connivance  
between  the  three  defendant-­‐appellees  herein  and  the  six  accused  in  criminal  case  6258-­‐M  of  the  CFI  of  Bulacan.  In  our  view  the  
court   a   quo   incurred   in   error   in   reading   this   conclusion.   This   error,   which   is   one   of   misinterpretation   of   the   phraseology   of   the  
information,  was  induced  by  a  reading  of  the  first  of  the  said  information  which  states  as  follows:  

That   on   or   about   the   22nd   day   of   September,   1966,   in   the   Municipality   of   Sto.   Tomas,   Province   of   La   Union,  
Philippines,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   abovenamed   accused,   conspiring   and  
confederating  together  and  mutually  helping  one  another  and  in  active  aid  with  Filipino  nationals  who  are  presently  
charged  before  the  CFI  of  Bulacan  in  Crim.  Case  No.  6258-­‐M,  did  then  and  there  wilfully,  unlawfully  and  feloniously  
bring  in  and  ferry  into  the  Philippines  thirty-­‐nine  (39)  Chinese  aliens  who  traveled  by  the  Chinese  vessel  'Chungking'  
from  the  port  of  Hongkong  ...  (Emphasis  ours)  

It   is   crystal-­‐clear   that   the   words,   "the   above-­‐named   accused,   conspiring   and   confederating   together   and   mutually   helping   one  
another,"  can  refer  only  and  exclusively  to  the  three  persons  accused  in  this  case,  namely  Maximo  Martin,  Candido  Martin  and  Rodolfo  
Higashi.  While  the  unfortunate  insertion  in  the  information  of  the  clause  reading,  "and  in  active  aid  with  Filipino  nationals  who  are  
presently   charged   before   the   CFI   of   Bulacan   in   Criminal   Case   No.   6258-­‐M,"   may   yield   the   implication   that   the   three   defendants-­‐
appellees  and  the  six  accused  in  criminal  case  6258-­‐M  before  the  CFI  of  Bulacan  may  have  agreed  on  the  sequence  of  the  precise  steps  
to  be  taken  in  the  smuggling  of  the  Chinese  aliens  and  on  the  identities  of  the  persons  charged  with  consummating  each  step,  still  
there  seems  to  be  no  question  that  the  three  defendants-­‐appellees  are  charged  only  with  bringing  in  and  landing  on  Philippine  soil  
the  thirty-­‐nine  aliens,  whereas  the  six  accused  in  criminal  case  6258-­‐M  are  charged  only  with  concealing  and  harboring  the  said  aliens.  
It  is  technically  absurd  to  draw  a  conclusion  of  conspiracy  among  the  three  defendants-­‐appellees  and  the  six  accused  in  the  criminal  
case  6258-­‐M  before  the  CFI  of  Bulacan  who  are  not  named  defendants  in  this  case.  

At   all   events,   the   words,   "and   in   active   aid   with   Filipino   nationals   who   are   presently   charged   before   the   CFI   of   Bulacan   in   Crim.   Case  
No.  6258-­‐M,"  can  and  should  be  considered  as  a  surplusage,  and  may  be  omitted  from  the  information  without  doing  violence  to  or  
detracting  from  the  intendment  of  the  said  indictment.  These  words  should  therefore  be  disregarded.  

Finally,  the  court  a   quo  erred  in  maintaining  the  view  that  the  acts  of  bringing  into  and  landing  aliens  in  the  Philippines  illegally  and  
the   acts   of   concealing   and   harboring   them   constitute   one   "transitory   and   continuing   violation".   We   here   repeat   and   emphasize  that  
the  acts  of  bringing  into  and  landing  an  alien  in  the  Philippines  are  completed  once  the  alien  is  brought  ashore  on  Philippine  territory,  
and   are   separate   and   distinct   from   the   acts   of   concealing   and   harboring   such   alien.   If   the   aliens   in   this   case   were   apprehended  
immediately   after   landing,   there   would   be   no   occasion   for   concealing   and   harboring   them.   Upon   the   other   hand,   one   set   of   persons  
may  actually  accomplish  the  act  of  bringing  in  and/or  landing  aliens  in  the  Philippines,  and  another  completely  different  set  of  persons  
may   conceal   and/or   harbor   them.   The   general   concept   of   a   continuing   offense   is   that   the   essential   ingredients   of   the   crime   are  
committed  in  different  provinces.  An  example  is  the  complex  offense  of  kidnapping  with  murder  if  the  victim  is  transported  through  
different  provinces  before  he  is  actually  killed.  In  such  case  the  CFI  of  any  province  in  which  any  one  of  the  essential  elements  of  said  
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complex  offense  has  been  committed,  has  jurisdiction  to  take  cognizance  of  the  offense.  

The  conclusion  thus  become  ineluctable  that  the  court  a  quo  erred  in  refusing  to  take  cognizance  of  the  case  at  bar.  

ACCORDINGLY,  the  order  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  La  Union  of  August  2,  1968,  dismissing  this  case  and  cancelling  the  bail  bond  
posted  by  the  three  defendants-­‐appellees,  is  set  aside,  and  this  case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  in  accordance  with  law.  

 
 When  “or”  means  expository  or  interpretative  of  preceding  term  
(18)  San  Miguel  vs  Municipal  Council,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐30761,  July  11,  1973  

Petition   for   writ   of   certiorari   to   review   the   judgment   of   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Cebu,   in   Civil   Case   No.   R-­‐10631,   upholding   the  
validity  of  Ordinance  No.  23,  series  of  1966,  as  amended  by  Ordinance  No.  25,  series  of  1967,  of  the  Municipality  of  Mandaue,  Cebu,  
imposing  "a  graduated  quarterly  fixed  tax  based  on  the  gross  value  of  money  or  actual  market  value  at  the  time  of  removal  of  the  
manufactured  articles  from  their  factories  or  other  manufacture  or  processing  establishments."  

In   enacting   the   said   ordinances,   the   municipal   council   of   Mandaue   invoked   as   basis   of   its   authority   Republic   Act   No.   2264   (Local  
Autonomy  Act).  

The  relevant  portion  of  Section  1,  Ordinance  No.  23  (1966),  as  amended  by  Ordinance  No.  25  (1967),  provides  as  follows:  

SECTION   1.   —   Municipal   License   Tax   On   Proprietors   Or   Operators   Of   ...   Breweries,   ...   Proprietors   or   operators   of   ...  
breweries,   ...   within   the   territorial   limits   of   this   municipality   shall   pay   a   graduated   quarterly   fixed   tax   based   on   the  
gross  value  in  money  or  actual  market  value  at  the  time  of  removal,  of  the  manufactured  articles  from  their  factories  
...  during  the  preceding  quarter  in  accordance  with  the  following  schedules:  ...:  

CLASS  QUARTERLY  LICENSE  TAX  

P160.00  and  P0.30  for  
QUARTERLY  GROSS  VALUE  each  P1,000.00  or  
fraction  thereof  in  excess  

1   P37,500.00   or   over   of   P37,500.00   gross   value.  

2   P31.250.00   to   P37,499.99   P158.00   per   quarter  
3   25,000.00   to   31,249.99   132.00   "   "  
4   20,000.00   to   24,999.99   105.00   "   "  
5   15.000.00   to   19,999.99   83.00   "   "  
6   12.500.00   to   14,999.99   63.00   "   "  
7   10,000.00   to   12,499.99   50.00   "   "  
8   8,750.00   to   9,999.99   42.00   "   "  
9   7,500.00   to   8,749.99   37.00   "   "  
10   6,500.00   to   7,499.99   31.00   "   "  
11   5,500.00   to   6,499.99   27.00   "   "  
12   4,500.00   to   5,499.99   23.00   "   "  
13   3,750.00   to   4,499.99   19.00   "   "  
14   3,000.00   to   3,749.99   16.00   "   "  
15   2,500.00   to   2,999.99   13.00   "   "  
16   2,000.00   to   2,499.99   11.00   "   "  
17   1,750.00   to   1,999.99   9.00   "   "  
18   1,500.00   to   1,749.99   8.00   "   "  
19   1,250.00   to   1,499.99   7.00   "   "  
20  Less  than  P1,250.00  5.00  "  "  

The  pertinent  portion  of  Section  2  of  Ordinance  No.  23  which  was  not  amended  by  Ordinance  No.  25  states:  

Payment  of  Municipal  License  Tax.  —  A  fixed  tax  imposed  on  this  ordinance  must  first  be  paid  before  any  person  can  
engage  in  business  and  is  payable  for  each  taxable  business;  ...  

The   graduated   fixed   tax   provided   in   this   ordinance   shall   be   paid   at   the   Office   of   the   Municipal   Treasurer   quarterly,  
on   or   before   the   twentieth   of   January,   April,   July   and   October;   ...   .   Provided   further,   That   as   regards   businesses  
already  operating  at  the  time  this  ordinance  takes  effect,  the  tax  for  the  initial  quarter  shall  be  paid  pursuant  to  the  
provisions   of   this   ordinance   and   shall   be   based   on   the   gross   value   in   money   during   the   quarter   immediately  
preceding,  ...  .  
 Within  the  time  fixed  for  the  payment  of  the  license  taxes  herein  imposed,  the  taxpayers  shall  prepare  and  file  with  
the  Municipal  Treasurer,  a  sworn  statement  of  the  gross  value  in  money  during  the  preceding  quarter  on  the  basis  
of  which  the  tax  shall  be  assessed  and  collected.  ...  .  

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The   basic   Ordinance   was   No.   88,   which   took   effect   on   September   25,   1962,   but   this   was   amended   by   Ordinance   No.   23   (January   1,  
1967),  and  by  Ordinance  No.  25  (January  1,  1968).  

Petitioner,  a  domestic  corporation  engaged  in  the  business  of  manufacturing  beer  and  other  products  with  a  subsidiary  manufacturing  
plant  in  Mandaue,  Cebu,  since  December,  1967,  paid  the  taxes  prescribed  in  the  aforesaid  ordinance,  protest  thus:  P309.40  on  January  
22,  1968  and  P5,171.80  as  of  July  18,  1968,  computed  respectively  "on  the  basis  of  70,412  and  2,203.070  cases  of  beer  manufactured  
and  removed  from  said  Mandaue  plant,  multiplied  by  P7.60  which  is  the  prevailing  market  price  (wholesaler's  price)  per  case  of  beer  
at  the  time  of  the  removal".  

Claiming   that   it   is   adversely   affected   by   the   ordinance,   which   in   its   view   was   beyond   the   power   and   authority   of   the   municipality   to  
enact,  petitioner  brought  and  action  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Cebu,  Branch  VI,  for  the  annulment  of  said  ordinance.  

Petitioner  contends  that  (1)  the  phrase  "gross  value  in  money  or  actual  market  value"  employed  in  the  questioned  ordinance  clearly  
referred  to  "sales  or  market  price"  of  the  articles  or  commodities  manufactured  thereby  indicating  a  manifest  intent  to  impose  a  tax  
based  on  sales,  and  (2)  that  to  impose  a  tax  upon  the  privilege  of  manufacturing  beer,  when  the  amount  of  the  tax  is  measured  by  the  
gross  receipts  from  its  sales  of  beer,  is  the  same  as  imposing  a  tax  upon  the  product  itself.  

Respondents  upon  the  other  hand  insist  that  the  tax  imposed  in  the  questioned  ordinance  (1)  is  not  a  percentage  tax  or  a  tax  on  the  
sales  of  beer  but  is  a  tax  on  the  privilege  to  engage  in  the  business  of  manufacturing  beer,  and  the  phrase  "actual  market  value"  was  
merely  employed  as  a  basis  for  the  classification  and  graduation  of  the  tax  sought  to  be  imposed;  (2)  that  it  is  not  a  specific  tax  because  
it  is  not  a  tax  on  the  beer  itself,  but  on  the  privilege  of  manufacturing  beer;  and  (3)  that  with  conversion  of  Mandaue  into  a  city  on  
June  21,  1969,  the  appeal  has  become  moot,  because  the  prohibition  against  the  imposition  of  any  privilege  tax  on  sales  or  other  taxes  
in  any  form  based  thereon,  is  applicable  only  to  municipalities.  

While  We  have  heretofore  announced  the  doctrine  that  the  grant  of  power  to  tax  to  charterred  cities  and  municipalities  under  Section  
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2  of  the  Local  Autonomy  Act  is  sufficiently  plenary,  it  is,  however,  subject  to  the  exceptions  and  limitations  contained  in  the  two  (2)  
provisos  of  the  same  statute.  In  other  words,  the  municipal  corporation  should  not  transcend  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  statute  
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on  the  basis  of  which  the  power  to  tax  is  sought  to  be  exercised.  Thus,  We  held  in  the  Marinduque  case,  that  an  ordinance  providing  
for  a  graduated  tax  based  on  either  "gross  output  or  sales"  violates  the  prohibition  on  municipalities  against  imposing  any  percentage  
tax  on  sales,  or  other  taxes  in  any  form  based  thereon,  as  the  only  standard  provided  for  measuring  the  gross  output  is  its  p eso  value,  
as  determined  from  true  copies  of  receipts  and/or  invoices  that  the  taxpayer  is  required  to  submit  to  the  municipal  treasurer.  

We  are  thus  confined  to  the  narrow  issue  of  whether  or  not  the  challenged  ordinance  has  transcended  the  exceptions  and  limitations  
imposed  by  section  2  of  Republic  Act  2264.  

Section  2  of  the  aforecited  statute  provides:  

Provided,   That   municipalities   and   municipal   districts   shall,   in   no   case,   impose   any   percentage   tax   on   sales   or   other  
taxes  in  any  form  based  thereon  nor  impose  taxes  on  articles  subject  to  specific  tax  ...  .  

Section  1  of  Ordinance  No.  88  of  the  Municipality  of  Mandaue,  as  amended  by  Ordinances  Nos.  23  (1967)  and  25  (1968),  specifically  
provides  that  the  graduated  quarterly  tax  shall  be  "based  on  the  gross  value  in  money  or  actual  market  value  at  the  time  of  removal,  
of  the  manufactured  products  ...  from  their  factories  ...  during  the  preceding  calendar  year  ...  .  

Well  settled  is  the  rule  that  in  the  absence  of  legislative  intent  to  the  contrary,  technical  or  commercial  terms  and  phrases,  when  used  
in  tax  statutes,  are  presumed  to  have  been  used  in  their  technical  sense  or  in  their  trade  or  commercial  meaning.  Thus,  the  phrase  
"gross  value  in  money"  has  a  well-­‐defined  meaning  in  our  tax  statutes.  For  instance,  the  term  "gross  value  in  money"  of  articles  sold,  
bartered,  exchanged  or  transferred,  as  used  in  Sections  184,  185  and  186  of  the  National  Internal  Revenue  Code,  has  been  invariably  
used  as  equivalent  to  "gross  selling  price"  and  has  been  construed  as  the  total  amount  of  money  or  its  equivalent  which  the  purchaser  
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pays   to   the   vendor   to   receive   or   get   the   goods.   It   must   be   noted   that   the   ordinance   specifically   provides   that   the   basis   of   the   tax   is  
the  "gross  value  in  money  or  actual  market  value"  of  the  manufactured  article.  
The  phrase  "actual  market  value"  has  been  construed  as  the  price  which  an  article  "would  command  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business,  
that  is  to  say,  when  offered  for  sale  by  one  willing  to  sell,  but  not   under  compulsion  to  sell,  and  purchased  by  another  who  is  willing  
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to  buy,  but  under  no  obligation  purchase  it,  or  the  price  which  the  property  will  bring  in  a  fair  market  after  fair  and  reasonable  efforts  
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have  been  made  to  find  a  purchaser  who  will  give  the  highest  price  for  it.  The  "actual  market  value"  of  property,  for  purposes  of  
taxation,  therefore  means  the  selling  price  of  the  article  in  the  course  of  ordinary  business.  

Considering  that  the  phrase  "gross  value  in  money"  is  followed  by  the  words  "or  actual  market  value",  it  is  evident  that  the  latter  was  
intended  to  explain  and  clarify  the  preceding  phrase.  For  the  word  "or"  may  be  used  as  the  equivalent  of  "that  is  to  say"  and  gives  that  
which   precedes   it   the   same   significance   as   that   which   follows   it.   It   is   not   always   disjunctive   and   is   sometimes   interpretative   or  
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expository  of  the  preceding  word.  Certainly  We  cannot  assume  that  the  phrase  "or  actual  market  value"  was  a  mere  surplusage,  for  
it   serves   to   clarify   and   explain   the   meaning   and   import   of   the   preceding   phrase.   In   any   event,   it   is   the   duty   of   the   courts,   so   far  
reasonably  practicable,  to  read  and  interpret  a  statute  as  to  give  life  and  effect  to  its  provisions,  so  as  to  render  it  a  harmonious  whole.  

It  is  also  significant  to  note,  that  there  is  a  set  ratio  between  the  amount  of  the  tax  and  the  volume  of  sales.  Thus  if  the  "gross  value  in  
money  or  actual  market  value"  of  the  beer  removed  from  the  factory  exceeds  P37,500.00  per  quarter,  the  taxpayer  is  required  to  pay  
a  quarterly  license  tax  of  P160.00  plus  P0.30  for  every  P1,000.00  or  fraction  of  the  excess.  In  other  words  in  excess  of  P37,500.00,  the  
taxpayer   will   pay   to   the   municipality   a   certain   amount   of   tax   measured   by   a   percentage   of   the   sales.   It   is   therefore   evident   that   the  
challenged  ordinance  was  a  transparent  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  municipality  to  impose  a  tax  based  on  sales.  

Although  section  2  of  the  ordinance  in  question  provides  in  a  vague  manner  that  the  tax  shall  be  assessed  and  collected  on  the  basis  
of  the  sworn  statement  of  the  manager  of  a  firm  or  corporation  "of  the  gross  value  in  money  during  the  preceding  quarter,"  in  actual  
practice  the  quarterly  tax  levied  upon  the  petitioner,  was  computed  on  the  basis  of  the  total  market  of  the  beer,  per  quarter,  as  shown  
by   the   shipping   memorandum   certified   to   by   the   storekeeper   of   the   Bureau   Internal   Revenue   assigned   to   the   brewery.   Thus   the  
amounting  to  P309.40  and  P5,171.80,  paid  by  petition  January  22,  1968  and  July  18,  1968,  were  actually  determined  respectively  on  
the   basis   of   70,412   and   2,203.070   cases   manufactured   and   removed   from   the   Mandaue   plant,   multiplied   by   P7.60   which   is   the  
prevailing  market  price  (wholesaler's  price)  per  case  of  beer.  

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In  Laoag  Producers'  Cooperative  Marketing  Association,  Inc.  vs.  Municipality  of  Laoag,  We  held  that  the  challenged  ordinance  imposed  
a  tax  based  on  sales,  although  the  ordinance  merely  imposed  a  "municipal  tax  or  inspection  fee  of  on  one-­‐half  (1/2)  centavo  on  every  
kilo  of  Virginia  leaf  tobacco,  garlic  and  onion  on  all  wholesale  dealers  and  vendors"  because,  in  its  application,  it  does  impose  a  tax  
based  on  sales,  as  it  is  based  the  number  of  kilos  sold  and  purchased  by  him  and  when  the  wholesaler  or  vendor  accumulates  his  stock,  
he  does  so  for  only  one  purpose,  to  sell  the  same  at  the  appropriate  time,  and  "he  cannot  by  its  very  nature,  carry  on  his  business  
unless  he  sells  what  he  has  bought."  Similarly,  in  the  case  at  bar,  the  circumstance  that  the  tax  is  imposed  upon  petitioner  at  time  of  
removal   from   the   factory   of   the   manufactured   beer,   and   not   on   the   date   of   actual   sale,   is   not   of   important   consequence   since  
petitioner   will,   in   the   end,   sell   the   beer   removed   from   the   factory,   because   by   the   nature   of   its   business,   it   has   no   alternative   but   to  
sell  what  it  has  manufactured.  

We  therefore  hold  that  the  questioned  ordinance  imposed  tax  based  on  sales  and  therefore  beyond  the  authority  of  the  municipality  
to  enact.  

Having   reached   this   conclusion,   it   becomes   unnecessary   to   pass   upon   the   additional   question   posed,   i.e.,   whether   or   not   the  
challenged  ordinance  imposes  a  tax  on  a  product  subject  to  specific  tax.  

Respondents  however  claim  that  with  the  conversion  Mandaue  into  a  city  pursuant  to  Republic  Act  No.  5519,  which  was  approved  on  
June   21,   1969,   the   issue   has   already   become   moot,   since   the   prohibition   contained   in   section   2   of   Republic   Act   2264   applies   only   to  
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municipalities  and  not  to  chartered  cities.  The  same  contention  has  been  rejected  in  City  of  Naga  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  and  Laoag  
Producers'   Cooperative   Marketing   Association,   Inc.   v.   Municipality   of   Laoag,   supra,   where   We   ruled   that   the   legality   of   an   ordinance  
depends   upon   the   power   of   the   municipality   at   the   time   of   the   enactment   the   challenged   ordinance.   Since   the   municipality   of  
Mandaue  had  no  authority  to  enact  the  said  ordinance,  the  subsequent  approval  of  Republic  Act  No.  5519  which  became  effective  
June  21,  1969,  did  not  remove  the  original  infirmity  of  the  ordinance.  Indeed  there  is  no  provision  in  the  aforecited  statute  which  
invests  a  curative  effect  upon  the  ordinances  of  the  municipality  which  when  enacted  were  beyond  its  statutory  authority.  

IN   VIEW   WHEREOF,   the   appealed   judgment   is   hereby   reversed   and   Ordinance   No.   23,   series   of   1966,   as   amended   by   Ordinance   No.  
23,   series   of   1966,   which   became   effective   January   1,   1968,   of   the   Municipality   of   Mandaue,   Cebu,   is   hereby   declared   null   and   void.  
Respondents  are  also  ordered  to  refund  the  taxes  paid  by  Petitioners  under  the  said  ordinance,  with  legal  interest  thereon.  No  costs.  

 
 Surplasages  
(19)  Demafiles  vs  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐28396,  December  29,  1967  
 
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The  new  municipality  of  Sebaste  in  Antique  province  held  its  first  election  of  officers  in  the  general  elections  of  November  14,  1967,  
with  the  petitioner  Agripino  Demafiles  and  the  respondent  Benito  B.  Galido  vying  for  the  mayoralty.  

On  November  21  the  respondent  Galido  asked  the  provincial  board,  acting  as  municipal  board  of  canvassers  pursuant  to  section  167  
(b)  of  the  Revised  Election  Code,  to  disregard,  as  "obviously  manufactured",  the  election  return  from  precinct  7  on  the  ground  that  
the  said  return  shows  that  195  voters  were  registered  (of  whom  188  voted),  when,  according  to  a  certificate  of  the  municipal  election  
registrar  only  182  had  registered  in  that  precinct  as  of  October  30,  1997.  At  its  session  on  the  following  day,  November  22,  the  board,  
over  the  objection  of  one  member,  voted  to  reject  the  return  from  precinct  7  and  then  proceeded  with  the  canvass  of  the  returns  
from  the  other  precints.  The  resulting  tally  gave  Galido  888  votes  as  against  844  for  Demafiles.  Accordingly,  Galido  was  proclaimed  
mayor-­‐elect  of  the  municipality  of  Sebaste.  

On  November  24  Demafiles  wired  the  Commission  on  Elections,  protesting  the  board's  action  of  rejection  of  the  return  from  precinct  
7  and  the  subsequent  proclamation  of  Galido,  and  challenging  the  right  of  two  board  members,  Julito  Moscoso  and  Quirico  Escaño,  to  
sit,  considering  that  they  were  reelectionists.  Acting  on  the  protest,  the  COMELEC  resolved  on  November  28,  1967:  

To  annul  the  canvass  and  proclamation  of  the  local  officials  of  the  new  municipality  of  Sebaste,  Antique,  which  was  made  by  
the  Provincial  Board  of  Antique;  

To  constitute  the  Board  of  Canvassers  by  appointing  the  substitutes  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Sec.  167  (a)  of  the  Revised  
Election   Code,   which   shall   canvass   anew   the   results   of   the   election   for   local   offices   of   Sebaste,   Antique,   in   accordance   with  
the   Instructions   to   Boards   of   Canvassers   contained   in   the   Resolution   of   the   Commission   No.   RR-­‐544,   particularly   No.   5-­‐K  
thereof,  and  thereafter  to  proclaim  the  winning  candidates  for  local  offices  of  said  municipality.  

In  turn,  Galido  asked  for  a  reconsideration  on  the  ground  that  the  two  members  of  the  provincial  board  who  were  reelectionists  were  
disqualified  from  sitting  only  when  the  board  was  acting  as  a  provincial,  but  not  as  a  municipal,  board  of  canvassers  and  that  the  
COMELEC  resolution  annulling  the  canvass  and  proclamation  of  officials  was  issued  without  giving  him  an  opportunity  to  be  heard.  In  
its   resolution   of   December   4,   1967   the   respondent   Commission   reconsidered   its   previous   order   and   held   "that   the   canvass   and  
proclamation  already  made  of  the  local  officials  .  .  .  stands".  

Failing  to  secure  a  reconsideration  of  this  latter  resolution,  Demafiles  filed  the  present  petition  for  mandamus  and  certiorari  to  set  
aside   the   aforesaid   resolution   of   the   COMELEC,   to   annull   the   proclamation   of   Galido,   and   to   secure   an   order   directing   the   COMELEC  
to  appoint  substitute  members  of  the  provincial  board  and  to  order  a  new  canvass  of  the  returns,  including  that  from  precinct  7.  

The  three  principal  issues  tendered  for  resolution  in  this  case  are:  (1)  whether  the  respondent  board  of  canvassers  was  within  the  
periphery   of   its   power   in   rejecting   the   return   from   precinct   7   on   the   strength   of   an   election   registrar's   certificate   that   a  less   number  
of  voters  than  that  shown  in  the  return  had  registered;  (2)  whether  the  provincial  board  members,  who  were  candidates  for  reelection,  
were  disqualified  from  sitting  in  the  board  in  its  capacity  as  a  municipal  board  of  canvassers;  and  (3)  whether  the  Commission  on  
Elections  can  order  the  board  of  canvassers  to  count  a  return  from  a  given  precinct.  

These   issues,   together   with   the   arguments   of   the   parties,   will   be   discussed   seriatim,   but   we   must   first   proceed   to   dispose   of   the  
preliminary  question  raised  by  the  respondent  Galido,  namely,  that  this  case  is  moot  because  he  had  taken  his  oath  and  assumed  
office  on  November  22,  pursuant  to  Republic  Act  4870.  

Obviously,  the  frame  of  reference  is  section  2  of  the  statute  which  reads:  

The  first  mayor,  vice-­‐mayor  and  councilors  of  the  Municipality  of  Sebaste  shall  be  elected  in  the  next  general  elections  for  
local  officials  and  shall  have  qualified  [sic].  

In  our  view,  the  last  portion  of  the  provision  —  "and  shall  have  qualified"  —  is  devoid  of  any  meaning,  is  unmitigated  jargon  in  or  out  
of  context,  and  does  not  warrant  the  respondent's  reading  that  the  term  of  office  of  the  first  municipal  officials  of  Sebaste  begins  
immediately   after   their   proclamation.   It   is   quite   probable   that   that   is   what   the   legislature   meant.   But   here   is   a   clear   case  of  a  failure  
to   express   a   meaning,   and   a   becoming   sense   of   judicial   modesty   forbids   the   courts   from   assuming   and,   consequently,   from  
supplying.itc-­‐alf  "If  there  is  no  meaning  in  it,"  said  the  King  in  Alice  in  Wonderland,  "that  saves  a  world  of  trouble,  you  know,  as  we  
needn't  try  to  find  any."  Frankfurter,  who  himself  was  fond  of  quoting  this  passage,  admonishes  that  "a  judge  must  not  rewrite  a  
statute,   neither   to   enlarge   nor   to   contract   it.   Whatever   temptations   the   statesmanship   of   policy-­‐making   might   wisely   suggest,  
2
construction   must   eschew   interpolation   and   evisceration."   Accordingly,   we   have   to   go   by   the   general   rule   that   the   term   of   office   of  
3
municipal  officials  shall  begin  on  the  first  day  of  January  following  their  election,  and  so  the  assumption  of  office  by  the  respondent  
Galido  in  no  way  affected  the  basic  issues  in  this  case,  which  we  need  not  reach  and  resolve.  

First,  a  canvassing  board  performs  a  purely  ministerial  function  —  that  of  compiling  and  adding  the  results  they  appear  in  the  returns,  
4
transmitted  to  it.  This  is  the  teaching  in  Nacionalista  Party  v.  Commission  on  Elections:  "the  canvassers  are  to  be  satisfied  of  the,  
genuineness  of  the  returns  —  namely,  that  the  papers  presented  to  them  are  not  forged  and  spurious,  that  they  are  returns,  and  that  
they  are  signed  by  the  proper  officers.  When  so  satisfied,  .  .  .  they  may  not  reject  any  returns  because  of  informalities  in  them  or  
5
because  of  illegal  and  fraudulent  practices  in  the  elections."  Thus,  they  cannot  pass  upon  the  validity  of  an  election  return,  much  less  
6
exclude  it  from  the  canvass  on  the  ground  that  the  votes  cast  in  the  precinct  from  whence  it  came  are  illegal.  

But  the  exclusion  of  the  return  in  this  case  is  sought  to  be  justified  on  the  ground  that  it  is  "obviously  manufactured"  because,  contrary  
to  the  statement  therein  that  there  were  195  registered  voters,  of  whom  188  voted,  the  certificate  of  the  local  election  registrar  states  
7
that  only  182  voters  had  registered  on  October  30,  1967.  Lagumbay  v.  Commission  on  Elections  is  cited  in  support  of  this  view.  In  
Lagumbay   the   returns   were   palpably   false   as   it   was   indeed   statistically   improbable   that   "all   the   eight   candidates   of   one   party  
garnered   all   the   votes,   each   of   them   receiving   exactly   the   same   number,   whereas   all   the   eight   candidates   of   the   other   party   got  
precisely  nothing.itc-­‐alf"  In  other  words,  the  aid  of  evidence  aliunde  was  not  needed,  as  "the  fraud  [being]  so  palpable  from  the  return  
itself  (res  ipsa  loquitur  —  the  thing  speaks  for  itself),  there  is  no  reason  to  accept  it  and  give  it  prima  facie  value.  

On  the  other  hand,  the  return  in  this  case  shows  nothing  on  its  face  from  which  the  canvassers  might  conclude  that  it  does  not  speak  
the  truth.  It  is  only  when  it  is  compared  in  the  certificate  of  the  election  registrar  that  a  discrepancy  appears  as  to  the  number  of  
registered  voters.  The  return  therefore  is  by  no  means  "obviously  manufactured"  so  as  to  justify  its  exclusion.  

This  is  not  to  belittle  the  respondent's  claim  that  more  people  than  registered  voters  were  allowed  to  vote  in  precinct  7.  Perhaps  that  
is  true,  although  the  petitioner  claims  that  after  October  30,  1967  eight  more  voters  were  allowed  to  register  (making  a  total  of  190,  
voters),  and  on  the  day  of  the  election  5  voters  erroneously  assigned  to  precinct  6  were  allowed  to  vote  in  precinct  7  because  that  was  
where   they   were   really   assigned.   The   point   is   simply   that   this   question   should   be   threshed   out   in   an   election   contest.itc-­‐
alf  Lagumbay  itself  explicitly  says  —  

Of  course  we  agree  that  fraud  in  the  holding  of  the  election  should  be  handled  —  and  finally  settled  —  by  the  corresponding  
courts  or  electoral  tribunals.  That  is  the  general  rule,  where  testimonial  or  documentary  evidence  is  necessary.  .  .  .  

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Consequently,  the  canvass  made  and  proclamation  had  should  be  annulled.  

Second,   the   canvass   and   proclamation   should   be   annulled   because   two   of   the   four   members   of   the   board   of   canvassers   were  
9
disqualified  from  sitting  in  it,  they  being  candidates  for  reelection.  As  this  Court  held  in  Salcedo  v.  Commission  on  Elections:  

And  added  reason  for  the  nullification  of  the  actuation  of  the  Provincial  Board  of  Oriental  Mindoro  is  the  fact  that  its  members  
were  disqualified  to  act  it  appearing  that  they  were  all  candidates  for  reelection.  This  is  clear  from  Section  28  of  the  Revised  
Election   Code   which   provides   that   any   member   of   the   provincial   board   who   is   a   candidate   for   an   elective   office   shall   be  
incompetent  to  act  in  said  board  in  the  performance  of  its  duties  in  connection  with  the  election.  

Branding  the  above  statement  as  obiter  dictum,  the  respondent  Galido  argues  that  reelectionist  members  of  the  provincial  board  are  
disqualified  under  section  28  only  when  the  board  acts  as  a  provincial  board  of  canvassers,  to  prevent  them  fro  canvassing  their  own  
votes,  and  not  when  they  sit  as  a  municipal  board  of  canvassers.  

With   respect   to   the   canvass   and   proclamation   made   the   provincial   board   of   Oriental   Mindoro,   three   issues   raised   in   Salcedo,   in  
resolving  which  this  Court  held  (1)  that  a  provincial  board  cannot  act  as  a  municipal  board  of  canvassers  where  a  municipal  council  has  
been   formed;   (2)   that   provincial   board   members   who   are   candidates   for   reelection   are   disqualified   to   sit   in   the   board   and   (3)   that   a  
board  of  canvassers  which  excludes  from  canvass  the  return  from  a  precinct  acts  "in  contravention  of  law."  

At  any  rate  the  language  of  section  28  is  all-­‐inclusive  Thus:  

Any  member  of  a  provincial  board  or  of  a  municipal  council  who  is  a  candidate  for  office  in  any  election,  shall  be  incompetent  
to  act  on  said  body  in  the  performance  of  the  duties  the  of  relative  to  said  election  .  .  .  .  
The   statute   draws   no   distinction   between   the   provincial   board   acting   as   a   provincial   board   of   canvassers   and   the   same   board   acting  
as   a   municipal   canvassing   body   new   municipalities,   and   so   we   make   none,   in   line   with   the   maxim   ubi   lex   non   distinguit,   nec   nos  
distinguere  debemos.  

Third,  it  is  now  settled  doctrine  that  the  COMELEC  has  the  power  to  annul  an  illegal  canvass  and  an  illegal  proclamation  as  when  they  
10
are  based  on  incomplete  returns,  and  order  a  new  canvass  to  be  made  by  counting  the  returns  wrongfully  excluded.  If  it  has  power  
11
to  direct  that  certain  copies  of  election  returns  be  used  in  preference  to  other  copies  of  the  same  returns,  there  is  no  reason  why  it  
cannot  direct  canvassing  bodies  to  count  all  turns  which  are  otherwise  regular.itc-­‐alf  Indeed,  it  is  its  duty  to  do  so,  failing  which  it  may  
be  compelled  by  mandamus.  As  earlier  pointed  out,  it  is  the  ministerial  function  a  board  of  canvassers  to  count  the  results  as  they  
appeal  in  the  returns  which  on  their  face  do  not  reveal  any  irregularities  or  falsities.  

ACCORDINGLY,  the  resolutions  dated  December  4  and  8,  1967  of  the  Commission  on  Elections  are  set  aside,  and  the  canvass  of  returns  
made  and  the  subsequent  proclamation  of  the  respondent  Benito  B.  Galido  are  annulled.  The  respondent  Commission  on  Elections  is  
hereby  directed.  (1)  to  appoint  new  members  of  the  board  of  canvassers  in  substitution  of  Julito  Moscoso  and  Quirico  Escaño,  and  (2)  
immediately   thereafter   to   order   the   board   of   canvassers   as   reconstituted   to   convene,   canvass   all   votes   including   those   appearing   in  
the  return  from  precinct  7,  and,  in  accordance  with  the  results  of  such  canvass,  proclaim  the  winning  candidates.  Costs  against  the  
private  respondent  Galido.  

 
 
 
Punctuations  
(20)  United  States  vs  Hart,  G.R.  No.  8848,  November  21,  1913  

The  appellants,  Hart,  Miller,  and  Natividad,  were  arraigned  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Pampanga  on  a  charge  of  vagrancy  under  
the   provisions   of   Act   No.   519,   found   guilty,   and   were   each   sentenced   to   six   months'   imprisonment.   Hart   and   Miller   were   further  
sentenced  to  a  fine  of  P200,  and  Natividad  to  a  fine  of  P100.  All  appealed.  

The  evidence  of  the  prosecution  as  to  the  defendant  Hart  shows  that  he  pleaded  guilty  and  was  convicted  on  a  gambling  charge  about  
two  or  three  weeks  before  his  arrest  on  the  vagrancy  charge;  that  he  had  been  conducting  two  gambling  games,  one  in  his  saloon  and  
the  other  in  another  house,  for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  the  games  running  every  night.  The  defense  showed  that  Hart  and  one  
Dunn  operated  a  hotel  and  saloon  at  Angeles  which  did  a  business,  according  to  the  bookkeeper,  of  P96,000  during  the  nineteen  
months  preceding  the  trial;  that  Hart  was  also  the  sole  proprietor  of  a  saloon  in  the  barrio  of  Tacondo;  that  he  raised  imported  hogs  
which  he  sold  to  the  Army  garrison  at  Camp  Stotsenberg,  which  business  netted  him  during  the  preceding  year  about  P4,000;  that  he  
was  authorized  to  sell  several  hundred  hectares  of  land  owned  by  one  Carrillo  in  Tacondo;  that  he  administered,  under  power  of  
attorney,  the  same  property;  and  that  he  furnished  a  building  for  and  paid  the  teacher  of  the  first  public  school  in  Tacondo,  said  school  
being  under  Government  supervision.  

The  evidence  of  the  prosecution  as  to  Miller  was  that  he  had  the  reputation  of  being  a  gambler;  that  he  pleaded  guilty  and  was  fined  
for  participating  in  a  gambling  game  about  two  weeks  before  his  arrest  on  the  present  charge  of  vagrancy;  and  that  he  was  seen  in  
houses  of  prostitution  and  in  a  public  dance  hall  in  Tacondo  on  various  occasions.  The  defense  showed  without  contradiction  that  
Miller  had  been  discharged  from  the  Army  about  a  year  previously;  that  during  his  term  of  enlistment  he  had  been  made  a  sergeant;  
that  he  received  rating  as  "excellent"  on  being  discharged;  that  since  his  discharge  he  had  been  engaged  in  the  tailoring  business  near  
Camp   Stotsenberg   under   articles   of   partnership   with   one   Burckerd,   Miller   having   contributed   P1,000   to   the   partnership;   that   the  
business   netted   each   partner   about   P300   per   month;   that   Miller   attended   to   business   in   an   efficient   manner   every   day;   and   that   his  
work  was  first  class.  

The  evidence  of  the  prosecution  as  to  Natividad  was  that  he  had  gambled  nearly  every  night  for  a  considerable  time  prior  to  his  arrest  
on  the  charge  of  vagrancy,  in  the  saloon  of  one  Raymundo,  as  well  as  in  Hart's  saloon;  that  Natividad  sometimes  acted  as  banker;  and  
that  he  had  pleaded  guilty  to  a  charge  of  gambling  and  had  been  sentenced  to  pay  a  fine  therefor  about  two  weeks  before  his  arrest  
on  the  vagrancy  charge.  The  defense  showed  that  Natividad  was  a  tailor,  married,  and  had  a  house  of  his  own;  that  he  made  good  
clothes,  and  earned  from  P80  to  P100  per  month,  which  was  sufficient  to  support  his  family.  

From   this   evidence   it   will   be   noted   that   each   of   the   defendants   was   earning   a   living   at   a   lawful   trade   or   business,   quite   sufficient   to  
support  himself  in  comfort,  and  that  the  evidence  which  the  prosecution  must  rely  upon  for  a  conviction  consists  of  their  having  spent  
their  evenings  in  regularly  licensed  saloons,  participating  in  gambling  games  which  are  expressly  made  unlawful  by  the  Gambling  Act,  
No.  1757,  and  that  Miller  frequented  a  dance  hall  and  houses  of  prostitution.  

Section  1  of  Act  No.  519  is  divided  into  seven  clauses,  separated  by  semicolons.  Each  clause  enumerates  a  certain  class  of  persons  
who,   within   the   meaning   of   this   statute,   are   to   be   considered   as   vagrants.   For   the   purposes   of   this   discussion,   we   quote   this   section  
below,  and  number  each  of  these  seven  clauses.  

(1)   Every   person   having   no   apparent   means   of   subsistence,   who   has   the   physical   ability   to   work,   and   who   neglects   to   apply  
himself   or   herself   to   some   lawful   calling;   (2)   every   person   found   loitering   about   saloons   or   dram   shops   or   gambling   houses,  
or  tramping  or  straying  through  the  country  without  visible  means  of  support;  (3)  every  person  known  to  be  a  pickpocket,  
thief,  burglar,  ladrone,  either  by  his  own  confession  or  by  his  having  been  convicted  of  either  of  said  offenses,  and  having   no  
visible  or  lawful  means  of  support  when  found  loitering  about  any  gambling  house,  cockpit,  or  in  any  outlying  barrio  of  a  
pueblo;  (4)  every  idle  or  dissolute  person  or  associate  of  known  thieves  or  ladrones  who  wanders  about  the  country  at  unusual  
hours  of  the  night;  (5)  every  idle  peron  who  lodges  in  any  barn,  shed,  outhouse,  vessel,  or  place  other  than  such  as  is  kept  for  
lodging   purposes,   without   the   permission   of   the   owner   or   person   entitled   to   the   possession   thereof;   (6)   every   lewd   or  
dissolute  person  who  lives  in  and  about  houses  of  ill  fame;  (7)  every  common  prostitute  and  common  drunkard,  is  a  vagrant.  

It  is  insisted  by  the  Attorney-­‐General  that  as  visible  means  of  support  would  not  be  a  bar  to  a  conviction  under  any  one  of  the  last  four  
clauses  of  this  act,  it  was  not  the  intention  of  the  Legislature  to  limit  the  crime  of  vagrancy  to  those  having  no  visible  means  of  support.  
Relying  upon  the  second  clause  to  sustain  the  guilt  of  the  defendants,  the  Attorney-­‐General  then  proceeds  to  argue  that  "visible  means  
of  support"  as  used  in  that  clause  does  not  apply  to  "every  person  found  loitering  about  saloons  or  dram  shops  or  gambling  houses,"  
but   is   confined   entirely   to   "or   tramping   or   straying   through   the   country."   It   is   insisted   that   had   it   been   intended   for   "without   visible  
means  of  support"  to  qualify  the  first  part  of  the  clause,  either  the  comma  after  gambling  houses  would  have  been  ommitted,  or  else  
a  comma  after  country  would  have  been  inserted.  

When  the  meaning  of  a  legislative  enactment  is  in  question,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  courts  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  the  true  legislative  
intention,  and  adopt  that  construction  of  the  statute  which  will  give  it  effect.  The  construction  finally  adopted  should  be  based  upon  
something  more  substantial  than  the  mere  punctuation  found  in  the  printed  Act.  If  the  punctuation  of  the  statute  gives  it  a  meaning  
which  is  reasonable  and  in  apparent  accord  with  the  legislative  will,  it  may  be  used  as  an  additional  argument  for  adopting  the  literal  
meaning  of  the  words  of  the  statute  as  thus  punctuated.  But  an  argument  based  upon  punctuation  alone  is  not  conclusive,  and  the  
courts   will   not   hesitate   to   change   the   punctuation   when   necessary,   to   give   to   the   Act   the   effect   intended   by   the   Legislature,  
disregarding  superfluous  or  incorrect  punctuation  marks,  and  inserting  others  where  necessary.  

The  Attorney-­‐General  has  based  his  argument  upon  the  proposition  that  neither  visible  means  of  support  nor  a  lawful  calling  is  a  
sufficient  defense  under  the  last  four  paragraphs  of  the  section;  hence,  not  being  universally  a  defense  to  a  charge  of  vagrancy,  they  
should  not  be  allowed  except  where  the  Legislature  has  so  provided.  He  then  proceeds  to  show,  by  a  "mere  grammatical  criticism"  of  
the  second  paragraph,  that  the  Legislature  did  not  intend  to  allow  visible  means  of  support  or  a  lawful  calling  to  block  a  prosecution  
for  vagrancy  founded  on  the  charge  that  the  defendant  was  found  loitering  around  saloons,  dram  shops,  and  gambling  houses.  

A  most  important  step  in  reasoning,  necessary  to  make  it  sound,  is  to  ascertain  the  consequences  flowing  from  such  a  construction  of  
the  law.  What  is  loitering?  The  dictionaries  say  it  is  idling  or  wasting  one's  time.  The  time  spent  in  saloons,  dram  shops,  and  gambling  
houses  is  seldom  anything  but  that.  So  that  under  the  proposed  construction,  practically  all  who  frequent  such  places  commit  a  crime  
in   so   doing,   for   which   they   are   liable   to   punishment   under   the   Vagrancy   Law.   We   cannot   believe   that   it   was   the   intention   of   the  
Legislature   to   penalize   what,   in   the   case   of   saloons   and   dram   shops,   is   under   the   law's   protection.   If   it   be   urged   that   what   is   true   of  
saloons  and  dram  shops  is  not  true  of  gambling  houses  in  this  respect,  we  encounter  the  wording  of  the  law,  which  makes  no  distinction  
whatever  between  loitering  around  saloons  and  dram  shops,  and  loitering  around  gambling  houses.  

The  offense  of  vagrancy  as  defined  in  Act  No.  519  is  the  Anglo-­‐Saxon  method  of  dealing  with  the  habitually  idle  and  harmful  parasites  
of   society.   While   the   statutes   of   the   various   States   of   the   American   Union   differ   greatly   as   to   the   classification   of   such   persons,  
their  scope  is  substantially  the  same.  Of  those  statutes  we  have  had  an  opportunity  to  examine,  but  two  or  three  contain  a  provision  
similar  to  the  second  paragraph  of  Act  No.  519.  (Mo.  Ann.  Stat.,  sec.  2228;  N.  D.  Rev.  Codes,  sec.  8952;  N.  M.  Comp.  Laws  1897,  sec.  
1314.)   That   the   absence   of   visible   means   of   support   or   a   lawful   calling   is   necessary   under   these   statutes   to   a   conviction   for   loitering  
around  saloons,  dram  shops,  and  gambling  houses  is  not  even  negatived  by  the  punctuation  employed.  In  the  State  of  Tennessee,  
however,   we   find   an   exact   counterpart   for   paragraph   2   of   section   1   of   our   own   Act   (Code   of   Tenn.,   sec.   3023),   with   the   same  
punctuation:lawph!1.net  
 .  .  .  or  of  any  person  to  be  found  loitering  about  saloons  or  dram  shops,  gambling  houses,  or  houses  of  ill  fame,  or  tramping  
or  strolling  through  the  country  without  any  visible  means  of  support.  

A  further  thought  suggest  itself  in  connection  with  the  punctuation  of  the  paragraph  in  question.  The  section,  as  stated  above,  is  
divided  into  seven  clauses,  separated  by  semicolons.  To  say  that  two  classes  of  vagrants  are  defined  in  paragraph  2,  as  to  one  of  which  
visible  means  of  support  or  a  lawful  calling  is  not  a  good  defense,  and  as  to  the  other  of  which  such  a  defense  is  sufficient,  would  imply  
a  lack  of  logical  classification  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  of  the  various  classes  of  vagrants.  This  we  are  not  inclined  to  do.  

In  the  case  at  bar,  all  three  of  the  defendants  were  earning  a  living  by  legitimate  methods  in  a  degree  of  comfort  higher  that  the  
average.   Their   sole   offense   was   gambling,   which   the   legislature   deemed   advisable   to   make   the   subject   of   a   penal   law.   The   games   in  
which  they  participated  were  apparently  played  openly,  in  a  licensed  public  saloon,  where  the  officers  of  the  law  could  have  entered  
as  easily  as  did  the  patrons.  It  is  believed  that  Act  No.  1775  is  adequate,  if  enforced,  to  supress  the  gambling  proclivities  of  any  person  
making  a  good  living  at  a  lawful  trade  or  business.  

For  these  reasons,  the  defendants  are  acquitted,  with  the  costs  de  oficio.